

# Unit History

1<sup>ST</sup> Infantry Group

Congo May ~ November

1961

UNIT HISTORY

FIRST INFANTRY GROUP

UNITED NATIONS FORCE IN CONGO

MAY 1961 - NOVEMBER 1961

SOUTH KASAI:-

MWENE-DITU  
LUPUTA  
KASHIA  
KELE

KATANGA:-

KAMINA  
KILUBI  
NYUNZU-NIEMBA

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UNIT HISTORY - 1 INF GP

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UNIT HISTORY - 1 INF GPINTRODUCTION

1. The First Infantry Group was formed in MAY 1961 in response to a UN request to increase the number of IRISH troops already serving in the Republic of the CONGO.
  2. As the first unit of its kind, the organisation of 1 Inf Gp proved to have many shortcomings, especially when employed in an independent role. That the Gp successfully carried out the various tasks assigned to it while operating in such a role is a tribute to the leadership and determination displayed at all levels of command and to the high standard of morale which existed among all ranks.
  3. The History of the 1 Inf Gp is the story of two infantry companies commanded by a Lieutenant-Colonel with a very small HQ Staff. In the ensuing pages is given the general outline of the Gp's activities, followed by detailed accounts of the activities of each company. Reports by appropriate officers are also attached.
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Africa. At LEOPOLDVILLE, each Chalk was met by the Force Commander (Lt-Gen S. McKeown) and the IRISH Liaison Officer and Staff of ONUC HQ. An overnight stay at LEOPOLDVILLE was welcomed by all, and here the Gp Advance Party took over in issuing tropical kit and providing meals and accommodation at CAMP MARETTI with the help of a work-party supplied by 34 Inf Bn from ELISABETHVILLE.

5. Settling in Following an over-night stay at LEOPOLDVILLE, Gp HQ flew to No 2 Base, KAMINA, KATANGA arriving there at 1000 hrs on Sun, 28 May 61 when HQ was re-opened. At KAMINA, the Gp Comd was met by Lt-Col. E. O'Neill, Officer Commanding 34 Inf Bn who later addressed all officers of the Gp and gave some very useful advice on living conditions in Congo and an excellent resumé of recent political and economic events. As 34 Inf Bn had previously been stationed at KAMINA and was now in ELISABETHVILLE, Lt-Col. O'Neill was in a position to illustrate his points by drawing on actualities which painted a very clear and concise picture of conditions in Congo and did much to prepare our officers for the work ahead. A reception party from 34 Inf Bn under Comdts. K. Nunan and J. Foley was at the Airport to meet each Chalk of the Gp as it arrived and to render valuable assistance in unloading and sorting out and in general getting settled in to new quarters at No 1 Base.
6. KAMINA, MAY 61 On arrival at KAMINA, the Group commenced collective full-time training which included riot-drill, range practices and patrol drills. By now the mission of the Unit had been made known to all, i.e. the maintenance of peace in the break-away state of SOUTH KASAI. Higher authority requested that the Unit be ready to move from KAMINA to its new location within a week of arrival in CONGO but medical requirements concerning vaccination necessitated a delay of some sixteen days before troops were fit for travel. This delay was occasioned by a World Health Organisation directive to the effect that UN Personnel entering SOUTH KASAI should have had positive vaccination reaction against smallpox within the previous six months. As many of the Unit had NOT shown this required positive reaction, the Gp OC recommended that the Unit's move to SOUTH KASAI be postponed until the Unit MO had completed re-vaccination. This recommendation was acted upon by ONUC HQ and a new programme for the Gp's move to the new province was set. As a result of this, the Gp spent some sixteen days at KAMINA and troops who were NOT excused duty following vaccination sickness were usefully employed in training and the necessary stores and eqpt were assembled at the local railway station. The lack of Unit tpt was acutely felt at this stage but close liaison with the SWEDISH Tpt Pl enabled schedules to be met. Much valuable assistance in all the Gp's problems was rendered by the Comd of KAMINA BASE (Bgd F. Goulson, Nigerian Bde) and his staff. Further help and advice was forthcoming from the OC of the GHURKA Regt, Lt-Col. MITTRA, and also from Lt. ANDERSON of the Swed Engr Bn.
7. SOUTH KASAI In preparation for the move to the new province a reconnaissance party under the Gp OC departed for SOUTH KASAI on 31 May 61. Included in the party were the Gp Ops Offr and Company 2ICs, the latter remaining on in the new locations until the arrival of the Coy Gps. On 8 Jun 61, "A" Coy Gp moved by train from the RRR rail depot at KAMINA to the town of LUPUTA, followed by Gp HQ and "B" Coy Gp on 16 Jun 61. Initially, Gp HQ was established at KASHIA, some five miles from LUPUTA, and "B" Coy Gp occupied a camp at MWENE-DITU some 30 miles away. Events proved that this latter town was, at the time, the centre of activity in the area, and on 20 Jun 61 Gp HQ moved to join "B" Coy Gp at MWENE-DITU.

8. Situation in SOUTH KASAI Following the granting of Independence to Congo, an autonomous State was set up in SOUTH KASAI by Albert Kalondji who styled himself "Kind Kalondji", ruler of the break-away territory. In defiance of the Central Government he maintained his own army and equipped it with modern automatic weapons, armoured cars and jet aircraft. The "kingdom" comprised some 5,000 sq. miles in extent and is reputed to produce approximately 80% of the world's industrial diamonds, capable of ensuring a firm economy and reasonable standard of living for its inhabitants. This economy was entirely disrupted following the flight of Belgian administrators during the Independence rioting, with the result that starvation and disease were widespread throughout the area. Conditions were further worsened by the arrival of weekly trainloads of refugees from KATANGA who were shepherded to a main refugee camp situated in the town of MWENE-DITU. Much good work in the Province was done by the UN Food Relief Organisation in the person of Mr. M. CATHEDRA who with his contingent of PAKISTANI drivers distributed supplies to the needy. At the time of the Gps arrival in SOUTH KASAI relations between the UN and the local population and army were somewhat strained - indeed the main UN camp at MWENE-DITU had but a few weeks previously been attacked by KALONJI soldiers who suffered losses in the engagement. In April, a UN company of the GHANA Contingent had been lured into being taken unawares at Port FRANCOU and were wiped out. As a result, Standard Operating Procedure decreed that all UN patrols be of at least Platoon strength, a requirement which the Gp had great difficulty in complying with due to numerous other duties. Internally in SOUTH KASAI, tribal hostilities existed between the KALONJI (BALUBA) and KANIOKA tribes and many arguments over territorial rights and cross-border encroachment resulted in killings on both sides, though with their modern armament and equipment the KALONJI soldiers were far superior in open fighting to the bows and arrows of the KANIOKAS. This superiority enable the KALONJIS to take over much territory which formerly belonged to their rivals, a notable example being the town of LUPUTA.

9. Posts Occupied. As a component of 2 GHANA Inf Bde under Bgd J.E. MICHEL, the Gp detached a Liaison Officer to Bde HQ at LULUABOURG. On taking over from elements of 2 GHANA Regt which was being redeployed, the following posts in SOUTH KASAI were occupied:-

a. MWENE-DITU ('B' Coy Gp)

(1) Layout In this straggling town astride the main railway line from ELISABETHVILLE to Port FRANCOU the effects of the Independence rioting were very obvious. With the exception of one or two badly stocked clothes shops and the town's only hotel (HOTEL ALTITUDE 1000), all establishments managed by Whites had ceased to function, and deserted buildings with broken shutters and cracked masonry were evident in many of the town's dusty streets. Some of these buildings would, with repair, have served ideally to house elements of the Gp, but the choice of accommodation and campsites did NOT rest with the UN as use had to be made of whatever sites were offered by the local Congolese administration. In this instance the camp available to the IRISH troops consisted of a rectangular piece of low-lying ground of approximately  $1\frac{1}{2}$  acres in extent which in the previous nine months had been occupied in turn by MOROCCAN, LIBERIAN and GHANAIAN UN troops. The perimeter of the camp was marked by a barbed-wire entanglement with several strong-points which were manned during the hours of darkness and afforded some measure of

protection in case of attack. To judge from the advice given by the Bde Comd, there was every reason to believe that attack was quite a likely event, especially as recent events had clearly indicated that hostility did exist on the side of the local population (20,000 approx) of MWENE-DITU towards the UN troops. Added to this was the constant surveillance of the camp by the local KALONDJI soldiers who occupied strong-points on high ground which dominated the UN positions.

- (2) Billeting All accommodation was in tents with the exception of three small bungalows in a very bad state of repair which were used as officers' mess, Medical Aid Post and Sick Bay with limited sleeping quarters for some of the officers. The camp had NO water supply, NO electric light and NO space for outdoor recreation as all available ground was used in a system of trenches left by previous UN troops. Due to the low nature of ground, little breeze ever penetrated between the rows of tents, making the tropical heat all the more uncomfortable for the men.
- (3) Rations The rations throughout the period in SOUTH KASAI can only be described in general as bad. Limited supplies of vegetables and fruit could be purchased locally in the town but they were of poor quality. Flour was bought and given to the local hotel which baked sufficient bread to meet our needs. The main bulk of the rations was flown in from LULUABOURG by plane and helicopter on an infrequent schedule often resulting in the day's food arriving too late to cook for the men's evening meal. Only too often the troops had to resort to an unpalatable tinned concoction of luncheon meat, with tinned tomatoes, to supplement the meagre fare available. But for some excellent items on issue in the IRISH Ration Packs, many a hungry day in the bush would have been spent by the Gp
- (4) Water The town of MWENE-DITU had NO piped water supply of any description, the populace relying on a diesel pump to raise water some 50 feet to a community water-trough. At this location, some three miles from the UN Camp, the KALONDJI troops, IRISH troops and local townspeople formed a queue in that order each morning for the purpose of obtaining water. The Unit had on location a 500 gal water trailer which, when filled and chlorinated, barely provided sufficient water to meet the cooking requirements for the 170 troops in the camp. Due to the local situation, this morning water detail took on the aspect of a patrol, and while at the water point sentries and lookouts were posted at all strategic points. For washing purposes, a journey of over five miles had to be undertaken daily by a stronger patrol to a muddy river where tin barrels were filled and brought back to camp. While a second journey to the town's water supply point would have eased the work of procuring water, the fact that the town's pump was operated only in the early morning necessitated the journey further afield. The water obtained in barrels was of a muddy brown hue, completely unfit for consumption even when chlorinated, but it sufficed to afford the troops some means of bathing and washing clothes. Showers or baths in MWENE-DITU were non-existent other than when constructed of a bucket with holes.
- (5) Duties For the number of troops available to the Coy Comd, duties were exceptionally heavy in MWENE-DITU. Apart from the operational requirements in the area, additional men

had to be found to form the two water patrols already referred to, plus a platoon for airfield duties each time a UN plane arrived in the vicinity. The town was provided with a landing-strip situated approximately 2 miles from the camp. Each UN plane on arrival at MWENE-DITU would circle the camp and await the securing of the airstrip by the IRISH troops before landing. As these planes arrived at varying times of the day, a force of platoon strength had to be kept standing by. Due to the absence of sanitary amenities in the camp and the non-availability of a refuse dump in the town, an average of 7 men were employed daily on pioneer duties. A typical example of commitments is given in the following duty table for 12 Jul 61:-

Camp Main Guard	30
Resting	30
Water detail	24
Airport	24
Op Patrol	44

TOTAL: 152 all ranks.

When further additions in respect of normal administrative duties, hospitalisation and sickness were added to the above total, the position arose that, to find men for the water detail and airfield duty, troops who were resting after guard had to perform these duties.

b. LUPUTA ('A' Coy Gp)

- (1) Layout The town of LUPUTA had much in common with MWENE-DITU - starvation and disease among the local population, empty shops, broken down buildings and poor camp sites. The site allotted to "A" Coy Gp in this location consisted of a rectangular piece of ground about the size of a football pitch, alongside the railway line. A high barbed wire fence protected the camp from encroachment by the townspeople (some 15,000) but provided NO privacy in regard to camp-life, as roads ran along the four sides of the site. As in MWENE-DITU, the camp was, of necessity, dotted with weapon pits and mortar emplacements together with the tentage required to accommodate the 110 all ranks garrisoned there. Being in such an exposed location, the troops were subjected to enduring the uncomfortable results of dust, raised in billowing clouds by every vehicle that passed on the adjoining roads.
- (2) Billeting One small bungalow was located within the camp area and this served as Medical Centre and Sick Bay with limited sleeping accommodation for some of the officers. The camp lacked a water supply, had NO electric light, and outdoor recreation space was non-existent.
- (3) Rations The troops stationed in LUPUTA were rationed on a somewhat different system to those in MWENE-DITU. While at times some fresh fruit could be purchased locally in the town, supplies of food had to be collected from the Coy's outpost six miles away at KASHIA where the only landing strip in the vicinity was located. Again the irregular deliveries by plane to KASHIA upset the menus prepared by the Unit's cooks and, as in MWENE-DITU, resort had to be made on many occasions to the IRISH pack ration. NO facilities for baking bread existed in the town, but by an ingenious use of barrels, mud-ovens were constructed and an excellent bread was baked in the camp by the Coy



Cook. Occasional supplies arrived by rail.

- (4) Water This was drawn daily by a patrol which made the trip to the KASHIA outpost and returned with the necessary water in barrels loaded on a pick-up truck. To provide some sort of washing facilities for the 110 all ranks in camp, a double run had to be undertaken on several days of the week. To avoid imposing additional calls on troops to mount water patrols, all ranks exercised the utmost economy in the use of water both for personal hygiene and laundering.
- (5) Duties Numerous train guards had to be provided by "A" Coy Gp to escort all trains through the Gp's territory and to ensure the safety of the refugees bound for MWENE-DITU. Trains were often protected by a road patrol which operated from the LUBILASHI River (some 30 miles away) along the main road which ran parallel to the railway almost into LUPUTA station. At the station a train guard of platoon strength mounted the train and escorted it through the various BALUBA and KANIOKA areas to the town of KELE, approximately 60 miles away. At KELE the train crew changed and returned with the guard on an outgoing train from LULUABOURG. As the trains in Congo seldom ran to schedule the guards usually had an overnight stay at KELE, resulting in 48 hours duty for the men. In addition to these road and rail guards for all trains, the company provided also for the drawing of rations and water supplies from the KASHIA outpost on a daily basis and for the mounting of major operational patrols of platoon strength (plus) for investigation and settlement of inter-tribal disputes concerning territorial rights and violation of tribal boundaries. The normal defence and security of the main LUPUTA camp could NOT be neglected, resulting in the following commitment of troops over a weekly period:-

10 patrols to KASHIA outpost.  
3 road patrols to areas of tribal activity  
3 train guards of 48 hours duration

On a numerical basis, some 64 other ranks were available to fulfil these commitments, i.e.,

Coy Strength	-	161
KASHIA Outpost	-	50
Average Sick	-	5
Camp Guard	-	21
Resting	-	21
Adm Pers	-	20

When both train guard and road patrol were needed on the same day, men who were resting from the previous night's duty had to form the water detail and ration patrol to KASHIA, together with any other special duty that arose in camp.

c. KASHIA

- (1) Layout In contrast to the previously described posts at MWENE-DITU and LUPUTA, this post, occupied by 50 all ranks of "A" Coy Gp, was set in comparatively pleasant surroundings of green grass and waving palm trees and was the only location within the Gp's area that boasted space for outdoor recreation. KASHIA had been established as a Presbyterian mission station which in normal times was

staffed by Americans who, in addition to their religious aims, endeavoured to raise cattle on the surrounding land comprising several acres. During the Gp's stay in the post the missionary (Mr. DAVIS) was absent on business but the troops were made welcome by his able administrator who was also a veterinary surgeon and did most of the work in connection with the cattle raising experiment. Situated some six miles from LUPUTA, on the railway line, the station boasted an airstrip capable of taking DC3 aircraft and was thus an important centre to be protected for UN operations in the Province. The mission itself consisted of two modestly but well-constructed bungalows, a small chapel, school and stores all built of a soft red brick produced from the red clay of the district. It was difficult to estimate the KANIOKA population of this district as living conditions were quite primitive and the people lived in mud huts which lay scattered in clusters over a wide area. About three hundred children attended the mission school daily, provided that relations with the neighbouring BALUBAS across the railway line boundary were NOT strained due to tribal differences which on an average arose daily and had to be sorted out by UN intervention. These differences ranged from petty complaints concerning chicken-stealing to armed aggression over territorial rights and tested the patience and diplomacy of the IRISH to the limit.

- (2) Billeting One of the mission bungalows was placed at the disposal of the garrison and was used for officer sleeping accommodation, the other bungalow being retained by the mission administrator who kindly allowed the officers to dine in his quarters. A store of large proportions was used as dining-hall for Other Ranks, the remainder of the accommodation being in tents.
- (3) Rations The normal system of supply by air with occasional train deliveries (to LUPUTA) operated for "A" Coy Gp and the KASHIA garrison was rationed by the Coy QM. Supplies were supplemented from the fruit growing locally in the area - lemons, oranges, bananas and pineapple - and fresh meat was obtained on a repayment basis by killing the occasional few cattle from the mission herd. The coy cooks proved themselves capable butchers in this work of killing and preparing the cattle for cooking but the distribution of the meat provided a problem due to the heat. Unless the work had been commenced early in the morning, the mid-day heat soon effected the freshness of the meat which quickly became unfit for consumption. Transportation of meat to the MWENE-DITU garrison was undertaken by road patrol on many occasions and, by using sheets regularly doused with water, some degree of success was achieved from the QM's point of view, though operationally the drain on man-power for such work was excessive.
- (4) Water KASHIA had its own water supply and troops benefitted greatly from the luxury of being able to bathe and wash frequently - and attend to personal laundering.
- (5) Lighting The permanent buildings at the mission were lighted from a diesel plant and by suitable additional wiring light was provided internally for most of the main installations of the garrison. It was NOT feasible to install exterior or perimeter lighting with the result that when darkness fell at 1800 hrs the sentries carried out their duties in unaccustomed blackness.

(6) Duties A garrison of 50 all ranks was maintained at KASHIA for the protection of the airstrip, mission station and KANIOKA villages in the immediate vicinity. A strong system of weapon emplacements was manned during the night, and by day mobile patrols policed the boundary line between the KANIOKAS and neighbouring BALUBAS. Duties at this post were NOT as onerous as in MWENE-DITU and LUPUTA, and efforts were made to maintain a fortnightly rotation of troops to the more pleasant surroundings of KASHIA throughout the Unit's tour of duty in the Province.

10. Tasks in SOUTH KASAI The 1 Inf Gp was now responsible for the general maintenance of peace in SOUTH KASAI Province and in particular for the tasks listed hereunder:-
- a. The prevention of inter-tribal strife between the KALONJIS and KANIOKAS.
  - b. The maintenance of supply routes between Port FRANCOIS and ELISABETHVILLE running through the Province.
  - c. The protection of refugees.
  - d. Protection and assistance to UN Food Relief Organisation workers.
  - e. The maintenance of communications.
11. As the first UN contingent of WHITE troops to serve in the province, the personnel of the Gp found climate and living conditions far different from anything encountered heretofore. In their task of settling in and getting organised it must be said that every assistance and advice was forthcoming from the BRITISH officers serving with the GHANA Contingent and they proved most helpful throughout the Gp's service with GHANA Bde. The Bde Comd visited Gp HQ on several occasions to discuss problems and difficulties as they arose and, where possible, the resources of the Bde were used to our advantage. The Unit was also visited by General Alexander (BRITISH), Chief of Staff of the GHANAIAN Army.
12. Operations The routine duties of the Unit have previously been mentioned in describing the various posts occupied. Before the Gp finally departed from the Province, an additional post at KELE was added to the unit's responsibility, resulting in an operational area some 150 miles in extent to be patrolled and kept under surveillance. Patrols to some areas were of over 48 hours duration (e.g. MWENE-DITU to TABACONGO and return) which entailed a night in the bush in unfamiliar and often unfriendly surroundings. The roads were of a deplorable nature, no more than a succession of deeply rutted paths cut from the jungle, and everywhere one wanted the ever-present dust arose to cover all concerned in a grimey film that penetrated the tropical uniforms. Baths or showers were a luxury for the men who returned to camp from such travelling, but it is true to say that more often than NOT, the bath was taken in a canvas bucket or tin basin. The men soon became accustomed to the arduous conditions of travel, for an average of three operational patrols a week were undertaken, often with an additional patrol ordered by Bde HQ in LULUABOURG. Arguments over territorial rights proved to be one of the principal problems with which commanders had to deal, but by numerous conferences, diplomacy and an occasional show of force, peace was maintained. As an example of what these conferences could entail, one might cite the PAN-KANIOKA Conference at KASHIA which lasted for over two days and was attended by tribal chiefs, advisors and followers totalling some 200 people.

13. Medical The work done by the Unit's two Medical Officers did much to help establish good relations with locals at all posts held, in addition to keeping the men fit by their untiring efforts to improve sanitary amenities and ensure hygienic living conditions. Medical treatment was afforded all creeds and classes, even to the extent of handling the KALONJI Army morning sick parade. The nearest civilian medical facilities were in the hospital at BAKWANGA, approximately 80 miles from the Gp's area, resulting in a continuous stream of people to the clinics set up by the unit's doctors. At the missions in MWENE-DITU and LUPUTA medical assistance was also given to the religious communities together with supplies of much needed drugs and antibiotics to help combat the various types of infectious diseases rampant in the area. From the military point of view, strict supervision of cooking, hygiene and refuse disposal in all posts contributed a great deal to leaving the men free from most sickness prevalent in the district with the exception of dysentery and gastro-enteritis which were impossible to avoid due to the conditions obtaining. In SOUTH KASAI some 80% of the Gp contracted these ailments, but remained free from other major illnesses.
14. Transport Lack of unit transport was greatly felt in trying to carry out the many operational tasks in the province, and following many requests to HQ ONUC, through Bde HQ, sufficient vehicles arrived in Jul to cater for normal requirements. For the longer patrols undertaken, use was made of the Bde helicopter for advance reconnaissance in the absence of a cavalry element, though its availability for this work was very limited. With the increase of unit transport holdings the need for a qualified S&T Officer and workshop section became very acute, but with the limited resources at their disposal the Unit fitters did manage to keep most of the 35 vehicles roadworthy.
15. Signals For the operational situation obtaining in the province, the signal organisation and equipment of the Unit was inadequate for the tasks imposed. A request for the services of a Signal Officer resulted in Capt J.N. Sloan being posted from HQ ONUC to the Gp in Jun and his technical knowledge and assistance went a long way towards overcoming most of the difficulties. The GHANA Bde provided rear-link operators in all the KASAI posts but ancillary equipment for testing and repair was lacking and at times hampered the efficiency of forward links. (Of the stock of six W/S Cl2, two of these were unserviceable by mid July due to lack of spares).
16. Chaplaincy The Gp Chaplain established connections with all missions in the Province, notable among them being the FRENCH CANADIAN SISTERS at MWENE-DITU and the WHITE Fathers at LUPUTA. These communities were living in very poor circumstances since Independence and gifts of food and essential medical supplies were welcome to enable the religious continue the work of ministering to the sick and needy in their immediate vicinity. Catering for the needs of the various posts held by the Unit was an arduous task for the Chaplain but due to the good offices of the Bde Comd, a small aeroplane was made available for the purpose of having Mass celebrated in each location on Sundays and holydays. By joining the many operational patrols, the Chaplain succeeded in visiting all posts at regular intervals throughout each week of the Gp's stay in SOUTH KASAI.
17. Morale and Discipline Despite the stresses of appalling living conditions, bad food, lack of outdoor recreation and arduous duties, the morale of the troops remained at a high level in SOUTH KASAI. As the first white troops to the area they settled down to their duties and soon won the respect and admiration of the CONGOLESE who heretofore had NOT been on friendly terms with UN Contingents. The low rate of breaches of discipline was a good

indication to the behaviour of the men, as indeed was the low numbers reporting sick with minor complaints.

18. Improvements in Relations The work of the Gp in SOUTH KASAI went on from June to July and into August, by which time a new Bde Commander had taken over- Bde OTU. Relations continued to improve with both KALONJIS and KANIOKAS and open warfare was prevented between the two tribes, although as yet they had NOT resolved all their differences concerning territorial rights. However, trade was re-established between them, a factor which did much to restore their economy and promote harmony apart from relieving hardship. This was most apparent in the town of LUPUTA where trade had come to a standstill when the KANIOKAS were driven out but was recommenced under the stabilising influence of the popular IRISH troops. Also contributing to improved relations was the close cooperation which existed between the Gp and the KALONJI Army Commander in the district, a Capt. ETIENNE. It should be stated that this CONGOLESE officer was a person of fine bearing and superior intelligence who in all his dealings with the IRISH was polite, honest and sincere.
19. Departure from SOUTH KASAI Towards the end of July 61 a redeployment of contingents was announced by HQ ONUC resulting in a proposed change-over between the IRISH in SOUTH KASAI and the NIGERIAN Battalion in KAMINA. By this time "A" and "B" Coy Gps had changed posts with each other in an effort to vary the men's environment, and the proposed move to KAMINA was news which was welcomed by all. Plans for hand-over were drawn up and the NIGERIAN Commander (Lt Col McMORROUGH-KAVANAGH) visited the Gp OC to finalise the details. On 22 July an advance party of the Gp consisting of ZICs of "A" and "B" Coy Gps plus Gp QM and 9 ORs flew to KAMINA to prepare for the move of the main body. On 30 July the major portion of "B" Coy Gp arrived by train at KAMINA, having been preceded a few days earlier by a platoon of "A" Coy Gp from KELE. Gp HQ flew to KAMINA on 4 August, followed on 10 August by "A" Coy Gp which made a slow two-day train journey with some 35 vehicles of unit transport on flatcars. Concurrent with these moves was the arrival of elements of the NIGERIAN Bn at the various posts. However, the NIGERIANS considered that conditions in the camps were NOT suitable for the Bn and consequently withdrew from MWENE-DITU, LUPUTA and KASHIA, concentrating instead at LULUABOURG.
20. Messages of Goodwill News of the intended departure of the IRISH from SOUTH KASAI evoked expressions of regret, gratitude and appreciation from the people of the area who had become accustomed to the reign of peace which the Gp had contributed so much to by their attitude of goodwill and impartial handling of tribal differences. The following message from the Minister for the Interior, SOUTH KASAI, typifies those received:

"The Government and people of SOUTH KASAI lament the departure of their IRISH garrison. They thank the Irish Army for the unselfish way they performed a very difficult task. The Irish came to an area in which war and famine raged and where people lived in constant fear. They leave a land in which PEACE reigns. The Government and people of SOUTH KASAI wish to thank the Government and people of IRELAND for their kindness and generosity to them for allowing their Army into an area where conditions for white troops were extremely difficult. They wish this message to be conveyed to His Excellency, the President of Ireland".

Subsequent to the departure of 1 Inf Gp, conditions of peace continued in SOUTH KASAI for quite some time, resulting in UN planes being able to land freely at MWENE-DITU without a UN

guard at the airstrip. Planes were refueled there and sent on their way with messages of goodwill for the IRISH.

21. KAMINA, AUGUST 61 Formerly a BELGIAN military airbase, KAMINA Base was now a key-point in UN operations in KATANGA where President TSHOMBE sought to establish an independent state in defiance of the wishes of the CONGO Central Government, headed by President KASAVUBU. One of the richest mining provinces in CONGO, KATANGA had established an economy which attracted thousands of whites and which sufficed to provide attractive salaries for white mercenaries who officered President TSHOMBE's modernly equipped army. This army was stationed throughout the province, with the exception of KAMINA Base which was solely in UN hands. The base possessed a modern airport with runways capable of taking the largest plane then in production, and accommodation was sufficient for several infantry battalions. In effect KAMINA comprised two bases some seven miles apart and took in an area of over one hundred square miles in extent. Base No. 1 consisted mainly of the Airport, an air training school (EPA Building), LUMWE officers' mess and a main petrol storage depot served by a branch line of the main railway. Base No. 2 housed the modern Base HQ, KALUNGA officers' mess, a recreation centre with sports field and cinema, a transmitter station, post office and modern hospital. The two bases were connected by the "ROUTE ROYALE", a 7 mile tarmac road with dual carriageway in many places. Situated close to the Base HQ was the "RRR" which housed the BASE's main supply depot and transport workshops, while a mile away was the CONGOLESE village of ENTOBI with market square and local administration offices. A farm was located two miles to the WEST of Base No. 2 outside the perimeter of the BASE and in normal times several varieties of fruit and vegetables were grown there in addition to raising of pigs and cattle. The nearest town to KAMINA Base was KAMINAVILLE, a town of prosperous appearance with about 15,000 of a native population and over 1,000 whites, situated 18 miles to the WEST of the BASE. The town contained many large shops, hotels, garages, an airfield and clubs of European standard. It served as a station for a strong battalion of TSHOMBE's Gendarmerie officered by approximately twenty white mercenaries of various nationalities supported by an armoured unit with twelve SARACEN armoured cars. Most of the territory in this NORTH-WEST portion of KATANGA belonged to the BALUBA Grand Chef KASANGA NIEMPA who had freedom of access to the Base and often arrived to confer with the Base Commander. On such occasions he would be accompanied by his advisors and personal bodyguard, drawn from his modernly armed Battalion which was also stationed in the KAMINAVILLE district.
22. KILUBI The military base of KAMINA received its electric power and lighting from a hydro-electric station which had been constructed by the BELGIANS at the KILUBI FALLS some 60 miles to the NORTH-EAST of KAMINA. While in peacetime KILUBI was a tourist attraction with its deep wooded valley and cascading falls, at the period in question it had taken on the appearance of a military post, garrisoned at platoon strength and supplied from the BASE. Access to KILUBI was by a narrow twisting road which crossed many culverts and streams, barely wide enough in places to take a normal 2-ton truck.
23. TAKING OVER KAMINA UN Command in KATANGA was divided into three sectors as follows:

SECTOR "A" with HQ at ALBERTVILLE  
 SECTOR "B" with HQ at ELISABETHVILLE  
 SECTOR "C" with HQ at KAMINA BASE.

On 4 August 1961 OC 1 Inf Gp took over command from Lt Col McMURROUGH-KAVANAGH, OC 3 NIGERIAN Bn and assumed command of KAMINA BASE and SECTOR "C" resulting in the following appointments:-

Base Commander	-	Lt Col J.C. O'Donovan
Base Ops Offr	-	Comdt P. Keogh
Camp Comdt No.1 Base	-	Comdt M. Hayes
Base Int Offr	-	Capt. J.D. Mulvihill
Base Adjnt	-	Capt A. Murphy
Base Tpt Offr	-	Capt J.N. Sloan
Base Logs Offr	-	Capt T.J. Hartigan
Base Supply Offr (RRR)	-	Capt J.E. Dawson

The above appointments were in addition to Unit duties as establishments did NOT permit of officers being released for the posts.

24. Tasks in KAMINA On taking over KAMINA the Unit became responsible for the following tasks:-

- a. Defence of the Airfield.
- b. Defence of the Base.
- c. Defence of KILUBI power station.
- d. General administration of the Base.

While the Gp settled down to enjoy comparative ease and comfort in the new surroundings, work in the administrative field went on apace in regard to the UN civilian staff of over fifty employees headed by the Base Administrator (MR. G. CAPRARIO) and the various UN military contingents - SWEDISH Inf Coy, NORWEGIAN and DANISH military police and movement control detachments, CANADIAN and INDIAN signals detachments, AUSTRIAN medical team and elements of a SWEDISH engineering battalion, - in addition to some 2,000 CONGOLESE civilian workers.

25. KILUBI Occupied On 16 August the SWEDISH detachment guarding the KILUBI power station was relieved by a platoon (plus) of "B" Coy Gp which continued to rotate troops to that post on a fortnightly basis up to the time the Gp departed from KAMINA.

26. Operation "RUMPUNCH" Soon after arrival at KAMINA it became apparent that the Gp would NOT be occupied solely with administrative duties. On 19 August the Gp Ops Offr reported to ONUC HQ in LEOPOLDVILLE for briefing in connection with the then secret forthcoming operation "RUMPUNCH" which involved the detention and eventual repatriation of all white mercenaries in KATANGA. The Gp Ops Offr returned from ONUC HQ on 23 August and briefing of all unit and detachment commanders, plus heads of UN civilian sections, took place at BASE HQ. The part to be played in the operation by the UN force at KAMINA BASE was on the general lines of the tasks stated in paragraph 24 above, with the additional requirement of establishment and maintenance of a camp to accommodate the detained white mercenaries. As the operation was likely to result in hostile action against the UN, preparations for a strong defence of the BASE were drawn up and work was allotted to the various detachments. A detainee camp was prepared with Capt. T.J. HARTIGAN in charge, assisted by Lt. T. McGRATH. Accommodation was prepared, feeding arrangements were put in train and security measures were drawn up.

27. Defence Preparations With the limited force of combat troops at his disposal the Base Commander decided on a strong defence of the

Airport and runways while establishing outposts which controlled the approach routes on the perimeter of Base No. 1 and Base No. 2. The Command Post in the event of hostilities would be located in the Airport Building together with an Ops Centre, UN Signal Centre and essential civilian administrative staffs. All non-essential civilians and all wives and children would be evacuated to LEOPOLDVILLE at the commencement of any hostile action. The main defence locations to be occupied by the combat troops of the Base were as follows:-

"A" Coy, 1 Inf Gp - Area of EPA Building  
 "B" Coy(-), 1 Inf Gp - Area of Airport  
 Swedish Coy - Area of Roundabout adjacent to Base  
 HQ extending to the LUPULA Barrier on  
 main KAMINAVILLE road.

In addition, a strong mobile reserve would be held out, capable of being quickly switched to any danger point. The necessary supplies of food, water, ammunition and POL were stockpiled at convenient points so that a siege of some 16 days could be endured. Though resources were limited, a commendable effort was made by the "Q" personnel at all levels and, with the exception of fresh food and extra mortar ammunition, arrangements seemed adequate for the task in hand.

28. KAMINAVILLE Patrols On 28 August "OP RUMFUNCH" commenced with the arrest and detention throughout KATANGA of the white mercenaries in TSHOMBE'S Army. Tension mounted throughout the province as the GENDARMES, now minus their white officers, took control and began to assert their new-found authority. In the neighbouring town of KAMINAVILLE the Base Commander organised nightly patrols in an effort to allay the fears of the local white population. These patrols, which commenced on 1 SEPTEMBER, were composed of two UN platoons which proceeded nightly to KAMINAVILLE and there married up with a GENDARME patrol, the combined force then doing a two-hour tour of the town in mixed formation. These patrols continued for twelve days and did much to relieve tension in the district and to maintain peaceful relations among all classes of the local populace. However, due to the overall situation in KATANGA, relations between UN and GENDARMES steadily deteriorated and anti-UN feeling soon became apparent in KAMINAVILLE where local agitators were busily at work. On receiving information that an ambush had been prepared on the KAMINAVILLE road for the IRISH troops, the Base Commander decided to discontinue the nightly patrols.

29. Detainees The camp for the detention of white mercenaries was established at Base No. 1 in close proximity to LUMWE Mess and afforded comfortable accommodation and modern amenities in what, formerly under the BELGIAN regime, had been single officers quarters. Instructions received from ONUC HQ laid down the standard of treatment to be given detainees and the privileges to which they were entitled - all in keeping with the terms of the GENEVA convention. Within a few days of the start of "OP RUMFUNCH" the Gp had close on 150 white mercenaries in the camp, and the camp Staff were kept working at full pressure to cope with all the problems which arose. Most of these problems were related to the plight in which the mercenaries now found themselves, the majority having been taken into custody by the UN without opportunity for packing kits, contacting relatives or putting their personal affairs in order. Every assistance was given them while in camp at KAMINA to settle these problems; letters were dispatched, clothes and necessaries were procured and in a few cases wives and children were given accommodation at Base No. 1. The LUMWE Mess was sufficiently large to enable portion of it to be set aside for use by the mercenaries and its facilities were made available to the detainees for meals and recreation up to 2000 hrs each evening.



Following interrogation by a UN team under Major WOODCOCK from the military information section of ONUC HQ, the nationality of the various mercenaries was determined and arrangements were made for their repatriation. By 9 SEPTEMBER many of the detainees from KAMINA were flown out by SABENA Boeing 707, but the majority remained at the Base up to the night of 14 SEPTEMBER.

30. Hostilities Commence Throughout early SEPTEMBER, tension continued to mount in KATANGA and anti-UN feeling was manifested in many ways, particularly in ELISABETHVILLE where demonstrations frequently occurred, culminating in open denunciation by RADIO KATANGA of UN action in the province. From intelligence received, the Base Commander was aware that an attack on KAMINA BASE was imminent from 12 SEPTEMBER onwards and troops were alerted accordingly. The problem at the time was to pin-point the direction of this attack, for in the vast expanse of bush and jungle surrounding the Base the GENDARMES had over 5,000 armed troops in outlying towns and villages capable of moving in on the Base from any compass point. As events proved, the decision to maintain strong outposts covering all approach routes paid dividends and enabled the Base Commander to employ his forces in a manner which suited their superior skill and training. On 14 SEPTEMBER, the GENDARMES from the KAMINAVILLE area, led by two white NCOs, launched an attack on Base No. 2 in the vicinity of the LUPULA Barrier at 1600 hrs. The attack was made at company strength, supported by SARACEN armoured cars and mortars, its apparent objective being to open up the main road to the Airport at Base No. 1. The area of the LUPULA Barrier was defended by a SWEDISH Platoon supported by an IRISH Anti-tank section (84 mm), and despite a mortar bombardment the attack was repulsed with losses to the GENDARMES of 20 dead and 50 wounded. The two leading armoured cars were put out of action by accurate 84 mm fire, causing the attack to lose momentum and scattering the attackers into hastily selected positions of cover from which they fired sporadically on the UN troops. Attempts to regroup were made throughout the remaining hours of daylight and several probing attacks were made in the area, all of which were repulsed by the mobile reserve ordered up by the Base Commander. This reserve did excellent work with accurate mortar fire and succeeded in denying any freedom of movement to the GENDARMES for the purpose of mounting a combined attack. Throughout the night of 14/15 SEP all UN troops remained on full alert and in the barrier area positions were improved.
31. At the commencement of the action the prepared plans for "OP RUMPUNCH" were smoothly put into effect and before darkness had fallen at 1800 hrs consolidated positions throughout the Base had been occupied, with Gp HQ located in the Airport Building. The initial mortar bombardment had damaged the Transmitter Station, but alternate communications to ONUC HQ were established by using the control tower radio facilities via LULUABOURG. All non-essential civilian UN employees and families were evacuated to LEOPOLDVILLE on outgoing aircraft and accommodation was provided in hangars for the CONGOLESE workers of the Base who flocked to the airport in their thousands seeking protection. Arming of mines on selected approach routes, the cutting of the railway line which ran from the RRR Supply Depot to the Airport and the blocking of culverts and bridges had all been completed by 2359 hrs and the KAMINA Garrison settled down to its task of defending the Base against the imminent attack by the GENDARMES in greater strength. A request to ONUC HQ for reinforcements was dispatched.
32. Efforts to penetrate the UN defences were renewed by the GENDARMES shortly after dawn on 15 SEP. Several probing attacks were repulsed at various points on the perimeter of the Base by the

prompt action of the mobile reserve which relentlessly harassed the attackers with accurately directed mortar fire. In one engagement in the area of the LUPULA Barrier a direct hit was scored on a GENDARME 3-ton truck carrying mortar and small arms ammunition. The resulting fire and explosions added further casualties and dead to those already sustained by the GENDARMES and so demoralised the CONGOLESE soldiers that NO further attempts at a concerted attack were made.

