



Unit History

32 Bn.

IN THE CONGO.

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FOREWORD.

This History has been compiled from Unit reports submitted to Headquarters by selected Officers of the Battalion on their return home to IRELAND on completion of the Units tour of duty in the REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO.

These reporting Officers were as follows:- Battalion Officer Commanding, 2 i/c, Adjutant, Quartermaster, Operations Officer, Engineer, Signals, Ordnance, Supply and Transport, Medical, Military Police, Legal, Head Chaplain and Company Commanders.

These reports were comprehensive and detailed. To avoid duplication and to allow for a concise and balanced history, they had to be shortened considerably. Thus much detail of the many actions and normal day-to-day activities has been omitted, in the hope of giving the reader a clearer and more concise picture of the whole operation.

Details which have been omitted or shortened may be perused, if required, by having recourse to the many reports, Unit journals and other documents which were compiled in the CONGO and are now located in G.H.Q. Archives.

The Battalion Officer Commanding wishes to take this opportunity to thank all these Officers for their co-operation and help in compiling this history.

M. J. Quachalla

COLONEL.

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CHAPTER 1.

THE "GET TOGETHER" AND "MOVE OUT".

1. The many crises, disorders, riots etc which began early in 1959, forced the BELGIANS to promise independence to BELGIAN CONGO by JUNE 1960. As the date of independence grew near, the exodus of BELGIAN nationalists increased, so that, when the day came it found the country without trained native leaders in all departments including the Army. This critical situation was heightened by the fact of MR. LUMUMBA'S direct appeal to RUSSIA to restore order and by the immediate offer to help from that source. Therefore it became necessary for UNITED NATIONS to act quickly or it would be too late to be effective; or worse, might lead to a world conflict - WORLD WAR III.

On the 13th JULY, 1960 the Secretary General of UNITED NATIONS got the support of the Security Council for the immediate dispatch of a UNITED NATIONS FORCE to THE REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO in order to restore peace in that country and to speed-up the withdrawal of BELGIAN troops. The future of the CONGO had thus become a world problem, and as such was to become a major test for UNITED NATIONS ORGANISATION.

2. UNITED NATIONS accepted the responsibility of "PROTECTING LIVES AND PROPERTY WHEREVER THEY ARE IN DANGER IN CONSEQUENCE OF THE INABILITY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE CONGO TO ENSURE THEIR PROTECTION FROM ITS OWN RESOURCES. THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS FORCE WILL BE LIMITED TO THAT TASK. IT WILL HAVE NO ROLE TO PLAY IN ANY PROBLEMS OF A POLITICAL NATURE IN THE CONGO, EXISTING OR FUTURE." The words in inverted commas and capitals were spoken by AN TAOISEACH, MR. LEMASS in his address to Dail Eireann on the occasion of the introduction of legislation to enable Irish troops to be sent to the CONGO as part of the UNITED NATIONS FORCE.

IRELAND was one of the countries acceptable to all sides for participation in this campaign and was requested by UNITED NATIONS to provide a military contingent for this work.

3. To meet the Government's decision to help in this task, Army HQ Staff decided to send one Battalion initially. Thus was born the 32nd IRISH INFANTRY BATTALION. Broadly it consisted of a Battalion HQ., a HQ Company and three Rifle Company Groups, and totalled in strength:- 45 Officers (including two Chaplains) and 640 other ranks - a total of 685 all ranks. The figure 32 (i.e.) the number of the Battalion was chosen because it followed the 31 Battalions which existed in the Army up to the end of the Emergency. As it consisted of troops from all Units, Brigades, Commands, Corps and Services it was not qualified to take the title of any one of the existing Battalions. The Battalion was activated on 22 JULY 1960, the date on which all ranks reported to the CURRAGH Training Camp and was disbanded on 20 JANUARY 1961. Thus it existed for six months as planned.

Each Command provided a Company as follows:-

Eastern Command	-	A Company.
Southern Command	-	B Company.
Western Command	-	C Company.
Curragh Training Camp	-	HQ Company.

All Commands contributed personnel to HQ Company where CURRAGH Training Camp was unable to meet its full commitment.

4. The period 18th to 27th JULY was one of much activity and preparation. For the personnel of the Battalion there was medical inspection, X-Ray, teeth extractions and many inoculations including smallpox vaccination. But this work was light in comparison to the preparatory work carried out behind the scenes by personnel of various Corps and Services who had to provide, inspect, test, crate, weigh and mark the many items of equipment which were required for overseas service. The amount of prepared and tinned foods alone which had to be provided was sufficient for a minimum of one months rations for the whole Battalion. Other items, such as vehicles (jeeps) wireless sets and accessories, medical stores, engineer equipment, ordnance equipment, including a sufficiency of ammunition and weapons to meet the peace-keeping requirement as visualised had to be selected, securely packed, recorded, weighed and moved to BALDONNELL Airport in a few days. Throughout the whole period of CONGO Service there was ample proof of how well the Battalion was organised and equipped; of how well this equipment had been packed and recorded, and in general, of the far-sightedness of those who organised the work as well as of the thoroughness with which the work was done. Whilst the personnel of the Battalion were basking in the full glare of "glamorous" publicity, the work outlined above was being done quietly at all hours - day and night - by personnel of the various Corps and Services. The gratitude of every member of the Battalion is due to those comrades who worked so diligently behind the scenes during this preparatory period.

5. On 19th JULY the Battalion Commander, 2 i/c, Battalion Adjutant, Battalion Quartermaster, Company Commanders and some other staff Officers were selected and names were published. Each Command began the work of selection of personnel to fill the Company establishment as outlined in the organisation table prepared by Plans and Operations Branch G.H.Q. It was with pride that the Government was able to announce that almost the whole Army had volunteered for this service. Companies were concentrated in one locality in each Command and the work of mobilisation continued in all its varied aspects. The Battalion was ordered to concentrate in the CURRAGH on 22nd JULY. Battalion HQ opened at 0800 hrs on this date in the Infantry School and the work of preparing for the move to the CONGO continued for a week.

6. At 0900 hrs on 24 JULY (Sunday) 32 Infantry Battalion had its first full-dress parade to Mass. Fr. G. Brophy - one of the Chaplains attached to the Unit - said the Mass and preached a very effective and instructive sermon. Immediately after Mass the O/C addressed the troops in the Gymnasium - on such subjects as discipline, behaviour, duty, dress, responsibility etc.

On Tuesday, 26th JULY the whole Battalion paraded to the new Gymnasium - where the MINISTER FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, MR. ALLEN, the MINISTER FOR DEFENCE, MR. BOLAND and the CHIEF OF STAFF, GENERAL S. McKEOWN addressed the troops. The Battalion Officer Commanding replied on behalf of the unit. At this ceremony also Mrs. Donagh, wife of Colonel Donagh (Officer Commanding CURRAGH Training Camp) and President of the CURRAGH Ladies Committee, presented the Unit with a beautifully embroidered Unit flag, in green and gold.

Later that day, HIS EXCELLENCY, the PRESIDENT OF IRELAND received all the Officers at his residence at ARÚS AN UACHTARAIN. Also present were MR. LEMASS and many Ministers of State and other State Officials.

7. Wednesday, 27th JULY was the date of departure for the first contingent. Mass was at 0630 hours in the CURRAGH. Thereafter the Battalion moved by motor transport to DUBLIN CASTLE, whence it paraded through DUBLIN at 1100 hours. AN TAOISEACH, MR. LEMASS took the Salute at the GENERAL POST OFFICE. This was the most impressive military parade ever seen in DUBLIN - impressive because of the wonderful enthusiasm shown by the public towards the troops. Thousands

3. GEN VON HORN decided to deploy the Battalion in the area COQUILHATVILLE with the mission of restoring the situation in EQUATEUR Province to normal. On this basis it was intended that the Battalion would fly into LEOPOLDVILLE and subsequent deployment would be by river transport. Briefing on the situation in the proposed area of deployment was non-existent because the staff had no information on the area. The staff was unaware of the UNITED NATIONS (NEW YORK) undertaking to provide tropical clothing and there were no stocks available. There was no mosquito netting nor could UNITED NATIONS provide any long range wireless equipment for communications between the Battalion and UNITED NATIONS LEOPOLDVILLE.
4. While the Officer Commanding Advance Party and the Battalion Medical Officer were considering the implications of deployment in the COQUILHATVILLE area, the Chief Medical Officer of UNITED NATIONS, who was also the Medical Officer of the GHANA Brigade, advised GENERAL VON HORN against the employment of white troops in this area for medical reasons. The area was low lying, swampy and abounded in hook-worm and mosquitoes. GENERAL VON HORN accepted this recommendation at 2230 hours 24 JULY and changed the area of operations to KIVU province.
5. The change in operational area, while to the medical benefit of the Unit, created a number of other problems. The greater distance involved, (EAST KIVU was over 1,000 miles from LEOPOLDVILLE) created an urgent requirement for high powered radio for communications. The only practical means of quick deployment, reinforcement and resupply would be by air. It was thus important that the Unit should be based on a good air-head.
6. The UNITED NATIONS staff had no information on the situation in KIVU and the greater part of Monday 25 JULY was taken up by the 2 i/c and Medical Officer 32 Battalion in acquiring intelligence concerning the area of operations. SABENA Officials provided details of the capacity of all airfields and airstrips in the province and the advance party made this information available to UNITED NATIONS. Planters, missionaries, truck drivers, SABENA pilots and the representatives of commercial firms such as FRIDAM and SEDEC were among the many people interviewed by the advance party. Telephone calls were made to BUKAVU, GOMA and KINDU and additional information was acquired from a Power Plant superintendent and from other civilian sources in these towns. By these means the advance party was able to build up a very complete picture of the Force Publique (later National Congolese Army) and the BELGIAN Forces in KIVU province, down as far as platoon level. Subsequent operations by 32 Battalion in KIVU proved the accuracy of the intelligence picture at the time which comprised:
 - a. Location, strength and activity of BELGIAN Forces.
 - b. Location, strength and activity of CONGOLESE Forces.
 - c. Banditry.
 - d. Accommodation available in the area.
 - e. Availability of supplies, water, POL, vehicles and repair facilities.
 - f. Road trafficability and water transport.
 - g. Means of communications, ham radios etc.
 - h. Attitude of population.
 - i. Trigger spots.

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7. a. The fly-in of the Battalion and its subsequent deployment KIVU province were the subjects of discussion with UNITED NATIONS staff, Monday 25 JULY. UNITED NATIONS staff held that US Air Force would be unlikely to fly direct into KIVU province but would be prepared to off-load STANLEYVILLE from where the Battalion would deploy by water, road and air to allotted stations. The 32 Battalion Advance Party favoured a direct fly-in. However this problem could not be resolved until US Air Force was consulted. The UNITED NATIONS staff did not favour the establishment of Battalion HQ in GOMA. They thought that BUKAVU, the seat of the KIVU provincial Government, was a more suitable location. The Officer Commanding Advance Party reasoned as follows:-
- b. A good airhead for the Battalion was essential. GOMA provided this and it had the capacity to take the biggest piston-engined aircraft in service. The airfield near BUKAVU was actually located in RUANDA-URUNDI and was unsafe for anything bigger than twin-engined aircraft. Political difficulties could well arise if the Battalion was dependant on this airfield on BELGIAN-held territory.
- c. During the 25 JULY a cable (Annexure A) and a letter was sent to Army HQ DUBLIN setting out the proposed plan to deploy in KIVU via STANLEYVILLE. LT. COL. LEE arrived on this date and was briefed.
3. On 26 JULY a US Airforce Liaison team arrived in LEOPOLDVILLE. After consultation with DR. BUNCHE and Advance Party it was agreed to fly in 32 Battalion to GOMA, KINDU and BENI. One Company would be deployed on arrival from GOMA to BUKAVU by river steamer. The Officer Commanding Advance Party objected to BENI on the grounds that it would stretch the Battalion unnecessarily. Further the earlier information given to the Advance Party by SABENA indicated that BENI would not take Hercules aircraft. The fly-in plan as of 26 JULY '60 was notified to Army HQ by cable, Annexure 'B'. This message also advised tactical loading, and arrangements to make Companies self contained and in a state of preparedness on arrival. Within a matter of hours it was confirmed by US Air Force that BENI would not take Hercules aircraft. So the final plan emerged to have 32 Battalion less one Company land at GOMA and one Company Group at KINDU. This final plan was conveyed to Army HQ DUBLIN by cable, 26 JULY, Annexure 'C'. On the same date the remainder of the Advance Party consisting of the Battalion Legal Officer, Assistant Quartermaster and six NCOs arrived in LEOPOLDVILLE from IRELAND. These were briefed on all arrangements made to date and were given tasks in preparation for the fly-in of the Battalion. Constant pressure was maintained on UNITED NATIONS to provide aircraft to fly out stores and the Advance Party to GOMA and KINDU before the arrival of the main body.
- On the evening 26 JULY UNITED NATIONS agreed to make three DO 4s available at 0200 hours 28 JULY for this purpose.

During 27 JULY the Advance Party succeeded in acquiring mosquito netting, C Rations, helmets, berets, armbands, badges and tropical shirts and trousers sufficient to provide most of the Battalion personnel with two each. The Advance Party also acquired 7 SWEDISH Officer Interpreters. A ration scale suitable to IRISH tastes was agreed with UNITED NATIONS. This was based on the CANADIAN ration scale but provided additional potatoes and tea instead of coffee.

Imprests were provided as follows by UNITED NATIONS Finance Section.

- a. Allowance per diem @ 43 francs per day for the Battalion for 10 days.
- b. Imprest for local purchase of rations for 7 days @ 50 francs per day.
- c. Payment for accommodation and sundry services.

LT. COL. LEE was fully briefed on all operational and administrative arrangements.

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10. During 27 JULY, there was still some doubt whether the promised aircraft to fly in the Battalion Advance Party to GOMA and KINDU ahead of the main body would be made available. The Officer Commanding Advance Party made representations to UNITED NATIONS as follows:-
- a. The population of KIVU had not been prepared for the arrival of white UNITED NATIONS troops.
 - b. The airfield at GOMA had NOT been secured.
 - c. Accommodation in GOMA had NOT been reconnoitred and earmarked.
 - d. Vehicles had NOT been procured. Even if the 10 Land Rovers coming from IRELAND came in an early lift, they would be completely inadequate.
 - e. The possible reaction of the ANC and the local population was not known.
 - f. It was therefore essential that the unarmed Advance Party arrive in GOMA before the main body to test reaction, to secure GOMA by good will, to make the necessary arrangements about accommodation, transport and supply. Thanks to the intervention of DR. BUNCHE and Group CAPTAIN CARPENTER (CANADIAN Air Force) 3 Chartered SABENA aircraft were made available at 0200 hours 28 JULY '60.
11. Due to the unsettled nature of the situation there was no airport loading staff or load master operating at LEOPOLDVILLE airport. In the event the aircraft were loaded by the Advance Party and some SWEDISH troops. The aircraft crews were 90 minutes late in arriving and a further 30 minutes delay ensued in readjusting loads. At 0400 hours 28 JULY the aircraft took off; the loading of the aircraft as between cargo and passengers was dictated by Air HQ UNITED NATIONS.
12. One plane carried all the Advance Party personnel and the stores for KINDU. After off-loading at KINDU it was to proceed to GOMA. The remaining two planes were loaded completely with cargo and were to fly direct to GOMA. In fact two BRITISH Press men stowed away on the cargo planes. The plane bound for KINDU carried the Advance Party consisting of 4 Officers and 6 NCOs; 7 SWEDISH Officer Interpreters, 1 UNITED NATIONS Official; (political adviser) and 2 press men representing the IRISH TIMES and IRISH PRESS (Messrs O'SHANNON and O'HALLORAN). The landing at KINDU was uneventful. The BELGIAN troops had been notified of the arrival and received the Advance Party with courtesy. While the stores were being unloaded the Officer Commanding Advance Party visited the BELGIAN Commander and then drove in to meet the CONGOLESE Administrator (MR. OMARI). CAPT. LIDDY, one NCO and two SWEDISH Interpreters were left in KINDU to meet the Company on arrival. The quota of imprests for a Company operational instruction to be conveyed to the Company Commander was given to CAPT. LIDDY, Annexures D and E.
13. a. The aircraft then took off for GOMA. On arriving within 10 minutes flying time of GOMA the Captain of the aircraft informed the Officer Commanding Advance Party, that he had received a wireless message from one of the planes that had landed in GOMA to the effect that the CONGOLESE troops at the airfield were hostile, they had seized all the stores on the two aircraft and were waiting to "Take" the Advance Party. The Captain of the aircraft wished to divert to USUMBURA in RUANDA URUNDI. The Officer Commanding Advance Party ordered the Captain to land his aircraft at GOMA in accordance with his charter instructions. Unfortunately the "panic" message given by the Captain of the cargo aircraft went through the SABENA network to UNITED NATIONS. The Captain was instructed to send a message that the Advance Party would land and that progress would be reported.

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- h. The landing was made without incident. The Advance Party was met by about 300 armed CONGOLESE troops, about 50 armed police and about 10,000 CONGOLESE people. A speech was made by the Officer Commanding Advance Party from the steps of the aircraft setting out the aims and intentions of UNITED NATIONS; following which a conference was held in the terminal building with the Commandant of the ANC force, the Chiefs of Police, the Territorial Commissioner and the local administrator. The Officer Commanding Advance Party stated his requirements in accommodation and transport and requested the return of his stores.
 - c. At this stage a written message was given to the Captain of the aircraft for UNITED NATIONS HQ to the effect that the Advance Party had been given a friendly reception and that little difficulty was anticipated in recovering the stores.
 - d. A further speech was made from the steps of the terminal building outlining further the purpose of the UNITED NATIONS mission and briefly outlining the history of the IRISH people and their attitude to colonialism. The speeches were well received by the civilians but it was apparent that the military were distrustful of the motives and in doubt about the nationality.
- 14.
- a. The Advance Party was then conveyed in a military bus to the town of GOMA where schools were reconnoitred and visits were made to the offices of the Territorial Commissioner and the Local Administrator. A visit to the ANC Camp was also made to check on the location of the stores which had been seized.
 - b. While in the ANC Camp, it became very plain that some of the ANC Officers were putting pressure on the Commandant to detain the Advance Party in the Camp. The Advance Party was taken on a tour of the Camp and shown a recreation hut cum-canteen which had 16 beds made up. The Commandant "invited" the Advance Party to stay in the Camp. Heated discussions among the ANC Officers and NCOs in the Commandant's office, in a dialect only partly understood by the interpreters, disclosed that there was strong support for a proposal to hold the Advance Party as prisoners. The Officer Commanding Advance Party declined the "invitation" to stay. He requested that his stores be made available at the airfield the following morning at 0400 hours and that 3 trucks be made available for the transport of the Battalion and its stores on arrival.
 - c. The Advance Party then moved to the GRAND LACS HOTEL where it established HQ. The Officer Commanding Advance Party then made a tour of the townships with the Territorial Commissioner and Local Administrator and addressed the assembled local population in three centres. On the advice of the UNITED NATIONS Political Adviser the Officer Commanding Advance Party invited the following persons to dinner in the GRAND LACS HOTEL:
 - The Territorial Commissioner.
 - The Local Administrator.
 - The Commandant ANC.
 - Two Chiefs of Police.
- While this dinner helped to allay the suspicions of the ANC as to the nationality of the Advance Party (in 1960 NO BELGIAN would have invited CONGOLESE personnel to this hotel) it did not altogether dispel suspicion and the hotel was surrounded by about one platoon during the night.
- d. The BELGIAN hotel owner and other BELGIANS hardly concealed their displeasure at the presence of CONGOLESE in a hotel which was exclusively white even after Independence. The situation was made

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APPENDIX 'B' TO REPORT ON
ADVANCE PARTY OPERATIONS.

CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMY HQ, DUBLIN.

FROM: COMMANDANT ADAMS ONUC.

Most Immediate.

It is now planned to fly IRISH Battalion direct to not more than three airfields KIVU Province stop.

Redistribution will be effected later by smaller aircraft stop. Essential that Company Groups be self contained in essential personnel, ammunition, equipment supplies, cooking equipment and communications stop.

Situation in KIVU Province not clear stop. Personnel should carry ammunition for personal weapons stop.

Policy to carry out operations in peaceful manner; incidents unlikely but precautions should be taken. Will endeavour to have members Advance Party meet troops at each area on arrival but this is uncertain owing to shortage of aircraft here stop.

Recommend means of positive identification and FRENCH speaker each group stop. Will send further details when the people flying in are satisfied about suitability of airfields stop.

Expect this information in two hours. End.

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APPENDIX 'C' TO REPORT ON
ADVANCE PARTY OPERATIONS.

TO: CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMY HQ, DUBLIN.

FROM: COMMANDANT ADAMS ONUC.

- FIRSTLY UNITED NATIONS plan land Thirty Two Battalion less One Company at GOMA stop. CONGOLESE Forces in this general area well equipped but reported under control stop.
- SECONDLY One Company Group lands KINDU PORT EMPAIN now held by BELGIAN Forces who will be informed of arrival stop.
- THIRDLY Endeavouring to arrange simultaneously fly in blue helmets, tropical clothing and interpreters with members Advance Party stop.
- FOURTHLY Local purchase of supplies under UNITED NATIONS arrangements unlikely for four days after landing stop.
- FIFTHLY While normal security measures should be taken on landing stress peaceful nature of mission and avoidance of incidents stop.
- SIXTHLY Acknowledge all messages from ADAMS stop. End.

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APPENDIX 'D' TO REPORT ON
ADVANCE PARTY OPERATIONS.

Copy of a written Instruction given to
CAPT. LIDDY to be conveyed to the Officer
Commanding the Company Group which would
land at KINDU.

LEOPOLDVILLE
28 JULY '60.

1. SITUATION.

a. Armed Forces.

- (1) BELGIAN troops hold KINDU. Imperative to make immediate contact. When Unit settles in and position secure arrange their evacuation. All possible information to be got from BELGIAN Commander before evacuation.
- (2) 600 CONGOLESE reported LOKANDU (50 miles NORTH of KINDU). 13 Civilians reported prisoners in LOKANDU. Arrange release and treatment in accordance mission.
- (3) KIBOMBO - reported unsettled.
- (4) KASONGO - CONGOLESE mutineers reported in possession 22 JULY.

b. Own Forces.

ETHIOPIAN Forces hold STANLEYVILLE.

c. General Situation.

- (1) The local people are most primitive.
- (2) CONGOLESE NCOs and soldiers reported as having mutinied against BELGIAN Officers, ill treated them and their families.
- (3) KATANGA Province in the South is highly developed. IRISH troops should NOT cross Southern boundary.

d. Broad Mission UNITED NATIONS.

- (1) To restore peace.
- (2) To negotiate disarming CONGOLESE troops by peaceful means.
- (3) To encourage key BELGIAN civilian males to remain and to evacuate non-essential BELGIANS including women and children.
- (4) To protect and arrange the release of white prisoners.
- (5) To assist CONGOLESE troops where necessary by arranging food sups at UNITED NATIONS expense.
- (6) To restore the economy of the area.

e. Attachments and Detachments.

- (1) As arranged before take-off.
- (2) One DC 3 may be made available to Company.

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2. MISSION.

The Company Group will protect itself. On becoming settled in and on further orders Battalion Commander, it will clear LOKANDU, KIBOMBO and KASONGO in that order. In carrying out these tasks it will be guided by the mission of UNITED NATIONS in the CONGO.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Company Group Commander is free to determine the manner of its operations in accordance with its mission.

b. Company grouping in accordance with loading plan.

c. Essential Elements of Information.

(1) What is the economic situation, are people working, on strike, short of food?

(2) What is the location, strength and activity of CONGOLESE soldiers in the area along the RLUALABA and the rail road KINDU - KASONGO?

(3) What are the facilities for landing aircraft, specify by types.

(4) What is the food supply position of CONGOLESE troops? Indicate if food required. Can arrange to provide locally at UNITED NATIONS expense.

4. ADMINISTRATION.

a. Rations.

(1) Use rations carried until fresh supplies provided either by air or procured locally.

(2) To bolster economy intended to purchase as much rations locally as possible.

(3) Contact supply agent DETILHEUX of SEDECK Co. in KINDU to procure all your requirements food, transport/rail/petrol, medical supplies. He is agent all UNITED NATIONS supplies. Failing contact inform HQ at GOMA which will arrange fly-in your requirements.

(4) Simultaneous fly-in mosquito netting for force - blue caps for men, berets for Officers and arm bands and flashes for force.

b. Casualty Evacuation.

By Air, notify HQ which will arrange.

5. INTER COMMUNICATION.

a. Immediate contact on landing by wireless with HQ allowing for estimated time of touch down.

b. Failing wireless contact HQ responsible for getting contact with you by aircraft.

c. Use fly-in aircraft wireless while available.

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CHAPTER III.

THE JOURNEY OUT AND ARRIVAL IN THE CONGO - MAIN BODY.

1. The airlift was carried out by 322 U.S. Air Division using U.S. C130 Hercules aircraft. These were big, four engined turbo-prop pressurised aircraft - each capable of taking 60/80 persons and several tons of stores. They flew usually at 20,000 feet so that there was nothing to be seen from them except the clouds below. They were built for speed and for heavy load-transport and not for comfort. The lines of canvas seats were parallel to the line of flight, and one could not stretch a leg without at least disturbing his neighbour to a greater or lesser degree. But there was no complaint. We were glad to make full use of the blanket per man provided as it was cold up there, in spite of a good system of heating.
2. Let us then travel in spirit with the first of these aircraft. It seemed no time at all until we landed at EVEREUX in North FRANCE. This is an AMERICAN airbase to which we had to call for refuelling. Here we met AMERICAN soldiers who took us away for refreshments - the Battalion Officer Commanding to the Officers Canteen with the Base Officer Commanding and all others to a specially prepared room. The Pipe Band played a few tunes - and we were off again at 1900 hours - heading for the MEDITERRANEAN SEA and the North AFRICAN Coast.
3. (a) We arrived at WHEELUS airbase in LIBYIA at 2330 hours. We were given a meal and sleeping quarters had been lavishly prepared for us. Here we got our first introduction to warm climate conditions. It was pleasant.
(b) Early next day we met the base Chaplain (FR. O'BRIEN from CASTLEMAINE, CO. KERRY) and later we met Lt/Cpl. JEFFERIES and other Officers of the Royal Irish Fusiliers who were based nearby in TRIPOLI. They brought along their Brass Band and both bands gave recitals and drill displays. Friendships were made at all levels of rank - indeed many of the men in this Unit were ex-members of our Army.
(c) Later that day a number of Officers were received by the base Commander, Colonel GRIFFITHS at his HQ. Refreshments were again provided and photographs taken. Lunch was provided for all Officers at the Officers Club with Colonel GRIFFITHS presiding. Altogether we were royally treated by the AMERICAN Army personnel of this base and our gratitude is due to them for their kindness and helpfulness. We had no way of repaying them for this generosity but later we were able to some degree to provide U.S. Army/Air Force personnel, who visited our posts from time to time, with the security, accommodation and food which they required and they appreciated these facilities to the full.
4. At 1530 hours we departed from WHEELUS and headed South across the SAHARA DESERT towards KANO - NIGERIA. The run was uneventful and we arrived at KANO at 2130 hours. Here we were met by Major REYNOLDS - a BRITISH Officer with the NIGERIAN Army. Food had been prepared for us in their barracks. There was no time for sight-seeing as we were off again at 2330 hours - this time heading for LEOPOLDVILLE. The extreme heat at KANO brought home to us how ill-equipped we were for it. The standard green uniform was too heavy in such conditions, and indeed we had to discard tunics on disembarking from the aircraft.
5. We arrived at LEOPOLDVILLE at 0630 hours and after a brief stop for refuelling we took off again this time for GOMA - our destination. We arrived in GOMA at 0800 hours on the morning of 29th JULY less than two days after leaving IRELAND. Here we were met by Commandants ADAMS and LAFFAN and a number of NCOs who had flown out on 23rd and 25th JULY by civil aircraft as an Advance Party to the Battalion. (See Chapter 11). They had dropped off in LEOPOLDVILLE to be oriented

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on our mission etc at UNITED NATIONS HQ there, and then had flown on to GOMA, where they took over two large schools as accommodation for the troops assigned to GOMA.

6. The peaceful reception of our troops by the native civilians and military is due - in no small way - to the work done by the Advance Party prior to our arrival. At sight of the big aircraft the natives got excited, and local police, armed with rifles, not knowing what to do felt inclined to surround the aircraft to prevent us from disembarking. Unfortunately too, even though each Officer, NCO and man was armed with a Rifle, LMG or SMC, nobody had ammunition in his possession. This could have been awkward, but as events proved the Advance Party on the ground was able to allay the anxiety of the natives and so we disembarked peacefully, and soon we had the natives helping us to unload the aircraft and load "borrowed" trucks with stores.
7. Here too our Pipe Band gave its first display on CONGO ground and it was received with wild enthusiasm. This band from Southern Command (4 Battalion) under the command of Corporal J. SULLIVAN (promoted Sergeant later) was one of the finest Pipe Bands ever organised in the Army. Apart from their musical capabilities they were men of highest integrity and morale. As will be shown later in this report their work was of tremendous value to the Battalion throughout its service in the CONGO, and it established an international fame for itself and the Army.
8. We have followed the first aircraft from BALDONNEL to GOMA. The next four or five days brought in all seventeen aircraft on this route. All dropped their loads in GOMA except those carrying B Company. These had been diverted to KINDU which was to be location of this Company for many weeks to come, and the story of which comes later in this report. Suffice it to say here that it would have been better to drop the whole Battalion in one locality initially, and then when they had reorganised themselves, distribute the Company Groups to their allotted location by UNITED NATIONS aircraft and/or any other available means of transport.
9. As things went B Company was dropped in KINDU with elements of C Company attached to it, and less some of its own personnel who had been inadvertently taken to GOMA. Their Medical Officer and medical supplies were in GOMA - there was no contact by air, road or wireless with them for some time, and a situation could have developed which might have been serious. As things worked out all these matters were rectified and in good time too. The stories of these Rifle Company Groups follow - each being given a chapter to itself.
10. It is not proposed to deal with HQ Company as a whole, as its history has a bearing on all the other Companies. It will be appreciated that the Rifle Companies had detachments from the platoons which make up HQ Company, and in order to avoid duplication and/or repetition it is thought best to deal with HQ Company by giving a short report from the various branches which are in the Company.

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CHAPTER IV.

KIVU AND KATANGA PROVINCES.

1. GENERAL:

In order to appreciate the conditions under which the IRISH troops worked it is necessary to know some details on such aspects as:- climate, physical features, communications, habits and customs of the people, industries and the political set-up in both KIVU and KATANGA Provinces. The Battalion was stationed in KIVU Province from JULY to mid NOVEMBER and in KAMINA from mid NOVEMBER to JANUARY '61.

2. CLIMATE:

Usually dry and warm but NOT humid except in the KINDU area. Thus climatic conditions were very satisfactory and acceptable to the troops. The heat was not excessive except for a short period from about 12 o'clock to 3 o'clock each day. With normal care there was little danger of sun-burn. At night it could be quiet cool in the GOMA and BUKAVU areas and troops were glad to use their blankets on their beds. In KAMINA and KINDU the heat could be uncomfortable at night, and a sheet was usually ample bed covering in these areas.

From OCTOBER to JANUARY the rainy season set in. This usually meant a heavy shower of rain at about 3 or 4 o'clock in the afternoon. This lasted for about an hour and was usually torrential and accompanied by heavy thunder and lightening. This thunder and lightening was rather frightening at first, but as time went on it became more acceptable and there was no known case of damage or danger to life or property.

3. In KAMINA the climate was more oppressive than in KIVU. This was due to the relatively high altitude of KIVU compared with that of KATANGA. GOMA was some 5,000 feet above sea level and many mountainous areas nearby were up to 10,000 feet above sea-level. KINDU was low-lying by comparison. KAMINA was about 3,000 feet above sea-level.

4. PHYSICAL FEATURES.

KIVU Province is situated in the North-East of the Republic and the Equator cuts across its northern tip about 100 miles North of GOMA. Along the eastern border the country is mountainous and elevated. Volcanos exist about twenty miles South of GOMA, and one of these erupts every three years. At night the red glow over the crater can be seen in the sky for miles in all directions.

The road from GOMA to BENI and from GOMA to BUKAVU runs through some very mountainous country and as a result is a constant spiral of severe twists and turns which demand full attention and the greatest care when moving in convoy through the area.

Due West from this mountainous belt the country is rather flat and featureless, except in the tropical forest areas. These forests seem impenetrable from the air, but here and there a small clearing can be seen and a few huts indicate that "life" exists even in the most backward and out-of-the-way places. Semi-desert conditions exist outside these forest areas, and one could fly over miles of bare sandy country without seeing a human being or an animal.

5. The LUALABA is the principal river. It flows North to STANLEYVILLE where it takes its better known name "THE CONGO". It is rather slow moving and sluggish, and the water is usually discoloured by its mud-bearing torrential tributaries.

KAMINA is on a large featureless plain with semi-desert conditions,

except where cultivation has brought about a change. Belts of trees can be seen in a few areas and usually in the vicinity of riverbanks and/or swampy ground.

6. COMMUNICATIONS.

There are few roads in the CONGO and the majority of these are of low grade and sometimes little better than tracks. In the towns and sub-urban areas roads are usually wide and macadamised, but beyond the ten-mile limit there is little effort made to improve them. Generally it can be said that there is a fair North-South road net, and very poor East-West one. It was possible to carry out many motor-transport reconnaissances and patrols from GOMA North to the LUBERO and BENI districts and South to BUKAVU and UVIRA and other southern towns, and again from KINDU North to PUNIA and LUBUTU and South to the SANBA and KASCNGO districts. But ground movement from GOMA or BUKAVU to KINDU was never attempted. Granted a road net of sorts did exist, but reports on it were so discouraging that it was decided not to make this journey unless it was absolutely necessary. In the event there was sufficient air traffic between GOMA and KINDU to rule out the need for the ground run. However there was much movement of patrols inland from the GOMA - BUKAVU areas towards KINDU and from the KINDU area towards GOMA, but the complete crossing was NOT attempted.

7. There is only one railway in this area. It runs from KINDU South through KIPOMBO, SAMBA and across the border into KATANGA (See Appendix C) and on to KABALO, KAMINAVILLE and ELIZABETHVILLE. B Company were to get to know this line well as they used it on more than one occasion.

8. The principal means of travel in the CONGO is by aircraft. There are many air-fields varying from short dirt landing strips without equipment to the most up-to-date air-fields in the world. Each town had an air-field of some sort. KAMINA base was a full scale air-base. It was fitted with lights and all the necessary equipment. GOMA and KINDU had good air-fields but night-landing was not possible in GOMA. BUKAVU had its air-field in RUANDA URUNDI, and consequently the border problem made it doubtful from UNITED NATIONS point of view. IRISH troops did however use it quiet a lot even though there was a reasonably good road to BUKAVU, as well as a boat service from GOMA through LAKE KIVU to BUKAVU. This latter system was used for movement of large numbers and for heavy stores. It was a pleasant trip when the sun was shining and the water was usually calm and without a ripple.

9. CUSTOMS OF THE PEOPLE:

The civilian population in all towns and villages visited by our troops could be classified as placid, easy-going and inoffensive. They did not mind us - rather they ignored our presence and carried on their daily chores with little apparent interest in our activities. The children became a nuisance in GOMA as they were well treated by our troops, and always came back for more. Our troops could not be prevented from feeding them and in some cases clothing them.

Generally, in KIVU, the men were usually to be found working in offices, driving lorries and cars and at other indoor work, whilst the women worked on the land or cut and carried timber from the bush to their homes - for firewood presumably. Many men could be classified as idle or lazy whereas the women were always busy and active.

Men in administrative staffs were usually competent and methodical. Men in high positions such as District Commissioners, their assistants and other educated men were highly intelligent, shrewd and cunning. Invariably they were sincere, well-intentioned and ambitious, and were prepared to "talk it out" for hours if necessary.

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10. The Army (ANC) was a problem. A few leaders had and maintained control of their men - others were dependent on their own popularity to remain in charge. If they failed in this they were discarded. Thus discipline was usually at a low standard, and control was often non-existent. The same can be said of the police. Both police and soldiers were well-dressed and well-drilled. They had modern FN weapons but it is doubtful if anything more than a few knew how to load, aim and fire these weapons. They had been promised many privileges prior to Independence, but now that their white leaders were gone, they found they were often without pay and food and all the time without leadership and guidance.

It was difficult to know how far they could be trusted or how far UNITED NATIONS troops should "mix" with them. In GOMA good relations existed between the IRISH and the local garrison, but in KINDU and BUKAVU there were many differences of opinion; many flares-up and many reconciliations. The main point is that both sides refrained from using their guns - and this must go to the credit of both. One thing we were certain of was that we would never allow "mixed" guards on our posts.

11. INDUSTRIES - CROPS ETC.

In KIVU Province coffee plantations took pride of place. This was a major industry. Tea was grown on a much smaller scale. Sugar cane was grown in small quantities.

The main vegetables and fruits grown were: pineapple, bananas, tomatoes and in a small scale low grade oranges, lemons, grapefruits and apples.

KATANGA Province was much better developed due to its mineral products. Many valuable ores are mined extensively - thus making this Province very important and wealthy.

12. THE CHURCH:

There are many denominations represented in these areas, and the Church generally is well established in KIVU and KATANGA. All denominational leaders work harmoniously together. The Catholic Church seemed to be very well-organised, and it could boast of many beautiful buildings scattered throughout the Provinces as well as in the big towns. Some communities owned land which was highly cultivated and farming of a high order was carried on. One such place in BENI had a herd of some 30 or 40 Friesian cows which could do justice to any of our farms at home. This was a very elevated area and the climate could be quite cool.

Protestants were fewer in number to Catholics. The Moslem religion had its followers in the KINDU area. The vast majority of the people were still Pagan.

Church leaders remained at their posts when the BELGIANS withdrew, and they hoped to be able to continue their work in spite of opposition and the ever-present danger that all "whites" would be exterminated. The withdrawal of these Missionaries would be a great loss, not alone to the Church, but to the State and the people as well, as they were good organisers and teachers as well as preachers.

13. THE ALBERT PARK:

This is an area covering thousands of acres of land and stretching for some 100 miles North of GOMA to BENI. It is the natural habitat of wild animals such as Buffalo, Elephant, Hyppopotamus, Gazelle of many types and many others. This area was a great tourist attraction in peace times and is well worth a visit. Needless to say visitors were few in 1960 - and the UNITED NATIONS patrols were the most constant visitors to the area.

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14. POLITICAL OUTLOOK:

In KIVU there was a peaceful approach to the new idea of Independence. The President of KIVU, MR. MIRUHU, lived in BUKAVU, and had control of his provincial government. There was unity and co-operation in this Province most of the time, with a few troublesome periods especially in BUKAVU. Troops were difficult to control, and they moved about armed in public; and were a source of worry to all with whom they came in contact. Our problem was to try and keep their arms in barracks - thus guaranteeing freedom of movement to the civilian population.

KATANGA was a different problem as MR. TSHCMBE, the President, wanted to break away from the central Government, and make KATANGA a separate and independent State. This matter did not come to a head until after 32 Infantry Battalion had left the area and thus is outside the scope of this document.

16. THE BELGIANS:

All BELGIAN troops were withdrawn from the CONGO within ten days of our arrival there. Thereafter only BELGIAN settlers, planters, shopkeepers, factory owners and supervisors remained. In general we traded with them for our day-to-day needs of food, drink and other necessaries. They were glad to have our custom. But behind all this they were mostly unco-operative and often disloyal. They did not like us, and did not want us to "interfere" in their problem in the CONGO. They were not to be trusted and often spread false reports or distorted facts to our disadvantage. They could be very affable to-day and the very opposite to-morrow.

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CHAPTER V.

GOMA.

BATTALION HEADQUARTERS - HEADQUARTERS COMPANY.

1. As already stated 32 Infantry Battalion, less B Company, landed at GOMA in KIVU Province on 29, 30 and 31 JULY 1960 and took up residence in the nearby schools. The work of settling in, allotment of accommodation, storing of equipment etc proceeded methodically with the co-operation of local CONGOLESE and some borrowed transport. Food was confined entirely to tinned rations for three to four days after which we were on a CANADIAN ration, which meant we could purchase locally and over a wide range of foods. Forty cigarettes per person per week and chicken twice weekly were part of the ration and we got our entitlement of these items. However work was not confined to the business of organisation alone; on the first day, that is 29th JULY, things began to happen in the Military and Political Field.
2. At 1500 hours on 29 JULY a message was received from the airfield that a BELGIAN fighter plane with a BELGIAN major and a pilot aboard had landed and wished to proceed to KISENYI (in RUANDA URUNDI which was still a BELGIAN protectorate) just across the border from GOMA. They were immediately heset by CONGOLESE troops who wished to shoot them. An armed party was rushed to the airfield to discover that the pilot was in the terminal building unharmed, but the Officer had been taken to the local police station. The Battalion 2 i/c proceeded here and after prolonged negotiations the Officer was released just in time to take off before dark. In the meantime another BELGIAN Officer arrived from KISENYI and unaware that the major had been released, informed the Officer Commanding 32 Battalion that BELGIAN troops were massed on the RUANDA border and were coming across to rescue him. A platoon was immediately ordered out to take up position between the BELGIANS and CONGOLESE along the border in the general area GOMA-KISENYI with orders to try and prevent these forces making contact. At approximately 2100 hours when it became apparent that there was to be no offensive action by either party half the platoon were returned to Barracks and the remainder remained as a standing patrol until 0630 hours (daylight) on 30th JULY.
3. In the meantime the remainder of the Battalion had been arriving and by 31 JULY all the Unit had arrived in the CONGO and were disposed as follows:-

HQ Company)	
A Company)	GOMA
C Company)	
E Company	-	KINDU
4. At 1900 hours on 30 JULY a briefing conference was held at Battalion HQ at which all available Officers attended and the political, civil and military aspects of the UNITED NATIONS mission were given as follows:-
"UNITED NATIONS Forces will operate for the purpose of restoring order in the province of KIVU in accordance with the following policy instructions:-
 - a. UNITED NATIONS weapons will NOT be used for offensive purposes, but only for self protection.
 - b. Key white workers will be encouraged to remain in the area.
 - c. White non-key workers, particularly women and children will be encouraged to evacuate.

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- d. UNITED NATIONS troops will protect the lives and homes of white people remaining in the area.
- e. CONGOLESE native armed forces will be disarmed by negotiation and will be encouraged to remain a disciplined force in their barracks. (The first part of this clause was never put into effect).
- f. CONGOLESE native troops will be fed.
- g. Medical and other assistance will be given to the native population.
- h. Essential materials for the maintenance of UNITED NATION forces will be purchased.
- j. Labour parties will be recruited where necessary.
- k. Hold all airfields and airstrips as a firm base in areas where UNITED NATIONS forces are in occupation."

5. An airfield guard was established forthwith and after negotiations with various local officials (District Commissioner etc) it was decided that a 24 hour patrol must be maintained on the KIVU - RUANDA border to assist in discouraging incidents between CONGOLESE and BELGIAN armed forces and this was also put into operation. In addition to these and normal security guards, daylight and night mobile patrols covering the town and outskirts of GOMA were also established.

6. It was now decided to despatch A Company to BUKAVU as soon as possible when duties and areas of responsibility would then be defined for all three Companies. The move to BUKAVU was completed on 2nd AUGUST, '60 and the dispositions of the Battalion was now:-

HQ Company)	GOMA
C Company)	
A Company	-	BUKAVU
E Company	-	KINDU

7. Areas of responsibility were allotted as follows:-

a. GOMA CONTINGENT - district of NORTH KIVU comprising the following territories:- (See Appendix 'C' attached)

- (i) BENI
- (ii) LUBERO
- (iii) MASISI
- (iv) RUTSHURU
- (v) GOMA
- (vi) WALIKALE

b. BUKAVU CONTINGENT - district of SOUTH KIVU comprising the territories of:-

- (i) KELEHE
- (ii) KABARE
- (iii) SHABUNDA
- (iv) UVIRA
- (v) MWENGA
- (vi) FIZI.

c. KINDU CONTINGENT - district of MANIEMA comprised of the following territories:-

- (i) KINDU
- (ii) KIBOMBO
- (iii) PANGI
- (iv) KABAMBARE
- (v) LUBUTU
- (vi) PUNIA

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- d. Generally the policy of 32 Battalion was to visit all populated areas especially those garrisoned by Units of the ANC (Armee Nationale CONGOLESE, formerly the Force Publique) as frequently as possible, consulting with the administrators and Chefs dn Post on their local problems and these were brought to the notice of the District Commissioner for rectification. Patrols were also responsible for periodic visits to WHO (World Health Organisation) teams who arrived later and were located throughout the province, and the supply of rations to them as required.
8. The Commander-in-chief had requested that the following information be forwarded as early as possible to HQ ONUC.
- a. Operations.
- (i) Communications, situation in Units, between Units and formations.
 - (ii) Own order of battle, including location of all Units and detached Sub-Units with names of Commanders.
 - (iii) Condition of roads in all occupied areas.
 - (iv) Rail situation where usable for tactical moves.
 - (v) River transportation for tactical moves.
- b. Intelligence.
- (i) Order of battle of ANC, locations, strengths and names of Commanders.
 - (ii) Order of battle. BELGIAN forces in their respective areas if any.
 - (iii) Road reports, unoccupied areas.
 - (iv) Rail reports, unoccupied areas.
- c. Most of this information was supplied by our patrols and intelligence agencies within a month of arrival in the province of KIVU.
- d. Frequent requests for escort patrols to evacuated plantations were received from owners who wished to return to pay their workers or to remove personal property. Generally these requests were acceded to. There were many incidents during the early period of plantation, owners and whites generally being molested by CONGOLESE civilians and ANC which usually led to appeals for extra patrols and guards. In many cases the demands exceeded the supply as far as troops were concerned, but as far as possible every assistance possible was rendered, very often with little thanks, for the presence of UNITED NATIONS troops was largely resented by the BELGIAN settlers.
- e. During the period of operation in KIVU province by 32 Infantry Battalion all areas were regularly patrolled except the North-West portion which for reasons of distance and non-availability of personnel was only visited twice. Similarly the area of KABAMBARE was somewhat neglected. Patrols varied in duration from one day for local patrols to four days e.g. GOMA/BENI; KINDU/SAMBA/KASONGO; BUKAVU/LULIMBA.
9. A word about communications generally will not be amiss at this stage. On arrival in the CONGO telephonic communications were in a chaotic state and for quite a period were most unreliable when working at all. There were many examples of telephone messages being delivered to Battalion HQ three full days after despatch, from places like BUKAVU approximately 100 miles away and from WALIKAIE approximately 50 miles away from GOMA.

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Very often they were never delivered at all. For the first few days after arrival there was NO communication at all with B Company at KINDU a distance of over 300 miles away by road and two hours flying time by air over dense jungle. The Battalion was equipped with C.12 wireless sets in limited numbers and it was generally accepted that these had a very limited range. The Battalion Signal personnel however, managed to set up communication with these between all three outposts and wireless communications were quite satisfactory most of the time for the duration of the Battalions period in KIVU province. It is worth mentioning that at a later stage the Signal Officer also experimented with these sets from ground to air at long distances and they worked. The Signal detachment of the Battalion on the whole did a tremendous job of work. Communication with HQ ONJC in LEOPOLDVILLE was solved by using a "ham" station located in KISENYI in "enemy" territory (RUANDA URUNDI) during these early days and occasionally a message by wireless to BUKAVU could be got to LEOPOLDVILLE by TELEX but this system was NOT always reliable. Later a BC 610 set operated by UNITED NATIONS signal personnel was provided and from then on the problem of communication with LEOPOLDVILLE and SCOMEF (Sub Command Eastern Provinces which was established at a later date as the 9 Infantry Brigade) was solved.

The story of the orders received by wireless for the move of B Company from KINDU to MANONO might well be told here. The Battalion Officer Commanding was in wireless contact with LO in LEOPOLDVILLE one evening from the "ham" station in KISENYI (RUANDA-URUNDI). He spoke in Irish as the information involved the projected move of a Company. The orders were: Glyaisfid Complact B on ait in a bfuil siad, soir o'deas go "Fear-o-ni-hea " The Battalion Officer Commanding had NO map (not allowed when crossing border) so not being well up in the names of the towns in KIVU, Fear-o-ni-hea meant just nothing, and there was no further help coming from the other side. Eventually the Battalion Officer Commanding had to ask LO to "wait" out whilst he sent Lieutenant Flynn, Signals Officer back to HQ to smuggle in a map of the CONGO. Whilst Lieutenant Flynn was absent on this mission the Battalion Officer Commanding noticed a tourist map on the wall of the room in which the set was located, and having nothing else to do began to study it. Lo, and behold he found the town MANONO - which was South-East of KINDU and in a flash the message went home - Fear-o-ni-hea was MAN-O-NO. By the time Lieutenant Flynn returned the Battalion Officer Commanding had completed his work with the L.O. and was able to report "ROGER". This story has got around a lot and has been added to here and there. It caused many a laugh (apart altogether from its effect for the time being on the Battalion Commander's blood-pressure) but it should be noted that it worked, and it is very doubtful if the "enemy" broke its secrecy. B Company did not go to MANONO afterwards due to a change in plans.