33. The FOUGA Jet During the ensuing week the GENDARMES continued to infiltrate in small numbers into the area of Base No. 2 but were ejected with casualties on each occasion. While NO casualties occurred among UN troops in the Base, some deaths did occur however among the civilian CONGOLESE workers who had congregated in the vicinity of the airport and were caught in the open when a KATANGA jet fighter attacked the Control Tower with cannon fire and shrapnel bombs. The first jet attack was made on 15 SEP at 1240 hrs with successive attacks on 16, 17 and 18 SEP, resulting in superficial damage to the Airport Building but causing NO interruption in signal communication as the bombing was NOT accurate. One UN DC4 plane was destroyed on the ground at the airport in one of the attacks, and the two UN pilots who were working on the plane at the time sustained injuries from machine gun fire.
34. KILUBI Evacuated On 16 SEP the powerline from the hydroelectric station at KILUBI was cut, leaving the Base without power or light. The Control Tower continued to function, as it was equipped with a generating plant for such emergencies. Intelligence reports indicated that the GENDARMES were planning an ambush for any party attempting to either repair the power line or relieve or reinforce the UN garrison at KILUBI. While a company of INDIAN UN troops of the JAT BN had arrived at KAMINA, the number of combat troops at the Base Commander's disposal was NOT sufficient to mount a strong fighting patrol for the purpose of relieving the KILUBI garrison and at the same time adequately defending KAMINA Base. Accordingly, a request to ONUC HQ to provide helicopters to lift the garrison from KILUBI was acceded to and two helicopters manned by SWEDISH pilots were made available to the Base Commander. Evacuation of KILUBI was commenced at 1830 hrs on 20 SEPTEMBER, and as each helicopter was capable of carrying only four men with their equipment and ammunition the task continued on through the night up to 0600 hrs the following morning. Credit is due to the SWEDISH pilots for completion of the evacuation without mishap or casualty. Once the lift got underway, they were fired on from GENDARME ground positions on numerous occasions but bravely continued the mission, using different approaches for each trip and thus denying the GENDARMES the opportunity of engaging them with concentrated fire.
35. The Cease-Fire Following negotiations with the KATANGA Government, ONUC HQ announced the terms of a cease-fire agreement with effect from midnight on 21 SEPTEMBER. This news was welcomed by the KAMINA Garrison but an air of sadness prevailed due to the accompanying announcement of the death of the UN Secretary-General DAG HAMMARSKJOLD, in a plane crash during the early hours of 18 SEPTEMBER. When the Cease-Fire became effective a period of discussion and negotiation followed between the Base Commander and UN team on one side and the CONGOLESE Officers of the GENDARMES on the other, resulting in an amicable settlement of problems on both sides. Despite these arrangements however, the KAMINA Garrison continued to improve defence of Base No 1 and Base No 2. The UN troops at the disposal of the Base Commander had been increased during the week of hostilities to include:-

One company SWEDISH BN ex EVILLE, strength 101 all ranks  
 Two companies JAT BN ex LEO, strength 232 " "  
 Half-Troop of 2 RECCE REGT MSF (MALAYA), strength 4 " "

These additional troops, together with the nationalities listed in paragraph 24 above, all played their part in helping the 1 Inf Gp defend KAMINA Base against attack and keep the Airport clear for UN operations.

36. Visit of Minister for External Affairs On 22 SEP at 1820 hrs the IRISH Minister for External Affairs arrived at KAMINA to visit the troops of 1 Inf Gp as part of his inspection of the IRISH Contingent in CONGO. His plane overshot the runway on landing but fortunately NO injury resulted. His visit did much to boost the morale of the IRISH who gave him a warm welcome and responded readily to his questions. The Minister made a tour of the IRISH positions and had a conference with OC 1 Inf Gp and his staff before departing for ELISABETHVILLE later in the night.

37. Move to NYUNZU On 10 Oct, further redeployment of the 1 Inf Gp was ordered by ONUC HQ, to take over from the GHANA Battalion which was being repatriated from the NYUNZU - NIEMBA area in northern KATANGA. Notice of 24 hours was given the Gp and by 12 Oct the Unit had flown out in relays to ALBERTVILLE and from there by train and plane to the new station. The same company of SWEDISH troops under Major LINDQUIST was placed under command to OC 1 Inf Gp who deployed his force as follows:-

- a. NYUNZU - Gp HQ and "B" Coy Gp.
- b. Airstrip (3 miles from NYUNZU) - "A" Coy Gp.
- c. NIEMBA (30 miles away) - SWEDISH Coy.

One of the Gp Officers remained at Bde HQ in ALBERTVILLE to act as Liaison Officer and arrange for supplies and equipment for the Unit.

38. Reminiscent of SOUTH KASAI, the Gp now found itself once more under canvas, without adequate water supplies and very short of transport. The outgoing GHANA troops had left behind only UN transport which consisted of 1 watertruck, 2 two-tonners and 1 jeep - the rest of their transport was of national origin and was taken away for repatriation. In an effort to keep the various posts and cook-houses supplied with water, it required the services of the watertruck during all daylight hours, plying back and forth between company locations and the town water pump.

39. NYUNZU The town of NYUNZU lay 100 miles to the EAST of ALBERTVILLE on the main railway line and was built around an area where several roads from the NORTH and WEST linked up. With a population of some 3,000 pro-Central Government CONGOLESE, in peace-time it had operated a modest cotton factory, small hospital and school, all of which now lay deserted and idle for want of BELGIAN administration and direction. The Gp Commander established close liaison with the local CONGOLESE administrator in the town on arrival, and very soon the school was re-opened and functioning, while impounded CONGOLESE commercial vehicles were released to enable the people meet the requirements of the cotton industry which provided a livelihood for the bulk of the population. Medical services were provided in the local hospital by the Gp

HISTORY "A" COY - 1st INFANTRY GROUP (IRISH)

CONGO : MAY - NOV 1961

1. IRELAND: Trng & Prelim

- (a) "A" Coy 1st Infantry Group was formed in late April 1961 for service in Congo with UN. Its personnel were mainly drawn from Eastern Command and A.H.Q. with specialists from CTC and Western Command. Some NCOs and men had previous service with 32nd and 33rd Bns. The Coy was concentrated in Cathal Brugha Bks at an early stage and preliminaries of documentation were carried out by Records Branch and staff from AHQ simultaneously with medical charting, inoculations and vaccination at St. Bricin's Hospital.
- (b) An intensive programme of training was carried out under the supervision of Operations Branch, Eastern Command, while our Q Staff received extra instruction on Field cooking from the Army School of Cookery. A complete course was re-run on cooking by hydra container which was to prove of great value to us in the months to come.
- (c) All personnel were fully fired in their personal weapons but it was not until a late stage that we were issued with 10 FN Rifles for training purposes. A crash course was run for Officers and NCOs by the Garrison Ord Coy and we were then able to issue the 10 rifles to each platoon for one half day each for training. The Coy O/C and 2i/c had fired the weapon some months previously and with the aid of two NCOs from the AOC Range practices were successfully completed. However, even with known good shots, it was found impossible to get anything other than very poor scores in the timed practice at the kneeling position. (3 fig tgts). With the permission of Trng Branch AHQ and Ops Branch Eastern Command, who luckily for us were on the ranges that day, we substituted the lying position for the kneeling position in this practice. This showed some improvement in the scoring and helped to restore our confidence in the weapon. A demonstration of the 84 mm was given to selected personnel in Glen Inaal and a full training programme was carried out. We were issued with the FN Rifle at Baldonnell Airdrome on the day we left for Congo.
- (d) DEPARTURE: The Coy having been "activated" on 24 May left Baldonnell (Casement) Airdrome in Chalks 1 to 4, commencing with Chalks 1 and 2 on Thursday 25th May 1961 at 2000 hrs. The Gp O/C Lt Col O'Donovan and GP HQ travelled on Chalk 1. Chalk 3 was delayed 24 hours in Wheelus while Chalk 4 was delayed 24 hours in Baldonnell. Chalks 1 and 2 arrived in Wheelus at dawn on Friday and were given an excellent reception (as were all of A Coy) by the U.S.A.F. We were also welcomed by the O/C Inniskillings (Col Blake from Galway). We were unlucky to walk into a dry hot dust storm (known locally as a "djibli" I believe). Our American hosts apologised for the weather and it was extremely trying for our troops who were experiencing their first taste of the tropics dressed in heavy woollen clothing. We arrived at Kano next (Saturday) morning at dawn and again experienced the hot sultry weather of the Southern Sahara. After 1 hr stop in Kano we flew on to Leopoldville where we were met on arrival at the Airport by the UN Forces Comdr Lt-Gen Seán Mac Eoin. We quickly moved to a transit camp where we were met by our advance party under Comdt P. Keogh and immediately issued with tropical uniforms - a very welcome change. We were again visited by the Forces

Comdr in our transit camp and that evening the Gp Comdr and the Coy 2i/c were brought into UN HQ by Col D. McCormack (Irish LO) for briefing.

(e) KAMINA

The leading elements of "A" Coy and Gp HQ arrived in Kamina on Sunday morning (28th) and were met by Lt Col E. O'Neill (O/C 34th Bn) and a party of officers and men of the 34th Bn. Chalk 3 arrived on Sunday night and Chalk 4 at 1000 hrs on Monday. During the next few days the officers of the Gp were briefed by Lt Col O'Neill and demonstrations of vehicle and riot drill were given by the 34th Bn party. Range practices were fired and the new weapons adjusted. As a result of a smallpox epidemic now raging in South Kasai an order was given that all men who had not been vaccinated within the previous 3 months would have to be re-vaccinated. 63 had to be re-vaccinated on 2.6.61. The Gp Comdr with the Gp Ops Officer and the 2i/cs of "A" and "B" Coys left for South Kasai on 31st May. The Coy 2i/cs remained there for briefing, recce, and preparation for the move-in by the Coys. The Forces Comdr again visited us in Kamina on 3.6.61 and inspected the unit. "A" Coy left Kamina at 1800 hrs on 8.6.61 and after an uneventful and pleasant journey by train reached Luputa at 1400 hrs next day where they found that Marquees had been erected, beds laid out and a meal prepared for them by the 1st Recce Sqdn (O/C Major Jack Dickson) Ghanaian Army, whom they were to relieve.

2. SOUTH KASAI

- (a) On arrival in Kasai the Coy took over Luputa and Kashia. Both of these posts were on the main Elizabethville-Port Franqui railway. Luputa was a fairly large town with railway sidings and a water tank. The business part of the town was now deserted entirely by the Europeans and normal trade was at a standstill. The only establishment working was the Post Office, but the Burgomaster and town council were functioning. The local garrison of Kalonji troops (A Coy) numbered about 200 and were under the command of Lt John Pierre. The local police under their Commissioner were sometimes in evidence. Up to the time of our arrival the atmosphere had been tense and it was only a relatively short time since the massacre of the Chanaian troops in Port Franqui. The complete disappearance of a Sgt and two troopers of the same recce sqdn had occurred only a few days prior to our leaving Ireland. Luputa was on the borders of Baluba (Kalonji) and Kanioka (Central Govt) territory and very few houses in the surrounding country had escaped the burnings carried out within the previous six months. In fact, within a radius of about 5 miles on all sides the inhabitants had withdrawn to Luputa itself, or scattered elsewhere. Our own Camp was about the size of a football pitch and on this we had 14 Marquees and one triple Marquee as dining-hall/cookhouse and we had one 3 roomed house. The camp was entirely surrounded by high barbed wire and diamond mesh wire to a height of about 8 ft. All troops were confined to this area at all times and left only on patrols of ab strong. Weapons were carried fully loaded at all times. had running water but it was unfit for drinking. We had electricity from the town plant until midnight.
- (b) Kashia was about 7 miles away to the East and was entirely Kanioka Territory. It was a Mission Station run by the "American Presbyterian Mission to Congo" whose home HQrs were in South Carolina. As well as the Mission they also ran an

experimental cattle farm under Mr. John Davis, and had a private airstrip and maintained a Cessna twin engine cabin aeroplane there. The strip could accommodate a DC3 with full load in an emergency. It was our contact with the outside world and UN planes landed there frequently. It had running water which was passed by our MO as drinkable after he had tested it. It also had flush toilets and we had the use of 3 houses and a large building for stores. It had its own electricity plant. It was in an excellent area for Radio and we established a link there which could contact Mwene-ditu with ease. The Ghanaians left a rear-echelon there to help us out with radio for some time until our own signals became familiar with the sets. We regarded Kashia as a rest camp and rotated a platoon plus MMG 84 and Mortar Secs there every two weeks. The total strength there was approx 50. Capt T. Hartigan was appointed O/C Kasnia from 10/6/61 until 7/7/61 when the Coy 2i/c took over and Capt Hartigan returned to Luputa.

- (c) Life in our area was reasonably uneventful. An odd alarm or excursion into the bush to look for missing persons or to calm a disturbed village served to enliven our days. We had a minimum of three train guards per week. These Guards lasted usually 20 hours but could stretch into two days while one Guard under Lt P. McMahon lasted for 4 days due to a breakdown of the engine. These guards joined the train at Luputa and carried on through Mwene-Ditu to a siding at Kele. Here the train met a down-coming train from Luluabourg which had a guard of Ghanaians. Train guards and crews swapped over at Kele and our own guard returned on the down train. Any breakdown on either train meant a delay. Baluba refugees were also arriving from Elizabethville by special train, and these had to be met by a road patrol at the Lubilash river on the Katanga border. The road patrol escorted the train to Luputa and a train patrol took over from there to Mwene-Ditu. This train patrol had then to wait for the normal train from Kele to return to Luputa. This meant that we could have nearly sixty men missing from Camp at the one time. We also did a minimum of one patrol to Kabwa each Thursday for a conference of the Kanioka Chieftains Grand Chef Malarji, Chief Kabanda and the local administrator Mr. Kazadi. Kabwa was 20 miles South of Luputa, but the route went through beautiful country. This patrol was very popular and all non-essentially employed personnel volunteered for it. Cooks, clerks MPC, Signals and about 10 men from Kashia with a sprinkling of even men resting off night guard went on these patrols. It was a very welcome change from the hot dry dusty camp at Luputa to the cool jungle which fringed most of the road to Kabwa. Kabwa was on high hilly ground and again had excellent radio reception so that we could keep in constant contact with Kashia and through to Luputa while we were there. Jacaranda trees were in full bloom and their petals in some places covered the road. Jungle fowl and brilliantly coloured birds were frequently seen but though it was supposed to be lion country we never saw any other type of wild life except for an odd lazy snake crossing the roadway, or the ever present lizards. Our greatest problem on these patrols was lack of transport. We had a pick-up truck in Kashia and a jeep and a 5 ton truck in Luputa. All 3 were used in the Kabwa patrols. The 5 ton truck was later abandoned beyond repair. At its best it could travel about 10 mph and it still bore the bullet holes in its body and cabin which it had got in ambushes prior to our arrival. It was not until 1.7.61 that we got 6 new jeeps and 2 new trucks from UN in Luluabourg. We also got a water trailer which meant we could now make one patrol to Kashia daily for water instead of the two patrols daily heretofore.

than in Mwene-Ditu because of the tactical situation in our area.

- (g) On 29.6.61 at about 1500 hrs the Molupwe Albert Kalonji visited our camp and inspected a Guard of Honour. He spoke to the townspeople giving high praise to the Irish Troops. He spoke of the history of the Irish people and their struggle for freedom for 800 years, their hatred of Communism, colonialism, and their Christian Faith. He ordered the people of his kingdom to co-operate with the Irish at all times. He later returned to our camp at 1900 hrs and stayed on until 2330 hrs. Next morning the Coy O/C and 2i/c with our interpreter Fausto Jerez (who spoke the native lingo fluently) went to Kashia and after consultation with the Gp O/C they went unescorted to a Missa Cantata and Te Deum at the local White Fathers Mission about 2 miles from Luputa. Seats had been reserved for them inside the High Altar beside the Molupwe on whose invitation they had come. This was the first Anniversary of Congolese Freedom. They had breakfast at the White Fathers Mission and returned to camp at 1030 hrs. About an hour afterwards they were asked to go to the village of KASANSA about 10 miles West of Luputa to collect a Kanioka Chieftain who wished to see the Molupwe. Coy O/C, 2i/c, Fausto and No 4 platoon went out accompanied by the Mayor of Luputa and a lorry of local dignatories. The journey was by a very poor unused road and the leading jeep had often to force its way through bushes and the elephant grass. When we arrived in the vicinity of Kasansa the road deteriorated into a bush covered pathway. There was still about 400 yards to go and the Coy O/C refused to escort the Mayor any further and also refused to allow any UN soldiers or any of the civilians to escort him. He pointed out to him that this was being done in order to ensure that there would be no question of using force or threats to bring in the Kanioka. However he did permit the 2i/c to escort him to the railway line which was about 200 yards North. This journey was all through Kanioka lands parallel to, and South of the railway but the village was actually North of the railway and so, technically in Kalonji territory. The Chieftain arrived back about 30 minutes later with the mayor and some of his own men. The Chief's name was Mamba Kiyere and we were to meet him again twelve days later about 40 miles eastwards of this in Lusuka. We brought him back with us after being assured by him that he was coming at his own request. The same patrol left for Kashia at 1400 hrs less the Coy O/C, to report to Gp O/C on the morning's events. While in Kashia Mr. John Davis reported that the Kaniokas were fleeing the village of KABI about 10 miles south. The patrols collected the MO and left immediately for there and found the report to be correct. The villagers were reassured and the patrol remained long enough to see household goods unpacked again. The MO Comdt. Jim Burke carried out a "sick parade" and treated the sick cases. This had always been his custom on patrols and had been responsible for much of the good-will with which we met on subsequent visits. The patrol arrived back at 1730 hrs and the Coy O/C, 2i/c and Fausto immediately left for the Town to deliver a letter from the UN Political Officer in Luluabourg to Kalonji. The Coy O/C and Fausto went in to meet Kalonji while the 2i/c stayed outside in the jeep. The letter was a bomb. Tempers flew, floors were stamped, shouts were heard. The Coy O/C pointed out that he was unaware of the contents of the letter which was personal to Kalonji. Mamba Kiyere was produced now nicely togged out in new European clothes. "Is this the way I kill Kaniokas?" asked Kalonji. The shouting could be heard on the roadway and the natives were becoming very uneasy. However Comdt McMahon through Fausto, persuaded

all and sundry that he was only the bearer of the letter and was not aware of its contents - nor did he ever become fully aware of what the contents were. Tempers cooled off and Kalonji apologised for the outburst. He invited the Coy O/C and 2i/c to his Capital at Bakwanga and repeated once more his appreciation of the good conduct and impartiality of the Irish troops. He left Luputa for Bakwanga at 1900 hrs. The Coy O/C and party returned to camp at 1830. Had we been aware of the explosive contents of the letter we certainly would not have gone out unescorted. Kalonji's personal bodyguard were very well dressed, appeared to be well drilled, knew their job and were armed with brand new Italian sub-machine guns. We had been asked by the Bde I.O. in Luluabourg to get the serial numbers of some of these weapons but although we offered to swap round guns "to get the feel of them" we failed. They were very zealous in their guarding of him and fell in on all sides of him immediately he came out of a building. When he entered a building they immediately doubled round and guarded all sides of it. Kalonji presented our troops with a cow before he left. We later received 4 calves instead of the cow and we eventually presented the 4 calves to the Burgomaster to be given to the people of Luputa.

- (h) Calm returned once more to the area and with the exception of the incident of the Commissioner of Police our only breaks from routine were visitors from UN. Lt Col Hollager (Norway) UN Food and hygiene expert visited us and was loud in his praise of the lay-out of our camp and especially the ingenuity of our cooks under Cpl Phelan. He saw bread being baked in ovens made from 40 gallon drums, mud, brick and 7lb tins. He tested the bread and declared it excellent. He stated that these were the best laid-out field kitchens he had seen in the Congo. Col D. McCormack (Irish LO) paid us a two-day visit and Dr. Yaroon WHO Chief for Kasai Province paid us a call. He is a citizen of Israel and he was very interested when he learned that our unit came from Dublin where Bob Briscoe was Lord Mayor at that time. Brigadier OTU (Ghana) visited us on the 11th July and during his visit we heard the first inkling of the trouble which was to become our biggest headache in South Kasai.
- (j) A Pan-Kanioka conference was scheduled to start in Kashia under UN protection and Brigadier OTU, Lt Col O'Donovan, and staff had come in on Tuesday, 11th July to arrange the preliminaries. While they were there we had sent out an escort with Mr. John Davies to visit a Mission cattle farm at Tchabobo about 10 miles East of Kashia. Mr. Davies reported that Kalonji troops had occupied the village. A patrol left as soon as possible under Comdt McMahon and found that this was correct. They went on to Lusuka (a further 15 miles) but they did not go any further because of the late hour. A stronger patrol with 2 plns of B Coy (Total 100) left next morning again under the Coy O/C for Lusuka. They found about 40 Kalonji soldiers in Tchabobo and about 80 more in Lusuka. Prior to this the Kalonji Army had confined itself to Luputa and Gandajika about 20 miles due North of Lusuka. There was no usable roadway between Gandajika and Lusuka except through Luputa and these troops must have detrucked about 10 miles North and marched in. They had no transport with them. They claimed that they were rightfully there since the railway line was the territorial boundary and both these villages were on the Railway Line. At this time we noticed a village burning south of the railway line and the 2i/c went to investigate. He found the village deserted but it was obvious that the fire had started accidentally or otherwise



at the railway line itself and had spread to the village, gradually widening out until it had reached the village, burned some houses and was now running its course through the bush to the South. The patrol pushed onwards to the East and finally stopped at the Lubilash river on the Katanga border. Everywhere they went they met terrorised villagers who implored them to remain behind to protect them. The patrol returned to Lusuka and they met the newly elected Burgomaster of Lusuka. The Kalongi Adjutant i/c troops there pointed out that this man was freely elected by the people of the village and had appealed to them for help. He appeared to be totally unaware of the fact that the Burgomaster was not a native of the village and although he, like the other villagers, was a Kanioka, he was our old acquaintance from Kasansa, Mamba Kiyere. Some election that!! Having warned the Kalongi troops to keep strictly north of the railway the patrol returned shortly after dark. On Thursday the same patrol returned to Lusuka and delivered an ultimatum. "Return to Gandajika by 1400 hrs on Friday or be driven back". Late that Thursday night we were instructed that the ultimatum had been lifted indefinitely because Kalongi had gone to Leopoldville to negotiate with the Central Government. In the meantime the Kashia garrison had set up a complete blockade of the Railway and the road in the area to prevent supplies being brought in to the Kalongi troops. On Friday a patrol under Capts McDonald and Ryan went down to Lusuka and thus escorted a limited lorryload of foodstuffs to the Kalongists. The lorry returned with the patrol and also brought back 40 Kalongi troops from Tehabobo. On Saturday Brigadier OTU arrived with Major Jack Dickson (B.A., seconded to Ghana) and Mr. Caballero UN Political Officer, by helicopter, to attend the Pan-Kanicka conference and get a first-hand account of the Lusuka affair. A platoon of "B" Coy under Lt. W. Phillips arrived from Mwene-Ditu to supplement the garrison in Kashia and camp defences were strengthened. On Monday 17th a patrol 50 strong left Kashia for Lusuka under the 2 i/c. Their mission was to secure the railway for the first contingent of the Nigerian Brigade who were coming from Kamina to Luluabourg to take over from the Ghana Brigade. When the patrol, accompanied this time by a Kalongi Officer from Mwene-Ditu, arrived at Lusuka they explained their mission to the O/c Lusuka. They insisted that he remove all his troops from the vicinity of the railway. After a lengthy discussion this was agreed to and our patrol then proceeded to set up posts overlooking both sides of the railway. At this stage a Kalongi Sergeant arrived and in a most insulting manner and in complete defiance of his own Officers demanded that the UN troops withdraw immediately from Lusuka or he would order his own platoon to open fire. The 2i/c called up Ptes Keegan and Cramp (both later promoted A/Cpls) and informed the Sgt through Fausto that he himself would be the first person to be shot if he gave an order to fire. His own Officers fully agreed to this, disarmed him, and ordered him to stay in full sight of us at all times. This ended any opposition and by the time the Nigerian Bde HQ came into the station the only Kalongis left there were two Officers who remained to be introduced to them. The patrol escorted the train (the roadway ran parallel to the railway) to Luputa. We parted on friendly terms with the Kalongi troops and their Officers apologised again and again over the conduct of the Sergeant who was now under arrest and escorted by two armed men.

(k) In the meantime the Pan-Kanioka conference was in progress in Kashia. Chiefs were arriving at all hours, complete with litter bearers, cymbal clangers, bell ringers, fan wavers. To add to the confusion, refugees were crowding into the mission. On Friday two truckloads of refugee food arrived. This was rationed out by the garrison. The refugees were our biggest problem. They had to be re-assured, fed, and sent South. Since our camp was in the centre of the mission, without any definite perimeter, and the conference was being held in the centre of the camp, most of our days were spent keeping refugees out of our camp. At night time our patrols had to literally step over hundreds of sleeping men, women and children. Since we could not now afford the luxury of resting off night duty, all Officers and senior NCOs had to take a two hour turn at night patrol. We strongly suspected that the "Lusuka Affair" was an attempt to disrupt the Pan Kanioka Conference since it was obvious that the Kalongi troops could not hold the area and our blockade had effectively proved that we could starve them out in a very short time.

(1) We started a routine change-over with "B" Coy also on that Monday (17th). The change-over was completed by Wednesday when the 2 i/c reached Mwene-Ditu about an hour after dark with the rear echelon. Lt P. McMahon was left with his platoon in Kashia because of the situation there. On Thursday 20th we received orders to take over Kele from the Ghanaians and Lt Mc Mahon's Pln was withdrawn from Kashia on Friday while Lt Tom McGraths Pln with support elements went to Kele by train at 2200 hrs on arrival of Lt McMahon and his pln. Capt T. Hartigan was appointed o/c Kele, while the 2i/c's "A" and "B" Coys and Capt Dawson left by air with advance elements for Kamina to take over there from Nigerians (3rd Queens Own whose O/C was Lt Col Kavanagh from Borris). We were relieved at Kele on Monday 24th and Lt McGraths party after a long and weary journey arrived in Kamina at 1400 hrs on Wednesday 26th. The remainder of A Coy remained in Mwene-Ditu waiting to be relieved by the Nigerians. We were later informed that we were not being relieved and that South Kasai was being evacuated by UN. We were given the job of taking over the lorries and equipment of the W.H.O who were also pulling out. This was done and we were joined by Lt Elythe and his platoon from Luputa on Thurs 3.8.61. They brought all the stores and transport from Kashia and Luputa with them so that we were now chock-a-block in our camp here. Lt Col O'Donovan and the remainder of Gp HQ flew to Kamina next day leaving Comdt Keogh behind with us. The picture changed so much in the interim that Comdt Keogh had to fly to Kamina on Saturday to put the Gp O/C into the picture. On Sunday we were informed that a special train had been arranged for us and was on its way from Luluabourg. On Monday we were informed that our train had arrived in Kele and we evacuated to the railway station. We were then instructed to send an escort to Kele to meet the train. When the escort reached Kele they found that the train had not yet arrived and they had to spend the night in the station while the remainder of the company had to do likewise in Mwene Ditu. The escort eventually left Kele at 0730 hrs next morning with the train and we spent the day loading. We were on our way by that night. Before we left Mwene Ditu we were met by the Secretary to the Minister of the Interior of South Kasai who carried a message from Kalonji's Government. I quote the message.

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"The Government and People of South Kasai lament the departure of their Irish Garrison. They thank the Irish Army for the unselfish way they performed a very difficult task. The Irish came to an area in which war and famine raged and where people lived in constant fear. They leave a land in which peace reigns. The Government and People of South Kasai wish to thank the Government and People of Ireland for their kindness and generosity to them for allowing their Army into an area where conditions for white troops were extremely difficult. They wish this message to be conveyed to His Excellency, The President of Ireland".

Speeches were made by local dignitaries and by members of the local garrison. They sent their warmest greetings to the remainder of the Group and assured us that we would be welcomed back at any time. Comdt McMahon replied and thanked them for the help and cooperation which we had received from all officials in the area. He mentioned in particular Capt Etienne and Lt Jean Pierre whose personal bravery and coolheadedness had calmed many a situation which could have given rise to misunderstandings. We learned later that Capt Etienne had been promoted to Lt Col shortly after we left the area.

Darkness had fallen when we pulled out of Mwene-Ditu and after travelling about twenty miles the train broke down. After the crew had made repeated futile attempts to get going, Sgm Charlie Hurley left with a small escort to search for a telephone line. Having found it he climbed a pole and hooked up his handset. He got Luputa railway station at the first attempt and contacted the Station Master. He was our old friend "M'sieu Albert" and he immediately backed out an engine from Luputa and came to our rescue. He arrived shortly after dawn. In the meantime back in Kamina there was no news of us since we could not make radio contact. The Coy 2i/c was instructed to fly along the railway line, inspect it at low level for possible damage, and contact us. He arrived after we had crossed the Luilu river midway between Mwene Ditu and Luputa. We had again broken down and his plane circled us just overhead until we had got going again. When we arrived at Luputa M'sieu Albert worked wonders with our engines. We had about sixty flatcars loaded with stores of every description, including nearly 40 vehicles. Eventually towards evening we were ready to move on again. We were sent off by all the local dignitaries who made very formal speeches to "their friends, the Irish". We arrived at Kashia in the gathering darkness and the entire population appeared to be gathered at the railway line. They cheered us as we steamed slowly through. We were met at Lusuka by Kalonji troops and in the darkness of the railway station a very formal speech was delivered by an Officer from Bakwanga. He informed us that he had been specially sent direct from the Capital to ensure our safe passage. As we crossed the Lubilash river into Katanga we got "Dateline Dublin" loud and clear. The programme that night was devoted entirely to the men of "A" Coy and it was a very welcome boost to us. We made very good time from then on and were about 40 miles from Kamina when we were met once more by our recon plane. This time it carried the Gp O/C as well as the Coy 2i/c. They circled us until we were in Kaminaville. We had run out of drinking water that morning but had salvaged some water for washing. Each man spruced up and changed into a clean uniform before we pulled into Kamina. We arrived at 1600 hrs on Thursday 10th August. Once more we pay tribute to our catering staff who supplied us with hot meals throughout this long and frustrating journey.

3. KAMINA

By the time we reached Kamina "B" Coy had settled in and were running the Base. Comdt Hayes had been appointed C.O. Base I and his Coy were in occupation of the Airport Buildings while "A" Coy were in occupation of the E.P.A. "A" Coy took over the running of the Officers Mess and sent Lt McGrath and his platoon to Base II. Lt Col O'Donovan, in the meantime was Base Commander and O/C of sector "C" of Katanga which included Kilubi power dam, Kaniama, and North West Katanga to the borders of South Kasai. Capt McDonald was appointed Welfare Officer and we supplied key personnel to the various offices and installations throughout the Base. Capt Hartigan was appointed Logs Officer for the Base and Capt Ryan, Mess Manager. The Coy settled down to training and re-fitting. We worked each day to 1300 hours and the afternoons were devoted to recreational training. It was good to enjoy the luxury of baths, buildings and swimming pools after our spartan existence for two months in South Kasai. Inter Coy matches were played and we were beaten 2-nil by the local soccer team, the Kaminaville Dynamos. The Force Commander Lt-Gen S. McKeown visited us on 12th August and we received visits from Lt Col McNamee O/C 35th Bn, and on 16th from Lt Comdr Brunicardi the Irish L.O. in Leopoldville. Duties were light and life was pleasant. We changed round platoons with Base 2, Lt Tony Murphy's pln going there. "B" Coy sent a pln plus to garrison Kilubi on the 21st August and they took Comdt Jim Burke, our M.O. with them. We were warned to change over with them in three weeks. Our ordnance and stores were checked, cleaned, and polished and Comdt T. Moynihan A.O.C. and Subidar Major Ickball of the Pakistani Army arrived to carry out a Board of Survey. We were, in fact, starting to tick off the days remaining until we went home. All local dignitaries and all civilians in the base were invited to an entertainment in the Officers Mess. From the 10th to the 27th August life was as we felt it should be.

4. RUMPUNCH

On 27th August the Force Commander Mr. Khiary and a staff of Military and civilians visited the Base. That night Belgian and a French mercenary officer were delivered into our custody and were lodged under guard in the Batchelors' Quarters beside the Church in Lumwe Base I. Next morning at 5 a.m. "Rumpunch" proper commenced. All that day plane loads of mercenaries arrived at the airport and were placed in the same detention area enclosed by barbed wire and sentries. By that night over 100 detainees were held and next day we had a spill-over who were guarded by the Swedes in the Technical Schools. Capt Hartigan was appointed O/C detainees with Lt McGrath 2i/c. Duties for the whole group became very heavy. Each day the group had to find 93 on duty, 93 resting, 53 in Kilubi and from 2nd September onwards, 25 on nightly patrol to Kaminaville. "A" Coy sent the first patrol in that night. It consisted of 2 Officers and 23 ORs under 2i/c A Coy. It also had a Swedish party of about 20 u/c. They left at 1800 hrs, joined a Gendarme patrol at the edge of the town (The Welcome Inn) and did a joint patrol through the town for some time, visiting all streets and back streets. Everything appeared to be calm and peaceful. The patrol returned to camp at 2230 hrs having covered a distance of nearly 100 miles. This patrol was carried out nightly for over a week, alternating each night with "B" Coy. In the meantime, the Base was extremely busy. Officials were flying in at all times to interview the mercenaries. More detainees were arriving daily while those already held were being repatriated with their wives and families. Some of them were on the wanted list of many nations. Interpol had a representative with us and we had visits from Consular officials who were looking after the interests of their own nationalities. One of these was the British Vice-Consul (Shades of

Casement). While he was there we had a most violent sand storm. Palm trees were bent almost to the horizontal. He remarked that he had never seen anything like it in all his time in Africa. And yet, the whole thing lasted only about an hour. We were soon to become embroiled in a different storm which was to last considerably longer.

5. MORTHOR

- (a) On the night of 12th September 1961 we were given orders to stand-to. All that night the Officers and senior NCOs with some selected men checked, packed and re-checked our weapons and ammunition and laid in stocks of food and water. We were allotted a sector of defence from the Technical Schools (excl) where we tied in with the Swedes, to the old post office on the main road about 1 mile North of the E.P.A. to the Officers Mess at Lumwe, and thence back to the E.P.A. Bldgs which was our main line. The line was occupied before dawn on the 13th. Patrols were also sent at this time to Base 2. Lt McMahon's pln did this patrol which was co-ordinated by 2i/c as the pln was broken up into small parties. Nothing unusual occurred and the patrol withdrew at 0830 hrs. At the same time the Coy also stood down from their defence area leaving small standing patrols in position. Road Blocks were set up to prevent any sudden mobile forces breaking through to our area and these were covered off by M.M.G. crews. That afternoon a UN DC4 circled the Airport for over an hour before it finally crash landed. Its undercarriage had been damaged by SA fire over Elizabethville. All occupants were unharmed. On that night we sent patrols to Base II and having patrolled all night they were relieved by the Swedes at 0515 hrs.
- (b) The Coy occupied their positions on the morning of 14th Sept at 0420 hrs. By this time we had reports of the fighting in Elizabethville and were fully prepared for a dawn attack on Kamina. Nothing happened however and the coy stood down at 0900 hrs again leaving their standing patrols in position. Nothing happened during the day and at approx 1630 hrs we received word that an attack had been made on the barrier (Kaminaville Road) which at this time was occupied by 27 Swedish troops. The Coy O/C and 2i/c with an escort of 2 men went by jeep to the vicinity of the barrier where they got first-hand news of the attack. The attack was still in progress and they were unable to proceed any further. They returned to the E.P.A. Bldg where they briefed the "O" gp. That night Lts McMahon and Minihan with a Rifle and Mortar Pln reported to the Roundabout. Lt Minihan was held there and Lt McMahon's pln were brought up to the barrier area under cover of darkness. During the afternoon and that night congolese refugees started to come through our defence lines in large numbers. They were all directed to the Airport Buildings.
- (c) 15th Sept The Coy occupied their positions before dawn but now in a sadly depleted condition. Two of our platoons, (Lts McGrath and McMahon) having gone to Base II and the Barrier the previous night while most of our Mortars and Lt Minihan were also under command to the Swedish company at the Barrier. We received the welcome news at 0645 hrs that 100 Swedish reinforcements had flown in by plane and were on their way to Base II. Lt McGrath's platoon were now split up. Lt McGrath with half of his platoon was sent to the vicinity of the RRR where they were posted to guard a bridge at a place called KIBPI on the Kilubi Road. A section of Swedish engineers arrived there at dawn under the Gp I.O. with the intention of blowing up the bridge. However they found that an

electric pylon was in the immediate vicinity and blowing the bridge would endanger the electricity supply to Kamina. They finally compromised by disabling a Bedford truck and leaving it across the bridge as a roadblock. With the arrival of the Swedish reinforcements Lt McGrath was relieved and returned to the Coy at 1240 hrs. In the meantime Sgt Seymour with the other half of the platoon was stationed about 4 miles away on the other side of Base II. They were left to guard the vicinity of the Farm area. Their strength was 1 Sgt, 2 Cpls and 9 men. They took up positions at 2130 hrs on 14th Sept under cover of darkness. Their orders were to prevent infiltration into the Base. They were positioned by a Swedish Major whose instructions prior to his leaving, were that they were to make their way back to the roundabout in the event of a heavy attack. They were visited next morning at dawn by the Swedish Major and at 0630 hrs by the Coy QM, Capt McDonald. During the night there were no occurrences and all appeared quiet. Suddenly and without any warning they came under heavy fire from the bush. This was at 0810 hrs. They returned the fire for some time. Shortly afterwards they found that three of their F.N. weapons began to jam due to the heavy clouds of fine dust thrown up by the discharge. They moved the Bren team to the left flank and managed to pin down the frontal fire from the bush. After about 30 minutes the Bren gun came under heavy fire from the left and rear. The enemy (about 50 strong) had now occupied buildings in the Base itself, and had cut off their retreat to the roundabout. It was now about 0930 hrs and Sgt Seymour decided to organise a withdrawal through the bush itself. A Swedish driver was with them and he was familiar with the terrain. With him as their guide they made their way, still harassed by fire, by bounds to the UN HQ at Base II and thence to the roundabout. They arrived there at approx 1100 hrs from whence they were sent by truck to the E.P.A. Building. There were no casualties but they were physically exhausted. In all they expended 600 rds in the action. Nothing happened at the Barrier and at 0830 half of Lt McMahan's platoon were stood down. Sgt Mooney and Cpls Roche and Pierce were left with 9 men as the Swedes lacked long range guns. Quite suddenly at 0900 an attack was made on the Barrier. This attack was pushed ahead and wave after wave of the attack was broken up by long range fire and very accurate mortar fire from Lt Minihan's mortars. The attack broke up after slightly over an hour and no further attacks were made that day. A truck had been abandoned by the enemy in no-man's-land and towards evening it was noticed that they were making an attempt to retrieve it. Lt Minihan was ordered to prevent this and his platoon brought mortars to bear on it at a range of 550 yards. They scored a direct hit with their third bomb and the truck exploded destroying its contents of ammo.

Because of the heavy demands made on the Coy it was decided to re-organise its main line of defence. With our depleted strength we were too thin to hold the extended area and it was decided to draw back into a smaller area around the E.P.A. This was agreed to by the Base Commander Lt Col O'Donovan, and our new area was organised and occupied by 1130 hrs. Shortly afterwards at about 1230 hrs we were disagreeably surprised by the first attack from the Fouja jet. He attacked the Airport buildings by bomb and cannon and then swung off towards our lines. Sgt Barnes and his M.M.G. section went immediately into action preparatory to engaging him from the E.P.A. Balcony, but he flew low over the roadway between us and the Technical Schools. The Coy 2i/c prevented the guns from opening up as they would be firing directly at the defence area of the Swedes at the Technical Schools. The jet

flew in a circle and machinegunned the area around the Officers Mess at Lumwe but was out of our range at this time. By that night our company was almost complete with the exception of Lt Minihan's platoon and Sgt Monney's section who were at the Barrier. At 2000 hrs we received orders to retake Base II and Lt Murphy's platoon with an 84 mm sec were detailed for this task. Lt O'Donnell and a Mortar Sec from "B" Coy were u/c to this platoon.

16th Sept The counter attack on Base II commenced at 0615 hrs. The platoon searched the area of the Hospital and UN HQ but found that the enemy had retreated into the bush. The patrol was led by 2 Malayan Ferret cars which had landed in the Base some time previously. They then came into Base II proper and were ambushed and came under heavy S.A. and mortar fire, when they had come to about 100 yards from the Church. At the roadway to the Farm confusion reigned for some time but eventually with the help of Sgt Harbison on the left flank and Sgt Costelloe on the right flank the platoon was got into a sound defensive position. The enemy put in an attack on the left flank and then on the right flank. An attempt was made to contact the Malaysians but they had retreated out of range of the 31 set. Before the platoon was got into position Lt Murphy and Sgt Costelloe had to expose themselves for some time and give covering fire to the men. At this stage pte Keenan (Air Corps) (later promoted A/Cpl) came up with a Bren gun and with complete disregard for his own personal safety, mounted his gun in an exposed position and pinned down the enemy and prevented them from firing. Again, the bogey of clogging rifles struck us. In all, 9 Rifles jammed. A message was sent to Coy HQ for rifles, ammo and a replacement for our 84 mm. Weapons were tested and adjusted within minutes by the coy 2i/c and sent on with ammo and the 84. This relieved the situation and left the pln in a position to counter-attack. Lt O'Donnell's mortars were bringing down accurate fire on the enemy position and we had recieved/ of a Swedish Gustaf Section plus a Swedish 84 and MMG Section. The Swedish troops guarded the right flank but the disappearance of the Malaysians left the left flank exposed. Despite this the pln vigorously counter-attacked and with the aid of Lt O'Donnell's mortars and their own and the Swedish "84" they drove the enemy from the Base. The action lasted 3½ hours from the time of the ambush. A Swedish patrol went forward and collected a number of enemy weapons. They reported that they found 4 enemy dead in the area but there were indications from blood etc., that a large number of the enemy were wounded. It was estimated that there were 60 enemy engaged in the action. Despite the fact that the buildings in the area were peppered with S.A. shots from ranges within 50 and that a considerable number of mortar bombs had fallen in the area we had no casualties. The platoon was relieved from the area at 1800 hrs.

Sgt Mooney and his section had come under heavy attack at the Barrier where they were under Command to the Swedes. They had been in position since 0530 hrs on the 15th. In all, five attacks were made on the Barrier on the 16th but each attack was broken up by long-range weapons (as opposed to Gustaf range) and Mortar fire from Lt Minihan's platoon. So accurate was the mortar fire that the greatest number of bombs dropped on any attack was six. The enemy set up a Browning M.M.G. at long range on the left flank and brought flanking fire to bear on the Barrier. Cpl McCabe's mortar section engaged them and their fifth bomb landed directly on the gun and killed all the crew. This seemed to take the steam out of the Gendarmerie and their attacks from then onwards took the form of long range

reinforcements/

unexposed fire from the bush. The position was constantly harrassed by enemy mortar fire but this was very inaccurate. Sgt Mooney's section was relieved at 1900 hrs.

17 Sept At 0230 Lt McGrath's platoon was sent to the Barrier with an M.M.G. section. They remained there until 2030 hrs. During the day they were subjected to intermittent long range S.A. and mortar fire but no enemy were to be seen. The M.M.G. sec replied by sweeping the area with indirect fire, and the mortars fired on likely enemy assembly areas.

18 Sept Further reinforcements arrived with the leading elements of the JAT Indian Battalion. These took over most of the heavy duties previously done by our Coy. It was decided to evacuate all stores from Base II and Lt McMahon and his platoon were detailed to carry out this under the supervision of Comdt Moynihan A.O.C. They worked throughout the day and although they had a few alarms they never came into direct contact with the enemy.

Early that morning Capts Ryan and McDonald received permission to set up Vickers M.M.Gs as A.A. guns. Both were trained A.A. Artillery Officers. They set up their guns but the jet came in that morning almost directly overhead of them. The usual happened when the Vickers Guns tried to fire at too high an angle, they jammed. They did however manage to direct one stream of tracers towards his plane. It would appear that they had the desired effect because he was completely wide of his target that morning his bomb falling wide of, and the Hangars about 1,000 yards from the Control Tower. He departed without his usual cannonade and flew in the direction of Kaminaville. He passed low over the Barrier and the Swedes opened up on him there. It was later claimed that black smoke came from his engine during this second encounter. Later that day Tshombe announced that he had grounded the jet - in order not to prejudice his talks with UN officials. Maybe his pilot had had enough.

19 Sept This was a quiet and restful day. Lt McMahon's platoon continued with Comdt Moynihan and Subidar Major Ikbal (Pakistan) to evacuate Base II. The Jat Bn had now established their HQ at the Water plant and taken over from the Swedes at Base II. The previous night they had kept up harrassing fire from their heavy armament on likely enemy areas, and there was no trace to be seen of any enemy or any enemy fire on this day. That night at 2100 hrs we received word that heavy enemy reinforcements about 20 lorryloads were seen by air recce moving from the Jadotville direction towards Kamina. A strong patrol was called for by the Gp Commander. The Coy Comdr and 2i/c were briefed by the Gp Ops Officer Comdt Keogh and the Gp I.O. Capt Mulvihill. A patrol of 2 platoons plus Mortars, 84 and M.M.Gs was organised and briefed by the Coy O/C and left the Coy area. The patrol was under the control of the Coy 2i/c and Lts Minihan and Murphy. They went through "B" Coy area where they were joined by the I.O. He set up a listening and watching patrol on top of the Water tower at the edge of Base 1 and the patrol continued onwards with a dismounted platoon leading to a likely ambush area which had already been chosen. No incidents occurred and when they reached the area they found no difficulty in getting into position. Weapon pits had already been dug there by the 34th Bn. They were in constant contact with Coy HQ and Gp HQ by Radio, and after remaining there for a short period they were ordered back by the Gp O/C. Capt Charlie Garneau of the Canadian Signals had intercepted frantic radio messages from



BUKAMA where the Gendarmerie were being overrun by the Balubas. Bukama was on the direct route from Jadotville. This would appear to put paid to any attack on Kamina that night. Helicopters had landed on the Base and were flying directly over the patrol area on their way to Kilubi where they were evacuating the 60 men of "B" Coy, and the Swedish helicopter crews could see no trace of these reinforcements. The Patrol returned to base at 2300 hrs where they slept in their clothes, ready at a moment's notice to go out once more if the threat materialised.

20th Sept Lt McGrath's platoon plus support weapons left for "Gun Hill". This overlooked a bridge on the Kolwezi road (past the Officers Mess at Lumwe) on the edge of the jungle area at the base perimeter. The bridge was blown and anti-personnel mines were sown. Some days later after peace had been declared Comdt Moynihan went out to inspect the minefield which he had sown. Imagine his consternation when he found the area criss-crossed with marks of bicycles these were made by civilian employees who were once more, back at work in the base. How the natives had escaped the mines is another of those unexplained mysteries. Some of the tyre marks passed within inches of the mines. That night we received word at 2045 hrs that a cease-fire was effective from midnight. Messages were conveyed to all units coy 2i/c being used to carry the written message to the Jat Bn. While some people expressed their disappointment at the news the general feeling was one of relief, especially when we now knew that the cease fire meant greater hope for the safe delivery of the 150 Irish who had been deceived into capture in Jadotville. The Coy M.O. Comdt Jim Burke who had been with the garrison in Kilubi was evacuated to Hospital in Leo, suffering from Diabetic shock.

21st Sept to 12 Oct 61 The arrival of the cease-fire lessened the strain and the tension of the previous weeks but did not ease the volume of work. We still had to occupy "Gun Hill" with a platoon plus, and some hours after the cease fire the Gendarmerie tried to occupy the Farm area and the lower end of Base II. They were quickly pushed out by Lt Col O'Donovan but this coy had then to occupy this area also with a platoon as well as occupying Gun Hill. Both of these platoons plus numbered about 40 men and had to have about 50% on duty at all times. We changed round personnel as often as we could but the best we could do was to keep men on a "24 on 24 off" basis. We also had to keep our guards on the E.P.A. up to full strength. The Jat Battalion was by no means up to full strength and the terms of the cease fire prevented any more reinforcements moving in. However the greatest source of complaint heard among the men at this time was the total lack of news coverage by the Irish newspapers. As far as they were concerned the Group did not exist. One newspaper published photographs of our destroyed Saracens but attributed them to the 35th Bn in Elizabethville. As far as the people at home were concerned, Kamina was still "overrun". We had a pleasant surprise on 22nd Sept when we were visited by our Minister for External Affairs, Mr. Frank Aiken. The visit very nearly started as a tragic one because his plane overshot the runway and was damaged when it crashed into the rain channel at the end of the runway. However all ended happily and nobody was injured. He visited most of our outposts and was entertained to dinner at the Airport that night by the Gp Commander. He left at 2015 hrs in another UN plane. This plane was a cargo plane and was still reeking with the smell of mixed cargo. We hoped Mr. Aiken would not have too unpleasant a journey. We learned later that even this plane

did not have an uneventful journey. It arrived in Leo with 2 of its four engines not working.

Col Quinn, Chief of Staff, arrived on 29th September for a discussion and it was planned that we might go to Elizabethville to marry up with the 35th Bn in the event of further hostilities breaking out. This news came as a definite morale booster. After being in the Congo for four months without seeing a town, even a war in Elizabethville was more desirable than a war in the jungle. Rumour followed rumour and hopes were high that we would see some signs of civilization before we left for home. Warning orders were issued on 2nd October to move to an unspecified place. It was presumed that this was Elizabethville or possibly Leo. The Group M.O. had written requesting a move on medical grounds. Nothing happened until 1800 hrs on the 9th October. At that time we were warned to move next day to Northern Katanga to take over from the Ghanaians. We were told at first that we were going to NIEMBA. This was later changed and the Swedish Coy who were with us in Kamina were detailed to go to Niemba while the group were to take over NYUNZU about 60 miles west of Niemba. The first elements of the group were to fly out next morning at 0900 with "B" Coy leading. Most of the night was spent packing and reconditioning for this most unwelcome detail. We were to leave all unessential personal baggage behind in Kamina where it would be locked in the Airport. Capt Hartigan was to stay behind in Kamina with the baggage, with one or two men. After a series of false starts due to breakdowns and non-arrival of planes the coy eventually left on Thursday 12th at 0930 hrs. On arrival at Albertville a platoon left immediately by D.C.2 for Nyunzu. The remainder of the Coy were to travel on by train next day. No arrangements had been made for our overnight stay and we had to sleep that night in railway trucks and under the verandah at the railway station.

13th Oct to Fri 10th Nov The Coy (less 1 pln) travelled by train next morning at 0800 and after a pleasant 5 hour journey through hilly country, heavily wooded and rather reminiscent of Glen Malure we arrived at Nyunzu where "B" Coy were already installed. We took over the area of the Airstrip West of Nyunzu. We were divided from the remainder of the group by about 3 miles but were in radio and landline contact with Gp H.Q. Our mission was to guard the Airstrip, which had been hacked out of the jungle, and the Niemba approach to the Town. We detached a platoon under command to "B" Coy and this platoon took over the Kangolc barrier which guarded the northern approach to the town. Duties were heavy with the loss of this platoon and as we had over 40 men on guard daily there was not much time for any activities other than those of a purely military nature. The group, about 350 strong had taken over from a Ghana Battalion and a Ghana Recce Squadron. Our group had now to do the same work as over 1,000 had done previously. Since we could not hope to hold the same perimeter we had relocated all, or most of, the defence posts in our area. This meant a considerable amount of hard physical labour. The rainy season was also upon us and our canvas after 4½ months of continual use was porous. We had no DDT fogging machines and flies swarmed over everything. Very shortly after we arrived most of the Coy were suffering from dysentery. We could not afford the luxury of "going sick" and even those who were under treatment had to do guard duties. Sentries were always in pairs so that even a sick

man could carry on. Morale was good however and an odd patrol served to enliven the monotony. The Coy 2i/c Comdt Quinlan (he had been promoted on 11th Sept) was appointed O/C of the Tshombe prisoners held by us. We now had the rather peculiar distinction of having a Comdt Pat Quinlan from Kerry and 150 men held as prisoners by Tshombe since Jadotville and we now also had a Comdt Mick Quinlan from Kerry in charge of approx 150 of Tshombe's forces. Comdt Quinlan's appointment was effective from the day after we arrived in Nyunzu. Since we now guarded the airstrip we were the first to greet all arrivals at Nyunzu. We also had a problem with these planes. Since the airstrip was sandy and was now waterlogged with the rains, we often had to dig out the wheels of planes which had sunk into the sand. This meant hard work dragging them out by rope, but this hard work was cheerfully done by the men - it was a break in the monotony and we never lacked volunteers for the work. Two attempts had to be made to exchange the prisoners and a delegation arrived through us on each occasion. The second attempt which was on 26th Oct, was successful. Our platoon was directly concerned on 29th Oct when 500 of Tshombe's troops attempted to enter the town through the Kongolo Barrier. Again on the next day about 100 of them attempted to pass the barrier. On each occasion they got short shift from Lt Col O'Donovan and were sent back to Kongolo. The group Comdr decided to erect a cross at the site of the Niembra ambush and Sgt McLoughlin was given the job of casting the cross and Pte Appleby did the carving and lettering on it. We did a joint patrol with "B" Coy to the site on 5th Nov when the cross was erected and Mass offered by Fr. McCable on the spot. We arrived back in Camp shortly after dark. Dr. Conor Cruise O'Brien and Brigadier Rajah arrived to visit us with a party of UN officials on Wednesday 1st November. A conference was held in Gp HQRS, at which Comdt McMahon was present. The following was tentatively decided. Prisoners to go by train to Albertville on Saturday 4th. Group to return to Kamina on 7th November and go home on 10th November.

"C" Coy 35th Bn arrived by train on 6th November and "A" Coy moved by train to Albertville on 7th November. Again, as on our first arrival in Albertville we had to sleep overnight in the station. We were held a further day in Albertville awaiting the arrival of planes and it was not until Thursday 9th that we finally got out. The Coy finally came together on Friday 10th when the 2i/c who was supervising the Gp. Airlift, arrived with the last of "B" Coy on that day.

10th Nov to 24 Nov 1961 The period from 10th November until we came home was the first free period we had enjoyed since our arrival in Congo 5½ months previously. We had no responsibility for anything except the running of our own unit. The Jat Battalion were running the Base and our time was our own except for packing and checking of stores preparatory to handing them over to some other Irish Unit. These stores were eventually handed over to the 35th Bn.

The Force Commander, Lt Gen McEoin again visited us in Kamina. He was accompanied by Dr. Cruise O'Brien and Brigadier Rajah. A very colourful ceremony was held and we were presented with our Congo Medals by Lt Gen McEoin. The Jat Battalion lent their pipe band and they supplied the Guard of Honour. The Jat Officers Mess entertained all the Officers of the Group to tea and we indulged in a "mad social fling" of entertainment. The majority of our old UN friends of the previous September were still in the base and most of them invited us to some form of entertainment.

Q REPORT - "A" 1 INF GP

The "Q" set-up for the 1 Inf Gp bristled with difficulties. These stemmed from two main causes:

1. The two coys making up the Gp were each accounting units, whilst the Gp QM was given absolutely NO authy.
2. There was an extraordinary lack of staff allotted to the "Q" side.

Chronologically this report is best divided into five parts:

a. Before our departure for the Congo - 24/5/61

At this stage the "Q" staff consisted of 1 Capt, 1 CSC, 1 Storeman. Practically all stores had to be drawn from Iosta AOC entailing the signature of the Capt in person and his consequent frequent absence from the Coy. At this time also there was an amount of chopping and changing with regard to the personal weapon to be allotted to each man. This culminated in the Lee Enfield rifles being taken from the man and an FN rifle being handed to him as he boarded the plane, the accounting being left to catch up.

b. First period in Kamina - 29th May, 1961 - 8th June, 1961

In this time the UN clothing was drawn and issued, an Officers' Mess and Men's Dining Hall set up and a Canteen got under way. The collection and issue of rations was undertaken by the Gp QM. Stores schedule for taking over from the 34th Bn, which had a stores in Kamina were received and everything was checked for the move to Kasai. The main handicap at this time was the complete lack of transport available to the Coy, a handicap aggravated by the great distance involved (to travel up to 150 miles a day on routine adm work would have been normal). Transport on the Base was very scarce and in a deplorable condition. The work was done by borrowing a truck from the Nigerians whenever we could. Somehow it was all done and by the 8th a special train of four carriages and four enormous wagons was loaded, even to the mattresses of the coy and the coy moved to Luputa, South Kasai.

c. South Kasai

(1) Luputa and Kashia. There were two camps to be taken over with all that entailed including transport and fuel. For a lengthy period only biscuits were available until some ovens could be constructed. The allotment of cooks had to be supplemented from the ranks of the platoons as it was physically impossible for 1 Cpl and 3 cooks to serve both camps. A further Cpl was impressed to look after the rations and a man was taken for the canteen.

(2) The coy had £50 and 100,000 cigarettes to run its canteen from the ACB. However the lengthy train journey from the PX supply depot and the Brakasai brewery, both in Luluabourg, meant that long periods without canteen facilities would have to be endured unless large quantities could be bought at one time. The men were assembled and the situation explained to them and a suggested solution made. This was that they should lodge their money on a temporary basis with the Adm Offr, as savings, with the difference, that this money would be refundable on demand to them - the money to be used to provide them with a better canteen. This worked well and

There were stops and starts and further stops awaiting the planes to take us home. The Coy 2i/c was appointed "load master" of the airlift. For the first time since we left Ireland we had full facilities and time to make preparation for our airlift. Gp HQ made out the Chalks and each man's weight plus his official baggage was checked and recorded. By the time the U.S.A.F. Globemasters arrived we were in a position to give them the exact load for each chalk. They expressed their appreciation of this which they stated was a rare occurrence. It enabled the crew to work out their exact flight schedule. Eventually "B" Coy left on 18th November and we had daily flights from that onwards. "A" Coy were the last to leave and we were in the Base to welcome the advance party of the 36th Bn who were on their way to Elizabethville. Our last platoon (Lt McMahon's) with the Coy QM Capt McDonald and the 2i/c left Kamina on Tuesday 21st Nov. Even then we were delayed. The Captain of our plane was grounded in Leo suspected as having a touch of Malaria. The plane was taken over by the Oi/c Lt Col Cox and on our way to Wheelus one of our engines began to lose power. When we reached Wheelus it was decided to instal a new engine. We were not ready to leave Wheelus until the night of Thursday 22nd. Since this was American Thanksgiving Day our men were invited to join the festivities. A car was put at the disposal of the Officers and they were brought on a day-long sightseeing tour. We eventually left Wheelus after midnight on the next morning and arrived in Dublin Airport on Friday morning 23rd of November at 1000 hrs. Peckoning on days we were just over the half year (by about 12 hours) away from Ireland.

Despite the hardships suffered by the men of the Company, morale never faltered during our six months in Congo. The cooperation given by each Officer, NCO and private is worthy of being recorded. At no time did we find a man trying to dodge a duty. We never lacked volunteers for hard work and our patrols always had more men anxious for them than we were able, or could afford, to carry. Crime was very low and in fact, our only breaches of discipline occurred when things were relaxed and men were inclined to let rip loose in their celebrations.

very few dry spots were encountered from then on. The disadvantage was that, at times, very large amounts of cash were held by the Adm Offr.

(3) The fresh meat arrangements at this stage are worthy of comment. The American Presbyterian Church Mission Station was the site of the camp at Kashia. One of the practical ways this mission had of helping the primitive Kanioka was to do research into the rearing of cattle and a small herd was kept at Kashia for this purpose. About twice a week late at night a steer was shot by one of the coy with a rifle. After the mission foreman had got the tail, the beast was tied behind a pick-up truck and towed to a spot where stood the tubular steel framework of a former swing. The beast was hauled up, head down, to this frame and allowed to bleed overnight. At first light before the heat and flies came the beast was butchered by the medical offr assisted by two men of the coy working with jackknives, and this meat was eaten that day as the refrigeration available was meagre.

(4) The bulk of the cooking was done on hydra cookers in Kasai and indeed throughout the coy's tour in the Congo. The cooks acquired great skill in their use but the number of cookers and the supply of spares with them was inadequate and was the source of constant worry to the "Q" staff. (See recommendation at para 3).

(5) For a short while after the changeover with "B" Coy and the occupation by "A" Coy of the camp in Mwene Ditu all the foregoing snags were relieved to some extent by the concentration of the coy. However, very soon, a platoon plus was ordered to another outpost, Kele. A feature of the "Q" situation at this time was the uncertainty of what was to be the method and time of "A" Coy's relief. From hour to hour the situation changed. This uncertainty was occasioned by two factors. There was doubt as to whether Mwene Ditu was to be garrisoned at all after our departure (this persisted even while a coy of Nigerians sat in a train in the station. After 24 hrs they were ordered to Luluabourg). The second factor was the presence in the town of two W.H.O. representatives whose contract precluded their being left anywhere where there were no troops. On charge to them was a fleet of transport consisting of about 9 x 5 ton trucks, 19 x 3 ton trucks, and 6 x 3/4 ton and the rolling stock in Luluabourg could not run to more than one train of the size necessary to lift so many vehicles. Finally it was decided that all available rolling stock would be combined and that the W.H.O. people and their transport would go south with us instead of north to Luluabourg.

(6) The work of moving to the station took all day, the biggest single item being our stock of fuel oil of various kinds, more than a hundred drums in all. Anything which we thought might be of help to the French Canadian nuns who ran a school there, we brought to them, mostly flour and diesel oil. The next day the train arrived about noon and the work of loading the flat cars commenced and was completed by dusk. The Onan lighting set was loaded on a flat car next to the one on which the cookhouse was set up. Thus the meals were ready the moment the train stopped even after dark. The journey took three days.

- d. Kamina - From the "Q" point of view Kamina held promise of a relatively carefree life. The cookhouse was electrically operated and magnificent, the quarters were good and no insurmountable problems appeared to be in store for us. About this time the 35th Bn in Elisabethville had had a fire and we were asked to send whatever serviceable tentage we had down to them which we did, sending anything which merited that description. Up to this point in our tour of duty the creation of difficulty because

of the two coys being accounting units had not arisen very much. With the arrival of the mercenaries on Aug 28th all efforts at trying to keep the stores of the two coys separate except for serial numbered items had to be abandoned. Particularly as regards barrack services. Immediately on the heels of that crux came the problems caused by the start of the fighting at Kamina. My separate report of the period of hostilities does not need amplification except to remark that once again we were back to the Hydra Cookers as the supply of current to our beautiful kitchens was cut as soon as the fighting flared up,

e. Nyunzu

The move to Nyunzu and our sojourn there created no difficulties with which we were not familiar already. As has been said the Hydra cookers and spares lasted, I would say, at least four times their normal life. This was in no small measure due to the cocks and in particular the cpl cook, Cpl. Phelan. The other big wants were (1) the tentage we had given to "charity" when in Kamina, and (2) the fact that we had no "Fogging Machine" for insect control. On our return to Kamina on 7th November we were accommodated in a Hangar which gave excellent quarters and stores and on 24th November the move to Dublin was completed.

3. Recommendations

- a. That the unit be the accounting unit, - NOT, as in our case, the subordinate units. It is hard to describe all the difficulties thus created. In addition to those mentioned there was a further one in that UN higher officials both civilian and military found themselves dealing with up to three representatives of the 1 Inf Gp.
  - b. That adequate staffs be provided to do the job. "A" Coy Inf Gp would have needed an additional Sáir (Stores), Cpl (Stores), Cpl (Welfare), and Pte (Stores).
  - c. That the quality of the boot be improved with particular attention to the sole.
  - d. That some way be found to enable a unit to leave Ireland with the ledgers balanced and vouchers posted and cleared.
  - e. That the return of a unit should be so organised that the "Q" staff is represented on the first plane of the formation home and that that representative should take in all the stores of that formation and so finish the job itself. In the present system there is a feeling that one abdicates just when the end is in sight.
  - f. The officers of the Gp bought their own tropical walking-out uniform. This was issued to subsequent officers. The cost to the offrs of the Gp was £15.0.0d. on average. Some reimbursement of this cost is felt to be justified.
  - g. The underclothing issued is not of a pattern most commonly worn in Ireland. It is uncomfortable and should be changed.
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IRELAND AND BASE II KAMINA

"B" Company 1st Infantry Group was formed in April 1961 for service with UN in the CONGO. Its members were, in the main, drawn from the South but small number of specialists was supplied by Curragh Training Camp and Western Command. Contrary to subsequent practice, platoons when formed, were allowed to remain in their home stations for training under the guidance and direction of the selected Platoon O/Cs. While agreeing that this system considerably lessened hardships of a domestic and financial nature, it would have been more desirable from my point of view to have the Company concentrated in one barracks or post. This would have given officers a better opportunity of getting to know the men and NCOs and, more important still, allow the NCOs time to get acquainted with the different officers of the Coy. Furthermore, it would have given sufficient time to ensure that all personnel were in possession of the correct entitlements of kit and equipment and suitably allocated to appointments in the Company Establishment.

This company was the first from the South to be issued with the FN rifle. These were issued to the Unit in Dublin prior to departure for the CONGO. Unfortunately, as far as I am aware, there were only limited numbers of this weapon available for training purposes and range practices. The latter were considered too difficult, particularly that fired from a kneeling position at figure targets pasted on a six foot background at varying elevations. The poor scores obtained, even by recognised good shots, tended to make men sceptical of this excellent infantry weapon.

On the 22nd May, 1961 the whole Company, less three men who later joined the Company in Dublin, mustered in Limerick. On the 2 May the troops were inspected by the Command OC Colonel P. Curran. Later we left by road for Collins Barracks, Dublin.

The journey to the CONGO was uneventful. It is suggested that due to the rapid change in atmosphere and climate that less sandwiches be issued and biscuits be substituted; also milk in bottles rather than containers as once the latter is opened the contents must be consumed right away. Bottles of minerals might be considered as a substitute for milk. It is hoped that this will be taken as a constructive criticism and not as a grouse, as generally the standard of food provided for the flight was excellent and most welcome.

The only embarrassing experience during the journey to the CONGO was in Wheelus Air Base. Here we witnessed our Irish soldiers suffering intensely from, what was to them at the time, almost unbearable heat, dressed in uniform that was never intended for tropical wear. This most undesirable situation has now been overcome and it is unnecessary to stress the matter.

En route to KAMINA, CONGO, the Company remained in Leopoldville for one night. Here in the transit camp they were issued with two sets of tropical uniforms, less boots. On arrival at Kamina on 29th May we were welcomed by Col O'Neill, O/C 34th Bn who with officer and NCO members of his staff had done everything possible to ensure that our arrival, movement to quarters and accommodation there were as good as could possibly be.

About two days after our arrival in Kamina an advance party under command of Capt T. Carroll left for Mwene-Ditu via Lulusburg. An instruction was now received from the W.H.O. that troops should not be permitted to enter South Kasai unless they had been successfully



vaccinated within the previous three months. Many of us who had been unsuccessfully done before leaving Ireland had now to be re-vaccinated; others who had been in the CONGO before had also to be inoculated. The Group had already received orders to move to South Kasai - "A" Company to Luputa and Kashia, "B" Company to Mwene-Ditu. Our medical Officer, Dr. O'Farrell, deemed it most undesirable and inadvisable to move to Ditu until men had recovered from vaccinations. His suggestions to allow us to remain in Kamina when made to Lieut Colonel O'Donovan were considered and sanctioned. Reports from UN sources and our advance party about conditions in Ditu were not very encouraging. "A" Company in the meantime, moved by train to their stations at Luputa and Kashia where conditions and amenities were fair.

While awaiting instructions to move from Kamina all men not affected by vaccinations were put on weapon training with a view to firing modified range practices. It was during this period of training that we discovered we had some men filling specialists roles, such as Mortar and MM Gunners, who had no previous training in these weapons. This problem was satisfactorily solved as a thorough check of the Company showed that men trained in these weapons were amongst those in Rifle sections. This, incidentally, is another reason why men should be brought together before leaving Ireland in order that such problems should be resolved. All personnel of the Company were fired in the different weapons during our stay in Kamina although difficulty was experienced in getting permission to fire Mortar H.E. This little dilemma was overcome by having a Mortar Shoot with Smoke instead of H.E.

Generally speaking, conditions were pretty good during our short stay in Kamina. However, some of the habits of other UN troops were rather strange to our men and took a little getting used to. All UN other ranks were cooking and eating in the same dining hall. The cooking and eating procedure of such personnel as Nigerians, Indians, etc., was a bit disconcerting for the Irish and there was a distinct reluctance on the part of our chaps to partake of food in the same dining room. This was overcome by allocating special portions of the dining hall to particular Units.

One of our biggest headaches in Kamina was a shortage of transport in fact we had none apart from our bicycles. Eventually Capts Costello and Aherne located a discarded jeep and by cannibalising two similarly discarded vehicles we had transport which for our remaining days on the base was worth its weight in silver. Training continued uninterrupted during morning periods and included riot drills and jungle patrols. Unfortunately, because of the absence of transport no long patrols could be carried out although troops available were instructed in SOP for such missions. All men were issued with first line amn, mags, belts, etc., were filled in order to get them accustomed to using loaded weapons and also to instil into them the serious aspect of their job in the CONGO.

On the 14th June we were notified that a train was available for loading at the three R's. Officers and NCOs were allocated their different jobs in this matter but again our main problem was insufficient serviceable transport for the job. Water, which was considered unfit for drinking for a few days unless boiled, was now OK again. This was a relief as it was intended to carry a considerable amount of this commodity on the train to cater for cooking and drinking on the journey.

Together with all our fighting equipment and three tons of barbed wire, the Company also took fortyfive days dry together with as much fresh rations to Mwene Ditu. Pillows, mattresses, and as much insecticide in powder and liquid form, as could possibly be obtained by begging and borrowing in and around Kamina Base were also taken. With the dreadfully unhygienic condition of the post we were to occupy, this last was perhaps the most valuable part of our cargo when we set out on our 26 hour train journey across the CONGO.

At mid-day on the 16th June, after many abortive attempts to get going, we finally set out. At our first scheduled stop, Kaminsville, we were requested to perform our first, but by no means our last, errand of mercy. We were asked by some nuns and priests in the community there to take supplies to their sisters and brothers in Luputa who were reported to be badly off. Their profuse thanks for our willingness to oblige were almost embarrassing and we left with their blessings and promises to be remembered at Masses.

Sometime during the morning of the 17th June we arrived in Luputa where we were welcomed by Comdt K. McMahon, his Officers and men and partook of some very welcome food. Having replenished our water supplies and ensured that supplies were delivered to the local religious community we moved on to our destination accompanied by Comdt Keogh, Group HQ. The remainder of the Group HQ stopped off in Luputa to set up HQ in KASMAIA. The natives, who were conspicuous by their absence during the night journey now began showing themselves in ever-increasing numbers at all the little settlements we passed through. Their general demeanour seemed to convey a reluctance to be friendly but perhaps their puzzlement at seeing white troops move in to this area could be accepted as a reason for their surly appearance. In some places cigarettes thrown amongst them worked wonders while at others such efforts to behave in a friendly manner were treated with disdain.

Throughout the journey stringent security measures were enforced. All men carried weapons fully loaded and during night and day strong armed parties were on duty at all entrances to carriages, and a particularly strong one travelled with the driver and stokers.

#### MWENE DITU

At 1500 hours on the 17th June we arrived at Mwene-Ditu station where we were met by Capt T. Carroll, 'B' Coy, and the O/C of the Ghanian contingent, Major Jack Carruth. During the latter's enforced stay with us we got to referring to him as "Mad Carruth".

The drill for getting our troops off the train, in order to provide maximum protection without appearing aggressive, had previously been rehearsed and worked admirably. So smoothly did it work that Major Carruth, later that evening, thought fit to compliment us on the conduct of the NCOs. He stated that before he would have his men off he would have shouted himself hoarse. This was considered high praise indeed, coming from an officer who had many months experience in the CONGO, and a veteran of the last war. It was particularly gratifying in view of the fact that fourteen of the NCOs were promoted Acting Corporals before leaving Ireland. Incidentally none of them had completed a NCO course but all were old soldiers.

A big crowd of natives had assembled in and around the station when we arrived, together with about thirty armed Kalongi soldiers. This crowd increased noticeably when the band, suitably attired, struck up some martial airs. The attitude of the crowd, soldiers included, could best be described as one of silent hostility. Leaving a strong group - Platoon plus - to guard the train the remainder headed for Camp which was about one mile away. One sniff and one look was all that was necessary to convince us that everything we had heard about it was an understatement.

We took over duties as quickly as possible in order to facilitate the Ghanians in their wish to get out of the Camp. Major Carruth informed us that one platoon per night would be required on duty so, having found that number, the remainder, having taken over five trucks and two jeeps, proceeded to get the baggage carriages unloaded. This was

Duties in Ditu were heavy and exhausting. Thirty-two other ranks were on duty daily to make up four guards of eight men each. These in units of eight occupied four strong points on the Camp perimeter from 15,00 hours to 0700 hours daily with the main guard on for twenty four hours. Resting during the day-time from any duty was practically impossible due, principally, to the heat in the marquees.

Apart from the twice-daily water patrols we were required to have a strong party ready at a minute's notice to rush out to the Airport to protect UN planes and personnel landing and taking off. These duties were normally taken from parties which worked on the perimeter defences with their arms and ammunition beside them. Again, normal routine patrols were sent thrice weekly along the road and railway line dividing the Baluba from the Kanioka territory. To call the routes for these patrols a road is a misnomer. They were deep-rutted dust-tracks and, except for the occupants of the leading vehicle, all troops became unrecognisable after a couple of miles because of a thick covering of black-red dust which penetrated into working parts of weapons and through clothing. There was never sufficient washing water to meet our requirements and in order to economise on this precious commodity that used for washing the person was afterwards utilised for washing clothes.

Going on apace with all these duties was the job of strengthening the camp defences by building strong-points, improving slit and communication trenches and erecting barbed-wire fences. The slit and communication trench system was quite good on taking over from the Ghanians but were constantly filling through the silting of the soil. However, barbed wire defences were practically non-existent - probably there was none to be got - so the three tons of barbed wire we brought from Kamina were put to good use.

All these improvements in the Camp Defences were considered very necessary even though it added tremendously to the duties associated with soldiering in Mwene-Ditu. The location of the Camp was surely never selected for its strategic or tactical position. It, however, had within its confines five small houses which were used as stores, sleeping accommodation and officers Mess. The Kalongi camp was situated on a hill about six hundred yards away and it completely dominated ours. So much did it over-look ours that on taking over the Officers' Mess building from Major Carruth it could be closely compared to a black-out building. Blankets were used as curtains on the windows and doors. Besides, the window panes were liberally plastered with breath-taking pin-up girls !!! Having taken over it was considered that shooting was just as desirable a way to die as to do so by smothering, so the curtains and blankets were dispensed with. We had taken an Onan lighting plant from Ireland with us which proved a real blessing here. It was wired up to supply perimeter lighting at dangerous points, together with giving light to the houses.

Relations between ourselves and the natives, including the Kalongi soldiers, showed a distinct improvement as time went on. This happy situation was partly due to our efforts to give some food to the starving children who assembled outside the barbed-wire after meal hours and to have Dr. O'Farrell do what he could for the diseased and dying in the town. At first there were only about twenty who got reasonably well fed but after about two weeks the number increased to about two hundred. Needless to remark there was very little for that number. Dr. O'Farrell willingly attended at the local clinic though there was little he could do to curb the daily death-roll. He also visited the Kalongi Camp where he helped and advised the native medical orderly, who certainly had his hands full. Locally we found a community of Canadian Nuns who had come safely through the earlier troubles. They had a beautiful school but no pupils, a hospital which lacked no shortage of patrons.