- 10. For contact with the Battalion outposts there existed communications with BUKAVU by road, lake boats operated by OTRACO and by air when aircraft was available, but with KINDU the only means was by air on rare occasions. The road journey to KINDU would take over two days in the best of conditions and the question of whether it would be possible at all in the rainy season is academic as the Battalion had left KIVU before it commenced, but it is doubtful. This fact brings to mind the matter of the advisability of splitting up a Battalion over such a large hunk of territory, in a situation such as existed in the CONGO at this time. There were in fact many anxious moments spent by the Battalion staff during the invasion of KATANGA when the main route taken by Central Government troops to the border was through KINDU and the garrison there was under constant threat.

Railways in KIVU were non-existent except for one stretch of line from KINDU to KATANGA.

- 11. (a) On 20 AUGUST orders were received from LEOPOLDVILLE that effective this date 32 Infantry Battalion came under command Eastern CONGO (SCOMEF) with COLONEL BYRNE as Officer Commanding and HQ at ELIZABETHVILLE.

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- (b) On 30 AUGUST a warning order from SCOMEF was received to be prepared to despatch one Company of approximately 100 all ranks to KAMINA. Here a Battalion for the ground defence of KAMINA was being organised consisting of two IRISH Companies (one 32 Battalion and one 33 Battalion), one SWEDISH Company and one ETHIOPIAN platoon. The second-in-command of the 32 Battalion was appointed Officer Commanding of this composite Battalion. Airlift of C Company from GOMA to KAMINA commenced on 1 SEPTEMBER and was completed on 3 SEPTEMBER.
- (c) During the latter days of AUGUST the abortive invasion of NORTHERN KATANGA by Central Government troops was taking place and there was heavy troop movement from STANLEYVILLE, via LUBUTU - KINDU - KASONGO and via GOMA - BUKAVU - KASONGO towards the KATANGESE border. These movements led to various incidents and tensions particularly as it was intimated to 32 Battalion that part of the invasion planning involved the use of the airfields held by us for the airlift of A.N.C. Units to KATANGA. The Company at KINDU in its isolated position was a constant source of worry and the position at GOMA following the move of C Company to KAMINA was NOT much better. On 5 SEPTEMBER orders from SCOMEF were received to block the runways at GOMA and KINDU on receipt of the codeword LOB to prevent their use as take off points for the invasion and at 2200 hours on that night the codeword was given. At GOMA the only troops available for this task after other duties e.g. defence of Battalion HQ were found, was one platoon in addition to the normal airport guard and stand-to party and the only automatic weapons available were two MMGs and two LMGs.
- (d) During the day 180 members of the A.N.C. had arrived on the airfield at GOMA to await air transport (in RUSSIAN planes from STANLEYVILLE) to the invasion area. Nevertheless, at 0530 hours on the morning of 6 SEPTEMBER the IRISH platoon moved in and at 0600 hours the runway was blocked and the air field held. The runway at KINDU was blocked at 0900 hours. In the course of the morning the A.N.C. on GOMA airfield were inclined to be truculent. The provision of a hot meal in the afternoon by Quartermaster 32 Battalion restored their good humour however and in the evening they entrucked and departed from the airfield.
- (e) The arrival of a platoon from A Company from BUKAVU on 7 SEPTEMBER and one section from B Company from KINDU on 11 SEPTEMBER eased the duties problem at GOMA. In the meantime B Company at KINDU continued for some time being harrassed by demands from the A.N.C. for use of the airfield there, which were in all cases refused. This situation continued until 14 SEPTEMBER when these airfields were again opened to all civilian aircraft except those carrying military personnel and material when prior permission from UNITED NATIONS had to be obtained.

12.

All during the month of SEPTEMBER reports kept coming in to Battalion HQ from KINLU and BUKAVU of whites being molested, property looted and general belligerence and intransigence by marauding bands of CONGOLESE troops. Patrols were constantly on the move investigating alleged beating-ups of whites by members of the A.N.C. and there were several instances of members of religious orders being arrested on such trumped up charges as sabotage. These events placed a heavy strain on the resources of the outposts and Commanding Officers especially were forced to spend very fruitless hours in conference with Government and local CONGOLESE officials who themselves were in most cases terrorised by and had absolutely no control over these troops who ignored them completely and who often refused to take orders even from their own Officers. At one stage the Provincial President was forced to ask the Officer Commanding A Company (BUKAVU) for a UNITED NATIONS guard on his own residence. These incidents naturally increased the feeling of insecurity amongst the EUROPEAN population who now began to leave in large numbers or declared their intention of leaving. This meant that economic conditions, which up to now were serious, would become disastrous.

13. Following the failure of the KATANGA invasion by A.N.C. arrangements were made between the Central Government and ONUC that troops returning from KATANGA via KINDU would be airlifted from KINDU to home stations at GOMA and STANLEYVILLE. Between 22nd and 24th SEPTEMBER, 131 A.N.C. members were airlifted from KINDU to GOMA and 87 from KINDU to STANLEYVILLE. Many others passed through KINDU and continued their journey homewards by road.
14. Meanwhile on 12 SEPTEMBER a warning order was received from SCOMEF of the impending move of 32 Infantry Battalion from KIVU to KAMINA BASE in KATANGA and their relief by a NIGERIAN Battalion. Plans were made for the movement of non-essential stores in advance by utilising aircraft proceeding to KAMINA as they became available, and by 28 SEPTEMBER all these stores had been airlifted to KAMINA BASE.
15. On 8 OCTOBER an order for the deployment of SCOMEF Units provided for the immediate move of B Company to KATANGA by air and rail to take over KAMINAVILLE. On 10 OCTOBER airlift of B Company commenced and by 12 OCTOBER all personnel to be lifted by air had left KINDU and on 13 OCTOBER the balance of the Company plus stores left KINDU by rail for the journey to KAMINA. After an eventful journey through NORTH KATANGA where their train was frequently halted, due to the rails being lifted and when they were often threatened by hostile BALJEAS, these troops finally reached KAMINAVILLE at 1800 hours on 16 OCTOBER.
16. On 15 OCTOBER a NIGERIAN reconnaissance party arrived at GOMA (MAJOR GEN FOSTER and thirteen other NIGERIAN Officers) to carry out a three day tour of KIVU and make plans for the arrival of the NIGERIAN Battalion. On 9 NOVEMBER the advanced guard of this Battalion arrived in GOMA and on the same day the airlift of 32 Battalion to KAMINA commenced. Move of 32 Battalion to KAMINA BASE was completed on SUNDAY 13 NOVEMBER 1960.
17. By and large the population of KIVU province displayed great friendliness towards the 32 Battalion during its occupation of this territory. The A.N.C. on the whole were pretty well behaved except during the period of the KATANGA invasion when some hostility was shown. The intransigence of the latter was due to a large extent to ignorance, fear and a wide distrust of white men in general - to them all white men were BELGIANS and all BELGIANS were enemies. The same could be said of the local Government Officials in general - they had NOT been trained for their tasks and were only groping for the truth so to speak. Many of the outbreaks of violence against and arrest of EUROPEANS on frivolous charges while NOT excusable could be taken as the natural reaction of an ignorant people, newly freed after years of exploitation and oppression.
18. HQ 32 Battalion re-opened in KAMINA BASE at 1400 hours on 13 NOVEMBER 1960. The Battalion was now disposed with B Company in occupation of Base 1 with its principal task being the defence of the airfield and the remainder of the Battalion located in Base 2. Orders from SCOMEF were "that one Company of 32 Battalion be reserved exclusively for train guards when complete Battalion is in KAMINA. Train guards in the future must be as strong as possible and absolutely firm in their actions to prevent any interference whatsoever." To implement these instructions train escorts of platoon strength were initially provided for all trains leaving KAMINAVILLE for LUENA where the escort was relieved by SWEDES from ELISABETHVILLE. The escort then returned to KAMINAVILLE. Orders were later however received for the basing of a Company in KAMINAVILLE and C Company was despatched to there where they went into occupation of a wing in the convent, and where they were most hospitably received by the community. These train guards constituted a very heavy duty as very often two trains per day departed from KAMINAVILLE for either LUENA or LUPUTA in SOUTH KASAI and each demanded a guard of platoon strength. The duration of these journeys averaged eighteen hours. Very often the guard detailed the escort of up to 1000 natives who were fleeing from the tribal warfare in KATANGA. Frequently the Company at

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KAMINAVILLE had to be temporarily reinforced from a platoon by the BASE to fulfill its commitments. On 14 DECEMBER C Company was relieved at KAMINAVILLE by A Company who remained in occupation of this post until withdrawn in JANUARY 1961 for the journey home. During C Company's tour of duty at KAMINAVILLE (21 NOVEMBER to 13 DECEMBER) they conducted 21 train guards, 19 to LUENA and 2 to LUPUTA.

19. Other duties which devolved on 32 Battalion at KAMINA BASE were as follows:-

Company located at Base 1.

- a. Main Guard.
- b. New Runway Guard.
- c. Airfield Buildings Guard.
- d. Petro - CONGO Guard.
- e. Waterworks Guard.
- f. BUKAMA Barrier Guard.

Troops located at Base 2.

- a. Main Guard.
- b. Transmitter Station Guard.
- c. Receiver Station Guard.
- d. R.R.R. Guard.
- e. Ammunition Dump Guard.
- f. LUPULU Barrier Guard.

In addition a permanent guard had to be provided for the water and power station installations at KILUBI, approximately 60 miles NORTH of the Base. This guard consisted originally of one section whose tour of duty lasted for one week but, on orders from SCOMEF this was later increased to platoon strength.

20. The month of DECEMBER passed quietly enough. The usual small scares occurred from time to time and various rumours were rife of impending attacks on KAMINAVILLE and KAMINA BASE by either the BALUBAS, the GENDERAMERIE or both, neither of which transpired. Christmas was celebrated in true IRISH fashion and on the receipt of a cargo of welfare stores from IRELAND which arrived just in time added to the general well being. In the meantime plans were going ahead for the return of the Battalion home. This commenced on 13 JANUARY 1961 and the last of the Unit arrived at COLLINSTOWN Airport on 16 JANUARY 1961.

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CHAPTER VI.

"A" COMPANY - EASTERN COMMAND - COMMANDED BY CEANNFORT T. TRACEY.

1. "A" Company, 32 Infantry Battalion, formed up as a Company for the first time in the Gymnasium, Cathal Brúgha Barracks at 09.00 hours on Friday, 22nd JULY, 1960. Its personnel were drawn from all units of Eastern Command irrespective of Corps and Services. The Company was inspected and addressed by Officer Commanding Eastern Command and later entrucked and moved to McDonagh Barracks, CURRAGH CAMP; arriving at 13.00 hours. Here it continued the work of completion of inoculations, of issuing of clothing and other equipment and took part in the ceremonies and parades as outlined for the Battalion in Chapter I.
2. On Thursday, 28th JULY, three MATS C130's lifted the complete Company and stores and flew on the same route as already described in another Chapter. The Company arrived in GOMA on morning of Sunday, 31st JULY. It was allotted accommodation and later the Company Commander got a warning order to prepare to move by boat to BUKAVU on 2nd AUGUST.
3. BUKAVU is the capital of the KIVU Province and accordingly the seat of the Provincial Government. It is a beautiful city situated on an inlet of LAKE KIVU. It is about 120 miles from GOMA and can be reached by road, by sea and by air. The journey by land is over a very rough road and through some mountainous areas. Careful driving is essential all the way. The scenery is beautiful. The journey by lake is somewhat shorter than the land run and is always a very pleasant experience as the water is calm and placid, and the boats are comfortable and powerful.
4. The airfield for BUKAVU is in RUANA URUNDI which is now a separate state from the REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO and thus did not come under UNITED NATIONS control. Crossing the border from the airfield to the city was often the cause of trouble with the local police and military. However, we used the airfield quite a lot, and we always got the co-operation of the BELGIANS and natives in the area. BUKAVU is a modern city with most up-to-date churches, houses, shops, cinemas etc. and has an outward appearance of wealth.
5. The advance party from "A" Company moved by boat from GOMA to BUKAVU on 1 AUGUST, 1960. It consisted of 5 officers and 27 other ranks. They were well received by native officials including MR. MEROHU the President of the Province and the Local Force Publique Commandant. The remainder of the Company moved to BUKAVU on 2 AUGUST and was initially housed in a large disused school. LIEUTENANT LINDHOLM, SWEDISH interpreter was also allotted by Battalion HQ to this Company.
6. Guards were immediately established at BUKAVU Post Office, The Central Power Station and the Bridge on the border connecting BUKAVU with the airfield known as SHANGUGU. Armed native troops were withdrawn from their posts, and unarmed police began town patrols with our police.

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Peace reigned at once, and people were allowed to go about their business unmolested. There were still native armed guards on the President's House, the Electricity Transformer, the Water Pumping Station and other places, but these guards had no contact with the people and accordingly were not a nuisance.

7. At 19.45 hours 3rd AUGUST the following SITREP was dispatched by morse: "Company established at ATHENE ROYALE, BUKAVU. Contact made with Ministers of KIVU Provincial Government. Agreed the Force Publique and Gendarmes will not carry arms in public, but will use them only for training within their camp. Guards have been established at the following locations:- The Border bridge at SHANGUGU : BUKAVU POST OFFICE : CENTRAL POWER STATION. Armed native troops were withdrawn from these posts. Unarmed police on duty with our force. Armed native troops on guard at following: Water Pumping Station : Electricity Transformer Station: Stores of Electrical Spares : Residence of the President and Ministers of Province. These guards will not have contact with the public and are only to protect property."
8. M. Le BAR - owner of a HAM Radio Station who had previously assisted by sending messages to Battalion HQ in GOMA - informed Company HQ at 21.30 hours 3rd AUGUST that natives were attacking settlers at TSHIBERI on the SHABUNDA ROAD approximately 46 Kms. from BUKAVU. This report was supposedly based on S.O.S. messages picked up by M. Le BAR. Company Commander, LIEUTENANT O'LEARY and patrol of 10 men with interpreter moved out at 21.30 hours - travelling in A.N.C. carriers. After full investigation the patrol returned, satisfied that there had been no incidents in the area and that we had been the victims of a hoax, possibly to try out our reactions.
9. Patrol to MWENGA (CAPTAIN CANTRELL and 2 N.C.Os.) left Company HQ at 12.35 hours, 4th AUGUST. Patrol did not succeed in reaching MWENGA due to bad roads. Arrived back 11.00 hours; 5th AUGUST.
15.30 hours, 4th AUGUST - M. MERTENS - INTER COMMUNICATIONS reported to Company HQ that telegraph was now working between BUKAVU - KINDU - GOMA - LEOPOLDVILLE.
Patrol, 5th AUGUST, (LIEUTENANT WRIGHT, 2 N.C.Os and 2 Men) escorted M. LARS GRONGVIST of SENTAB CONGO (a Company constructing a hydro-electric scheme for FORCES D'LEST) to KATOBO. Patrol passed through RUANDA-URUNDI and on return journey landrover went over on its side near PONT NATUREL. Nobody was injured and landrover was lifted back onto the road and returned to Company HQ without incident.
10. (a) On 5th AUGUST, Company Commander and Quartermaster attended reception at PLATEAU MEDICAL honouring 10th anniversary of the setting up of the Commission of CCTA. President of KIVU Province present and spoke to Company Commander re establishment of Battalion HQ in BUKAVU. At 17.00 hours on 5th AUGUST, COLONEL GRAY, Director of Plans and Operations, phoned Company HQ direct from DUBLIN. He had not received any information as to location of Battalion or how it had fared since departure. He requested that Battalion Officer Commanding should submit report. He informed us that 33 Infantry Battalion was being formed and that they would leave IRELAND on 18th AUGUST. He asked for suggestions re organisation and equipment. Did we require more rations? or anything else? Cable him urgently. Re payment of troops - where will money be sent?

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- (b) 05.15 hours 6th AUGUST: LIEUTENANT WRIGHT, 2 N.C.Os and 3 Men left Company HQ by jeep for KALEHE to meet patrol from GOMA at 11.00 hours. Contact made as arranged and nothing unusual to report.
11. (a) 14.30 hours, 8th AUGUST: Company Commander had interview with Officer Commanding 2 Battalion F.P. He discovered that there were 4 Companies in the Battalion - No. 1 Company - BAGIRA : No. 2 Company - SAEO : No. 3 Company - GOMA : No. 4 Company - KINDU : Each Company had approximately 175 all ranks. Battalion Commander stated that troops were going on their monthly manoeuvres on 16th and 17th AUGUST. He agreed to allow ONUC to accompany them on exercises.
- (b) 09.40 8th AUGUST : Patrol consisting of CAPTAIN CANTRELL, 2 N.C.Os, 6 Privates and one interpreter left for KAMITUGA. Patrol interviewed local administrator at MWENGA and found no disturbances. Patrol then accompanied by administrator left for KAMITUGA and found no disturbances there. Patrol returned without incident at 19.30 hours, 9th AUGUST.
- (c) 15.30 hours 8th AUGUST : Company Commander had interview with Assistant Commissioner of Police. He agreed that police would NOT carry arms. Company Commander pointed out that police should carry out their normal duties and that if aid were needed we would send out patrols with these police.
- (d) 19.45 hours 8th AUGUST : Message from Battalion HQ - "Contact civil authorities KALEHE re attack on white planters at KYBHTI and LUTNGO. Planter JACQUES VAN HOEGAERDEN." Patrol left Company HQ at 08.30 hours 9th AUGUST, i/c LIEUTENANT WRIGHT, 2 N.C.Os and 2 Men. (LIEUTENANT WINDBERG - SWEDISH Interpreter). Message proved to be correct. Worker appeared to be mis-handled and one EUROPEAN beaten up but not badly. Gendarme had arrested 5 ring-leaders of trouble earlier in the day. Patrol returned 18.15 hours same day, without incident.
12. (a) 10th AUGUST : Outpost of 1 N.C.O. and 3 Men established at IRSAC, LIVIRO. This is a scientific institute. LIEUTENANT DUGGAN and CAPTAIN DALY, Medical Officer, established the outpost. Company maintained outpost here up to 15.45 hours, 11th AUGUST. Message received re trouble on island of OKA, near KALEHE - 2 dead and several wounded.
- (b) 09.30 hours, 13th AUGUST : Patrol of 1 Officer, 1 Sergeant, 4 Corporals, 16 Privates, 1 Medical Orderly, 2 Interpreters and 2 Native drivers set out for KALEHE to investigate recent disturbances at OKA, leaving half the patrol at KALEHE, and proceed himself and other half to MINOVA. This was done. Administrator at KALEHE was afraid for his life as his driver had been killed in OKA incident and he feared revenge from driver's family. LIEUTENANT DUGGAN and 2nd half of patrol succeeded in arriving in MINOVA at 16.50 hours on 13th AUGUST and on contacting the local chief, found situation calm. Next morning patrol left for GOMA and reported to Officer Commanding 32nd Battalion. Battalion Operations Officer instructed patrol to return to Company HQ BUKAVU on 15th AUGUST and that patrols would be sent out twice weekly from BUKAVU and GOMA meeting on the way and would check with administrator and chiefs in the villages concerning the situation. This would relieve unit of necessity of maintaining section outposts.

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Only unusual incident of this patrol was while at KALEHE the sentry on the house occupied by the section, caught a CONGOLESE coming up behind him with an iron implement and on turning round cut the man's hand with his bayonet. The CONGOLESE then fled into the darkness.

13. 14.30 hours, 17th AUGUST : Conference between Company Commander, Staff Officers No. 3 Group STANLEYVILLE to reach agreement re patrols in BUKAVU.
18.00 hours, 18th AUGUST : Combined CONGOLESE and IRISH patrols left camp to patrol BUKAVU and suburbs. Patrol carried out without incident.
16.35 hours, 18th AUGUST : CAPTAIN CUNNINGHAM and patrol who had made contact with the twice weekly patrol from GOMA returned with 2 Jeeps, Welfare Rations and Post.
14. (a) 19th AUGUST : 1 N.C.O. and 3 Privates established in outposts at KATANA which was a Roman Catholic Mission and Hospital.
- (b) 08.50 hours: Secretary to District Commissioner came to Company HQ to report that the King KABARE was rising against the local administrator. Two natives had been injured and this had led to unrest. District Commissioner requested that a UNITED NATIONS patrol be sent to restore order. Company Commander called on District Commissioner and it was decided to send a section to KABARE to patrol the area for a few days. LIEUTENANT WRIGHT, Sergeant MAGUIRE, 1 Corporal, 8 Privates and 1 Medical Orderly left Company HQ for KABARE at 14.20 hours, 21st AUGUST. LIEUTENANT WRIGHT was to return to Camp that night having got the facts of the trouble from the local administrator and leave the Sergeant i/c of the party. Administrator, King KABARE and Adjutant of BAGIRA camp were in conference when patrol arrived at 15.30 approximately. By 16.30 hours an agreement had been arrived at with the King and Administrator informed the Officer in Command of patrol that their assistance was no longer necessary.
- (c) 18.55 hours, 31st AUGUST: Message received from Corporal in KATANA that a CONGOLESE had been shot by a F.P. soldier. This wounded man was subsequently moved to CONGOLESE Hospital in BUKAVU.
- (d) 08.30 hours, 23rd AUGUST: Normal bi-weekly patrol to HOTEL BELVEDERE to meet patrol from GOMA. Patrol escorted 3 SWEDISH Missionary Ladies who travelled with the patrol back to GOMA. Patrol on return journey visited IRSAC and KATANA where two outposts were being maintained - all calm. Then patrol proceeded to LUGENDO where trouble was reported. SULTAN KABUKU and his Secretary were interviewed and it was established that due to KING KABARE's policy of trying to keep in his own hands all tax collection, justice and administration there was continuous trouble in the area. It was stated by SULTAN KABUKU that on Sunday 21st AUGUST, the King's own Police Force had killed two natives and captured a lesser Chief's wife in spite of 4 F.P. soldiers who were stationed in LUGENDO. The Sultan requested that a UNITED NATIONS patrol be sent around the area of KABARE to try and re-assure the people.

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15. (a) 09.00 hours, 23rd AUGUST: SERGEANT MAGUIRE and ten Privates left on 7 days' escort duty to TOPOGRAPHICAL COMPANY in KALIBA area. Returned 31st AUGUST - no incidents.
- (b) 09.45 hours, 24th AUGUST: LIEUTENANT O'LEARY, 1 N.C.O. and 2 Men with interpreter to UVIRA where they were returning VW. van to Administrator. Patrol returned at 16.35 - Area quiet.
- (c) During the night of 24/25 AUGUST combined patrols discovered cases of looting in the town. A total of 5 CONGOLESE handed over to the Police. 08.30 hours, 25th AUGUST: CAPTAIN DUGGAN, LIEUTENANT WRIGHT, 1 N.C.O. and 3 Men out on patrol to KATANA - LUHIHI - LUGENDO - BIRAVA. Contact made again with SULTAN KABUDU who was worried about a car parked in his village. (Car was either stolen or one of KING KABAKA'S RAIDERS). Otherwise there was no trouble in area.
16. 11.30 hours, 27th AUGUST: From Battalion HQ, GOMA, this message received: "Schools likely to re-open 6th SEPTEMBER. Examine possible alternative accommodation your Company. Also reconnoitre possible location assigned to HQ Company BUKAVU". 27th AUGUST: Guard at KATANA withdrawn.
17. (a) 27/28/29 AUGUST: Tension at SHANGUGU BRIDGE and POWER STATION. First, over BELGIAN troops turning back a truck. Secondly, CONGOLESE troops were of the opinion that BELGIANS Paracommandos were holding two CONGOLESE soldiers - BELGIANS in RUANDA-URUNDI denied this. Thirdly, BELGIANS had one of the CONGOLESE's helmets which they refused to return until approached by O.N.U.C. Fourthly, a CONGOLESE policeman accidentally shot his son and fled into RUANDA and was taken into custody by the BELGIANS who would not hand him back to CONGOLESE until O.N.U.C. was present. Company Commander was present at hand-out and tensions eased.
- (b) Visit of COLONEL BYRNE, Officer in Command Eastern Provinces, with CAPTAIN MONAGHAN. Guard of Honour provided by Company under LIEUTENANT M. DUGGAN.
- (c) 08.30 hours 31st AUGUST: CAPTAIN BOYLE, ACC., I.N.C.O. and 3 Men to SUCRAF, UVIRA. Made contact with Technical Manager and Factory Manager and was assisted in every way. Received all relevant information re production, yield market, spare parts situation, fuel, economic situation, personnel employed, EUROPEAN and CONGOLESE; which was the subject of a long report to the Battalion Operations Officer.
- (d) 2nd SEPTEMBER: Engineer Officer to PONT CLAIRE to inspect buildings, lighting, and sanitary arrangements. Fatigue party there in the afternoon. Curfew imposed with effect from 19.00 hours on all CONGOLESE in BUKAVU, by Chief of Police. Company Commander to conference with President of KIVU who feared possibility of Civil War.
18. (a) 12.45 hours, 5th SEPTEMBER: Battalion 2 i/c COMMANDANT O'CARROLL and H.C.F. arrived BUKAVU. CONGOLESE Battalion Commander and Staff called for conference with 32 Battalion 2 i/c.
- (b) 6th SEPTEMBER: Battalion 2 i/c Company Commander conferred with President of KIVU Province.

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- (c) 6th SEPTEMBER: LIEUTENANT O'LEARY and Platoon detailed to stand-by for move to GOMA at 2 hours notice. 1st line ammunition, blankets and kits made ready. Party to travel by speed-boat hired from OTRACO. - No. 2 Platoon to GOMA.
7th SEPTEMBER: Detachment from IRSAC withdrawn.
- (d) 7th SEPTEMBER: Company Commander and interpreter left to visit Provincial President - MR. MIROHU re activities of A.N.C. At 11.00 hours Company Commander telephoned from Government Office: "All ranks to stand-by, mortar bombs to be fused, MMG belts to be filled. Stand-to Party to be ready to move. Fatigue Party at PONT CLAIRE to be withdrawn. RT sets to be netted - sand-bags to be filled and camp to be prepared for all round defence."

19. This alert was necessary due to fact that the A.N.C. had taken control of the border and would not allow any exits or entrances without authority of Officer Commanding A.N.C. President was being ignored and was making a final effort to assert himself. If he failed he intended to call on UNITED NATIONS to take over control. Message to this effect was sent to GOMA.

20. 08.30 hours, 9th SEPTEMBER: Report from Minister for Mines who stated that there were Paracommandos at FIZI and that 3 A.N.C. soldiers had been killed. 10.30 hours, 9th SEPTEMBER: CAPTAIN CANTRELL, 1 interpreter and ten other Ranks left on patrol to FIZI to investigate incidents. On arriving at FIZI contact was made with M. DAVITEX, Chef de Poste, and MAJOR BANGALA who had come south from BUKAVU with 24 CONGOLESE soldiers; also to investigate the incident. The incident, it was learned, had taken place on KATANGA border when KATANGA and CONGOLESE soldiers were chatting until a former Officer of the Force Publique (a BELGIAN) who was now serving with the KATANGESE appeared. An argument developed and two CONGOLESE were shot dead and one wounded. This was reported by the wounded CONGOLESE soldier and was not confirmed.

21. CAPTAIN CANTRELL spoke to the surgeon who operated on the wounded CONGOLESE - who had three bullets in his back. Patrol reported that there was much unrest in the area on the return journey as natives were going about armed and setting up road blocks. Patrol returned at 20.00 hours on 10th SEPTEMBER.

22. (a) 06.40 hours, 10th SEPTEMBER: Message from GOMA re move of Company to new quarters at PONT CLAIRE and the possible move of a 2nd Platoon to GOMA at 3 hours notice. This move of Platoon was cancelled after Company Commander had made case that position in BUKAVU would then be unworkable.

(b) 08.15 hours, 12th SEPTEMBER: Patrol consisting of LIEUTENANT WRIGHT, 1 N.C.O. and 2 Privates, with interpreter to UVIRA on instruction of Battalion Operations Officer, GOMA, to find out situation. Party travelled by escarpment road as all travel through RUANDA-URUNDI was prohibited. DR. HALLEN of UVIRA HOSPITAL and M. MORRIEU of local hotel interviewed. Both confirmed that there was no trouble in area. Patrol proceeded to SUCRAF installation and interviewed the Technical Manager, M. LEBLONE. Position had remained unchanged since visit of last patrol on 31st AUGUST, except that EUROPEAN houses had been visited on the

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10th SEPTEMBER by seven A.N.C. soldiers and told to prepare to evacuate as their houses and appointments were taken over by CONGOLESE in the near future. M. LEBLONE requested that a section of UNITED NATIONS troops be sent to SUCRAF as a standing patrol. Our patrol toured the area and then proceeded back to DUKAVU and arrived at 17.15 hours. MAJOR DUNCAN SMITH applied for position as interpreter and began to work with Company before appointment was confirmed.

- (c) "A" Company moved to PONT CLAIRE hotel. CAPTAIN CANTRELL, Company Staff Officer, notified on 14th SEPTEMBER to leave for ELIZABETHVILLE next day to understudy AIR OPERATIONS OFFICER with a view to eventually taking over the appointment. CAPTAIN CANTRELL left next day on aircraft which was taking COLONEL McINERNEY, A.M.C. to ELIZABETHVILLE.
- (d) CORPORAL N. CARROLL and 2 Privates accompanied EAST GERMAN Medical Team to SHABUNDA where they were turned back by A.N.C. They were escorting Medical personnel to KINDU. They arrived back in Company HQ at 06.45 hours on 16th SEPTEMBER.
- (e) 16.15 hours, 16th SEPTEMBER: LIEUTENANT VAN MELLE telephoned to say that he had received a message that EUROPEANS in FIZI were surrounded by A.N.C. and police. Patrol of 1 Officer (CAPTAIN CUNNINGHAM), 1 interpreter, 1 Sergeant and 8 Privates left to investigate position in FIZI at 09.00 hours on 17th SEPTEMBER. Patrol found that in DARAKA, near FIZI, civilians were openly carrying arms and manning the barriers on the roads on both sides of the village. EUROPEANS were leaving because of the hostile and aggressive attitude of both the police and CONGOLESE civilians. The patrol escorted three brothers (HOAREAU) and their possessions to safety. They were BRITISH subjects from SEYCHELLES. The patrol then visited the Protestant Mission which consisted of six men, six women and two children. They were ready to leave the area and had their entire possessions loaded on five trucks. They were anxiously awaiting permission from the Administrator to leave.
- (f) The patrol left 3 Privates at the Mission for their protection and with the intention of re-inforcing them on the following Wednesday. On continuing on to FIZI; the centre of Administration and the HQ of the A.N.C., the patrol found the situation all calm. On the return journey SUCRAF at UVIRA was again visited and the management were found to be very apprehensive about outcome of wages dispute and situation generally. The patrol then returned to Company HQ without incident.

23. At 00.45 hours, 18th SEPTEMBER, an O.N.U.C. Guard of 1 N.C.O. and 6 Men escorted M. le President to his own home from Company HQ where he had come for protection following a report on the death of M. LUMUMBA. Guard remained on President's house for two days.

24. The same day Bishop CLEIRE called to report that six priests had been arrested in KASONGO. Battalion HQ and "B" Company at KINDU informed. "B" Company sent out a strong patrol to investigate incidents.

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- (d) CORPORAL N. CARROLL and 2 Privates accompanied EAST GERMAN Medical Team to SHABUNDA where they were turned back by A.N.C. They were escorting Medical personnel to KINDU. They arrived back in Company HQ at 06.45 hours on 16th SEPTEMBER.
- (e) 16.15 hours, 16th SEPTEMBER: LIEUTENANT VAN MELLE telephoned to say that he had received a message that EUROPEANS in FIZI were surrounded by A.N.C. and police. Patrol of 1 Officer (CAPTAIN CUNNINGHAM), 1 interpreter, 1 Sergeant and 8 Privates left to investigate position in FIZI at 09.00 hours on 17th SEPTEMBER. Patrol found that in DARAKA, near FIZI, civilians were openly carrying arms and manning the barriers on the roads on both sides of the village. EUROPEANS were leaving because of the hostile and aggressive attitude of both the police and CONGOLESE civilians. The patrol escorted three brothers (HOAREAU) and their possessions to safety. They were BRITISH subjects from SEYCHELLES. The patrol then visited the Protestant Mission which consisted of six men, six women and two children. They were ready to leave the area and had their entire possessions loaded on five trucks. They were anxiously awaiting permission from the Administrator to leave.
- (f) The patrol left 3 Privates at the Mission for their protection and with the intention of re-inforcing them on the following Wednesday. On continuing on to FIZI; the centre of Administration and the HQ of the A.N.C., the patrol found the situation all calm. On the return journey SUCRAF at UVIRA was again visited and the management were found to be very apprehensive about outcome of wages dispute and situation generally. The patrol then returned to Company HQ without incident.

23. At 00.45 hours, 18th SEPTEMBER, an O.N.U.C. Guard of 1 N.C.O. and 6 Men escorted M. le President to his own home from Company HQ where he had come for protection following a report on the death of M. LUMUMBA. Guard remained on President's house for two days.

24. The same day Bishop CLEIRE called to report that six priests had been arrested in KASONGO. Battalion HQ and "E" Company at KINDU informed. "D" Company sent out a strong patrol to investigate incidents.

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25. (a) At 08.45 hours on 21st SEPTEMBER a patrol consisting of CAPTAIN CUNNINGHAM, 2 N.C.O.s and 7 Privates plus 3 ANC other ranks with an interpreter left for BARAKA and FIZI again. Their mission was to relieve the 3 men on protective duty at the Protestant Mission at BARAKA and to protect the Mission personnel during their evacuation. At 13.00 hours the patrol arrived at the SWEDISH Mission in UVIRA. There they were met by the Guard they had left at BARAKA who informed them that they had been ordered to leave by the Chef de Poste and the police within two hours and that if they entered BARAKA again WAR would be the result. The patrol nevertheless proceeded to BARAKA with the three members of the Guard and entered the Mission without incident. The three ANC soldiers who were accompanying the patrol then requested permission to instruct the police that they and the UNITED NATIONS troops had arrived from BUKAVU with orders to escort the Mission personnel safely out of BARAKA. CAPTAIN CUNNINGHAM gave his consent reluctantly as he feared treachery but his fears were unfounded. The three ANC arrived back within half an hour to say that the Mission personnel could leave the next morning without interference. The patrol escorting the Mission personnel left the next morning and were astonished to find the natives waving farewell and the CONGOLESE civilians no longer carried arms. This change of attitude could only be attributed to the influence which the presence of the ANC must have had on the local population. On the return journey the patrol was caught on an earthquake in the UVIRA district. The road south of the town was blocked by boulders and rocks coming down the mountainside and a path just wide enough for the vehicles had to be made. The road was cracked and cratered. The patrol was lucky to pass through unscathed as during the move the tremors continued and the stones continued to fall. The patrol escorted the Missionaries to the SWEDISH Mission at UVIRA and proceeded back to BUKAVU arriving there at 19.45 hours on 22nd SEPTEMBER without incident.

(b) At 09.15 hours on 21st SEPTEMBER an AIR CONGO aircraft flying from USUMBURA to KAMEMBE was fired on and hit when flying low over ANC Camp SAIO. ANC stated that they thought it was KATANGA troops coming to attack them.

26. 22nd SEPTEMBER 1960: Company Commander attended Conference at the house of President MIROHU. The attendance included senior members of the court and senior ranking officers of the Army. The Conference developed into a criticism of the UNITED NATIONS policy in general, listing such things as UNITED NATIONS interest in protecting whites only, and that UNITED NATIONS were interfering in the internal affairs of the state. ANC officers at this Conference stated that the arrest of white people was completely their (ANC) business and further that despite the guarantee already given the ANC border guards would remain there until their removal was sanctioned by HQ 3 Group, STANLEYVILLE. Officer Commanding "A" Company in his report to Battalion HQ outlined the definite anti-UNITED NATIONS feeling amongst some members of the Government and also the fact that the ANC were not prepared to carry out the instructions of the Provincial Government except when it suited them. Also pointed out to Battalion HQ was the fact that the growth of power within the ANC could lead to the disruption of the Government and that the solution to the problem seemed to be the disarming of the ANC.

27. Following the Conference ANC guards were in fact withdrawn from the Border posts. "A" Company withdrew their guards on the understanding that the police and custom officials would control all movement. This happy state of affairs was destined not to last, however. Within two days the ANC were back again, this time digging trenches and numbering approximately platoon strength at SHANGUGU BRIDGE. All movement here consequently affected; - ANC very worried as they said that they had got radio message to the effect that BELGIAN Para-commandos were massing to attack BUKAVU. Tension was rapidly mounting due to all this ANC activity. Officer Commanding "A" Company attended Conference frequently at this stage in an endeavour to ease the situation and get traffic moving at Border controls again. Some of these Meetings were held in the UNITED NATIONS camp where the President stated that the ANC has issued orders for his and other Ministers arrest and he was worried. He also stated that the ANC troops were not obeying orders that they should be sent back to STANLEYVILLE and that if they were not disarmed that they would depose the Government.
28. During this time a M. BECKER of SHANGUGU was arrested by the ANC for bringing laundry of BELGIAN Para-troopers to BUKAVU to have it laundered by the HOTEL RESIDENCE (M. DE BEVE). The laundry was confiscated and both M. DE BEVE and BECKER lodged in jail. This confiscation of laundry ultimately resulted in the famous "Battle of the Shirts" which will be dealt with later. To realise the tension that existed at this time one has only to look at the text of a message sent from President MIROHU to the Central Government at LEOPOLDVILLE. It reads "Situation in BUKAVU alarming and dangerous. Unless ANC are disarmed immediately, BUKAVU will be a city of fire and blood."
29. Further Conference followed between Officer Commanding "A" Company, the ANC, President MIROHU, M.J. GRUN and M. DAVIDE of UNITED NATIONS Civil Operations, newly arrived from GOMA. Again the ANC were adamant that they would control the Border posts and all movement through these posts, that no person could pass the control points unless in possession of passes signed by the ANC. Following these Conferences the ANC began arresting people more or less "ad lib", pulling them into their jeeps, ill-treating them and locking them in jail. It was at this stage that Officer Commanding "A" Company decided to mount day patrols, dividing the town into sectors and covering these areas by foot and jeep. This action put a stop to the wholesale arrests and further conferences resulted in the withdrawal of the ANC from the Border posts. Tension was eased considerably.
30. At 08.30 hours on 1/10/60 the I.O. in GOMA asked Officer Commanding "A" Company to send a patrol to KAMITUGA where armed ANC from MANIEMA district were reported to be giving trouble. Officer Commanding "A" Company explained that due to unrest and also lack of transport this patrol could not be undertaken. LIEUTENANT WRIGHT's patrol to SUCRAF, UVIRA, returned on this day (1/10/60) and stated that the expected trouble arising from pay disputes did not materialize. Definite easing of tension at this stage despite "A" Company's insistence that two of these arrested and ill-treated in the recent ANC activity (MS. BECKER and DE BEBE) be released.
31. OCTOBER 6th saw the arrival of COLONEL J. McCARTHY, Deputy UNITED NATIONS Chief of Staff, LIEUTENANT/COLONEL LEE and Staff. Party met by excellent Guard of Honour, complete with white belts, under the command of LIEUTENANT WRIGHT. Battalion Officer Commanding also arrived this day and conferred with Officer Commanding "A" Company. All the group left for GOMA, the following day, OCTOBER 7th.

32. OCTOBER 7th: Another busy day for "A" Company. Disturbances once again initiated by ANC. A BELGIAN White Father, Father DUMOULIN, from KATANA Mission was arrested by ANC at POWER HOUSE BRIDGE, was assaulted and had his truck impounded. CAPTAIN DUGGAN and interpreter secured his release and an escort was provided for him back to KATANA. Just at this time we saw enacted the BUKAVU "Battle of the Shirts". Three high ranking Officers (CONGOLESE) has asked for safe conduct through RUANDA to KEMEMBE Airport where they were booked to fly to KINDU. When permission was sought from the BELGIAN Paratroopers to have the safe conduct arranged they replied that no passage through RUANDA would be permitted for these Officers unless their (the BELGIANS) laundry (recently confiscated by the ANC) was returned. On investigation by "A" Company patrol it was discovered that the Officers had actually gone to KEMEMBE Airport at 07:00 hours that morning unmolested and taken off for KINDU. Next to arrive at SHANGUGU BRIDGE was the ANC Battalion Commander, CAPTAIN BANGALA, and he, not knowing that the three ANC Officers were in fact en route to KINDU and fearing that the BELGIANS were holding them, decided to return to his camp to fetch the laundry for the Paratroopers. Two hours later CAPTAIN BANGALA arrived but instead of the promised laundry he had with him two platoons of fully armed ANC plus MMGs and Mortars. This group immediately took up their positions overlooking the Border post at SHANGUGU BRIDGE eager and anxious to take on all comers. "A" Company patrol commander forthwith arranged a "pow-wow" between the BELGIAN Lieutenant (i/c of the section of Para-Commandos), CAPTAIN BANGALA and himself. This took place dramatically in the middle of SHANGUGU BRIDGE with CAPTAIN BANGALA demanding the release of the three ANC Officers, the BELGIAN Lieutenant demanding the return of their laundry and all the while the 2 platoons of ANC becoming more and more warlike. This Meeting broke up without any agreement despite the fact that CAPTAIN BANGALA did learn that the 3 ANC Officers were in fact in KINDU by that time, and as for the BELGIAN "Paras" - still no laundry but only BANGALA's promise. There now remained the problem of the 2 ANC platoons in the hills, which they refused to vacate, but with the determined effort of more of "A" Company troops the ANC were forced to withdraw half of them. The "battle" had not yet ended. Coming down from the hills the UNITED NATIONS soldiers observed Officer Commanding "A" Company and President MIROHU having a heated discussion on the whole affair in the middle of the road with the result that "A" Company withdrew all troops leaving the remaining ANC on the hill arguing amongst themselves.

33. Following all this activity by the ANC came a message from M. VANDENBURG the Director of IRSAC (internationally known AFRICAN Research Station) looking for UNITED NATIONS protection at IRSAC. Unfortunately this could not be provided due to the actions of the ANC. Indeed a message from Battalion HQ asking that a patrol be sent to SHABUNDA 350 Kms away to clear the Airfield there was also refused. (This patrol was in fact sent out on the 11th OCTOBER). Again on this day of all activity a M. CHATEAU when menaced by ANC was ordered by them to drive to the jail escorted by 2 ANC soldiers. He wisely drove to "A" Company camp where the 2 ANC at seeing the blue berets took to their heels and ran. A guard had to be put on M. CHATEAU's house that night.

34. A new effort at solving the mail problem was made at this time with the help of "A" Company's UNITED NATIONS Finance Officer, M. PHILIP de GAIGNERON. New arrangement was that all outgoing mail from "A" Company would be sent through USUMBURA at UNITED NATIONS expense.

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35. After this very active day the ANC night patrol turned up again at 18.00 hours to go on duty. These were joint patrols aimed at, successfully so far, preventing looting and stealing by the local population. At the end of SEPTEMBER, due to the very high tension that existed between the ANC and UNITED NATIONS, the ANC refused to send out the nightly patrol. Now they were back and this was acknowledged by "A" Company as more or less a return to normal good relations again.
36. Next day a N.C.O. and 1 Man on escort duty with a EUROPEAN was stopped near BAGIEA camp and taken into the camp by ANC in jeeps. They were later transferred to Police HQ. A vigorous protest was made to CAPTAIN BANGALA by Officer Commanding "A" Company who demanded their instant release. This was done and also an apology offered to "A" Company by BANGALA. The number of arrests began to decrease again and for the next few days the number of ANC soldiers occupying the Hills at SHANGUGU also began to diminish. There was some disquiet in the area due to the fact that the ANC positions on the hill were in the gardens and back-yards of the EUROPEAN houses there. However, this was settled by placing a small UNITED NATIONS guard on one of the houses in the area.
37. OCTOBER 11th: 08.00 hours on this date saw the departure of CAPTAIN CANTRELL and small patrol to SHABUNDA. Mission was to get permission from ANC there to land a UNITED NATIONS Medical Team with supplies by plane and radio back to HQ whether airfield would be clear and safe. This patrol encountered KIVU roads at their worst. Torrential rain coming up through floorboards, mountain mist and lightning of appalling density, slowed the patrol to such an extent that it took 14 hours solid driving to cover the 350 Kms. On arrival at SHABUNDA the patrol was met by a hostile group of ANC soldiers, but once diplomacy won the day and 22.00 hours saw CORPORAL KING and signaller frantically climbing banana trees in an endeavour to set up aeriels for his radio. Eventually a big cheer from the small patrol as communication was established with Battalion HQ and a message was sent to the effect that the airfield was clear for landing. The plane duly arrived the following morning and supplies were brought in to the Medical team (EAST GERMAN) at SHABUNDA. Another "mission accomplished" for "A" Company.
38. The next few days saw the men of "A" Company return to their normal routine duties again including another Guard of Honour; this time for MAJOR GENERAL FOSTER and NIGERIAN Battalion Commander and group who arrived and were very impressed with the turn out of the Guard of Honour. This party was entertained by MR. MIROHU in the Presidential House where an introductory conference took place. (The NIGERIANS were due to replace "A" Company in BUKAVU when "A" Company moved to KAMINA). The wholesome arrests by ANC now diminished to only the odd arrest being made which "A" Company was easily able to overcome; and indeed the next phase of ANC activity was one of indignation. This was expressed at the action of the police who decided that since the Army had been paid the promised rise in pay and they had not, that they would go on strike. This they did and further, they threatened to arrest the President. The latter scornfully rejected UNITED NATIONS protection, promised the strikers their increase in pay and within two days the situation was normal again.
39. At this time towards the end of OCTOBER and early NOVEMBER the Company was actively engaged in the following type of routine duties:- Daily and Nightly town patrols, guards at the following locations:- Company HQ., Power House, Power House Bridge, SHANGUGU Bridge, Post Office, LWIRO (TBSAC)

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unloading of planes at KAMEMBE Airport (goods and foodstuffs for UNITED NATIONS WHO), all these onerous tasks and in addition the occasional 2 or 3 day patrol sent out for information and intelligence purposes. Thus the Company was kept busy and once the ANC began their frequent "blow outs" all personnel were really at full stretch. On NOVEMBER 7th a special report was sent to Battalion HQ by Officer Commanding "A" Company concerning the political unrest in BUKAVU. This unrest was caused when a motion of censure of the Government and Ministers was tabled by some of the deputies. This gave rise to quite an amount of political controversy and the President threatened to arrest the responsible deputies. Some deputies were in fact in jail. When the assembly met again to debate the motion of censure, the ANC were detailed off to patrol the town and some had surrounded the assembly itself and were even located in the hall. Some of the threatened Ministers sought UNITED NATIONS protection and were informed that this would be forthcoming if required. All "A" Company's patrols were alerted on this date, but fortunately no incidents were reported. A number of arrests were made under the guise of political agitation but the resulting incarceration was short lived. Some deputies were, however, dismissed and once more BUKAVU returned to normal.

40. The pace of messages arriving at "A" Company HQ at this time began to increase noticeably and their contents invariably dealt with the arrival time of the relieving NIGERIANS and the departure time of "A" Company. After a few false starts and timings the first move was made by LIEUTENANT WRIGHT and his platoon (No. 3). This party moved to GOMA by boat at 13.00 hours on 8th NOVEMBER with the remainder of the Company on a 24 hour notice to be ready to travel. In the middle of this movement our radio operator, CORPORAL HUGHES, picked up the radio messages of the patrol from the 33rd Battalion sent out to investigate the non return of LIEUTENANT GLEESON's patrol. It was in this fashion that "A" Company received the grimest news of all - the ambush at NIEMBA and its tragic consequences. Just after lunch on that fateful day a sorrowing "A" Company knelt in the dining hall where the Company Commander gave out the Rosary.

41. The move to KAMINA via GOMA was completed in a few days, the Company being eventually relieved at BUKAVU by the NIGERIANS (5 QONR). The move to GOMA was made by boat and the journey to KAMINA was by D.C.6. On arrival in KAMINA the Company set about the new routine in quick fashion and the first call was for a strong patrol to KILUBI, the electric generating station, where troops of "C" Company were located. Communications had broken down between "C" Company and Battalion HQ and as it was on a 2 hour call system, the new patrol was alerted. "A" Company's response was immediate. Within two hours the patrol under CAPTAIN DUGGAN and LIEUTENANT WRIGHT had reached KILUBI without incident, where all was well. They installed a C.12 set and communications were re-established with Battalion HQ.

42. It was at this time in KAMINA that the whole 32nd Battalion got together for the second time in its short history. The first occasion was when the Battalion assembled at McDONAGH BARRACKS in the CURRAGH and were addressed by LIEUTENANT/COLONEL BUCKLEY, and here in KAMINA the men of the 32nd once again came together under the Battalion Commander, but this time as CONGO veterans being exhorted to maintain their standard and high morale.

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43. Shortly after arrival in KAMINA the Company buckled down to the usual guard duties and patrols. CAPTAIN CANTRELL was detailed for duty in ELIZABETHVILLE and the Company already had the following commitments. Guards as follows:-

1. KAMINA GATE BARRIER.
2. WATER WORKS.
3. THE THREE RS.
4. TRANSFORMER STATION.
5. RECEIVER STATION.
6. MOBILE PATROL.

Despite these heavy duties, however, the morale of "A" Company remained high, was even given a boost by the arrival and exhibition by LOUIS ARMSTRONG. On the 4th DECEMBER, LIEUTENANT WRIGHT was detailed to take the platoon to KILUBI for protective duty. Up to this time the duty was performed by an N.C.O. and a section, but due to the unrest in the area it was deemed necessary to send a full platoon. This relieved SERGEANT MAGUIRE and his men of No. 4 Platoon who had been in KILUBI for the previous week.

44. On the 9th DECEMBER, KAMINA was visited by the Irish Army Chief of Staff, Quartermaster General and Party. The group also visited KILUBI and were impressed with the work of "A" Company troops there.

45. The 12th DECEMBER saw the relief of KILUBI by "C" Company and on the following day "A" Company withdrew all guards and patrols and moved to KAMINAVILLE, where they commenced to do train guards. The first train guard was made by No. 4 Platoon under CAPTAIN DUGGAN to LUENA where no incidents were reported. This was followed by CAPTAIN CUNNINGHAM with No. 1 Platoon. The next train guard to BUKAMA was met by hostile BALUBAS, who objected to UNITED NATIONS Troops carrying weapons outside the train and also because they were not allowed to inspect the train. The following day on the train guard to BUKAMA the BALUBAS were very belligerent and threatened to attack the next train that arrived if their demands were not met. Several more train guards to LUENA were completed without incident but the next one to BUKAMA (DECEMBER 27th) resulted in what quickly became known as the Massacre at BUKAMA. In fact nobody was killed but a terrific amount of confusion arose at the station in BUKAMA when hundreds of refugees left the train and began milling about. One shot was fired by MOROCCAN troops over the heads of the crowd and within hours the papers in ELIZABETHVILLE stated that a wounded GENDARMERIE had reported that IRISH Troops in BUKAMA were responsible for killing 40 or 50 refugees. This statement received world press headlines, but of course not a word of it was founded on fact. A visit two days later by Officer Commanding Troops in KATANGA (COLONEL H. BYRNE) finally cleared the air and the lie was exposed.

46. However, it took many days before the feelings of the native population, which had been aroused by the most fantastic reports were again back to normal and troops had to be confined to the camp area and only allowed out when absolutely necessary.

47. "A" Company continued to provide train guards to LUENA and KABCNGO with one also to LUPUTA. In all the Company provided guards of Platoon strength for 19 different trains during that period. The train guard to LUPUTA was one with a difference

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because the escort was provided for a transport platoon of the PAKISTAN UNITED NATIONS FORCES in KAMINA BASE who were ordered to move to LULUABORG. Although armed with rifles and light machine guns and 42 strong, nevertheless an escort of infantry had to be provided for them.

48.

The Company moved from KAMINAVILLE back to the BASE on 12th JANUARY, 1961, and commenced preparations for the journey home. The Company was the last Sub-Unit of the 32nd Battalion to leave the CONGO and the last plane took off from KAMINA BASE on 15th JANUARY, 1961, and reached COLLINSTOWN on the 17th.

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CHAPTER VII.'B' COMPANY - SOUTHERN COMMAND - COMMANDED BY CEANNFORT D. HASSEY.

1. On 20 JULY, 1960, COMMANDANT HASSEY was informed by the Officer Commanding Southern Command that he had been selected to command B Company 32 Infantry Battalion. The following Officers were also nominated:-

CAPTAIN E. RUSSELL	2 i/c Company.
CAPTAIN P. ALLEN	S.S.
CAPTAIN J. DUGGAN	Administrator Officer.
LIEUTENANT S. FITZGERALD	Officer Commanding No.4 Platoon.
LIEUTENANT T. HARRINGTON	Officer Commanding No.5 Platoon.
LIEUTENANT A. O'RIORDAN	Officer Commanding No.6 Platoon.

2. The Company was formed in the main from the following Units:-

No.4 Platoon and 81 mm Mortar	4 Infantry Battalion.
No.5 Platoon	1 FA Regiment and 1 Motor Squadron.
No.6 Platoon and MMG Section	12 Infantry Battalion.

3. Company Headquarters and other elements were selected from the following Units:-

Southern Command Headquarters.
 1 and 3 Brigade Headquarters.
 13 Infantry Battalion.
 14 Infantry Battalion.
 3 F.A. Regiment.
 1 A.A. Regiment.
 1 Field Company Corps of Engineers.
 1 Field Company Signals.
 1 Field Company Supply and Transport.
 Command Training Depot.
 3 Garrison Company A.O.C.
 3 Hospital Company A.M.C.

4. The Company was concentrated in CORK on 21 JULY and a "passing out" parade was held on 22 by the Officer Commanding Southern Command. The Company moved to the CURRAGH that evening and was accommodated in McDermot Barracks.
5. During the period 23 to 27 JULY the Company carried out its many administration, training, equipping and parading commitments in conjunction with the remainder of the Battalion. It took part in the parade through DUBLIN and the review by AN TAOISEACH, MR. LEMASS.
6. On THURSDAY 25th it embarked on aircraft and following the route already described it arrived in LEOPOLDVILLE at 0500 hours on 30 JULY. Here the IRISH Liaison Officer, Lt/Col J. E. IEE briefed the Company Commander on his duties and area of operation. The Company was to go to KINDU and thus be separated from remainder of the Battalion - for the time being. The Company reached KINDU at 0700 hours on 30 JULY where they were met by CAPTAIN P. LIDDY (Advance Party) and two SWEDISH Interpreters. They moved from the airport into the town - a distance of about 3 miles, and got accommodation at the schools run by the White Fathers (i.e.) BELGIAN Priests.
7. During the period 30th JULY to 4th AUGUST, the troops were rested, camp established, scheme of defence and security measures prepared. This was most necessary since troops were now affected by vaccination. During this period also all possible information under the following headings was collected.

- a. Local Administration, The system of Local Government, Lists of Officials.
- b. Economic situation, industry, lists of large scale employers.
- c. Unemployment and cost of living.
- d. Finance.
- e. Situation.
- f. Public Utilities, light, water power.
- g. Health.
- h. Communications, road transport, rail transport, water transport, vehicles available, spares and P.O.L.
- i. List of Chefs de Posts and Chiefs of Tribes.

8. The 2nd Paracommando Battalion (BELGIAN White Troops) were stationed in the Airport at the time. Contact was made to get as much information as possible. Particularly their modus operandi, the sitting of road blocks and patrols to prevent looting since almost the entire white civilian population had been evacuated. As a result cars, houses, furniture had been left behind. The Commanding Officer was most helpful and co-operative.

9. The biggest difficulty at this stage was that there were two District Commissioners, one appointed by M. LUMUMBA and the other appointed by the Provincial Government at BUKAVU. Conferences were held with MR. MIROHO, a Minister of the Provincial Government and with the local Government Officials to try and get the matter clear since taxes, minor officials pay etc were all up in the air.

10. The IRISH Lt. Col. IEE arrived with operation "SIMBA" and the Company was put on two hours notice to move from 051200. Move to the province of KATANGA on the route KABALO - ALBERTVILLE.

- 11. a. The Company was located at the White Fathers School at KINDU from 30/7/60 to 5/8/60.
- b. Moved to SAMBA at 0900 5/8/60. The Company was located at villas owned by COTTONCO while in SAMBA.
- c. Moved back to KINDU on 10/8/60. The Company was located as follows:-

Company Headquarters, Mortars, MMGs at HOTEL LEOPOID 11.

Three Rifle Platoons under canvas at the airport. Eventually on 13/8/60 the final location of the Company was as follows:-

- (1) One Rifle Platoon, MMG Section and Mortar Section at the Airport.
- (2) Two (2) Rifle Platoons at BELGIAN School at KINDU.
- (3) Company Headquarters at HOTEL LEOPOID 11 in KINDU.

12. Move to KAMINA Base commenced on 10th OCTOBER 1960. The move was to be by air and stores by rail. Due to difficulties with the aircraft, the airlift was NOT successful and the majority of the Company moved by rail. Sixty-one all ranks moved by air. The move by rail commenced at 0900 hours on the 13th of OCTOBER, 1960 and arrived at KAMINAVILLE on 16th OCTOBER, 1960 at 1600 hours. Mission was to take over ETHIOPIAN Battalion area with suitable adjustments. The Advance

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Party of MALI Battalion, 53 all ranks to relieve us in KINDU arrived in KINDU on 9th OCTOBER, 1960. Two Sections were in SAMBA. Balance of MALI Battalion arrived 11th/12th OCTOBER.

On arrival in KAMINA the Company was situated as follows:- One platoon plus mortars, MMGs in the BELGIAN School at KAMINAVILLE, the remainder at KAMINA Base (Base 2). On the move of A Company 33rd Battalion, on the 25th OCTOBER the complete Company was moved to Base 1, LUMWE. Mission was the protection and security of the airfield. The complete Company was stationed at the advanced Flying Training School and the airport buildings.

INCIDENTS AND PATROLS.

13. As a result of briefing by LT. COL. LEE a patrol of forty all ranks went to SAMBA at 0600 hours 1st AUGUST under CAPTAIN RUSSELL. Journey took 14 hours due to bad roads, use of ferries, and hired transport which was NOT good. Everything quiet in SAMBA. It had been looted some weeks before but one platoon of BELGIAN paracommandos were there. Some BELGIANS were returning to their businesses. The patrol returned on the 14th AUGUST. Situation calm in SAMBA.
14. Small patrol and some white fitters to KAMPENE to effect repairs to the rice mill and persuaded whites to continue working. They had contact with KINDU by radio and a patrol could be sent at any time if required.
15. On 2nd AUGUST a conference held with the Local Government Officials and MR. MIROHO, Minister of Provincial Government to discuss:-
 - a. Refugees, b. Industry, c. River Boats and rail communication.
 - d. Chain of command from the Provincial Government.
16. 3rd AUGUST arrival of MR. SUMIALOT with papers from Central Government in LEOPOLDVILLE. He is appointed District Commissioner. MR. OMARI appointed by Provincial Government missing. The assistant District Commissioner now is the only one with training left. All EUROPEANS say they will be forced to leave if SUMIALOT is District Commissioner. He has had two short periods in office and is a known COMMUNIST. He belongs to the M.N.C. party (LUMOMBA). Succeeded in persuading EUROPEANS to carry on and have constant town patrols.
17. The Company moved to SAMBA on 5th AUGUST by rail, arrived at 1900 hours. The main difficulties were lack of water, light, transport to unload stores and rations. The Company has been on pack rations since arrival. There was NO transport in SAMBA and the greatest difficulty was in getting supplies flown in to KASONGO and SAMBA. The troops now look tired and worn out due to:
 - a. lack of fresh rations.
 - b. Inoculations.
 - c. Vaccination.
 - d. NO beer and scarcity of cigarettes.
18. Returned to KINDU by train on 10th AUGUST. As a result of a visit by CAPTAIN LIDBY and COMMANDANT QUESHA it was learned that the imprest could be used to buy fresh rations. Everything now was much better. It was possible to buy all requirements.
19.
 - a. Town patrols by day and by night were established to prevent the looting of unoccupied houses and to give confidence to the population.
 - b. Standing patrols were set up (i) At the road to KASONGO, (ii) The ferry at KINDU and special guards put on, (iii) Police Station which had dumps of EUROPEAN arms and ammunition and (iv) Ration Store at AVE PONTHER which was the store of reserve C Rations. On 13th the store was moved to the BELGIAN School to save a guard.
20. Reports of political activity and the inciting of workers to strike at KALIMA were received on 15th AUGUST. It was investigated by CAPTAIN ALLEN. A patrol was sent on the 16th and the position was restored to order and work continued.

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21. It was reported from GOMA that MR. MINSART and four other EUROPEANS had been captured by CONGOLESE at LUKABA on the 15th AUGUST. A patrol under LIEUTENANT O'RIORDAN was sent to investigate. The EUROPEANS had been released and returned to their homes unharmed. Patrol returned at 1915 hours.
22. Representations were made by COMMANDANT J. NGABIANDI to prevent EUROPEANS from transmitting messages to BELGIUM. He had taken one set from a EUROPEAN. The return of the set was arranged and ALL EUROPEANS gave assurances re messages. Sets were allowed to remain in situation because they were the only means of communication between the towns and villages in the whole district which was 300 miles long and 150 miles wide. Business would cease if the sets were taken and all EUROPEANS would be forced into KINDU and then to evacuate. Agreement was made with both parties but tension was gradually building up.
23. Reports of trouble with dissatisfied workers were received from C.F.L. on 17/8/60. The train would NOT leave KINDU. The EUROPEAN workers at K37 station refused to work unless protected and had fortified their house and displayed arms. Patrol under LT. HARRINGTON was sent to station at K37 after his investigation and his message to KINDU, things returned to normal. Tension was building up in the area.
24. Visit by District Commissioner and Police Commissioner, that a special train had been arranged to bring into KINDU BELGIAN Paratroops. The population were really frightened. The matter was investigated and everybody was satisfied that it was a special train to bring in dissatisfied railway workers who were being paid off and dismissed.
25. We noticed that some FORCE PUBLIQUE were carrying weapons in the town. On investigation it was found that they were from LOKANDU and had arrived on instructions from STANLEYVILLE. Having discussed the situation with COMMANDANT NGABIANDI it was agreed to have them in the FORCE PUBLIQUE Camp and NC arms would be carried in the town. This agreement was carried out.
26. Two hold-ups occurred on 19/8/60. MR. AFFIO and MR. GALLOW were held up and robbed. A combined patrol was used and the culprits were arrested.
27. We received reports of unrest in FANGI, due to Political activities. The Bishop was also worried about nuns and priests. A patrol was sent and reported back that the situation was calm.
28. A conference was again held between the two FORCE PUBLIQUE Commandants. The District Commissioner and Officer Commanding B Company to arrange guards to be done by FORCE PUBLIQUE and to ensure that arms would NOT be carried in town. The police commenced to visit houses, search for arms and at this stage EUROPEANS started to hand in weapons for which we gave receipts. We also commenced doing town patrols (combined). Curfew ordered by District Commissioner.
29. Patrol to KASONGO and SAMBA. On 23/8/60 it reported situation calm and returned on 24/8/60. LIEUTENANT A. O'RIORDAN was i/c of patrol. Some difficulties with business and traffic reported from LUKUNGU. A patrol was sent under LIEUTENANT FITZGERALD and reported that everything was in order.
30. During the end of AUGUST an attempt was made to search planes and passengers. We put out the self styled Official. He looked to the FORCE PUBLIQUE for help. They came to the Airport in more than Platoon strength. The situation became very tense and eventually when they realised that we were serious about any interference they withdrew.
31. (a) A patrol sent to Km.9 on the KAMINA road on the request of the District Commissioner. The District Commissioner accompanied the patrol and two trouble makers were arrested and brought back to KINDU jail. One was KIJUMBO ALBERT who had caused the trouble at the Airport.

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- (b) Patrol to KIBOMBO 130 Km to protect the move of machinery and saw mills to K35 on SAMBA road. District Commissioner informed and the job was done without any hitch.
- (c) At this stage there was a lot of mutual mistrust between the various Political groups which affected Police, Local Officials and FORCE PUBLIQUE. Some arrests were made but generally only hotheads and trouble-makers were kept in jail. At the same time a Surete man RAGOEN arrived from LEOPOLDVILLE but left after a few days when he quarreled with the District Commissioner. Patrols were sent to KALIMA and to KIBOMBO on 28/8/60 - they reported everything in order. Two EUROPEANS were fined for insulting the A.N.C. The amount of the fines could NOT be ascertained.
32. Information received re destruction of bridges. Battalion Headquarters informed and permission granted to send patrols to investigate. The patrol was accompanied by the District Commissioner. The bridges were supposed to be destroyed by Forces from KATANGA, between KASONGO and KABAM BARE. The investigation showed NO bridges destroyed.
33. Received orders from Battalion Headquarters to block Airport on 6/9/60. The order was complied with on the same day. We hired more transport in case it would be needed. We had some difficulty with the CONGOLESE NATIONAL ARMY who wanted to use the Airport for Troops flying in from RUMANGABO and LULUBURG. Eventually they sent messages that the airport could NOT be used. Relations now with the CONGOLESE NATIONAL ARMY were very strained. There was NO co-operation.
34. (a) At this stage the GENDARMERIE and the A.N.C. started commandeering vehicles presumably in fear of A.N.C. troops who were reported to be on the move South from STANLEYVILLE to attack KATANGA. With some difficulty all vehicles were recovered, less those which had been acquired with a permit signed by the District Commissioner.
- (b) The move South from STANLEYVILLE was confirmed on 8/9/60. Approximately 50 vehicles passed KINDU on the East side of the river. No traffic came through KINDU. The whole Unit was alerted and on Stand-To. The standing patrols were reinforced.
- (c) Political unrest continued as men were being moved from jobs and more suitable men Politically were replacing them. Searches for arms continued and everything remained calm though tense. Reports confirmed that A.N.C. Battalion moving South was taking food and drink without paying for it. Rice, flour, sugar flown in by two UNITED NATIONS D.C.119s for A.N.C. troops. A small patrol sent to LUBELENGA. One A.N.C. man was arrested and the trouble was over. Investigation of priests in the area by the District Commissioner has commenced. The Bishop very perturbed and in order to satisfy everybody a guard of A.N.C. and our troops were put on the Mission so that all priests could be interrogated and so that they would NOT be missing thereby causing further trouble.
35. Patrols to KALIMA - PUNIA - LOBUTU - OBOKOTE under LIEUTENANT HARRINGTON TO INVESTIGATE REPORTS OF DISTURBANCES AND LOOTING. Patrol to KALIMA re flying out of women and children. Neither patrol has anything unusual to report. Information confirmed that 250 A.N.C. were in KASONGO from STANLEYVILLE (COMMANDANT MULAMBA i/c). Approximately 700 A.N.C. were in the area. We arranged pay for A.N.C. at LOKANDU, 1,800,000 francs and then sent messages to LEOPOLDVILLE. The troops had NOT been paid since JUNE and were at the stage where they would loot, kill etc. The payment was made to them and everything was normal again.
36. Food was flown to KASONGO and arrangements made to feed and airlift A.N.C. troops back to STANLEYVILLE and GOMA. Fed 460 and airlifted 138 to GOMA. The balance were fed at the Airport until a/c would arrive to fly them out. These were flown out the following day to STANLEYVILLE.

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37. (a) A patrol was sent to KAILO and they brought into KINDU five nuns. They reported all quiet.
- (b) A patrol was sent to PUNIA and another to KIMBOMBO on 27/28 SEPTEMBER. The one to KIMBOMBO area to LOWE with MRS. JOUNIDES to see her property. Her husband had been killed and she had had a nervous breakdown. Property and machinery valued at 4,000,000 CONGOLESE Francs practically destroyed. She returned to KINDU with the patrol.
- (c) During the period 25th SEPTEMBER to 2nd OCTOBER the Minister for the Interior of the Provincial Government MR. MUTAMBALA and the Government's appointed District Commissioner, MR. OMARI, arrived. A days conference led to NO solution and MR. J. SUMIALOT remained as District Commissioner. MR. MUTAMBALA returned to BUKAVA. MR. OMARI was placed under protective custody. We intervened. He was not molested or beaten. We secured his release and escorted him to SHABUNBU on 2/10/60. All cars which had been left behind by evacuated EUROPEANS were collected and impounded at LUKAMA Camp by the District Commissioner and the Gendarmerie.

38. Tension at this stage was very noticeable due to the efforts and reported efforts to arrest the District Commissioner. The population of KINDU and the whole province believed that money collected in taxes etc had been spent by the Provincial Government on BUKAVU. This led to unrest and distrust of the Provincial Government.

39. From the 3rd of OCTOBER to the move out from KINDU the situation remained calm and quiet. Routine patrols only were undertaken. The most important of these patrols was to ensure that the railway line to the KATANGA border was NOT disrupted. The train with the MALI troops which were to replace us was held up for three days by the GENDARMERIE at SAMBA. We arranged the release of the train. The Advance Party arrived on the 9th of OCTOBER. The rest of the Battalion arrived on the 11/12th OCTOBER.

40. The period 9th to 13th was generally used to pack and prepare to move by air and rail, the handing-over of accommodation, vehicles, weapons handed in by EUROPEANS and briefing the MALI Battalion on the situation etc. On the 11th OCTOBER 20 Officers and 5 Other Ranks of the A.N.C. flew in from BUKAVU to arrest the District Commissioner. They were unsuccessful in their mission. On the 13th OCTOBER the balance of the Company left KINDU by rail for KAMINA. Some elements had already been flown out to KAMINA.

41. The train journey from KINDU to KAMINA took from 312.00 hours on the 13th OCTOBER to 16.00 hours on the 16th. The first half of the journey took only 23 hours. The observer group in KABOLA could give us NO information as to the condition of the railway line. The only information we had was that only one train had got through in the previous fortnight.

We removed two blocks from the railway line at Km.85 and Km.88. These blocks consisted of trees. A delay of approximately 4 hours was imposed on us by them. We proceeded only a few more miles when the train stopped again. About 300 yards of railway line had been removed. We were stopped in a deep cutting and were surrounded by approximately 250 BALUBAS. The train was on a curve and the rear was NOT visible from the front. After considerable difficulty, talking, feeding the BALUBAS we managed to persuade them to repair the track. This was completed and we arrived in KITANDA at Km.95 at 1900 hours. The rails we replaced were got in a ravine 30 feet down from the railway line and some had to be taken out from the permanent way behind the train so that we could move. Two further breaks in the line at Km.127 and Km.137 were also repaired. We arrived at KABONGO at 2200 hours on the 15th. The journey to KAMINAVILLE was routine and normal.

42. The period in KAMINA Base from 23th OCTOBER to 13th JANUARY consisted principally of normal guards and duties. Initially we were under command of the Officer Commanding Base Defence group and finally back under the command of our own Battalion. The special duties in KAMINA consisted of train guards, evacuation of refugees and the protection of KILUBI hydro electric scheme. The details of these, since we were under Battalion control, were NOT recorded.

43. The Company flew out from KAMINA on 13th JANUARY, 1961 and arrived in DUBLIN on the 15th JANUARY, 1961.

CHAPTER VIII.

C COMPANY - WESTERN COMMAND - COMMANDED BY COMMANDANT P. J. CARROLL.

I. FORMATION OF UNIT.

On Tuesday, 19th JULY, 1960 volunteers were sought for the CONGO mission. At 1400 hours on Wednesday, 20th JULY COMMANDANT CARROLL, P., having been appointed Company Commander, assembled his Company Officers at CC, Ceann I, ATH LUAIN.

a. Officers.

COMMANDANT	CARROLL, P.	Company Commander.
CAPTAIN	CROGHAN, P.	2 1/2.
CAPTAIN	O'DWYER, J.	Administrative Officer.
CAPTAIN	BLACK, D. A.	SO.
LIEUTENANT	KISSANE, J.	Platoon Commander, No.1 Pl.
LIEUTENANT	FIVES, J.	Platoon Commander, No.2 Pl.
LIEUTENANT	STEWART, F.	Platoon Commander, No.3 Pl.

b. Selection Other Ranks.

Other personnel were selected at CC, Ceann - CC Complacht, 3 Rifle Platoons, MMG Section and Mortar Section. A roll of personnel, according to instructions, had to be available at 1630 hours that evening. This proved impossible of accomplishment but the roll was ready that night. Some personnel selected had to be brought in from all the stations of the Command including FCA. Some personnel were even recalled from the GLEN IMAAL where they were in training. On that morning some names, for medical and other reasons, were removed from the list and others substituted.

c. Administrative Details in ÁTH LUAIN.

On Thursday activity consisted of medical examination, issue of personal kit by units, documentation at CC Iosta Treineala who were responsible for that. Web equipment and ordnance were also issued. CC Complacht continued with the selection of personnel, preparation of documents, preparation for movement to the CURRAGH.

d. Parade and Address by OIC, Ceann I.

The Company paraded on the square and was addressed by COLONEL LAWLOR, OIC, Ceann I at 1845 hours, after which there was a March Past and the Company entrucked on the square for the movement to the CURRAGH.

e. Movement to CURRAGH.

The Company received a tumultuous send off from military personnel, representatives of civilian life and relatives in barracks, and from the populace of ATHLONE who lined the streets. Similar demonstrations on the route were given at each town and village on the way to the CURRAGH - MOATE, KILBEGGAN, TULLAMORE and even at the smaller villages. The Company arrived in the CURRAGH at 2140 hours and established CC Complacht at CONNOLLY BARRACKS at 2200 hours.

f. Activities at CURRAGH.

The Company remained in the CURRAGH until its departure for DUBLIN on 27th JULY, 1961, During its stay in the CURRAGH the following activities occurred.

(1) Reorganisation of Other Ranks Personnel.

10 Privates were discarded for medical and disciplinary reasons and to fill vacancies in Battalion CC. These were replaced by ten Privates from the 3rd Infantry Battalion who remained with the Company until demobilisation. One Private from 6 Infantry Battalion was returned to his unit on compassionate grounds on the eve of our departure for DUBLIN, leaving the Company one short of establishment going overseas - 159 all ranks.

(2) Injections and Inoculations.

Yellow fever injections and smallpox inoculations were given to everyone and those requiring teeth extractions were also attended to. This latter operation in some instances was severe to the point of brutality, some men getting as many as eleven teeth out, in addition to the painful yellow fever injection. However this is unlikely to occur again.

(3) Documentation.

With the assistance of administrative teams from CCA new unit records were initiated and parent unit records were collected and brought up to date.

(4) Weighing Loads.

In accordance with instructions laid down, all equipment was loaded into crates, each being weighed and the exact weight recorded on the crates or boxes.

(5) Lectures, Films.

Lectures were given on various aspects of tropical dangers. A film, showing different aspects of tropical life, was also shown by a priest who had been in AFRICA. A lecture on riot procedure was also given by a legal Officer.

(6) Address by VIPs.

Finally the troops were addressed by the Minister for External Affairs, Minister for Defence and the Chief of Staff. A unit flag, presented by the ladies of the CURRAGH, was received by Officer Commanding, 32 Infantry Battalion with acclaim.

(7) Finance.

The troops availed of arrangements to convert their final pay to dollars and Officers changed their imprests likewise.

(8) A Farewell Dance was organised in Sergeants' Mess, 3rd Infantry Battalion for other ranks personnel going overseas. Nearly all personnel attended and visitors from many parts of the country arrived to say farewell.

(9) Visit to An tUachtarán.

All Officers of the Battalion on Tuesday 26 JULY proceeded to Arus an Uachtaran and were received by the President.

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(10) General.

This period will always be remembered by all personnel of the Company as being the most intensive period of their army life. By most it is remembered as a time of numerous parades for injections, inoculations, lectures, addresses and training staffs, as a period of feverish preparation for the journey and whatever lay ahead. The thanks of this Company is also due, in great measure, to the Officers from Ceann.I who assisted us in the CURRAGH, as well as the Officers and ONC from OCA who assisted in documentation and particularly to the OIG and CRN, 3 Infantry Battalion and their staff who gave unstinting support to our efforts.

MOVEMENT, LOCATION AND ACTIVITY.

2. MOVEMENT TO DUBLIN - CONGO.

The Company moved to DUBLIN from CURRAGH with remainder of 32 Battalion on Wednesday, 27th JULY, 1961. It participated in parade through DUBLIN on Wednesday and assembled at COLLINS BKS for lunch before proceeding to BALDONNEL. Having arrived in BALDONNEL the Company participated in the parade of the Battalion to receive the blessing of the Archbishop of DUBLIN. The Company then got ready to emplane but, due to inclement weather, only a few personnel departed on the first day. (For exact numbers see Journal). The remainder of the Company returned to DUBLIN and stayed overnight in PORTOBELLO BARRACKS. On Thursday the 28th JULY the Company emplaned and flew for the CONGO on the route DUBLIN - EVEREUX (FRANCE) - WHEELUS Air Base (TRIPOLO LIBYA) - KANO (NIGERIA) - LEOPOLDVILLE - GOMA, arriving on 30, 31 JULY. Number 1 Platoon less 5 other ranks landed at KINDU with 'B' Company and did NOT rejoin the remainder of Company in GOMA for one week. Ten other ranks 'B' Company similarly landed in GOMA and rejoined their unit later. The Company settled down in GOMA (See paragraph on "Activities") until 1st SEPTEMBER when they moved to KAMINA Air Base.

3. MOVEMENT TO KAMINA.

On 30th AUGUST the Company was ordered by the newly arrived Eastern Provinces Command to move 100 personnel to KAMINA. The airlift commenced on 1 SEPTEMBER and continued over the next few days. In the meantime it was decided to send the Company complete and the airlift was completed on 11th SEPTEMBER. In KAMINA the Company became 'C' Company of KAMINA Base Group - an ad hoc formation formed to protect the base under UNITED NATIONS control. 'A' Company 33 Battalion became 'A' Company and a SWEDISH Company became 'B' Company. On leaving GOMA CAPTAIN CROGHAN became OIC Company 'C', COMMANDANT CARROLL going 2 i/c 32 Infantry Battalion Vice COMMANDANT ADAMS who became OIC KAMINA Base Group. When the 32 Infantry Battalion replaced KAMINA Base Group at KAMINA, completed 13th NOVEMBER, these Officers resumed their original appointments and remained thus until demobilised.

4. MOVEMENT TO KAMINAVILLE.

The Company moved to KAMINAVILLE, 15 miles from the base, to undertake train guard and escort duties under SCOMEF control, replacing the Company of INDONESIANS who were sent to BUKAVU on a new mission. The Company returned to the Base on 12th DECEMBER.

On completion of tour of duty at KAMINAVILLE the following message was received from SCOMEF:

"TO Officer Commanding C Company 32 Infantry Battalion

SCOMEF wish to compliment Commander, Officer and troops of Charlie Company on their performance on train guard duty during the past few weeks and wish them a well earned rest from these onerous tasks."

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5. MOVEMENT TO DUBLIN.

The airlift home commenced on 13 JANUARY and all ranks Company 'C' were in IRELAND on 15 JANUARY, 1961. All ranks, with a few exceptions, returned to their home station 16 JANUARY, 1961.

ACTIVITY.

a. GOMA.

Reconnaissance, escort and Intelligence Patrols, Border Guards between REPUBLIC OF CONGO and RUANDA URUNDI.

Protection of Airport GOMA.
HQ protection duties.
Training of weapon teams and firing of range practices.

b. KAMINA BASE.

Air Base protection duty.
Combat patrols.
Train Guards.
Escort Patrols.
CAPTAIN BLACK was employed as Air Movement control Officer and COMMANDANT CROGHAN was Base Operations Officer from 13/11/60 to end of Mission.

Protection of KILUBI power station.

c. KAMINAVILLE.

Train guards for supply of goods and escort of refugees.

Train guards normally consisted of platoon strength and escorted trains from KAMINAVILLE to LUENA and vice versa, also with refugees from KAMINAVILLE to LUPUTU (South KASAI).

Mercy mission.

Post protective duties.

RUNDA

OUTLINE OF IMPORTANT ACTIONS AND INCIDENTS DURING
SERVICE IN CONGO WITH 32 INFANTRY BATTALION ONUC.

6. Special Intelligence Patrol to BENI - (250 miles NORTH) -
11-13 AUGUST.

- a. Mission. To ascertain Military, Political and Economic situation in area LUBERO - BUTEMBO - BENI and also to report on communications, roads, airfields, etcetera and medical and educational facilities.
- b. Strength. 1 Officer (CAPTAIN O'DWYER), 1 NCO, 4 Privates plus Interpreter, SWEDISH LIEUTENANT BERT RENSTROM and CONGOLESE Liaison Officer, First SERGEANT SALAMU ALEXANDER.
- c. Vehicles. 1 Land Rover and 1 VW Saloon.
- d. Armament and Supplies. Personal, weapons and first line ammunition, 5 days pack rations. Petrol, oil and lubricants to be purchased locally.

The patrol left GOMA at 06.00 hours 11th AUGUST and returned at 21.30 hours 13th AUGUST having stayed overnight at Catholic (WHITE FATHERS) Mission at MULO (170 miles NORTH) on both outward and return journeys. During the course of the patrol it was necessary to meet the local CONGOLESE Civil Administrator and Chefs-de-post at LUBERO, BUTEMBO, BENI and MUTWANGA. The report on Mission was given to Battalion Intelligence Officer on completion of Mission. Four such patrols in this area were carried out.

7. Patrol to WALIKALE 11 & 12 AUGUST 1960.

The patrol consisted of 1 Officer, 1 NCO, 3 Men, 2 Drivers, Signaller and Interpreter. It left GOMA at 07.30 hours in two Landrovers, one of which had a C 12. The journey from GOMA to WALKALE was without incident. On arrival there at 07.00 hours approximately contact was made with a BELGIAN hotel owner VANDORP where it was intended to stay the night. However, he advised that contact should be made with the local Administrator and provided a guide to show the way. On route a person was seen signalling the patrol to stop and on closer examination a line of armed men were seen to take up a firing position behind a small hedge on right of the road.

On seeing this the leading jeep came to a halt immediately and the patrol was surrounded at once by about 30 armed soldiers of the CONGOLESE Army. They thought that the patrol was a BELGIAN one and when told, through the interpreter, that it was UNITED NATIONS one from GOMA they did NOT appear to believe so. Some elements of the CONGOLESE Army wanted to exterminate the patrol at once. These were removed after a while and their Commander, SERGEANT MAJOR DAKALA NICOLY appeared convinced that the patrol was really a UNITED NATIONS one. He, accompanied by five others, went with the patrol to the Administrator's house.

At first the Administrator, MUPENGO LUSOLO HENRI, was very friendly but after a short consultation with his assistant, MBATI FLORIBERT, he became quite hostile and seemed to doubt the identity of the patrol. After further arguments it was decided to return to the BELGIAN hotel. The patrol was now accompanied by the CONGOLESE Commander, the Administrator, his assistant and 5 CONGOLESE soldiers.

The patrol was again stopped on the way near the CONGOLESE Army Barracks. The CONGOLESE then insisted that the patrol should spend the night in their Barracks but on going there it was found

that there was NO suitable accommodation. As they still appeared to have doubts re the identity of the patrol they ordered that the arms should be handed over for the night. The patrol Commander (CAPTAIN KISSANE) refused and ordered that the patrol would 'sleep' in their jeeps.

Before retiring for the night the signaller tried to contact UNITED NATIONS HQ in GOMA as arranged but failed to do so. (At first the CONGOLESE refused to allow the patrol to use their radio but later agreed under supervision of the local post office man who could read morse).

When the patrol retired to their jeeps the CONGOLESE placed a guard of 12 men on them and inspected the occupants at frequent intervals during the night.

At first light on 12th AUGUST the Administrator checked with GOMA re identity of the patrol and when it was confirmed they accepted the patrol and from then all co-operated with them in every way.

The patrol returned to GOMA at 06.30 hours without further incident.

8. Release of BELGIAN from GOMA Jail 31st AUGUST 1960.

At approximately 15.30 hours CAPTAIN O'DWYER of "C" Company was instructed by Battalion Officer Commanding to proceed to CONGOLESE Police Barracks to secure release of BELGIAN who had been arrested and beaten up by CONGOLESE Police. This man was a plantation owner from WALIKALE who was apparently trying to get out of CONGO through KISENYI and was arrested on a trivial charge and subsequently beaten up when he resisted arrest. Interpreter "MIKE" NOLAN and a small patrol accompanied CAPTAIN O'DWYER. After 1½ hours parley with the Police Commissioner they secured his release with a "wash-out" on the charge of resisting arrest and a small (100 CF) fine on the lesser charge. He then put a spanner in the works by saying he was unable to pay this fine. On further representations to the Commissioner by the Officer he was given 14 days in which to pay and released forthwith.

A number of similar incidents took place in which "C" Company Officers and personnel had to make representations for release of whites.

9. Securing of GOMA Airfield and its defence against strong CONGOLESE force - 6th SEPTEMBER 1960.

On night 5th SEPTEMBER a CONGOLESE force (ANC) of strength 160-180 occupied GOMA Airfield and the buildings on either side of the control Building. At 23.45 hours CAPTAIN O'DWYER was called to conference with Battalion Officer Commanding and G3 and informed that ONUC HQ had issued instructions to block all Airfields. The ONLY forces available at GOMA were HQ Company and 53 all ranks of "C" Company. Of the "C" Company personnel there were ONLY 1 Officer, 4 NCOs and 12 Privates immediately available, the remainder being on guards, patrols, etcetera. The Battalion Officer Commanding instructed CAPTAIN O'DWYER to carry out the mission of securing the Airfield with a composite force of HQ Company and "C" Company personnel to be organised as follows:-

Platoon HQ	- CAPTAIN O'DWYER and SERGEANT MANNING
MMG Section	- CORPORAL McMANUS, "C" Company, In Charge.
No. 1 Rifle Section	- CORPORAL SULLIVAN, Band, HQ Company, In Charge.
No. 2 IMG Section	- SERGEANT DIGNAM, HQ Company, In Charge.

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No. 3 Rifle Section - CORPORAL CARROLL, HQ Company, In Charge.
 No. 4 IMG Section - CORPORAL CROCKO, "C" Company, In Charge.
 No. 5 Rifle Section - CORPORAL MULLINS, "C" Company, In Charge.

Each Section consisted of 1 Corporal and 4 Privates including driver and was allotted a jeep each. The total force therefore was:-

"C" Company	- 1 Officer	4 NCOs	12 Privates
HQ Company	-	4 NCOs	12 Privates
TOTAL		1 Officer	8 NCOs 24 Privates

(NOTE: HQ Company supplied an extra NCO - SERGEANT DIGNAM J. The entire force was to be in position 10 minutes before first light 6th SEPTEMBER).

10. The plan was as follows: The six jeeps to move via control Building, down through the Apron and on to the centre of the runway and park thereon at 150 yards interval, thereby blocking it to Aircraft. The MMG Section to remain on jeep with gun mounted on the NORTH end of runway. The Rifle and IMG Groups to dismount and take up positions in their numerical order from NORTH to SOUTH on high ground between the runway and the GOMA-RUTSHURU road which ran parallel to it, thereby controlling both the runway and the road. The order of march was: the MMG Section, No. 1 Rifle Section with Platoon Commander and Platoon Sergeant, Nos 2, 3, 4 and 5 Sections.

11. The plan was executed without any hitch and all Sections in position by 05.20 hours. The Battalion Officer Commanding and G3 saw the platoon into position. CONGOLESE troops, two sections, which were in positions on the WESTERN side of runway, abandoned their positions, which were dominated by ours and rejoined the main body in the area of the Control Building. At this stage part of the main body of CONGOLESE must have left one of the sheds because about 09.00 hours part of their force, approximately 1 platoon, was seen deploying in NORTH EAST of that area on the far (EASTERN) side of the road. They advanced towards our position along the axis of a lane running diagonally NORTH EAST-SOUTH WEST from road, through our position to runway. The Section Commanders were instructed NOT to open fire until the CONGOLESE crossed a low bank with some bushes on it about 150 yards to our front. If our troops had to open fire the MMG Section would have their (CONGOLESE) RIGHT flank and the party still in one of the sheds, under fire. As it happened the CONGOLESE just took up firing positions behind the bank and facing our position. They also had an LA Group and Rifle Section as a kind of a fire support group on the far side of the road facing our Nos 4 and 5 Sections. After about an hour or so at approximately 10.00 hours the Sections which had advanced across the road withdrew but the support group remained in position. Again at about 10.30 or 11.00 hours they advanced in similar manner and took up positions on the bank opposite ours. They withdrew again at 12.45 hours and a number of trucks then came down to their assembly area. The Control Building Guard threw them out a few "C" Rations and they all entrucked and returned to their Barracks.

The Battalion Officer Commanding withdrew our force at last light (18.00 hours).

RÜNDA

12. Evacuation of CONKAT refugees from KABCNDA-DIANDA
5th OCTOBER 1960.

- (a) At 12.00 hours Base Group Commander sent SERGEANT MANNING and two Privates from "C" Company by helicopter to investigate report of trouble in KABCNDA-DIANDA. At 12.15 hours LIEUTENANT STEWART was sent by road with stand-to party (2 NCOs and 10 Privates) to rescue EUROPEANS there who were besieged by BALUBAKATS. At 13.30 hours CAPTAIN O'DWYER was sent with No. 3 Platoon to assist, if necessary, the party which had left at 12.15 hours.
- (b) LIEUTENANT STEWART'S party arrived approximately 14.30 hours and CAPTAIN O'DWYER'S party at 15.45 hours. There were four EUROPEANS including one woman in the house that had been besieged, all were armed with FN Rifles and Browning LMGs. They maintained that they had been attacked by a force of 500 at 06.00 hours and that they had killed 17 of the attackers. There was plenty of evidence of an attack around. This party refused to be evacuated as they said the BALUBAKATS would NOT attack again for a good while, but they asked that we escort a bus load of CONGOLESE (CONAKATS) - 25 in all - who were bailing out of the area - as far as KAMINAVILLE.
- The entire party and escort left at approximately 18.00 hours.

13. The search for missing EVANGELIST Missionaries MUKAYA-KAMAI
area - 28th NOVEMBER 1960 - 1st DECEMBER 1960.

- (a) As a result of a request from a MR. WOMERESLY to BRITISH Consul ELIZABETHVILLE a UNITED NATIONS helicopter reconnaissance party, consisting of CAPTAIN O'DWYER, PRIVATE MOORE and guide (MR. WOMERESLY, Jnr.) took off from KAMINAVILLE airfield at 13.30 hours to search road to NORTH and the MUKAYA area for two EVANGELIST Missionaries, MESSRS. KNAUF and HODSON reported missing. The two had left KAMINAVILLE in a RED Dodge Van on 24th NOVEMBER en route to LULUNGU Mission in SOUTH KASAI.
- (b) The helicopter followed the course of the road for 200 miles NORTH as far as MUKAYA, a BALUBAKAT village which was its extreme range for a daylight return to base. Two strong road blocks were seen just SOUTH of the village. On circling the village for return the helicopter was fired on but NOT hit. NO sign of RED van on road or in village.
- (c) The search was resumed the following morning - 29th NOVEMBER - at 06.30 hours. The same route was taken. On arrival over MUKAYA the reconnaissance party noticed that the village was deserted. The next area searched was KAMAI some 10 miles to NORTH WEST. This was also deserted. The patrol then returned as there was only enough fuel left for return. Again the search was resumed at 05.00 hours 1st DECEMBER. The area of search was LULUNGA, some 20 miles NORTH EAST of MUKAYA. The helicopter landed at LULUNGA where the party got eye witness account of the ultimate fate of the two Missionaries.
- (d) They had been arrested at MUKAYA road block on 24th NOVEMBER and taken across a jungle track towards KAMAI. On the journey some of the "Jeunesse" elements of the party suggested killing them. The older members

protested but were shouted down. After they had been killed, the older members, who had been CHRISTIANS, asked for the bodies to give them decent burial. This was refused and the bodies mutilated. Ex CHRISTIANS were themselves attacked by the younger members. They fled into the bush and some of them made their way across the KASAI border into LULUNGA. The search party was also informed that the RED van was concealed somewhere in the KAMAI area.

- (e) The Officer in Charge of reconnaissance party suggested a search of the area in which they had been killed. MR. WOMERESLY, the guide, advised against this as, knowing the area, he said that at this stage NO trace of the bodies would be found. He was also perfectly satisfied that the information we had been given was true beyond question.

The reconnaissance party then returned direct to KAMINA.

- (f) MR. WOMERESLY Senior called later to Company HQ to convey the thanks of the BRITISH Consul for our efforts to locate the missing men and in establishing their ultimate fate.

14. Attack on LUENA by BALUBAKATS - 2/4th DECEMBER 1960.

At 09.00 hours 2nd DECEMBER 1960 a message came in from LIEUTENANT STEWART, who, with No. 3 Platoon, had escorted two trains to LUENA the previous day, stating that the town had been attacked and surrounded by a few thousand BALUBAKATS at 04.30 hours that morning. The position at time of message was that the trains could NOT leave as the train drivers and railway staffs had taken refuge. A number of CONAKATS and BALUBAKATS had been killed, the latter by GENDARMERIE rifle fire and mortar fire by MORROCCANS. The Company Commander and CAPTAIN KISSANE set off for LUENA at 14.00 hours by helicopter to examine position and reconnaissance railway line between KAMINAVILLE and LUENA. Meanwhile the Company Commander had ordered the remainder of the Company to be in readiness to move immediately to LUENA if necessary.

15. On his return he ordered the Support Weapons Platoon under CAPTAIN BLACK to move to LUENA to:

- (a) Reinforce No. 3 Platoon
and
- (b) Act as escort for second train on return journey as soon as railway staffs became available.
- (c) Captain C'Dwyer was also ordered to LUENA as Officer in Charge of the combined force (No. 3 Platoon and Support Weapons Platoon), to reorganise the defence layout of the area occupied by our troops and to allot escorts to the trains as soon as return to KAMINAVILLE was possible. At this stage it was decided that in future the strength of each train escort would be one platoon with necessary medical and signals attachments, instead of half platoon as heretofore.
- (d) The reinforcement party left that night 02.00 hours 3rd DECEMBER on SWEDISH escorted train passing through KAMINAVILLE en route from LUPUTA to ELIZABETHVILLE. Father CREAM, Chaplain to the Forces, travelled with this party.

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- (e) On arrival at LUENA two extra buildings were taken over and the defence reorganised by Company Commander, who flew in by helicopter, in consultation with Officer in Charge and the local MOROCCAN Commander. There was NO further attack on the town. On the following morning - 4th DECEMBER - the MOROCCAN Commander informed the Officer in Charge that the BALUBAKATS had dispersed during the night.
- (f) During the morning the railway officials were contacted and crews obtained to bring back trains. CAPTAIN FIVES arrived by helicopter with supplies. By special arrangements with the Railway Company the two trains left LUENA at station interval, the regulation interval being two hours.

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REPORT ON 'A', 'Q' TRAINING, ENGINEERS, SIGNALS, ORDNANCE, TRANSPORT.

ARMY MEDICAL CORPS, MILITARY POLICE.

1. ADMINISTRATION.

The Battalion was satisfactorily administered throughout its period of service. COMMANDANT W. CARROLL, as Battalion Adjutant and his staff left nothing undone to ensure complete compliance with regulations - both home and UNITED NATIONS - and on return to IRELAND there were NO problems to be ironed out, nor was there any need for corrections or explanations to the Army or civilian authorities.

It became obvious early on that the Battalion Adjutant could not give much time to the duties of Officer Commanding HQ Company, and that there was need for an independent Officer of the rank of COMMANDANT for this duty.

2. 'Q' BRANCH.

(a) Here also the staff gave highly satisfactory results. Headed by COMMANDANT T. RYAN, who was new to Quartermaster work, the section had no difficulty in accepting the new UNITED NATION system of supply. This applied mainly to food as we were almost completely self-contained otherwise.

(b) The CANADIAN ration was ample except for sugar, butter, and bread which had to be supplemented. Also there was no extra food provided for night guards, patrols etc so we had to occasionally purchase "extras" as well as conserve our "savings". There was a scarcity of tea in KAMINA for a month in late NOVEMBER and early DECEMBER and coffee was not popular. Generally the standard of food was excellent.

(c) During our stay in KIVU province we were allowed to make "local" purchases of such items of food as were available in the shops. We were allowed 50 francs or one dollar per person per day for food. This was adequate.

Later on, in KAMINA, we were provided with food by the PAKISTAN Supply Unit. We were NOT allowed to make local purchases. This meant that when any item was not available we had to do without it and it was not replaced by some other commodity. Thus when an item was not in stores there was NO alternative provided and what was not available for one day was not provided next day or ever (i.e.) if eggs were not available for one days ration they were not issued on the "double" next day.