Here we did all we possibly could by supplying a little food and some medicine and felt well compensated by the amount of goodwill which we were creating.

In Mwene-Ditu, as in all other stations occupied, we were realising the inadequacy of our Company organisation and equipment. To mention but two at this stage. We were allowed three cooks which is obviously not enough where some type of Officers' Mess must be in operation. Here in Ditu we had two or three planes or helicopters calling daily whose crews and UN personnel, in transit, had to be fed. Again we had daily visits from alleged VIPs from the town and adjoining areas for the purpose of conveying their compliments or complaints to us. All these people had to be provided with some form of refreshments. Naturally three cooks were not capable of doing all the work and they had to be supplemented by calling on the services of Private soldiers who professed to have some aptitude for such work. This Company was provided with, as far as I remember, fourteen sets of delph. This was not enough particularly when Group Headquarters moved to Ditu. The delph was not unbreakable and consequently gradually decreased. Replacements were not available in the area. Again no drinking glasses were supplied to our Company. It was not particularly edifying to see our visitors partaking of a wee drop or a glass of Simba from a bottle cut in two.

It became apparent after a few days in Mwene-Ditu that this place was a focal point in South Kasai so on the 20th June Group HQ moved to Ditu from Kashia thus relieving "B" Company of a good deal of responsibility. Duties and work continued as usual until on the 29th June, twenty-eight UN vehicles arrived in Ditu for the 1st Inf Group.

Initially we had, in each Company, one Cpl Fitter and three drivers but since our arrival in Kasai we had more vehicles than drivers in use. Now we had an additional fourteen per Company. Yes, we eventually got about fourteen drivers in the Company most of whom never drove anything heavier than a saloon. Despite this handicap not one driver from this Company was involved in any mishap or accident during our tour of duty in South Kasai.

On the 28th June the "Minister for the Interior" (Kalongi's) visited the Camp and was provided with a Guard of Honour.

It was on this date also that instructions were received from Brigade Headquarters at Luluaburg to send a strong patrol to Tobacongo. It had been reported that a strong force of Kalongi troops had moved into Lunta territory and were burning villages and killing the natives. "B" Company were to organise this patrol. As this entailed travelling over a hundred miles through unsurveyed country a strong patrol was indicated. A garrison of Ghanian troops still remained in a place called Kele which was a key position controlling roads leading from Baluba to Kanioka and Lunta territory. Between Kele and Mwene-Ditu was another hamlet called Tuzule which was held in strength by Kalongi soldiers. Not alone was this garrison indisciplined, they were also reputed to be cannibals. The Commander of the Ghanian garrison in Kele Captain Paten had flown over to Ditu to discuss our forthcoming patrol. He informed us that he was in possession of definite information that three of his soldiers who had been taken prisoner during a recent skirmish with this Tuzule group had been eaten.

Everything possible was done to ensure that maximum precautions would be taken on the patrol. Brigade Headquarters also placed two helicopters at our disposal which were used to reconnoitre the route before and during patrol.

Captain Etienne had been sent for and informed that the patrol was being sent through Tuzule. His offer to accompany the patrol to Tobacongo was turned down but a second offer to go to Tuzule was accepted. He assured us there were now no Kalongi troops south of the specified line. Even at this early stage we knew that most Congolese vacillated and their assurances were not to be taken at their face value. However, it is only fair to state that we found Etienne most dependable and co-operative during our time in Kasai.

In fact this patrol, despite previous reports, encountered nothing untoward during its forty-two hours duration. Strength of numbers, equipment and armament have a wonderful cowing and taming effect even on savages. Troops in Tuzule were well armed but wore all sorts and types of uniform. They looked quite capable of behaving as savages but were indeed a very cowed garrison during our extended delay there. The patrol only succeeded in getting about threequarters way to Tobacongo before darkness and the difficult track conditions called a halt. Roads were a mere jungle track, bridges had to be reinforced before taking unladen trucks over them. The track for the second part of the journey improved and much better time was made.

The patrol reached its destination at the same time as the helicopters. The arrival of UN troops caused some excitement; one of the most noticeable things being the way all women and girls had disappeared. No Kalongi troops were located in the area although road-trenching and sandbagged emplacements showed that they had been there. At the inevitable conference, at which the Group OC attended, we were informed that the Kalongi soldiers had moved out a few days before our arrival but the place was raided the day before by another tribe who killed many of their livestock. Several times during the conference we were asked to leave the UN troops there. Promising to pass on the request to the relevant authority we left, wishing we could transfer those beautiful, modernly appointed buildings from here to Ditu. The whites, who had so obviously surrounded themselves with comfort had left this oasis in the Jungle. The patrol arrived back in Ditu at about 2015 hours. Movement by night was not favoured by us, if avoidable, but the patrol leader who was in constant contact with HQ by radio decided to get back. Coming back through Tuzule they were accorded VIP Treatment, arms presented, women and children waving etc.

As a result of this patrol we learned one useful lesson, i.e. trucks without four-wheel drive were unsuitable for jobs like this. Such vehicles, of which we had a number, were henceforth used only on routes that were known to us.

About this time we had, believe it or not, a visit from a UN food and hygiene officer, a Col Hollinger. He did not remain long and was rather aghast at conditions obtaining there. His arrival more or less coincided with that of the Brigade OC for whom we were interested in getting a clean Guard of Honour. His inspection was postponed at the last moment from the 6th to the 10th July.

The World Food Relief Organisation had now established a depot in Mwane-Ditu and badly-needed food was becoming available in increasing amounts to feed the local hungry. All patrols leaving Ditu brought a limited supply of meal and frozen fish for distribution to the needy. The World Food Relief Organisation itself, well equipped with trucks, distributed food to bigger centres but hunger and disease were rampant throughout the whole area. Twice, at least, we brought consignments of food to a place called Tshinzoboi where the natives were actually starving. Here also we sent two medical orderlies with a limited supply of medicine and bandages to attend to the pitiable creatures suffering from sores and disease.

Colonel McCormeck visited us on the 6/7/61 and remained one night before proceeding to Luputa and Kashia. On 10/7/61 it was decided to reduce our heavy night guard from thirty-two other ranks to 1 Sgt, 3 Cpls and eighteen Privates. This was made possible because of the apparent improved attitude of the Kalongi soldiers towards us and the now friendly approach of the civilian population. Added to this, Mwene-Ditu camp was practically impregnable and we had heard, unofficially, that we would shortly have to supply a platoon to Kele to take over from a Company of Ghanians.

This latter commitment was shortly made official but the date of departure was changed from the 12th to the 14th July following the visit of the Brigade OC to our Camp on the 10th July. All arrangements were made for taking over but the military situation around Luputa ("A" Coy area) took an unexpected turn for the worse which caused a change in planning.

The Kalongi troops in Luputa had occupied several places in Kanioka territory, South of the stipulated boundary. They were also building up their strength around Luputa and becoming aggressive towards "A" Company Troops. To build up in Luputa they had reduced the large garrison in Ditu very considerably. Reports coming in to Group Headquarters from Luputa were alarming. On 12th July a patrol of about forty four all ranks, with Capt Carroll i/c, left Mwene-Ditu to strengthen "A" Company. On returning that night they reported a build-up of forces around Luputa and Lusuka.

An order was now received that Kalongi troops should be informed that they had until 0800 hours on the following morning to move back to their original positions. Failing this they were to be pushed back by force. In order to carry out this order it was necessary to reinforce "A" Company. Capt Aherne, Lieut Phillips, 14 NCOs and 44 men - a total of 60 all ranks left Mwene-Ditu for Luputa where they were to remain overnight. On the following morning a further patrol with Capt Harrington i/c left for Luputa. The Group OC and myself flew over the area by plane during the morning. In the meantime the time of expiration of the ultimatum was postponed from 0800 hours to 1400 hours. Later that morning it was decided at high level that better results might be obtained by negotiating rather than fighting.

The change of attitude did not lessen the tension between opposing troops. Our Company could do nothing further at this stage but increase patrolling. At 1730 hours on the night of the 16th July I was instructed by Group DC to move to Luputa with my Company to take over from "A" Coy. The change-over took place on the morning of the 17th. July in a very quite and smooth way. I believe the soldiers in the Kalongi Camp were not aware that a change-over was taking place. On the evening of the 17th Capt Aherne and myself moved out from Luputa with a strong patrol to investigate reports of strong concentrations of Kalongi troops around Tshobobo and Lusuka. All the native Kaniokas had fled from these villages. The troops we counted were about eighty at Lusuka and fifty at Tshobobo. There could, of course, have been many more away in the huts.

We met the officers i/c at both places and discussed

- (a) our right to travel where we wished without interference
- (b) their demanded right to cross over the railway line which by now became the official boundary in the area. Having left them under no doubts about the boundary and our right to go where we wished we returned to Camp. The officers appeared friendly, willing and anxious for appeasement but other ranks were surly, aggressive and obviously spilling for a fight.

Later on in the night of the 17th I received word from Comdt Burke, MO at Kaskia, that the Kalongi soldiers had fired into Kanioka territory wounding one tribesman who had been brought to Kaskia for treatment. On the following morning I had a discussion on the whole situation with Lts Alexandra (our old friend from Mwene-Ditu) and Paul. Both denied knowing anything about shooting the previous night but were requested to investigate the incident and stop any more of this nonsense as it would not be tolerated by UN. Lt Alexandra left with our patrol and reported to me that evening that despite carrying out a thorough investigation at Lusuka he could find no evidence or admission of shooting.

During this time one platoon of "B" Company was in Kaskia, the remainder of the Company in Luputa. One of the usual tribal conferences, this time with a grandiose title of Pan-Kanioka, was in session in Kaskia. Representatives of the tribes from all over the Congo were there and in all constituted a sizeable gathering. In order to be as militant as their enemies across the railway line they had a large number of Jeunesse undergoing training there. The Jeunesse had no fire-arms. Several times each day reports came in to the office at Luputa of arrests and beatings of their subjects by Kalongi troops, and about preparations to take over our Camp in Kaskia together with Pan-Kanioka representatives. In order to forestall such an incident Company Headquarters and a second platoon was moved to Kaskia. Here we were tormented during the remainder of their Conference with alarms, deputations and requests for transport for selected delegates to attend the Central Government meetings. We succeeded in satisfying a few of their requests for transport with the help of Group HQ in Ditu so everyone was happy. Their Headman, Chief Mulagee, thanked us for our help during their all-important conference. He was still more profuse in his thanks after imbibing a couple of bottles of our precious stock of Simba.

On our arrival in KASHIA we found that this place was used as a distributing centre for food supplies by World Food Organisation. There was however no proper control or method of distribution since the American Presbyterian Minister, Mr. Davis was away a good deal. Captain Aherne took over this and food was more efficiently and expeditiously doled out to deserving people. Indeed during one of our many patrols we decided to call on the Catholic religious community South of Luputa - the community to whom we delivered supplies on our way to Mwene-Ditu. We found them with practically nothing in the stores or larder and yet they were helping some hundred of the local natives. A modern touch of the miracle of the loaves and fishes. The following day we had delivered to them about twenty-five tons of maize, rice and frozen fish.

Before the Company moved to South Kasai we were promised that we would be relieved in six weeks. That was a promise that the Force Commander obviously intended to keep. Even before "B" Company left Mwene Ditu for Luputa the Nigerian Bn O/C., stationed in Kamina, had, with his Staff inspected Mwene-Ditu, Kele, Luputa and Kaskia preparatory to moving his battalion into those places to take over from our TWO Companies. It was apparent that they were reluctant and slow to move and were far from impressed with the conditions obtaining. Even for coloured troops running water, light and reasonable sleeping accommodation is considered essential.

Each day brought a fresh crop of reports - now they are taking over, now they are not. However on the 28th July one Company of Nigerians arrived in Kaskia to take over that outpost from me. The Company O/C., Major Howie, had received no instruction to take over Luputa but thought another Company was coming in there in the course of a day or so. Lt Col O'Donovan instructed me to leave a holding Unit in Luputa and proceed by train to Kamina with the remainder of my Company.

Capt Harrington and Lieut Blythe remained in Luputa with a strength of forty four other ranks. This number was moved to join "A" Coy in Mwene Ditu after nine days where they remained until moving to Kamina about 10th August. So ended our tour in South Kasai.

Transport, QM and Medical problems are dealt with in separate reports which are attached. As the reports are compiled by officers who were intimately concerned with these matters I do not propose to elaborate on them.

In retrospect it is easy to appreciate the excellent way the soldiers conducted themselves under the trying conditions in Kasai. At first they were allowed a ration of beer daily but an incident occurred one night which caused a change of heart in this matter. Men were forbidden to leave camp after dark unless as a patrol and under command of an officer. To do so, at the beginning at any rate, was tantamount to committing suicide. Realising that some Irish soldiers will break camp if they have partaken of some beer it was decided after long consideration to prohibit the issue of beer altogether. This decision was deeply resented by a small element of the Company but was warmly received by the majority. Fluids, even water which was scarce, were a must so a case was made to the UN for the issue of two bottles of minerals per man per diem. Sanction for this was received almost by return.

First impressions, we are told, are almost always correct. All who served in Ditu will surely remember the smells emanating from disused cooking pits where all sorts of food had been prepared, and the stench of numerous spots of foul ground. At night, these, which were made bearable by day by the use of gallons of insecticide and disinfectant, reached the nauseous stage by the additional aroma from open latrines wafting up from a town of 26,000 human beings with nothing but the most primitive sanitary arrangements.

#### KAMINA

On 30th July the major portion of "B" Company arrived back in Kamina. Our departure from Luputa was expedited by the judicious gift of one bag of rice to the Station master. An advance party of "A" Coy, from Kele, South Kasai had arrived a few days before us. Our journey from Luputa to Kamina was without incident except at the Lubilash Bridge - the border between Katanga and Kasai. Here the train was stopped by soldiers from Tshombie's Gendarmerie. We were informed by them that we could not proceed until the white officer in charge came along and cleared us. Having no idea when this was likely to happen, if at all, and being a little impatient with meddlers at this stage we decided to push on to our destination ignoring the patrol and its protests.

On arrival we were met by Capt Hartigan who had reported to Kamina with a platoon of "A" Company. We were now to occupy billets in No.1 Base which was about eight miles from Base No.2 which we knew slightly before leaving for South Kasai. A large part of the Nigerian Battalion, which was expected to take over from us in Kasai, was still in No.1 Base. Their officers, principally English, could not possibly do enough for us. Our officers were allowed the facilities of their Mess. This was much appreciated as we had now very little if any left to establish our own.

On 12/8/61 the remainder of the Group arrived. Lt Col O'Donovan's conference shortly after his arrival specified our operational role in Kamina. I was appointed Camp Comdt No. 1 Base with responsibility for the defence of the Airport, Magazine and the water plant. At a



subsequent conference officers of "A" and "B" Coys were allotted their tasks and responsibilities. Although duties were now very much reduced, compared to what we had been accustomed to, there was very little time for engaging recreation. The Group was now responsible for staffing Base Headquarters, the three R's, running Officers Mess, Transport, etc., There was no staff whatsoever in the Group for such duties consequently, men deemed suitable for such jobs, were taken out of the Companies in order to keep an establishment, which was previously run by a full-strength Battalion, turning over.

On the 16th August I was notified that the Group would be required to take over Kilubi power station from the Swedes. This station was 60 miles from Kamina. On the 18/8/61 a patrol left Kamina for Kilubi to ascertain our needs there when taking over. On 21st August Captain T. Carroll and Lieut Phillips moved to Kilubi to take over from the Swedish unit.

Patrols were sent to Kilubi thrice weekly with rations and supplies. The men stationed there seemed to enjoy the peaceful atmosphere although duties were again very heavy. These were necessary as there was a Headquarter guard and two outlying posts - one about 1½ miles away to be manned. However, it was known that each garrison would only remain three weeks there when they would be withdrawn to Kamina to rest. The medical Officer, Comdt J. Burke, volunteered to go with the first contingent.

Commencing on the 26th and 27th when the first two captured mercenary officer prisoners arrived in Kamina the situation in Katanga took a decided turn for the worse. On 28th August I was instructed by Lieut Col O'Donovan to get an internment camp prepared for mercenary prisoners. This was immediately got under way but prisoners started arriving before anything worth while was done. In fact before the first strand of wire was erected prisoners started arriving. Never was so much expected from so few. The worsening situation demanded intensified patrolling outside the Base along the runways at night while at the same time guards had to be strengthened at the Airport, Magazine, water filter, EPA buildings and the prisoners' Camp. To add to our worries we had to supply armed escorts for prisoners as they arrived; provide them with messing facilities even though we had not enough delph, cutlery or glasses to meet our own requirements. Because of the lack of preparation for the prisoners it required 34 men to guard them in the group of buildings ear-marked as an internment camp.

The Group was also required to arrest about 27 mercenaries in its own area. All these tasks were successfully completed but not without many tense moments and sleepless nights. At one time, as far as I can remember, we had over a hundred prisoners to guard and cater for. I have often wondered if someone in the Katanga command did not make a miscalculation about our strength and got us slightly mixed up with an Infantry Battalion. This deduction is not as fantastic as it would appear as we did, in fact, get official letters addressed to "The 1st Irish Inf Bde Group".

Following interrogation of the prisoners on the 30/8/61 we were informed that some of them would be flown out to Belgium on 1/9/61. This did not materialise, however, and we had some prisoners to guard all the time until the outbreak of hostilities on the 14th September.

From 30th August on we were asked to send a patrol nightly to Kaminaville where they would marry up with the Gendarmarie and remain patrolling the town from 1700 hours to 2130 hours daily. We had to call on the Swedish company of around eighty men to help in

this and naturally, help was willingly forthcoming. Our own official interpreter had been hospitalised since our return to Kamina and it was extraordinarily difficult to get any of the civilian employees in Kamina to volunteer for the job. All of us realised that going out on these patrols at night left us very vulnerable but they were apparently having a very steadying effect on the population of Kaminsville, both white and black, so obviously they were worth continuing.

On the morning of the 9th September word was received from a reliable source that a little reception was being prepared for our patrol that night. The patrol was cancelled. Afterwards we were informed that an ambush was, in fact, prepared.

The garrison in KILUBI was due for relief which was effected on the morning of 11th September. Capt Harrington, Lieut Blythe with 55 other ranks took over in Kilubi, Comdt Burke volunteering to remain with them.

Since our return to Kamina and particularly after the worsening of the Katanga situation following the arrest of the mercenaries, every spare moment and man was devoted to the improvement of the defence system around the Airport ("B" Coy) and EPA buildings ("A" Coy). Notwithstanding all this we were not completely satisfied with the position when at 2300 hours on 12th September we were informed that a general alert would be on from 0400 hours on the morning of the 13th.

At 2359 hours on 11th September, during Company conference, firing was heard from the far end of the runways. Our alert was on somewhat earlier than that specified by Katanga Command. Strong mobile patrols went out to investigate the shooting but located nothing. Mobile units continued patrolling the runways and adjoining bush all night.

At first light all defensive positions of the airport were checked. They were found generally good but it was painfully obvious that we were woefully thin on the ground. The "thin blue line" in the Congo could be aptly applied to our position here.

At 1645 hours on the 13th instructions for further patrols were issued embracing roads and runways adjoining our position at the airport. Signals, attached to us, were instructed to contact detachments in Kilubi every hour throughout the day and night. At 1630 hours on the evening of the 14th Gendarmerie from Kaminsville attacked the Swedes and Irish Mortar Section at the barrier. Patrols were mobilised and sent out along runways, particularly on the farthest one from the central building. There were innumerable lanes and tracks through the jungle which would be impossible to control by standing patrols. Fighting and Mortaring continued around the area of the barrier throughout the evening and the early night.

One immediate result of the outbreak of fighting at the barrier was the concentrated scamp of all UN employees and their families from base HQ and Base II to the airport buildings. These were followed by native Congolese from the settlement situated between the two Bases. The Norwegian police unit, numbering about sixteen was unable to control the unexpected rush for safety. Road blocks had been set up beforehand to stop or slow down such a rush but the frightened populace poured in from all sides. These created a tremendous problem, milling around the building and our defences. After a considerable period and with plenty of forbearance they were brought under some type of order and moved to the hangars which were situated about eight hundred yards away.

Group HQ also moved from Base HQ to "B" Coy's position together with all ancillary sub-units, i.e. Signals, Medical etc. Signals set up in the main building while the Medicals (Austrians) established themselves in the fire-fighting building.

Later that night permission was received to evacuate all UN women dependants and their children. It was rather surprising to see the large number of UN men employees who now realised they had urgent business in Leopoldville. Their motives were not questioned once there was room in the aircraft; as the more we could evacuate the better the position became from "B" Coy's point of view.

The Group Commander despatched a message that evening to UN Hqs in Leopoldville describing the situation and requesting reinforcements, with heavy weapons particularly mortars and MGs. Almost by return a reply was received that there were no reinforcements forthcoming and exhorting us to fight to the last. This statement was considered strange in the circumstances since it was thought that the task of holding an area of 100 square miles with 250 Irish and 80 Swedes was a bit much. However, on the following evening, much better news was received from the Force Commander to the effect that two Swedish Companies and four armoured cars would arrive during the night.

Reports now were coming in to HQ from all sources, some quite alarming, some ridiculous but all had to be investigated. One that could neither be verified nor discarded was that the Gondormarie in Kaminaville had an armoured rail-coach which they intended using against us. As a railway line ran almost into the centre of the airport this report required some definite action. Later that night, under cover of darkness the I.O. went out with Lieut Allison (Swedish engineer) and Sgt McLoughlin, engineer Sgt from 'B' Coy, to recce the line. They succeeded in destroying large sections of it with the use of explosives in the vicinity of the three Rs, and North of the Airfield.

At the beginning of hostilities 'B' Coy received on request about 5,000 sandbags. When quietness obtained and a small number of men were available they were used to fill these. The civilian employees who were still with us willingly pitched in and helped at this task. These sandbags were used to build gun positions and reinforce windows at the airport, fire-station, hospital and telephone exchange buildings. These formed a rough triangle in a central controlling position. They also had the tremendous advantage of having reinforced concrete flat roofs. In each of these was also placed about fourteen days rations together with filled water-containers of every type and description. We felt that if our scattered positions around the airport runways became untenable these buildings would provide three really strong points which would be hard to crack.

MG positions which were prepared by previous Units on the roof of the main building were excellent but very exposed. From the outbreak of fighting we had prepared alternative positions on the top floor of the control tower. We had not yet occupied them as the civilians who worked there, in key appointments I expect, were reluctant to leave. Besides, the windows, which filled three sides of the room were metal-framed and would have to be removed. To do so would result in a considerable amount of damage and the non-combatant people who control such things would not give the necessary permission. However, all that changed quite quickly on the afternoon of 15th August at exactly 1240 hours. The wind of change can best be described in the words of an officer of "B" Coy who was on the roof of the building at the time:-

"On the second day of hostilities I was on the roof of the main airport building on which our two machine guns were sited. Line was laid from the machine gun positions to the mortar pits. The day was very hot and I was sitting in the shade of the control tower when the silence was shattered by two heavy explosions and the rattle of machine

gun fire. I rushed over to the nearest machine gun position and asked if anyone saw where the mortar and machine gun fire came from. I was told by Cpl Hawkins that it was not machine gun or mortar fire but an ---- jet. The narrowness of the escape can be gauged by the fact that the sandbags were ripped open around the gun positions and the windows of the Control Tower were completely blown in. Mr. Kieron, control Tower operator, salvaged some of the bullets from the sandbags pointing out that they were really meant for him".

This was a real sneak raid with the sun behind the pilot. I happened to be standing at the door of the building when I noticed two or three Congolese, who were making their way across to the hangars, go down on the ground as if they had been smashed there by a giant's invisible hand. The casualties resulting from this raid were one Congolese killed, two wounded, and one UN pilot, who was getting ready to take off, also wounded.

After this first raid there was no difficulty in getting into the room selected for our MGs, nor indeed was there any problem in removing the glass from the windows. The frames were removed by sledge and crow-bar, and the gunners installed with the confident feeling that they now had quite a bit of protection.

As far as my records go the fuga jet bombed and machine-gunned at the airport on six occasions. After the first sneak raid our air-spotters were so good that sufficient warning was received to allow people to get under cover. Some days he came twice. His second raid was carried out at a fairly low altitude with his main target apparently the Control Tower. A fair sprinkling of tracer was interspersed with the H.E. in the ammunition for Brens and MG. These together with FMs were used on him during all his raids excepting the first. It was useless and probably a waste of ammunition but it was clearly noticeable that after the second raid he machine gunned and bombed from a higher altitude. Besides, men felt much better and not quite so helpless when allowed to fire at him.

On the evening of the 18th August all power and light to Kamina failed - the power line between Kilubi and Kamina having been cut. At the same time fighting and mortaring was taking place around the hospital and Base II Hqrs. On the following morning information came in that Gendarmes had succeeded in establishing themselves in Base II during the night. A Platoon from "A" Coy with a mortar section commanded by Lieut O'Donnell of "B" Coy was sent to reinforce the Swedes. No outside reinforcements had as yet arrived in Kamina. I quote from Lt O'Donnell's report:-

"On the morning of the fourth day at first light, 6 a.m. I went with a mortar crew to support Lieut Murphy to clear Gendarmes from Base II. We patrolled the area with the Swedish Major Lunkquest. Having done the area where the Gendarmes were reported seen, it appeared they had evacuated the place during the night. We arrived at a place where one of the Swedish Platoons was resting after the previous three days at the barrier. Mortar shells were falling into the Camp around this point and the enemy position seemed to be in or about the farm. The Swedish Major ordered me to engage the enemy mortar position, at the same time instructing Lieut Murphy to take up defensive position around the next billet to the Swedish platoon. After engaging the enemy position for a short time the enemy fire stopped but if it did a tremendous volume of small arms fire broke out all round us, mostly from the rear. We extricated ourselves from our position under fire continuously. The discipline and the field craft of the men across the open spaces was greatly to be admired. When we reached the drains in front of the Swedish position I was quickly put in the picture by Pte O'Donnell, medical orderly with the platoon. Lieut Murphy's platoon again came under heavy fire from

the Gendarmes in the billets. Both sides were now engaging each other with a heavy volume of small arms fire and Lieut Murphy requested mortar support. This was not as easy as it might appear as in order to get the crews safely in the drains I had left the mortars and ammunition in the trenches. No difficulty was experienced in getting volunteers to retrieve the mortars and we quickly set them up in our new position.

After some exploratory siting shots we succeeded in bringing a heavy volume of mortar fire on to the billet area which the Gendarmes held, many of the shots actually going through the roofs. At this stage the Gendarme evacuated their positions leaving some dead and weapons behind. Our casualties in the action which took nearly two hours were Nil" (Unquote).

This incident was the last serious effort on the part of the Gendarmes to attack or infiltrate into Kamina. True indeed that sporadic mortar fire was taking place around the Base and numerous reports of movements and massing of strong enemy forces at various places around the camp were received. Some of these were coming from most reliable sources such as UN pilots who were now flying in reinforcements and supplies at night. One of these pilots reported seeing about twenty trucks with infantry in convoy moving in the direction of "B" Coy's position. Having questioned the pilot at length we were satisfied that his information was correct. Realising that if these got close to our base they could dictate when, where and how they would attack. It was decided to oppose them at a selected point on the road on which they were travelling. A platoon plus was quickly moved out to the pre-selected position at about 2330 hours. At 0300 hours they had dug in and although they waited patiently until 1130 hours on the following day the enemy convoy did not materialise.

Reinforcements of Indians and Swedes had now arrived and were still arriving with the result that the situation which was unsatisfactory because of our lack of numbers, was now very much improved. Furthermore, some of the many strong-points were now gradually being taken over by these fresh troops with the result that the original garrison could avail of a little rest.

On the night of 15th September the power line from Kilubi to Kamina was cut. The following day information was received that this failure was due to blowing down Pole 110 where the power line and only road to Kilubi passed over a large area of swamp-land. It was further confirmed that a road bridge at this point was blown up, the ground around mined and the position strongly help by Tshombie's troops.

On the day following the outbreak of hostilities Capt Harrington, O/C Kilubi, was directed to pull in his outposts and organise his unit into a strong point around his HQ. Messages received from Kilubi showed that supplies were pretty scarce and that men were on short rations in order to ensure that the meagre supply would last a few days.

It was patently obvious that leaving a small garrison in Kilubi was now unnecessary since the line was cut. It was also apparent that Tshombie's soldiers were actively patrolling from the road block to the vicinity of Kilubi. It was decided on the evening of the 16th (1945 hours) to look for helicopters to either feed them - if higher authority decided to leave them, - or evacuate if permission was granted for this.

On the evening of the 17th September helicopters had not arrived as promised. A message from Kilubi stated that all food was exhausted. At coy conference the Kilubi situation was discussed. It was decided to get them out by road on the morning of the 19th if

helicopters did not arrive next day. It was further decided that a pincer movement from Kilubi and Kamina presented the best chances of success. Major Rang Sing of the Indian Company promised to give us a section of mobile 108 guns with crews. During all this time the Fouga jet did not let us forget that there was a little war on, and some activity around Lupula barrier indicated that the enemy infantry had still got ideas about taking the Base.

It was, too, on the evening or morning of the 18th September we received confirmatory tidings of the UN Secretary General's death. On this night also we moved two soldiers from the vicinity of the airport building to Leopoldville hospital, who were presumed to be suffering from battle fatigue. However, every cloud has a silver lining and "B" Coy's little ray was forthcoming when we were informed that two helicopters would arrive the following morning to evacuate the Kilubi garrison.

The copters arrived at 1015 hours on the morning of 19th September. With them came two reporters from the Sunday Times who did a conducted tour of the Base. Later that evening as these gentlemen were about to proceed by UN plane to Elizabethville word was received from another UN pilot that a strong enemy convoy was approaching the Base from the West. A strong patrol was motorised and sent out from 'B' Coy to investigate the report. The reporters wished to accompany this patrol. However, they reluctantly stayed and boarded the plane for E/ville when informed by me that it was unlikely they would see any fighting with our patrol. The latter returned to base after a thorough search of the roads and jungle without locating any enemy. My real reason for mentioning the arrival of these reporters is to disprove what was afterwards stated by other paper representatives, viz., they were not allowed to fly into Kamina base during the bother.

On the 19th a message in Irish was sent to OC Kilubi informing them of the impending evacuation; the amount of kit to be taken out; the destruction of remaining material, tents, trucks, etc. At 1745 hours the helicopters left Kamina for Kilubi. Throughout the night, despite being fired on many occasions, the evacuation went on. It was completed at 0745 hours on 20th Sept. Because of some unexpected delays much of the men's personal gear had to be left behind in order to complete the move during cover of darkness. However, all ranks of "B" Coy were thankful that these men, whose position was serious, had rejoined us without suffering anything worse than a little hunger and the loss of some personal equipment and belongings.

"B" Coy was now in a very strong position with the addition of the Kilubi garrison. These were now ordered to organise a strong-point on the Kamina-Bukama road. This was necessary as again information was received that enemy reinforcements were moving on this road from Kolwezi. On the evening of the 19th Sept all main approaches to the Base were blocked, mined and adequately defended.

At 2030 hours on the 20th September a message was received from Leopoldville that a cease-fire had been arranged and would become effective from midnight. All troops were informed of the contents of the message which was as follows:-

"If fire is opened on UN forces after 210001 local commanders will ensure that unless their men are injured no fire will be returned by UN troops."

Apparently in order to keep interest alive a platoon of Gendarmes was located in Base II at 1300 hours on 21st. They were, after a show of force by UN, requested to leave and did so. Quiet all day.

At 1820 hours on the 22nd the Irish Minister for External Affairs Mr. Aiken arrived in Kamina. His plane overshot the runway and was badly damaged. Nobody was injured. He departed for Elizabethville on another

plane at 2015 hrs after being oriented on the situation in Kamina and touring the defensive positions.

The next few days were given over to inspection of positions and rest for the men as far as it was possible in the circumstances. There was no relaxation as reports of movement of troops and false alarms of attack on the Base were still coming in.

On 29th September Col Quinn and some other UN officers arrived in Airport Building on way from Elizabethville to Leopoldville. Self and Comdt Keogh received them as the Group Commander had gone to E/ville for conference. Col Quinn informed me that the complete Jat Battalion would move to Kamina to take over from us if hostilities were resumed or in the event of the cease-fire being violated. In the same circumstances we would be flown to E/ville and marry up with the 35th Irish Battalion which was now very much depleted in strength. I informed Col Quinn that no matter where we were moved we would much prefer to remain an independent force. He assured me that he understood perfectly this point of view.

The evening of the 2nd October brought another Warning Order from Leopoldville. The following few days produced nothing definite about any move and, with time running out, the racing fraternity among the Company were laying generous odds against a move.

#### NYUNZU

At 1800 hours on the evening of the 9th October we received definite orders to move next morning to Nyunzu to take over from a Ghanian Battalion. At the subsequent Group conference "B" Coy was instructed to be ready to move by planes to Albertville, thence by train to Nyunzu, the first flight to take place at 0900 hours on the morning of the 10th October.

This early move at such short notice entailed all night work for "B" Company Officers, staff and expertly selected men from the platoons. The problem of arranging specified weight load without weighing apparatus of any description is a difficult one but nevertheless planes left on schedule the following morning. The one on which I was travelling had to return to Kamina for a forced landing because of power failure. The defect was rectified and the plane took off more than twelve hours late.

At Albertville all personnel, baggage, ammunition and heavy weapons were unloaded from the planes to trucks. It was then conveyed to the Railway station and transferred to the train which was to move the Company less the Company Commander and thirty eight other ranks to Nyunzu. The heavy work involved, in a tropical climate, of unloading a company's baggage, rations and fighting equipment from DC3s and 4s without any hydraulic lift must be experienced to be appreciated.

The O/C "B" Company and party having arrived in Albertville were flown to Nyunzu in order to take over from the Ghanians before the arrival of the remainder of the Company. This particular flight from Albertville to a jungle strip in Nyunzu was ~~really a nightmare~~. There were only half enough seats for the passengers so that when coming in to land most, if not all, lay around the pile of equipment on the floor of the plane in order to avoid the inevitable buffeting about.

Having reported to the Ghanian Battalion HQ we were oriented by the O/C Brig Ankrah and then inspected the defences of Nyunzu. I was struck by the absence of barbed wire around the area but, having questioned the OC about it, I was informed that he had taken up all such wire the previous week and was taking it back to Ghana with his Unit. I was surprised but my surprise was nothing to his amazement when he became

aware that our Group HQ strength was a total of nine. His Company Hq personnel numbered 250 which meant that his remaining companies were allowed to remain intact to perform their primary task of combat missions.

At 2000 hours the remainder of "B" Coy arrived by train at Nyunzu. It was then quite dark but, nevertheless, the work of unloading and taking over platoon positions from the Ghanians was performed quite expeditiously. The Ghanians, less the remnants of HQ and one Company, returned to Albertville by the same train that night.

Early the following morning the job of re-organising our position got under way. The perimeter defences, designed for a Battalion, were pulled back considerably. This entailed re-building strong-points, pill boxes, trenches, etc. The situation in the area was relatively calm as the local garrison of about 84 had given themselves up to the Ghanians during the recent fighting. These 84 were prisoners in the village and were handed over to "B" Company together with a large assortment of arms and equipment.

Our troops were living under canvas which was not so pleasant now that the rainy season had arrived. Again, as in Ditu, there was no electric light and no water except that drawn by trailer. However, the Ghanians had erected showers made from petrol barrells and these were much appreciated by all ranks. Duties were heavy and monotonous during our stay there. We had very little transport consequently our long distance patrolling was limited. Nevertheless, on the 16th Oct a patrol, supplemented by "A" company, was sent to Niemba to locate the position at which our Irish troops had been ambushed as it was intended, even at this early stage, to erect a cross to their memory.

Late on the 16th two Gendarme officers arrived in Camp to discuss the cease-fire and the release of prisoners. The following day two other Gendarme officers accompanied by two Indians arrived for the same purpose. It was arranged that prisoners held at Nyunzu would be released on the same date as the Irish prisoners who were held by Tshombie's forces. Actually, because of the abortive attempts to hand over the Irish prisoners, those held by us were retained until we were perfectly satisfied that the change had been completed in Elizabethville.

Patrols continued to be sent out from Nyunzu on various days but because of the meagre supply of transport no long ones were attempted. During the negotiations about the release exchange of prisoners we were instructed by Bde HQ in A/ville to allow a corresponding number of armed Gendarme from Kongola Camp to garrison Byunzo when the prisoners there were released. This did not materialise during our time there. At 1020 hours on 29th October we were informed that a large armed party of Gendarme was approaching the barrier on the Kongola road. A general alert was sounded, all strong-points manned immediately. The Group Commander, Lieut Colonel Donovan, and myself proceeded to the barrier where we saw about 500 motorised troops on the road. Several of their officers and one civilian approached the barrier. The situation was discussed at length. Their orders, which they alleged came from Elizabethville, were that they were to take over Nyunzu; ours that they had no such authority.

Before any discussion whatsoever took place the officers were instructed to move their troops back a minimum distance of 500 yards. This was considered necessary in view of the tenseness of the situation. One trigger-happy soldier on either side could precipitate a fight. The officers were willing enough to carry out these instructions but it was only after much heated discussion with the troops that the latter reluctantly carried out the orders issued to them. The nigger in the wood-pile was the civilian who accompanied the Gendarme. He was, we were later informed, the deposed civilian administrator of Nyunzu.



It was lashing rain since the arrival of the Gendarmerie. Three unarmed enemy officers were now brought into Group HQ with the idea of clarifying the knotty situation. It was thought that Brigade headquarters would do this but no definite instructions were forthcoming from that source. Some hours had passed in the meantime and darkness was only about two hours away. The idea of having 500 well-armed troops in the vicinity of a camp held by 150 men from "B" Company during the night was not at all pleasant. The Group O/C., therefore, instructed the Gendarmerie officers to move their troops back to Kongola and report back to Nyunzu the following day with about fifty men when we hoped to have some definite information concerning the re-occupation of Nyunzu.

This they did but the fifty for which they got permission was increased to about 100. In the meantime Brigade HQ had informed Group that Gendarmerie would not be permitted to occupy Nyunzu. After some parleying with the Gendarme officers they were told to get to back to where they came from. No further trouble was experienced by us from the Gendarmerie in that area during our stay in Nyunzu.

On the 31st October a patrol from "B" Company left from Nyunzu for the purpose of erecting a suitable base for the memorial cross. Patrol returned at about 1800 hours with nothing, apart from the friendliness of the natives, to report.