(d) It was the fault of UNITED NATIONS HQ that during our stay in GOMA, KINDU and BUKAVU we were not supplied with beds or mattresses. The men had to sleep on stretchers without mattresses. They did not complain. In spite of our best efforts we failed to solve this problem even though we were promised all these things by UNITED NATIONS Officials on many occasions. It is not possible to say what caused this failure since it was known that there were ample such stores in LEOPOLDVILLE. In KAMINA we took over BELGIAN beds and Dunlopillo mattresses, which had been left in the billets on withdrawal of the BELGIAN troops, so the problem was solved for us at that stage.

(e) As stated elsewhere the issue of UNITED NATIONS tropical clothing was highly unsatisfactory. It was NOVEMBER before men got their full entitlement of clothing. Some had worn their first issues to shreds, and had fallen back on wearing their own fatigue suits again. It was difficult to maintain a high standard of dress but it must be said that men were at all times conscious of the need to appear well-dressed in public places. Washing and ironing took up a lot of spare time.

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- (f) The wearing of superfine tropical clothing by the Officers helped to maintain the Officer status in relation to his men. Also it was necessary for Officers to be well dressed in Messes, at Public Functions etc., or else suffer adverse comment from other contingents - all of whom were better serviced in this matter than the IRISH Officers.

Our Officers provided themselves with tropical kit at the earliest possible opportunity by purchasing cloth and getting it made-up locally in GOMA or BUKAVU. It was hoped to recoup the cost of these items from State Funds, but so far this has been unsuccessful. Consequently Officers are at a financial loss for doing what was then, and is now, thought to be the right thing.

3. TRAINING.

- (a) Personnel of 32 Infantry Battalion had no time for Unit Training during the week of concentration in the CURRAGH prior to the move to the CONGO. However sub-units made up for this deficiency as soon as they got organised in their localities in the CONGO. Many drills were evolved and practiced; safety regulations were emphasised and discipline was instilled at all levels.
- (b) Ammunition was distributed to each Officer, NCO and man, and was not collected again until the last day of service, except in the case of sick personnel. This was a calculated risk taken after much consideration. It was felt that any soldier should have ready means to defend himself at all times, and also that he should be ready for action with the least delay. This could only be achieved by having ammunition "on" the man. It is with pride and gratitude that it can now be said that no man failed to honour this responsibility at any time. Indeed this responsibility gave them a pride in themselves, and a feeling that they were important and could be depended on. (Note: One man, who had to be repatriated as a mental case, did fire three rounds of rifle ammunition at an IRISH patrol post in GOMA but did not do any damage).
- (c) A number of men were exercised in personal weapons which they had not hitherto fired, so as to ensure that they could be used in different roles if need be. Also it was considered advisable to train Army Medical Corps personnel in the use of Rifles and SMGs so that they could defend themselves on patrols if necessary.

4. ENGINEERS.

- (a) The Engineer Section which was incorporated in the 'Q' Platoon, HQ Company consisted of 1 Officer, 1 Sergeant, 4 Corporals and 10 Privates. The section was employed in provision of stores, adaptation of existing buildings for offices, stores etc., building of wire obstacles around guard-rooms, billets and stores, crating and weighing of stores for transit by air, sea or road.
- (b) CAPTAIN J. BURKE was also responsible for a survey of road, bridges, power stations etc in KIVU province. He travelled extensively throughout the province and his reports were thorough and enlightening. In KAMINA Base he undertook the servicing of water-pumps, and for this work alone he received the thanks and commendation of the Base Commander and his staff. He was the only person on the base capable of repairing the electric water-pumps when they had become unserviceable through mishandling by natives. He worked up to twenty hours a day to get the water supply going again, and succeeded in doing so in the minimum of time.

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ORDNANCE.

REPORT ON WEAPONS, AMMUNITION, EQUIPMENT.

5. WEAPONS.

- (a) Rifle SMLE No.4:- This weapon is inadequate for the conditions of modern warfare. While it is robust and generally trouble-free it is seriously lacking in fire power. Troops in the CONGO, who on occasion placed themselves in opposition for diverse purposes to 32 Infantry Battalion, were armed with the NATO F.N. Rifle and were at a great advantage.
- (b) Gustaf S.M.G.:- This proved to be an excellent weapon under all conditions encountered. It is robust, accurate, trouble-free and has excellent fire power.
- (c) Bren L.M.G.:- This is of course a well-tried weapon, and it proved excellent under the tropical conditions of the CONGO. It required minor adjustment to meet the very hot climate.
- (d) Vickers M.M.G.:- NO trouble was experienced with this weapon.
- (e) Pistol Revolver:- A small number of .38-in Webley Revolvers were on issue and were satisfactory.
- (f) Verrey-Light Pistols.:- Quite Satisfactory.
- (g) Mortars 81 mm and 60 mm.:- Those were NOT fired but they stood up well to the climatic conditions.

6. AMMUNITION.

The ammunition reacted well to the conditions. Exudation of filling of the Smoke Projectiles for the Mortars occurred, but was NOT serious.

- (a) Grenades High Explosive.:- These grenades were used, in the absence of any others, as hand-grenades. They are fitted with Igniters, with 7 seconds delay, which are NOT suitable for hand-grenades except for training.
- (b) Generators Lachymatory were unsatisfactory. Fifty per cent failures were obtained which was due to the advanced age of the store. They were manufactured over twenty years ago.
- (c) An allocation of Energa Cartridges-Ballistite should be made to HQ Company for firing parties. Some 250 cartridges would be a suitable figure.
- (d) Signal Cartridges - Red, Green, Blue and cartridges illuminating should be issued on a larger scale than that of the 32 Infantry Battalion.

7. OPTICAL INSTRUMENTS.

Binoculars tended to develop a fungoid growth due to the heat. Watches G.S. were in constant use, and most of them are now unserviceable.

8. (a) Cooking Equipment.

The Hydro Cookers supplied were in continuous use each day. They are NOT designed for this, and required constant maintenance. A large stock of spares is necessary to keep them going. Six to nine months is the useful life of the cookers, under these conditions. They are NOT suitable for Guardrooms, Barrier Posts, Train or Road Guards or Patrols. A smaller type cooker is essential for these purposes. The use of Contained Gas type cookers could profitably be

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explored. Many such were in operation in the CONGO and were excellent. Container-Gas was available, and a combination of the Hydro Cooker and the Container-Gas Type Cooker might be the answer.

(b) Cooking Utensils.

These were quite satisfactory, but containers with hinged lids are now available and would be an improvement on existing ones.

(c) Bedding.

The stretchers supplied are NOT satisfactory. They were cumbersome and took up much valuable space particularly on road patrols and on transport generally. In addition they became quickly unserviceable as the canvas does NOT stand up to the wear and tear imposed.

(d) Tentage.

The G.S. Mk.2 tents, the Bivouacs and the Marquee stood up well to usage and proved watertight to tropical rainfall. The Bivouacs are NOT suitable however to the climate, as they get stifling hot. The Marquee used by the 32 Infantry Battalion is NO longer fully serviceable. It was in continuous use and the constant erection and re-erection has caused deterioration.

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SIGNAL PLATOON.

9. Platoon Commander - O.7463 CAPTAIN B.A. DEEGAN, 4 Field Signals.
 Platoon Officer - O.7718 LIEUTENANT J. FLYNN, 1 Field Signals.

OPERATORS - WIRELESS AND LINE.

404096	SERGEANT	MAGORRIAN, P.	11 FIELD SIGNALS (Platoon Sergeant).
802409	SERGEANT	FOGARTY, A.	DEPOT SIGNALS.
809211	CORPORAL	KING, J.	1 FIELD SIGNALS.
800945	CORPORAL	BEECHER, W.	2 FIELD SIGNALS.
803274	CORPORAL	HUGHES, W.	2 FIELD SIGNALS.
806073	CORPORAL	O'DONOGHUE, D.	2 FIELD SIGNALS.
807531	CORPORAL	O'SULLIVAN, M.	DEPOT SIGNALS.
803386	CORPORAL	FLEMING, T.	4 FIELD SIGNALS.
93691	CORPORAL	BEVAN, L.	DEPOT SIGNALS.
808202	SIGNALMAN	RYAN, P.	1 FIELD SIGNALS.
807958	SIGNALMAN	CULLEN, P.	1 FIELD SIGNALS.
809456	SIGNALMAN	RYAN, J.	2 FIELD SIGNALS.
808965	SIGNALMAN	McCANN, P.	2 FIELD SIGNALS.
806514	SIGNALMAN	HENNESSY,	DEPOT SIGNALS.
806310	SIGNALMAN	RYAN, J.	2 FIELD SIGNALS.
807960	SIGNALMAN	TIERNEY, D.	1 FIELD SIGNALS.
807790	SIGNALMAN	SULLIVAN, T.	1 FIELD SIGNALS.
809032	SIGNALMAN	DUFFY, J.	2 FIELD SIGNALS.
808089	SIGNALMAN	REDMOND, W.	DEPOT SIGNALS.
808094	SIGNALMAN	NOLAN,	DEPOT SIGNALS.

LINESMEN.

808638	SIGNALMAN,	HOGAN, P.	1 FIELD SIGNALS.
807829	SIGNALMAN	McGRATH, J.	2 FIELD SIGNALS.
807397	SIGNALMAN	DUFFY, M.	2 FIELD SIGNALS.

RADIO MECHANICS.

96415	SERGEANT	BLICK, N.	DEPOT SIGNALS.
804513	CORPORAL	GUCKIAN, P.	DEPOT SIGNALS.

	<u>OFFICERS</u>	<u>SERGEANTS</u>	<u>CORPORALS</u>	<u>SIGNALMEN</u>	<u>TOTAL.</u>
<u>ESTABLISHMENT:</u>	2	3	8	14	27.

10. Above is shown the establishment and personnel of the Signal Platoon 32 Battalion of which CAPTAIN B.A. DEEGAN was Platoon Commander. During their six months service with ONUC in the CONGO their primary task was the provision of radio communication from Battalion HQ forward to the Companies and from Battalion HQ back to Brigade HQ. Their job of line communications consisted solely in the "wiring up" of the various HQ within Battalion HQ and the connecting of Battalion HQ to the local exchange. During their service the Battalion served in KIVU province for the first three and a half months approximately and for the remainder of their period in the CONGO the Battalion served in KAMINA Base in KATANGA. It is proposed to deal with those two periods separately because of the very different signal requirements and the different signal lay-out within the Battalion for each period. In dealing with those two periods it is proposed to cover the entire signal aspect during the first period (JULY - NOVEMBER) under the following headings:-

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- (a) Equipment - suitability of.
 - (b) Incidence of duty.
 - (c) Effect of climatic conditions.
 - (d) Standard of Operators.
 - (e) Statistical data on range of communications obtained.
 - (f) Statistical data on messages received and sent.
 - (g) Contacts with "HAM" Radio.
11. (a) The wireless sets on charge to the Signal Platoon were ten C12's, thirty 31 sets and twenty four 88 sets and a HRO 100 receiver. The C12 wireless set proved itself to be a really first class set, both from the point of view of the range in communication it provided, and its serviceability throughout the six month period. Regarding its serviceability, it is of interest to note that during the entire six months only two valves required replacement and this despite the fact that generally seven or eight of our ten C.12's were in use for sixteen hours every day. The only other time when a C12 set required repair was when the send/receive relay "burned out" when the aerial on the set came in contact with High Tension wires during a Train Guard. The proven serviceability of this set is all the more praiseworthy when one considers the treatment and hardship which the sets had to endure. They provided communications on patrols which travelled up to two hundred miles and more, on roads which were indescribably bad and where the sets were operated in landrovers and other vehicles without proper secure fittings. In paragraph 15 it is proposed to deal with the range this set provided. The 31 set also showed up very well. It provided perfect communication with the ground plane aerial and its serviceability was also satisfactory. They required frequent valve replacements but other than that and the fact that towards the end of the six months some of the sets required re-alignment, this set was very satisfactory. The serviceability of the 88 set was also satisfactory, only minor trouble with head-sets was experienced. However during our service in the CONGO this set had a very limited use - this will be described in paragraph 15.
- (b) Our battery charging equipment consisted of eight CHORE HORSE charging plants and one Crypton charger. Later a mains charger purchased by UNITED NATIONS in the CONGO was made available to us. During the period under review however (JULY to NOVEMBER) all our charging was done with the CHORE HORSE plants. These plants did not give a very high rate of charge but apart from the fact that they required extreme care and maintenance, they gave very satisfactory service. At the end of our period each of the CHORE HORSE plants was in working order, the only "snag" being that a large amount of spares e.g. gaskets, fuel pipes etc were needed for repair and replacement. The Crypton charging plant gave very satisfactory service and was particularly useful when the demand for batteries was heavy. Apart from the necessary replacement of one rectifier valve, this charging plant necessitated no repairs during the period.
- (c) The HRO receiver was used full-time at Control Station at Battalion HQ and was very necessary and useful particularly when operators were on long periods of watch. All the items of workshop equipment gave excellent service and proved to be both suitable and adequate. The line equipment e.g. telephones and switchboard proved very reliable. The only thing here was to ensure that the telephone cells were kept in a "cool place". All our spares brought with us from IRELAND proved to be adequate for the six months period. The only items of spares that required replacement were 31 set valves and CHORE HORSE spares. Regarding 31 and 88 sets, they gave very good service. The battery on the 31 set (Control) which kept a continuous 24 hour watch gave an average of 36 to 40 hours "life".

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12. INCIDENCE OF DUTY.

During this period up to NOVEMBER the personnel of the Signal Platoon were divided as follows:-

Battalion HQ - 1 Officer, 5 NCOs and 5 men Operators.
1 NCO Mechanic, 2 Linesmen.

'A' Company - 1 NCO and 2 men Operators.

'B' Company - 1 NCO, 2 men Operators and 1 NCO Mechanic.

'C' Company - 1 Officer, 2 NCOs, 1 man Operator. and 1 Linesman.

As an overall picture the incidence of duty for the men of the Signal Platoon was particularly heavy and exacting. This was the case throughout the entire period but particularly so up to the time we occupied KAMINA. It is worthy of mention here that despite the heavy and frequent duty for all personnel of the Signal Platoon, it is a source of pride to say that each NCO and man displayed a sense of responsibility, a standard of discipline, willingness and initiative of the very highest degree. The incidence of duty for Wireless Operators at each of the three Companies worked out as - eight hours "ON" and sixteen hours "OFF". In case this might present a false picture, it might be more correct to say that an operator having done "watch" from "08.00 hours to 16.00 hours" to-day would be due for a watch to-morrow from 16.00 to 23.30 hours. It should be borne in mind that an eight hour watch on radio is much more arduous than let us say an eight hour watch on patrol or guard because (i) the watch is continuous unless for meal breaks and (ii) if communications are difficult or traffic is heavy the mental and physical effort required is much more strenuous. When operators were off watch at these Company Headquarters they were required to look after Batteries and Charging Plants. At Battalion HQ there were two separate watches on radio plus signal office duty. The Control set on the Battalion-Company net (as shown in Appendix 'A') operated from 08.00 to 23.30 daily, the Control set on the local 31 set net (as shown in Appendix 'B') kept a continuous 24 hour watch and the Signal Office operated from 08.00 hours to 23.59 hours daily. So here at Battalion HQ the duty was roughly the same, eight hours "ON" in every twenty-four hours. In addition to "wireless watch" an amount of work at Battalion HQ e.g. care and maintenance of sets and charging plants and a continuous cleaning of equipment had to be done by the operators when off watch.

13. EFFECT OF CLIMATIC CONDITIONS ON EQUIPMENT.

Strange to relate the climate had very little effect on any of the Signal Equipment. In GOMA, KIVU, where the Battalion HQ were stationed for the first three-and-a-half months, the climate was pleasant and not severe at any stage - this was due to the fact that although we were only some eighty miles south of the Equator we were 5-6,000 feet above sea level. As a result of the dry climate and the completely unsurfaced roads, sets became completely covered with dust (despite all efforts to prevent it) when accompanying patrols in Landrovers. 31 and 88 set Batteries were kept in a cool place, also telephone cells with the result that, apart from these items, there were really no bad effects from the climate on any of the Signal Equipment.

14. STANDARD OF OPERATORS.

There were twenty operators in the Signal Platoon. On leaving IRELAND six of this twenty were in fact not operators - they had not been graded as such. They had just commenced their tests for 2 Star Wireless Operator when they left with the 32 Battalion, having completed a Basic Wireless Operators Course. Four others had just completed a Basic Wireless Operators Course and had been graded immediately prior to leaving for the CONGO. As a result of the training and practice which these operators received during the first few months, the above-mentioned 2 Star and ungraded operators had been tested in and graded as 3 Star Wireless Operators before DECEMBER with the exception of one man.

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These men had an average of 14 to 16 words per minute in Telegraphy on leaving IRELAND and by the end of NOVEMBER they had achieved a speed of 21-23 words per minute. In fact after one month these operators, as a result of the heavy duty and practice, had improved out of all recognition. So even including those operators, who were both young and inexperienced, the standard of operating in the Signal Platoon was very good, over the entire period of service.

15. While Battalion HQ were in GOMA, 'A' Company were in BUKAVU, a distance of approximately 90 miles and 'B' Company were in KINDU, a distance of approximately 280 miles. Communication between Battalion HQ and both these Companies was loud and clear on CW all day every day and loud and clear on voice all day with the exception of perhaps two hours generally between 20.00 and 22.00 hours. All sets were using dipole aerials and were working on the frequencies shown at Appendix 'A'. A point of interest here might be that as an experiment we tried working BUKAVU with both stations using 12 foot rod aerials and both stations were strength 4-5 on CW and about strength 2-3 on Voice. We attempted the same experiment with KINDU which is 280 miles from GOMA across mountainous country and the result was strength 4-5 on CW. However the greatest range obtained on the C.12 was between Battalion HQ in GOMA and 'C' Company in KAMINA, roughly 550 miles away. While communications here were never satisfactory on Voice, the signal on CW was generally 4-5 which was a really wonderful performance both for the set and the operators. The set incidentally has an output of 5 watts on VOICE and 8 watts on CW. During our stay in GOMA the Battalion were required to carry out an air reconnaissance rather urgently along the KIVU-Oriental province border. The result of this air reconnaissance was required urgently so we experimented with a C.12 in another aircraft. This necessitated using a very makeshift aerial but again the C.12 proved its versatility by providing excellent communication right during the reconnaissance. The distance involved was in the region of 200 miles. Before leaving the subject of communication I might add that during our stay in GOMA communication to LEOPOLDVILLE and EVILLE was provided by a UNITED NATIONS civilian operator who came from ISRAEL and later by a crew of INDIAN operators. The equipment here was a BC 610.

16. STATISTICAL DATA ON MESSAGES RECEIVED AND SENT.

<u>Month.</u>	<u>Number of Messages Received</u>	<u>Number of Messages Sent.</u>
AUGUST.	954	487
SEPTEMBER.	970	693
OCTOBER.	865	541
NOVEMBER (1-12)	370	214

Regarding the above messages - those received were often up to 400 words per message and in FRENCH.

17. HAM CONTACTS.

A very important part of our signal communications was the contacts we made to IRELAND through the help of "HAMS". It makes a good story also. CAPTAIN DEEGAN reports:- "One morning at about 07.00 hours about the middle of SEPTEMBER I was listening on the C.12 to the HAMS working around 7 mc/s. By chance I called one of them, an AMERICAN Missionary and I was surprised when he answered me as he was in BUNIA about 300 miles distant. When I told him I was IRISH he told me there was a HAM in UGANDA from IRELAND called TIERNEY and that if he heard him he would tell him to look out for me. The following morning having spoken again to the AMERICAN I was called by a HAM from KAMPALA. When I mentioned TIERNEY to him he told me he would ring him that day and arrange to have him on the air the following morning. TIERNEY lived in JINJA about 50 miles from KAMPALA. The following morning I had the pleasure of contacting TIERNEY and at this stage I would like to say that during the rest of our service there his help was invaluable to the 32 Battalion. Each morning from then on I spoke to TIERNEY on the C.12 and each night he spoke to a HAM in DUBLIN - FR. STONE, who also gave us every possible help and went to endless trouble to get news out

to us and from us. This meant that even at this stage we had news from IRELAND within 12 hours, relayed by TERRY TIERNEY. On the 30th OCTOBER TERRY presented me with a Tx which he built himself for us for direct contact with IRELAND. He drove in his Volkswagen from his home in JINJA to the UGANDA-CONGO border at KISORO where I met him - a distance of 300-400 miles and gave me this transmitter which had an output of 60 watts." As a result of this 400 mile spin in the Volkswagen the set was in a pretty bad shape when it finally got to GOMA and it took us four full days to get it working. However on the 7/11/60 I contacted FR. STONE direct in DUBLIN and he told me I was loud and clear on both Voice and CW. This contact which I maintained twice daily practically without a break to the end of our service was a tremendous boost to our morale. It meant that where Officers, NCOs and men requiring urgent news from home (e.g. if they had got news by letter that their wives were ill) they had the news back generally within six hours from places such as ATHLONE, CORK etc. I spoke to FR. STONE twice daily at 11.00 hours G.M.T. and 17.00 hours G.M.T. The procedure generally was that e.g. I gave him a message at 11.00 hours requiring an answer, he immediately rang GHQ and at our contact at 17.00 hours he generally had the reply for me. In fact on some days where conditions were extraordinary good, he would ring GHQ while I was speaking to him and I would have the reply (if the question had to do with official matters) back immediately. The transmitter which TERRY TIERNEY gave us was crystal controlled on 10, 20 and 40 metres. On our 11.00 hours contact we worked on 10 metres and at 17.00 hours we worked on 20 metres. On 20 metres we used an ordinary Dipole but on 10 metres we used a beam aerial with reflector and director. This beam aerial was made out of 4 foot rod aeriels and was erected to a height of 70 feet through the roof of our HQ. The HRO receiver which we had brought with us was our HAM receiver. This HAM contact was I consider one of THE most important aspects of our communications. Incidentally FR. STONE had a contact in RADIO EIREANN with the result that we had the results of matches played each Sunday at roughly 17.30 hours - an hour before they were broadcast in IRELAND on RADIO EIREANN.

18. The second period of our service as far as Signal communications are concerned started when we arrived in KAMINA in NOVEMBER. I propose to cover this period under the following headings:-

- (a) Signal lay-out.
- (b) Incidence on duty.
- (c) Line communications.
- (d) Statistical Date on messages received and sent.
- (e) Signal Lay-out.

19. The Signal lay-out was as shown in Appendix 'B'. At Battalion HQ working forward to the Companies we had a C.12 and later an MBLIE Tx which we took over from the BELGIANS. Our three outstations were as follows, KAMINAVILLE where at first 'C' Company were stationed and later 'A' Company was about 16 miles distant from KAMINA. It was from this Company outpost that Train Guards were organized and this Train Guard was another and THE MOST important outstation. The third outstation was a Platoon post at KILUBI - an electric power station about 70 miles from KAMINA. A continuous 24 hour watch was maintained at Battalion HQ on this net for the entire period while we were in KAMINA. The providing of communication with the train guards was quite a problem. The escort coach on the train provided for the guard was about 25 yards in length and with help from Engineers we erected over the length of the roof of this coach a dipole aerial with the co-ax coming in the window. We had been told that the same escort coach would accompany each train but this did not always happen with the result that a rod aerial had occasionally to be used - stuck out the window and held in place by the second operator. It was necessary to send two operators with each Train Guard as the equipment required an amount of handling at railway stations etc. Also the duty was extremely rough on Train Guards

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and the duty and watch was continuous for anything up to 36 hours. The rear link at Battalion HQ back to Brigade HQ at ELIZABETHVILLE was also manned by our operators using an MBLE Tx. We were in fact the only Battalion in the CONGO to operate our own rear link. In KAMINA we provided Signal Communication for every BELGIAN contingent in KAMINA Base. This rear link set operated from 08.00 hours to 00.30 hours and as a result of the many contingents we were providing communications for, the traffic on this net was very heavy.

20. INCIDENCE ON DUTY.

While we had not as many outstations while in KAMINA the duty continued to be frequent and arduous. This was appreciated by the Officer Commanding 32 Battalion and his staff with the result that never once during our period of service were operators called upon for any other duty other than wireless. The duty continued to be heavy because:-

- a. A continuous 24 hour watch was kept at Battalion HQ working to Companies and Train Guards.
- b. The traffic on this net was heavy and very often priority because of train guards.
- c. The traffic on the rear link was extremely heavy because of the many foreign contingents we were working for.
- d. A total of nine operators were required in KAMINAVILLE, three for the actual Company outpost and six operators to alternate in pairs as Train Guard crews. This number of nine was changed every two to three weeks because of the strenuous duty involved.

21. STATISTICAL DATA ON MESSAGES RECEIVED AND SENT.

<u>Month</u>	<u>Messages Received</u>	<u>Messages Sent.</u>
NOVEMBER 14-30	344	210
DECEMBER	625	419
JANUARY 1-10	195	110.

22. LINE COMMUNICATIONS.


Unlike GOMA, KAMINA Base had an excellent central Battery telephone link-up within the base. All our Guard outposts around the perimeter of the Base were connected to Battalion HQ by telephone. The BELGIANS also provided maintenance service for all telephone communications. However it was not possible to make any trunk call e.g. to ELIZABETHVILLE, and in fact this was more or less the case in GOMA also where a telephone call to LEOPOLDVILLE had a delay of approximately 48 hours, and this of course was completely undependable and impractical for use.

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APPENDIX 'A'.



FREQUENCIES USED:

- 8 • 4 mc/s
- 8 • 8 mc/s
- 8 • 9 mc/s

Indicates sets manned by 32 Battalion. Rear link to LEOPOLDVILLE and EVILLE operated by UNITED NATIONS personnel other than IRISH.

1. From 3/8/60 to 31/8/60 there were only four outstations on the net namely 'A' and 'B' Companies plus patrol wireless sets sent from both Companies.
2. On 31/8/60 'C' Company left GOMA for KAMINA and became a fifth outstation on the net.
3. On 13/10/60 the MALI Battalion located at KINDU joined our net - 'B' Company having moved from there to KAMINA the previous day.


4. Station	Location	Distance from Control.
32 Battalion HQ.	GOMA	-
'A' Company.	BUKAVU	90 Miles approximately.
'B' Company.	KINDU	280 Miles approximately.
'A' Company's Patrol.	Area of SHABUNDA	100 Miles approximately.
'B' Company's Patrol.	Area North of KINDU	250 Miles approximately.
'C' Company.	KAMINA	550 Miles approximately.
MALI Battalion.	KINDU	280 Miles approximately.

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APPENDIX 'B'



1. Above is shown the net which operated from our arrival in KAMINA until the completion of our service.

<u>Station</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Distance from Control.</u>
Bn HQ.	KAMINA	-
Brigade HQ.	ELIZABETHVILLE	450 Miles.
'A' Company ('C' Company).	KAMINAVILLE	14 Miles.
Infantry Platoon Outpost.	KILUBI	50 Miles.
Train Guards,	LUENA	To a maximum of 120 Miles.

3. An M.B.L.E. Tx was used at Battalion HQ for rear link.

4.  Indicates sets manned by 32 Battalion Operators.

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TRANSPORT PLATOON23. TRANSPORT TASKS.

Tasks performed by MT Platoon were:-

- (a) Provision of Patrol Vehicles which included routine patrols, investigation of incidents, escorting of WHO, FAO, Red Cross and Missionary Personnel, and conveyance to their operational areas, town, airport, border and airbase patrols, escort of Planters on paying missions.
- (b) Provision of transport for UNITED NATIONS Air Crew personnel.
- (c) Provision of transport for VIPs and UNOC Inspection Staffs.
- (d) Collection of rations and sundry local purchases.
- (e) Collection of medical supplies, food and various items of UNITED NATIONS equipment from aircraft and subsequent dispatch by air, water or road, depending on the ultimate destination of these items.
- (f) Troop carrying to and from terminals of Battalion and other contingents, carrying of guards and stand-to parties.
- (g) Transportation of Battalion Stores.
- (h) Provision of transport for liaison, medical and intelligence work.
- (j) Reservation of seating and cargo space on UNITED NATIONS and Civil aircraft, water barges and railways.
- (k) Surveys of garage and workshops facilities available in area of operations.
- (l) Provision of petrol, oil and lubricants for vehicles, cooking, signal and engineer requirements. Liaison with Civil Airlines re availability, stocking and reservation of various aircraft fuels, for UNITED NATIONS purposes.
- (m) Purchase of whatever suitable spares available locally.
- (n) Routine Transport Administration and Accountancy for petrol, oil, lubricants, vehicles, spares and certification of all accounts in connection with transportation.
- (o) Inspection of all vehicles in service with the Unit and carrying out of Field Repairs to IRISH and UNITED NATIONS vehicles.
- (p) In conjunction with Military Police Corps, Compilation of Traffic Accident files.

RÜNDA

- (a) The initial allotment of transport to the Battalion was 10 Land Rovers from IRELAND. These began to arrive at GOMA on 29th JULY, but one of the vehicles was temporarily "lost" at LEOPOLDVILLE and did not arrive with the Unit until late SEPTEMBER, having been used in the intervening period by another UNOC contingent.
- (b) For the initial transportation of the Battalion and its equipment from airports to billeting areas, buses and trucks from the local Territoire garage, which was at that time under the control of the local CONGOLESE Administration, were used. This arrangement, and the only practical one at the time, had been made by COMMANDANT ADAMS, 2nd in Command of the Battalion and senior member of the Advance Party. This transport was dismissed on completion of the assembly, and paid for subsequently by UNITED NATIONS, charges having been based on kilometres performed and the overall carrying capacity of the vehicle.
- (c) On 31st JULY ten Dodge 4-Ton trucks were given to the Unit by 11 ANC Battalion, RUMANGABO. These vehicles were offered in a spirit of co-operation and as such they were accepted without question of their condition. On inspection they were found to be in a deplorable state, even for minor routine maintenance, such as greasing and attention to batteries. Two vehicles were found without oil in the sumps, two other had both braking systems out of order, tyres in some cases were worn to the canvas. The vehicles were of 1955 vintage and had steel bodies, but bodywork generally had obviously not received attention from the time the vehicles were put into service.
- (d) By the 2nd AUGUST, the sub Units had settled in their various locations - GOMA, KINDU, BUKAVU and the operational transport needs of the Battalion became of major importance. Some distribution of the transport now available had to be made, but as there was neither road, rail or water communications between Battalion HQ at GOMA and KINDU, where "B" Company was stationed, and suitable aircraft for transportation of vehicles were not available, the only solution in the case of "B" Company was to acquire transport locally. Two saloons were hired from local garages and two troop carrying vehicles were supplied by the Gendarmerie at KINDU. "A" Company at BUKAVU were allotted two of the nine Land Rovers and the local Gendarmerie supplied a jeep and one troop carrying vehicle with drivers. The local authorities at BUKAVU put a Chev Saloon at the disposal of Commander, "A" Company. Thus, after a week the vehicles at the disposal of the Battalion were :-
- GOMA:- Battalion HQs, HQ Company and "C" Company,
7 Land Rover and 10 CONGOLESE Army Trucks.
- BUKAVU:- 1 Saloon, 2 Land Rovers, 1 Jeep and one
3-Ton Troop carrying vehicle.
- KINDU:- 2 Saloons and two 3-Ton Troop carrying
vehicles.

RÜNDA

The reasons for the retention of the 10 CONGOLESE Army Vehicles at GOMA were, on the one hand, because of their unreliability and on the other because GOMA was the main airport for KIVU and handling the bulk of UNITED NATIONS Supplies coming in to the Province. Within a fortnight all IRISH Contingent vehicles were painted in UNITED NATIONS colours - blue and white. Paint was purchased locally, and the work carried out by a member of the Platoon with the aid of a spray gun on loan from a local garage. In addition, the ten ANC trucks at GOMA were painted in UNITED NATIONS colours, but these had to be repainted back to their original colour of dark brown before being handed back on AUGUST 30th.

- (e) These twenty-six vehicles were totally inadequate for to meet the growing needs of the Battalion. Despite repeated requests to Logistics, LEOPOLDVILLE, for policy on purchase or hireage of suitable vehicles for the Unit, such information was not forthcoming. A suitable vehicle establishment, which included an Ambulance, was drawn up, and requisitions submitted accordingly to LEOPOLDVILLE but without result. On 6th AUGUST two Volkswagon Saloons were hired and on 8th AUGUST two more vehicles of this type. These four were put into service at GOMA. Two of the five Willys Jeeps which arrived from IRELAND on the 18th AUGUST were allotted to "A" Company at BUKAVU.
- (f) Two immediate problems now presented themselves. Firstly, the inadequacy of transport available to "B" Company at KINDU and secondly, the unreliability and unsuitability of the CONGOLESE Army Vehicles made it imperative that alternative trucks of 3-4 Ton capacity be acquired. Bedford, Chev and Volkswagon trucks of 3-4 Ton capacity and Chev, Opel and Volkswagon Saloons were available from stock in many showrooms. Price Lists of these vehicles, which included certain modifications - painting in UNITED NATIONS colours and discount rate - were obtained from various firms already known to have large UNITED NATIONS contracts. These lists were forwarded through the local Civilian UNITED NATIONS Administration Officer to Logistics, LEOPOLDVILLE, with the Unit's recommendations.
- (g) The question of the ten CONGOLESE trucks at GOMA resolved itself. At that time, the Armie Nationale CONGOLESE were preparing an attack on KATANGA Province. The local ANC 11 Battalion demanded back their vehicles and these were gladly handed over on 30th AUGUST 1960. To offset this, three Chev 4-Ton trucks were hired from a local garage and despite the reduction in numbers, the GOMA Post had now a better service than at anytime up to that date.
- (h) The handing back of the CONGOLESE trucks coincided with an advice from LEOPOLDVILLE of the pending dispatch to GOMA by air of eight new UNCC Willys Jeeps for service with the Battalion. Urgent messages were sent to have five of these diverted and dropped with "B" Company at KINDU. Despite these instructions, five Jeeps arrived at GOMA on

31st AUGUST 1960. As the result of further requests to LEOPOLDVILLE, the three remaining Jeeps were delivered by air direct to KINDU on 6th SEPTEMBER 1960.

(j) Early SEPTEMBER a directive was issued by UNOC HQs that all CONGOLESE Army and Gendarmerie vehicles be handed back. This directive was complied with. Statistics, covering mileages performed; number of days in service, hours each day, petrol, oil and lubricants (if any) supplied to vehicles were compiled with a view to reimbursing the CENTRAL GOVERNMENT for the service of these vehicles. The Company Commander's Saloon at BUKAVU was given back to the local Administration and two Saloons were hired for the Post. The Gendarmerie vehicles which were in use at BUKAVU were replaced by two hired volvo trucks.

(k) At the end of SEPTEMBER the missing IRISH Land Rover arrived at KINDU and on 25th SEPTEMBER a Chev Bel Air Saloon was hired for use of the Battalion Commander.

(l) The total number of vehicles there at the disposal of the Battalion were:-

	<u>Saloons</u>	<u>Jeeps</u> (Willys)	<u>Trucks</u> (4 Tons)	<u>Land Rovers</u>
GOMA	5	8	3	7
KINDU	2	3	-	1
BUKAVU	2	2	2	2
	Total = 37 vehicles.			

This position remained until the Battalion was transferred to KATANGA.

(m) "B" Company at KINDU had barely sufficient transport to accomplish their mission in that area, but while the Battalion was alive to that fact, the situation was apparently NOT appreciated by Logistics at UNOC HQs. Furthermore, few vehicles were available there for hire and owners refused to allow their cars to operate in other areas. The absence of suitable aircraft for transportation of IRISH Contingent or UNOC vehicles from GOMA prevented any addition from Battalion HQ to KINDU.

(n) Firm but simple contracts were drawn up in respect of all hired transport. The charges, which included petrol, oil and service, was on a kilometre basis, and depended on the type and carrying capacity of the vehicles.

(o) All hired transport was handed back to respective owners on transfer of Battalion to KAMINA AIR BASE. Various conflicting orders were received regarding the procedure to be adopted in the case of IRISH Contingent and UNOC vehicles. Firstly, that none of these vehicles were to be brought to KAMINA, secondly, that only IRISH vehicles were to be transferred and, finally, that all such vehicles were to accompany the Battalion. "B" Company, which had moved sometime previous to main body of Battalion, complied with

second instruction, handing over three Willys Jeeps to MALI Battalion, which was the relieving Unit.

(f) All that remained of 32 Battalion in KIVU Province after 13th NOVEMBER, 1960, was a Platoon of "A" Company, which was airlifted to KAMINA on 16th. CAPTAIN BRADY and SERGEANT ROWE of Battalion HQs. The latter were to supervise the airlift of eight vehicles still remaining at GOMA to KAMINA AIR BASE. Specific arrangements had been made with Air Operations, LEOPOLDVILLE, for four flights to GOMA for conveyance of the vehicles. The aircraft had NOT arrived by 16th and GOMA had been off the air on 14th and 15th because the NIGERIAN Battalion had some difficulty in establishing their radio links. On Thursday, 17th, two vehicles were sent out by USAF CI30 aircraft going from GOMA to KAMINA, transferring GCA equipment in connection with airlift to CONGO of Second NIGERIAN Battalion. This CI30 was diverted when airborne and the two vehicles were off loaded at KINDU, where by now a NIGERIAN Company had taken over from the MALI Battalion. Air Operations, who were informed on the 16, 17, 18 and 19th of the position, but only on 20th was a message received at GOMA from Air Operations, LEOPOLDVILLE, that the airlift of remaining vehicles could NOT be undertaken for some time owing to the commitment of CI19 aircraft to a more pressing mission. CAPTAIN BRADY and SERGEANT ROWE left GOMA by scheduled UNITED NATIONS flight on 22nd NOVEMBER, eventually arriving in KAMINA on 24th, having spent two days at HQs, GHANIAN BRIGADE LULUABURG, awaiting an aircraft connection.

(g) Middle of OCTOBER instructions were issued from LEOPOLDVILLE that Battalion Transport Officer was to take over fourteen Mercedes Benz, 7 Ton Diesel trucks from Company's Agents at BUKAVU. These vehicles were intended for use with the Battalion, but had been purchased without reference to the Unit's recommendations regarding specification and capacity. CAPTAIN BRADY, on arrival at BUKAVU, found that only four cabs and chassis were immediately available and these were being fitted with bodies. The remainder were at STANLEYVILLE - none of these vehicles were ready for "take over" from the Agents at the time the Battalion moved from KIVU.

25. KAMINA AIR BASE - KATANGA.

(a) PAKISTAN Transport Platoon, under direct supervision of Logistics Officer, KAMINA BASE, were responsible for location of transport to Units performing various duties on the Base. This transport included Volkswagon Saloons and Transporters, Bedford 4 x 4 trucks, Minerva Land Rovers, Recovery Vehicles - all taken over from the BELGIANS. In addition, there were UNITED NATIONS Jeeps and Saloons. Saloons comprised Opel, Volkswagon, Taunus, Zodiac, Consul and Prefect.

(b) When KAMINA BASE Security Group, mainly comprising "C" Company, 32nd Battalion, was formed under command of COMMANDANT ADAMS, the difficulties which this Group had to surmount in getting sufficient transport and subsequently maintaining it for the accomplishment of its mission, were immense.

RÜNDA

"A" Company, 33rd Battalion, joined its Unit at ALBERTVILLE and handed over its IRISH and UNITED NATIONS vehicles to the Security Group. These were augmented by Bedford Trucks, Land Rovers and Saloons, (previously in service with ETHIOPIAN and SWEDISH Contingents) and located from PAKISTAN Platoon.

- (c) When the Battalion had finally concentrated at the Air Base on the 15th NOVEMBER, the following vehicles were on charge:-

<u>Bedford</u> 4 x 4 <u>Trucks</u>	<u>Armd</u> Scout <u>Cars</u>	<u>UNCC</u> Jeep <u>_____</u>	<u>Minerva</u> Land <u>Rovers</u>	<u>Irish</u> Land <u>Rovers</u>	<u>Irish</u> Jeeps <u>_____</u>	<u>VW</u> Sal- <u>cons</u>	<u>Opel</u> Sal- <u>oons</u>
22	4	8	15	6	5	1	1

In addition, there were 5 Land Rovers and 3 Jeeps still in KIVU. From these vehicles, three Land Rovers and three Bedford Trucks were permanently at the disposal of the Company stationed at KAMINAVILLE and Land Rovers performed the local chores of the Platoon on duty at KILUBI Power Station. By 1st DECEMBER, six vehicles, which were left behind at GOMA, had arrived piecemeal, at the Air Base, but up to the 13th JANUARY, 1961, there was NO sign of arrival from KINDU of the Land Rover and Jeep.

- (d) Base HQs kept rigidly to itself the allocation of saloons and despite the fact that many other ranks of other Contingents had saloons at their disposal, it was only after considerable bargaining that the Unit got a Consul and Taunus for use of the Battalion Commander and Head Chaplain.
- (e) On 6th DECEMBER there was a change in policy, apparently due to lack of UNITED NATIONS funds. The Base Administrator decided that certain vehicles, which had been taken over by UNITED NATIONS should be handed back to the BELGIANS. The particular vehicles for return were decided upon by "type", and without reference to mechanical condition, with the result that the Battalion found itself in some case, forced to hand back good vehicles and retain much inferior ones. Appeals against this method of selection were found to be waste of time. Vehicles handed back were:-

- 8, 4 x 4 Bedford Trucks.
- 7, Minerva Land Rovers.
- 4, Armd Scout Cars.

This left the Battalion sadly depleted in trucks for troop carrying and stores, but to make up this deficiency, the Unit had recourse to the transport pool of the PAKISTAN Platoon. There was NO transport, however, available from the pool. It was all in workshops awaiting spares and repairs and it was anybody's guess as to when it would be roadworthy.

- (f) On 8th DECEMBER, two Willys 1 Ton Pick-up trucks arrived from LEOPOLDVILLE for duty with 33rd Battalion. These vehicles had six cylinder engines and were equipped with four wheel drive.

RÜNDA

(c) The vehicles handed over to 34th Battalion on 12/13 JANUARY, 1961, were:-

Bedford Trucks	-	14	
Minerva Land Rovers	-	8	
Irish Land Rovers	-	9	(One was written off by BOS as result of accident).
Irish Jeeps	-	5	(Including 1 LR and 1 Jeep still at KINDU).
UNOC Jeeps	-	8	
Willys 1 Ton Pickup	-	2	
Saloons	-	4	(Including 1 Opel, 1 Consul, 1 Volkswagon, 1 Taunus).
Motor Cycles	-	4	

(One Land Rover and three Jeeps, Irish Vehicles, of "A" Company 33rd Battalion were sent with 2nd NIGERIAN Battalion by rail from KAMINA BASE to ALBERTVILLE on 15th DECEMBER).

26. SUITABILITY OF VEHICLES.

- (a) Suitability of vehicles must be considered in the light of carrying capacity, depending on the nature of the task, the overall road conditions encountered and climatic conditions.
- (b) Except in the immediate vicinity of cities, fair sized towns and airports, there were no tar macadam or metalled road surfaces. The remainder can only be described as dirt tracks, and roads as we know them are non-existent. In the dry season these roads carry four or five inches of dust or fine gravel, turning into mud tracks when the rains came. The danger of skidding in either case is ever present and constitutes a real hazard in the more remote areas, where only single line traffic is catered for. Whereas steep hill climbing is encountered, as in the east of the CONGO near the Equator, it is overcome by series of zigzag roads with enumerable dangerous V bends. Having travelled some considerable distance, frequently it is possible to see thousands of feet below, the road travelled over an hour previously. When two vehicles meet one has invariably to stop to allow the other to pass, but on V bends the road is divided by a number of shrubs to keep the traffic flow on its correct side. Except in vicinity of cities and towns few vehicles travel at night, for apart from dangerous roads, dense fog cuts down visibility to a few yards. It is customary for CONGOLESE drivers employed by the large transport companies to park their vehicles on the road-side at nightfall and sleep in the cabs.
- (c) Traffic moved on the right hand side of the road and although traffic lights were availed of for control in principal cities, most main crossroads depended on roundabouts.

- (d) Land Rovers proved superb vehicles for patrol work. The vehicle load capacity of six passengers plus two and a half cwts of equipment was adequate. The tyre dimensions and wheel base, particularly 107 models, proved them to possess good road holding characteristics. Seldom was the four wheel drive called for and then only to take the vehicle out of muddy surfaces. Despite operating in temperatures of 90° to 100° no major difficulty was experienced with the cooling systems.
- (e) Willys Jeeps, with their recognised load of 5 passengers and the driver; were most uncomfortable for travel over long distances. Passengers were cramped and the carrying of anything but personal equipment was ruled out. These vehicles were prone to skidding on the road surfaces encountered on long patrols and generally they were confined to local areas of operation. Their overall mechanical performance was satisfactory.
- (f) Trucks were not tactically suited for patrol operations. However, vehicles of 3 to 4 ton carrying capacity were an essential for troop carrying and transportation of stores at UNITED NATIONS Posts and Airports. Road condition and maximum loads for carriage to any destination made the employment of heavier trucks hazardous and uneconomical.
- (g) In the saloon class, Volkswagons were far ahead of all other in the conditions encountered. They were reliable, economical in petrol consumption, negotiated easily the most difficult roads and the air cooled engine was a decided advantage for operations in such high temperatures.
- (h) Willys one ton pickup, although fitted with a six cylinder engine was a short wheel base vehicle and in the light of load space provided was considered waste of power.

27. REPAIR, MAINTENANCE, RECOVERY.

- (a) The strength of the platoon in fitters was, one Sergeant, two Corporals and two Privates. Of these, two fitters were detached to 'A' and 'B' Companies at KINDU and BUKAVU. While the Battalion was stationed at KAMINA AIR BASE, one fitter was detached to Company at KAMINAVILLE. With equipment and stores brought from IRELAND the Platoon was capable for carrying out field repairs to Land Rovers and Jeeps. A fitter accompanied each patrol, bringing with him (apart from tool kit) as far as could be made available, spare fuel pump, generator, starter motor, fan belt, contact points and steel tow rope. This procedure was found an unqualified success, as on no occasion had a vehicle on a long patrol to be towed back to Camps because of minor defects. A small proportion of Land Rovers and Jeep stores were sent to KINDU and BUKAVU, but as there was a passable road between GOMA and BUKAVU, if a vehicle revealed a major defect it was brought to GOMA for repairs and a replacement provided.
- (b) By SEPTEMBER, elaborate contracts had been placed by UNITED NATIONS HQ for supply of spares and carrying out of repairs to vehicles locally by large motor firms with branches throughout the CONGO. Battalion Transport Officer could authorise repairs up to 400 dollars.

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Repairs estimated over that figure had to have sanction of EMF at LEOPOLDVILLE. Surveys of garage facilities available and technicians employed were carried out and results forwarded to UNCC HQ. LEOPOLDVILLE.

- (c) While the majority of these garages offered the most up to date equipment, NO spares whatsoever were available for Land Rovers or Willys Jeeps. Large stocks were carried for most continental vehicles, and to a lesser degree, Chev and Dodge makes. UNCC Willys Jeeps had arrived at the Unit with spare wheel rims, but no spare tyres or tubes. It took five weeks to get suitable tyres and tubes. While UNCC HQs were notified of the non-availability of suitable spares, up to the time of the Unit's departure for KAMINA there was no improvement in the position. Apart from replacements necessary as a result of accidents such as windscreens, steering assemblies and some items on which the nature of operating conditions placed a heavy demand such as shock absorbers, in the main spares brought from IRELAND were adequate for maintenance of IRISH Contingent vehicles. Fifty-three items were requisitioned from Ordnance Company at LEOPOLDVILLE which was responsible for stocking of Mechanical Transport Stores, but despite the fact that the volume of paper-work involved in demanding was greater than anything previously experienced, no more than one item could appear on any requisition; all this produced was fifteen gallons of white paint.
- (d) Any repairs necessary to vehicles on hire were carried out by the owners. This was a term of their contracts.
- (e) Irrespective of routine inspections all vehicles were inspected and serviced after patrols. Apart from dirt and dust in carburettors, fuel pumps, distributors, plugs and points required cleaning and adjustment and the damage resulting to master cylinders and brake lines from loose stones thrown up by road wheels was considerable.
- (f) Punctures were frequent and it was generally experienced that severe damage resulted to tyres and tubes, even after minimum distance of travel by the vehicle.
- (g) Fitters under a first class Sergeant proved themselves capable of dealing with all repairs and replacements demanded in so far as parts available allowed. While two men had little experience at the start of the mission, their progress during the six months was very creditable.
- (h) In KIVU PROVINCE, while local garage facilities and equipment were availed of as required; most of the repairs were carried out in Platoon workshops. This was set up in what appeared to be an outdoor playground, used in inclement weather. It had a roof, open side and tiled floor.
- (j) KAMINA AIR BASE had a fully equipped Base Workshop, which catered for all Base Units and was capable of even major overhauls. Civilian CONGOLESE technicians were employed there, and when taken over by UNITED NATIONS a SWEDISH Workshop's Officer was appointed and he was assisted by a team of NORWEGIAN NCOs. 32nd Battalion continued to carry out its own repairs because there was excellent accommodation for doing so in the Battalion Area. CONGOLESE technicians, while efficient, are very slow and there was a pile-up of transport of all descriptions awaiting repairs in the base Workshops.