On 1st November we were privileged to receive a visit from Mr. Conor Cruise O'Brien, Brig Raja etc. After some refreshments and a brief talk with the local native VIPs they left to continue inspection of UN posts in North Katanga. The following day a train with an Indian troop escort arrived from Albertville to escort Gendarmerie prisoners to Albertville. The local Baluba population became threatening and abusive towards the prisoners. The prime leader and agitator was placed under arrest before any serious attempt had been made to interfere physically with the prisoners. It was thought desirable to reinforce the Indians with some troops from "B" Coy with Comdt Quinlan, "A" Coy in charge of the complete escort. The sending of our troops was much appreciated by the Gendarmere whose O/O before departing, thanked the Group Commander for the treatment accorded him since our arrival in Nyunzu.

It was now decided, because of our imminent departure, to erect the cross which had already been made in Nyunzu, on 5th November. Following a very slow journey to the site at Niemba the cross was erected satisfactorily. Afterwards Mass was celebrated by our Chaplain at the spot, after which we returned to Nyunzu, arriving there about 1930 hours.

Group HQ held a conference dealing with our move back to Kamina prior to returning to Ireland. Journey from Nyunzu to Albertville was to be by train, from there to Kamina by planes. "A" Company to move first.

"B" Company 35th Irish Battalion arrived on 7th November to take over. Train with "B" Coy 1st Inf Group left Nyunzu at 1740 hours arriving at Albertville at 0100 hours. No accommodation was available for our troops at Albertville so we had to make do with what shelter we could procure at the railway station. As there was no indication on that morning when planes would be available to move us to Kamina we set about making some arrangements for feeding, washing and sleeping. The Station Master, a Belgian, kindly moved some rolling stock to our position on the station. This was used as far as possible for sleeping, the overflow making do with some covered veranda on the station platform. Cover of some sort was essential as it was raining continuously during our move. Feeding presented very little problems to the efficient QMs staff, now that the Company was together.

Albertville was a town of uncertainty during our short stay there. Indian mobile troops were constantly patrolling the town to keep the young Baluba element, who were moving in in ever-increasing numbers, armed with an assortment of weapons, from molesting their political opponents and the white population. The latter were making arrangements to get across Lake Tanganika as quickly as possible.

There are two incidents which occurred during our short stay which illustrate the situation obtaining in Albertville. At about 1400 hours Comdt Keogh and myself were standing at the entrance to the Station when we were approached by four Belgian priests who were accompanied by Revd Fr McCabe, chaplain to our Group. They explained that they tried to leave the town to visit their church which was situated on the suburbs but were prevented from doing so by Baluba youths who had set up road blocks on the outskirts of the town. They feared for their safety and that of some nuns who were also living in the same locality. As we were in transit we possessed no transport of any sort. We, Comdt Keogh and myself, approached two different Indian patrols requesting them to provide an escort for the priests but, perhaps because we were misunderstood, neither patrol commander acceded to our request.

We subsequently appropriated two jeeps belonging to civilian UN employees and sent a patrol with the priests. The patrol escorted them to the home where they collected their belongings and then to the convent to pick up the nuns isolated there. The whole were conveyed to the main home or convent which was located in the City. No serious opposition was encountered from the roving Balubas.

At 2359 hours on the same night a roll-call showed that three soldiers were missing. In fact no soldiers were allowed out on that night and orders had been issued to that effect. In the disturbed circumstances it was considered undesirable and indeed quite dangerous to have small numbers of UN personnel around the town. A strong patrol was organised to locate them, three officers volunteering to go with it. After about an hour and a half's search they were found in some night-spot and bundled unceremoniously back to camp. As the patrol moved up the main street of Albertville on its outward journey it was seen by some white families who were making some last-minute preparations to leave by boat the following morning. At 0830 hours Mr. Olbrechts a Belgian, who managed Messrs Samra, a large drapery store adjoining the Du Lac Hotel called to the station to see me. He thanked me most profusely for patrolling the town on the previous night and by so doing instilling a feeling of safety into the white population with the result they retired to bed and enjoyed the first night's sleep for about a week. Little he realised that our patrol had returned to Base at approximately 0130 hours.

Throughout the 9th we moved "B" Coy and stores at irregular intervals as planes became available. Late on the evening of this day the move was completed. The following three or four days were devoted to cleaning and checking of weapons, ammunition and equipment preparatory to handing over to the 35th Battalion.

On the afternoon of the 13th the complete Group was entertained to tea by the JAT Battalion which replaced us in Kamina. This was an enjoyable evening and the generous gesture was very much appreciated by the Irish Contingent.

The Force Commander, accompanied by Mr. Cruise O'Brien and Brig Raja visited Kamina to present all ranks of the 1st Infantry Group with Congo medals. The ceremony which was arranged for outdoors, had to be transferred to one of the hangars because of torrential rain. Later that evening the final concert arranged by "B" Coy took place at the Airport. It was most enjoyable until some few soldiers, having imbibed too liberally, misbehaved to some extent. "B" Coy was, on the following day, held responsible for doing a considerable amount of damage to the airport

building. The first estimate of the cost of repairing the damage was 20,000 francs. It was difficult to understand how this amount was arrived at since the building had been very badly damaged during the fighting in September and had not been repaired in the meantime. It was confirmed that the principal item on the assessment was for the replacement of glass which had, undoubtedly, been broken previously. The assessing officer was requested to meet the O/C of "B" Company in order to carry out a detailed inspection. The former was so busy that he found it impossible to do the inspection as requested. Without a further inspection the assessment was reduced to 9,000 francs. This was even considered exorbitant but, because of our very short stay in Kamina and the non-availability of the assessing officer, it was accepted as final and subsequently paid.

On the morning of the 18th November 61 "B" Company left Kamina for Ireland. No regrets were expressed by anyone before departing. The personnel of "B" Coy, as indeed had the complete Group, carried out the many and varied details and duties under the worst conditions ever experienced by any Irish UNO contingent. Essential amenities such as light, a plentiful or even limited supply of readily available water; reasonable sleeping accommodation was non-existent except in Kamina. Nevertheless each and every man of "B" Company felt a glow of satisfaction in the certain knowledge that they had done pretty well throughout their Congo stint. The outstanding memory was the wonderful spirit of friendliness, comradeship and co-operation that existed at all times between Officers, NCOs and men of "B" Company and those of other UN Units.

With a view to preparing similarly organised Units for overseas service the following recommendations are submitted:-

TRAINING:

1. A Company should be drawn, as far as possible, from one Unit. The practice of making up a Company and even a platoon, from various Commands, Units and Corps has nothing to recommend it.
2. The Company should be organised, concentrated and receive all preliminary training under the command, supervision and guidance of the Officers and NCOs accompanying it overseas.
3. The issue of new weapons, i.e. FN rifle, immediately prior to departure is not commended. Range Practices to be fired should be designed to build up men's confidence in such weapons. One fired by men i.e. three figures at different elevations on a six-foot background is so difficult, even for known good shots, that there was a distinct possibility that the scores obtained would undermine men's confidence in this excellent weapon.
4. The number of Gustafs issued to be reduced and FNs increased accordingly.
5. At least one section of 81 MM mortars should be issued. We were, at all times, outraged by the enemy and potential enemy mortars.

ADMINISTRATION

"Q" ADM

1. The numbers of cooks, three per Company, was found completely inadequate. The minimum suggested is five per Coy to be borne on the strength of Group HQ and supplied to Companies as required.
2. A Baker and Butcher are essential at all times but particularly when Units are stationed in the jungle.

3. It must be remembered that no matter what the conditions or situation are like it will be necessary to form some type of Officers Mess. The Staff for such should be in Group Headquarters and not associated with any Company. Sufficient equipment to form such a Mess and cater for normal replacements and breakages should be issued. It is embarrassing for the Officers concerned and indeed a reflection on our organisation not to be in the position to treat visiting VIPs in a suitable way. We were, on occasions, obliged to dispense hospitality to visiting personalities, black and white, out of decapitated bottles.
4. Due to the possibility of other troops having to serve under conditions equivalent to ours it would be necessary to issue a supply of flat irons to Coys before leaving Ireland.

#### TPT

1. One Corporal Fitter and three official drivers were found inadequate. A Transport Officer and Maintenance Staff should have been included in Group HQ. We never had sufficient official drivers while at one period of our stay we had fifty-two (52) vehicles on charge with only two Corporals and six men to look after them.

#### A ADM

1. The inclusion of a staff officer is not necessary.
2. Conduct sheets of all personnel should be closely scrutinised in order to weed out undesirable men. Men with charges of insubordination, even of a minor nature, are poor risks for overseas service.

#### WELFARE

1. Battery and electric radios should be available on a ratio of two battery and one electric per Company.
2. Record players are also a welcome gift.
3. The supply of papers was good but always completely outdated.
4. Bi-aladdin lamps were found extremely good but there were never enough of spares for replacements. A plentiful supply of methylated spirits should be available.

Finally I suggest that Group Headquarters should be enlarged to cater for sufficient trained personnel to carry out all duties associated with "A", "Q" and Tpt matters. Taking Officers, NCOs and men from the different Companies to do such work - which was a must in our case if we were to function at all - is to be deplored. It removes such personnel from key positions, disrupts essential organisation and consequently reduces considerably the combat efficiency of the Company.

'Q' REPORT - 'B' COY GP, 1 INF GP

1. On formation in April 1961, 'B' Coy Gp was mustered at Limerick and full kits of clothing and web equipment were issued. Much valuable assistance in this work was given by 12 Bn BQMS and CQMS Leo, on loan from 3 Bde. Prior to departure for Congo, further assistance was forthcoming from personnel in Clancy Barracks - OC and Staff, No 3 Grn Ord Coy and Comdt McCanny and staff. With regard to welfare and canteen facilities, a comprehensive briefing was given by Lt-Col Moylett; radios, films and tapes, plus a cheque valued £50 were supplied by the Cork Comforts Committee.
2. On arrival in Kamina in May '61 it soon became apparent that the Coy would depend on our Hydra Cookers for most of our cooking requirements. The fine cookhouses at Kamina Base had modern cooking equipment, but due to lack of maintenance was almost entirely out of action. As regards the number of cooks allotted per Establishment (1 NCO, 3 Cooks), it is recommended that the minimum per Coy Gp should be five. This applied particularly when later the Coy had to establish two posts and also an Officers Mess.
3. The food generally was good at Kamina, with the exception of the bread provided - this was a half-cooked unpalatable concoction which was, on many occasions, deemed unfit for consumption by the MO. The sugar ration proved inadequate for Irish requirements and was supplemented by purchases from canteen funds. It is recommended that an issue of 7ozs per man per day be sought for future contingents of Irish troops.
4. Among the many 'Q' problems which arose in connection with the unit's move to South Kasai was the provision of sufficient charcoal irons, as the new location was without electricity. To cater for troops stationed in bush areas, without electric current, it is recommended that a quantity of flat irons be included in unit stores, as the necessity for ironing and pressing uniforms arises almost daily.
5. On arrival in South Kasai work commenced immediately on the erection of perimeter lighting for security purposes, the Orion lighting set being put to good use in this respect. It was here that the need for the inclusion of qualified electricians in a Coy organisation became very apparent. Throughout the unit's tour of duty, Sgt McLoughlin and his Engr Sec did tremendous work in meeting all the Coy's needs from very limited resources.
6. Rations in South Kasai arrived on an infrequent schedule by plane and train from Luluabourg. These often had to be supplemented from our Irish pack rations. This was the mens first introduction to these packs and they were favourably impressed by the quality and quantity of the items, as also were the British officers of the Ghanaian Contingent who were with us during the hand-over period.

8. Ghena Bde HQ at Luluabourg was most helpful in the matter of supplying most of our ration requirements other than fresh meat. Some supplies of meat were obtainable from KASHIA where the Presbyterian Mission kept a small herd of cattle. In the work of slaughtering and butchering our cooks did a fine job, but the need for a qualified butcher was keenly felt.

9. Due to the operational situation in KASAI it was found necessary on occasions to have at least 30 men on Camp guard, located at various posts, and this made the use of one Hydra container impractical. It is suggested that a small type container be made available to cater for small parties of men of say 20 all ranks.

10. While erecting the many tents and marquees required to house troops and stores in the various posts in Kasai, it became apparent that few NCO's had a first class knowledge of the correct procedure involved - a short course on this important subject would be of much value to NCO's before taking the field on foreign service.

11. Following the Coy's tour of duty in KASAI, we once more returned to Kamina, in Aug '61, where billeting was less of a problem and water and ration supplies more plentiful and regular. Sets of tableware were purchased in the neighbouring town of Kaminaville for both Officers and Senior NCO Messes, and canteen stocks were improved.

12. On the commencement of hostilities in Sep '61 all 'Q' personnel worked overtime keeping the many posts supplied with regular meals and, in addition, contributing staff for the operation of the Base's main supply depot, the RRR.

13. Due to the number of operational patrols in Kasai, stocks of 4x2 and oil were low and it is recommended that units in similar locations (where there is an ever-present fine dust) carry double the normal supply of both these items. Also due to the number of patrols, there had been an abnormal demand on our pack rations. A reserve stock held under unit control would have eased the burden on Coy QM's who had to forage far and wide on occasions to meet ration requirements.

14. The need for extra pack rations was actually felt when the unit received orders to move NORTH to NYUNZU in early Oct '61. Again the problem of erecting tents and marquees arose, and again we found ourselves depending on the Hydra cookers and thankful for the amount of Hydra spares carried. In our new location it was back to the mud ovens for baking bread, but our baker did a magnificent job in keeping the unit supplied with all its bread requirements.

15. A point concerning UN tentage is worthy of note. All UN tentage was oil-soaked in proofing and double roofed. All pegs were iron or steel for use in hard ground. For Irish tentage, some spare sets of poles would appear desirable, to cater for wastage due to dry rot. This applies also to ropes.

ADVANCE PARTY - 1 INF GP.

1. On 16 May, 1961 an Advance Party of 1 Inf Gp departed from Dublin Airport for Congo, flying by USAF Globemaster. In charge was the Gp Ops Offr. (Comdt. P. Keogh) assisted by Lt. V. Blythe, Sgt. Kane and Cpl. Roche and the party carried a consignment of FN Rifles for 35 Irish Bn in Elisabethville with accompanying Ord Staff under the command of Lt. Col. McKenna. Two days later, after short halts at Wheelys Airbase and Kano the Advance Party arrived at Leopoldville, where they were met by the Irish Liaison Officer (Lt. Col D. McCormack). Later that evening the officers were entertained to dinner as guests of the Force Commander (Lt. Gen S. McKeown).
2. The following day (19th May) the Advance Party were introduced to other Irish Officers on the ONUC HQ Staff - Capt. R. Fogarty and Capt. W. Bergin. Arrangements were put in train for the procuring of tropical uniforms and equipment for the Gp., including transport facilities and refrigerators.
3. The Gp Ops Offr received a briefing from the Force Commander on 20th May, which included orders for the initial stationing of the Unit at Kamina and subsequent move to South Kasai Province to take over three outposts from the Ghasa Bde which had its HQ at Luluabourg.
4. The Advance Party flew to Luluabourg on 21st May and there met Brigadier-General Michel and Colonel Breeze of the Ghana Bde. Colonel Breeze briefed the Gp Ops Offr on the situation in the breakaway province of South Kasai and subsequently the officers left Luluabourg for the outposts at MWENE-DITU, LUPUTA and KASHIA. Major Jack Carruth was Officer-in-charge of the Ghana Coy at MWENE-DITU and Major Dickson was OC of the Recce Sqn stationed at LUPUTA and KASHIA. With one exception, all the officers at these outposts were British. That evening the Gp officers were invited to dinner at KASHIA which Major Dickson and his officers attended. On the table was a large card inscribed "CEAD MILE FAILTE GO POBLACHT SOUTH KASAI". This card was the work of a Scottish officer (Lt. McBride) who had a knowledge of Scots Gaelic. While in the area the Gp Ops Offr was introduced to the Bn Comd of the local Kalonji troops, a Capt Etienne, together with some of his officers. This Kalonji unit had a Belgian mercenary (Capt. Lazimoney) as advisor; he subsequently transferred his allegiance to TSHOMBE'S Katanga Gendarmerie and the 1 Inf Gp met him later at KAMINAVILLE. On the following day the Gp Ops Offr travelled with the Ghana Recce Sqn on a small mission to the outskirts of the KASHIA locality. The Gp Officers returned to Leopoldville via Luluabourg on 22nd May.
5. The Gp Ops Officer reported the result of the reconnaissance in South Kasai to the Force Commander and final details concerning the deployment of the Gp were discussed. On 23rd May, a fatigue party from 34 Irish Bn arrived from Elisabethville and rendered valuable assistance in preparing a reception centre for the Gp at Camp MARTINI. The first plane of the main body of 1 Inf Gp arrived in Leopoldville on Sat., 27th May and during the next four days the remaining five chinks arrived. Each chink was met at the airport on arrival and was transported by the Pakistani transport elements to Camp MARTINI where meals were provided and tropical uniforms issued.
6. On completion of the work in Leopoldville the Advance Party flew to Kawina and joined the main body in preparing for the move to South Kasai Province.

REPORT BY GROUP INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Movements, Locations, Activities, Actions:-

1. At 2115 hrs 25th May 1961, Group Headquarters left Baldonnel on Chalk I en route to the CONGO. Staging through Wheelus Base, Libya, Kano in Nigeria we arrived in Leopoldville at 1430 hrs on the 27th. Here we were greeted by the Force Commander Gen McKeown, and some of his Staff, and within twenty minutes left for a transit Camp outside the city. After a meal we were issued with tropical uniforms which even though they didnt fit too well, were nevertheless cool and light.
2. This was our first chance to have a shower since leaving Wheelus and after 13½ hours flying it was very welcome indeed. We took off for Kamina in darkness at 0400 hrs on the 28th and arrived there on Sunday morning at 1000 hrs. It was a pleasant trip, possibly due to the fact that we had become accustomed to Globemaster travel.
3. Our move into Kamina was helped by the fact that the 34th Bn had provided a small party to prepare billets, houses etc., for us. The lack of transport however was a big handicap in moving in subsequent Chalks, and endeavouring to carry on normal duty at the same time. Another snag was the distance between our quarters and the unit HQ; and the complete absence of telephone communication between unit HQ and Base HQ, two miles away.
4. We spent approximately two weeks in Kamina, sorting out stores, equipment, weapons, ammunition etc. In view of our move to disease ridden Kasai smallpox vaccinations for all were a must, so our MOs were kept busy. "A" Company were the first to move out by rail on 8th June, and arrived at their new locations on the 9th, Company HQ plus three platoons at Luputa and one platoon at Kashia.
5. Our stay in Kamina was not all work. The Mess (Kalunga Mess, in Base 2) was good and the swimming pool was a favourite attraction. There was a very good sports stadium complete with running track, soccer pitch and boxing ring quite near the Mess. There were also free cinema shows in the Base cinema each evening, and for the more energetic, tennis by floodlight.
6. Group HQ and "B" Company left Kamina by rail on the 16th at 1330 hrs and arrived at Luputa 21 hours later. The train was very comfortable and two meals were served on the journey. During the night we stopped on the Katanga/Kasai border at Kaniama, and the pipe band played on the platform, much to the delight of the natives who no doubt did not mind losing a night's sleep to hear such weird and wonderful music.
7. Train journeys in the Congo meant plenty of work for the platoon commanders. Each train had a guard at either end, plus another in the middle. The platoon commanders travelled in the same carriages as their men and had to be constantly on the alert to see that all were in readiness to repel an attack.
8. 'A' Company HQ at Luputa, was a camp beside the railway station, and here on arrival we had our first meal in Kasai. The location of Group HQ was Kashia, 4¾ miles West of Luputa. This is a very good station, occupied by a Presbyterian Mission. It stands on high ground, and there was a supply of water available, a local plant provided electricity.



9. B' Company continued their journey to Mwene-Ditu by rail and took over the Camp there that evening from the Ghanians. Group HQ moved from Kashia to Mwene-Ditu on 19th of June. All movements outside our camp in Kasai had to be accompanied by platoon strength escorts. Our opposite numbers, the Kalondji Army, were an untidy, undisciplined lot but were well armed. They had camps near ours in both Luputa and Mwene-Ditu and during the time we spent in Kasai numerous incidents occurred which caused us much trouble and inconvenience.
10. Our mission in Kasai was to maintain the boundary line, which was the railway from Mwene-Ditu - Luputa to the Katanga border, and separated the Kalondjis from the Kaniokas. The Kalondjis were a well-armed outfit, all the Kaniokas had bows and arrows and a few muzzle-loading rifles. Both Mwene-Ditu and Luputa were Kanioka towns and were now occupied by the Kalondjis. As both were centres of trade their loss to the Kaniokas seriously affected their economy. With the departure of most of the Belgians from these towns the natives moved in and occupied their houses. Supplies in the few shops that existed were at a very low level and very high prices could be asked and got for such essentials as shirts, shoes, trousers, while luxuries like watches and transistor radios seemed to have a "status" symbol and were eagerly sought after by the more affluent natives.
11. Hunger and disease were wide-spread in Kasai, particularly smallpox. The mission stations run by nuns, and priests and also the non-Catholic missions did splendid work in alleviating the suffering of these unfortunate people. In Mwene-Ditu there was a large convent run by a French/Canadian order of Christ the King and hundreds of youngsters both boys and girls were given a basic education up to our primary certificate standard. Belgian fathers helped in the running of the schools which had their own electricity generating plant, and water supply. The large number of orphan children being cared for by the nuns bore testimony to the tragedies attendant on "independence". There was also a good maternity hospital run by the same order of nuns attached to the convent, and our MOs supplied any medicines and drugs which the nuns required.
12. Our Camp in Mwene-Ditu was bordered on three sides by the native village and on the fourth side by the railway station. We had barbed wire entanglements and sentry posts around the perimeter of the Camp, while within the restricted space of  $1\frac{3}{4}$  acres the ground was criss-crossed with slit trenches and mortar pits. Deep trench latrines which had to be opened and closed very frequently further reduced the available space, and when it is considered that at least 170 all ranks approximately were in occupation of the Camp at any one time and that of those at least 150 lived in tents it can be seen that facilities for recreation were non-existent. At least 30 NCOs and men were required each night for guard duties, and another 40 twice per day for water patrols. In addition, airport guards often meant the calling out of bed of men who had been on duty the previous night, especially if the unit had a long range patrol out, or a train guard.
13. Generally speaking our relations with the local population were on a friendly basis, perhaps this was due to the fact that we did not mix with them. We were on friendly terms too with the Kalondji Army, particularly with the commander of the local garrison at Mwene-Ditu a Capt Etienne.
14. There were huge numbers of refugees in the town and these had to be fed and given some form of medical treatment when required. The UN HQ at Luluabourg had established a Famine Relief centre at

Mwene-Ditu and this centre was efficiently staffed by Mr. Cathedra a Greek and Mr. Mutier. As assistants they had 15/20 Pakistanis, NCOs and men who drove and serviced the trucks allotted to the centre. Dried fish, mannioc and rice were the principle form of relief dispensed. In addition supplies of DDT were alsway in demand to combat the ever present threat of malaria.

15. During our stay in Mwene-Ditu we were invited by "King" Albert Kalondji, self-styled ruler of South Kasai, to attend a parade, and also to visit the Administrative Office and Burgomasters Office. The Administrative building had been the former Belgium one and was of modern design. During our visit to the various offices we noticed large scale wall maps of the Congo still headed "Congo Belge", this eight months after "independence". It was ever more remarkable as far as we were concerned because all our Congo maps issued by UN HQ had the "Belge" part of the title carefully deleted.
16. The "Mayoress" of Mwene-Ditu was a remarkable character. Age uncertain possibly 60, medium height, thin, wore dirty gym-shoes, no socks, a long one piece frock and when not smoking "butts" chewed the sulphur end of matches. She apparently was a person of some importance in the Kalondji heirarchy, as she sat next to the "King" at the meetings, and travelled in the same car. Numerous other ministers of State and officials visited us at our HQ during our stay in Mwene-Ditu, including Mulkamba, the Minister for the Interior, Ngalula, Vice Pres, South Kasai, Civil Administrator, Kazadi, Minister for gendarmerie and Information, Col Kabangu, Chief of Staff, South Kasai Forces, and all partook of the hospitality which we dispensed so liberally without ever offering to return the compliment.
17. Our bailwick in South Kasai stretched Westwards to Tabacong, a distance of 96 miles from Mwene-Ditu. This village was in Bekete territory and on the 30th of June we received an order from HQ 1 Ghana Inf Bde Group, to whom we were under command, to send a patrol there. We had two helicopters in support of this mission, which we used on route recce bringing along the commander of the patrol and his 2 i/c.
18. On the 3rd of July the patrol moved out, its strength, two platoons with sp weapons (61 mm Mors and 84 mm Atk) Capt Ahern was the patrol commander and Capt Sloan travelled as signal officer. The group OC, Ops Offr, 1.O. and "B" Coy Comdr, travelled by helicopters along the route, and on the evening of the 3rd found the patrol stuck on a jungle bridge by a broken-down truck. After quite a struggle the bridge was cleared and the truck abandoned temporarily. The next morning the patrol reached its objective, Tabacong, and the CO and staff landed by helicopters in the centre of the village. A conference was held with the local administrator who expressed a hope that the IRISH would stay and garrison the village, and provide protection for the people who feared both the Kalondji and the Lulus. It was a pleasant spot and would have been ideal for a company position, however our already over-extended group just could not accept a further commitment so all we could promise was future patrols to keep an eye on things.
19. The return journey was made without incident and the broken-down truck was towed as far as the Ghana company position at Kele.
20. Later patrols of 10 hour duration were made to Tshinsiboi Kalenda, Lusuka and shorter ones to Luputa, Kashia and Tilen. The object of these patrols was to check on Kalondji troop movements and to note the attitude of the natives in these areas towards the UN.

21. On the 12th July a report from one of our patrols indicated that large numbers of Kalondji troops and Kaniokas were facing each other at Lusuka and it appeared that a clash between them was imminent. Because this village was outside the boundary line of the railway, and in Kanioka territory the Group Commander sent for Capt Etienne. As Etienne was not available his 2 ic, Lieut Jean Kadima, arrived at our HQ. He was informed by Col. O'Donovan that the Kalondji troops would have to be evacuated from Lusuka before 1400 hrs the following day. The Kalondkists had also reinforced at Tshababa and the railway bridge on the Katanga border and were known to have received these reinforcements from Gandajika.
22. The following morning Etienne reported to Group HQ with Lieut Kadima, his 2 ic and Lieut Kasanboa, his adjutant. He asked for a meeting between his Minister for the Interior, Mulkamba and Caballero, Civil Affairs Adviser, UN HQ, Luluabourg, to clarify the border position between Luputa and the Katanga border. He also asked the Colonel to suspend the 1400 hr ultimatum pending the outcome of the meeting.
23. In the meantime we were receiving reports from "A" Coy patrols which indicated that the Kalondji forces at Lusuku, were two coys strong, equipped with MMGs, LMGs, FN Rifles and Grenades. This put "A" Coy in an awkward position especially if the ultimatum had to be enforced, as they were inferior in numbers and weapons. In addition we would have found it practically impossible to assist them, as HQ and "B" Coy, were 30 miles away and would have had a tough job battling their way to the rescue.
24. At 1130 hrs on 15 July, Caballero arrived from Luluabourg, accompanied by the Ghana Bde. Commander OTU, and Major Dixon. Etienne, his Adj and 2 ic and Civil Administrator of Mwene-Ditu were also present. The conference opened without the Minister, Mulkamba, and it was the Bde Comdr who outlined the situation and stated that the boundary was the railway line, Mwene-Ditu - Luputa and then the Road, Luputa-Gandajika, as an Eastern boundary to the Kalondjis. This was news to us, as we had been led to believe that the railway to the border was the boundary. Capt Etienne too was taken by surprise and obviously had no idea of this change. He agreed to halve his forces at their present positions and not to provoke any trouble between themselves and the Kaniokas, and furthermore that he would not interfere with the Kanioka conference then taking place at Kashia.
25. Two days later the Minister for the Interior arrived and another conference was held, Col O'Donovan and his Staff represented the UN. The Minister said he was aware of the discussions of the previous meeting and agreed with them. He also agreed that we should be informed of all their troop movements in the disputed areas.
26. As "A" Coy were bearing the brunt of the patrols and alarms it was decided to change them over with 'B' Coy. By the 19th of July the change - over was completed. The Company Medical officers were the only ones who didnot change, because it was felt that they were more in touch with the medical situation in their own areas and it was hoped that by the end of the month we would be leaving Kasai.
27. On the 19th also we had a "farewell" visit from Brigadier Otu, Ghana Bde, and some of his staff and a "take over" visit from Brigadier Goulson Nigerian Bde Comdr, and Col Kavanagh OC of the Battalion who were to take over from us. The plan for our departure from Kasai was discussed, in the meanwhile we were to withdraw our Platoon from Kashia, and send another to Kele to take over from the Ghanians and hold the position until relieved by the

Nigerians.

28. On the 22nd the platoon moved to KELE, and took over, and on the 25th left KELE for KAMINA via MWENE-DITU. At MWENE-DITU, a refugee family, seven in number, of Mr. Tshipama, were taken on board the train en route to KAMINA where the father was working. The family had been located in the village of MWENE-DITU MUKAYA, by the I.O. and Signal Officer, and the necessary exit documents for the family had been procured from the Civil Administrator and Chief of Police of Mwene-Ditu. On the afternoon of the 26th the train reached KAMINA and there the family was once more reunited.
29. The following day the first rain of the season fell in MWENE-DITU. Accompanied by thunder and lightning, torrential rain fell during the night and soon swamped the Camp. Tents and marquees, were blown down, slit trenches and weapon pits were filled with water, and the troops had to be moved into the few available houses and the tents abandoned. The Adjutant, and I.O. stood fast in their tent, having had the good fortune to have prepared a twelve inch trench all around it, with floor boards inside which at least kept their feet dry.
30. One advantage the rain did bring was that for the first time since our arrival in MWENE-DITU on the 19th of June we were able to have a shower, even though the water was red. Water or lack of it, was one of our major problems in KASAI. In MWENE-DITU the supply of fresh water was controlled by the KALONDJISTS through the one pump in the town, while for washing purposes we were forced to pump water from a river seven miles away. All these water patrols necessitated the dispatch of at least a platoon to the water points for security purposes. Sometimes we were unlucky enough to get to the town pump just as the supply ran out, on other occasions we had pumping trouble at the river and would have to return to Camp to repair the pump and then return to the river in the afternoon. The bridge over the river where we set up our water drums and from which we lowered the pump was very narrow and while we were pumping all traffic had to stop. There was high ground on both sides, so our escort platoon had to take up defensive positions to guard against surprise attack. We usually brought 14 x 40-gallon drums, full of river water back to Camp, this sufficed for one day's needs. We were indeed very glad to hear that we were soon to finish with pumping problems as the date of our departure had been set for August 4th.
31. On the 27th of July we came under command of 3rd Nigerian Bde, LULUABOURG. Before leaving KASAI we had a farewell dinner at Group HQ in MWENE-DITU. Capt Etienne and his staff were present, with the local Curé and Civil Administrator. All wished the unit well and said how sorry they were to see us leave.
32. The following morning we sent a large patrol to LUPUTA to evacuate the remaining platoons of "B" Company. All UN and Irish equipment was removed from the Camp and two UN trucks which were unserviceable were towed back to MWENE-DITU. On the 4th of August Group HQ left for KAMINA by air and the following morning Col O'Donovan took over as Base Commander, KAMINA.
33. The following appointments were made after the first conference in Kamina. Comdt Keogh, Base Operations Officer, Comdt Hayes, Camp Comdt No. 1 Base, Capt A. Murphy, Base Adjutant, Capt Sloan, Base Transport Officer, Capt Mulvihill, Base Intelligence Officer, Capt Dawson, OC R.R.R. (Supply Depot), Capt Hartigan, Base Logistics Officer.
34. On the 10th of August the Group was finally concentrated at KAMINA, with the arrival from KASAI of "A" Company, plus the last platoon of "B" Company. All our transport and refrigerators etc., also arrived so at last we could settle down to a life of ease. All the

unit was concentrated in Base I, near the airport, while the HQ Staff, plus one platoon were operating from Base HQ in Base II, seven miles away. This necessitated quite a lot of travelling by the Staff each day so we were glad to have the extra jeeps etc., which came back from KASAI.

35. We found the civilian side of the UN staff at KAMINA Base very helpful and cooperative during our settling-in period as "Masters" of the Base. Thrice weekly conferences, which were attended by the representatives of all units including the civilians, kept all of us in the "picture" as to events and happenings in our large bailiwick. The social side was not neglected either and the Base Commander and his Staff attended a Cocktail party given by the Austrian Medical team, and another given by Mr. Caprario, Base Administrator. In return we gave a big party in our Mess at LUMWE to which we invited all the civilian and military UN representatives on the Base. In addition we also invited a large group of Belgian friends from KAMINAVILLE. Our relations with the Belgians were excellent, and indeed we were very friendly too with the CO of the Gendarmerie battalion in KAMINAVILLE Major Barveau. The Grand Chef, Kasango Niemba, was favourable disposed towards us early on, but the influence of his Belgian political advisor, Mauden, who was anti UN, gradually turned him against us. Still during the month of August we enjoyed ourselves. There was swimming a plenty in both pools daily and sometimes by the more intrepid few at night. Nightly cinema shows for all, plus a very good mess and excellent bar soon made us forget any of the KASAI hardships. Capt Tom Ryan deserves the highest praise for the splendid job he did in making our mess, including the bar, so popular. A Danish entertainment group visited us towards the end of August, and put on a very fine show, which was much appreciated by all on the base.
36. The Force Commander visited us on two occasions, as did Dr. Conor Cruise O'Brien, Mr. Khiari and OC Katanga Command, Brigadier Raja.
37. Towards the end of the month rumours of impending trouble in KATANGA reached us, and on the night of August 27th we received secret orders from HQ LEOPOLDVILLE to arrest all white officers serving with the Gendarmerie at 0500 hrs the following morning. This order was later amended for us in KAMINA to read by 0900 hrs instead of 0500 hrs.
38. On the morning of the 28th of August, the Ops Officer and I.O. left the Base for KAMINAVILLE to carry out this order. Their mission was to arrest four named officers and bring them back to the Base. When they reached KAMINAVILLE they found the Gendarmerie out in force with a road block set up at the entrance to the town. Both officers were forced at gunpoint to leave their cars, and were thoroughly searched as was the car. On being allowed to enter the town they immediately set out to search for the white officers. Having found no trace of them they returned to Base and reported to Col O'Donovan.
39. Two hours later, accompanied by the Base Commander they again set out for KAMINAVILLE. This time the car was again stopped three miles outside the Base by a gendarmerie patrol of four armoured cars, and a platoon of lorry borne infantry. The I.O. was taken out of the car and held as a hostage, while the Base Commander and Ops Officer were allowed to proceed. After about 45 minutes sitting in the sun with no shade, a Hungarian doctor serving with the Gendarmerie arrived in a jeep, and very kindly offered the I.O a lift into KAMINAVILLE. On entering the town they met Col O'Donovan and Comdt Keogh, and all were invited

into the "Hotel Welcome" for a drink by the doctor. We noted that the attitude of the Belgians was decidedly cool and that some of those whom we greeted turned away from us. It is possible that they did not wish to appear over friendly towards us as the natives were watching them closely.

40. At 1600 hrs on the 28th of August the first batch of detainees arrived at Base I, a total of 76 officers and NCOs. They had come from Elisabethville. The Swedish Engineer battalion had placed wire and floodlights around the batchelor quarters WEST of LUMWE Mess, and here the detainees were housed. Capt Tommy Hartigan was appointed OC of the detainee Camp, with Lieut Tom McGrath as his 2IC.

41. The following morning two gendarmerie armoured cars and a platoon of infantry were posted on the road, KAMINA - KAMINAVILLE, one mile from the Base. To counter this the Base Commander ordered a platoon from the Swedish company to dig in at the LUPULA barrier astride the KAMINAVILLE road. During the next few days there was a further influx of detainees from Elisabethville, Manono and Albertville, until we had a strength of 113 officers and NCOs, 3 Women and 5 Children. During the night of 30th August two internees escaped from the Camp and eventually made their way back to Elisabethville.

42. Mixed patrols of UN and gendarmerie were organised to patrol KAMINAVILLE, commencing 1st Sept. The UN contingent was a platoon plus in strength and was made up of IRISH and SWEDISH troops. The object of the patrols was to ease the tension in the town and reassure the white population who at this stage were beginning to worry about their future. The UN patrol left the Base each evening at approximately 1900 hrs and joined up with the Gendarmerie patrol on the main street of KAMINAVILLE. It was usual to have every second vehicle in the patrol a UN one. The patrol drove around all the streets of the town and usually returned to Base at 2100 hrs.

43. A report received on the evening of 1st September indicated that fifty European families had been arrested by the natives at KANIAMA on the KATANGA/KASAI border. The Base Commander ordered an aerial recce for the following morning, and the I.O. and Signal Officer left by DC3 to carry out the mission. A thorough recce showed no sign of trouble, the natives were in their own section of the town and the whites apparently in theirs. Our arrival overhead caused some panic among the gendarmeria at KANIAMA. We could see them dashing out of their barracks and heading hastily for the airfield. We did not land!

44. On the 1st September a Sabena DC7 arrived at KAMINA and evacuated 64 officers, 2 NCOs, 3 Women and 3 Children to Brussels. We were very glad to see them go because the Mess was overcrowded and our precious supplies of liquor were rapidly disappearing down the thirsty throats of our "guests". Those who left on this flight had already been interrogated by a special team from HQ, Leopoldville, and found not to have been mixed up in the killing of LUMUMBA. On subsequent days up to the 15th, further plane loads departed for Brussels. On the instructions of HQ, Leopoldville, three former gendarmerie officers, and one civilian were sent to Leopoldville under escort. These four were suspected of having information as to the death of LUMUMBA, and one of them Chalmoix or Hugh Chalmers, a former Group Mobile Officer in the Albertville area, was a native of Stranraer. A Mr. Herman Stainslans was also sent to Leo, he claimed to have been a lawyer in the KATANGA government service.