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- (k) PAKISTAN Ordnance Platoon were responsible for all Mechanical Transport Stores on the Base. These Stores had been taken over from the BELGIANS and mainly comprised Bedford and Minerva Land Rover sections. The amount of paper work involved in getting whatever stores were available, had to be experienced to be believed. Bedford trucks and Minerva Land Rovers had not received maintenance and servicing for months and when items like starter motors, generators and voltage regulators became in the repairable category they were replaced until stocks ran out, but no effort was made to get components for repairable items. Although this obvious and necessary procedure was pointed out to the PAKISTANIS, it did not seem to register, and eventually half the Bedfords and Land Rovers on the Base were without starter motors. Fortunately, by cannibalising and scrounging the Battalion vehicles were maintained in service. No effort was being made to avail of the tyre remoulding facilities available at LEOPOLDVILLE and tyres were being worn to such a condition as to be unfit for remoulding and eventually the only ones obtainable from stocks were Bedford tyres and these were running short. There were no spares available from Base Stores for the many and varied types of saloons in service.
- (l) Due to a change in the plan as to the actual date of transfer of the Unit to KAMINA and the fact that an airlift of Battalion Stores had been laid on previous to that date, the Mechanical Transport Stores arrived at the AIR BASE a month before the Platoon itself.
- (m) Recovery vehicles were available from local garages, but we had not occasion to call on their services. At KAMINA AIR BASE there were two excellent recovery vehicles and with one of these a Bedford Truck was recovered from its position where it lay overturned against a tree, about eight feet down the side of a river bank at KILUBI. All Bedford trucks at KAMINA AIR BASE were equipped with winches.

2. PETROL, OIL AND LUBRICANTS.

- (a) Battalion Advance Party had been issued with a supply of UNITED NATIONS Coupon Books, made out in favour of Mobiloil, for drawing supplies of petrol, oil and lubricants. Two drums of petrol were brought from LEOPOLDVILLE to KINDU by Advance Party. Mobiloil Stations operated in BUKAVU, GOMA and KINDU, but as filling of individual vehicles at stations was too slow a detachable trailer tank, with a capacity of 2,000 litres was got on loan for use at GOMA and a number of 40 gallon drums for BUKAVU and KINDU. A number of jerricans had been allotted to each Post, and these were replenished daily. At KAMINA there were ample storage tanks and all supplies of petrol, oil and lubricants for the Unit were drawn daily in bulk from the INDIAN Supply Platoon. Other Units on the base drew their petrol from the pumps of the Supply Platoon, but this was found unsatisfactory as far as our Unit was concerned. It was thought that the UNITED NATIONS petrol, oil and lubricants coupons could be of use on patrols but it was found that petrol, oil and lubricants were not available in outlying areas, thus necessitating the carriage of spare petrol, oil and lubricants. For patrols of 550 miles round trip, up to thirty jerricans of spare petrol were carried. RUNDA

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- (b) Two grades, Nos. 1 and 3, petrol were available, SAE 40 was the standard engine oil, SAE 80 for gear boxes and a multipurpose grease.
- (c) As, on arrival in CONGO, we had no instructions about accountance for petrol, oil and lubricants; our IRISH system was put into operation. All petrol, oil and lubricants were accounted for in litres (1 gallon equals 4.5 litres). A signed coupon was given to the depot where petrol, oil and lubricants were drawn from mobiloil direct and a copy was retained as a basis for eventual payment. Where petrol, oil and lubricants accountancy instructions arrived at the end of AUGUST it revealed that a total consumption per vehicle per month was required by Logistics, LEOPOLDVILLE and in compiling such a summary, AF.294 was of great assistance. While in KAMINA this return was furnished to the INDIAN Supply Platoon.
- (d) Average monthly consumption of petrol for all purposes, cookers, engineer equipment, charging plants and vehicles, other than those on hire was 3,200 gallons. Land Rovers and Jeeps averaged 15 miles to the gallon, which is considered reasonable, taking into account the amount of low gear work performed and enumerable short runs undertaken in connection with local security duties and domestic chores. A total of 220,000 miles was performed by UNITED NATIONS vehicles in service with the Battalion, plus 40,000 miles by hired transport. Average speeds obtained, on what can be described as normal roads in the CONGO, were about 25 miles per hour.

29.

DRIVING STANDARDS.

- (a) The Platoon included two Sergeants, Mechanical Transport, two Corporals, Mechanical Transport, and 15 drivers. Neither of the Corporals had any knowledge of transport administration, one could scarcely be called a driver, and was removed to other duties within the Battalion on 10th AUGUST. Sergeants performed the regimental duties of Barrack Orderly Sergeant and IC Stand-To. An M.T. NCO who retired at 23.59 was on duty nightly as Detail NCO. On some installation and border guards, a vehicle was absolutely essential and during periods of pressure, the driver was actually a member of these guards. At this period the incidents of all night duties of Platoon drivers was one in three. The number of drivers in the Platoon was totally inadequate for the Battalion's needs, but fortunately, quite a number of drivers were among the personnel of Infantry Platoons and their services were called upon to make up the deficiency. This was only the lesser of two evils, as it automatically increased the regimental and other duties of members of the Platoon. In addition, many Officers and NCOs were called upon to do a lot of driving.
- (b) It was felt that the sudden change to "right hand side" driving would result in a high incidence of accidents initially, but this was not the case. Of fifteen drivers in the Mechanical Transport Platoon, three had finished courses within the six months previous to their going to CONGO, five others had little or no experience of saloon or truck driving, but within six weeks they had improved beyond recognition and their handling of all type of vehicles was excellent. In the beginning, the

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leading vehicle of a long distance patrol was driven by an experienced Supply and Transport driver and this gave the less experienced drivers guidance and confidence until they found their feet. Demands for transport were such that very little time off could be given to drivers and hours of driving duty were long and arduous, nevertheless, they stood up well to the strain and the incidence of sickness among the men of the Platoon was practically NIL.

- (c) With effect from 15 JANUARY, 1961, specific instructions were laid down by UNOC HQ as to the procedure to be adopted before issue of UNITED NATIONS certificates, giving personnel permission to drive vehicles under UNITED NATIONS control. These, among other aspects, provided for driving tests to be carried out by a Board with Unit Transport Officer as President. During the Battalion's period of service, any Officer or man with an AF.154 on leaving IRELAND, was given permission to drive as the occasion demanded, and in the case of Officers NOT in possession of AF.154, IRISH civilian driving licence was the accepted standard.

30. UNO INSURANCE OF VEHICLES.

Naturally, owners of hired transport refused to place Insurance cover on their vehicles while in service with UNITED NATIONS. This was brought to the notice of Logistics LEOPOLDVILLE. By the end of AUGUST, arrangements had been made with a firm of Insurance Brokers in LEOPOLDVILLE for third party cover on all vehicles in UNOC Service. In this connection, documentation covering chassis and engine numbers, make, type, horse power and year of manufacture was completed and forwarded to Logistics.

31. TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS.

- (a) Traffic Accident Procedure was basically similar to that in operation here. The main difference was that all accidents were investigated by Military Police in addition to Transport Officer and a copy of accident proceedings was required by Chief Provost Marshal, UNOC. The Insurance Company covering UNOC vehicles also required a copy.
- (b) Disciplinary action against personnel of the Unit was not considered necessary as a result of any accident which occurred involving vehicles on charge to the Unit. In all cases vehicles involved were on official duty and on authorised route and it was considered that the collisions were unavoidable. Disciplinary action was taken against a Unit driver who, while on detachment to UNOC HQs, LEOPOLDVILLE, drove without authority, and damaged a vehicle of another contingent.
- (c) Nature of Accidents:-
- (i) UNOC Jeep in collision with hired Saloon - KINDU.
 - (ii) Hired Saloon overturned at dangerous bend - KINDU.
 - (iii) Land Rover, driven by Officer, overturned, dangerous bend - BUKAVU.

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- (iv) Land Rover in collision with roundabout - BUKAVU. Vehicle was written off as a result of this accident.
- (v) Truck in collision with tree - BUKAVU.
- (vi) Jeep in collision with CONGOLESE child - GOMA.
- (vii) Saloon, driven by Officer, in collision with CONGOLESE child - GOMA.
- (viii) Saloon, driven by Officer, in collision with civilian Saloon, driver of which was drunk.
- (ix) Truck overturned at river bank as a result of side of road subsiding - KAMINA.

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HISTORY OF ARMY MEDICAL CORPS - 32nd IRISH BATTALION.

32. Foreword. The mission of the Army Medical Corps detachment with the 32nd Battalion was to afford medical treatment with particular emphasis on prevention of disease and disability and in so doing, to support the morale and confidence of our troops. Other responsibilities which arose after arrival in the CONGO were the provision of aid to the CONGOLESE population, medical treatment of other UNITED NATIONS personnel, collection of medical intelligence, and liaison with the World Health Organisation (W.H.O.) and Red Cross team.
33. Advance Party. A Medical Officer travelled with the advance party of the Battalion. After arriving in LEOPOLDVILLE, he collected information relating to climate, food, water, hospitals, endemic diseases, etc. in the area assigned as the Battalion's mission. Before the main body of troops arrived, he reconnoitred, and found suitable accommodation for them.
34. Composition of Army Medical Corps. The Army Medical Corps detachment was organised as a medical Platoon, in the Headquarters Company, and under Command of COMMANDANT J. LAFFAN. There were three Medical Officers, one Sergeant, five Corporals and 16 Privates.
35. Standard of Fitness. With very few exceptions, all Officers and men were fit for service overseas, in so far as could be known before departure. Some men of low medical category were taken who might better have been left at home. One of the three men who were repatriated, had a history of duodenal ulcer, and a second one had spent a total of a year in hospital or on sick leave during the previous four years. Some of the older NCOs were rather corpulent on leaving IRELAND, and appeared to be doubtful risks, but this did little to impair their efficiency, and they quickly lost much of their excess weight.
36. Climatic Conditions were better than bargained for except in the case of the Company stationed at KINDU. In GOMA, BUKAVU and KAMINA, the heat was bearable, and the humidity was not oppressive, largely due to high altitude above sea level. There was considerable risk of sunburn from the strong sunshine, until troops learned caution about exposing themselves. During the day very light clothing, i.e. shirt and either shorts or slacks, was sufficient for comfort. In the highland country, the temperature dropped, late at night, so that men on patrols or guards needed woollen clothing. Troops in KINDU and LEOPOLDVILLE were exposed to higher average temperature and humidity both by day and by night than those in GOMA, BUKAVU. Most men were able to endure it, at least for a period of 14 weeks as happened in KINDU, and the limit of their endurance would be more likely to depend on psychological than on climatic factors. Air conditioning greatly increased comfort of working conditions, where it was available.
37. Incidence of Disease. Below is a table listing the numbers who became ineffective through injury or sickness and were excused duty for one or more days, and yet excluding all who were admitted to hospital. A much larger number of men reported for dressings and treatment of lesser disabilities which did not involve being excused from duty:-

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Reaction to T.A.B.T. Vaccine	180
Reaction to Smallpox Vaccine	152
Minor Injuries	58
Respiratory Infections, colds, 'flu', etc.	47
Diarrhoea, colic, etc.	44
Ear, Nose, Throat, complaints	42
Headaches, Neuralgia	33
Dyspepsia, gastritis	32
Boils	12
Rheumatic Conditions, Lumbago, etc.	8
Gonorrhoea	5
Skin Diseases	4
Depression	4
Conjunctivitis	4
Constipation	3
Dental condition	3
Athletes' Foot	2
Urethritis - non-specific	2
Sunburn	2
Malaria	2
Haemorrhoids	2
Cystitis	1
Debility	1

As can be seen above, the first two categories (reactions to immunisations) caused far more disability and loss of man days than any other ailment, but were unavoidable due to the short time available for preparation of the Battalion before departure overseas.

38. Hospitalization. Hospital treatment was available in practically all towns where companies of the Battalion were stationed. The general policy regarding treatment, was to hold and treat all patients in the Unit as far as possible and to admit to hospital only when the needs of the patient so required. Within two days of arrival in the CONGO a number of men became ineffective due to severe vaccination reactions. All of these, and some men with other complaints, were treated quite satisfactorily in billets, converted into a Barrack Hospital. After the first fortnight, the number of sick dropped considerably. The average length of treatment was about four days, and the patients were comfortable in quarters.

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39.

In GOMA, KINDU and BUKAVU there were Government Hospitals still partially staffed by doctors employed by the Provincial Government, though most of the remaining doctors left the country during the next two months. Our troops were admitted to these Hospitals as necessary. In KAMINA BASE there was a large Military Hospital and 26 out of a total of 35 admissions went to this Hospital. All of these Hospitals were comfortable and our patients were well treated. One patient, thought to have poliomyelitis was flown to the EUROPEAN Hospital in USUMBURA, capital of BELGIAN RUANDA-URUNDI territory where he was well received and treated. His infection was not poliomyelitis but a diagnosis of Maniema fever was given. Four other patients were admitted to UNITED NATIONS Hospital in LEOPOLDVILLE, three of them for repatriation.

Fuller details are given in the following table:-

KAMINA BASE HOSPITAL.	Dysentary - (Bacillary)	7	} 26
	Injuries	11	
	Malaria	3	
	Bronchitis	1	
	Athletes' Foot	1	
	Renal Colic	1	
	Otitis Media	1	
	Abdominal Colic	1	
LEOPOLDVILLE.	Mental Cases	3	All repatriated.
UNITED NATIONS.	Sunburn (acute and extensive)	1	
GOMA.	Acute Urinary Retention	1	
	Head Injuries - (minor)	1	
BUKAVU.	Rickettsial Fever	1	
	Herpes Zoster	1	
USUMBURA.	Maniema Fever	1	

40. Protection against Disease. In so far as was possible, emphasis was placed on prevention of disease rather than on curing it. Herewith is a summary of preventative measures taken.

41. Smallpox and Yellow Fever. All were immunised against these two diseases before leaving IRELAND, in accordance with International regulations.

42. Enteric Fever and Tetanus. Active immunisation against these diseases was given to the majority of the Battalion by means of two injections of T.A.B.T. vaccine. In about one third of patients, these injections are followed by a feverish reaction

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lasting for about one day, and a sore arm for two or three days. In conditions of active service it is difficult to have men available and free from duty; for this immunisation, on account of the subsequent disability, and not more than 85% received full protection.

43. Poliomyelitis. Supplies of poliomyelitis vaccine (Salk) were flown from IRELAND and with a few exceptions all personnel received two injections of this vaccine.
44. Sleeping Sickness. This disease occurs in many parts of KATANGA and men on train guards could unwittingly be exposed to infection. A drug called Pentamidine, when injected gives a fair degree of protection against sleeping sickness, for about ten months. About 70 - 80 men received this drug.
45. Malaria. Mosquito control measures had reduced the numbers of mosquitoes in most parts held by the 32nd Battalion so that it was not necessary to use mosquito nets. Anti-malarial drugs were used routinely as prophylactic against this disease. For part of the time, Paludrine, in dosage of 100 mg. daily was used. Acting on advice from local experts, a different drug - Chloroquine, 300 mg. once per week was substituted for Paludrine. Medical orderlies were employed to distribute tablets of Chloroquine at all meals on Saturdays. The few cases of malaria which occurred could well be due to laxity in taking the drug as it was hard to ensure that everybody received and swallowed his tablet every week.
46. Plague. Plague occurs in two areas of north KIVU Province. One of these areas was important because a major patrol route passed through this town. A proposal was made by UNITED NATIONS HQ that plague vaccine be given to all troops at risk. This procedure was impractical and was not carried out due to scarcity of vaccine and the risk of very severe reactions following its use. The danger was regarded as very small and patrols were instructed not to stay overnight in the suspect area.
47. Dysentary. All troops were warned of the danger of taking food which was likely to be contaminated. Fresh vegetables and fruit which are normally eaten without cooking, e.g. lettuce and strawberries, were first washed, and then treated with a mild disinfectant, and then washed again. Other fruits which are peeled before eating, e.g. bananas and oranges were considered safe. Adequate measures were taken to exclude flies from food. Water supplies were generally safe and were checked frequently. A considerable amount of materials for water purification were carried, and of this, very little was used.
48. Venereal Disease. The CONGOLESE population was found to be very promiscuous, and also many were infected with gonorrhoea. Having been warned of this very early, the Medical Officers lectured the troops on the risks of venereal disease, and in all posts, facilities for prophylaxis of venereal disease were set up.
49. Medical Supplies. In the few days that were available for outfitting the 32nd Battalion, a generous and comprehensive amount of medical supplies was collected. Supplies and equipment of the following categories were carried:-

(a) Requirements for **RUNDA** diseases of temperate

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- (b) Drugs for such tropical diseases as one could expect to meet with reasonable certainty.
- (c) Equipment for minor surgery.
- (d) Laboratory and water testing.

As far as possible, all drugs were carried in dry and compact form to minimise losses and breakage. For example, no mixtures were brought. This precaution turned out to be superfluous, because all supplies were packed in stout wooden boxes which travelled very well, with no losses whatsoever. Supplies for (a) presented little trouble. As regard (b) provision was made for only two diseases, malaria and bacillary dysentery. Anti malarials were purchased for prophylaxis and treatment of malaria, and for dysentery, a combined sulphonamide and streptomycin called "Streptotriad" was used.

- 50. Surgery was regarded as a wide open problem. None of the Medical Officers of the Battalion had the training to undertake anything beyond limited emergency surgery. The equipment carried included instruments for minor surgery, dental extractions, intravenous anaesthesia, dried human plasma, and sterilizing equipment.
- 51. Laboratory equipment consisted of a microscope, stains, a hand centrifuge, haemoglobinometer, and some simple reagents, and a Horrocks water testing outfit. There was plenty of work for these items.
- 52. Soon after arrival some deficiencies and shortages were discovered and were rapidly made up, partly by a further consignment speedily sent from DUBLIN, and partly by local purchase. Drugs purchased in local chemists shops were very expensive, being from 5 to 10 times the IRISH prices.
- 53. Poliomyelitis vaccine was sent air freight from DUBLIN. It was packed refrigerated in thermos flasks. The first consignment of about 90 vials was left lying around in NDJILI airport at LEOPOLDVILLE in unknown circumstances for over a fortnight. As it was feared that this vaccine was likely to be inactivated by high temperature, it was destroyed. A second consignment of 180 vials was promptly delivered, and was used.
- 54. UNITED NATIONS arrangements for replenishment of medical supplies was slow and incomplete. The first consignment arrived at the beginning of OCTOBER with others to follow at 2 monthly intervals. One of the benefits of good liaison with Red Cross teams was the exchange of surplus supplies, to mutual advantage. In KAMINA it was possible to bypass slow UNITED NATIONS procedures, by indenting on a well stocked Base Medical Depot which was in process of being taken over by UNITED NATIONS.
- 55. Assistance given to other Contingents, CONGOLESE, and others. While the Battalion was in KIVU its contact with other national contingents were few and isolated and the only recorded instances of medical treatment for members of other contingents comprise one each of the following:-

DANISH
ETHIOPIAN
ITALIAN

(Hospital - malaria)

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56. In KAMINA the position was quite different and then there was a demand for medical assistance from a number of contingents who had no medical officer nearby. The following are the numbers recorded:-

INDIAN	61
PAKISTANI	59
NIGERIAN	41
SWEDISH	8
NORWEGIAN	3
INDONESIAN	2
LEBANESE	1

57. CONGOLESE. As part of a policy of goodwill to UNITED NATIONS an offer of medical treatment was made to the CONGOLESE population in GOMA by the advance party. This offer was taken up enthusiastically and in a short time the numbers attending the Battalion Aid Post reached the total of 150 a day.
58. At this stage it became necessary to call a halt following a UNITED NATIONS directive forbidding such aid. Besides the numbers treated involved a big drain on the initial complement of medical supplies, and the amount of work and time involved, interfered with other duties. Fortunately, about this time a civilian WEST GERMAN Red Cross team arrived and the CONGOLESE patients were directed to the newcomers and the daily attendance dwindled considerably. Quite a number of CONGOLESE preferred to come to the Medical Aid Post for treatment, even though a good service was supplied by the Red Cross team. This was due partly to the fact that at the Government Hospital, a service charge of 5 francs was made, and partly to tribal rivalry. The CONGOLESE attendants at the hospital were able to exclude from its clinics members of other tribes, particularly WATUTSIS whom they regarded as unwanted strangers.
59. No records were kept of the CONGOLESE patients attended. In addition to CONGOLESE civilians, gendarmes and a small number of soldiers were treated. On three occasions a Medical Officer visited a large Army base at RUMANGABO, where the CONGOLESE garrison had no doctor.
60. In KAMINA a good medical service for the CONGOLESE was still operating at the hospital while the 32nd Battalion was stationed at the Base. Two of the IRISH Medical Officers worked part time at the hospital. On several occasions IRISH soldiers were asked to volunteer as blood donors, once for a CONGOLESE woman, and once for a wounded NIGERIAN soldier. On each occasion there was a prompt and generous response.
61. European patients were also treated, and usually these were victims of assault, or emergencies. One such emergency concerned a case of poisoning in the BELGIAN territory of RUANDA-URUNDI. This patient who was a woman was brought into CONGO territory and with the combined resources of BELGIAN World Health Organisation and UNITED NATIONS medical services she survived.

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62. Liaison with World Health Organisation. The military arm of UNITED NATIONS worked in close liaison with the civilian agencies of UNITED NATIONS, and particularly with World Health Organisation. The Medical Officers of the Battalion passed on to World Health Organisation Officer in LEOPOLDVILLE all relevant information concerning medical services in the Battalion area, and this information guided that body in its allocation of medical teams to areas that needed them. Information was gathered, for example, about hospitals, which ones were operating still, and which ones were closed, the numbers and locations of doctors and nurses, shortages of supplies, diseases prevalent, etc. When the Red Cross teams arrived in KIVU they were helped by the Battalion to travel to their location, and were given all the aid, supplies and support that they required. Relations with them were very cordial except in the case of the EAST GERMAN team in KINDU, and there was excellent co-operation with the IRISH Medical Officers. When the IRISH Red Cross team arrived, a WEST GERMAN team was already operating in GOMA, so the IRISH doctors set up their station at BENI in the north of the Province. Here they received frequent visits from our patrols.
63. Employment of NCOs and Men. The Sergeant and two Corporals were retained at Battalion HQ and one Corporal and 4 men were allocated to each of three rifle companies. At each Post a Medical Aid Centre was established, and during the day an NCO or orderly was always on duty. At any time a Barracks Hospital was established, the nursing care was carried out by orderlies. Apart from the normal daily routine, one of their most important duties was to accompany patrols and train guards in order to provide medical care and first aid if needed. These men were given a good deal of responsibility and they discharged it well. In no case did they exceed their instructions and undertake treatment beyond their training and ability.
64. For about a period of two months, a Medical Orderly was sent on duty to the EUROPEAN Hospital in GOMA every night, following a period of civil disturbances. The nurses and patients in the Hospital were understandably apprehensive, and an unarmed Medical Orderly supplied a UNITED NATIONS presence and inspired confidence. While the Battalion was in KAMINA one of the Medical Orderlies, PRIVATE HANNA M. who is normally employed as a laboratory technician, was given facilities to work in the laboratory of the Base Hospital and thereby widen his experience.
65. Association with Neighbouring Countries. On the 8th AUGUST 1960 COMMANDANT LAFFAN, while on a tour with COMMANDANT J. ADAMS, 2 i/c, and the CONGOLESE District Commissioner of GOMA, crossed the frontier of UGANDA and visited the frontier post of ISHASHA.

HISTORY OF MILITARY POLICE SECTION.

66. FORMATION AND STRENGTH.

The section was formed by personnel of the Corps grouped from the four Commands. It first came together on 21st JULY, 1960, at McDONAGH BARRACKS, CURRAGH CAMP.

The strength of the Section was-

1 Officer, 2 Sergeants, 10 Corporals, comprised as follows.

			<u>Parent Unit.</u>
0.6370	Captain	Patrick Reidy.	Depot, Military Police Corps.
433933	Sergeant	Thomas Dowse.	do.
97588	"	Bennett, Denis.	do.
96833	Corporal	Chapman, John.	do.
81399	"	Fleming, James.	do.
98479	"	Heavey, Christopher	do.
97615	"	Doolan, James.	No. 2 Garrison Company, Military Police Corps.
805795	"	Waters, James.	do.
93017	"	White, James.	do.
96453	"	Heaphy.	No. 3 Garrison Company, Military Police Corps.
805121	"	Murphy, M.	do.
808162	"	O'Reilly, M.	No. 4 Garrison Company, Military Police Corps.
803775	"	Smith, T.	do.

67. MOVEMENT.

- (a) The Section left BALDONNEL AIRDROME, DUBLIN, on 27th JULY, 1960, at 15.10 hours on an AMERICAN C.130 Aircraft. It was accommodated on the first Aircraft to leave IRISH soil and travelled with Battalion HQs. The flight touched down at EVREUX in FRANCE at 17.30 hours for refuelling. The flight left EVREUX at 19.30 hours same day and arrived at WHEELUS Air Base in LIBYIA at 23.00 hours. An overnight stay in WHEELUS was arranged. The flight left WHEELUS at 15.15 hours on 28th JULY and touched down at KANO Military Airdrome at 20.00 hours. Refreshments were

provided by the BRITISH Regiment there and at 01.00 hours on 29th JULY the Aircraft left KANO for LEOPOLDVILLE arriving at 04.00 hours. The flight left LEOPOLDVILLE at 05.00 hours on 29th JULY and arrived in GOMA, KIVU Province, of the Republic of the CONGO, at 08.00 hours on 29th JULY, 1960.

- (b) Locations. On 1st AUGUST, 1960, two Military Police were detached to "A" Company, 32nd Battalion, who moved by boat down LAKE KIVU to BUKAVU. The personnel concerned were:-

96833 Corporal Chapman, J.
803775 Corporal Smith, T.

These Corporals were detached to "A" Company and carried out Military Police duties in BUKAVU until their return to the Section on 8th NOVEMBER, 1960, prior to moving to KAMINA Air Base. They were visited regularly by the Military Police Officer and the Company Officer Commanding (COMMANDANT T. TRACEY) had the highest of praise for the loyalty, tact and outstanding devotion to duty of these two Military Police Corporals.

The remainder of the Military Police Section were grouped together at Battalion HQs at GOMA from 29th JULY, 1960 to 9th NOVEMBER, 1960.

- (c) Move to KAMINA Air Base. The Section commenced moving to KAMINA Air Base on Wednesday, 9th NOVEMBER, 1960. CAPTAIN REIDY and SERGEANT DOWSE left GOMA on NOVEMBER 9th and the remainder of the Section left on the following day. The move to KAMINA had been anticipated for a long time and in consequence, SERGEANT BENNETT and CORPORAL WHITE were dispatched there on OCTOBER 9th to reconnoitre and prepare the way for the Section. On arrival in KAMINA on 9th NOVEMBER, we found that SERGEANT BENNETT was ill in Hospital and CORPORAL WHITE was operating a Detention Guardroom with the help of Infantry personnel. CORPORAL WHITE had made very good use of his time in KAMINA and within an hour of the arrival of CAPTAIN REIDY and SERGEANT DOWSE they were on a conducted briefing tour of the base. By the time the Section arrived the following day we had a fairly good knowledge of the layout, installations, etc. of the base.

- (d) KAMINA Air Base. The Section stayed together in KAMINA Air Base until Friday 13th JANUARY, 1961, when they left KAMINA for home. Their activity in the Base will be covered later on.

68. ACTIONS AND INCIDENTS - GOMA, KIVU PROVINCE.

- (a) Complaint re IRISH Troops - Sedec Manager. On 1st AUGUST, 1960, a BELGIAN, who was Manager of Sedec Stores in GOMA, complained that IRISH soldiers had stolen around 60 harmonicas from his shop last night. The price of the harmonicas varied from 45 to 1000 francs. Investigations revealed that there were no harmonicas stolen by IRISH troops and the Manager admitted later that it was many weeks since he had seen the harmonicas in his shop. He

admitted, after interrogation, that he could be wrong in saying that the articles were stolen. The investigation was so thorough that all blame was taken off the IRISH soldiers and the complaint withdrawn.

There is a lesson from this incident which is no new one. Troops overseas will initially be blamed for many things which they never committed. It is one of the things which our Military Police were waiting for. The most thorough and painstaking investigation must be undertaken on the first complaint of such a kind and if it is possible, redress the complaint or exonerate the troops completely from blame. This incident is mentioned solely for the lesson it gives. Never after in GOMA were IRISH troops accused of stealing anything.

(b) Fusion with Civilian Police GOMA. On 2nd AUGUST, 1960, CAPTAIN REIDY had an interview with the Commissionaire of Police in GOMA and his two assistants. The Commissionaire stated that his police were afraid to patrol the streets and enforce law and order. There were about 40 policemen sitting around the police station enjoying the sun, but they did nothing else. The Commissionaire was asked to assemble all available policemen at 14.00 hours that date. At 14.00 hours CAPTAIN REIDY arrived at police station and 44 policemen were "fell in" awaiting his arrival. He addressed them and offered all assistance to train and exercise them. All policemen were willing to come and accept this offer. That night police Town Patrols were active once more in GOMA. They were mixed Patrols of one IRISH Military Police and one CONGOLESE Civilian Policeman. Six such Patrols operated in GOMA with the object of:-

- (i) Showing CONGOLESE Policemen in company with IRISH Military Police to the Natives and White settlers.
- (ii) Examining lock up shops after dark.
- (iii) Preventing nuisances and disorderly conduct, and to help keep the peace.

From this date on, we took over the operation of Town Patrols in GOMA and despite the language barrier our troops fused very well with the CONGOLESE.

We christened them "The FINNEGANS" - and very shortly all the CONGOLESE Policemen were known to us by names such as MICK FINNEGAN - PAT FINNEGAN - JIM FINNEGAN - and strangely enough these CONGOLESE readily responded, and always with a smile, to their new names.

(c) Bank Protection. During the period 1st AUGUST to 19th AUGUST, 1960, Military Police were employed in vicinity of the local Banks. The A.N.C. had intimated that they required money and in the event of not being accommodated by the Bank that they would take it by force, and kill the employees.

To counter this threat Military Police organised a Riot Squad from 20 members of Battalion HQs, and this Squad augmented by Civil Police were alerted many times between AUGUST 1st and AUGUST 19th. No incidents or clashes took place but the presence of the Riot Squad helped in no small way to show that Military Police were prepared to act should the Bank be attacked or employees molested.

- (d) "The tables are turned on us". It must be recorded here that up to 19th AUGUST, rumours were rife that the CONGOLESE, stationed in RUMANGABU would move down very shortly into GOMA and take it over and establish martial law. At 13.45 hours on AUGUST 19th, 1960, the Battalion Officer Commanding and 2 In Charge instructed the Military Police Officer to call on all EUROPEANS living in GOMA and inform them:-
- (i) "That UNITED NATIONS ORGANISATION troops understand that martial law has been proclaimed in the Republic of the CONGO for the past two days, so far we here in GOMA have no evidence of such a proclamation".
 - (ii) "That we had unconfirmed reports, repeat UNCONFIRMED REPORTS - that the Garrison in RUMANGABU may move down and take over GOMA".
 - (iii) "If such a thing did happen all EUROPEANS were requested NOT to panic, that they should remain calm and stay in their houses".

CAPTAIN REIDY contacted 21 EUROPEAN Families in GOMA and through an interpreter gave the information as set out above. Later that evening, the BELGIANS, both in GOMA and KISENYI, had rumoured that all EUROPEANS had been warned by UNITED NATIONS ORGANISATIONS to leave GOMA and go to KISENYI. Feeling was very high about the warning given to EUROPEANS. Excitement went even to fever pitch later that evening when our vehicles appeared in the streets with MMGs and IMGs mounted on them. The RUMANGABU troops never invaded GOMA, but the BELGIANS "turned the tables" on the instructions given to the EUROPEANS in GOMA that day. Nothing could have created more panic and demanded private protection by house to house visits by the Military Police Officer.

- (e) Incident at BORDER POST. At 21.30 hours on 6th SEPTEMBER, 1960, the following incident occurred at No. 1 Post on the KISENYI GOMA border. Our border guard had reported that a civilian was held by them. CAPTAIN REIDY went to investigate and found a civilian at the post who said he was a BELGIAN Army Officer to wit a 2nd LIEUTENANT PETERS. He had no identification on him and he said he was waiting for 50 soldiers of the BALUBA tribe who were to desert the A.N.C. to-night and come to RUANDA through our border. He said 7 had managed to get across since 19.30 hours, but he feared we might have intercepted the remainder. Needless to say the so called MR. PETERS was dispatched very hurriedly to his own side of the border. This incident could have been serious especially as our troops were in a very tight predicament on GOMA Airfield since yesterday.

(f) Mercy Mission MR. MORENS. MR. MORENS, a BELGIAN, was arrested by the local GENDARMERIE on Monday, 5th SEPTEMBER, 1960, at GOMA Airfield. The Military Police Officer visited him on Wednesday, 7th, 1960, and found:-

- (i) His cell was NOT properly ventilated.
- (ii) He was sleeping on a wooden bed without mattress.
- (iii) He was in need of medical attention.
- (iv) He had been given no exercise and was very depressed.

After consultation with CONGOLESE Garrison Commander the Military Police Officer :-

- (i) Brought MORENS blankets and a mattress.
- (ii) Ensured that he got 4 hours exercise daily.
- (iii) Brought Battalion Medical Officer to see him.
- (iv) Brought him food and arranged to have all further meals sent to him from the local RIFF HOTEL.

(g) The stolen cars of MADAME JEANNE, KISENYI. On 14th SEPTEMBER, 1960, CAPTAIN REIDY went to BELGIAN Army HQ in KISENYI, RUANDA URUNDI, where the BELGIAN Commandant introduced MADAME JEANNE, who had the following complaint to offer :-

"That on varying dates between 5th SEPTEMBER, 1960, and 12th SEPTEMBER, 1960, she had 4 cars stolen by the CONGOLESE Army in GOMA. Her employees had driven the cars across the border into GOMA where they proceeded to hand them over to the CONGOLESE Gendarmerie. She asked us to get her vehicles back". The following is an account of efforts made to recover the vehicles without success:-

- (i) Military Police Officer discussed the case on afternoon of 14th SEPTEMBER with District Commissioner GOMA. The latter said the President of KIVU in BUKAVU was aware of the incident and would give a direction to-morrow regarding the disposal of the vehicles.
- (ii) On 15th SEPTEMBER, Military Police Officer saw District Commissioner GOMA re a speedy handing over to MADAME JEANNE of her cars. Commissioner still awaiting direction of President in BUKAVU.
- (iii) On 16th SEPTEMBER, Military Police Officer saw District Commissioner regarding MADAME JEANNE's car and expressed displeasure at the Commissioner's handling of this affair. The Commissioner tried to contact the President in BUKAVU by phone without result.

- (iv) On 19th SEPTEMBER, 1960, was informed by District Commissioner that the President in BUKAVU had decided as follows:-
"That MADAME JEANNE would get her cars back when she had paid the six months wages owing to her driver. That Madame was never to put her foot inside the CONGO again".
- (v) Military Police Officer saw MADAME JEANNE on 21st SEPTEMBER and communicated contents of paragraph (iv) above. MADAME JEANNE presented records of payments to her employees which proved beyond all doubt that Madame owed no money to any employee as imputed.

On afternoon 21st SEPTEMBER, 1960, the Military Police Officer presented a copy of payments made by MADAME JEANNE to her employees and suggested a meeting between MADAME JEANNE, her employee, The Commissioner and Military Police Officer to "iron out" the problem. The Commissioner agreed but would have to consult with Military Commissioner GOMA regarding MADAME JEANNE'S safety while in GOMA.

- (vi) On 29th SEPTEMBER, 1960, Commandant BOURBOU to BELGIAN Commander in KISENYI requested an interview with the Military Police Officer regarding MADAME JEANNE'S cars. Military Police Officer went to KISENYI to see Commandant BOURBOU who was in conference with MADAME JEANNE. Commandant BOURBOU requested that we give MADAME JEANNE a letter to the effect that after repeated requests to the Commissioner in GOMA the cars had NOT been returned. Military Police Officer decided once more to force the meeting suggested in para (v) above and saw Commissioner GOMA on afternoon of 29th SEPTEMBER. The Commissioner would not agree to the meeting nor to doing anything about returning the cars.

- (vii) On 30th SEPTEMBER, 1960, the Military Police Officer sent a letter on MADAME JEANNE'S cars to District Commissioner's Office, UNITED NATIONS ORGANISATION, LEOPOLDVILLE, copy to MADAME JEANNE, summarising the efforts made to recover the cars without result, and asking for pressure to be put on the President at BUKAVU to return what was obviously a theft of these vehicles.

69. ARRIVAL OF GENERAL VON HORN TO 32nd BATTALION.

GENERAL VON HORN and Staff arrived in GOMA Airport at 12.30 hours, 20th SEPTEMBER, 1960. He was given a Military Police escort to Battalion HQs and during his stay that night in the Hotel Grand Lac a Military Police Protective Escort was mounted outside and inside the Hotel.

The General, on departure, had the Military Police personnel of his escort paraded and commended for their vigilant escort.

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70. ASSAULT OF FRENCHMAN - COMTE de ROCHEMONTIEX - M. JEAN de CHALVET IN MAISISSI BY CONGOLESE SOLDIERS.

At 17.30 hours on 23rd SEPTEMBER, 1960, a lady, DOCTOR R. KROON, reported that the above mentioned had been seriously assaulted by A.N.C. soldiers in MAISISSI that morning. She feared that de CHALVET was now in GOMA prison.

Military Police investigated and found that de CHALVET was NOT in GOMA prison but was now in EUROPEAN Hospital in GOMA. DE CHALVET, on being interviewed by the Military Police Officer, said:-

- (a) That earlier that morning around 11.00 hours, while acting in his professional capacity as a Veterinary Surgeon, he had condemned meat in MAISISSI as being unfit for consumption because the beast had died of blackleg. Whereupon seven CONGOLESE soldiers of the A.N.C. in MAISISSI assaulted him with truncheons across the head, shoulders, ankles and legs.
- (b) Military Police Officer in conjunction with DOCTOR KROON examined his injuries which were very extensive and consistent with his story of being badly beaten.
- (c) District Commissioner in GOMA was immediately informed of the brutal assault and instructed the Chef Adjutant of A.N.C., GOMA, to take disciplinary action against the soldiers in question.
- (d) DE CHALVET was later (after some days in GOMA Hospital) evacuated to BELGIUM (we believe) for prolonged hospital treatment. Rumour had it that he subsequently died in BELGIUM but confirmation of this report was never verified.

71. ARREST OF BELGIAN LADY, MADAME BEAUX SOMERS.

At 17.15 hours on 11th OCTOBER, 1960, Battalion HQs was informed that a BELGIAN lady to wit MADAM BEAUX SOMERS had been arrested by Native Police and was in prison in GOMA.

Military Police Officer investigated and found as follows:-

- (a) MADAME BEAUX SOMERS was in custody in the Civil Police Station in GOMA.
- (b) She had called a Native boy (an employee of hers) a "MACAQUE" (Monkey).
- (c) The lady admitted calling her employee the name.
- (d) Civil Police decided to put her in prison for the night, pending trial on the following day at the Police Station.
- (e) Military Police Officer objected to the lady having to spend the night in Jail, which he pointed out was NOT a place suitably staffed nor appointed to cater for EUROPEANS. He requested that the lady be handed over to his Military Police and that he would guarantee her appearance in Court to-morrow morning. The Police Commissioner refused.

- (f) Military Police Officer left Police Station and accompanied by Military Police from Battalion HQs and CAPTAIN J. SLYE, they surrounded the Police Station. Military Police Officer then went into Police Station and took MADAME SOMERS away, telling the Commissioner that he would have the lady at the Police Court in the morning. The CONGOLESE were completely taken by surprise and had to agree to the Military Police Officer's proposals.
- (g) MADAME SOMERS was taken to Battalion HQs where she was given refreshments and later she was taken to her home in GOMA. Two Military Police were placed on duty in her house in case of any trouble from the CONGOLESE.
- (h) Later the same night the full facts of this case were put to the District Commissioner, GOMA, who was accompanied by the Minister of Interior from BUKAVU. They were adamant that the lady should have been jailed on the spot!
- (j) At 09.00 hours on 12th OCTOBER, 1960, Military Police (CORPORALS WATERS and DCOLAN) took MADAME SOMERS to the Police Court. She was fined 500 francs. MADAME SOMERS was very grateful for the help Military Police of 32nd Battalion gave her in this case.

72. ARREST OF BELGIAN CIVILIANS - MR. ROMMEL AERE, AND MR. RONNE LAAR.

The Story.

- (a) Military Police informed that two BELGIAN civilians were arrested on 24th OCTOBER, 1960, by Civil Police and were in custody in the CAMP MILITAIRE, GOMA.
- (b) Military Police investigated on 25th OCTOBER, 1960, and found that MR. ROMMELARE and MR. LAAR were in a dark cell in custody in the CAMP MILITAIRE, GOMA. They were arrested early on 24th OCTOBER and when seen by Military Police at 10.00 hours on 25th OCTOBER, they had NOT eaten nor had a drink since they were arrested over 18 hours ago.
- (c) Military Police Officer demanded the release of the two men who had been arrested unlawfully. MR. ROMMELARE was an Auctioneer and was showing MR. RONNE LAAR (a prospective client) over a shop which ROMMELARE was selling for a MADAME FILCHMAN in KISENI. The Civil Police did not understand the presence of the BELGIANS in lock-up shop and arrested them.
- (d) Their release was eventually affected after long negotiation at 12.15 hours on 25th OCTOBER, 1960. Both civilians were then driven to their homes by Military Police, 32nd IRISH Battalion.

73. ARREST OF BELGIAN NCO NO. 63095, SERGEANT HUSSON, ROBERT BELGIAN GARRISON, KISENYI RUANDA URUNDI.

The Story.

- (a) SERGEANT HUSSON was arrested by Civilian Police at No. 3 Post GOMA/KISENYI border at midnight on 3/4th NOVEMBER, 1960.

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- (b) He was trying to cross the border into GOMA town to keep an appointment with a lady.
- (c) There was feverish excitement by the CONGOLESE at his capture and his person was greatly in danger.
- (d) Military Police Officer was on the scene within minutes of the BELGIAN's capture and ensured that no harm befell him.
- (e) The District Commissioner, GOMA, arrived on the scene and ordered the NCO to be held in Military Custody until tried. Military Police Officer insisted that the BELGIAN be given proper protection and that no harm should be done to his person. This was agreed to.
- (f) Military Police Officer crossed into KISENYI at 02.00 hours on 4th NOVEMBER, 1960, and informed the BELGIAN Commander of the arrest and disposal of the NCO.
- (g) SERGEANT HUSSON was taken to BUKAVU the following day and all requests by 32nd Battalion for a mixed escort were turned down. Officer Commanding "A" Company, 32nd Battalion, was informed by radio, and requested to keep the safety of the soldier in sight at all times.
- (h) On 6th NOVEMBER, 1960, SERGEANT HUSSON was handed over to his Officer Commanding, CAPTAIN CARPENTIER, at the KISENYI border by Officer Commanding GENDARMERIE GOMA. The handing over was supervised by the Battalion Officer Commanding 32nd Battalion, the Intelligence Officer and Military Police Officer.
- (j) SERGEANT HUSSON appeared in good health and spirits and suffered no ill effects from his custody.

74. INSPECTION OF GOMA PRISON.

- (a) During the 32nd Battalion's stay in GOMA the Military Police Officer visited GOMA prison once each month and interviewed all detained persons there.
- (b) On these inspections he was accompanied by Reverend C. P. Crean, Head Chaplain to the Forces and COMMANDANT J. LAFFAN, Medical Officer.
- (c) Reports on each visit were made out by the Military Police Officer and submitted to the Intelligence Officer who sent them with Intelligence Reports to HQ. UNCC LEOPOLDVILLE.
- (d) Despite the interest taken by Military Police and repeated requests for a Prison Survey, it would appear that very little notice was taken of these reports by the appropriate authority in LEOPOLDVILLE.
- (e) Military Police did, however, manage in the end to ensure that boys of tender years in prison were not allowed freely to associate with other adult criminals.

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75. ASSOCIATION WITH OTHER MILITARY POLICE CONTINGENTS UNOC

- (a) KIVU. Our Military Police Section had no association with other Military Police of UNOC during our stay in GOMA. We did employ, train and encourage the Civil Police to become active in GOMA, but in any of the 32nd Battalion areas in KIVU there were no Military Police of UNOC stationed.
- (b) KAMINA. In KAMINA we first encountered Military Police of UNOC, and the Officer Commanding 32nd Battalion approved a joint proposal by CAPTAIN LUND, Military Police, and CAPTAIN REIDY, Military Police, for the fusion of the two Military Police detachments. From there on we worked together in wonderful harmony and standardised procedures to suit the ad hoc formations. CAPTAIN WILLIAM FIDDES, Military Police, of the CANADIAN Provost Corps was helping CAPTAIN LUND (when we arrived in KAMINA) to standardise procedures, methods of approach, and we finally evolved an excellent workaday procedure for Military Police.

CAPTAIN LUND (a NORWEGIAN Military Police Officer) was AMERICAN trained, while CAPTAIN FIDDES and CAPTAIN REIDY were both BRITISH trained Military Police Officers. The result was that Military Police NCOs from NORWAY, DENMARK, CANADA and IRELAND worked together in the closest harmony in KAMINA and performed security duties, Garrison Military Police duties, S.I.B. Investigations, and the training of CONGOLESE Military Police (200 men) with perfect harmony. This period in KAMINA was the only real period when the Military Police of the 32nd Battalion got an opportunity to perform the duties of Corps Military Police for which they are trained and in which they specialise. For the remainder of the period (in KIVU) the duties performed by Military Police of the 32nd Battalion were really those of Battalion Regimental Provost: Corps Military Police are NOT, and never should be, employed in such a role. The Battalion establishment should cater for Regimental Police, i.e. 1 Sergeant, 2 Corporals and 5 Privates, but the practice of employing Corps Military Police in this role is against Military Police teaching and should be discouraged.

76. The Military Police Section returned home to IRELAND on completion of its period of service with the remainder of 32nd Infantry Battalion early in JANUARY, 1961.

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CHAPTER XI

ASSOCIATIONS WITH OTHER UNITED NATIONS CONTINGENTS - VISITS BY VIPs.

GUARDS OF HONOUR, BAND RECITALS.

Personnel of 32 Infantry Battalion had many associations with other UNITED NATIONS contingents throughout their CONGO Service.

On arrival at GOMA we found a platoon of TUNISIANS in occupation of one of the schools. Many of them were sick; they had little food, and no medical supplies. We gave them medical attention and supplies as well as food. They were withdrawn from GOMA within a week. They did not mix with our men - chiefly we think due to the language barrier, and in any case both sides were new to the CONGO and consequently were very cautious of each other.

All Companies had dealings with local A.N.C. soldiers, but except to tolerate men on patrol duty, there was no other contact with them. They never looked for canteen facilities from us, nor would they get them if they did.

When NIGERIAN soldiers arrived in GOMA and BUKAVU to take over from 32 Battalion they became very friendly with our troops. Likewise in KAMINA Base, we usually had as many NIGERIANS and INDIANS as our own in the Canteen. Our troops were very acceptable to them and also our Canteen facilities were a big attraction for them. They had no such facilities of their own as far as could be seen.

Contact was also made to some degree with SWEDES, INDONESIA, MOROCCANS, PAKISTANIANS, ETHIOPANS, TUNISIANS and MALIS. Generally the language barrier was a handicap and limited very much the relations between the contingents. SWEDES were very independent and did not mix very much with our troops. INDONESIA were very quiet and subdued, and seemed to keep to themselves mostly. The PAKISTANIANS were very friendly and interesting. MALIS, ETHIOPANS, TUNISIANS and MOROCCANS made little or no effort to mix with our men, but the INDIANS and NIGERIANS were most friendly and approachable. The language barrier did not exist in the latter cases.

As far as the A.N.C. are concerned it should be noted that a great friendship developed between COMMANDANT P. CARROLL, Officer Commanding 'C' Company and the local A.N.C. Commander who became known to all as "JOHN WILLIE". It is reasonable to say that COMMANDANT CARROLL'S visits to the A.N.C. Barracks including visits to the Commander's house, helped in keeping his troops on our side. COMMANDANT CARROLL gave them demonstrations of our weapons on their ranges. This included our MMGs which seemed to impress the A.N.C. They refused to give us any demonstrations on their weapons, chiefly we thought because they were not skilled in their use.