45. The mixed patrols helped to ease the tension in KAMINAVILLE and until the 13th September these were made nightly. On the evening of the 12th the I.O. went to KAMINAVILLE on the instructions of the Base Commander and escorted Major Barvaux to the Base. He advised

us to suspend the nightly patrols as local agitators were stirring up anti UN feeling in the native quarter. The I.O later escorted Major Barvaux back to the town. The major is to be praised for his action in coming to the Base, as it obviously was a danger for him to be seen with a UN officer. The I.O. noted that the town was strangely quiet and that a number of shops were closed and had the shutters up. There were no gendarmerie to be seen however, either in the town, or on the road back to Base.

46. The following day road blocks were set up by the gendarmerie between the Base and KAMINAVILLE, 12 miles away. The estimated strength of the gendarmerie at the block, three miles from the Base was two companies of infantry and six armoured cars. Later in the day we learned that the UN PX civilian employees, who had gone to the town earlier in the day for supplies, had not been allowed to return to Base and had been taken into custody by the gendarmerie. A full scale alert was in operation at the Base and a section of IRISH mortars joined the SWEDISH platoon at the LUPULA barrier.
47. On the morning of the 14th September, Grand Chef, Kasongo Niembo, requested us to allow his two sons and one thousand of his followers to leave the Base. He said that he was afraid that the UN would attack them. They were advised that they were in no danger but that they were free to leave the Base and return to KAMINAVILLE if they wished. The Grand Chef's sons left the Base but his followers stayed where they were.
48. Next day we were advised that the male population of the district had been armed in preparation for an attack on the Base. The overall strength was 20,000 approximately, and we could expect an attack that evening.
49. At 1630 hrs on the 14th the Gendarmerie attacked the LUPULA (KAMINAVILLE) Barrier with 37 mm cannon mortar and machine gun fire. They had two companies of infantry for this attack supported by two armoured cars armed with 37 mm cannon and 5 MMGs. The SWEDISH platoon supported by the IRISH mortar section returned the fire, knocking out the two armoured cars, and an ammunition truck which was following up behind the AFVs. Gendarmerie casualties were ten to twenty killed, and thirty wounded. The UN troops suffered no casualties. The enemy withdrew into the bush on both sides of the road, and kept up a steady rain of 81.MM mortar fire. Their shooting was not very accurate but they did succeed in knocking out the transmitting station in Base 2.
50. Our mission in KAMINA was to defend the airport and keep it open for UN aircraft. As planned Base 2 was evacuated except for the military. Prior stocks of food, water, amn, P.O.L. etc., had already been located at Base I and our dispositions were as follows: One SWEDISH company less the platoon at the Barrier and another platoon at the Roundabout were at the Swedish camp in Base I. Two IRISH companies less the mortar section at the Barrier and Platoon (+) at KILUBI were in the Airport area in Base I. The civilians both UN, and natives withdrew to the airport buildings. Group HQ, was set up in the airport and the CANADIAN signals joined us there. At 1945 hrs that night most of the UN civilians, both men, women and children were evacuated by air to LEOPOLDVILLE. Only UN secretary, Miss Sandra Classeiri, remained on the Base, as assistant to the Base Civil Administrator, Maurice GAVRAU.
51. Our radio communications were disrupted for a while, however we succeeded in re-establishing them again by using the control tower radio facilities via LULUABOURG in KASAI. At the same time we sent a message to HQ ONUC requesting reinforcements of one company with heavy weapons as soon as possible. OC 3 Nigerians

called on the radio and promised to send a company to support us provided HQ Leo gave him the "go ahead". He never got the "go ahead".

52. Meanwhile the gendarmerie were building up their strength in preparation for a big attack the following day. The railway line from KAMINAVILLE ran through the Base Supply Depot and right down to the Hangars on the airfield. This was a danger to our defences as the gendarmerie were known to have an armoured train in KAMINAVILLE. To counter this threat Col O'Donovan ordered two sections of the line to be blown, one section on the enemy side of the supply depot and the other outside the perimeter of the airfield. The Base I.O, a Swedish Engineer Officer Lieut Allanson and Sgt McLaughlin set out at 2030 hrs and accomplished the mission without incident. At 2330 the same party were detailed to blow a bridge on one of the entrances to the Base. Lieut Tom McGrath's platoon were occupying a defensive position here and were very glad to see them arrive. After two hours hard work the charge was finally ready for firing, however just before lighting the fuse, Lt Allanson (Sweden) noticed that we would undoubtedly blow an electricity pylon which could just be seen near the bridge in inky darkness. We had to set to again and remove the packing and explosive from under the bridge. We immobilised a 5 ton truck on the bridge and as it was covered by fire it served as a good obstacle. We could have taken a chance on blowing the pylon as it turned out afterwards, because the following evening the gendarmerie blew one twelve miles NORTH of the Base and so cut off our electricity supply. In anticipation of this we had the stand-by generators at the airport ready so we were able to carry on without serious delays.
53. The large numbers of CONGOLESE who had fled their homes and were now milling around in the airport vicinity created a problem. It was decided that the following morning they would be encouraged to return to their homes or alternatively they would be moved out to the hangars.
54. At 0930 hours on the 15th fighting broke out again on the Camp farm, and another attack was launched at the Barrier. Shortly afterwards a company of Swedish troops with four dogs arrived. These were welcome reinforcements and gave us an opportunity to reorganise our defences. A new and unexpected problem arose at 1240 hrs with the arrival of the FOUGA jet. He attacked the airport with cannon and machine gun fire, and dropped some 15lbs bombs. One Congolese was killed, two injured while one UN pilot was injured by the machine gun fire. A UN C.119 aircraft was slightly damaged. At 1800 hrs sixty (60) gendarmerie attacked the hospital in Base 2 and the Base HQ building. The UN troops at the Barrier and Base HQ counter - attacked and drove off the enemy destroying an enemy ammunition truck and two mortars.
55. From the 16th the FOUGA became a regular visitor twice per day, early morning and mid-day. On the 16th however he attacked at 1030 hrs and caught a patrol of Malayan armoured cars as they crossed the tarmac on their return from a recce patrol. Two aircraft on the ground were machine gunned but suffered no serious damage. The Signal officer was about to take off on an air recce when the jet arrived and caused the pilots some anxious moments as they taxied out to the runway. The same day all the Congolese were moved out of the airport buildings and accommodated in one of the Hangars. We were very glad to see them go because since their arrival the smell of manioc was all over the airport buildings.
56. On the evening of the 16th the last platoon of the second Swedish company arrived as well as a company (+) of Indians. This brought



the UN strength on the Base to two Irish Companies, less KILUBI garrison of a platoon (+), two Swedish Companies and a company (+) of Indians. In the meantime the garrison at KILUBI had been surrounded by the gendarmerie and as the power line to the Base had been cut and their food was running short it was decided to evacuate them. This called for an airlift by helicopters which would have to come from LULUABOURG.

57. On the 17th the FOUGA had its most successful day. A DC4 aircraft had just been pushed out of the Hangar after servicing and was doing a ground run check when the jet attacked. The aircraft was hit by a bomb, and riddled by machine gun fire which wounded all the crew. The aircraft blazed firececy but the crew were got out of it before the undercarriage collapsed. All crew members had been wounded and were later evacuated by air to LEOPOLDVILLE. The aircraft was a total loss.
58. Shortage of heavy weapons including AA guns, mortar, bazooka and machine gun ammunition were our biggest problem during the first two days and frantic calls were made to HQ at LEOPOLDVILLE for supplies. Gradually the supplies of ammunition improved, by the nightly arrival of supply aircraft, but heavy weapons had still to come. The gendarmerie meanwhile continued to harass us with 81 mm mortars; they seemed to have an endless supply of ammunition. Our reply was 60 mm mortars which had neither the range nor weight. However, our superior training soon overcame this disadvantage.
59. On the 18th we received news that Dag HAMMARSKJOLD, the secretary General had been killed in an aircrash near NDOLA, and all UN flags were flown at half mast for three days.
60. The Canadian signals meanwhile had set up a continuous watch on the gendarmerie nets, and were able to monitor all their conversation. This gave us valuable information as to their intentions, locations and supply position. Capt C. Garnau, O/C Canadian Signal detachment is to be highly complemented on the efficiency of his unit.
61. By the 20th it appeared that the gendarmerie were expecting a big attack by the ANC from the KASAI side of the LUBILASH River, as instructions were given to blow all bridges over the river. This indicated that they would be unable to reinforce for an all out attack on the Base for at least some time. As there were at least seven major approaches to this huge Base of 100 sq. miles, not to mention innumerable jungle tracks, it was decided that mines and trip-wires should be used in front of all positions. The Swedish engineer officer, Lt Allanson, and our own engineers laid the mines and set up the trip-wires. In most cases we were able to cover these by fire, but the jungle tracks were so numerous that all we could hope for was early warning from trip flares.
62. The Fouga continued to harass us twice daily, his object being to "knock out" the Control Tower and so make it impossible for us to receive reinforcements and supplies by night. He very nearly succeeded as on one occasion, he dropped a bomb within thirty feet of the tower and broke all the glass with machine gun fire and shrapnel from the bomb. He also ruined a very nice airport bar, the walls of which were gashed and pitted by shrapnel from the bomb. Fortunately no one was injured. Our greatest concern at the time was that he would hit our aviation spirit dump at PETROLCONGO. This was a huge installation about  $\frac{3}{4}$  mile from the control tower. Had he hit this the surrounding buildings and the tower would surely have been badly damaged, if not completely destroyed. In view of the very near misses it was decided to take our Vickers machine gunners off the roof of the airport building as there was

- grave danger that they would be blown off by the blast from the bombs. How we wished for a battery of AA guns or a few jet fighters. As it was, all we could hope for was that the Fouga would be tempted to come low enough to be hit by machine gun fire from the ground.
63. Apart from limited attacks from the Farm area, and the C.T.B. Camp, the gendarmerie relied mainly on harrassing fire from their mortars. Our forward platoons in Base 2 counter-attacked and cleared them out of the Base on the few occasions they penetrated. We were not allowed to launch an attack outside the Base, which we could have done from the 19th onwards. The OC of the 2 Jats, Lt Col Rajuragh Singh, took over control of the Indian troops on the Base and inspected all UN positions. He was still sending frantic messages to Leo, looking for his heavy mortar platoon which had not arrived at KAMINA. The 120mm mortars would have been a valuable asset.
  64. On the 19th we heard for the first time that both the BBC and the newspapers were reporting the Base as having been captured by the enemy. Knowing full well that these wild rumours would cause our relatives at home much concern, we sent urgent signals to our HQ staff in Leopoldville asking them to deny these rumours. We suspected that some of the Control Tower Staff (ICAO employees) may have been panicked by the air attacks, and called for help to Leopoldville, exaggerating the situation. As for newspaper representatives, the only ones we saw in KAMINA during the trouble were two correspondents, one from a German Paper and the other from the Sunday Times.
  65. At 2000 hrs on the 19th we started the evacuation of the Kilubi garrison by helicopters. Flying eight round trips the evacuation was completed at 0530 hours on the 20th. Only personal weapons and ammunition were brought back, all other UN and Irish equipment, including fridges and transport were destroyed.
  66. Later in the morning we received a signal from HQ Luluabourg indicating that they had intercepted a gendarmerie radio message on the KAMINAVILLE net which called for two aircraft, and 2 x 20mm anti aircraft guns. This indicated that they intended to make a bold effort to shoot down all UN aircraft trying to land at KAMINA, and so deny us vital supplies of food and ammunition.
  67. Before the helicopters returned to Luluabourg, our Ops officer I.O. and Swedish platoon commanders carried out an air recce of our own and the enemy positions. The enemy opened fire on the helicopters over the LUPULA barrier area but did not score any hits. The fire was returned by the Ops officer and I.O.
  68. It would have helped the Base Comdr, and his Staff to make an up to date assesment of situation daily if HQ could have provided us with a recce aircraft permanently stationed at the Base. On the odd occasion when we had one it proved invaluable for a recce of the enemy positions. An air recce three times a day of all approaches in a radius of 30 miles from the Base would have left the staff in a very happy position as all enemy moves could have been countered with the minimum amount of force and movement.
  69. At 2030 hrs on the 20th of September we received a message from HQ Leopoldville indicating that a cease-fire agreement had been reached between TSHOMBE and the UN, effective as from midnight that night. The agreement provided that all airlifts of Arms, ammunition and other warlike stores to and from KATANGA would be immediately suspended. The airlifting of troops into or from KATANGA was also suspended. The cease fire brought an end to the air attacks, but did not make life any easier for the troops who

still continued to live in the trenches. Numerous reports of gendarmerie entering the Base had to be investigated and some proved to be true, while others were cases of mistaken identity, such as the Indians reporting trucks of gendarmerie in Base 2 which, when investigated, proved to be two trucks of Congolese workers. From the 22nd onwards, meetings took place almost daily between Base Commander or his representatives, and the gendarmerie representatives at the LUPULA barrier. Matters relating to the cease fire, missing civilians, equipment, armoured cars etc., were ironed out in an amicable fashion.

70. On September 22nd Mr. Frank Aiken, our External Affairs Minister, literally 'dropped' in on us. His DC3 aircraft overshot the runway and crash-landed in the rough, its left undercarriage leg collapsed and the aircraft tilted over on one wing. The Minister escaped without a scratch and soon joined us for a few drinks and later tea. He left in a relief aircraft for E'Ville at 2015 hrs.
71. The Austrian Medical team left KAMINA for STANLEYVILLE on the 25th Sept. Prior to their departure the I.O. and Norwegian MP Officer, Capt Owdegaard investigated theft of pistols, radios and clothing from their Stores. Most of the missing items were found in a house in the LUMWE area, and were returned to the Austrians prior to their departure. That afternoon the Farm area was reced in detail. There were no gendarmerie there, but there were all the signs of a previous occupation, remains of a dead pig, empty tins of condensed milk etc. The remaining farm animals looked quite healthy and lacked only water.
72. Rumours of renewed attacks by the gendarmerie were being spread in the village of NTOBO, in Base 2. The object of the rumours apparently being to cause a mass exodus of Congolese to the airport. To counter this the I.O. and Norwegian MPs had road blocks set up around the village and confiscated all native transport. Two Congolese who had come back to the Base, having spent ten days in KAMINAVILLE, were arrested for spreading the rumours.
73. Mr. Pierre Bouchan, Manager Banque du Congo, arrived from E'Ville on the 27th with an authorisation from Tshombe, Cruise O'Brien and Raja, to travel in UN aircraft. The object of his visit was to liberate UN funds which had been frozen in the Banks by Tshombe at the start of the trouble. He went to KAMINAVILLE and returned the same evening being escorted by the gendarmerie to and from LUPULA barrier to the town. On his return he was questioned by the I.O. about conditions there. He had visited Kasongo Niemba and leading Belgian civilians, he reported the town as being calm but business practically at a stand still.
74. The cease fire commission arrived from E'Ville on the 29th and toured the Base, accompanied by the Base Comdr. and his Staff. In the afternoon they left for KAMINAVILLE in two saloons, driven by the Signals Officer and the Base I.O. Three miles from Base, at MWITABE, the cars were stopped by the gendarmerie and detained for two hours, twenty minutes until the District Commissioner of KAMINAVILLE had given permission to proceed. During that time the Gendarmerie representatives on the Commission, one a colonel, had tried unsuccessfully to convince the locals that Tshombe had given instructions for us to proceed to the town. While we were stopped we counted 125 gendarmerie, equipped with .303 rifles, FNs, 2 LAs, grenades and noted an Atk gun located just off the road covering the route from the Base.
75. At the conference held in the Administrative building the Grand Chef, aided and abetted by Maudan, his political advisor, expressed hatred for the UN, demanded that they should withdraw from the Base, stated that he would NOT supply electricity to the Base, and demanded compensation for losses suffered by the

gendarmerie - this after trying to wipe us out in the Base! The following morning the District Commissioner, NDALA, arrived at the Barrier with 20 gendarmerie and demanded the return of the armoured cars. The Base Commander refused him permission to enter the Base, and told him that he would not be allowed to recover the cars.

76. As a result of an air recce carried out by Swedish electrical engineers, the I.O. and Signal Officer of the KAMINA, SUNGU, KATALA, and LUBINDA areas, one electricity pylon was located NORTH of LUBINDA knocked across the road. The blowing of this pylon had left us without electricity since the start of hostilities. Under the present circumstances it was impossible to move out to repair the line because the cease fire agreement excluded troop movements. Pres. Tshombe paid a visit to KAMINAVILLE on 7th October and remained there until the morning of the 9th. This information was accidentally gleaned from the gend representatives at the Barrier.
77. At 1500 hrs on the 9th the group was informed by HQ Leopoldville that they would be moving to NYUNZU, in NORTH KATANGA. It was an unexpected detail, as we had assumed that we would be allowed to finish our time in the comparative luxury of KAMINA. However "ours was not to reason why .....". So "B" Coy moved first by Air via ALBERTVILLE on the 10th followed by group HQ, and "A" Coy on the 13th. Capt Hartigan was left in KAMINA as Irish L.O. Group HQ left A'Ville by air from NYUNZU at 1430 hrs, while "A" Coy, concentrated in the railway station for the night. Next morning they moved by rail to NYUNZU, via NIEMBA. Both ourselves and the Swedes were now concentrated at NYUNZU and NIEMBA, having taken over from the GHANIANS.
78. In NYUNZU the Group were under command to the Indian Bde, HQ Section "A", ALBERTVILLE. Thirty miles to the EAST along the railway line, a Swedish Coy held NIEMBA. As in KAMINA the Groups resources were stretched to the limit to look after the airstrip, several road blocks, and 140 gendarmerie prisoners. In addition daily patrols were made to NIEMBA to bring supplies to the Swedes. On 29th October Bde HQ A'Ville, were perturbed to receive a report from Group HQ to the effect that 200 Gendarmerie with armour, had arrived from KONGOLA to take over NYUNZU. However due to the diplomacy of the Group commander a very difficult and dangerous situation was averted - sighs of relief at Bde HQ! !
79. At approximately the same time the L.O. in A'Ville received a request to procure six (6) bags of cement and dispatch them by rail to NYUNZU. These were purchased in a local Belgian hardware store and were used to construct the memorial cross which was erected at NIEMBA on 5th November.
80. On the 3rd of November, following agreement between the KATANGESE authorities and the UN the 42 gendarmerie prisoners were released in exchange for the IRISH taken at JADOTVILLE. Comdt M. Quinlan was in charge of the escort and all arrived safely in A'Ville at 1700 hrs 2nd November.
81. "B" Coy 35th Bn arrived in A'Ville, on 6th November from E'Ville. They were on their way to NYUNZU to take over from the Group. Despite repeated requests no accommodation was provided by the INDIANS for these units in transit, and our own companies had to spend the night of their arrival in the station at A'Ville. Thanks to the co-operation of the Belgian station-master additional carriages were moved into the station to provide accommodation for the troops. By the evening of the 7th November the Group was reformed in A'Ville railway station awaiting an airlift back to KAMINA.

82. The town of A'Ville in the prosperous days of peace must have been a very pleasant spot. Situated on Lake Tanganyika, it had two good hotels - the Du Lac, and the Palace; two very good self-service stores - Sedecs and Sarmas and numerous other miscellaneous stores, cafes, bars and the Railway Club. There were schools, churches, and hospitals run by priests and nuns from Belgian Orders and Belgian, Italian and French doctors staffed the hospitals. There was even a swimming pool, situated on the highest point in the town from which no doubt, the Belgians enjoyed wonderful views over the lake and the surrounding countryside, - at the same time sparing themselves the risk of catching bilharztzie or being caught by crocodiles by not swimming in the lake.
83. By the 7th of November only a few Belgians remained in the town, mostly those with shops or other business. the majority of the women and children having been evacuated by lake steamer to USUMBURA on the NORTH shore of the lake, some days previously. There had been a gradual infiltration of the town by BALUBA 'tedy boys' since the 5th of the month. Their aim and object appeared to be to terrorise the white population by stopping and searching their cars, women too were insulted and threatened by them. The white fathers and the sisters were much heartened by the presence of the IRISH troops in A'Ville, because they too received their quota of abuse from these BALUBAS. It was regretted that the INDIAN patrols did NOT take stronger action against these lawless elements who were easily cowed by aggressive action.
84. The move back to KAMINA started on 7th November and by the evening of the 9th the Group was once more concentrated at the Airfield. The two companies were billeted in a hangar once all the stores and equipment were checked and weighed, for the return flight to IRELAND. The Jat battalion who had taken over from us prior to our departure for NYUNZU were still in control of KAMINA and on the 13th entertained the Group to tea in the EPA building.
85. The Force Commander, Conor Cruise O'Brien, and Brig Raja visited us before our departure for home and presented the Group with the UN Congo medals.
86. The departure of the Group for home commenced on 18th November, and was completed by 27th November. Even though everyone was glad to get home it was quite a shock to step out of the aircraft at DUBLIN airport into a chilly November morning after the wonderful sunshine of the Congo. In retrospect I think everybody felt that it had been a very worthwhile six months tour of duty, and whereas if sometimes the bad days appeared to outnumber the good ones, it had all been in a good cause.
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1. On June 19th 1961, at KASHIA, in South Kasai, the Group had its first official contact with the Congolese people. The occasion was a conference held by the Group c/o, Lt. Col. O'Donovan, with representatives of the KANIOKA tribe. The object of the conference was to discuss the problems which the KANIOKAS said had arisen due to the fact that part of their territory, and two of their towns were occupied by the KANONDJIS'.

Since the Group's mission in KASAI was to maintain the boundary line between the two tribes and prevent bloodshed, (the railway line from KELE through MWENDITU, LUPUTA and KASHIA to the River LUBILASH being the boundary) the C/O informed the KANIOKA chiefs that we would do everything to ensure that peace was maintained.

At this meeting it was decided that there would henceforth be a weekly conference and that O/C LUPUTA, at this time, Comdt. K. McMahon, would be responsible for making the arrangements.

2. Group HQ moved from KASHIA to MWENE DITU on the 20th June and on the 28th we were visited at our HQ by the Minister for the Interior of South KASAI who was accompanied by the Minister for gendarmerie, and Information, Chief of Staff, South KASAI Forces, Capt. Etienne, O/C. KALONDJI troops, MWENE DITU, their aides and advisors.

The C/O and his staff, plus interpreter Bob Forrest, and Mr. Cathedra WHO . represented the UN at the meeting. The points raised by the Minister for the Interior were as follows:-

- (a) a request for a meeting on the following day with the KANIOKA Chiefs.
- (b) A request for supplies of food and DDT. Mr. CATHEDRA of the World Health Organisation represented the UN at this Conference, and said that distribution of food would commence in MWENE DITU within a few days. Supplies of DDT. would be requisitioned from LULUABOURG.

Col Donovan informed the Minister that it would be impossible to arrange a meeting with the KANIOKA Chiefs at such short notice, but that he hoped a later meeting might be arranged.

On 29th of June C/O. and his Staff were invited to attend a parade in honour of KING KALONDJI of KASAI. The KING appeared in a lounge suit with a leopard skin thrown over his shoulder - quite a sight!! The KING later left for LUPUTA, and Col Donovan departed by air for KASHIA, arriving in LUPUTA that evening.

3. Patrol Order No.6 received from HQ 1 Ghana Inf Bde Group, Luluabourg, instructed O/C. 1 Inf Group to send a two platoon strength patrol to TABACONGO 96 miles N.W. of MWENE DITU. At 0900 hrs on 3rd of July the patrol left Camp under the command of Capt Aherne. On the following day the C/O, OPs, I.O and O/C "B" Coy, flew by helicopters to TABACONGO, and met the patrol as they entered the village. A meeting was held with the District Commissioner, Administrator, Commissioner of Police and their staffs. The principle points raised at the meeting were -

- (a) A request for the stationing of UN troops in TABACONGO. This village had been occupied by a company of KALONDJI troops up to the beginning of June, and the natives, the BEKETE tribe, were living in fear of their return and also the arrival of the LULUAS.

(b) Medical supplies urgently needed in view of the small-pox epidemic in the area.

The C/O. said that we would be unable to station troops there at the moment, but that we would send patrols, furthermore he would discuss matters raised by them, with the UN HQ in LULUABOURG.

The people were very friendly and it was obvious that they would welcome the stationing of UN troops in TABACONGO.

Our first encounter with the Congolese on the sports field took place on Sunday, 9th July, at Mwene Ditu. The local Ditu Dynamos and our group representatives from "B" Company, played a 2-2 draw. There was a huge crowd at the game, which was played at a very fast pace throughout and was very entertaining. The pipe band paraded around the field at half time and their efforts were well applauded. Some of the nuns from the local convent attended the game. These nuns belong to a French Canadian Order of Christ the King, and are doing a splendid job, running two schools, a hospital and a home for orphans, under difficult circumstances. Our Chaplain, Rev. Fr. McCabe celebrates Mass each morning in their convent at 0600 hrs and no efforts have been spared to help them with food, petrol etc., all of which they greatly appreciate.

Reports from "A" Coy at LUPUTA around the 13th July indicated that the KALONDJI troops were building up their strength in the LUSUKU, TSHABABA area, and near the railway bridge at the KATANGA border. As LUSUKU is outside their territory the C/O sent for Capt. Etienne, commander of the KALONDJI troops in the area. An ultimatum was delivered to the KALONDJIs to have their troops evacuated from LUSUKU before 1400 hrs on 14th. A dangerous situation was developing, particularly in view of the reinforcements being received by the KALONDJIs from GANDAJYKA, and the fact that our own troops were strung out over a distance of 30 miles. To try to solve this problem without a clash of arms Capt. Etienne arrived for a conference at Group HQ on the morning of the 14th. He asked to have the ultimatum suspended and requested a meeting at our HQ later between UN Civil Affairs representative, Caballero and some of his own Ministers. The C/O agreed provided the Minister for the Interior would be present. On the morning of the 15th July Caballero Ghana Bde Comdr and Staff arrived at our HQ. Capt. Etienne, and his staff, plus the Civil Administrator of Mwene-Ditu were present. The Minister for the Interior had not arrived.

At the meeting which followed the Bde. Comdr informed the KALONDJI representatives that they had broken the agreement of November 1960 by moving into the villages of LUSUKU, and TSHABOBO. He restated that the boundary line was the railway from MWENE DITU - LUPUTA, and then the road LUPUTA - GANDAJYKA. (Road inclusive to KALONDJIS as their EASTERN boundary. - This was news to the Group HQ, we had been given to understand previous to this that the railway line as far as the KATANGA border was the boundary line - Mr. Caballero reminded Capt. Etienne that as the UN would not be always in the Congo that the KALONDJIS and KANIOKAS should settle their differences peacefully. Capt. Etienne agreed, and said that he would reduce the number of his troops by half at LUSUKU and TSHABOBO and furthermore that he would comply with any requests made by the Central Government.

The meeting was conducted in a friendly atmosphere and it appeared that the Kalondji representatives were only too anxious to ensure that no clashes took place between the UN troops and their own. Two days after this meeting the Minister for the Interior South Kasai, appeared in MWENE DITU, and held a meeting in the Administrative Building. The C/O and his staff represented the UN. The Minister had been informed of what had been discussed and agreed upon at the previous meeting of July 14th and he was quite satisfied to accept the decisions. Capt. Etienne also agreed to inform us of all his troop movements.

6. The Vice President of South Kasai, NGANULA Joseph, and a large retinue of Ministers and advisors paid us a visit on 27th July. The object of the visit was to discuss food relief, medical supplies and petrol supplies, and I think also to sample our Irish Whiskey and cigarettes. It was a very happy social occasion.
7. While the various meetings and conferences were taking place at our HQ, with the local representatives of the State of Kasai, each member of the Group was contributing in some way, no matter how small, to the furthering of good relations between the UN and the locals. Our MO. Comdt T. O'Farrell, attended the clinic daily at the KALONDJI army camp, our troops on their daily patrols distributed food, sweets, and medical supplies to the locals, and each day at meal times our cooks and indeed the soldiers saved enough food from their breakfast, lunch and dinner rations to feed hundreds of very hungry native children who managed to crawl through our barbed wire fences. Our final social gathering with our KASAI friends was a farewell dinner held at our Mess in Mwene Ditu; on the 2nd August. Capt. Etienne and his Staff Officers, the Civil Administrator, and the local curé attended. It was a very enjoyable function and our guests all expressed regret at our imminent departure from their Province, and thanked us for all the help both material and otherwise that we had given them. We felt that they were genuinely sorry to see us leave them, and were happy to know that we had contributed in some small way to spreading a better understanding of UN role in the Congo among the Congolese people.
8. On our return to Kamina Base on the 4th of August we found that our relations with the local population would not be as close as those we had in KASAI. Henceforth we were to meet more of the other UN contingents stationed on the Base, the Belgians in KAMINAVILLE, and the white officers of the gendarmerie. On the 15th of August, our group soccer team played a KAMINAVILLE XI on their home ground and were beaten 2-0. The referee was a Dutchman, the UN baker, so the game had a real international flavour. We noticed that the native soccer teams were very well turned out, and that even in remote places like Kasai province there were very good soccer pitches complete with concrete stands. The Belgians must have trained the locals very well at the game, because every town and even village had at least one team and the standard of play was remarkably high. On the 24th of August we held a big party at Lumwe Mess, in Base I, to introduce ourselves to the other contingents on the base and also to meet local Belgian administrators and business people from KAMINAVILLE.

The party was an outstanding success, in particular it gave us the opportunity of meeting the Belgians and understanding their problems. It also was an opportunity to meet some of the gendarmerie officers who were so soon afterwards to be interned by us. One officer in particular Major Barvaux, O/C. of the Gendarmerie Bn. in Kaminaville, later became very friendly with us, and in fact at great personal risk to himself tipped us off by phone the day the Base was to be attacked. Mixed UN, Gendarmerie patrols each night to KAMINAVILLE helped reduce tension and let the Belgian population know that at least they were not being abandoned, and that if they wished to come to the Base for protection the opportunity was still available to them. Unfortunately no Belgian family availed of the offer due to the refusal of KASONGO NIEMBA - the grand Chef of Kaminaville to allow them to go.

After the fighting was over, in fact many months later, we heard that conditions were most unpleasant for them and that many had been threatened with arrest.



We were sorry for the plight which had befallen these people, one family, the Swalués, had in particular been most helpful to us. The husband, a reserve artillery officer in the regular Belgian Army, and owner of a large garage had arranged numerous meetings for the group C.O. with the C/C., and Company Commanders of the Gendarmerie and helped to foster the good relations which existed between us. It was in no small way due to these good relations that no white officers led the gendarmerie forces who attacked the Base on September 14th.

9. The Group was moved to NYUNZU, in NORTH KATANGA, by air and rail and concentrated there on the 14th of October.

The population of this village were all black, and they owed their allegiance to the Central Government in Leopoldville.

Cordial relations were immediately established between ourselves and them; they put on a concert on the village green on our first Sunday there. The District administrator was a most helpful, intelligent type and during our stay of approximately one month we helped the population with all the food and medical supplies we could spare.

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1. Documentation: This was carried out at home stations and was co-ordinated and finalised by AHQ Staff on concentration of the Gp in DUBLIN prior to departure for CONGO. Gp HQ and Company L.A.'s 141 were compiled and all necessary documents assembled. The documentation and processing proved satisfactory and did NOT warrant adverse criticism during the Unit's tour of duty abroad, with the exception that a closer scrutiny of Conduct Sheets could have been made in order to eliminate from service abroad some few individuals whose previous crime record repeated its pattern of misdemeanours in CONGO.
2. Establishment and Staffs: These proved inadequate for the job in hands and did NOT permit of any relief during periods of resting after duty, sickness or patrols. It is suggested that an increase in officer and OR staff be made for any future unit of similar composition.
3. Stationery Equipment: Satisfactory, with the following comments:-
  - a. The metal boxes for transportation did NOT stand up well to rough handling or dragging and tended to come apart at the seams, necessitating local repairs.
  - b. The small portable typewriters did NOT permit of foolscap-size paper being used lengthwise - as was required for some UN returns. One typewriter with full-length carriage is suggested for inclusion in the stationery equipment of any future unit.
4. Postal Arrangements: In general, the arrangements for post proved satisfactory between Dublin and Leopoldville. Internally in CONGO, however, mail was liable to delays of from 1 to 2 weeks due to misdirection or non-availability of aircraft. A letter posted in Kamina for Elisabethville could, if sent via Leopoldville, take up to three weeks to arrive at its destination.
5. Administration: In the initial stages the administration of the Gp was hampered somewhat by the lack of UN Directives and Instructions, but gradually the staff became accustomed to local conditions and procedures. After a settling-in period in KASAI the administration went smoothly and efficiently despite the adverse living conditions. On taking over responsibility for KAMINA BASE the volume of administrative work increased for the Gp HQ Staff, and the staffing of 'A' and 'Ops' department in Base HQ proved a strain on the limited establishment of the HQ personnel who now had to treat with the many nationalities on the Base. Some officers from the companies were appointed to take charge of departments in the Base HQ, so that the efficient handling of each contingent's problem would be ensured.
6. Morale and Discipline: As may be seen from the reports of the company groups, morale throughout the Unit's tour of duty was good. The discipline responded well to correct treatment, which was somewhat rigidly enforced while in KASAI. The following factors tended to lower the standard of morale:-
  - a. No mail from home and/or delays in mail.
  - b. Lack of recreational facilities, particularly in KASAI where NO space was available for sport except for Kashia where pls were rotated weekly so that all might have some recreation.
  - c. Lack of facilities for visiting towns and/or cities.
  - d. NO local leave; NO late passes.

Serious offences against military law were few. A statistical table of offences is attached.

7. Recommendations: For future Units of a similar nature the following recommendations are submitted:-

- a. Issue tropical uniforms before leaving Ireland.
- b. Include MP Officer in HQ establishment.
- c. Include a Legal Officer in HQ establishments.
- d. Include an Int Sgt in HQ establishment to relieve work of 'A' Personnel.

Statistical Table of Offences against Military Law  
Defence Act, 1954

AWOL (Sec 137)	31
Conduct to the prejudice of good order and mil discipline (Sec 169)	50
Drunk when NOT on duty (Sec 142c)	8
Drunk on duty (Sec 143b)	2
Disobeying a lawful command (Sec 131)	19
Failure to comply with lawful order	1
Using insulting language (Sec 133)	2
Using insubordinate language (Sec 132)	11
Threatening a superior (Sec 132)	3
Unauthorised use of mil vehicle (Sec 160)	3
Breaking out of quarters (Sec 134d)	2
Illegal entry	1
Making false statement	1
Out of bounds (Sec 168)	2
Resisting arrest (Sec 134C)	1
Civil Offence (Sec 169)	1

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## INTRODUCTION

1. On paper, prior to the mobilisation of the unit, it would appear that the intention was that the QM of the Gp would be mainly employed on welfare matters and the Coys would attend to 'Q' matters individually, and more or less independently. However, due to the role given to the Gp in the Congo this idea could not hold in practice. As the 'Q' Dept at Gp HQ consisted of the Capt QM only, this could have led to well-nigh insurmountable difficulties. Due to the sympathetic appreciation of the Gp OC however, and the assistance given at most times by the Coy Comds and the CS's the expected snags seldom arose. The assistance of the Coy QMs was of course rightly taken for granted.
2. This report will deal mainly with the occasions when the Gp 'Q' was operating independently of the Coys or with the Coys directly dependent on it. The remainder of the report will be tied in with the reports of the individual Coys.

## KAMINA - FIRST PERIOD

3. Immediately after arrival at KAMINA Base, GP QM was informed that 4 weeks complete rations (emergency), and 3 weeks dry rations would be arriving during the coming ten days. These rations were for consumption after the Gp's arrival in SOUTH KASAI. The rations for consumption during the period in KAMINA were drawn in the normal fashion from the RRR Depot by Gp HQ and distributed to the Coys.
4. To take the 'Immediate Use' rations first. Dry rations were indented for and collected twice weekly from 107 Supply Pl (Indians) at the RRR. Fresh rations were indented for and collected from same source daily, excepting meat. All milk, incidentally, was tinned. All "butter" was margarine and also was tinned. Meat consisted of fresh beef, pork, ham and bacon. Beef and pork were a local contract from a butcher in KAMINAVILLE and were of good quality. Ham and bacon were a local contract from ALAKAT, a huge cold storage in K'VILLE, operated by a Belgian concern. We were exceptionally lucky in our supply of ham. It was a tinned commodity in 5lb tins of Dutch origin. It was without bone and almost completely lean. However, when the supply in stock was gone, due to currency restrictions no more was obtainable and we had to make do with bacon. This was a great pity as the bacon was of very poor quality. About 50% fat, rather like bacon in Ireland from pigs whose diet consisted in the main of windfall apples.
5. During this period the food generally was ample. There was more than enough tea as the coffee was the Congo brand and much too bitter for the Irish taste, consequently a double ration of tea was taken. A problem arising from this was the perennial in the Congo among the Irish - a terrible shortage of sugar. This was overcome by digging into our Kasai rations, and trusting in God and our LO in Kasai. The Almighty and the LO both came up to scratch when we got to Kasai.
6. To take the KASAI rations next, (see para 3). These created damnable problems. To appreciate this the following was the set up:- the unit was a mile from the nearest phone and its only transport was one VW and one broken-down jeep. The Airport was 7 miles from our base. Movement Control was contacted four times daily to see if rations had arrived. Generally they did not know if rations were coming until they were on the ground, and then they could do nothing about them until we contacted them.

Leaving a man permanently at Movement Control - (if a man for such a task could be obtained) was no solution as he had no means of contacting us. Transport could NOT be laid on as it was at a premium and could NOT be standing by all day and up to 2200 hours at night on the chance of rations arriving. Consequently when Gp HQ found that rations had arrived a mad search for transport first had to be made, then one of the CSs approached for a fatigue party and a dash made to the airport before half the rations were "lost". This fatigue party was quite a problem as all the men were busy all the time on training for our activities in KASAI and had to be taken off training or more often dragged from their well-earned rest, late in the evening. The loads ranged from a full DC4 (15,000lbs) to a few parcels weighing maybe 500lbs put in to fill a DC3.

7. Storage of these rations was a bit of a problem too, but by continuous recce and by browbeating the NCO's from other units and Contingents who had keys to stores all the supplies were got under cover. The rations were eventually all (more or less) received and before the Coys moved to Kasai they were distributed between them. Neither Coy of course was satisfied with their amounts but this was in the main due to the suspicious nature of all QMs who are convinced at all times that an attempt is being made to "wipe their eyes" though of course a certain amount of rations did get lost between Leo and the stores at Kamina Base. As there was no proper storage at Ndjili before they were put on the plane, and as they were sometimes on the tarmac at Kamina unattended after dark while awaiting collection this can hardly be considered surprising, despite the best will in the world on the part of those involved in the Movement Controls.

8. To digress for a moment. One big problem at Kamina was the bread. This was full of weevils, but however was passed as edible by MOs.

9. The main task of Gp 'Q' was the distribution of certain equipment, when it was not sufficient to go around. There were a few acrimonious "discussions" on this matter, but as everyone was reasonably satisfied with his share en route to Kasai it is NOT worth mentioning further in this report.

10. As regards welfare, in so far as it was effected by 'Q', water etc., this will be covered in the consolidated report.

#### SOUTH KASAI

11. As I mentioned above we brought a considerable amount of supplies with us from Kamina. In addition we were rationed from Luluabourg and these supplies were flown in by light aircraft and helicopter. Bread and fruit were purchased locally (we supplied the flour and paid in cash and kind). And while we got frozen meat - from Chicago, USA - from Luluabourg, we also purchased cattle on the hoof in Kasai and did our own butchering. Distribution of the results of our butchering presented quite a problem as the cattle had to be shot very early in the morning and butchered before the full heat of the day made itself felt. We distributed to the Coys by covering the carcasses with wet sheets, and continually wetting them, trusting to the evaporation to serve as refrigeration. This system while not perfect, was reasonable enough. Our butchers were a few young soldiers who had worked in or around butchers shops in civilian life supervised now by our Medical Officer.

/Eventually.....

Eventually we did get an official soldier butcher but by then our amateurs were so proficient that they carried on butchering.

12. Drinking water was got from a local supply in tanks but had to be purified with chlorine which did NOT improve its taste. Washing water in some stations was available on the spot, in others had to be collected in barrels from streams and rivers.

#### KAMINA - SECOND PERIOD

13. This part of the report deals with the period during which the Gp was administering KAMINA Base in Aug and Sep '61. The internal 'Q' affairs were looked after by the Coys while GP HQ took control of the RRR, which was responsible for rationing the whole Base. The Contingents on rations there at the time were: Irish, Swedish, Indian, Canadian (Sigs) and a hospital with white and Congolese patients.

14. Our supplies came from three main sources - LEO, E'VILLE and local contract. E'VILLE was our primary source; from LEO we got items which E'VILLE could NOT supply, and locally we purchased meat, vegetables and fruit. There was a farm on the Base from which we got some fresh supplies from that source. The supplies from E'VILLE and LEO came by chartered aircraft at a cost of 475 dollars per hour. Some supplies came by train but this was a slow and chancy method and seldom used. The biggest snag with local contracts was vegetables. We had to take, within limits, whatever kind of vegetables was delivered and unfortunately until we got to know our way around and became very firm with the contractors we were getting a lot of lettuce. The MOs were NOT happy with this as the "fertiliser" used by the locals was NOT ideal, to say the least of it. This was tough on the contractors who actually were middle - men, who told the local farmer what to grow, and frequently supplied the seeds; then went round in their vans to collect them.

15. Our major problem from the rations supplying point of view was the Indians. Their ration scale is quite unusual including as it does many unusual items of food and spice. There were, furthermore, about a dozen different kinds of seed on the scale which we had great difficulty in differentiating between, so much so that on one occasion, Sgt Kane, one of my right hand men, in a moment of real exasperation said to me "Damn it, are we feeding birds or soldiers".

16. As a matter of interest some Indian Sects ate all kinds of meat, some all meat except beef, some no meat at all, but would eat eggs, and some would NOT even eat eggs. During our time some of these people were taken off CRA and made go on rations. This they did not like as CRA was more convenient and much more lucrative. Consequently, like all soldiers they were awkward as could be towards our efforts to feed them as we represented those people known as "they" who spend their time making life miserable for poor soldiers everywhere. As we had four different Sects in the Indian Group which had no transport and as we should'nt have, but on the quiet did, send their food on a vehicle carrying beef we had some amusing incidents.

17. In the RRR we kept a months supply of rations at all times for the whole Base. In addition we kept large quantities of American 'C' rations. In the case of items like meat, fruit and vegetables we kept the tinned varieties. The RRR included the Bakery, quite a modern set-up which could turn out bread for fifteen hundred men daily. This was managed by a Dutchman (UN) initially and then by myself, aided and guided by Pte O'Toole from the Bakery in the Curragh when the Dutchman went on leave.

18. I might mention here that we took over the Supply Depot from a group of 44 Nigerians assisted by 3 Indian supply personnel. The Supply Depot (RRR) consisted of a dry food Dept, supplied by LEO and E'VILLE, a Fresh Food Dept supplied by local contract, a Combat Ration Dept and a Bakery. In typically Irish fashion our staff consisted of one officer and twelve OR's of whom only the officer had any Q' knowledge or experience. The situation was not helped by the fact that our staff had to do guard duties, man weapons, dig trenches in their Coy areas and consequently were often missing from the RRR. The snags caused by this man-shortage were severe, as not only did we issue food to all contingents on the Base but on occasion sent food as far as Kabelo by train and to other places by aircraft. Also planes came every day with supplies and generally our own staff had to unload them.

19. The receipt and issue of food was easy enough. It was the paper work that was murder. We did as much of the paper work as possible but concentrated on getting and issuing the food irrespective of red tape. Luckily however, fighting broke out before we had to hand over our books and accounts and this solved most of our paper problems.

20. The fighting caused no problems with food, even when we were reinforced by a battalion of Jats as we plenty stockpiled at the Airport itself and had every available jerrycan and tank filled with water. Furthermore we were able to make collections from the depot every day despite the shooting. In point of fact on the first day of fighting we were in a position to answer an emergency call for rations from the contingents in ELIZABETH-VILE and sent them a DC3 loaded with two tons of assorted food-stuffs. The main problem was bread. Immediately the fighting started all the native bakers fled. A conference was held with the Swedish contingent and they gave us a number of bakers. However these 'bakers' were not really bakers but pastry cooks. Luckily Pte O'Toole was equal to the occasion and under his supervision and instruction they quickly became quite good bakers. Except for the first three days of the fighting the bakery was fully operational and supplied bread for all units and for the first two days of that we had enough bread in stock to carry us through.

21. During the fighting the Coys looked after their own ammunition supplies and the Gp QMs only job in this sphere was distribution when one Coy was short and had to borrow from another and when ammunition supplies came in from LEO and had to be shared out between Irish Swedes and Jats. The fact that we found quite a stock of ammunition in the magazine at the Base helped us considerably.

22. During one period we had over 100 Mercenary officers prisoners on our ration indent; but these were accounted for and fed as white officers of any contingent and presented NO real problem.

23. Fresh meat was a problem during and after the fighting. This snag was overcome, however, due to the fact the Capt Hans Oodergarde of the Norwegian Police detachment gave the use of his NCOs. With these I scouted the Base and its surroundings and rounded up a few cows, pigs and sheep. The cows were shot where we found them and brought to the "abbatoir and we dealt with the carcasses there. The pigs and sheep we put on a pick-up truck and killed back at the Base. The civilian staff at the Base did not see eye to eye with us on this point as these animals originally belonged to the Base. But desperate diseases called for desperate remedies so we agreed to differ.

24. Though we did NOT know that we were going to NYUNZU until the day before we moved, we had known for quite a while that we would be moving somewhere. Consequently the store-room at the Airport was refilled and I packed as much rations as possible on the planes to NORTH KATANGA. Arrangements were made to have us rationed from A'VILLE, so while enough of all types of rations were packed for all ranks, great pains were taken to ensure attractive foods, such as tinned fruit, fruit juices, sugar, tea and the attractive rations packs were brought. In fact almost a ton and a half of sugar were brought. Despite this, and tho' a reasonable flow of rations from A'VILLE was maintained by light aircraft, helicopters and train we were always short of sugar. The ration of sugar was the same as in IRELAND but in IRELAND we go on weekends; supper is supplied on only a few nights weekly; elevenses are obtained from the Canteen but most of all the climate is not so conducive as the tropical climate to the drinking of tea; and all this in the CONGO had to be sweetened from the normal ration of sugar.

25. In NYUNZU we had 154 POWs. These represented quite a problem as all were Congolese and their taste in food differed very much from ours. However we got some suitable rations from A'VILLE and they had to make do for the balance with rations as issued to Irish troops. Luckily flour, rice and coffee were acceptable to them. As POWs they were entitled to an issue of beer and cigarettes by International laws. Beer we did not have for ourselves but we did give them many thousands of cigarettes. Incidentally, due to the red tape with which the U.N. Finance people surround themselves we never got paid for the cigarettes but luckily I evolved a system whereby we were not down the price of cigarettes.

26. The Indians at A'VILLE were absolutely unable, despite much cribbing from me, to supply us with bread. There was no bakery within 100 miles so we had to make our own bread. This we did by building ovens from mud. The fire was lit in the oven and kept going until sufficient heat was built up in the walls and floors of the ovens. The fire was then taken out and the dough, which had been proving under sheets in the open - the day-time temp in the open was from 118°F to 124°F - was put in. All this of course was done by Pte O'Toole, our baker, but it is doubtful if such a situation, or such equipment, was envisaged when he did his bakery course. Before we left NYUNZU three ovens were in operation and over three hundred lbs of bread daily was baked. The day and night before we moved from NYUNZU 7.0 lbs of bread was produced so as to have some for the stop-over in A'VILLE. This meant continuous baking for 24 hours and was I think a great achievement by O'Toole and his bakery 'staff'.

#### CLOTHING

27. Due to the fact that the Unit was on what could be termed "Alert" all the time in KASAI and were on the Alert and in action in KAMINA, clothing presented quite a problem. It was found impossible to keep one uniform in "Guard Mounting" condition. The UN issue sclae was quite sufficient for normal purposes but was NOT nearly sufficient for the conditions under which we operated. Furthermore unlike most other Irish contingents we got NO issue of Jungle or Snake boots and only one issue of mosquito boots. Despite frantic letters and signals even these boots did NOT arrive until we had left KASAI.

28. On the one occasion when we sent an S.O.S. to the Mothercountry for clothing, to replace that lost in the evacuation of KILUBI, so that all our troops would have heavy uniforms to arrive home in, we were badly let down. The clothing never arrived. Lest we are being uncharitable it should be mentioned that uniform did in fact leave Ireland, or so someone heard from someone else, but somewhere between DUBLIN and KATANGA they went astray. Fortunately the weather was unseasonably mild for November when the Gp arrived at COLLINSTOWN so no great harm was done.

29. I feel however that a temporary store-room at DUBLIN airport and the issue of great coats made from there rather than from Clancy Bks would have been the better arrangement.



30. Irish Pack Rations were used, American "C" Rations and American 5 in 1 rations, at different times. Without doubt and absolutely without Chauvinism I can say that the Irish Ration Pack was by far the best ration pack and a source of wonder to all the other contingents.

31. Consideration should be given to the production of some sort of in-flight ration pack. It should be pre-cooked of course and come in two categories, one for the short hop of up to five hours, and one for the longer journey of over that - the hop from LEO to WHEELUS non-stop is 12 hours.

#### COOKING FACILITIES

32. During our first stay in Kamina cooking was done in the Base Cookhouse in the normal fashion. We shared the cookhouse with Nigerians but this caused few real problems. In the other stations and during our second visit to KAMINA we used hydra-cookers, fires lit in the open and a mixture of petrol and sand in containers ranging from condensed milk tins (for making a hot drop) to tar barrells for preparing pig carcasses for shaving and skinning.

33. Our cooking on train journeys was on hydro-cookers rigged up on flat cars. Sometimes the meals were part cooked and finished off on the train, sometimes they were completely cooked on the trains.

34. Spare parts for hydro-cookers were absolutely unobtainable so I would strongly recommend that double the normal quota of spare parts be carried with every cooker and at least one replacement part for every part that could possibly wear out or be broken.

#### ORDNANCE

35. The question of ordnance is really an operations matter, but I feel that had we had even one picce of anti-aircraft equipment during the fighting in KAMINA life would have been much more pleasant and much less frustrating. I feel also that some form of heavy support weapon, even 81mm mortars, is essential to any Unit going on active service.

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## Organisation

A transport platoon or section was not included in the Group organisation, but each of the two companies had one A/Cpl. driver/mechanic and three drivers in its establishment. This proved to be inadequate to meet the demands of the Group to carry out the tasks allotted to it and the number of drivers had to be increased.

On arrival at Kamina towards the end of May '61 one VW saloon was made available for use by the C/O but no vehicle was available for the group as a whole and it was almost impossible to carry on. During that period stores were being organised, rations had to be collected from the RRR and the airport, men had to be taken to the ranges etc., and without transport these tasks were impossible. However, each company made its own arrangements and by borrowing a vehicle from some other unit, managed to get along somehow. The QM of 'B' Coy. eventually 'came by' an old Land Rover pick up, and even though it was in poor mechanical condition, and had no spare wheel, it gave great service during the organisation period of the Group at Kamina. Late one night the Group QM got word that a consignment of food and canteen supplies had arrived at the airport for him and had to borrow the Land Rover to collect it. If the supplies were allowed to remain at the airport over night they might be considerably reduced by the morning. The load, however, was a little too much for the vehicle and on the way back to base, one of the tyres burst. The only solution was to keep going as there was no spare wheel or no breakdown service to call on. During this period also the bicycles which were brought out from Ireland were put into service.

In June the Group moved to South Kasai. 'A' Coy took over Luputa and Kasha and 'B' Coy with Gp HQ moved into Mwene-Ditu. The Ghanian units in these posts handed over some UN transport to the coy. Q.M.s, and on June 29th a number of new and almost new, vehicles arrived by rail from Luluabourg. The following list of vehicles were then on charge to the Group :-

5-ton Bedfords	2
3- " "	4
1- " Pick Ups	8
$\frac{1}{2}$ - " Jeep	4
$\frac{1}{4}$ - " "	8
Dodge Power Wagons	2

These were equally divided between the companies. With all these vehicles a number of new drivers had to be found and sufficient were found within the platoons. Every day during the tour of duty in South Kasai these vehicles were on the road and the servicing was a difficult problem. The 'part time' drivers had no time or experience for this task, and the regular drivers could only look after their own cars. Consequently many of the vehicles were neglected in this respect. However, there were few breakdowns as the cars were in good condition when issued. On long patrols the 3 ton Bedfords bogged down on sandy roads as they had not got a four wheel drive; however, the 5-ton cars were able to tow them out of the most difficult situations. The Jeeps and Pick-Ups were never in difficulties. Petrol and oil was available as required from H.Q.

Early in August the Group returned to Kamina. As the posts in South Kasai were being abandoned the unit of the World Health Organisation which was stationed there had to leave. All its vehicles were brought to Kamina with the Group, and as there was no arrangement for anyone to take over the vehicles, they were looked after by the Group transport section. This increased the number of vehicle with the unit as follows:-

Jeeps	3
Bedfords 5-ton	4
BMC 6-Wheelers	6
Mercedes Benz	11
Willys Station	1
Wagon	

This brought the total number of vehicles with the Group to 52 and with a

transport section of 2 NCO's and 6 men some re-organisation was necessary.

With the taking over of Kamina Base by the 1 Inf Group from the Nigerians there were many calls on transport. The O/C Sp. Pl. B Coy. became acting transport officer, one extra Cpl. was provided as detail NCO and another Cpl. took charge of petrol and oil and transport documents. Four extra drivers were added to the section. The world Health Vehicles were assembled in preparation for a board which was to decide their disposal. The unit cars were controlled in a hangar where they were all garaged. Every day all drivers were on detail and there were many late details for vehicles to move stores from the airport. The two mechanics were employed in running repairs but were handicapped by the lack of spare parts. This difficulty was solved by taking parts from other vehicles which were off the road. Punctures, greasing etc., were attended to by a depot in the RRR which was run by a Swedish engineer unit that employed local labour. After a short time all vehicles were being serviced regularly and records of details, mileage, petrol etc. were being well kept. Supplies of petrol were also available from the RRR.

In mid September when fighting broke out between the UN and the Katanga army the organisation of the transport section was disrupted. All attached personnel were returned to their units as they were required in the trenches for the defence of the base. As vehicles were required by platoons in outpost positions, the platoons in question supplied their own drivers and kept the vehicles with them. When the air attacks commenced on Sept. 15th it was necessary to disperse the vehicles in the bush for safety. Petrol in drums was also scattered away from buildings for supplying the cars. When reinforcements of a coy. of Swedes and of a Coy of the Jat India Bn arrived by air during the night these had to be given vehicles and, in all, about twelve trucks and jeeps were given to them without any documents or signatures. It was not possible to have vouchers completed at the time. At this time the Airport building became the base HQ. Many civilian employees left Kamina when the fighting broke out and left their UN saloon cars parked at the airport. These cars became a hazard and the transport officer was made responsible for them. The staff of the RRR also left the camp and petrol had to be drawn from there and stored in dumps. All vehicle drivers in the camp were now looking to the Irish for petrol, but as there was no soldier to spare for the task of looking after a petrol point a 'self service' petrol point was set up. This worked for a while until the engineer who was in charge of the emergency lighting plant took away the semi-rotary pump which was used for filling the vehicles. He wanted it to fill up his diesel engine. However, it was finally agreed to share the pump. During the cease fire, efforts were made to sort things out. All vehicles were accounted for and there were some extra ones found. The Congolese drivers abandoned their cars and these were taken into safe keeping by the Group. The civilian cars of the Rev Mother at the hospital, and the missioner in the Camp - Fr. De-Mot - were repaired when required at the request of their owners.

On the evening of the 9th Oct. orders were received to be prepared to move out to Nyunzu the next day. A proper hand-over of vehicles was not possible, and furthermore there was no one there to take them over. However, the transport officer, prepared a list of all the vehicles, and accompanied by a Lieut of the Jat BN he drove around the base and located the 52 vehicles in question. Some were with the Irish, some with the Swedes and some with his own unit. Eventually the MTO of the Jat Bn signed the voucher for the vehicles.

On Oct. 16th the move out to Nyunzu began and was completed in a few days. Here the UNO transport was taken over from the 1 Ghanian Bn. which had a transport platoon of 2 officers and 70 other ranks. The list of vehicles taken over here was:-

Jeeps $\frac{1}{4}$ ton	1
Bedfords 5-ton	4.

This reduction in vehicles made the transport accountancy problem very easy. Of course the amount of vehicles was insufficient. One of the trucks

required a set of gaskets and points to put it on the road. Efforts to obtain replacements from the Indian HQ at Albertville were without success. A second truck's ring gear became defective but once it was started with a push it worked alright. Another Bedford was under a 500 gal. water tank permanently thus leaving one truck per Coy. with the Jeep under Gp HQ control. However with the small number of cars the Group managed to carry on. Extra vehicles were expected but they did not arrive until after the 1 Inf Group had left. On leaving Nyunzu all the vehicles were handed over to the 35th Battalion.

The official drivers and mechanics worked very hard and for longer periods than the average man in the Group. The additional drivers were of a good standard and there was only one driver involved in an accident. This man was only a temporary driver and speeding was the cause of the accident. He had to pay part of the cost of the repairs. A second accident occurred as a result of a corporal who was in charge of a vehicle attempting to drive while the official driver was not in the vehicle. This NCO also had to pay for the damage caused.

The strength of the transport section was completely inadequate for the tasks which it had to perform. Even though the Group managed to carry on it was not possible to attend to the vehicles properly and no doubt they suffered as a result. Full credit is, however, due to the transport section for keeping the wheels turning.

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I was Medical Officer with 'B' Coy 1 Inf Gp serving in Congo from May to Nov., 1961. In dealing with the medical aspects of the Gp I propose to divide the account into four separate periods as we were, broadly speaking, in four different stations and each one presented a particular medical problem.

1. KAMINA BASE on arrival. A period of two weeks approximately was devoted to training prior to move to SOUTH KASAI. The problems were the usual ones associated with a sudden move to the tropics - non-specific enteritis, heat exhaustion and the inevitable sore arms in some cases following small-pox vaccination prior to leaving home. During the period I got an instruction from DMC, GHQ, DUBLIN, saying that in view of the smallpox epidemic in SOUTH KASAI I was to re-vaccinate everyone who had NOT had a positive reaction within the previous six months. On checking, I found there were approximately 170 in the Gp in this category and these I re-vaccinated with success. Some of those vaccinated were quite ill, including the Gp Comd and Ops Offr, and I therefore requested a postponement of our move to SOUTH KASAI for seven days. At this time I was also looking after INDIAN and NIGERIAN troops in the Base as they did NOT have a Medical Officer.
2. SOUTH KASAI. 'B' Coy moved to MWENE-DITU to relieve GHANA troops who had been therefor some months. The "Camp" we inherited has been in continuous occupation by coloured troops - TUNISIAN, LIBERIAN and GHANAIAN - for twelve months. From the hygiene point of view it was an absolute nightmare. Water was drawn from a river in the town, using a mechanical pump to get it up to an outlet. This pump was constantly breaking down and it was due only to the ingenuity of our engineers that it could be made to work intermittently. The townspeople, KALONJI troops and ourselves drew from this supply daily and our amount was strictly rationed. Needless to say I treated and tested each consignment before use. We had barely adequate for cooking and drinking. Personal cleanliness was a problem. There were no toilet facilities so slit-trench latrines were used. The problem here was that in view of the prolonged occupation a lot of the ground was foul and new sites were difficult to find, The GHANAIAANS had a complex of slit trenches running throughout the camp which reduced the ground available. This meant in addition that any form of exercise for the men was impossible. As they were confined to camp apart from patrols, this was an added nuisance. We were surrounded by barbed wire and almost all space inside was occupied by tents. Because of our predecessor's more casual attitude to hygiene flies were there in hordes. The GHANAIAANS kindly left me a "fogging machine" and I believe is what prevented a real epidemic during our stay. This machine converted liquid DDT into a "fog" and by having a medical orderly "fog" the entire camp twice daily we managed to reduce the fly population to bearable limits. Despite constant vigilance and complete cooperation from everyone, there was dysentery among officers and men, but fortunately at any one time confined to about 15 to 20 patients.

I visited the KALONJI troops and did their "sick parade" each morning and otherwise when needed. On these occasions I went alone and had an arrangement that if I did NOT report back by a certain time the troops would come to investigate my absence. The population of the town itself had swollen to about 5,000 with refugees returning from KATANGA; and among the people a smallpox epidemic was rampant. There was a "clinic" in the town, which I visited daily and here the smallpox sufferers were in evidence everywhere. They were ambulant, dying and dead, and the misery of these people is quite impossible to describe. Food was very scarce so starvation was added to the list of troubles of the natives.

Some FRENCH CANADIAN Sisters had a school and maternity clinic in the town and these I visited and helped in whatever way I could. The problem was similar there - mothers and babies dying daily from smallpox.

I have devoted what may appear to be excessive detail about this place but even so it is quite impossible to convey a full picture of the squalor, disease and obvious lack of recreation, or indeed normal living standards, tolerated quite cheerfully by the Unit in MWENE-DITU. I would just like to add that I made a personal appeal in LULUABOURG to the World Health representative to send a team to KASAI to initiate vaccination and in the meantime to send me lymph. Neither lymph nor team arrived up to the time of our departure.

3. KAMINA BASE. From the time of our return to KAMINA BASE until hostilities started, medically there was the routine of sick parades, which were small, and hygiene inspections of billets, cook houses etc. Health was good generally. When the Base was attacked the electric power was cut and the sanitation system broke down. It was the hydra cooker and slit-trench latrines again, but this time of course no space problem. Because of our small numbers and the large area to defend duties were very heavy for the men. The continual tension combined with attacks from jet aircraft made sleep difficult even in the rest periods. Therefore I gave mild sedation to those needing it and evacuated a few by air to LEOPOLDVILLE who cracked under the strain. The numbers who required tranquillisers and/or sedation at this time were very small and I cannot speak highly enough of the wonderful morale of everyone under trying circumstances. The only casualties at this time were some CONGOLESE caught by the jet on its first run. A pilot and first officer were later shot by the jet while working on their plane and these I evacuated to LEOPOLDVILLE as the Base Hospital had been evacuated due to its position at the perimeter of the Base. In fact the GENDARMES on entering the Base searched the hospital for UN personnel.

4. NYUNZU. The problems here were again those of lack of sanitation. Men were under canvas but we did have adequate water. At this stage the Gp was tired following KAMINA. Food had been irregular and uninteresting and the cooks were limited, using hydra cookers, in the preparation of meals. Here I had clinics three mornings a week in the hospital which NO longer functioned as such. I did open two wards where I put the more seriously ill of the natives. There was NO staff in the hospital except an "infermière" and water and power had been removed since "independence".

5. Observations.

- a. A basic rule in hygiene is that white troops should NOT occupy a camp immediately following occupation by coloured troops. I would sincerely hope that IRISH troops will never again be asked to live in the impossible conditions existing in MWENE-DITU. The Colonel in charge of the NIGERIAN troops who were to replace us refused to allow his troops into MWENE-DITU and the place was in fact NOT occupied after our departure.
- b. I found the "fogging machine" invaluable in dealing with the fly menace. In the tropics it should be standard equipment with troops. Medical orderlies should be trained in its use before going overseas.
- c. With regard to medical supplies generally the quantity and variety were excellent. In this important item I never had worries about being unable to treat anyone under my care.
- d. I believe it is standard practice for medical officers with IRISH troops abroad to treat the local population. When there are NOT any other local medical services available, this can help to improve relations. In our particular case I think the fact that I treated the local KALONJI troops, and the local population to the best of my resources, helped in a small way to allay the anxieties of the

people with regard to UN intentions in the KASAI area.

- e. A medical officer is sometimes in a unique position to assess the morale of troops. He is often their confidant about problems both local and at home. I should like to pay a very sincere tribute to the exceptionally high morale of officers and men in this Gp. There were many difficult times and very little personal comfort during these six months but the response was always magnificent.

Finally, I shall always feel proud and honoured to have served with the 1 Inf Gp. My duties as Medical Officer were made easy by the cooperation and help I received from everyone concerned.

0.7526 T.G. O'FARRELL. COMDT.

(T.G. O'FARRELL)

MESSAGE FROM AN tAIRE COSANTA.

Message from An tAire Cosanta to the Irish Contingent on the occasion of visit of An Ceann Foirne, Nov 61.

"I am very happy to avail myself to the visit of the Chief of Staff to the Irish troops in the Congo to send this message of greetings and good wishes.

In the brief period since my appointment as Minister for Defence last month, I have seen quite a lot of the Army and I have been greatly impressed by its discipline and devotion to duty. I now look forward to welcoming you home in the near future on the completion of your tour of duty. I know what an anxious and difficult time it has been for all of you. For many of you there are memories of hardships and sufferings and the loss of gallant comrades who have made the supreme sacrifice in that distant land. But sad and painful as these things are, I know that, being good Christian Soldiers, you do not cherish feelings of bitterness or hatred but will continue to strive for the success of the United Nations Mission of bringing peace and order to the sorely tried peoples of the Congo.

As part of the United Nations Force in the Congo, you are serving the noble cause of peace everywhere, and men of good-will honour you for it. The world is now such a place that the peace of remote lands which we scarcely knew of formerly is a matter of vital importance to all mankind and not least to our Country. You are, each of you, Ireland's ambassadors of peace and goodwill and you have the opportunity of making Ireland known and respected not only among the peoples of the Congo but also among the soldiers of many nations who comprise the United Nation Force. Your conduct both on and off duty must always reflect the highest standard of discipline, efficiency and courtesy. I am pleased to note from reports which I have received that you have admirably acquitted yourselves in these respects and Ireland is proud of you".

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25 Aibreán, 1961.

LITIR THREÓRA UIMHIR 197

ORGANISATION OF 1 GRÚPA COISITHE.

1. An Infantry Group will be organised and prepared for service with the United Nations Emergency Forces in the Republic of the Congo.
2. The Group will be provisionally organised and equipped in accordance with Tables of Establishments Nos. 1 to 3 issued on 25 Aibreán, 1961 and Annexures to be issued.

3. a. The personnel of the Group will be supplied as follows:-

A Coy Gp	-	Ceann O.
B Coy Gp	-	Ceann D.

- b. The personnel of Gp HQ will be drawn as necessary from any Army Unit. Selection of personnel of Corps other than Infantry will be made by the Corps Director concerned after consultation with the OIC Ceannasaíochta.

S P&O will co-ordinate the organising of Gp HQ.

4. A Adn and A Crn will issue the necessary directions with regard to A and Q Adm matters.
5. S Trn will issue the necessary Training Directives in connection with the special training programmes to be arranged for the Group.

*S. Coileán Mac Giolla Phóil*  
MAOR-GHINEARÁL  
(S. Coileán Mac Giolla Phóil)

CEANN FOIRNE.

IMDHÁIL:

	<u>Cóipeanna</u>		<u>Cóipeanna</u>
CF	1	OIC Ceann O.	20
A Adn	6	OIC Ceann D.	20
A Crn	6	OIC Ceann I	20
CFC	1	OIC CTC	20
S Trn	2	OIC Aer Chór	2
S Fais	2	OCSC	2
S Airt	2	Cft Col Mil	3
S Mar	2	OIC 1 Gp Cois	2
S Inlr	2		
S Corí	2	Comhad	5
S Ord	2		
S S&I	2		
SCLA	2		
SSCA	2		
SPA & PM	2		

SRÍANTA

U.N. IDENTITY NO	SERVICE NO	RANK	N A M E	PARENT UNIT
42993	0.4483	Lt-Col	O'DONOVAN, John C.	2 INF BN
42994	0.5065	Comdt	BURKE, James	1 HOSP COY
42995	0.4666	,,	HAYES, Martin	14 INF BN
42996	0.6156	,,	KEOGH, Patrick	2 MOT SQN
42997	0.4973	,,	McMAHON, Joseph K	6 Bde HQ
42998	0.6219	Capt	AMERI, Denis A	CT DEPOT (S)
42999	0.7073	,,	CARROLL, Thomas P	3 Bde HQ
43000	0.7128	,,	COSTELLO, Michael P P	CT DEPOT (S)
43001	0.7358	,,	DAWSON, James E	CDA (S)
43002	0.7498	,,	HARRINGTON, Michael J.	1 Bde HQ
43003	0.6870	,,	HARTIGAN, Thomas J D	5 INF BN
43004	0.7113	,,	MULVIHILL, John D	AIR CORPS
43005	0.7328	,,	MURPHY, Anthony	AHQ STAFF
43006	0.7443	,,	McDONALD, Thomas J.C.	2 FAR
43007	0.7526	,,	O'FARRELL, Thomas G.	1 HOSP COY
43008	0.6398	,,	QUINLAN, Michael F.	CT DEPOT (E)
43009	0.7447	,,	RYAN, Thomas E	1 AA Regt (E)
43010	0.7727	Lieut	BLYTHE, Vincent L	14 INF BN
43011	0.7579	,,	DOBEY, Bernard	22 INF BN
43012	0.7620	,,	MINEHANE, Michael F.	2 INF BN
43013	0.7857	,,	MURPHY, Anthony T.S.	5 INF BN
43014	0.7626	,,	McGRATH, Thomas V.A.	2 Gen MP Coy
43015	0.7769	,,	McMAHON, Patrick J	8 INF BN
43016	0.7730	,,	O'DONNELL, Martin V. B.	11 INF BN
43017	0.7556	,,	PHILLIPS, William X.	3 FAR
43018	—	Rev Fr	McCABE, Phelim (CF)	DUN CATHAL BRU
25446	0.6760	CAPT.	SLOAN, JAMES N.	11 Fl Sigs
43019	430337	Coy-Sgt	DULLARD, William	4 INF BN
43020	405923	,,	RYAN, James	5 INF BN
43021	88679	CQMS	KING, William	5 INF BN
43022	209735	,,	O'DONNELL, Joseph	12 INF BN
43023	421123	Sgt	CONNOLLY, John J	1 Gen Ord Coy
43024	74197	,,	COSTELLO, Jeremiah	2 INF BN
43025	77920	,,	DALY, Henry	2 Bde HQ
43026	95600	,,	DILLON, John	12 INF BN
43027	88086	,,	DWYER, Patrick	1 Gen Ord Coy
43028	97967	,,	FLAHERTY, Patrick	5 INF BN
43029	802409	,,	FOGARTY, Anthony	DEPOT SIGS
43030	83894	,,	HARBISON, Liam	2 FAR
43031	87286	,,	KANE, William	12 INF BN
43032	95158	,,	KEEGAN, John	5 INF BN
43033	94778	,,	LAWTON, John	1 FAR
43034	79703	,,	MEEHAN, John	12 INF BN
43035	92572	,,	MOONEY, Patrick	2 INF BN
43036	82684	,,	McLOUGHLIN, William	1 FA Engr Coy
43037	90924	,,	O'BRIEN, Patrick	2 FAR
43038	88972	,,	SEYMOUR, John	2 INF BN
43039	86676	,,	SEYMOUR, Patrick	15 INF BN
43040	417231	,,	SHEEHAN, James	McKee Bks Coy
43041	84258	,,	SHELRIDAN, Henry	1 FA SIGS

IDENTITY NO.  
NO.

IDENTITY NO.	NO.			
43042	801579	Corpl	BARNES, John	5 INF BN
43043	803825	"	BARRY, Peter	12 INF BN
43044	809957	"	BUSTEED, Timothy	1 FAR
43045	804230	"	CHANEY, Donald	MCKEE BKS
43046	800311	"	COLLINS, George	MCKEE BKS
43047	810285	"	COURTNEY, Edward	5 INF BN
43048	92986	"	DOHERTY, Patrick	9 INF BN
43049	810950	"	FITZPATRICK, James	2 Gm M P Co
43050	804635	"	GALLEGHER, Patrick	2 FAR
43051	809439	"	GRACE, Pierce	6 Bde HQ
43052	89979	"	HALL, Joseph	12 INF BN
43053	87459	"	HANTON, John	12 INF BN
43054	97444	"	HEFFERNAN, Joseph	2 Gm M P Co
43055	89816	"	HENNESSY, Laurence	2 HOSP COY
43056	804198	"	HICKEY, William J.	MCKEE BKS
43057	70665	"	HOARE, John	1 7th M P Co
43058	805364	"	HOGAN, John	1 FAR
43059	807949	"	HOWLIN, Charles	5 INF BN
43060	805254	"	HURLEY, Thomas	4 7th Sigs
43061	804294	"	KAVANAGH, John	2 Gm M P Co
43062	416628	"	KELLY, Florence	1 FAR
43063	82930	"	KENNEDY, James	12 INF BN
43064	79179	"	LENIHAN, John	20 INF BN
43065	99875	"	LYNCH, William	1 Fd M P Co
43066	809242	"	MAHER, Edward	1 Fd M P Co
43067	809128	"	MAHER, Michael	Depot AOC
43068	96854	"	MORAN, Francis	E. Comd HQ
43069	808906	"	MULLINS, John	12 INF BN
43070	808540	"	Murphy, Laurence	Depot AOC
43071	98420	"	MURPHY, Nicholas	12 INF BN
43072	87234	"	McCABE, Patrick	7 INF BN
43073	95224	"	McCARTHY, Henry	8 INF BN
43074	98365	"	McGUINNESS, Christopher	2 INF BN
43075	80453	"	McGRATH, John	4 HOSP COY
43076	804416	"	McKNIGHT, Michael	4 INF BN
43077	800821	"	NAUGHTON, John	12 INF BN
43078	96522	"	NOLAN, Thomas	MCKEE BKS
43079	90301	"	O'DONNELL, Patrick	12 INF BN
43080	99697	"	O'LEARY, James	1 AA Regt
43081	808732	"	O'ROURKE, Patrick	2 INF BN
43082	802831	"	O'SULLIVAN, Jeremiah	1 Fd M P Co
43083	808828	"	O'SULLIVAN, Joseph	5 INF BN
43084	807531	"	O'SULLIVAN, Michael	Depot Sigs
43085	93910	"	PEARSE, Christopher	12 INF BN
43086	93768	"	PHELAN, John J.	2 FAR
43087	802062	"	PIERCE, Denis	2 INF BN
43088	92715	"	POWER, John J.	Depot AOC
43089	809295	"	REDMOND, Peter	5 INF BN
43090	803336	"	RICHARDSON, Patrick	2 7th Sigs
43091	803570	"	ROCHE, Martin	2 INF BN
43092	96905	"	RYAN, Michael	12 INF BN
43093	809285	"	TYNDALL, George	5 INF BN
43094	807213	"	WATSON, Peter	MCKEE BKS
43095	804744	"	WHELAN, Thomas N.	2 Gm M P Co
43096	91936	"	WHITE, George	C + Depot (E)
43322	803471	Corpl	WICKHAM, Richard	MCKEE BKS
	804509	CPL.	CRONIN, PATRICK	2 7th Sigs

U.N. IDENTITY NO	SERVICE NO	RANK	N A M E	PARENT UNIT	
43097	801519	Pte	AHERNE	Henry	1 Fd Sigs
43098	91507	,,	APPLEBY	Patrick	MCKEE BKS COY
43099	808827	,,	AYRES	Patrick	5 INF BN
43100	811164	,,	BARRETT	Charles	1 FAR
43101	809990	,,	BARRETT	James	1 FAR
43102	811160	,,	BARRY	Maurice	1 FAR
43103	808816	,,	BEHAN	Martin	12 INF BN
43104	806219	,,	BERKE	George	12 INF BN
43105	806191	,,	BERKE	Edward	12 INF BN
43106	809205	,,	BOURKE	William	12 INF BN
43107	805711	,,	BURKE	Michael	12 INF BN
43108	806741	,,	BRADDISH	James	2 FD ENGR COY
43109	809696	,,	BREEN	Joseph	2 INF BN
43110	807809	,,	BRENNAN	John	MCKEE BKS COY
43111	808535	,,	BRETT	John	1 Fd Engr Coy
43112	808822	,,	BROWNE	James	5 INF BN
43113	68519	,,	BROWNE	James	CT Depôt (S)
43114	811069	,,	BUCKLEY	Daniel	1 FAR
43115	810781	,,	BUTLER	Michael	CLANCY BKS COY
43116	810254	,,	BYRNE	Myles	5 INF BN
43117	809808	,,	BYRNE	Noel	5 INF BN
43118	806282	,,	GAGNEY	James	12 INF BN
43119	807038	,,	CAMPBELL	Christopher	BASE WKSPTS, S+T.
43120	809689	,,	CASMIN	James	1 FAR
43121	811120	,,	CASSIDY	Andrew	1 FAR
43122	807277	,,	CLARKE	John	6 Bde HQ
43123	94880	,,	CLARKE	Patrick	1 Fd Engr Coy
43124	803854	,,	CLARKIN	Anthony	2 FD SIGS
43125	810087	,,	CODY	Patrick	2 INF BN
43126	802559	,,	CONLON	James	3 Hosp Coy
43127	808534	,,	CONNOLLY	John	12 INF BN
43128	82071	,,	CONNOLLY	William	12 INF BN
43129	806874	,,	COSTELLO	Christopher	1 FAR
43130	809653	,,	CRAMP	James	2 FD ENGR COY
43131	808475	,,	CROWE	Joseph	12 INF BN
43132	809278	,,	CUDDIHY	Patrick	12 INF BN
43133	807816	,,	CULHANE	Donald	12 INF BN
43134	811188	,,	CULLEN	Charles	1 FAR
43135	811112	,,	CURLING	Fredrick	1 FAR
43136	809675	,,	CUSHNAHAN	Michael J	2 FD ENGR COY
43137	805448	,,	DALY	Arthur	12 INF BN
43138	807956	,,	DALY	Philip	12 INF BN
43139	811132	,,	DARBY	Michael	2 INF BN
43140	97906	,,	DAVITT	Patrick J	5 INF BN
43141	811092	,,	DELANEY	James A.	2 INF BN
43142	805141	,,	DELANEY	James	12 INF BN
43143	808425	,,	DONAGHY	Kevin	2 FD ENGR COY
43144	96863	,,	DONNELLY	Daniel	8 INF BN
43145	808701	,,	DONNELLY	Richard	1 FAR
43146	810091	,,	DOOGUE	Andrew	2 FD SIGS
43147	806763	,,	DORE	John	1 FAR
43148	96591	,,	DOUGLAS	Edward	2 FAR
43149	808619	,,	DOWNNEY	Thomas	3 FAR
43150	806492	,,	DOYLE	Aidan	CT Depôt (S)
43151	803452	,,	DOYLE	James	5 INF BN
43152	88689	,,	DOYLE	John	12 INF BN
43153	811081	,,	DRUMM	Garrett	1 FAR
43154	808953	,,	DUFFY	Joseph D	20 INF BN
43155	807903	,,	DUGGAN	James	1 FAR
43156	97238	,,	DUNDON	Michael	3 Bde HQ