The following UNITED NATIONS Officials and other VIPs visited 32 Infantry Battalion at the times and places as outlined hereunder:-

1. UNITED NATIONS OFFICIALS:

- (a) COLONEL H. BYRNE: Officer Commanding SCOMEF visited the unit at GOMA on 29th AUGUST, 1960 and went on to 'B' Company in KINDU afterwards. His arrival had not been expected so we did not have a Guard-of-Honour ready. He visited the unit again with GEN VON HORN.
- (b) GEN VON HORN: Supreme Commander, UNITED NATIONS in the CONGO visited GOMA, KINDU and KAMINA on 20th SEPTEMBER, 1960. He stayed in GOMA one night and was given Guard-of-Honour, dinner and general VIP treatment.

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- (c) MR. J. DAVIDE: UNITED NATIONS Official from LEOPOLDVILLE visited GOMA for conference on local hospitals, factories etc on 26th SEPTEMBER, 1960.
- (d) COLONEL J. McCARTHY: OIC Operations UNITED NATIONS HQ arrived at GOMA on 5th OCTOBER, 1960 and went on to BUKAVU on 6th. He was given a Guard-of-Honour in both places.
- (e) GENERAL FOSTER: OIC NIGERIAN Forces. Visited GOMA on 15th OCTOBER and BUKAVU on 16th. His visit was in connection with the projected take over of KIVU province from us by NIGERIAN troops. He was very impressed with treatment given him and staff. He asked permission to inspect the band on parade after inspecting the Guard-of-Honour.
- (f) MR. DAGG HAMMARSKJOELD: Secretary General UNITED NATIONS ORGANISATION NEW YORK. Arrived at KAMINA at 0850 hours on 5th JANUARY, 1961. He was expected earlier, and almost came unannounced in the end. However 'B' Company had Guard-of-Honour ready at short notice. The Secretary General had breakfast with COLONEL ROI, OIC KAMINA Base, OIC 32 Infantry Battalion and civilian staffs of UNITED NATIONS. He departed at 0930 hours.
- (g) GENERAL RIKYE: Arrived at 1745 hours on 24th DECEMBER, 1960. He represented the Secretary General and as such greeted all available troops on behalf of the UNITED NATIONS ORGANISATION with the usual seasonal Christmas Greetings.
- (h) COLONEL KIPOOR: OIC UNITED NATIONS Medicals in LEOPOLDVILLE arrived in GOMA on 17th OCTOBER - Party included three AUSTRIAN Doctors. Reconnaissance on proposed setting-up of WORLD HEALTH ORGANISATION centres.
- (i) MR. SHIELDS - UNITED NATIONS CHIEF FINANCE OFFICER.
- MR. BRACKENBURY - UNITED NATIONS CHIEF PERSONNEL OFFICER.
- MR. GRANVILLE FLETCHER- INFORMATION SERVICE.
- MR. RICHIE CALDER - INFORMATION AUTHOR.
- MR. FERGUS FITZGERALD - UNITED NATIONS ADMINISTRATOR.
- MR. P. De GARGNERON - FINANCE OFFICER.
- MR. J. MILLAR - LIASON OFFICER KIVU GOVERNMENT.
- MR. F. PHASIL - UNITED NATIONS ADMINISTRATOR.

All above persons visited 'A' Company in BUKAVU. MR. JOHN GRUN, Chief of UNITED NATIONS Mission worked in BUKAVU and had many contacts with COMMANDANT TRACEY there.

2. NON-UNITED NATIONS PERSONNEL.

- (a) GENERAL S. McKEOWN: CF and party including COLONEL S. COLLINS POWELL, Quartermaster General visited KAMINA Base on 8th DECEMBER, 1960. Guard-of-Honour provided - also unit dinner in honour of the visitors.
- (b) MR. MERIHU: President of KIVU province. Visited GOMA on 30th JULY, 1960 for conference. He visited 'A' Company in BUKAVU on several occasions during their stay in that city.
- (c) MR. KIGERI: Commissioner in GOMA and staff visited GOMA HQ on several occasions and in the end almost daily, for conferences. He was helpful and reasonable. He was sincerely sorry to see us leave eventually.

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- (d) DOCTORS BARNES AND MURPHY: Arrived in GOMA on their way to BENI early in AUGUST. Special dinner given for them and other WORLD HEALTH ORGANISATION personnel.
- (e) BISHOP OF GOMA: Called to HQ on 31st JULY - courtesy call. Visited HQ officially on 5th AUGUST, 1960.
- (f) COLONEL McINERNEY: Director Army Medical Corps arrived in GOMA unannounced at 1800 hours on 14th SEPTEMBER and stayed overnight.
- (g) AMERICAN CONSUL: LEOPOLDVILLE - arrived unannounced in GOMA on 4th NOVEMBER. Stayed in local hotel - had interview with Commissioner next day and departed.

3. GUARDS OF HONOUR:- 32 INFANTRY BATTALION.

- (a) GOMA:
- (i) BISHOP OF GOMA. MONSIGNOR RSIMBA.
 - (ii) COLONEL H. BYRNE. OIC SCOMEP AND 9th BRIGADE.
 - (iii) GENERAL VON HORN. OIC UNITED NATIONS ORGANISATION LEOPOLDVILLE.
 - (iv) GENERAL FOSTER. OIC NIGERIAN ARMY.
 - (v) COLONEL McCARTHY. UNITED NATIONS STAFF.
 - (vi) GENERAL RIKYE. REPRESENTATIVE OF SECRETARY GENERAL.
- (b) KINDU:
- (i) COLONEL H. BYRNE.
 - (ii) GENERAL VON HORN.
 - (iii) BISHOP OF KINDU.
- (c) BUKAVU:
- (i) PRESIDENT OF KIVU. MR. MIRIHU.
 - (ii) COLONEL H. BYRNE.
 - (iii) COLONEL J. McCARTHY.
 - (iv) GENERAL FOSTER.
- (d) KAMINA:
- (i) GENERAL S. McKEOWN. CF.
 - (ii) GENERAL VON HORN.
 - (iii) CEREMONIAL - LOWERING OF BELGIAN FLAG ON BASE.
 - (iv) COLONEL McCARTHY.
 - (v) MR. HAMMARSKJOELD.
 - (vi) GENERAL RIKYE.
 - (vii) U.N. DAY - 24th OCTOBER.

NOTE: Guards of Honour usually consisted of one Officer and 50 other ranks. The band paraded with the Guard when available at the locality concerned. The unit flag was also on parade where possible. MR. HAMMARSKJOELD got a CAPTAINS Guard-of-Honour. GENERAL McKEOWN got a Guard-of-Honour consisting of 2 CAPTAINS, 4 LIEUTENANTS and 100 OTHER RANKS (i.e.) a CAPTAIN i/c Guard, 1 CAPTAIN carrying unit flag, 1 LIEUTENANT and 25 OTHER RANKS from each Command and CURRAGH Training Camp.

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GENERAL VON HORN got a "mixed" Guard-of-Honour from COMMANDANT ADAMS, OIC KAMINA Base troops. It consisted of a platoon of IRISH troops and a platoon of SWEDES with CAPTAIN FIVES i/c the whole Guard. After the general salute and "present" each platoon was handed over by the Lieutenant in charge. This Guard and that provided for GENERAL McKEOWN earned much favourable comment from the many nationalities present on the occasion.

4. BAND RECITALS.

As stated elsewhere the pipe band from Southern Command under the Command of Corporal SULLIVAN made a great impression everywhere and with all contingents from its first display at EVEREUX on 27th JULY to its last at KAMINA Base on 12th JANUARY, 1961. This band paraded many times in GOMA and in so doing helped to break-up threatening groups of natives and soldiers. The natives gathered at every opportunity to listen to the music and watch the drill display. GENERAL VON HORN and GENERAL FOSTER also took a keen interest in it, so much that GENERAL VON HORN invited the Battalion Officer Commanding and the band to LEOPOLDVILLE for UNITED NATIONS week which began on 24th OCTOBER, 1960. At this display, which lasted four days, the pipe band joined with a GHANIAN all-black brass band in providing the music and drill for the many ceremonies involved. The climax of their effort was reached when both bands marched off together playing "The Minstrel Boy". The brass band spent the whole previous night practicing this piece of music. IRISH onlookers were nostalgically reminded of the massed bands display at the Military Tattoo in BALLSBRIDGE in 1945.

It was fitting that "Cpl" SULLIVAN was promoted Sergeant before he returned home from the CONGO.

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DISCIPLINE, REGIMENTAL DUTIES, WELFARE, MORALE, CHAPLAINCY,
INTERPRETERS, BRAVERY, THE PRESS.

PRE-CONGO DISCIPLINE.

1. An assessment of the Battalions disciplinary record in the CONGO could NOT be arrived at without, in the first place, briefly adverting to matters which had adversely affected the soldiers disciplinary make-up prior to his service in the CONGO. In all fairness it is only in that light that the discipline of the Battalion can be judged.
2. For the past fifteen years or so there has been an easing-off of disciplinary standards at home. Offences which at one time met with very severe punishments (i.e. insubordination and disobedience) have for some time back been treated more lightly. Absence has become a very common offence and excuses for it have been accepted which at one time would not have been. NCOs have progressively lost the authority and power over men which they once indisputably wielded. What has caused all this is beyond the scope of this paper but the fact that it has occurred must be recognised if a study of the Battalion's disciplinary record in the CONGO is to be of any value.

DISCIPLINARY IMPACT OF OVERSEAS SERVICE ON OR PERSONNEL OF THE BATTALION.

3. The discipline required for active service in the CONGO had of necessity to be far stricter than the discipline which the average post-emergency soldier had become accustomed to at home. The transition was a sudden one. The need to inflict comparatively heavy punishments for what the soldier had heretofore regarded as comparatively trivial offences became only too apparent. Because of the disciplinary background referred to in Paragraph 1. the average post-emergency NCO or Private displayed a lack of awareness and understanding of the absolute necessity for strict discipline and instant obedience.

ANALYSIS OF BATTALIONS DISCIPLINARY RECORD.

4. (a) See Appendix 'A' for summary of all disciplinary offences in statistical form. All offences were summarily disposed of.
- (b) Absence without leave: It will be noted that out of a grand total of 758 offences, absence without leave accounted for 354 or 45% of the total offences. The vast majority of these were short absences varying in duration from a few minutes to a few hours and were practically all occasioned by men staying out of camp after roll-call at night. Because of the tricky political and racial situation it was from time to time necessary to restrict men's after duty-hours freedom and have them in Camp much earlier than is customary at home. When the situation allowed it the normal roll-call was at 23.00 hours. This question of minor absence will be also covered under sub-heading (e).
- (c) Out of Bounds Offences: It became necessary in the interests of men's health and morals to place certain establishments and locations out of bounds to them. As further experience was gained whole areas had to be placed out of bounds. These were mainly native quarters and villages where dance-halls and drinking and other dives flourished. The placing of these areas out of bounds undoubtedly restricted the men's after-duty movements but it was unavoidable under the circumstances. The question of out of bounds locations will also be covered under sub-heading (e).
- (d) Insubordination and Disobedience: Service in a tropical country, absence from home, little relaxation, lack of privacy, heavy duties, absence of mail etc undoubtedly contribute to occasional feelings of annoyance and bouts of exasperation, depression, and frustration which the soldier might not experience at home under

peace-time conditions. A good basic disciplinary training is imperative if these feelings are not to be allowed to find expression in insubordination and disobedience. It is probable also that the lack of leadership and personal example displayed by some of the junior NCOs contributed to some extent to these offences.

- (e) Drunkness and Drinking: It will be noted that the number of convictions for drunkness was 50 (including one case of drunken driving). Whilst this figure, at a first glance, when related to a strength of over 600 over a period of six months, might be considered a most reasonable one, it must be borne in mind that as drunkness is nearly always an after-duty hours offence the rate of detection is necessarily low. From a statistical point of view therefore the figure has little value. If one is to assess the affect of the consumption of intoxicating liquor (whether in excess or otherwise) on discipline a much wider field must be examined than the figures for drunkness.

At home for example it would be ludicrous to assume that drink is responsible either directly or indirectly for a high percentage of absence. Family ties, company keeping, dances and other such possibly non-alcoholic amusements could in fact be mainly responsible. In the CONGO however such cause did not generally speaking exist and it is considered a fair assertion that drink, directly or indirectly, was a major contributing factor in absence (other than absence off parade).

In the case of offences of being in places out of bounds it is asserted that drink was also a factor if not the major one. These places usually stocked cheaper drink than could be got in more reputable establishments and men got bored drinking in Camp. It is true of course that drink was not the only attraction of these locations but if they had been "dry" it is extremely likely that the offences under this heading would have been much smaller in number.

The offences of resisting arrest, breaking out of Camp, creating a disturbance, pointing firearm at comrade soldier, entering Camp by unauthorised route, striking comrade soldier, could all be classified as offences in which the consumption of drink often was a factor.

The vast majority of the offences committed could therefore be said to have been directly or indirectly attributable to the consumption (not necessarily in grave excess) of drink. Let it not be assumed that the suggestion is being made that if intoxicating liquor were not available the number of offences would have been proportionately less. It is realised that a drastic curtailment of drink or drinking facilities (even if this were possible) could have produced other offences. It is however asserted that the IRISH soldier on foreign service when deprived of the hobbies, amusements, pastimes, distractions and relaxations of garrison life at home is apt to indulge in drink to a greater extent than he does at home and that this indulgence in drink, which may be far short of drunkness, has an adverse affect on his discipline.

5. PUNISHMENTS.

- (a) The means at the disposal of Officers with Commanding and Subordinate Officers powers for the enforcement of discipline were sometimes inadequate.
- (1) In many stations, because of lack of proper places of detention, it was undesirable to award a period of detention. Furthermore placing men in detention involved the lack not only of their services but also the services of the personnel who had to guard them. Large commitments and small strengths were sometimes factors which had to weigh heavily with an Officer awarding punishment.

- (ii) Because of high incidence of guards, stand-tos and patrols and also because of the lack of local amenities CB was often not the deterrent it should have been. Its enforcement was also a problem in a non-enclosed Camp.
 - (iii) Fines had to be awarded against the man's IRISH Army Pay and they lacked their immediate punitive effect.
 - (iv) LCMs could not very readily be resorted to because of the practical difficulty involved in their assembly, provision of witnesses, legal Officers etc in a country where distances were great and communications poor or non-existent. When these circumstances existed an LCM was a cumbersome method of providing punishment and at best considerable delay, expense and inconvenience would be entailed.
 - (v) The man's right of election for a Courtmartial when awarded a trivial fine gave him an immense, and it is felt under these peculiar circumstances, unreasonable advantage over an Officer. The grave danger in these circumstances is that an Officer, under powerful influence to be expedient, may award a lesser punishment than is warranted, so that the accused may accept it.
- (b) Because of the prevalence of one or more of the factors mentioned in sub-paragraph (a) fines were mainly employed in the award of punishment. Their punitive effect was not as great as it should have been because of the reasons stated.

6. GENERAL.

Personnel of the Battalion committed no really major offence. All cases were summarily disposed of. Such offences as were committed were in the main influenced by drink and the soldiers pre-CONGO disciplinary make-up which he found it difficult to re-adjust to necessarily stricter standards.

7. SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT OF DISCIPLINE IN OVERSEAS SERVICE.

The following suggestions are put forward for the improvement of discipline overseas.

- (a) That home discipline be so tightened that the transition to overseas service be a smooth one.
- (b) That Section 97 (4) of the Act be amended (if this is necessary) to provide for stoppages of UNITED NATIONS allowances in foreign currency.
- (c) That the Commanding Officers power to fine on active service be considerably increased.
- (d) That, on active service, a man should NOT have the right of election for LCM for fines up to £5 or in the case of a private, detention up to seven days. It will be remembered that until recently a junior Officer in peace-time had not this right.
- (e) That the Officer Commanding IRISH Contingent be given power to temporarily reduce any NCO in rank for the unexpired duration of the tour of duty without prejudice to a substantive reduction by the Adjutant General.
- (f) That a more ready means of providing a Courtmartial on active service be made available. That the Commanding Officer be the convening authority and that the necessity for a written summary of evidence be dispensed with. That the Officer Commanding IRISH Contingent be the confirming authority and that the accused have the right of petition.
- (g) That a ready means be provided to a Commanding Officer at the first opportunity to repatriate personnel who have demonstrated their unsuitability for overseas service and that such personnel be immediately discharged "services no longer required" on arrival home.

SUMMARY OF DISCIPLINARY OFFENCES - 32 INFANTRY BATTALION.

NUMBER OF OFFENCES.	TYPE OF OFFENCE.
354	ABSENCE WITHOUT LEAVE.
21	ABSENCE OFF PARADE.
57	BEING IN A PLACE OUT OF BOUNDS.
11	BREAKING OUT OF CAMP.
2	ENTERING CAMP BY UNAUTHORISED ROUTE.
2	ESCAPING FROM CUSTODY.
49	DRUNKNESS.
1	RESISTING ARREST.
12	CREATING A DISTURBANCE.
7	STRIKING COMRADE SOLDIER.
3	POINTING FIREARM AT COMRADE SOLDIER.
1	THREATENING COMRADE SOLDIER.
43	INSUBORDINATION.
59	DISOBEDIENCE.
3	LOADING WEAPON WITHOUT AUTHORITY.
2	WILFULLY DISCHARGING FIREARM.
7	NEGLIGENTLY DISCHARGING FIREARM.
2	QUITTING OF ARMS.
4	IMPROPER DISPOSAL OF SERVICE PROPERTY.
12	DESTRUCTION OF SERVICE PROPERTY.
1	UNAUTHORISED USE OF SERVICE VEHICLE.
1	NEGLIGENT DRIVING.
4	DRIVING WITHOUT AUTHORITY.
1	DRIVING WHILE DRUNK.
19	NEGLIGENT PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES.
6	DRINKING ON DUTY.
6	NEGLECT TO REPORT FOR TREATMENT.
4	MAKING FALSE STATEMENT.
84	MISCELLANEOUS, MINOR ACTS, NEGLECTS AND OMISSIONS.

REGIMENTAL DUTIES.

8. (a) Incidence of duty varied from time to time can be broadly segregated into three main periods.
- (i) From arrival in GOMA on 29/7/60 until the departure of 'C' Company to KAMINA on 7/9/60.
 - (ii) From 7/9/60 until Battalion HQ moved to KAMINA on the 12/11/60.
 - (iii) From 12/11/60 until end of mission.
- (b)
- (i) During period at (a) above the incidence of duty was light as Battalion HQ personnel did only the Battalion HQ guard at GOMA and stand-to duties.
 - (ii) During period at (b) above the incidence of duty was exceptionally heavy as Battalion HQ plus one Platoon of 'A' Company had to carry out all guards and patrols executed by the GOMA garrison during that period (See Operations Officers report on guards and patrols for the period). The position was further aggravated by the fact that the vast majority of the personnel were also responsible for the execution of the normal administrative tasks of a Battalion HQ. During this period Corporals and Privates were generally on guard one day, resting on the second day, on stand-to on the third day. On Sergeants and senior NCOs the duties were not quite so heavy.

When patrol commitments were heavy during this period the incidence of duty was even worse than that stated above. In some cases Corporals and Privates did guard on alternative days and the stand-to party sometimes perforce included men who were resting-off guard.

Signal personnel did not do guards but their signal duties were equally hardshipping and they had a heavy incidence of night duty. Transport personnel were equally hard-worked as apart from their normal duties they were involved in some guard duties and all patrols.

The nature of the duties and their frequency during this period entailed a heavy strain on all personnel involved.

- (iii) During the period (a) (iii) above Battalion HQ personnel carried out three guards (1 NCO and 3 Privates) each and provided a stand-to party of 3 NCOs and 10 Privates. In KAMINA the adm duties were such that many administrative personnel had, of necessity, to be excused guards. This entailed duties of about one in four for the remaining Corporals and Privates.
- (iv) Initially, due to climatic conditions, a twenty-four guard was a very heavy duty. It was found that NCOs succumbed to sleeping or dozing-off at night-time in spite of the dangers at hand. Recourse to changing sentries hourly was a help but constant checking was the best solution. Some guard-rooms especially in KAMINA were small, stuffy, uncomfortable and badly lighted and these things did have a lowering effect on morale, especially towards the end of the term when boredom and monotony were liable to intrude. Patrols - no matter how long or hazardous were always welcomed - were a great boost to morale, and indeed gave ample opportunity for good leadership as well as good team-work at all levels.

9. WELFARE ITEMS BROUGHT WITH UNIT.

On leaving IRELAND the Unit brought with them some essential supplies such as Cigarettes, Soap, Toothpaste, Laces, Polish also such items as Playing Cards, Dart Boards, Boxing Gloves, Rounders, Ring Boards and Footballs. Traders, such as Messrs GUINNESS and SMITHWICK had given help and we brought with us a very generous supply of their products - some as free issue and more for sale in the Canteen.

At time of departure it was not fully realised how important it was to have these essential supplied with us. Bringing them meant that from the day of our arrival we were able to provide a Canteen service and set up at least minimum recreation room facilities. The IRISH troops were the only Units who brought with them cigarettes and such items and it was agreed that it was well worth while in view of the limited stocks available in the CONGO and the difficulty of procurement on arrival.

10. ESTABLISHMENT OF CANTEENS.

From the day of our arrival a Canteen was set up on the basis of one Canteen (combined wet and dry) at Battalion HQrs which catered for all NCOs and men located there. Each Company, while on Outpost, had its own Canteen which was supplied with the main goods from the HQ Canteen. Two of our Companies, one which was located in BUKAVU and the one which was in KINDU were able to obtain most of their supplies locally. Considerable difficulty was experienced in supplying goods to the Company in KINDU, as we were dependant on availability of aircraft to transport goods to the Company HQ.

11. RUNNING OF CANTEENS AND THEIR SUPPLY.

Weather conditions and the long hours of darkness meant a greater use and volume of business for the Canteen. It also tended that more drink and more cigarettes were consumed. Great difficulty was experienced in getting suitable supplies of such items as Beer and Cigarettes. GUINNESS'S Stout and the cigarettes from home remained by far the most popular. From the start every effort was made to provide the soldier with all his needs in the Canteen. Such items as Ivory souvenirs, elephant tusks etc., clothes, watches etc were provided and proved very acceptable. Prices in all cases were much lower than for similar goods outside. Due to conditions in the REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO it meant that we could not depend on supplies from home and therefore local traders were our main source of supply. These proved most difficult and uncertain. Still we were able to have on sale a great variety of local beers and cigarettes at all times. When the Unit moved to KAMINA we had to look after the Canteen requirements of the following contingents: INDIANS, INDONESIANS, MOROCCANS, TUNISIANS, NIGERIANS and PAKISTANIS. This presented some problems in currency which had to be overcome. All our money transactions were in CONGOLESE francs and they in turn were lodged with the local UNO Finance Officer to the credit of Army Canteen Board who converted them to sterling in DUBLIN. During the latter part of our service UNO had established its own Canteen system. (PX). We felt that there would always be a need and a demand for a Unit to have its own Canteen and therefore continued to operate separately. Hours of opening were 11.00 hours to 13.00 hours and 19.00 hours to 20.00 hours. Sale of intoxicating drinks was not allowed during mid-day. Whiskey was not for sale to Other Ranks but this was acceptable as in the main IRISH whiskey was not very popular. IRISH Army Canteen Board did succeed in getting some supplies out to us during the end of our service and these contained items such as Films, Soap, Cigarettes and Ale. Looking back over this part of our operations it could be stated that the IRISH troops were the only ones who were able to establish and maintain a Canteen Service from the day they reached the CONGO. The importance of having a Canteen service under the particular conditions in the CONGO was evident from the start.

Our Canteens were staffed by personnel of the Battalion and the fact that the Establishment did not allow for such Staff made the work more difficult as it meant that the Staff was being continually

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called upon for other duties. During our stay in the CONGO there were two changes of currency in our area. This created great difficulties as we were unable to lodge money in the banks to our credit due to the fact that we would be unable to make withdrawals. Large amounts of cash had to be held to enable traders to be paid, and this was done on a weekly basis.

12. GAMES, RECREATION AND NEWSPAPERS.

Recreation rooms were established and every effort was made to have such things as newspapers, books, record players and radios available. We did in fact purchase some suitable radios in the CONGO and Messrs PHILLIPS of IRELAND sent us five which were most acceptable. We did obtain on loan a Public Address System and found it a great addition as records had been very kindly sent to us from home. Also tape recordings of matches could be heard by all ranks. Whist-Drives and Pongo were well attended and small prizes were given to the winners. Newspapers were supplied from home fairly regularly and these were always looked-forward to. Due to the long distance which they had to travel news was sometimes somewhat stale but we were always glad to get these papers. Games of Hurling, Football and Soccer were arranged regularly; the aim being to have some game on every day. It was possible to play the undermentioned teams in Soccer.

Civilian CONGOLESE	(3 Games).
INDONESIAN Battalion	(2 Games).
SWEDISH Battalion	(1 Game).
NIGERIAN Battalion	(1 Game).
INDIAN Ordnance Battalion	(1 Game).
PAKISTANI Ordnance Platoon	(1 Game).
DANISH Contingent	(1 Game).

Regular participation in sporting and recreational activities is most necessary and we found no difficulty in getting Officers, NCOs and men to take part. A Battalion Sports and a Swimming Gala were held while the Unit was in KAMINA and both proved outstanding successes. Also a Battalion Championship was held in Gaelic Football, Soccer and Basketball. Coming near the end of our service we received from home a wonderful supply of recreation-room equipment which was handed over to the 34th Battalion. Hurling was very popular and proved a great attraction to the local CONGOLESE but the difficulty of keeping up the supply of hurleys and balls nearly proved insurmountable.

13. RADIOS AND RECEPTION OF PROGRAMMES.

The Programme "Date-Line Dublin" was looked forward to very much but unfortunately while the Unit was in the KIVU Province reception was very poor. There was always a great demand for messages to be received and sent over the Radio from families at home. The absence of a tape-recorder was very much felt and it was considered that if the programme "Date-Line Dublin" was sent out to the Unit in the form of a tape and they were in possession of a tape-recorder it would be a big advantage over receiving it per Radio Brazzaville.

14. FILMS.

Some few weeks after our arrival the Unit received Film Projectors from home and a very limited supply of films. Great use was made of our projectors but alas the supply of films was very limited and in fact it was not until the last week of our service that this showed and improvement. Local cinemas do not show ENGLISH Films and therefore were not popular.

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15. MAIL - ITS DELIVERY AND COLLECTION .

I would place Mail, its delivery to the man and ensuring his letters got home quickly in first place in order of importance. Our Unit started very badly and nearly two weeks went by before we got any letters from home. We were at that time receiving them via LEOPOLDVILLE UNITED NATIONS ORGANISATION HEADQUARTERS and they were then dependent on availability of aircraft for delivery. This system proved entirely unsatisfactory. As there was an Aerodrome in GOMA, where we were stationed at that time, we were able to send the mail by air-freight direct to DUBLIN. This system was a great improvement. UNITED NATIONS ORGANISATION regulations allow for the sending of mail free of all charge but unfortunately it was sometime before we could bring this into operation. When the Unit moved to KAMINA mail service improved somewhat but never proved entirely satisfactory.

16. GENERAL.

The Battalion Staff wish to place on record its appreciation of the work done by the Welfare Officer, CAPTAIN SLYE and his staff throughout the whole period. CAPTAIN SLYE was tireless in his effort to provide any and every canteen facility for the men and at reasonable prices too. He travelled far and wide for goods such as watches, ivory and ebony goods, shirts, cameras, film etc and succeeded beyond expectations in meeting all our needs. The demand for beer and minerals alone was a full-time job in such warm weather conditions and with limited resources.

The Battalion's appreciation and thanks go too to all those firms such as Cigarette Manufacturers, Guinness, Jacobs, Red-Cross, Phillips, Smithwicks and many others - both groups and individuals - who donated gifts, cigarettes, foods, books, games, drink of all kinds and many other attractive items for our use.

Our appreciation too, of the work carried-out by REV. FR. CREAN, HCF, REV. FR. BROPHY, CF, CAPTAIN D. BOYLE, BQMS HARRINGTON, SERGEANT DUGNEAN, SERGEANT O'NEILL and C/S McCOURT - to name but a few in organising indoor games of table-tennis, pongo and whist should be recorded. This work was very essential especially during the long dark evenings from 1800 hours to 2300 hours, and was well supported and appreciated by all ranks.

MORALE.

MATTERS WHICH IN VARYING DEGREES ADVERSELY AFFECTED MORALE.

17. (a) CLOTHING.

The lack of a National tropical uniform was a factor which became apparent to all ranks very early in their overseas service. In high summer in TRIPOLI our troops created quite a spectacle. The heavy woollen uniform was impossible to wear in that blistering heat. When the tunic was removed the even less sightly "grey back" and braces were exposed to the gaze of the astonished AMERICAN servicemen. Only those who were quite insensitive failed to have their morale badly jolted by this experience.

(b) The uniform supplied by UNITED NATIONS is purely a fatigue dress. All uniforms were supplied (initially at any rate) in the same size. The man himself had to do the adjustment. Only two such uniforms were available to the men during the first few months of their service. Men out on patrol in dusty roads all day had to wear this sweat impregnated uniform for walking out that night as the other one was in the wash. Wearing of this

"Sloppy" uniform hardly contributed towards a man's self respect. Full supplies of these uniforms were not procurable until NOVEMBER, 1960 (i.e.) four months later.

- (c) As the United NATIONS tropical uniform was totally unfit for wear by Officers except when on guard patrol or training exercises, a decision was made by the Battalion Officer Commanding in AUGUST to allow Officers to purchase "superfine" tropical dress. The majority of Officers did so, and indeed many had to do so as they could not get a UNITED NATIONS uniform large enough to fit them. Such Officers as Battalion Officer Commanding, Welfare Officer, FR. CREAN and others could not get into the uniforms as issued. The cost of these superfine uniforms was met from the cash allowance given to each Officer prior to leaving IRELAND. That the Department eventually disallowed this expenditure is a matter outside the scope of this document and it is still sub-judice.
- (d) The effect mail had on morale was prodigious. On occasions our mail delivery was poor and its effect could be noticed at once. Men became listless and began to grow introspective. Immediately after a delivery morale soared.

GENERAL.

- (e) With the exception of some slight and usually temporary loss of morale because of the above factors it can be said that the morale of the Battalion was excellent throughout the tour of duty. This was particularly evidenced on the few occasions when the situation seemed to be dangerous. Morale dropped during spells of low activity and quiet conditions, only to soar again when danger loomed and activity increased. It was most important to dispel boredom and idleness by pictures, talks etc. This was never lost sight of at all levels.

18. CHAPLAINCY.

- (a) The Battalion was privileged to have with it two Chaplains; REV. FR. CREAN, Head-Chaplain and REV. FR. G. BROPHY, CF CURRAGH. In FR. CREAN we had a man of wide experience with troops in all conditions of service; at home and in foreign fields. FR. BROPHY, though less experienced, was no less capable in his duties as a priest and a soldier. Both priests endeared themselves to all ranks; were always approachable and sympathetic but also clear and firm on moral and religious matters. Both men were brave and tireless, and were always to be found in the forefront if and when danger was eminent. There are numerous examples of their devotion to duty and their helpfulness to those who sought their aid or advice. It is not possible to give such details in this short report nor indeed would these priests wish for any such publicity.
- (b) REV. FR. CREAN remained in GOMA at Battalion HQ most of the time until we moved to KAMINA. He visited BUKAVU occasionally to hear confessions, as this garrison were dependent on a local white priest. FR. BROPHY spent all his time with 'B' Company - early on in KINDU and later at KAMINA.
- (c) Mass was offered every morning on one place or another and often men had the benefit on SUNDAYS of two or maybe three Masses. Mass in the evening was necessary for guards.
- (d) A special midnight Mass on Christmas was attended by all available troops. It was an awe-inspiring ceremony with a special choir of soldiers and nuns.
- (e) In addition to his priestly duties REV. FR. CREAN proved to be an excellent interpreter and the Battalion Commander called on his services on many occasions. FR. CREAN is a first class linguist, especially in FRENCH and GERMAN.

19. INTERPRETERS.

(a) With a language problem it is obvious that we had to have interpreters. Very few BELGIANS or CONGOLESE had any English, and we had no "foreign" language. Thus we were provided with SWEDISH interpreters who understood and spoke KISWAHILI, FRENCH and ENGLISH. We had initially seven such SWEDISH interpreters but as time went on we lost some and with the scattered Battalion it became necessary to get others. UNITED NATIONS ORGANISATION was unable to supplement the original allotment but authorised us to hire suitable persons whenever we could. Thus 'A' Company in BUKAVU acquired the services of MAJOR DUNCAN SMITH who resided across the river in RUANDA-URUNDI. He was an Ex-British Officer employed as a Salesman by DAVID BROWNE, TRACTOR MANUFACTURERS. He was out of work as a result of the CONGO unrest and was glad to get a job as an interpreter for which he was eventually well paid. He gave very good service to us in KIVU, where he remained on our withdrawal to KAMINA.

(b) At Battalion Headquarters in GOMA, we had at first SWEDISH interpreters but later we had to hire three more. These were MADAMOISELLE DE GALBERIE - a RUSSIAN born naturalised FRENCH woman who owned a plantation in RUANDA-URUNDI, and with some ten languages at her command was glad of work to fill her idle hours. Later we hired MIKE NOLAN, an IRISHMAN who had some twenty-three years service in the CONGO, owned a plantation in STANLEYVILLE, but had to leave it when trouble broke out there. "MIKE" became well known to all and travelled to KAMINA with us. In late NOVEMBER he became ill whilst on a train guard and after a few weeks in Hospital he went home to his wife and family in UGANDA only to return later to join another IRISH Unit.

(c) "JOSHUA" was a native of TANGYNAIKA. He had been a teacher and spoke perfect English. He was jet black. As an interpreter he was very good, and his colour helped too - there was more confidence established with the natives because he was black. He was handed over to the next Battalion but did not remain long in their service. He was a good athlete and won the 880 yards championship at the Battalion Sports. He wanted to come to IRELAND with 'C' Company in order to become an IRISH citizen and settle down here. We did NOT encourage this and finally put him off the idea.

20. BRAVERY.

(a) At NO time was there any evidence of panic or fear even when the worst was expected. This applied to all ranks. If anything men were often over daring when caution might be the better choice.

Whereas one can admire this lack of fear, one sometimes felt it was carried too far by a few men who had the habit of moving about alone especially after dark. These were a source of anxiety at times, but happily NO harm came to them.

(b) One man, 304718 PRIVATE JOHNSTON A, Depot Corps of Engineers, was reported on for disarming a soldier who had loaded his rifle and had fired three rounds at the tent in which JOHNSTON and his comrades were on guard duty. It should be understood that the soldier concerned was certified insane by three Doctors and thus did NOT understand what he was doing. JOHNSTON was promoted to rank of Acting Corporal and later to the rank of Sergeant and he received official recognition of his bravery.

(c) Three other persons were reported on for bravery but the results of the investigation have NOT been made known.

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THE PRESS.

21. (a) There is no need to describe the publicity given to the Army in general and to 32 Infantry Battalion in particular by the Press from the time the Battalion was organised to its final departure. It was front page news everyday and in every paper - daily, weekly, periodical, - national and provincial alike. It was good publicity and was always fair and just without being too voluble or extravagant. Photographs of groups and of individuals appeared - thus giving the folks at home an interest in their own local representatives in the Army. Press correspondents and Photographers were very co-operative and never once took advantage of their position.

(b) We did not expect to see our IRISH papers represented in the CONGO, but we soon found that press correspondents had been selected by each of our national daily papers and by Radio Eireann and that these men had arrived in the CONGO as soon as, if not before us. They travelled by civil aircraft to LEOPOLDVILLE, and thereafter by UNITED NATIONS aircraft to GOMA. These were as follows:-

Radio Eireann	-	MR. JOHN ROSS.
Irish Press	-	MR. MICHAEL O'HALLORAN.
Irish Independent	-	MR. RAYMOND SMITH.
Irish Times	-	MR. CATHAL O'SHANNON.
Official Photographer (Irish Independent)		MR. GAY O'BRIEN.

They had been staying at the local hotel, which was very high grade establishment, but very expensive, and at these times unsafe for White people, as CONGOLESE Police and armed native troops were liable to raid at any time looking for BELGIANS. We decided that these Press men should stay with us for the short time they would be in the locality. Thus we took them into our post in GOMA and they enjoyed the facilities of the Officers Mess - such as they were - until they eventually departed. In this way we were able to give them any information they wanted, and they were at all times very co-operative, and never attempted to send information which we did not authorise. Likewise they were careful in their dealings with the natives. In general they were never a source of worry or trouble, and the most cordial relations existed between them and us.

(c) RAYMOND SMITH left us after a few days and the others left on or about 17/18 AUGUST. They moved to ALBERTVILLE to meet 33 Infantry Battalion which was due in there at this time. We did not see them again until we returned home to IRELAND.

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CHAPTER XII.

KAMINA.

1. EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE LOCATION OF UNITED NATIONS TROOPS IN KAMINA BASE.

Annexure 'A' sets out a brief history of KAMINA Base, its construction, description and its administration. It also briefly outlines the events leading up to its occupation by UNITED NATIONS Forces.

2. COMPOSITION KAMINA BASE GROUP.

The original composition and the various changes in the organisation of KAMINA Base Group are set out in Annexure 'B'.

3. FORMATION KAMINA BASE GROUP.

- a. KAMINA Base Group was formed under orders Officer Commanding 9 Brigade with effect from 1/9/60 with the mission of denying the use of the Base except for UNITED NATIONS purposes.
- b. Elements of 32 Battalion, which formed part of the Group, commenced fly-in on 1/9/60. The fly-in was protracted and it was almost 10 days before the lift of 'C' Company 32 Battalion was completed.

4. MISSION.

MR. G'ALO PLAZA, who was head of a mission negotiating the hand-over of the Base to UNITED NATIONS, was the senior UNITED NATIONS official. We verbally expanded the mission already given in writing by Officer Commanding 9 Brigade as follows:-

- a. UNITED NATIONS intended taking over the Base from the BELGIANS. In a phased take-over UNITED NATIONS technician and specialist personnel would replace BELGIAN personnel, who would be evacuated.
- b. KAMINA Base Group would deny the use of the Base to CONGOLESE or KATANGESE Forces and preserve it solely for the use of UNITED NATIONS. It would use such force as necessary to achieve this.
- c. It would prevent BELGIAN in-flights except for the purpose of evacuating stores or personnel in accordance with agreed plans for BELGIAN withdrawal.
- d. It would protect vital base installations against sabotage and maintain order amongst the native population to ensure the efficient operation of the base.

5. BASE COMMAND.

- a. Up to 3 SEPTEMBER, 1960, Base Command was retained by the BELGIANS. On this date a formal hand-over took place, the UNITED NATIONS flag was raised and the BELGIAN flag lowered. 'C' Company 32 Battalion combined with 7702 SWEDISH Company to find a guard of honour on the occasion.
- b. Officer Commanding KAMINA Base Group was appointed Acting Base Comd until the appointment of COLONEL WILLANDER (Royal Swedish Air Force) on 5 SEPTEMBER, 1960. The BELGIAN commander remained as Advisor.
- c. COLONEL WILLANDER continued as Base Commander until 16 OCTOBER, 1960 when he was replaced by COLONEL ROY, INDIAN Army.

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6. CHAIN OF COMMAND.

- a. One of the matters which gave rise to some difficulty was the chain of command which was ill-defined. KAMINA Base Group was formed on the orders of Officer Commanding 9 Brigade. It comprised Units under his command. Attachments and detachments to the Group were made on his orders. In spite of this the Group came under orders of KAMINA Base Commander, who in turn was directly under command UNITED NATIONS HQ LEOPOLDVILLE. In accordance with orders, Base Commander, the operations of KAMINA Base Group were to be confined to KAMINA Base and its defence. Yet occasionally the orders of Officer Commanding 9 Brigade required operation outside the Base and thus were in conflict with the orders of the Base Commander.
- b. Except in one case, it was possible to resolve these difficulties by co-operation and good-will.

7. CONGOLESE AIR TRANSPORTED THEREAT.

The concentration of CONGOLESE troops and assembly of commercial aircraft at airfields in the CONGO led UNITED NATIONS to fear an attempt to air-land troops in KATANGA and particularly in KAMINA Base. This resulted in a decision to block the two main runways, taxi-ways, two old air strips and the margins of the main road. This work was completed over the week-end by Units of the Group, commencing SATURDAY, 3rd SEPTEMBER. Movable blocks were placed on one runway in order to permit flights of authorised aircraft. The blocking of the runways on orders HQ UNITED NATIONS LEOPOLDVILLE took place two days prior to the executive order issued by 9 Brigade from ELIZABETHVILLE.

8. FLIGHT CONTROL.

- a. During the period from 3 SEPTEMBER to 11 SEPTEMBER, when the airfield was to remain closed to all except authorised flights, considerable difficulty was experienced through inadequate communications. Invariably the notification of authorised flights from LEOPOLDVILLE or ELIZABETHVILLE into KAMINA Base arrived after flights had landed. This demanded the presence of a responsible Officer almost continually either at or in communication with the control tower to clear landings on his own initiative.
- b. The presence of such an Officer from the Group quite likely averted a tragedy, when on 7 SEPTEMBER, 1960, the air-control staff refused landing clearance for an unidentified aircraft during the hours of darkness. The pilot who spoke neither English or French could not identify himself. However, the aircraft on the orders of Officer Commanding Group was permitted to land. The aircraft, it was learned after landing, had insufficient fuel to divert.

9. DEVELOPMENT KAMINA BASE AS A TRAINING CENTRE.

- a. On 7 SEPTEMBER, 1960 a mission led by GENERAL WHEELER, UNITED STATES Army Engineers (retired) arrived in KAMINA Base to examine the outstanding contracts for constructional work in progress on the Base and to advise on the installations and equipment which should be maintained to keep the Base effective as a major vocational and specialist training institution for the CONGO on a whole.
- b. The plan proposed by the WHEELER Mission was an ambitious one but extremely costly. It involved KAMINA Base Group in the preparation of inventories of barrack service equipment, engineer equipment including cookers, welfare stores and ordnance equipment, scout cars and transport including transport spares which were recommended for acquisition by UNITED NATIONS.
- c. The WHEELER plan provided for a somewhat leisurely hand-over and a phased replacement of BELGIAN by UNITED NATIONS technical and specialist personnel. It also provided for the evacuation of equipment not required by UNITED NATIONS. This involved the Base Group in the provision of escorts for trains transporting material.

- d. As events turned out, the WHEELER Plan was not implemented, which created the necessity to prepare very much reduced inventories. Furthermore the BELGIAN evacuation was speeded up on direct orders of the Secretary General. Many BELGIAN technician specialists and administrative personnel were evacuated before competent UNITED NATIONS replacements were made available. This threw considerable strain on the Base Group and there were ever-increasing demands for its personnel as stop-gap replacements until the arrival of the 32 Battalion.
10. On 8 SEPTEMBER, 1960 BELGIAN sources reported a concentration of 2,000 BALUBA advancing on the Base from MALEMBA NIKULA. Aerial reconnaissance and ground reconnaissance failed to substantiate the report. Nevertheless a plan to meet such a situation was prepared.
11. On 26 SEPTEMBER, 1960 a further BELGIAN report indicated the concentration of about 1000 BALUBA KAT in the vicinity of KABONDA DIANDA (40 miles East of the Base). This report was investigated by helicopter reconnaissance. Positions were prepared for platoons on the main points of entry to the Base and Patrol limits for all Sub-Units on the perimeter were fixed. This report was again proved to be without foundation.
12. a. On 5 OCTOBER, 1960, one Platoon 'A' Company 33 Battalion reverted from under command and moved to ALBERTVILLE by air.
- b. On the same date a helicopter pilot reported three white men and one white woman surrounded by 150 BALUBAKAT at KABONDA DIANDA. Efforts to contact the ETHIOPIAN Battalion at KAMINAVILLE in whose area lay KABONDA DIANDA were not successful.
- c. One Sergeant and two Privates 'C' Company 32 Battalion volunteered to go to the assistance of the besieged people by helicopter. At the same time one rifle section under LIEUTENANT STEWART was sent to KABONDA DIANDA by road. They were followed at one hour interval by the balance of one platoon under CAPTAIN O'DWYER. The platoon found that the male white people were part of the KATANGESE Gendarmerie. They refused evacuation. The platoon, however, evacuated some 80 CONGOLESE people to the Base and thence to KAMINAVILLE.
- d. At about the same time on 5 OCTOBER, 1960 an urgent request was received from HQ 9 Brigade, requesting accommodation for 30 CONGOLESE Officers, who had been on a mission to ELIZABETHVILLE but who had to be evacuated from there by UNITED NATIONS for their own safety in the face of a hostile mob. Strict security precautions had to be taken for their protection while on the base during night 5/6 OCTOBER.
13. On 8 OCTOBER, 1960 the ETHIOPIAN platoon reverted from under Command. It was replaced in KILLUBI initially by a platoon of the SWEDISH Company and later by 'C' Company and 'B' Company on a rotation basis.
14. DERAILMENT OF AMMUNITION TRAIN.
- On the night 8/9 OCTOBER an ammunition train evacuating ammunition, explosives and weapons, the property of the BELGIAN Government, and escorted by SWEDISH troops from the Base Group, was derailed in the vicinity of KABONDA DIANDA. There were no casualties to personnel. Troops from all Units of the Base Group provided guards for the train wreck by night and day until final recovery of all the arms, ammunition and explosives. The engine and a number of carriages were wrecked beyond recovery. No attempt was made by BALUBA in the vicinity, who were suspected of the sabotage, to interfere with the stores or the guard. A helicopter carrying the Officer Commanding SWEDISH Company on one occasion and the acting Officer Commanding 'C' Company on a second occasion was fired on in the area.
15. On 8 OCTOBER, 1960, 9 Brigade alerted KAMINA Base Group to prepare for the reception of a large number of casualties from a reported massacre in KABALO. Medical assistance was sent from ELIZABETHVILLE and the Base Hospital at KAMINA was put at instant readiness. Reports from KABALO had been wildly exaggerated. About 60 refugees were cared for but none required urgent medical attention.

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16. On 16 OCTOBER, 1960 the leading elements of 'B' Company 32 Battalion arrived from KINDU. By 20 OCTOBER it had replaced 'A' Company 33 Battalion as part of KAMINA Base Group.
17. On 20 OCTOBER, 1960, the Base Group was alerted to deal with trouble in the native villages. The trouble was overcome by the native police and troops of the Base Group were not called into action.
18. On 28 OCTOBER, 1960 KASONGO BONIFACE, brother of KASONGO NIEMBO, was killed near KABALO. Since reprisals against BALUBAKAT personnel on the Base were feared, the Base Group were alerted. NO trouble materialised.
19. On 31 OCTOBER, 1960, the Base Group provided security for SENDWE JASON, the principal BALUBKAT leader, who toured North and Central KATANGA at the request of UNITED NATIONS to promote co-operation between BALUBAKAT and UNITED NATIONS. MR. SENDWE used KAMINA as his base for the tour. During his stay, threats were made against him by Gendarmerie at KAMINAVILLE, who promised to attack his villa with armoured cars. In addition there was the possibility of an attempt on his life from CONNAKAT followers of KASONGO NIEMBO. The Base Group took the necessary precautions. During his visit MR. SENDWE was accompanied by CC 9 Brigade and MR. DURAN, a senior UNITED NATIONS Official.
20. On 12 NOVEMBER the SWEDISH Company reverted from under command and on 13 NOVEMBER HQ 32 Battalion arrived at KAMINA Base and the KAMINA Base Group ceased to exist.
21. During its existence KAMINA Base Group maintained guards daily on the following vital installations:-
 - a. The magazine at Base 2 up to 13 SEPTEMBER.
 - b. The airport terminal at Base 1.
 - c. The airport hangar area at Base 1.
 - d. The petrol storage depot at Base 1.
 - e. The Lupulu Barrier near Base 1.
 - f. The Water Purification Plant near Base 1.
 - g. The Wireless Receiving Station near Base 2.
 - h. The Wireless Transmitting Station near Base 2.
 - i. The Kaminaville Barrier near Base 2.
 - j. The Logistical Centre (RRR) near Base 2.
 - k. The Power Plant at KILLUBI.
 - l. The Power Plant terminal near Base 2.
22. ORDERS.

Apart from the initial order issued by Officer Commanding 9 Brigade setting out the mission of KAMINA Base Group and the verbal directions from MR. G'ALO PLAZA there was NO written order issued by the Base Commander to the Base Group. The initial mission was clear cut and the operations of the Group throughout its existence were based on this mission.