U N IDENTITY NO.	SERVICE NO	RANK	N A M E	PARENT UNIT
43217	811305	Pte	LONG Edward	12 INF BN
43218	805939	"	LYNCH John R	2 Fd S+T
43219	811098	"	LYNCH Thomas	12 INF BN
43220	801421	"	LYSAGHT John	12 INF BN
43221	807807	"	MACKLIN Francis	2 INF BN
43222	802061	"	MAHER Denis	5 INF BN
43223	806872	"	MALONE Anthony	12 INF BN
43224	808359	"	MANGAN Martin	12 INF BN
43225	95911	"	MARTIN Thomas	2 INF BN
43226	98747	"	MASSEY Patrick	12 INF BN
43227	811171	"	MEANEY Garrett	1 FAR
43228	810441	"	MEEHAN Michael	2 FAR
43229	808288	"	MILLER Gerald	12 INF BN
43230	806598	"	MORRIS James	6 Bde HQ
43231	811116	"	MORRIS John	MCKEE Bks Coy
43232	806915	"	MULCAIRE Michael	12 INF BN
43233	811127	"	MULHALL Terence	2 INF BN
43234	800636	"	MULLINS Patrick	12 INF BN
43235	800852	"	MURPHY Charles	2 Fd Sigs
43236	805132	"	MURRAY Michael	2 FAR
43237	804693	"	MURRAY Peter	2 INF BN
43238	810565	"	MCCARTHY John	5 INF BN
43239	808750	"	MCGARRY Kevin	6 Bde HQ
43240	807810	"	MCGEOWN Domnick	6 Bde HQ
43241	807185	"	MCGIVNEY Phillip	6 Bde HQ
43242	809711	"	MCGRANE Michael	2 INF BN
43243	809497	"	MCGRATH Edward	1 FAR
43244	811661	"	MCGRATH Frank	12 INF BN
43245	804682	"	MCGRATH John	2 INF BN
43246	810747	"	MCGRATH Maurice	12 INF BN
43247	810562	"	MCGREGOR Robert	2 Fd Sigs
43248	811107	"	MCGROARTY Neill	1 FAR
43249	811125	"	MCCONNON Noel	2 INF BN
43250	811364	"	MCHUGH John	2 Hosp Coy
43251	804353	"	MCINERNEY Patrick	3 Bde HQ
43252	88152	"	MCINERNEY Thomas (det to Lee)	12 INF BN
43253	211409	"	McLOUGHLIN Peter	5 INF BN
43254	803569	"	McMARLOW John	2 INF BN
43255	807652	"	NAUGHTON Henry	12 INF BN
43256	810767	"	NEYLON Daniel	1 Fd Sigs Coy
43257	809788	"	NOLAN Michael	6 Bde HQ
43258	800511	"	NUGENT Michael	2 FAR
43259	811334	"	NULTY John	2 Gun Ord Coy
43260	806056	"	O'BRIEN Christopher	12 INF BN
43261	806633	"	O'BRIEN Denis	1 FAR
43262	86000	"	O'BRIEN James	5 INF BN
43263	808459	"	O'BRIEN John	2 Fd Engr Coy
43264	810556	"	O'BRIEN Michael	12 INF BN
43265	809171	"	O'BRIEN Michael	12 INF BN
43266	807765	"	O'BRIEN Patrick	5 INF BN
43267	808557	"	O'CALLAGHAN John	1 FAR
43268	811070	"	O'CONNELL Denis	1 FAR
43269	806612	"	O'DEA Michael	3 Fd Sigs Coy
43270	808639	"	O'DONNELL Edmond	1 Fd Engr Coy
43271	809821	"	O'DONNELL Michael	2 Hosp Coy
43272	810743	"	O'DWYER Christopher J	12 INF BN
43273	811163	"	O'LEARY Liam	1 FAR
43274	93814	"	O'LEARY Patrick	12 INF BN
43275	809646	"	O'LEARY Patrick	2 Fd S+T
43276	93986	"	O'LOUGHLIN Patrick	12 INF BN
43277	810869	"	O'LOUGHLIN Thomas	12 INF BN
43278	808558	"	O'MEARA Laurence	12 INF BN

U.N. SERVICE  
IDENTITY NO RANK N A M E

PARENT UNIT

U.N. IDENTITY NO	SERVICE NO	RANK	N A M E	PARENT UNIT
43157	92153	Pte	FANNING	Phillip
43158	811176	,,	FARRELL	Andrew J
43159	414502	,,	FAULKNER	James
43160	808292	,,	FENELON	Fergus
43161	90031	,,	FINN	David
43162	809201	,,	FITZGERALD	Matthew
43163	92065	,,	FITZGERALD	James
43164	811122	,,	FITZGERALD	William
43165	810891	,,	FLEMING	Christopher
43166	75786	,,	FLOOD	William
43167	808637	,,	FLYNN	Philip
43168	808895	,,	FLYNN	William
43169	809394	,,	FORAN	Joseph
43170	808347	,,	FORTUNE	Peter
43171	808109	,,	FRANKLIN	Patrick
43172	810407	,,	GAFFNEY	Patrick J
43173	808192	,,	GALLAGHER	Joseph
43174	800957	,,	GARDINER	John
43175	808244	,,	GARDINER	Joseph
43176	811165	,,	GRACE	John J
43177	96062	,,	GRAHAM	Michael
43178	809625	,,	GREGORY	Sean
43179	811104	,,	HANLY	Patrick
43180	91451	,,	HAWKINS	Leonard
43181	810851	,,	HAYDEN	Michael
43182	804190	,,	HAYES	Anthony
43183	809432	,,	HAYES	John
43184	810397	,,	HEALY	James
43185	809674	,,	HEGARTY	John
43186	95616	,,	HENDERSON	Patrick
43187	811304	,,	HENRY	Maurice
43188	810582	,,	HICKEY	Anthony
43189	800330	,,	HICKEY	Michael
43190	810421	,,	HICKEY	Michael
43191	808477	,,	HOGAN	Albert
43192	94798	,,	HOGAN	Michael
43193	808638	,,	HOGAN	Patrick
43194	808996	,,	HOULIHAN	Thomas
43195	811121	,,	HOURIGAN	Richard
4 3196	803527	,,	HUFF	Patrick
43197	805187	,,	HUGHES	Eamonn
43198	810746	,,	JORDAN	Desmond
43199	808728	,,	KAVANAGH	James
43200	809280	,,	KAVANAGH	John
43201	811101	,,	KAVANAGH	John
43202	809473	,,	KEANE	John
43203	88593	,,	KEARNS	Joseph
43204	803858	,,	KEEMAN	John
43205	810959	,,	KEEMAN	Patrick
43206	95147	,,	KELLY	James
43207	810770	,,	KELLY	James
43208	801776	,,	KELLY	John
43209	806232	,,	LANDY	Patrick
43210	811162	,,	LANG	Fredrick
43211	93585	,,	LARKIN	Brendan A
43212	806394	,,	LARRIGAN	Francis
43213	808872	,,	LASTE	John
43214	810472	,,	LAWLESS	Thomas
43215	809992	,,	LAWLOR	Henry
43216	806929	,,	LEECH	Gregory

12 INF BN  
5 INF BN  
CDA (S)  
2 FAR  
12 INF BN  
12 INF BN  
2 FAR  
1 FAR  
2 INF BN  
1 7d S+T  
12 INF BN  
3 HOSP COY  
12 INF BN  
2 7d Engr Coy  
12 INF BN  
2 FAR  
2 INF BN  
3 HOSP COY  
12 INF BN  
2 INF BN  
12 INF BN  
5 INF BN  
2 INF BN  
12 INF BN  
2 INF BN  
12 INF BN  
1 FAR  
2 FAR  
1 FAR  
2 FAR  
2 INF BN  
12 INF BN  
12 INF BN  
2 FAR  
12 INF BN  
12 INF BN  
1 7d Sigs Coy  
12 INF BN  
1 FAR  
6 Bde HQ  
12 INF BN  
2 INF BN  
2 7d Sigs.  
5 INF BN  
5 INF BN  
1 FAR  
2 HOSP COY  
AIR CORPS  
2 INF BN  
5 INF BN  
2 INF BN  
2 INF BN  
12 INF BN  
1 FAR  
2 HOSP COY  
2 7d Sigs  
12 INF BN  
2 FAR  
2 INF BN  
2 INF BN

U.N. IDENTITY	SERVICE NO	RANK	N	A	M	E	PARENT UNIT
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43279	808371	Pte	O'NEILL	Kevin			2 Fd Engr Coy
43280	809042	"	O'NEILL	John			12 INF BN
43281	98442	"	O'REGAN	Brendan			12 INF BN
43282	809389	"	O'REGAN	Patrick			1 FAR
43283	809616	"	O'REGAN	Thomas			1 Fd Sigs Coy
43284	810455	"	O'REILLY	Anthony			12 INF BN
43285	809358	"	O'REILLY	Paul			Out Sqn Sigs
43286	808658	"	O'REILLY	Edward			12 INF BN
43287	808183	"	O'REGAN	James			12 INF BN
43288	809026	"	O'SULLIVAN	James			12 INF BN
43289	803608	"	O'SULLIVAN	John P.			4 INF BN
43290	809402	"	O'SULLIVAN	Michael			2 INF BN
43291	808959	"	POLLARD	Daniel			12 INF BN
43292	807182	"	POWER	John			E COMB HQ
43293	I05522	"	PURCELL	John			5 INF BN
43294	810449	"	REDMOND	Gregory			2 FAR
43295	811047	"	REILLY	Joseph			2 FAR
43296	811050	"	RICE	Peter J			2 INF BN
43297	805611	"	ROCHE	James			12 INF BN
43298	804085	"	ROCHE	Robert R			2 FAR
43299	806424	"	RYAN	Sean			1 FAR
43300	809668	"	RYAN	Joseph			1 FAR
43301	808202	"	RYAN	Patrick			1 Fd Sigs Coy
43302	811541	"	RYAN	Thomas			CT Depot (E)
43303	810973	"	SANE	Patrick			2 INF BN
43304	809173	"	SHEEHAN	Christopher			1 FAR
43305	802484	"	SHEEHAN	Daniel			12 INF BN
43306	806128	"	SHEELS	Michael			3 Hosp Coy
43307	808458	"	STAPLETON	John			2 Fd Engr Coy
43308	800425	"	STEPHENSON	Joseph			5 INF BN
43309	808354	"	SULLIVAN	Daniel			2 INF BN
43310	810262	"	SWAN	Michael			5 INF BN
43311	808995	"	THOMPSON	Gerard			12 INF BN
43312	96964	"	TIER	John			14 INF BN
43313	811201	"	TWAMLEY	Brendan			5 INF BN
43314	811159	"	TWOHIG	Patrick			1 FAR
43315	803707	"	WALSH	Stephen			12 INF BN
43316	811408	"	WHELAN	John			5 INF BN
43317	806363	"	WHELAN	Joseph			2 INF BN
43318	808040	"	WHELAN	Michael			5 INF BN
43319	811629	"	WHITE	Bernard			CT Depot (E)
43320	806146	"	WIDDESS	Edward J			2 Fd Engr Coy
43321	809469	"	WOOD	Henry			2 Fd Engr Coy
	807852	"	HARMAN	JOHN			Depot S+T
	805625	"	O'TOOLE	ANDREW.			depot S+T.

President TSHOMBE , acting in the name of the Katangese Government is for the one part ;

Monsieur KHIARY , Mahmoud , acting in the name of ONUC , for the other part;

Considering the agreement of 20 September 1961 on the ceasefire and particularly Article 3;

Considering the report presented by the Military Sub-Committee which had the task of visiting the garrisons of the interior ;

Considering the agreements of the Commission set up under Article 3 of the ceasefire agreement;

HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:

- 1 The exchange of all military prisoners of the two sides will take place in Elizabethville on 16 October 1961 at 16.00 hours.

These prisoners will be brought by the authorities holding them to the old Elizabethville aerodrome where the exchange will take place .

The prisoners will be exchanged without arms or munitions .

(Note: The above paragraph has been qualified by a verbal agreement that the Katangese prisoners in our hands in North Katanga will be handed over to the Katangese at the actual place of their detention .)

2. Three joint sub-committees for control of the ceasefire agreement, each composed of two Katangese Officers and two ONUC Officers , will be set up .

These sub-committees will have full freedom to travel to any part of the Katangan territory and at any moment, at the request of one or the other of the two parties.

All facilities will be given to these sub-committees in carrying out their task .

Any complaints or claims which one or the other of the two parties may have to make will be brought before the Commission set up under Article 3 of the ceasefire agreement of 20 September.

3. The garrisons of the Katangese forces and of ONUC , who on 12 September were in particular at Albertville, Niamba , Nyunzu , Jadotville , will be authorised to occupy with the same effectives their normal positions .

They will be able to carry out freely the movements necessary to accomplish their mission .



Any troop movement falling within the framework of the agreement on the ceasefire signed on 20 September at Ndola must be the notice of the other party .

4. ONUC will hand over to the Katangese authorities in Elisabethville control of the following positions ;

- (a) the BCK hospital;
- (b) the Lido;
- (c) the tunnel of the Chausse de Kasenga

5. The Katangese authorities and ONUC bind themselves to maintain the neutrality of these places and they will not place any military forces either inside or outside them .

6. The General Post Office of Elisabethville will be handed back to the Katangese authorities , which will ensure liberty of communications .

UNUC technicians will be able to check the immunity of UN communication s.

7. The free use of aerodromes at present controlled by ONUC will be ensured for civilian traffic and for the Katangese authorities , using the means which they have for the normal supply of their troops , as in the past .

(Note: The French word here used for " supply" - revitalissement"-

means supply of food and similar necessities ; not supply of weapons and munitions .)

8. The radio installations at KILOBELOE will be handed back to the Katangese authorities . The latter and ONUC mutually bind themselves , from the signature of the present agreement, to see to it that no defamatory attack or campaign of agitation be undertaken by either of the two parties against the other .

The two parties will also abstain from taking any hostile measure or sanction , such as cutting off the water supply or electric current , refusal of economic dealings , forbidding use of aerodromes , etc .

9. The Katangese Government will help ONUC to find suitable premises for the lodgement of its civil and military services , in replacement of the premises which it hands over to the Katangese authorities . The choice of these premises will be made by common agreement and will involve the payment of a rent accepted by both parties .

10. The ONUC representatives do not consider as a violation of the ceasefire a possible reply by the Katangese Gendarmerie to an attack coming from the outside .

11 The Gendarmerie forces , which were at the Luana aerodrome and which were composed of 52 people equipped with the same weapons which they had possessed on 12 September, will be authorized to resume their positions for the surveillance of the Gendarmerie's military installations .

The Katangese police will ensure the normal service of control of immigration and of police .

These forces will not be disarmed by the UN troops and, in case of difficulties , the two parties will have recourse to Article 12 below .

12 . The two parties express their firm intention to handle any difficulties which may arise by peaceful means and bind themselves to submit to the Commission , established by Article 5 of the ceasefire agreement , any difference which may arise between them.

13. The present agreement enters into execution immediately and will become definitive after its approval by the Secretariat General in New York .

Elisabethville , 13 October 1961

(Signed) TSHOMBE

KHILARY

MESSAGE FROM AN tAIRE COSANTA.

Message from An tAire Cosanta to the Irish Contingent on the occasion of visit of An Cearn Foirne, Nov 61.

"I am very happy to avail myself of the visit of the Chief of Staff to the Irish troops in the Congo to send this message of greetings and good wishes.

In the brief period since my appointment as Minister for Defence last month, I have seen quite a lot of the Army and I have been greatly impressed by its discipline and devotion to duty. I now look forward to welcoming you home in the near future on the completion of your tour of duty. I know what an anxious and difficult time it has been for all of you. For many of you there are memories of hardships and sufferings and the loss of gallant comrades who have made the supreme sacrifice in that distant land. But sad and painful as these things are, I know that, being good Christian Soldiers, you do not cherish feelings of bitterness or hatred but will continue to strive for the success of the United Nations Mission of bringing peace and order to the sorely tried peoples of the Congo.

As part of the United Nations Force in the Congo, you are serving the noble cause of peace everywhere, and men of good-will honour you for it. The world is now such a place that the peace of remote lands which we scarcely knew of formerly is a matter of vital importance to all mankind and not least to our Country. You are, each of you, Ireland's ambassadors of peace and goodwill and you have the opportunity of making Ireland known and respected not only among the peoples of the Congo but also among the soldeirs of many nations who comprise the United Nation Force. Your conduct both on and off duty must always reflect the highest standard of discipline, efficiency and courtesy. I am pleased to note from reports which I have received that you have admirably acquitted yourselves in these respects and Ireland is proud of you".

---

RANNÓG PHEANANNA AGUS OIBRÍOCHT,  
CEANNCHEATHRÚ AN AIRM,  
GEATA NA PÁIRCE,  
BAILE ÁTHA CLIATH.

25 Aibreán, 1961.

1 GRÚPA COISITHE

1. Herewith Provisional Tables of Establishment and Organisation of 1 GRÚPA COISITHE which will be prepared for service with O.N.U.C. in The Republic of The Congo.
2. Annex A, (Provisional Armament Table), is attached.
3. Further Annexures relating to weapons, ammunition and equipment will follow.

*R. H. ...*  
CORNAL  
(T. de Graé)

STIÚRTHÓIR PLEANANNA AGUS OIBRÍOCHT.

IMDHÁIL:

	<u>Cóipeanna</u>		<u>Cóipeanna</u>
CF	2	OIC Ceann O	20
A Adn	10	OIC Ceann D	20
A Crn	10	OIC Ceann I	20
CFC	2	OIC CTC	20
S Trn	5	OIC Aer Chór	5
S Fais	5	OCSC	5
S Airt	5	Cft Col Mil	5
S Mar	5	OIC 1 Gp Cois	5
S Inlr	5		
S Corí	5	Comhad	20
S Ord	5		
S S&I	5	Mar eolas;	
SCLA	5	Rúnaí	3
SSCA	2		
SPA & PM	5		

RANNÓG PHILEANANNA AGUS OIBRÍOCHT,  
CEANNCHEATHRÚ AN AIRM,  
GEATA NA PÁIRCE,  
BAILE ÁTHA CLIATH.

26 Aibreán, 1961.

1 GRÚPA COISÍTHE

PROVISIONAL ESTABS + AMDT NO. 1

1. Table I. Add to Table: "Attachments: Chaplains - 1".
2. In Para 2 of covering letter, dated 25 Aibreán, 1961 Delete "Annex B" and substitute "Annex A".

3. ANNEX A

a. Group HQ

(i) Opposite 2 Privates, Orderlies and Runners -

delete 2 Gustaf SMGs.

substitute 1 Gustaf SMG and 1 FN Rifle.

(ii) Cancel Summary and substitute new Summary as follows:-

Bren LMG	FN Rifle	Gustaf SMG
1	2	6

b. Company Group

(i) Company Headquarters

Opposite Company Sergeant and Company Quartermaster-Sergeant -

Delete 1 Gustaf SMG (each)

Substitute 1 FN Rifle (each).

(ii) Summary - Coy Gp

Opposite Coy HQ -

Delete Gustaf SMG 18 and FN Rifles 14.

Substitute Gustaf SMG 16 and FN Rifles 16.

Opposite Total Coy Gp -

Delete Gustaf SMG 71 and FN Rifles 67

Substitute Gustaf SMG 69 and FN Rifles 69.

c. Summary 1 Inf GpDelete Summary 1 Inf GpSubstitute as follows:-

Sub-unit	Bren LMGs	Gustaf SMGs	FN Rifles	MMGs	60 mm Mor	84 mm Atk Rifles	.38 Rev.
One Coy Gp	(12)	(69)	(69)	(2)	(3)	(3)	(1)
Two Coy Gps	24	138	138	4	6	6	2
Group HQ	1	6	2	-	-	-	-
<b>TOTAL Inf Group</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>144</b>	<b>140</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>2</b>

4. ANNEX B is attached herewith.

*R. J. ...*  
 (S. (T. de Graé))  
 CORNAL

STIÚRTHÓIR FLEANANNA AGUS OIBRÍOCHT.

IMDHÁILCóipeannaCóipeanna

CF	2	OIC Ceann O	20
A Adn	10	OIC Ceann D	20
A Crn	10	OIC Ceann I	20
CFC	2	OIC CTC	20
S Trn	5	OIC Aer Chór	5
S Fais	5	OCSC	5
S Airt	5	Cft Col Mil	5
S Mar	5	OIC 1 Gp Cois	5
S Inlr	5		
S Cori	5	Comhad	20
S Ord	5		
S S&I	5	Mar eolas:	
SCLA	5		
BSCA	2	Rúnaí	3
SPA & PM	5		

RESTRICTED

ANNEX B

PROVISIONAL

Estabs 1 Inf Gp


1 INFANTRY GROUP

WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS DIAGRAM

Coy Gp HQ



Coy Gp HQ



SUMMARY

Sets	Allotment		Total
	Each Coy Gp(2)	Spare Coy Gp - Each	
C 12	1	1	4
31	5	5	20
88	2	6	16

SUMMARY - 1 INFANTRY GROUP

Sub-Unit	Bren LMG	Gustaf SMGs	FN Rifles	MMGs	60 mm Mor	84 mm Atk Rifle	.38 Revolver
One Coy Gp	(12)	(69)	(69)	(2)	(3)	(3)	(1)
Two Coy Gp	24	138	138	4	6	6	2
Group HQ	1	6	3	-	-	-	-
TOTAL Inf Group	25	144	141	4	6	6	2



Two Sub-Sections (each)

1 Corporal - I/C and No. 1 Gunner - 1 Gustaf Sub-Machine Gun.  
 1 Private - No. 2 Gunner - 1 Medium-Machine Gun.  
 1 Private - No. 3 Gunner - 1 FN Rifle.  
 1 Private - No. 4 Gunner - 1 FN Rifle (Energa).

Anti-Tank Section3 Sub-Sections (each)

1 Corporal - I/C - 1 Gustaf Sub-Machine Gun.  
 1 Private - No. 1 Gunner - 1 x 84 mm Atk Rifle.  
 1 Private - No. 2 Gunner - 1 FN Rifle  
 1 Private - No. 3 Gunner - 1 FN Rifle.

SUMMARY - COY GP

Sub-Unit	Bren LMGs	Gustaf SMGs	FN Rifles	Medium Machine Guns	60 mm Mortars	.38 Revolver	84 mm Atk Rifle
Rifle Platoon HQ	-	4	-	-	-	-	-
One Rifle Section	(1)	(3)	(4)	-	-	-	-
Three Rifle Sections	3	9	12	-	-	-	-
Total Rifle Platoon	3	13	12	-	-	-	-
Support Platoon HQ	-	5	-	-	-	-	-
60 mm Mortar Section	-	3	6	-	3	-	-
Medium Machine Gun Section	-	3	5	2	-	-	-
84 mm Anti-Tank Section	-	3	6	-	-	-	3
Total Support Platoon	-	14	17	2	3	-	3
Three Rifle Platoons	9	39	36	-	-	-	-
Support Platoon	-	14	17	2	3	-	3
Company HQ	3	16	16	-	-	1	-
Total Company Group	12	69	69	2	3	1	3

2.

3 Privates - Drivers MT	-	3 Gustaf Sub-Machine Guns.
4 Privates - Medical Orderlies		
1 Private - Tailor	-	1 FN Rifle.
1 Private - Boot-Repairer	-	1 FN Rifle.
1 Private - Storeman	-	1 FN Rifle (Energa)
2 Privates - Engineers	-	2 FN Rifles.

b. RIFLE PLATOON

Platoon Headquarters

1 Lieutenant	-	1 Gustaf Sub-Machine Gun.
1 Sergeant	-	1 Gustaf Sub-Machine Gun.
1 Private - Orderly/Runner	-	1 Gustaf Sub-Machine Gun.
1 Private - Signaller	-	1 Gustaf Sub-Machine Gun.

Rifle Section

1 Corporal - Section Commander	-	1 Gustaf Sub-Machine Gun.
1 Private - No. 1 Rifleman	-	1 FN Rifle (Energa).
1 Private - No. 2 Rifleman	-	1 FN Rifle.
1 Private - No. 3 Rifleman	-	1 FN Rifle.
1 Private - No. 4 Rifleman	-	1 FN Rifle.
1 Corporal - 2 I/C.	-	1 Gustaf Sub-Machine Gun.
1 Private - No. 1 Light Machine Gun	-	1 Bren Light-Machine Gun.
1 Private - No. 2 Light-Machine Gun	-	1 Gustaf Sub-Machine Gun.

c. SUPPORT PLATOON

Platoon Headquarters

1 Captain	-	1 Gustaf Sub-Machine Gun.
1 Lieutenant	-	1 Gustaf Sub-Machine Gun.
1 Sergeant	-	1 Gustaf Sub-Machine Gun.
1 Private - Orderly & Runner	-	1 Gustaf Sub-Machine Gun.
1 Private - Signaller	-	1 Gustaf Sub-Machine Gun.

60 mm Mortar Section

Three Sub-Sections (each)

1 Corporal	-	1 Gustaf Sub-Machine Gun.
1 Private - No. 1 Mortarman	-	1 60 mm Mortar.
1 Private - No. 2 Mortarman	-	1 FN Rifle.
1 Private - No. 3 Mortarman	-	1 FN Rifle (Energa).

Medium-Machine Gun Section

Section Headquarters

1 Sergeant - I/C Section	-	1 Gustaf Sub-Machine Gun.
1 Private - Rangetaker	-	1 FN Rifle.

1 INFANTRY GROUPPROVISIONAL GROUP ARMAMENT TABLE1. GROUP HEADQUARTERS

1 Lieutenant-Colonel	-	1 Gustaf Sub-Machine Gun.
1 Commandant	-	1 Gustaf Sub-Machine Gun.
3 Captains	-	3 Gustaf Sub-Machine Guns.
2 Sergeant - Clerks	-	2 FN Rifles.
1 Corporal - Clerk	-	1 Bren LMG.
2 Privates - Orderlies & Runners	-	1 Gustaf Sub-Machine Guns.
		1 FN Rifle.

SUMMARY

Bren LMG	FN Rifle	Gustaf SMG
1	3	6

2. COMPANY GROUPa. COMPANY HEADQUARTERS

1 Commandant Company Commander	-	1 Gustaf Sub-Machine Gun.
1 Capt/Comdt Medical Officer	-	1 .38 Revolver.
3 Captains	-	3 Gustaf Sub-Machine Guns.
1 Company Sergeant	-	1 FN Rifle
1 Company Quartermaster-Sergeant	-	1 FN Rifle
1 Sergeant - Armament Artificer	-	1 Gustaf Sub-Machine Gun.
1 Corporal - Clerk	-	1 Bren Light-Machine Gun.
1 Corporal - Storeman	-	1 Bren Light-Machine Gun.
1 Corporal - Signaller	-	1 Gustaf Sub-Machine Gun.
1 Corporal - Cook	-	1 FN Rifle.
1 Corporal - Fitter	-	1 FN Rifle.
1 Corporal - Operator - Wireless and Line.	-	1 Gustaf Sub-Machine Gun.
1 Corporal - Engineer	-	1 Gustaf Sub-Machine Gun.
3 Corporals - Military Police	-	3 Gustaf Sub-Machine Guns.
1 Corporal - Medical Orderly	-	
1 Private - Clerk	-	1 Bren Light-Machine Gun.
1 Private - Orderlies/Runners	-	1 Gustaf Sub-Machine Gun.
1 Private - Signaller	-	1 Gustaf Sub-Machine Gun.
3 Privates - Cooks	-	1 FN Rifle (Energia)
		2 FN Rifles.
4 Privates - Operators - Wireless and Line	-	4 FN Rifles.

PROVISIONAL ESTABLISHMENTS1 INFANTRY GROUP(CONSOLIDATED GROUP TABLE)

(Group Headquarters and Two Company Groups)

DETAIL (1)	Group Headquarters (2)	One Company Group (3)	Two Company Groups (4)	TOTAL 1 INFANTRY GROUP (5)	REMARKS (6)
<u>Privates:</u>					
Anti-Tank Numbers	-	(9)	18	18	
Boot-Repairers	-	(1)	2	2	
Clerks	-	(1)	2	2	
Cooks	-	(3)	6	6	
Drivers MT	-	(3)	6	6	
Engineers - Technicians	-	(2)	4	4	
Light Machine Gun Nos.	-	(18)	36	36	
60 mm Mortar Numbers	-	(9)	18	18	
Medical Orderlies	-	(4)	8	8	
Medium Machine Gun Nos.	-	(6)	12	12	
Rangetakers	-	(1)	2	2	
Operators - Wireless & Line	-	(4)	8	8	
Orderlies and Runners	2	(5)	10	12	
Rifleman	-	(36)	72	72	
Signallers	-	(5)	10	10	
Storemen	-	(1)	2	2	
Tailors	-	(1)	2	2	
TOTAL PRIVATES	2	(109)	218	220	
TOTAL ALL RANKS	9	(164)	328	337	

PROVISIONAL ESTABLISHMENTS1 INFANTRY GROUP

(CONSOLIDATED GROUP TABLE)

(Group Headquarters and Two Company Groups)

DETAIL (1)	Group Headquarters (2)	One Company Group. (3)	Two Company Groups (4)	TOTAL 1 INFANTRY GROUP (5)	REMARKS (6)
Lieutenant-Colonels	1	-	-	1	
Commandants	1	(1)	2	3	
Captains	3	(5)	10	13	
Lieutenants	-	(4)	8	8	
<b>TOTAL OFFICERS</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>(10)</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>25</b>	
Company Sergeants	-	(1)	2	2	
Company Quartermaster- Sergeants	-	(1)	2	2	
<u>Sergeants:</u>					
Armament Artificers	-	(1)	2	2	
Clerks	1	-	-	1	
Platoon Section	-	(4)	8	8	
	-	(1)	2	2	
<u>Corporals:</u>					
Anti-Tank Numbers	-	(3)	6	6	
Clerks	1	(1)	2	3	
Cooks	-	(1)	2	2	
Engineers - Technicians	-	(1)	2	2	
Fitters - MT	-	(1)	2	2	
Light Machine Gun Nos	-	(9)	18	18	
60 mm Mortar Numbers	-	(3)	6	6	
Medical Orderlies	-	(1)	2	2	
Medium Machine Gun Nos.	-	(2)	4	4	
Military Police	-	(3)	6	6	
Operators - Wireless & Line Section	-	(1)	2	2	
	-	(9)	18	18	
Signallers	-	(1)	2	2	
Storemen	-	(1)	2	2	
<b>TOTAL NCOs</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>(45)</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>92</b>	

RESTRICTED

3.

PROVISIONAL ESTABLISHMENTS

1 INFANTRY GROUP

COMPANY GROUP

(Company Headquarters, Three Rifle Platoons each of Three Sections, and One Support Platoon).

DETAIL (1)	Company Headquarters. (2)	One Rifle Platoon (3)	Three Rifle Platoons (4)	Support Platoon				TOTAL COMPANY GROUP (9)	REMARKS
				Headquarters (5)	Medium Machine Gun Section (6)	3 x 84 mm Anti Tank Sections (7)	3 x 60 mm Mortar Sections (8)		
<u>Privates (Cont)</u>									
Rangetakers	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	
Operators - Wrls and Line	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	
Orderlies and Runners	1	(1)	3	1	-	-	-	5	
Riflemen	-	(12)	36	-	-	-	-	36	
Signallers (f)	1	(1)	3	1	-	-	-	5	
Storemen	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	
Tailors	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	
<b>TOTAL PRIVATES</b>	22	(20)	60	2	7	9	9	109	
<b>TOTAL ALL RANKS</b>	41	(28)	84	5	10	12	12	164	

NOTE:

Two (2) Pipers and one (1) Barber will be included within the appointments shown for NCOs and Privates on this Table.

## PROVISIONAL ESTABLISHMENTS

## INFANTRY GROUP

## COMPANY GROUP

(Company Headquarters, Three Rifle Platoons each of Three Sections, and One Support Platoon).

DETAIL (1)	Company Headquarters (2)	One Rifle Platoon (3)	Three Rifle Platoons (4)	Support Platoon				TOTAL COMPANY GROUP (9)	REMARKS (10)
				Headquarters (5)	Medium Machine Gun Section (6)	3 x 84 mm Anti-Tank Sections (7)	3 x 60 mm Mortar Sections (8)		
Commandants	1(a)	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	(a) Company Commander.
Captains	1(b)	-	-	1(c)	-	-	-	5	
Lieutenants	-	1(c)	3	1(d)	-	-	-	4	
<b>TOTAL OFFICERS</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>(1)</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>10</b>	(b) 1 Second in Command. 1 Staff Officer. 1 Administrative officer 1 Medical Officer. (may be Commandant).
Company Sergeants	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	(c) Platoon Commander.
Company Quartermaster-Sergeants	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	
<u>Sergeants:</u>									
Armament Artificer	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	(d) Platoon Officer.
Platoon Section	-	(1)	3	1	1	-	-	4	
	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	
<u>Corporals:</u>									(e) May include one Sergeant. When so included, the numbers of sergeants will be increased and corporals decreased accordingly.
Anti-tank Nos	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	3	
Clerks	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	
Cooks	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	
Engineers - Technicians	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	
Fitters MT	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	
Light Machine Gun Numbers	-	(3)	9	-	-	-	-	9	
60 mm Mortar Numbers	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	3	
Medical Orderlies	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	
Medium Machine Gun Nos.	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	2	
Military Police	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	
Operators - Wrls & Line Section	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	
Signallers (f)	-	(3)(e)	9	-	-	-	-	9	
Storemen	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	
<b>TOTAL NCOs</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>(7)</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>45</b>	(f) May include Operators - Wireless and Line.
<u>Privates:</u>									(g) 1 Electrician 1 Plumber.
Anti-Tank Numbers	-	-	-	-	-	9	-	9	
Boot Repairers	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	
Clerks	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	
Cooks	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	
Drivers MT	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	
Engineers - Technicians	2(g)	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	
Light Machine Gun Nos	-	(6)	18	-	-	-	-	18	
60 mm Mortar Numbers	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	9	
Medical Orderlies	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	
Medium Machine Gun Nos.	-	-	-	-	6	-	-	6	

RESTRICTED

TABLE I

PROVISIONAL ESTABLISHMENTS

1 INFANTRY GROUP

GROUP HEADQUARTERS

DETAIL (1)	Group Headquarters (2)	REMARKS (3)
Lieutenant-Colonels Commandants Captains	1 (a) 1 (b) 3 (c)	(a) Officer Commanding. (b) Operations Officer.
TOTAL OFFICERS	5	(c) 1 Adjutant 1 Quartermaster and Welfare Officer. 1 Intelligence Officer.
<u>Sergeants:</u> Clerks (d)	1	(d) Also act as Typists.
<u>Corporals:</u> Clerks (d)	1	
TOTAL NCOs	2	
<u>Privates</u> Orderlies and Runners	2	
TOTAL PRIVATES	2	
TOTAL ALL RANKS	9	

ATTACHMENTS - ONE Chaplain.

RESTRICTED



... destiny is  
... easily be taken  
... despite alarmist  
... to the contrary. If we  
... courage of our convictions,  
... as well give up now.

## OBITUARY

### COL. J. C. O'DONOVAN

Colonel John Clement O'Donovan, who has died at St. Brigid's Military Hospital, was the Army's Director of Plans and Operations.

Born in Timoleague, Co. Cork, in 1911, and educated at St. Colman's Fermoy, he came into the Forces as a Cadet in 1931 and received his commission two years later. He was appointed to the 1st (Irish-speaking) Battalion but soon moved to the 4th Infantry Battalion in Cork, beginning an association with Munster infantry units which was to last for 20 years, including command of the wartime 19th Battalion in Little Island, Cork, the Limerick Area F.C.A. and the 13th Battalion in Clonmel.

In the Congo he commanded the 1st Infantry Group, a distinguished unit which served in areas of Kasai Province where no other white U.N. troops had ever been and which later defended Kamina Base against armed Katangese attack.

Promoted to Colonel in 1962, he was staff officer for Civil Defence, Director of Training from 1964 to 1969 and finally Director of Plans and Operations.

He is survived by his widow, the former Miss Sara Duff whom he married in 1948, and two sons and a daughter.

The remains will be taken to the Military Church of the Sacred Heart, Arbour Hill, at 5 p.m. today and the funeral will be to Dean's Grange Cemetery after 10 a.m. Mass in Arbour Hill tomorrow.

### Koenig for Poland

Cardinal Franz Koenig, Archbishop of Vienna, will visit Poland sometime this spring, his office said yesterday.—(U.P.I.)

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
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
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' 13 DECEMBER 1987



'According to the  
Civil Service handbook  
I rate as a Lieut-  
enant Colonel...'



DEFENCE

brian bagnall