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ANNEXURE 'A'

TO CHAPTER XII.

KAMINA BASE.

GENERAL DESCRIPTION.

1. KAMINA Base is located about 17 miles East of KAMINAVILLE. Its construction commenced in 1951 and was completed in 1956. Additions were planned and even in 1960 extra amenities were in course of construction on a considerable scale. The area of the Base comprised about 100 square miles and incorporated magnificent buildings, barracks, administrative installations and welfare facilities.
2. The airfield was capable of handling the largest aircraft in existence and was apparently designed as a key strategic air base.
3. The Base comprised two parts - Base 1, which included the airfield and ancillary ground installations, was normally occupied by BELGIAN Air Force personnel; Base 2 was located some 4 miles West of Base 1. It housed BELGIAN Army Units and a parachute training school. Base HQ was located in Base 2. There were three native villages located between the two bases.
4. KAMINA Base was built in the days when BELGIUM alone seemed to possess the secret of peacefully governing a colony and the problem of ground defence did not appear to be a key factor. It possessed a perimeter which was unmarked, undefended and indefensible and had over 14 points of entry by cross country vehicles. Dense vegetation encroached to the very edge of the cleared area and fields of fire were poor. Vital base installations were located on the perimeter, sited close to native villages and lay remote from the two main centres of troop accommodation. With one exception, none of the vital base installations provided accommodation for security personnel such as guards or police to cover entry and exit. The vital electricity generating station of KILLUBI on which the Base was dependent for power, light, fresh water and refrigeration was located some 60 miles North in the bush.

LEASE.

5. The Base was held on perpetual lease by the BELGIAN Government from KASONGO NIEMBO, the paramount BALUBA Chief of the area. A clause in the agreement provided that the Base would be handed back to the Chief if for any reason the BELGIANS evacuated.

POLITICAL AFFILIATION OF CONGOLESE PERSONNEL ON THE BASE.

6. Politically KASONGO NIEMBO and his tribe were CONKAKAT and supported MR. TSHOMBE. However, not all of the 14,000 CONGOLESE personnel on the base were members of KASONGO NIEMBO'S tribe. There were many LULUAS and BALUBA from North KATANGA. The latter were BALUBAKAT and were opposed to MR. TSHOMBE.

BASE NATIVE ADMINISTRATION.

7. The Base had its own administration. CONGOLESE personnel were, of course, subject to Central Governmental and Provincial laws. The administration of justice, except for major crimes, however, was a matter for the native administration on the Base.
8. The Base maintained courts of justice, and a jail. It provided registration for births and deaths and maintained a medical service. It provided a native police force of 120. The native administrator on the Base was HIPPOLITE, son of the paramount chief.

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SITUATION IN AUGUST, 1960.

9. In accordance with the terms of the agreement granting independence to the CONGO, BELGIUM was to retain the use of KAMINA Base. It became clear that the base might create a triangle of friction between the CONGOLESE Central authority, the KATANGESE Provincial Government and the BELGIANS. UNITED NATIONS exercised considerable pressure on BELGIUM to evacuate the base.
10. The UNITED NATIONS decision to occupy the Base was motivated by three main reasons:-
 - a. The probability that it would eventually develop into a point of friction between the CONGOLESE, the KATANGESE and the BELGIANS unless neutralised.
 - b. The necessity to have a firm base within the province of KATANGA which would be independent of KATANGESE control and which could be expected to provide logistical support for troops located in KATANGA.
 - c. The training facilities on the Base which UNITED NATIONS planned to use for the vocational and specialist training of CONGOLESE personnel.
11. In AUGUST, 1960, the main threats to the Base stemmed from:-
 - a. MR. LUMUMBAS threatened invasion of KATANGA by land with the possibility of a coup-de-main air landing on KAMINA Base using ILUSHIN RUSSIAN transports and aircraft requisitioned from the commercial air companies, supported by subversive elements on the Base.
 - b. An attempt to take-over the Base by KATANGESE Forces in order to deny it to CONGOLESE Forces and for their own use.
12. MR. GALO PLAZA, an ECUADORIAN diplomat was appointed head of a UNITED NATIONS diplomatic mission to negotiate the entry of UNITED NATIONS troops and eventual BELGIAN evacuation. He took up duty in KAMINA Base in the last fortnight of AUGUST, 1960, coincident with the arrival there of 33 IRISH Battalion, which was to be deployed in North KATANGA but was forced to use KAMINA Base as an air head in view of the inadequacy of airfields in the area of deployment.
13. When 33 Battalion moved overland to the ALBERTVILLE area, 'A' Company of that Battalion remained to defend the airfield in KAMINA Base. In the 1st week of AUGUST 'A' Company 33 Battalion was reinforced by No. 2 Company 8 SWEDISH Battalion. The ETHIOPIAN Battalion located in KAMINAVILLE was ordered to assist the two companies on the Base in the event of attack.
14. By the end of AUGUST, 1960, KAMINA Base held about 800 BELGIAN technical personnel and their dependants. These personnel comprised the administrative and air staff of the Base. In addition the Base was used as an assembly area for BELGIAN Military personnel who were in the process of withdrawing from the CONGO and KATANGA.

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APPENDIX 'B'

TO CHAPTER XII.

KAMINA BASE GROUP.

COMPOSITION.

1. THE COMPOSITION OF KAMINA BASE GROUP.

a. KAMINA Base Group was formed on 1 SEPTEMBER, 1960.

b. It consisted of:-

(1) Commander and Staff.

Commander	-	Commandant J. ADAMS	2 i/c 32 Battalion.
Signals Officer	-	Lieutenant S. FLYNN	Signals Platoon 32 Battalion.
		One Sergeant Clerk 'A' Branch.	32 Battalion.
		One Corporal and three Private Wireless Operators.	32 Battalion.

(2) Troops.

A Company Group	(IRISH)	33 Battalion.
No.2 Company Group	(SWEDISH)	8 Battalion.
'C' Company Group.	(IRISH)	32 Battalion.
One Platoon.	(ETHIOPIAN)	

2. STAFF.

a. On the formation of the Group, Officer Commanding 9 Brigade considered that, since each of the Companies was self-contained administratively, there was NO need for a group staff. Consequently the measure of Command was limited to operational matters. It became clear in the first 24 hours that a staff was required.

b. The measure of administrative self-containment was mainly nominal.

- (1) Companies had NO transport or transport maintenance personnel.
- (2) Except for 'A' Company 33 Battalion, Units had NO official transport drivers.
- (3) Except for two MP attached to 'A' Company 33 Battalion, there was NO MP personnel.
- (4) There was NO senior cook to take charge of the central cooking facilities in Base 2.
- (5) All indents from Sub-Units had to be consolidated by Base Group before acceptance by the BELGIAN administration and later by UNITED NATIONS Base HQ.
- (6) Proper attention could NOT be devoted to operational and intelligence aspects.

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- c. On 4 SEPTEMBER, 1960 the following additional staff was provided and allotted responsibilities as follows:-

G 1	CAPTAIN M. O'DONNELL,	33 Battalion.
G 2	CAPTAIN R. HINCHY,	33 Battalion.
G 3	CAPTAIN J. MORAN,	32 Battalion.
G 4	LIEUTENANT E. CASSIDY.	32 Battalion.

3. ALTERATIONS IN COMPOSITION OF GROUP.

- a. On 5/6 OCTOBER, 1960, in accordance with orders 9 Brigade, one platoon 'A' Company 33 Battalion reverted from under command and joined 33 Battalion in ALBERTVILLE.
- b. On 8 OCTOBER, 1960, in accordance with orders 9 Brigade, the ETHIOPIAN platoon reverted from under command.
- c. On 12 OCTOBER, 1960, an ordnance platoon (PAKISTANI) arrived on the base. As from this date, and in accordance with the orders of the Base Commander, the Base Group was responsible for the co-ordination of defensive measures in relation to the following additional Units,

One INDIAN Supply Platoon.

One PAKISTANI Ordnance Platoon.

KAMINA Air Service Unit.

- d. On 16 OCTOBER, 1960, the leading elements of 'B' Company 32 Battalion, which was to relieve the ETHIOPIAN Battalion in KAMINAVILLE, arrived in KAMINA Base.
- e. On 19 OCTOBER, 1960, in accordance with orders 9 Brigade, 'A' Company 33 Battalion was ordered to replace 'B' Company 32 Battalion in KAMINAVILLE. 'B' Company 32 Battalion came under command KAMINA Base Group and replaced 'A' Company 33 Battalion at Base 1.
- f. On 23/24 OCTOBER an INDONESIAN Company arrived at KAMINA Base to relieve 'A' Company 33 Battalion in KAMINAVILLE. The eventual fly out of 'A' Company 33 Battalion to ALBERTVILLE was protracted and was not completed until 10 NOVEMBER, 1960. In the meantime personnel were housed with KAMINA Base Group. They were not however under command.
- g. In the early days of NOVEMBER, 1960, No.2 Company SWEDISH Battalion was ordered to rejoin its parent Unit in ELIZABETHVILLE. Its fly out was also prolonged. Its move was completed on 12 NOVEMBER, 1960.
- h. In the early days of NOVEMBER elements of HQ Company and 'A' Company 32 Battalion flew into KAMINA Base. On 13 NOVEMBER, 1960, HQ 32 Battalion opened in KAMINA Base Group and the Group ceased to exist.

4. COMMENTS ON ORGANISATION.

- a. Throughout its existence as a Unit, KAMINA Base Group suffered from many of the disadvantages of an ad hoc organisation. It was severely handicapped by the lack of transport administrative and maintenance personnel to handle up to some 50 vehicles on charge. This problem was aggravated by the poor condition of many of the vehicles on take-over from the BELGIANS.
- b. In the early stages before the establishment of a CANADIAN Signal Unit on the base, the Base Group signal detachment was taxed to the limit and could not cope with the volume of traffic on the following nets which it was required to operate:-

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- (1) Passage of Base HQ traffic to LEOPOLDVILLE via HQ 9 Brigade. These messages were lengthy and invariably encroached.
 - (2) Communications with HQ 9 Brigade at ELIZABETHVILLE.
 - (3) Relay of traffic between HQ 33 Battalion at ALBERTVILLE and HQ 9 Brigade at ELIZABETHVILLE.
 - (4) Relay of traffic between HQ ETHIOPIAN Battalion at KAMINAVILLE and HQ 9 Brigade at ELIZABETHVILLE.
 - (5) Communications with KILLUBI power station.
- c. Base HQ made frequent demands on Base Group personnel for administrative purposes.
- (1) Assistance in the operation of air traffic control for a period of about one week.
 - (2) Establishment and operation of a system of air movement control for a period of about 8 weeks.
 - (3) Assistance in the administration of accommodation and allotment of barrack services.
 - (4) Requests to provide staff for the PX stores and the various messes were not acceded to.
5. In spite of the many deficiencies in organisation, KAMINA Base Group functioned as a Unit with the exception that it did not publish routine orders.

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CHAPTER XIII.

DEMOBILIZATION.

1. GENERAL.

Once DECEMBER came in our thoughts turned to Christmas and to our return home. Rumour had it that we might be home for Christmas. It was never possible to trace the origin of these rumours - they began as a joke in the Canteen or some such place, and could be said to be based on the wishful thoughts of the majority. The idea of being home for Christmas was easily fostered - men were getting home-sick and generally were anxious to be with their own families again. We knew, too, that another Battalion was being prepared to replace us, and we were on the look out for news of its coming.

2. VISIT BY CF AND QUARTERMASTER GENERAL.

The visit of the Chief of Staff, GENERAL McKEOWN and the Quartermaster General, COLONEL COLLINS POWEL to KAMINA on 8/9 DECEMBER was a big occasion for the Battalion, and all looked to them for definite news of the date of our return home. They could not give this information of course as final details had not been worked out prior to their leaving IRELAND.

However it became clear as time went on that the chances of getting away before Christmas were small, and eventually we became reconciled to spending Christmas in the CONGO, and to our return home sometime in JANUARY, 1961. Eventually nobody regretted our stay for Christmas. It was an inspiring experience for those who took part in the religious ceremonies on Christmas Night and for those who took part in the Guard-of-Honour for MR. DAGG HAMMARSKJOELD on the 5 JANUARY, 1961.

3. ADVANCE PARTY - 34 INFANTRY BATTALION.

On 6 JANUARY the Advance Party of 34 Infantry Battalion arrived headed by COMMANDANT B. McGUIRK. Next day we held our usual Battalion Conference and arranged for the hand-over of certain stores, billets and equipment. The Battalion Operations Officer, COMMANDANT MARTIN O'BRIEN, began orienting COMMANDANT McGUIRK on the duties of the Battalion. All guard posts, installations and HQs were visited, orders were reviewed, explained and handed over. Billets were arranged for the incoming Battalion and also for the 33 Infantry Battalion, which was due to arrive in KAMINA shortly, in preparation for its move to IRELAND.

4. THREE IRISH BATTALIONS IN KAMINA.

Thus we could foresee a time when three full Battalions would be concentrated in KAMINA Base. This created a problem of accommodation as well as dining facilities. However we felt we would gladly put up with a few days discomfort in order to give the new-comers every chance. So we tightened up. 33 Battalion took over outpost at KILLUBI, and many other guards in KAMINA Base. This released 32 Battalion from all duties and the Companies began to concentrate on Base 1 (i.e.) the airport terminal. Eventually two Companies moved into the large hanger on the tarmac. Stores were piled high nearby - having been packed and weighed beforehand. By 10 JANUARY all 32 Battalion personnel were located in Base 1. On 11 JANUARY LT/COL BUNWORTH and elements of 33 Battalion arrived and on the 12th the main body of 34 Infantry Battalion including Officer Commanding, LT/COL E. O'NEILL arrived. They were given accommodation and LT/COL O'NEILL was shown around the Base. On 13 JANUARY four aircraft (C124) were ready to begin the return journey to IRELAND. The first plane left at 0630 hours; the second at 1000 hours; the third at 1130 hours and the fourth at 1230 hours.

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5. HOMEWARD ROUTE.

We arrived at LEOPOLDVILLE at 1500 hours where we were met by the new Supreme Commander in the CONGO - LT/GENERAL S. MCKEOWN and COLONEL J. QUINN. We departed from LEOPOLDVILLE at 1630 hours and arrived at KANO at 2030 hours. We had a good meal at the airport restaurant and took off again at 2300 hours. We arrived at WHEELUS at 0500 hours and found billets ready for us. Next day we met our "old" friends the AMERICAN and BRITISH Officers who had been so helpful to us on our way out six months earlier. This time we were in tropical dress, and the locals were in winter garb -- a complete reversal to the situation apertaining to our outward journey. The sun was shining but there was a cold east wind, which decided us to put on our heavy "greens" as quickly as we could find them in the aircraft.

6. WHEELUS - DUBLIN.

- (a) On 15th at 0630 hours Mass was celebrated for us by REV. FR. O'BRIEN (the base Chaplain) and we took off at 0900 hours. The flight across FRANCE was most pleasant. It was a calm frosty day and the snow-covered mountains were a beautiful sight. We passed over LONDON and eventually we were circling about over DUBLIN - awaiting a signal to come in. We landed at 1600 hours (approximately) and were met by the Minister for External Affairs, MR. AIKEN, the Minister for Defence, MR. BOLAND, the Chief of Staff, GENERAL S. COLLINS POWELL and many other high ranking Officers. After medical examination and customs formalities we were brought to Clancy Barracks, and having been relieved of all weapons and ammunition we were free to stay in Barracks or return home on 30 days Special Leave.
- (b) The whole Battalion landed home safely in the next few days, and all troops reported to their parent Unit for demobilisation and pay. Two days after arrival home we were informed that an overseas allowance would be paid to all ranks. This was good news and was appreciated.

7. EASTER PARADE - 1961.

- (a) The Battalion was called together once more for the Easter Parade in DUBLIN on 1 APRIL. We were concentrated by Companies in DUBLIN Barracks and the CURRAGH for rehearsal the previous week. On Holy Saturday both 32 and 33 Battalions paraded on the Square in McKee Barracks for the ceremonial distribution of CONGO medals by the Taoiseach, MR. LEMASS. MR. LEMASS pinned a medal on both Battalion Officers Commanding; and they in turn pinned medals on the Unit Staff Officers, who then distributed medals to the other ranks on parade.
- (b) Next day the parade through DUBLIN was a quiet affair. It was a fine sunny day but quiet uneventful. Gone was the enthusiasm of the people as displayed on the occasion of our "going away" parade. Perhaps the glamour had worn off and the tragedy of the NIEMBA Ambush still cast a gloom over the country. This apparent lack of enthusiasm was not a disappointment, rather was it accepted as the best in the last analysis. The work was completed and well done and that ended the matter. Others were carrying on the work in the CONGO - it was fast becoming "normal routine."
- (c) When the parade dispersed to Cathal Brugha Barracks the Battalion Officer Commanding addressed the troops for the last time - thanked them for their work, and wished them God-speed for the future.

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CHAPTER XIV.

LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

The following is a summary of the lessons learned from the operation of 32 Infantry Battalion in the CONGO.

1. THE ADVANCE PARTY AND MAIN BODY.

- a. The absolute necessity for tactical loading of aircraft in accordance with principles taught in the Military College and practiced throughout the Defence Forces in relation to tactical ground movement.
- b. The flight plan should have provided for the fly-in of an advance guard company following the Advance Party and preceding the main body.
- c. Companies should have been self-contained in so far as ammunition, essential stores, administrative and communications personnel were concerned.
- d. Wireless equipment and wireless operators should have been distributed over all aircraft.
- e. Too many key-personnel were transported on the first aircraft. Its loss whether in flight or as a result of a massacre on arrival could have proved disastrous. Such a catastrophe could have occurred as the airfield was secured by nothing more than uncertain good-will. Even the protracted delay of the first aircraft could have seriously disrupted the Unit organisation over the first few critical days.
- f. Personnel were not in possession of ammunition on arrival as recommended in the cables dispatched by Officer Commanding Advance Party.
- g. The Advance Party should have included a Signals Officer and some Signals personnel.
- h. The absolute necessity for the provision by UNITED NATIONS of a rear-link radio with UNITED NATIONS HQ in LEOPOLDVILLE.
- j. The whole Battalion should have been landed in one locality initially, and then - after reorganisation - be distributed in Company Groups to its allotted areas of operation. However this is the ideal, and in the circumstances it was not possible for UNITED NATIONS HQ to adopt such a desirable plan.

RECOMMENDATIONS - MILITARY POLICE.

2. COMMENTS ON ORGANISATION AND STRENGTH.

- a. The strength available (12 NCOs) was totally inadequate to operate the Organisation. There were too few Military Police in each Squad.
- b. I recommend 16 NCOs for such a Section Organisation.
- c. I recommend that the Officer i/c Military Police Section on overseas service should have powers of Governor of a Detention Barracks incorporated in his appointment.
- d. A Senior NCO should be 2 i/c of the Military Police Section in addition to two Sergeants.
- e. Military Police should at all times be centralised at Battalion HQs and the practice of allocating two or three Military Police to Infantry Companies should be discouraged, except in the case of important Military Transport moves or for major investigations.

3. EQUIPMENT.

(a) Arms.

All Military Police were armed with Gustafs. There are times when this gun can be an incumbrance to Military Police. I recommend the issue of a pistol in addition to the Gustaf for Military Police on active service. The additional armament could be held in Section HQrs. and issued for particular situations.

(b) Military Police Equipment.

I recommend that consideration be given to obtaining the following standard Military Police Equipment for operational use.

- (i) Loudhailers, and Loudspeaking equipment capable of being mounted on a Jeep.
- (ii) The provision of standard Franco Plates, Stencilling Equipment and the training of Signwriters.
- (iii) The introduction of the white web belt and white cross strap. We were the only Military Police who did not wear this distinctive and internationally accepted Provost Dress.
- (iv) The provision of a Portable Crime Laboratory.
- (v) The issue of small rubber truncheons.
- (vi) Suitable Military Police brassards (Day and Night types) and modern traffic sleevelets, white gloves and traffic batons.
- (vii) Suitable tear gas capsules, preferably the new C.S. type developed by the BRITISH. These would have been very useful to us in our role as an Anti-Riot Squad which we fulfilled in the GOMA area.
- (viii) Issue of Police Sirens for use on Jeeps.

(c) Administration.

The Officer i/c Military Police Section should have Commanding Officers' powers to deal with his own men (overseas). It is not good for discipline to see Military Police appearing on parade with Battalion personnel for Commanding Officer's Orders. It is customary in other armies for the Military Police Officer to have Commanding Officers' powers with his own men.

- (d) The Rules for Military Prisons and Detention Barracks, 1954, should contain provisions for the granting of remission of sentence to detained men, up to 10 days by the Brigade or Contingent Commander of an overseas Force, or by a member of the Defence Council while on a visit to the overseas contingent.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS - TRANSPORT.

- (a) A change in Establishment catering for the inclusion of drivers and a fitter in Company Groups has since been drawn up. Three drivers are not sufficient to meet the needs of a Company. This number should be increased to five. A Mechanical Transport Company should be included in the Company Group to deal with transport administration. This is an essential except where Companies are stationed short distances from HQrs. Considerable difficulty was experienced in compilation of POL, mileage and servicing records because an NCO of this type was not available. Furthermore, a Corporal, Mechanical Transport, who has completed a Refresher Course has sufficient training to enable him to exercise some supervision over Company Fitter.

- (b) It is most likely that all vehicles for future operations in the CONGO will be supplied by UNITED NATIONS, but should the Army be called upon to equip a group with vehicles apart from armoured, the Landrover is recommended. Landrovers with longer wheel base and eleven seater capacity are now available and are standard equipment of other contingents.
- (c) It should be borne in mind that supplies of Lockheed or Girling Brakefluid are NOT available in the CONGO, or indeed in most AFRICAN States. If occasion demands, sufficient stocks of appropriate fluid should be brought from IRELAND to cover all eventualities.

RECOMMENDATIONS - AMC PERSONNEL.

5. TRAINING.

(a) Officers.

The Medical Officers of the 32 IRISH Battalion had little recent experience of surgery. I recommend that Medical Officers selected for future missions be given an opportunity to refresh their knowledge of traumatic surgery by attending at civilian hospitals with a busy surgical service. Even as short a period as three weeks in such a hospital, actually attending and assisting at operations would be useful. With the reduced size of the Army the amount of traumatic surgery in Army Hospitals is too small to give suitable training in a short period.

(b) NCOs.

NCOs with recent experience of field work should be given preference over others. Privates should be not less than Star Grade 2. Here also experience of duty in a medical aid post and of field duty is desirable.

(c) Other Training.

All NCOs and men should have fired a weapon course recently, in case they might be called upon to defend themselves in an emergency.

Also of value in an emergency, is ability to drive. At least some of the NCOs should be given minimum training in driving. This was done with the 32 Battalion in KAMINA with the co-operation of the Transport Officer.

(d) Unit Establishment.

The medical establishment of the 32 Battalion was excessively large for its type of mission. This establishment which was increased by a draft of 1 Corporal and 5 men sent out along with the 33 Battalion, would be more appropriate for a situation where casualties were inevitable and some spare men would be desirable as replacements. In actuality the extras were an embarrassment and at times were employed on non-medical work as an alternative to idleness.

On the other hand, the organisation of the A.M.C. as a platoon in the H.Q. Company was advantageous. This allowed of flexibility in the deployment of Medical Officers and men with each Company to meet varying requirements, even if it may have caused administrative untidiness elsewhere.

CHAPTER XV.SUMMARY.1. UNITED NATIONS MISSION.

It is not an easy task to write a short and yet concise and balanced summary to the foregoing fourteen Chapters of this History.

These Chapters are made up of the reports, either verbatim or abridged, of the Officers as outlined in the Foreword to this document. This last and fifteen Chapter is the Battalion Commander's Summary of the whole operation. To begin with it is necessary to again remind oneself of the Mission as outlined in Paragraph 5, Annexure 'D' to Chapter II and again in Chapter V Paragraph . . . This reads as follows:-

"UNITED NATIONS Forces will operate for the purpose of restoring order in the province of KIVU in accordance with the following policy instructions:-"

- (a) UNITED NATIONS Weapons will NOT be used for offensive purposes but ONLY for self protection.
- (b) Key white workers will be encouraged to remain in the area.
- (c) Non-key white personnel, particularly women and children, will be encouraged to evacuate.
- (d) UNITED NATIONS troops will protect the lives and homes of white people remaining in the area.
- (e) CONGOLESE Native Armed Forces will be Disarmed by NEGOTIATION and will be encouraged to remain a disciplined force in their Barracks.
- (f) CONGOLESE Native Armed Forces will be fed.
- (g) Medical and other assistance will be given to the Native population.
- (h) Essential supplies will be purchased locally as far as possible in order to improve the economy of the area.
- (j) Labour parties will be recruited locally for the same reason as at (h)."

2. To appreciate how far 32 Infantry Battalion achieved these objectives it is best to take each aim in turn and comment on it. It can be stated beyond question that order was restored and maintained during our stay in KIVU. UNITED NATIONS' weapons were NOT used either offensively or defensively at any time in KIVU or later in KATANGA. NOT one shot was fired in anger. In taking pride in this result one must admit that it was a "near thing" on many occasions, and one must also give credit to the CONGOLESE soldiers and civilians for their co-operation in this matter. There was many a battle of words - often angry words and threats - but NO offensive action. I like to think that we commanded the respect of the CONGOLESE, especially of the Officials and Army Officers. As time went on their respect for us increased. They truly accepted that we were there to help them and our many dealings with them proved to their satisfaction that we meant well, and that we were not there to use force or to interfere with their normal day-to-day activities.

3. Our patrols were to be seen here, there and everywhere on demand, and also when not called for. We turned up in the most unlikely places; showed the flag; conversed with local administrative groups; displayed a friendliness which only soldiers are capable of; joined in their games and other activities as far as possible; showed an interest in their welfare; guarded property and dispensed hospitality. They in turn accepted us and respected us for all these things. Our joint patrol was a major success.

The best tribute paid to us was on the occasion of our departure when the Commissioner and Assistant Commissioner stood on the tarmac at GOMA Airport and in tears begged us to stay with them. So too, in KINDU, both white and black sincerely regretted our departure. In BUKAVU, the President of the Province, not alone appealed to COMMANDANT TRACEY to stay but actually did all in his power to get HQ in LEOPOLDVILLE to leave the IRISH in KIVU.

4. White workers in general accepted us too. In a short time after our arrival those who had fled across the border began to trickle back to resume their normal duties in these towns. Later women and children returned in small numbers. We did not encourage this lest a change in attitude might put them in some danger. The Missionaries in particular were glad to have us near them. Nuns and Priests carried on their religious and teaching work in increasing volume as time went on.
5. We did not compel any non-key whites to leave. We advised them to keep the women and children out as much as possible and eventually there were few brave enough to stay on. Still some women did stay and did NOT regret so doing.
6. We were constantly on the move with patrols investigating maltreatment of whites and, where necessary, removing such persons under escort to places of safety. Many empty houses had to be inspected almost daily to ensure that they were kept intact and safe from robbery and destruction. It is to the credit of the CONGOLESE that there was very little damage done during our regime in KIVU.
7. We did NOT disarm the Native Armed Forces. I never agreed with this policy as I felt that no self-respecting soldier would willingly give up his gun. If we had tried to do this we would NOT have succeeded. It would have to be done by force, with the consequent loss of confidence and respect for UNITED NATIONS - leaving the situation worse than it would otherwise be. We did succeed to a large degree in getting the soldiers to leave their weapons in Barracks, thus bringing about a big reduction in the number of armed personnel to be seen in the streets and in the number of unauthorised searchings and investigations which were commonplace up to then.
8. The CONGOLESE Native Armed Forces were NOT fed by us except unofficial on one or two occasions. This was never authorised by UNITED NATIONS, so we were not called upon to implement it. The Army had been promised payment by UNITED NATIONS but we did NOT get money for this work except on one occasion in KINDU. We did supply food to a few white prisoners who were unlucky enough to spend short periods under arrest in the Native Barracks.
9. Initially we provided medical attention and supplies to many Natives who called to our HQ each day. Our Doctors were continuously engaged in this work until our supplies ran short and there were no replenishments coming up. Women and children were the main recipients of this medical attention.
10. All our food was purchased locally when in KIVU. When supplies were not available we were able to get some across the border in KEYSENI and elsewhere. Thus we contributed quiet a bit of money to the local traders, much to their advantage and to the advantage of the local economy. Our troops made many purchases of goods such as wearing apparel, shirts, tropical dress, cameras etc and of course the much appreciated beer and minerals.
11. We employed some labourers in each post. Cooks, Cleaners, Launderers and "Pioneers" were hired but only on a small scale. We did not have any responsibility for organising local works - this duty was usually done by the local administration and the civil branch of UNITED NATIONS ORGANISATION.

12. WORDS OF ADVICE.

This document would not be complete without reference to the advice given to us, firstly, by His Excellency, the President of IRELAND, MR. De VALERA, and secondly by His Grace, the Archbishop of DUBLIN, Most Rev DR. McQUAID prior to our departure to the CONGO. On the occasion of our visit to ARUS AN UACHTARAIN, MR. De VALERA told us that wherever we went we should go in such force as to ensure that all would be aware of our strength. "Nothing contributed more to trouble than the appearance of weakness through small numbers and once the first shot was fired the battle was already lost." The wisdom of this advice was often to be noted in our activities later.

His Grace, the Archbishop told us at BALDONNEL that the CONGOLESE were a kindly people, seeking their independence and bewildered by the turn their position had taken. They needed guidance, sympathy and tolerance. We found that this was an absolutely correct assessment of the situation and we were much influenced by the Archbishop's statement in our approach to the many problems which we had to solve in our normal day-to-day activities.

13. MESSAGES OF GOOD WILL.

I wish to place on record the appreciation and thanks of every member of 32 Infantry Battalion for the many messages of good will and best wishes received prior to our leaving IRELAND and during our first month in the CONGO from many firms, public organisations, groups and individuals. These messages were much appreciated and should be placed on record in this document. Unfortunately the list is incomplete and rather than risk the omission of any one message it is thought best to refer to the matter in a general way only, and to hope that this will be accepted by all as an acknowledgement of their kind and appreciated action.

14. GIFTS.

Our sincere appreciation and thanks must also go to the many firms which supplied us with foods, clothing, cigarettes, drink, books, games etc during our period of service in the CONGO. We were very glad to have these items especially early on in the period when our movements outside our camp area were limited or severely controlled.

These Gifts were appreciated most because they helped us to realise that our work was considered important and worthwhile by the donors, and also by the man in the street. The Army got a new lease of life, and was again being looked on with interest and as an efficient peace-making organisation. The soldier felt he was important again and this was a great boost to morale.

15. PRESENTATION OF 1916 MEDAL.

I must also place on record that MR. MORRISSEY (a well known DUBLIN man and old I.R.A. leader) presented me with a 1916 Medal (Mess Dress Type) on 27 JULY, 1960 - on the occasion of the Battalion's concentration in DUBLIN Castle Yard in preparation for its first public parade through DUBLIN. I accepted the medal under pressure as I did NOT feel worthy of such a great honour. NO words could adequately convey my appreciation of this magnanimous gesture on the part of MR. MORRISSEY and the medal shall be kept safely and cherished as a priceless emblem during my lifetime.

16. A POEM.

Finally I think the following Ballad, which appeared in one of our Evening Papers on or about 24 JULY, 1960; provides a fitting finish to this History.

BUCKLEY'S VOLUNTEERS.

Hark ! to the call, our soldiers grand,
 Are marshalled on the square,
 The spirit of Pearse and Connolly,
 Predominantley' there:
 To them now keen on venture told,
 No dread of Congo's fear,
 No thoughts such lurk within the hearts,
 of Buckley's Volunteers.

From out the provinces they come,
 In answer to the call,
 Ov'r valleys soaked in battle's gore
 And buried cannon ball;
 From rebel Cork the pipers came
 To lead the "fourth" boys in,
 To mingle in the Curragh
 With their own dear kith and kin.

There six hundred men and fifty
 Are 'felled in' on parade,
 The Irish Nation's answer to the U.N.O. Brigade.
 A mission to accomplish,
 God's blessing on the work,
 They follow in the footsteps,
 Of Dillon brave, and Burke.

They march thro' streets, so long baptised
 In patriotic blood,
 Where Eire fought so gloriously,
 And armoured power withstood,
 But not in vain did great men die,
 To allay Ireland's fears,
 Their spirit reflected here,
 In Buckley's Volunteers.

Now they are mustered at Baldonnel,
 Shrouded thick in misty air,
 The music of our Sireland,
 Tell of deeds so grand and rare;
 Soon they board the waiting transports,
 'Mid the tumult and the cheers,
 God's blessing on old Ireland,
 And Buckley's Volunteers.

RUNDA

O.O. NO. 1.

MAPS: CONGO 1/3,000,000; KIVU 1/1,000,000.

SITUATION.

There is a condition of mutiny in parts of KIVU province by CONGOLESE FORCE PUBLIQUE coloured Troops.

There is tension in KIBOMBO and KASONGA.

BELGIAN FORCES continue to hold KINDU and KASONGA.

1. ARMED FORCES.

DISPOSITIONS.

- a. 600 1st CONGOLESE Force Publique at RUTSHURU.
- b. 250 CONGOLESE Force Publique Troops at GOMA.
- c. 300 CONGOLESE Force Publique Troops at BUKAVU.
- d. 600 CONGOLESE Force Publique Troops at LUKANDU.

2. OWN FORCES.

- a. 1 Company Group at KINDU.
- b. Battalion Group less two Company Group in GOMA.
- c. 1 Company Group in BUKAVU.

3. FRIENDLY FORCES.

- a. EQUATOR NORTH LIBERIANS.
- b. EQUATOR SOUTH TUNISIANS AND MOROCCANS.
- c. EQUATOR ORIENTAL ETHIOPIANS.
- d. KASAI PROVINCE TUNISIANS.
- e. IEOPOLDVILLE MOROCCANS AND SWEDES.

4. TERRAIN.

- a. AREA 100,000 Square Miles.
- b. GEOGRAPHY HIGH ALTITUDES; in the East, Savannah Country in the West, tropical forest.
- c. HEALTHY OR UNHEALTHY HEALTHY.

5. MISSION.

UNITED NATIONS Forces will operate for the purpose of restoring order in the province of KIVU in accordance with the following instructions:-

- a. UNITED NATIONS weapons will NOT be used for offensive purposes but only for self protection.
- b. KEY White workers will be encouraged to remain in the area.
- c. Non-Key white personnel, particularly women and children, will be encouraged to evacuate.

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- d. UNITED NATIONS troops will protect the lives and homes of white people remaining in the area.
 - e. CONGOLESE Native Armed Forces will be disarmed by NEGOTIATION and will be encouraged to remain a disciplined force in their barracks.
 - f. CONGOLESE Native Armed Forces will be fed.
 - g. Medical and other assistance will be given to the Native population.
 - h. Essential supplies will be purchased locally as far as possible in order to improve the economy of the area.
 - j. Labour parties will be recruited locally for the same reason as at h.
6. EXECUTION.
- GENERAL OUTLINE.
- a. Battalion will land at GOMA and KINDU.
 - b. When secure Companies will move out on orders by Battalion Command to further areas to secure them and calm the population.
 - c. UNITED NATIONS Mission foresees eventual deployment in Platoon Groups.
7. CO-ORD INSTRUCTORS.
- a. Airport of disembarkation will be secured.
 - b. Camp will be established.
 - c. Contact will be made with GOMA and KINDU.
8. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION.
- a. What is the economic position of the area in which the landing is made. Are the people working, on strike, foodless? Are shops closed.?
 - b. What is the location, strength, arm and act of CONGOLESE troops in the Area.?
 - c. What airports are available in the area and what is their capacity.?
 - d. What food is required and how much of it can be provided locally at UNITED NATIONS expense.?
 - e. What transport facilities in all forms are available.?
9. COMMUNICATIONS.
- a. Communication initially by C 12.
 - b. Long Range sets will be provided later by UNITED NATIONS.
 - c. Contact will be established with GOMA/KINDU immediately on landings.
10. ADMINISTRATION.

Administration instructions will issue separately.

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APPENDIX 'B'.

PERSONNEL WHO SERVED WITH 32 BATTALION.

	<u>OFFRS.</u>	<u>ORS.</u>	<u>TOTAL.</u>
Served for full term(22/7/60 to 20/1/61).	45	625	670.
Served less than full term.		15	15
Total who served with 32 Battalion.	x 45	640	685

x Includes 2 Chaplains.

ROLL OF PERSONNEL WHO DID NOT SERVE FULL TERM.

<u>Ser.No.</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>From</u>	<u>To</u>	<u>Remarks.</u>
98143	Pte.	O'Halloran, D.	27/7/60	14/10/60	Repatriated.
807696	Pte.	Lysaght, M.	27/7/60	14/10/60	"
807187	Cpl.	McMahon, P.	27/7/60	20/12/60	"
207944	Sgt.	Fitzgerald, B.	17/8/60	20/1/61	Came with 33 Br.
97906	Pte.	Davitt, T.	17/8/60	20/1/61	"
805835	Pte.	Silke, C.	17/8/60	20/1/61	"
99913	Pte.	White, S.	17/8/60	20/1/61	"
801172	Cpl.	Durney, J.	17/8/60	20/1/61	"
806504	Pte.	Murphy, T.	17/8/60	20/1/61	"
806625	Pte.	McAdams, J.	17/8/60	20/1/61	"
204540	Pte.	Galligan, W.	17/8/60	20/1/61	"
809199	Pte.	Bergin, P.	17/8/60	20/1/61	"
808101	Pte.	Byrne, B.	17/8/60	20/1/61	"
806540	Pte.	Woodcock, A.	6/12/60	20/1/61	Ex Sigs IEO.
808332	Pte.	O'Regan, P.	14/12/60	20/1/61	Ex Sigs IEO.

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NOMINAL ROLL BY UNITS OF ALL

PERSONNEL WHO SERVED WITH 32 BN IN CONGO.

Very Rev. C.P. Crean.	HCF.
Rev. Fr. G. Brophy.	CF.
O.4909 Lt/Col. M.J. Buckley.	HQ West Comd.
O.6014 Comdt. F. Fleming.	Army HQrs.
O.5752 Comdt. J. Adams.	Army HQrs.
O.4975 Comdt. M.J. O'Brien.	HQ 4 Bde.
O.5171 Comdt. P.F. Croghan.	HQ 4 Bde.
O.7489 Capt. J. Fives.	HQ 4 Bde.
O.6931 Capt. J. Moran.	GT Depot CIC.
O.7434 Capt. J. Burke.	2 Maint Coy COE.
O.4955 Comdt. M.D. Hassey.	HQ Southern Comd.
O.6893 Capt. J.C. Slye.	HQ Southern Comd.
O.6196 Capt. J. Duggan.	HQ Southern Comd.
O.4976 Comdt. W.O'Carroll.	CT Depot East Comd.
O.5947 Capt. A.O. Cunningham.	CT Depot East Comd.
O.7420 Capt. N.G. Cantrell.	CT Depot East Comd.
O.7547 Lt. H.E. Daly.	Area Records, East Comd.
O.6370 Capt. P. Reidy.	Depot Mil Police Corps.
O.6208 Comdt. P.J. Liddy.	HQ East Comd.
O.4989 Comdt. T. Ryan.	1 Mot Sqn.
O.6387 Capt. D. O'Suibhne.	Mil College.
O.7480 Capt. M.J. Duggan.	Mil College.
O.7536 Capt. D.K. Boyle.	1 Gar Coy AOC.
O.7811 Lt. E.T. Cassidy.	2 Fd Coy Sigs.
O.7463 Capt. B.A. Deegan.	4 Fd Coy Sigs.
O.7718 Lt. J. Flynn.	1 Fd Coy Sigs.
O.6284 Capt. J.V.F. Brady.	Depot S&T Corps.
O.7582 Lt. D.G. Houston.	2 Gar Coy S&T Corps.
O.5030 Comdt. J.P. Laffan.	Base Lab AMC.
O.6745 Comdt. H.P.J. O'Shea.	Depot AMC.
O.7829 Capt. E.D. Daly.	3 Hosp Coy AMC.
O.6375 Comdt. T. Tracey.	2 Inf Bn.
O.6628 Capt. A.R. Maynard.	20 Inf Bn (FCA).
O.7664 Lt. M.O.H. Wright.	7 Inf Bn (FCA).
O.7522 Lt. C.D. O'Leary.	McKee Bks Coy.
O.6377 Capt. E. Russell.	HQ 1 Bde.
O.6386 Capt. P. Allen.	4 Inf Bn.
O.7643 Lt. T.G. Harrington.	13 Inf Bn (FCA).
O.7568 Lt. C.J. Fitzgerald.	23 Inf Bn (FCA).
O.7502 Lt. A.A. Riordan.	14 Inf Bn (FCA).
O.5134 Comdt. P.J. Carroll.	1 Inf Bn.
O.7162 Capt. D.A. Black.	HQ West Comd.
O.7207 Capt. J.O'Dwyer.	HQ West Comd.
O.7482 Capt. J. Kissane.	CT Depot West Comd.
O.7503 Lt. F. Stewart.	16 Inf Bn (FCA).

4 INF BN.

430337 CS Dullard, W.	79505 COMS Doyle, H.
807740 Cpl. Lillis, J.	82108 Sgt. Condon, D.
807690 Cpl. Murphy, J.	94780 Pte. Roche, P.
807201 Pte. Hayes, T.	809394 Pte. Fitzgerald, W.
807608 Cpl. Leahy, D.	809657 Pte. Fenton, D.
802479 Pte. Woods, J.	805482 Pte. Geary, J.
809379 Pte. Kelly, M.	809158 Pte. Kelleher, C.
809198 Pte. Lynch, P.	809141 Pte. Gleeson, C.
807199 Pte. Dennehy, P.	807200 Cpl. Cassidy, H.
809210 Pte. O'Neill, P.	806772 Pte. O'Brien, T.
808289 Pte. O'Donovan, P.	808936 Pte. McCarthy, D.
807651 Pte. Wallace, M.	92314 Cpl. Seaward, R.
809157 Pte. O'Riordan, K.	804374 Pte. O'Brien, D.
808893 Pte. Nugent, C.	806303 Cpl. Geary, M.
809260 Pte. Spillane, J.	809258 Pte. Slattery, T.
806687 Pte. Keohan, M.	81911 Sgt. O'Brien, N.
808962 Pte. O'Meara, P.	802646 Cpl. Higgins, M.
808982 Pte. Lowe, T.	803967 Pte. Grace, P.

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809137 Pte. Flynn, P.
 99626 Cpl. Shaw, E.
 806862 Pte. Murphy, J.
 806697 Pte. Meagher, T.
 808332 Pte. O'Regan, P.
 802841 Cpl. Kent, G.
 808161 Pte. Goulding, D.
 806555 Pte. O'Sullivan, P.
 801389 Pte. Hayes, F.
 94557 Sgt. O'Sullivan, W.
 807250 Cpl. Sharpe, E.
 808432 Pte. Collins, J.
 808687 Pte. Corbett, D.
 96796 Pte. Leahy, D.
 808946 Pte. McLoughlin, M.
 804128 Pte. Murphy, J.
 810384 Pte. Roche, J.
 97480 Pte. O'Connor, C.
 94764 Cpl. Goggins, D.

808061 Pte. Buckley, T.
 806750 Pte. Roche, B.
 805059 Pte. O'Rahilly, T.
 809086 Pte. O'Shea, M.
 95023 Sgt. Irwin, R.
 803627 Pte. Hogan, J.
 809355 Cpl. Parker, M.
 805879 Pte. Twomey, C.
 807759 Pte. Connolly, J.
 804780 Cpl. Timoney, B.
 807232 Pte. Conway, J.C.
 809707 Pte. Crowley, D.
 809535 Pte. Foley, D.
 808009 Pte. Lynch, J.
 809035 Pte. McSweney, T.
 808671 Pte. Raymond, R.
 807986 Pte. O'Connor, J.
 807233 Pte. O'Sullivan, D.

1st. FD COY SIGS.

95548 Cpl. Roche, B.
 808961 Pte. O'Brien, W.
 809211 Cpl. King, J.
 808202 Pte. Ryan, P.
 808638 Pte. Hogan, P.
 808938 Pte. Dillon, P.

807961 Pte. Kavanagh, S.
 803914 Pte. Barry, T.
 807790 Pte. Sullivan, T.
 807960 Pte. Tierney, D.
 807958 Pte. Callen, P.

1st FD COY S&T.

807345. Pte. Kiely, J.

99130 Pte. O'Neill, R.

1st FD COY COE.

806463 Cpl. Kavanagh, J.
 808636 Pte. Callanan, W.
 804726 Pte. Murphy, J.

808639 Pte. O'Donnell, E.
 804745 Pte. Relihan, P.
 805717 Pte. Heffernan, T.

1 FA REGT.

809496 Pte. Wade, T.
 81359 Cpl. Walsh, T.
 809421 Pte. Murphy, P.
 809497 Pte. McGrath, E.
 806874 Pte. Costelloe, C.
 809540 Pte. Carey, E.
 809472 Pte. Casey, W.
 806458 Pte. Donnelly, P.

809432 Pte. Hayes, J.
 809473 Pte. Keane, J.
 809508 Pte. O'Gorman, P.
 809390 Pte. Young, M.
 809990 Pte. Barrett, J.
 809689 Pte. Cashin, J.
 808701 Pte. Donnelly, R.
 91282 Cpl. Deegan, J.

1 MOT SQN.

801014 Pte. Nolan, J.
 802907 Pte. Barry, D.
 82357 Pte. Mockler, T.
 808147 Pte. Curry, J.
 804017 Pte. Lehane, D.
 807826 Pte. Carey, J.

808149 Pte. Roche, D.
 91953 Cpl. Mulcahy, W.
 805124 Pte. Nolan, W.
 806134 Pte. O'Regan, P.
 804027 Pte. McManus, D.
 809311 Pte. Power, P.

CT DEPOT SOUTH COMD.

802515 Cpl. Sisk, W.

802123 Pte. Minihan, J.

COMD HQRS SOUTH COMD.

803693 Pte. Elsted, S.
 804676 Pte. Ryan, P.

RÚNDA

808706 Cpl. Phelan, J.

3 G/COY AOC.

808250 Cpl. Cusack, D.
807890 Cpl. McCormack, P.

801225 Pte. Harte, C.
96387 Pte. Penkert, T.

3 G/COY S&T.

805435 Pte. Butler, J.

3 G/COY MPC.

96435 Cpl. Heaphy, E.

805021 Cpl. Murphy, M.

3 H/COY AMC.

82133 Cpl. O'Donoghue, P.
809363 Pte. Harmon, T.

807177 Pte. Hoey, M.
806128 Pte. Shiels, M.

3 FA REGT.

802344 Pte. Brennan, B.

806619 Cpl. O'Flaherty, T.

3 BRIGADE HQRS.

87508 Sgt. Mahon, D.

97238 Pte. Dundon, M.

12 INF BN.

88186 Cpl. Kelly, A.
90301 Cpl. O'Donnell, P.
303707 Pte. Walsh, S.
98320 Cpl. Power, J.
807816 Pte. Culhane, D.
808285 Pte. Hynes, G.
808906 Cpl. Mullins, J.
94290 Cpl. McCoy, E.
806281 Pte. White, P.
808637 Pte. Flynn, P.
800636 Pte. Mullins, P.
807239 Pte. O'Grady, J.
808658 Pte. O'Reilly, E.
809384 Pte. Foran, J.
809240 Pte. Grimes, J.
87286 Sgt. Kane, W.
98543 Pte. Hoare, W.
806943 Pte. Moloney, J.
807254 Pte. Murphy, E.
808816 Pte. Behan, M.

99239 Pte. Walsh, W.
805151 Pte. Fitzgerald, E.
806961 Pte. Thornton, W.
804904 Pte. Hussey, A.
808703 Pte. Higgins, L.
809006 Pte. Finnan, J.
806978 Pte. Farrell, P.
809171 Pte. O'Brien, M.
807030 Pte. Casey, D.
808642 Pte. Ryan, C.
807520 Pte. Holden, J.
810536 Pte. Barry, J.
807956 Pte. Daly, P.
808558 Pte. O'Meara, L.
808872 Pte. Laste, J.
801016 Pte. Corbett, S.
808959 Pte. Pollard, D.
99573 Pte. Flynn, J.
803765 Pte. Kelly, N.
806796 Pte. Lysaght, M.

14 INF BN.

804610 CPL. O'Donoghue, S.

806369 Pte. Troy, P.

1 INF BN.

801545 Sgt. Hegarty, W.
810337 Pte. Dunne, J.
95866 Pte. Corcoran, P.
807710 Pte. Cooley, P.
806311 Pte. Flaherty, P.
808614 Pte. O'Halloran, M.
809637 Pte. Purcell, M.
805680 Pte. Glynn, J.
806517 Pte. Sharry, P.
809956 Pte. Poole, G.
809275 Pte. Mannion, P.
806635 Pte. Noone, M.

809672 Pte. Walsh, P.
808211 Pte. Connole, M.
306464 Pte. Quinn, P.
809030 Pte. O'Donnell, C.
70286 Pte. Flaherty, M.
805603 Pte. McDonagh, B.
810041 Pte. Leydon, M.
805888 Cpl. McGowan, M.
90307 Pte. Crowley, T.
807996 Pte. King, M.
809441 Pte. Murphy, S.
808615 Pte. Joyce, P.

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6 INF BN.

86481	Cpl. Keneghan, J.	807357	Pte. Kelly, J.
87480	Pte. McMerney, A.	807029	Pte. Revins, T.
803636	Cpl. Ryan, J.	92660	Pte. O'Hanlon.
807712	Pte. Flynn, P.	809174	Pte. Shanagher, J.
809014	Pte. Tighe, M.	92657	Cpl. Dowling, E.
809849	Pte. Manley, D.	809947	Pte. Bradley, R.
808048	Pte. Dixon, P.	809854	Pte. Molloy, D.
425332	Cpl. Lynch, M.	809683	Pte. Brennan, M.
808554	Pte. Boland, F.	807302	Pte. Bracken, P.
87704	Sgt. McCarthy, R.	809693	Pte. Stanley, N.
809130	Pte. Ganley, J.	809016	Pte. Larkin, R.
77836	Cpl. O'Brien, J.	807301	Cpl. McNally, P.
808956	Pte. Parkes, J.	807328	Cpl. Malone, G.
804875	Pte. Malone, P.	94318	Cpl. McManus, R.
803890	Pte. O'Brien, P.	809179	Pte. O'Sullivan, K.
308118	Pte. Doherty, F.	809084	Pte. Feery, J.
808114	Pte. Gormley, E.	805835	Pte. Silke, J.
806704	Pte. O'Sullivan, M.	808266	Pte. Beirne, M.
804862	Cpl. Dowler, M.	801956	Pte. Conlon, B.
806438	Pte. Courtney, T.	807891	Pte. Hall, P.
808957	Pte. O'Neill, P.	802356	Pte. Devanney, M.
808977	Pte. Bracken, J.	808264	Cpl. Fogarty, P.
806823	Cpl. Mullins, D.	810214	Pte. Nicell, J.
807711	Pte. Flynn, M.	809777	Pte. Redmond, J.
806721	Pte. Daly, J.		

16 INF BN.

431370	CQMS Whitney, P.	90401	Pte. Moore, P.
805144	Pte. Maloney, T.	804551	Cpl. Bracken, J.

17 INF BN.

805374	Cpl. Conlon, J.	75543	Sgt. Manning, J.
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18 INF BN.

806980	Cpl. Tierney, G.	806506	Cpl. Kenny, J.
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19 INF BN.

803925	Pte. Lannon, M.	803227	Cpl. Denny, P.
807243	Cpl. Byrne, M.		

4 F/COY COE.

78049	C/S Byrne, C.	206011	Pte. Gildea, P.
71483	Pte. Kearns, A.	809853	Pte. Battles, G.
808440	Pte. Brady, J.	94301	Pte. Connolly, D.
808607	Pte. Devlin, J.	804740	Pte. Reynolds, J.
808181	Pte. Connolly, T.	98083	Pte. McEvilly, J.
802856	Pte. McManus, C.	807703	Pte. O'Neill, D.
806411	Pte. Cox, J.	92541	Pte. Hewitt, J.

4 F/COY SIGS.

800924	Cpl. Crocock, E.	803386	Cpl. Fleming, T.
803746	Cpl. Doyle, T.		

4 G/COY AOC.

803895	Pte. Tuohy, A.	809433	Pte. Spencer, E.
808049	Pte. Lynch, K.	92239	Sgt. Harris, J.
804139	Pte. Rowe, A.	807715	Pte. Geoghegan, J.
808074	Pte. Murtagh, G.		

RUNDA

4 F/COY S&T.

803923 Pte. McCourt, J.	808976 Pte. Larkin, T.
808263 Pte. Young, M.	93700 Pte. Nally, W.
808945 Pte. Newman, F.	809388 Pte. Heagarty, D.
810006 Pte. Donnelly, P.	85949 Pte. Archbold, W.
809012 Pte. Greevy, C.	806875 Pte. Deegan, W.
809804 Pte. Dunne, J.	803002 Pte. Hough, M.

DOD COY ATT WEST COMD.

803366 Cpl. Kelly, M.	809838 Pte. Morris, C.
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IV FA REGT.

86260 Pte. Harney, J.	809871 Pte. Quinn, M.
808472 Pte. Carroll, M.	91647 Pte. Snelly, T.
99848 Pte. Yeates, M.	808470 Pte. Cahill, M.
804539 Pte. Kelly, P.	801247 Pte. Greevy, T.
806874 Pte. Harvey, J.	99886 Pte. McKenna, E.
807716 Pte. Nooney, J.	804370 Pte. Nugent, J.
808012 Pte. Peppard, J.	

5 F/COY SIGS.

806951 Pte. Geraghty, D.

CT DEPOT WEST COMD.

84096 Cpl. Kelly, J.	802545 Sgt. Duke, J.
808119 Pte. Doherty, J.	90128 Pte. Shaughnessy, P.
89526 Sgt. Westman, J.	

4 BDE HQRS.

807792 Pte. Fitzsimons, C.	807971 Pte. Hanafin, T.
86531 Cpl. Dolan, W.	

4 G/COY MPC.

803775 Cpl. Smith, T.	805162 Cpl. O'Reilly, M.
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5 MOT SQN.

803595 Cpl. Kiernan, B.	805033 Cpl. Lambert, W.
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5 F/COY COE.

805400 Cpl. Bartley, T.	802953 Cpl. Flaherty, P.
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5 FA REGT.

801217 Cpl. Gavin, T.	807392 Cpl. Spence, H.
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WESTERN COMD HQRS.

807964 Pte. Broderick, J.	806005 Pte. Malley, A.
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3 INF BN.

808501 Pte. O'Rourke, C.	808506 Pte. Daly, M.
807058 Pte. Whelan, M.	808377 Pte. Cooney, D.
807583 Pte. Larkin, J.	803168 Pte. Kenning, B.
806674 Pte. McLoughlin, M.	807017 Pte. Meehan, J.
801624 Pte. O'Neill, P.	87589 Sgt. Byrne, T.
808392 Pte. Delahunty, J.	98364 Pte. France, A.
805666 Pte. Lawlor, P.	806594 Pte. McCaul, J.
93856 Pte. Wynne, M.	801104 Pte. Radford, M.
800019 Pte. Sheridan, A.	431861 Cpl. Kennedy, M.
807071 Cpl. Mahon, R.	803589 Pte. Doyle, J.

3 INF BN (CONTD).

803541 Pte. Dingley, M.
808379 Pte. Gannon, M.
807564 Pte. Sisk, T.
806088 Cpl. Kilty, M.
801123 Pte. Sherry, C.

96581 Pte. Furlong, P.
807615 Pte. Grace, J.
806850 Cpl. Colclough, A.
806673 Cpl. Sheehan, T.
807589 Pte. Doyle, C.

DEPOT SIGNAL CORPS.

96415 Sgt. Brick, N.
93691 Cpl. Bevan, L.
807531 Cpl. O'Sullivan, M.
808094 Pte. Nolan, J.
75963 Sgt. Quinn, M.
91467 Cpl. Shine, D.

802409 Sgt. Fogarty, A.
804513 Cpl. Guckian, P.
806514 Pte. Hennessy, J.
808089 Pte. Redmond, W.
806252 Cpl. Gannon, P.

MILITARY COLLEGE.

70901 BSM O'Connor, P.

803742 Pte. Morris, W.

CAMP HQRS CTC.

79188 Sgt. Hayes, P.
96103 Pte. Hayes, P.

801148 Sgt. Lawless, J.
99913 Pte. White, S.

GI DEPOT, CTC.

96939 Sgt. O'Neill, P.
89828 Cpl. O'Rourke, K.
809554 Pte. Breen, A.
803305 Pte. Costello, M.

803554 Cpl. Hamilton, R.
807114 Cpl. Cluskey, P.
809216 Pte. Noonan, D.
806241 Pte. Mallon, J.

1 H/COY AMC.

88313 Cpl. Carroll, P.
99926 Cpl. Durney, P.
807673 Pte. McNally, J.

801189 Pte. Lacey, T.
807668 Pte. McNair, P.

DEPOT S&I CORPS.

71074 Sgt. Madigan, J.
88642 Pte. Flynn, J.
800336 Pte. McGahey, E.
806157 Cpl. Fogarty, F.

91756 Sgt. Rowe, J.
98901 Pte. Fogarty, G.
89481 Pte. McGarahan, E.

DEPOT CAV CORPS.

800347 Cpl. O'Connor, T.
89893 Cpl. Mulcahy, J.
96124 Sgt. Sexton, J.

804743 Pte. Lucey, J.
98485 Pte. Creevy, M.
98143 Pte. O'Halloran, D.

DEPOT COE.

807662 Pte. Kelly, N.
809552 Pte. Coffey, J.
804701 Cpl. Clancy, P.
804696 Pte. Boland, F.
804718 Pte. Johnston, A.
804742 Pte. Sheerin, P.

98361 Cpl. Carroll, T.
422287 BQMS Harrington, P.
804727 Cpl. Murphy, S.
804712 Pte. Fagan, T.
804299 Pte. Lynch, P.

20 INF BN.

807187 Cpl. McMahon P.

DEPOT AMC.

98984 Cpl. Fagan, F.
806225 Pte. McAdams, J.
801172 Cpl. Durney, J.
806504 Pte. Murphy, T.

75881 Sgt. Gallagher, J.
807664 Pte. Hanlon, J.
806699 Pte. Murphy, T.
809821 Pte. O'Donnell, J.

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1st TANK SQN.

80367 Cpl. O'Connor, J.
86525 CQMS Nolan, D.
807151 Pte. Browne, K.

76288 C/S Galvin, M.
87689 Sgt. Dignam, P.
807221 Pte. Hackett, E.

1 ARMD SQN.

807101 Pte. Browne, M.
808594 Pte. Gaffney, E.

805380 Pte. Dunne, A.

IOSTA COR PA.

97558 Sgt. Bennett, D.
96833 Cpl. Chapman, J.
98479 Cpl. Heavey, C.

433933 Sgt. Dowse, T.
81399 Cpl. Fleming, J.

1 AA REGT.

99729 Cpl. Doyle, P.

99697 Cpl. O'Leary, J.

1 G/COY AOC.

806552 Pte. Martin, J.
98488 Sgt. Phelan, M.
92209 Cpl. Franey, P.

205132 C/S McCourt, K.
95103 Sgt. Sludds, P.

4 MOT SQN.

805715 Pte. Ellard, I.
807107 Pte. Nconan, M.

807168 Pte. Long, J.
804637 Cpl. Keogh, T.

AA TRG REGT.

809070 Pte. Walsh, J.

AIR CORPS.

803067 Pte. Raeside, A.

2 INF BN.

809457 Cpl. Roddy, J.
807676 Pte. Heffernan, E.
93140 Pte. O'Brien, P.
804907 Pte. Robinson, C.
806363 Pte. Whelan, J.
809775 Pte. Beresford, J.
809694 Pte. Finnegan, E.
807762 Pte. Glynn, S.
809710 Pte. Howard, F.
801776 Pte. Kelly, J.
808790 Pte. Mason, M.
803569 Pte. McMarlowe, J.
810442 Pte. Webster, M.
803570 Cpl. Roche, M.
808194 Cpl. Carroil, J.
808624 Pte. Browne, P.
808647 Pte. Brennan, J.
804393 Pte. Corbally, B.
808968 Pte. Delaney, S.
803998 Pte. McMahon, W.
805984 Pte. Wright, H.
805394 Cpl. Walsh, J.
807720 Pte. Corbally, P.
804693 Pte. Murray, P.
808274 Pte. Valentine, J.
807682 Pte. Lackin, P.
808907 Pte. Macklin, F.
809364 Pte. McDonagh, D.
807830 Pte. Russell, D.

8011078 Pte. Finlay, P.
806375 Pte. Kelly, J.
809372 Pte. O'Connor, W.
807692 Pte. Smith, W.
808271 Cpl. Talbot, R.
809792 Pte. Bishop, M.
807900 Pte. Fox, F.
807729 Pte. Hodgins, J.
809033 Pte. Hendrick, J.
809430 Pte. Mahon, J.
809711 Pte. McGrane, N.
807680 Pte. O'Rourke, R.
92194 CQMS. Bannon, P.
809001 Pte. Carey, M.
807077 Cpl. Duggan, A.
803533 Pte. Barnes, P.
806940 Pte. Barry, J.
809367 Pte. Dixon, O.
806936 Pte. Doyle, G.
93995 Pte. O'Reilly, W.
87182 Sgt. Norris, P.
806698 Cpl. Walsh, J.
810422 Pte. Lawlor, J.
804682 Pte. McGrath, J.
95508 Sgt. Maguire, J.
807728 Pte. Martin, A.
807209 Pte. McHugh, S.
806965 Pte. O'Brien, L.
800688 Pte. Richardson, E.

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5 INF BN.

RÜNDA

207944 Sgt. Fitzgerald, B.
 803672 Cpl. Broca, K.
 405923 C/S Ryan, J.
 807885 Cpl. McNair, J.
 809974 Pte. Buckley, J.
 810161 Pte. Lunny, M.
 807286 Pte. Ellis, L.
 809619 Pte. Hardy, J.
 806464 Pte. Laffus, E.
 809965 Pte. Murphy, J.
 808830 Pte. Newsome, P.
 807765 Pte. O'Brien, P.
 809150 Pte. White, K.
 809285 Cpl. Tyndall, G.
 807948 Cpl. Poland, J.
 807210 Pte. Byrne, P.
 807897 Pte. Davitt, M.
 804219 Pte. Hickey, D.
 809291 Pte. Millen, E.
 809507 Pte. McNally, A.
 802740 Pte. Brady, E.
 807941 Pte. Doherty, P.
 803660 Pte. Johnston, G.
 803658 Pte. O'Brien, W.
 805714 Pte. Burke, M.
 807332 Pte. Guarin, P.
 97906 Pte. Davitt, P.

806518 Cpl. Brennan, A.
 803841 Cpl. Bradley, G.
 807265 Cpl. Hamilton, E.
 803822 Pte. Browne, J.
 808466 Pte. Coyle, T.
 809246 Pte. Davis, R.
 809936 Pte. Fanning, M.
 807304 Pte. Kehoe, M.
 807267 Pte. Moran, J.
 809926 Pte. McConomy, D.
 807769 Pte. O'Reilly, W.
 803040 Pte. Whelan, M.
 94912 Sgt. Hickey, M.
 807766 Pte. Mooney, P.
 808804 Cpl. O'Dea, H.
 88070 Pte. Connolly, E.
 809625 Pte. Gregory, S.
 808919 Pte. Murphy, G.
 809254 Pte. McDonald, C.
 808683 Pte. McKenna, E.
 805041 Pte. Connole, M.
 802678 Pte. Doyle, J.
 802570 Pte. Leslie, M.
 807630 Pte. Sullivan, J.
 807009 Pte. Clifford, J.
 801209 Pte. Higgins, P.

7 INF BN.

806527 Cpl. Reilly, S.

8 INF BN.

97951 Cpl. Jenkins, G.

9 INF BN.

91181 Cpl. Foley, J.

21 INF BN.

94934 Sgt. Power, K.

804913 Cpl. Quinn, J.

2 F/COY SIGS.

404956 Sgt. Magorrian, P.
 803274 Cpl. Hughes, W.
 809032 Pte. Duffy, J.
 808965 Pte. McCann, P.
 806310 Pte. Ryan, J.
 806540 Pte. Woodcock, A.

809945 Cpl. Blecher, W.
 806076 Cpl. O'Donoghue, E.
 807297 Pte. Duffy, M.
 807329 Pte. McGrath, J.
 809455 Pte. Ryan, J.

2 MOT SQN.

807000 Pte. Dodd, S.
 808877 Pte. Kavanagh, G.
 806182 Pte. McQuillan, J.
 807040 Pte. Freeman, P.
 807241 Pte. Kenny, M.
 98598 Cpl. Garland, J.
 808626 Pte. Birchall, J.
 808572 Pte. Flood, W.

810361 Pte. Francis, T.
 805177 Pte. Murphy, L.
 808921 Pte. Nolan, P.
 802518 Pte. Hayes, G.
 803001 Cpl. Hayward, J.
 803470 Cpl. Ward, J.
 808309 Pte. McCreaner, J.
 803358 Pte. Nugent, A.

2 H/COY AMC.

211266 Pte. Hanna, M.
 808101 Pte. Byrne, B.
 804154 Pte. McKenzie, D.

RÜNDA

809189 Pte. Bergin, P.
 204540 Pte. Galligan, W.
 13106 Pte. Wolfe, T.

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2 G/COY MPC.

805797 Cpl. Waters, J.
97615 Cpl. Doolan, J.

93017 Cpl. White, J.

2 F/COY COB.

71527 Sgt. Handley, J.
86759 Cpl. Doyle, T.

802632 Cpl. Byrne, W.
808549 Pte. O'Farrell, O.

2 G/COY S&T.

90094 Pte. Egan, C.

2 G/COY AOC.

91722 Cpl. Cleary, M.
807313 Pte. Lynch, T.

806971 Pte. Donnelly, J.

11 FA REGT.

804635 Cpl. Gallagher, P.
806233 Pte. Deedy, W.
804103 Pte. McKenna, J.
804085 Pte. Roche, R.

808328 Pte. Dennis, O.
808311 Pte. McCooey, J.
808314 Pte. Rock, P.

CT DEPOT E/COMD.

810689 Cpl. Flynn, J.
78854 Pte. Madigan, P.
801568 Cpl. Kealy, T.

87729 Sgt. Keane, P.
809411 Pte. Lynch, V.
805588 Cpl. Carmody, A.

DOD COY MCKEE BKS.

807809 Pte. Brennan, J.
805416 Pte. Mooney, D.

806647 Pte. Fitzpatrick, W.
808422 Pte. Morrison, J.

2 BDE HQRS.

807981 Pte. Broggy, G.

807864 Pte. Harmon, R.

EAST COMD HQRS.

806444 Pte. Lester, M.

805643 Pte. Sheridan, W.

CLANCY BKS COY.

98555 Cpl. Reddin, J.

2 F/COY S&T.

95225 Cpl. Walsh, J.

DEPOT AOC.

90237 Cpl. Kavanagh, M.

RUNDA

DIRECTIVE TO THE OFFICER COMMANDING,
32nd INFANTRY BATTALION.

1. The Contingent of which you are the Officer Commanding is, as from the time of its departure from IRELAND, part of the UNITED NATIONS Emergency Force in the Republic of the CONGO.
2. The Commander UNEF who is the General Officer appointed as "Chief of the UNITED NATIONS Command" by the General Assembly of the UNITED NATIONS is operationally responsible for the performance of all functions assigned to the Force by the UNITED NATIONS, and for the deployment of the troops of your Command.
3. Regulations for the UNEF which are issued by the Secretary-General of the UNITED NATIONS provide various specific duties and responsibilities for the Commander UNEF. These are not to be interpreted as defining the scope of his authority. For the purpose of interpreting orders and instructions issued by or on behalf of the Commander UNEF, it is to be assumed that his authority over the IRISH Contingent and all personnel thereof is unlimited, save to such extent and in relation to such matters as may in future be specifically excepted in Rialacháin Óglaigh na hÉireann and in amendments thereto.
4. The IRISH Contingent comes under the immediate command of the Officer appointed by the Commander UNEF for that purpose in the exercise of his power of designating the chain of command for UNEF.
5. All employment of the IRISH Contingent is the responsibility of the Commander UNEF. For the avoidance of doubt it is hereby declared that in relation to training and operations, all regulations, orders and instructions issued by or on behalf of the Commander UNEF supersede the provisions of all manuals, directives, training regulations and training instructions in use in Óglaigh na hÉireann, insofar as they may be at variance with each other.
6. Each Officer and man of the IRISH Contingent shall comply with every lawful order issued to him by a foreign member of UNEF who is his superior in rank or appointment, in the same way as if such superior were a member of Óglaigh na hÉireann.
7. The provisions of Rialacháin Óglaigh na hÉireann, Orduithe Gnáthaimh Ginearálta and instructions issued by An Roinn Cosanta insofar as they are not at variance with regulations, orders or instructions issued by or on behalf of the Commander UNEF, are operative in relation to the IRISH Contingent.
8. Should it happen at any time that you are faced with an unforeseen question relating to the training or administration of the Contingent, and that the matter is:
 - (a) left to your discretion by the Commander, UNEF, and
 - (b) not covered, or insufficiently covered in regulations, orders or instructions issued by An Roinn Cosanta,you will act as follows: RÚNDA

RÚNDA

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- (c) if time permits, you will refer the question to An Stiúrthóir Pleananna agus Cibricht, Ceanncheathrú an Airm.
 - (d) if time does not permit of action as at (c) above, you will take such action as you think proper; having regard to the following considerations,
 - (1) the prestige of Óglaigh na hÉireann,
 - (2) the requirements of operations,
 - (3) the general trend of directives, regulations and orders issued by An Roinn Cosanta,
 - (4) safety of personnel,
 - (5) administrative convenience.
 - (e) You will inform An Stiúrthóir, Pleananna agus Cibricht of action taken as at (d) above.
9. You will impress on all ranks under your command the necessity of being courteous and correct in their relations with:-
- (a) officers and men of other Contingents of UNEF,
 - (b) the troops, police and population of the Host State - and of any other State.
10. Subject to any directions issued by or on behalf of the Commander UNEF, you will ensure that Officers and men of the IRISH Contingent, when present, whether on duty or not, at foreign courtsmartial, civil courts or ceremonial functions of any kind will conduct themselves in strict conformity with local regulations and prevailing local custom.
11. Subject to any directions issued by or on behalf of the Commander UNEF, you will issue and enforce such orders as, in your judgment, will prevent the conduct of the troops of the IRISH Contingent from offending the political, racial or religious sensibilities of the population of the Host State or of any other State.
12. (a) You will, insofar as it is practicable to do so, having regard to the operational and other commitments of the IRISH Contingent, observe the provisions of Defence Force Regulations A.7, Part III.
- (b) Regulations, orders and instructions issued by or on behalf of the Commander UNEF which have direct application to men of the IRISH Contingent, shall be read out and explained to them - (1) as soon as possible following their receipt and (2) thereafter on such other occasions as you may consider necessary.
13. In relation to personnel of the IRISH Contingent, UNEF Military Police have such powers of arrest as may be defined by or on behalf of the Commander UNEF. You will take all measures necessary to ensure that the powers of arrest of the UNEF Military Police are at all times known to all Officers and men under your command.
14. This directive is to be read in conjunction with Rialacháin Óglaigh na hÉireann C.S.7 - IRISH Contingent with the UNITED NATIONS Emergency Force.

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APPENDIX 'D'

NOMINAL ROLL AND APPOINTMENTS.

OFFICERS OF 32 INFANTRY BATTALION.

1. BATTALION HEADQUARTERS.

O/4909	Lt/Col M.J. Buckley.	O/C.
O/5752	Comdt. J. Adams.	2 i/c.
O/4975	Comdt. M.J. O'Brien.	Operations Officer.
O/6931	Capt. J. Moran.	Assistant Officer.
O/7434	Capt. J. Burke.	Engineer Officer.
O/6893	Capt. J.C. Slye.	Welfare Officer.

2. HEADQUARTERS COMPANY.

(a) 'A' Platoon.

O/4976	Comdt. W.O'Carroll.	Adjutant.
O/6208	Comdt. P.J.Liddy.	Legal Officer.
O/7547	Lieut. H.E. Daly.	Assistant Adjutant.
O/6370	Capt. P. Reidy.	Military Police Officer.

(b) 'Q' Platoon.

O/4989	Comdt. T. Ryan.	Quartermaster.
O/6387	Capt. D.O' Suibhne.	Assistant Quartermaster.
O/7936	Capt. D.K. Boyle.	Ordnance Officer.

(c) Intelligence Platoon.

O/6014	Comdt. F. Fleming	Intelligence Officer.
O/7811	Lieut. E.T. Cassidy.	Assistant Intelligence Officer.

(d) Signals Platoon.

O/7463	Capt. B.A. Deegan	Platoon Commander.
O/7718	Lieut. J. Flynn.	Platoon Officer.

(e) Transport Platoon.

O/6284	Capt. J.V.F.Brady.	Platoon Commander.
O/7582	Lieut. D.G.Houston.	Platoon Officer.

(f) Medical Platoon.

O/5030	Comdt. J.P.Laffan.	Platoon Commander and M.O.
O/6745	Comdt.H.P.J.O'Shea.	Platoon Officer and M.O.
O/7829	Capt. E.D. Daly.	Platoon Officer and M.O.

3. 'A' COMPANY.

O/6375	Comdt. I. Tracey	O/C 'A' Company.
O/5947	Capt. A.O. Cunningham.	2 i/c 'A' Company.
O/6628	Capt. A.R. Maynard.	Adm Officer 'A' Company.
O/7420	Capt. N.G. Cantrell.	Staff Officer 'A' Company.
O/7480	Lieut. M.J. Duggan.	O/C No. 1 Platoon 'A' Company.
O/7922	Lieut. C.D. O'Leary.	O/C No. 2 Platoon 'A' Company.
O/7664	Lieut. M.O. Hagan Wright.	O/C No. 3 Platoon 'A' Company.

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4. 'B' COMPANY.

O/4955 Comdt. M.D. Hassey.
O/6377 Capt. E. Russell.
O/6386 Capt. P. Allen.
O/7480 Capt. M.J. Duggan.
O/7568 Lieut. C.J. Fitzgerald.
O/7643 Lieut. T.G. Harrington.
O/7502 Lieut. A.A. Riordan.

O/C 'B' Company.
2 i/c 'B' Company.
Staff Officer 'B' Company.
Adm Officer 'B' Company.
O/C No. 4 Platoon.
O/C No. 5 Platoon.
O/C No. 6 Platoon.

5. 'C' COMPANY.

O/5134 Comdt. P.J. Carroll.
O/5171 Comdt. P.F. Croghan.
O/7207 Capt. J. O'Dwyer.
O/7162 Capt. D.A. Black.
O/7482 Lieut. J. Kissane.
O/7489 Lieut. J. Fives.
O/7503 Lieut. F. Stewart.

O/C 'C' Company.
2 i/c 'C' Company.
Adm Officer 'C' Company.
Staff Officer 'C' Company.
O/C No. 7 Platoon.
O/C No. 8 Platoon.
O/C No. 9 Platoon.

6. CHAPLAINS.

Rev. Fr. C.P. Crean.
Rev. Fr. G. Brophy.

Head Chaplain.
Chaplain.

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APPENDIX 'E'.

RESTRICTED

32 INF BN

CONSOLIDATED BN EQPT TABLE

ITEM	Battalion HQ Allotment		Coy Gp Allotment		Three Coy GPS Allotment		Total Allotment		GRAND TOTAL
	Combat	Res	Combat	Res	Combat	Res	Combat	Res	
<u>ARMAMENT</u>									
.303 Rifles No.4	84	20	(111)	-	333	-	417	20	437
Gustaf SMGs	83	9	(32)	-	96	-	179	9	188
Revolvers .455	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	2
Emerga Launchers No.4	-	4	(27)	-	81	-	81	4	85
Bren LMG Mk.III	4	2	(10)	-	30	-	34	2	36
Medium M4G-Vickers .303	-	1	(2)	-	6	-	6	1	7
60 mm Mortar-Brandt	-	1	(3)	-	9	-	9	1	10
81 mm Mortar	-	1	(2)	-	6	-	6	1	7
<u>COMMS EQUIPMENT</u>									
Wrls Sets No. C.12	2	2	(1)	-	3	-	5	2	7
Wrls Sets No. 31	-	9	(6)	(1)	18	3	18	12	30
Wrls Sets No. 88	-	15	(2)	(1)	6	3	6	18	24
Telephones 'J'	-	8	(4)	(-)	12	-	12	8	20
Switchboards WD.10 Line	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	2
Cable D.10 Twin - Miles	2	-	-	(1)	-	3	2	3	5
Apparatus Cable Laying No. 6	-	1	-	(1)	-	3	-	4	4
Batteries lead Acid	4	12	(2)	(2)	6	6	10	18	28
Batteries Telephone	-	56	(8)	-	24	-	24	56	80
Batteries Dry No.31 Set	-	264	(12)	(2)	36	6	36	264	300
Batteries Dry No.88 Set	-	228	(4)	(2)	12	6	12	228	240
Battery Charging Plant 2	-	2	(1)	-	3	-	5	2	7
<u>INSTRUMENTS & FD EQUIPMENT</u>									
Binoculars	26	-	(14)	-	42	-	68	-	68
Compass	38	-	(20)	-	60	-	98	-	98
Map Cases	38	-	(24)	-	72	-	110	-	110
Protractors	38	-	(20)	-	60	-	98	-	98
Romers	38	-	(24)	-	72	-	110	-	110
Torches Complete	38	-	(27)	-	81	-	119	-	110
Watches	17	-	(9)	-	27	-	44	-	44
Whistles	38	-	(39)	-	117	-	155	-	155
Verrey Light Pistols	6	-	(4)	-	12	-	18	-	18
Verrey Lt Ctges Red	24	24	(16)	-	48	-	72	24	96
Do. - Green	24	24	(16)	-	48	-	72	24	96
Do. Illuminating	36	108	(24)	-	72	-	108	108	216

Note: The Table provides for an additional 20 pers over the total shown in the original establishment table. All are in Bn HQ and incl the Bn band, etc.

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RESTRICTED

APPENDIX 'E'.

(Continued)

ITEM	Battalion HQ Allotment		Each Coy Gp Allotment		Three Coy Gps Allotment		Total Allotment		Grand TOTAL
	Combat	Res	Combat	Res	Combat	Res	Combat	Res	
<u>ENGR TOOLS AND EQPT</u>									
Axes Felling or hand	8	-	(8)	(9)	24	(27)	32	(27)	59
Axes Pick	25	-	(41)	(36)	123	108	148	108	256
Crowbars	9	-	(3)	(4)	9	12	18	12	30
Cutters Wire	10	-	(14)	(5)	42	15	52	15	67
Hooks Slashing	18	-	(27)	(12)	81	36	99	36	135
Saws Cross Cut	7	-	-	(2)	-	6	7	6	13
Saws Hand or folding	9	-	(8)	(5)	24	15	33	15	48
Shovels or spades	51	-	(54)	(48)	162	144	213	144	357
Sledges Steel	12	-	(3)	(5)	9	15	21	15	36
Wedges Steel Astd	72	-	(18)	(30)	54	90	126	90	216
Sandbags	-	2000	-	-	-	-	-	2000	2000
Ropes 50 ft Lengths	13	-	(9)	(10)	27	30	40	30	70
<u>AMMUNITION</u>									
.303 Rifle-On the man	4600	-	(5,550)	-	16,650	-	21,250	-	-
Do. - Coy Res	-	9200	-	(1,100)	-	33300	-	42500	-
Do. - 2nd Line	-	4600	-	(5,550)	-	16650	-	21250	-
								63,750	85,000
<u>BALLISTITE</u>									
On Man	-	-	(270)	-	810	-	810	-	-
Coy Reserve	-	-	-	(270)	-	810	-	810	1,620
<u>.303 LMG BALL</u>									
With Gun	3000	2250	(7500)	-	22500	-	25500	-	-
Company Reserve	-	1800	-	(4500)	-	13500	-	15300	-
								34000	74,800
								49300	
<u>.303 LMG Tracer</u>									
With Gun	300	225	(750)	-	2250	-	2550	-	-
Coy Reserve	-	180	-	(450)	-	1350	-	1530	-
2nd Line	-	400	-	(1000)	-	3000	-	3400	-
								4930	7,480
<u>.303 MMG Ball</u>									
With Gun	-	-	(7000)	-	21000	-	21000	-	-
Coy Reserve	-	-	-	(13000)	-	39000	-	39000	-
				(6000)	-	18000	-	18000	78,000
<u>.303 MMG Tracer</u>									
With Gun	-	-	(700)	-	2100	-	2100	-	-
Coy Reserve	-	-	-	(900)	-	2700	-	2700	-
2nd Line	-	-	-	(600)	-	1800	-	1800	-
								4500	6,600

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RESTRICTED

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APPENDIX 'E'

(Continued)

	Battalion HQ Allotment		Each Coy Gp Allotment		Three Coy Gps Allotment		Total Allotment		GRAND TOTAL
	Combat	Res	Combat	Res	Combat	Res	Combat	Res	
<u>.455 Ann Revolver</u>									
On Man	36	-	-	-	-	-	36	-	120
Coy Reserve	-	60	-	-	-	-	-	60	
2nd Line	-	24	-	-	-	-	-	24	
								84	
<u>.9 Mm Ann Gustaf SMG</u>									
On Man	17,928	-	(6,912)	-	20,736	-	38,664	-	154,656
Coy Reserve	-	17,928	-	(6,912)	-	20,736	-	38,664	
2nd Line	-	35,856	-	(13,824)	-	41,472	-	77,328	
								115,992	
<u>60 MM Mortar</u>									
<u>HE Ann</u>									
With Gun	-	-	(192)	-	576	-	576	-	1,692
Coy Reserve	-	-	-	(192)	-	576	-	576	
2nd Line	-	-	-	(180)	-	540	-	540	
								1,116	
<u>60 MM Mortar Smoke Ann</u>									
With Gun	-	-	(48)	-	144	-	144	-	396
Coy Reserve	-	-	-	(48)	-	144	-	144	
2nd Line	-	-	-	(36)	-	108	-	108	
								252	
<u>81 MM Mortar HE Ann</u>									
With Gun	-	-	(128)	-	384	-	384	-	1,248
Coy Reserve	-	-	-	(128)	-	384	-	384	
2nd Line	-	-	-	(160)	-	480	-	480	
								864	
<u>81 MM Mortar Smoke Ann</u>									
With Gun	-	-	(32)	-	96	-	96	-	270
Coy Reserve	-	-	-	(32)	-	96	-	96	
2nd Line	-	-	-	(26)	-	78	-	78	
								174	
<u>Energia Atk Grenades</u>									
On Man	-	-	(54)	-	162	-	162	-	405
Coy Reserve	-	-	-	(27)	-	81	-	81	
2nd Line	-	-	-	(54)	-	162	-	162	
								243	
<u>No. 36 Grenades</u>									
With Rifle Group	-	-	(108)	-	324	-	324	-	648
Coy Reserve	-	-	-	(108)	-	324	-	324	

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APPENDIX 'E'

(Continued)

	Battalion HQ Allotment		Each Coy Gp Allotment		Three Coy Gps Allotment		Total Allotment		GRAND TOTAL
	Combat	Res	Combat	Res	Combat	Res	Combat	Res	
<u>Smoke Grenades</u>	-	600	-	-	-	-	-	600	600
<u>Tear Gas Grenades</u>	-	200	-	-	-	-	-	200	200
<u>Hand Generators</u>	-	2,000	-	-	-	-	-	2,000	2,000
<u>Verex Light Pistol Cartridges</u>									
<u>Red and Green (each)</u>									
with Gun	24	-	(16)	-	48	-	72	-	144 (each)
Coy Reserve	-	24	-	(16)	-	48	-	72	
<u>Illuminating</u>									
with Gun	36	-	(24)	-	72	-	108	-	216
Coy Reserve	-	36	-	(24)	-	72	-	108	

RUNDA

RESTRICTED

RUNDA


APPX F

MAP OF KIVU PROVINCE

Scale



--- Railway



ORIENT

KATANGA

RUANDA
URUNDI


KASA

32 Bn

Outline Organisation

APPENDIX 'G'

Bn HQ (7)



21 7)

RUNDA

SUMMARY


	Offrs	NCOs	Men	Chaplains	TOTAL
In HQ and HQ Coy	22 (7)	77 (35)	98 (118)	2	199 (160)
Three Coy Gp	21	105	354	-	480
	43	182	452	2	679

32 Bn
Outline Organisation

APPENDIX 'G'

RÜNDA

BW HQ (7)



SUMMARY

	Offrs	NCOs	Men	Chaplains	TOTAL
HQ and HQ Coy	22 (7) 21	77 (35) 105	98 (118) 354	2 - -	199 (160) 480
32 Bn	43	182	452	2	679

32 CATHLÁN COISITHE.
CEANNCHEATHRÚ CATHLÁIN.

(Comhlánú de Oifigeach i gCeannas agus Foireann, Búton 'A', Búton 'C', Búton Faisnéise, Búton Combarthaíochta, Búton Iompair agus Búton Liachta).

SONRAI	(1)	Oifigeach i gCeannas agus Foireann (2)	Búton 'A' (3)	Búton 'C' (4)	Búton Faisnéise (5)	Búton Combarthaíochta (6)	Búton Iompair (7)	Búton Liachta (8)	Iomlán Ceanncheathrú Cathláin (9)
Leifneant-Chornall	..	1 (a)	1
Ceannfoirt	..	2 (b)	7
Captein	..	3 (c)	12
Leifneant	2
IOMLÁN OIFIGEACH	..	6	4	3	2	2	2	3	22
Maor-Sháirsintí Oathlúin	..	1	1
Ceathrú-Sháirsintí Oathlúin	2
Sáirsintí Complaechta	1
Ceathrú-Sháirsintí Complaechta	1
Sáirsintí:									
Serudoirt Loin Iarnhaigh	1
Armadóirí	1
Banna (O)	1
Cleirigh	1
Oceairí	1
Tionánaithe IM	2
Imnealltoirí-Teicneoirí	1
Faisnéoirí IM	1
Dualgasá Ghinearálta	1
Paisnéis	1
Giollaí Liachta	2
Póilíní Airm	1
Oibrítitheoirí—Radio agus Líne	2
Post	1
Radio Mheaneoirí	1
Stórálaithis	1
Deisitheoirí Tealga	1
Iompar	1
Ceannairí:									
Armadóirí	4
Banna (O)	2
Cleirigh	2
Oceairí	2
Tionánaithe IM	2

32. CATHLIÁN COISITHE.

CEANNCHEATHRÚ CATHLIÁIN

(Comhabetna de Oifigeach i gCeannas agus Foireann, Buíon 'A', Buíon 'Q', Buíon Faianéise, Buíon Comharthaíochta, Buíon Iompair agus Buíon Liachta).

(1) SONRAÍ	(2) Oifigeach i gCeannas agus Foireann	(3) Buíon 'A'	(4) Buíon 'Q'	(5) Buíon Faianéise	(6) Buíon Comharthaíochta	(7) Buíon Iompair	(8) Buíon Liachta	(9) Iomlán Ceanncheathrú Cathliáin
<i>Ceannairt: (ar lean)</i>								
Innealltóir-Tionnóir	1	23	23	8	11	7	6	79
Festóir IM								
Dualgas Ghinearálta		15	1					15
Fasna		1	1					1
Giolal Liachta		2	2					4
Póilín Airm		2	1					3
10		15	15					15
Oibrícheoir—Radio agus Line								
Radio-Mhionúscóir								
Síoraíochta			2					2
Deiltheoirí Teallta			1					1
1								1
Iomlán ONC	1	23	23	8	11	7	6	79
<i>Sonpháirtí Singil:</i>								
Bann (o)		15						15
Bearbóir		1	1					1
Greasaíche		2	2					4
Cleirigh								
Cócairí			15					15
Tionnaithe IM								
Innealltóir-Tionnóir			10					10
Festóir IM						2		2
Dualgas Ghinearálta		3						3
Giolal Liachta								
Oibrícheoir—Radio agus Line					14			14
Giolal agus Reathaithe		6						6
Grianghráfaí		1						1
Táilíocháir		1	1					1
Deisceoirí Teallta			2					2
IOMLÁN SAIGHDIÚRÍ SINGIL		28	31		14	17	16	106
IOMLÁN CEANNCHEATHRÚ DTL	7	55	57	10	27	26	25	207
<i>Ar Cheangal Séiplinigh</i>		(2)						(2)



Foxóráil:

- (a) Oifigeach i gCeannas.
- (b) 1 Leas-Oifigeach i gCeannas.
1 Oifigeach Oibríochta.
- (c) 1 Aidiúnach, agus Oifigeach i gCeannas Ceimicearra eile, Ceanncheathrú Cathlín.
1 Oifigeach DL.
- (d) Ceathrúnach.
- (e) Oifigeach Faisnéise.
- (f) Ceannasaithe Búine (1 Oifigeach Liaochta san áireamh).
- (g) 1 Leas-Oifigeach Oibríochta.
1 Oifigeach Imnealltóireachta.
1 Oifigeach Leasa.
- (h) 1 Leas-Aidiúnach.
1 Oifigeach Póilíní Airm.
- (i) 1 Leas-Ceathrúnach.
- (j) 1 Oifigeach Ordánais (MIO).
- (k) Leas-Oifigeach Faisnéise.
- (l) Oifigigh Búine (Oifigigh Liaochta).
- (m) Oifigeach Búine.
- (n) Arnaidóir.
- (o) Tréineálta mar aitheinaithe freisin

CÓR COISITHE.
32 CATHLÁN COISITHE.
GRÚPA COMPLACHTA.

(Comhlánú de Ceanncheathrú Complahta, Trí Bhulon Muscaid, Gasra amháin Inneall-Ghunna Meán agus Gasra 81 mm Moirtéir amháin).

SONRAI	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	FONÓRAI
Ceanntóir	1 (a)	1	1	1	1	1	1	(a) Ceannas Com- plahta.
Captaen	3 (b)	-	-	-	-	-	3	(b) 1 Leas-Oifigeach i gCeannas.
Léiteant	-	-	(1) (c)	3	-	-	7	1 Oifigeach Foinne. 1 Oifigeach Riarthach
IOMLÁN OIFIGEACH	4	(1)	(1)	3	-	-	7	(c) Ceannasat Baine.
Saireant Complahta	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	(d) 1a féidir bhoith san aireann—Oibrith- eóir—Radio agus Iain.
Ceathrú-Shaireant Complahta	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	
Sáireant:								
Bulon	-	(1)	-	3	1	1	3	
Gasra	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	
Ceannair:								
Óléirigh	1	-	(3)	9	-	-	1	
Uimhreacha Gunna IGE 60 mm Uimhreacha	-	-	(1)	3	2	-	3	
Moitéara	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	
Uimhreacha Gunna IGM 81 mm Uimhreacha	-	-	-	9	-	-	9	
Moitéara	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	
Gasra Cornairbhóid (d)	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	
Stóirleatáir	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	
IOMLÁN ONC	5	(8)	24	3	3	3	35	
<i>Sonpháirtí Singil:</i>								
Óléirigh	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	
Uimhreacha Gunna IGE 60 mm Uimhreacha	-	-	(9)	18	-	-	18	
Moitéara	-	-	(3)	9	-	-	9	
Uimhreacha Gunna IGM 81 mm Uimhreacha	-	-	-	-	10	-	10	
Moitéara	-	-	-	-	-	-	12	
Ghollat agus Realtáir	2	(1)	-	3	1	1	7	
Raon-Toisín	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	
Muscaid	-	-	(18)	54	-	-	54	
Cornairbhóid (d)	1	-	(1)	3	1	1	6	
IOMLÁN SAIRDÚIRÍ	4	(20)	87	13	13	14	118	
IOMLÁN CEANASNA DUTA	13	(38)	114	16	16	17	160	

CÓR COISITHE.
32 CATHLÁN COISITHE.
TABLA CATHLÁIN COMHDHÚITE.
(Comhlíonta de Ceanncheathrú Cathláin agus Trí Ghrúpa Complachta).

Sonraí.	CATHLÁN					Fondraí
	Ceanncheathrú Cathláin	Gásra Complachta Amháin	Trí Ghrúpa Complachta	Iomlán Cathláin		
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
Leifearant-Chornail ..	1	-	-	1		
Ceanntoirt ..	7	(1)	3	10		
Captáin ..	12	(3)	9	21		
Leifearant ..	2	(3)	9	11		
IOMLÁN OIRTÍOIRÍ ..	22	(7)	21	43		
Meor-Shárainní Cathláin	1	-	-	1		
Ceathrú-Shárainní Cathláin	1	-	1	1		
Sárainní Complachta	2	(1)	3	5		
Ceathrú-Shárainní Complachta	1	(1)	3	4		
Sárainní:						
Serradóir Lein Lámhaigh	1	-	-	1		
Armadóirí	1	-	-	1		
Banna ..	1	-	-	1		
Clárigh ..	1	-	-	1		
Océairí ..	2	-	-	2		
Tiománaithe IM ..	1	-	-	1		
Innealltóirí-Teicneóirí	1	-	-	1		
Festóirí IM ..	1	-	-	1		
Dualgais-Ghinearálta	1	-	-	1		
Faisnéis	2	-	-	2		
Giollai Liachta	1	-	-	1		
Póilíní Airm	2	-	-	2		
Oibrítheoirí—Radio agus Líne	1	-	-	1		
Post ..	1	(3)	9	9		
Radio-Mheicneóirí	1	-	-	1		
Gásra ..	1	(2)	6	6		
Stóráilaithe	1	-	-	1		
Deisitheoirí Teallta	1	-	-	1		
Iompar ..	1	-	-	1		

32 CATHLÁN COISTHE.
 TABLA CATHLÁIN COMHDHULÚITE.
 (Comhleanta de Ceanncheathrú Cathláin agus Trí Ghrúpa Complachta).

Ceanntarí:	SONRAI	CATHLÁN				FÓSDATAI
		Ceannocheathrú Cháitblain	Gasa Complachta Amháin	Trí Ghrúpa Complachta	Iomlán Cathláin	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Armadóirí:						
Banna	4	—	—	—	4	
Clérigh	2	—	—	3	5	
Oceairí	2	(1)	—	—	2	
Tiománaíthe IM	2	—	—	—	2	
Inneallóirí-Teicneoirí	4	—	—	—	4	
Fasóirí IM	2	—	—	—	2	
Dualgais-Ghineardla	2	—	—	—	2	
Faisnéis	6	—	—	—	6	
Uimhreacha Gunna IGE	—	(9)	—	—	27	
60 mm Uimhreacha Moirteára	—	(3)	—	—	9	
Uimhreacha Gunna IGM	—	(2)	—	—	6	
81 mm Uimhreacha Moirteára	—	(2)	—	—	6	
Giollai Liachta	5	—	—	—	5	
Póilíní Ailríon	10	—	—	—	10	
Oibrícheoirí—Radio agus Líne	7	—	—	—	7	
Radio-Mheicneoirí	1	—	—	—	1	
Gasa	—	(9)	—	—	27	
Comharthóirí	—	(1)	—	—	3	
Sárfóisthe	—	(1)	—	—	3	
Deistheoirí Teallta	1	—	—	—	1	
IOMLÁN ONC	70	(35)	105	184		
Seapháirtí Singil:						
Banna	15	—	—	—	15	
Beartóirí	1	—	—	—	1	
Greasaithe	1	—	—	—	1	
Clérigh	4	(1)	—	—	7	
Oceairí	15	—	—	—	15	
Tiománaíthe IM	15	—	—	—	15	
Inneallóirí-Teicneoirí	10	—	—	—	10	
Fasóirí IM	2	—	—	—	2	
Dualgais-Ghineardla	3	—	—	—	3	
Uimhreacha Gunna IGE	—	(18)	—	—	54	
60 mm Uimhreacha Moirteára	—	(9)	—	—	27	
Uimhreacha Gunna IGM	—	(10)	—	—	30	
81 mm Uimhreacha Moirteára	—	(12)	—	—	36	
Giollai Liachta	18	—	—	—	18	
Oibrícheoirí—Radio agus Líne	14	—	—	—	14	
Giollai agus Reachtaithe	—	(7)	—	—	21	
Graimghrásaí	6	—	—	—	6	
Raeon-Toisrí	1	—	—	—	1	
Muscadóirí	—	(1)	—	—	3	
Comharthóirí	—	(54)	—	—	162	
Táilóirí	—	(6)	—	—	18	
Deistheoirí Teallta	1	—	—	—	1	
2	—	—	—	—	2	
IOMLÁN SAIDHTOIRÍ SIOMH	106	(118)	354	460		
IOMLÁN OIRMHEANNA UITE	207	(100)	480	687		

NÓTAI BAESE:

1. Tarraingear na pearsaí sa Tábla seo ó Fhoirne agus Aonaid eile atá in iomlán na mBunaidh. Stochána agus faoiádh siad ina gcomhairleas des na cóir seibhise ón ar tarraingeadh iad.