

RÚNDA



STAIR AONDAID

5u Grupa Coisithe Naisiuin Aontuithe An Chipir

RÚNDA

Deire Fomhair 1965 — Márta 1966

UNIT HISTORY

5th INFANTRY GROUP

IN THE SERVICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN CYPRUS

1. Gp HQ, the Armd Car Gp and elements of HQ Coy assembled at Plunkett Bks, CTC, on 27 Sep 65 and preparations were made there for the reception of the main body.
2. The remainder of the Gp commenced assembling at CTC on 28 Sep 65 and by 30 Sep 65 the entire Gp was concentrated there, "A" and "B" Coys being billeted in Connolly Bks and the remainder in Plunkett Bks. See Appx "A" for nominal roll.
3. On Fri, 1 Oct 65, the CO and offr of the Gp attended a reception at Arus an Uachtarán, where An tUachtarán greeted each offr and addsd the offr generally on the implications of their impending service with the United Nations Force in CYPRUS.
4. An Adv Party, consisting of the CO, offr, Chaplain and OR, was flown to CYPRUS by JAT Airlines on 4 & 5 Oct 65.
5. On 7 Oct 65 An CF visited the Gp and insp the preparations for service abroad.
6. The Gp was activated on 13 Oct 65.
7. On 14 Oct 65 An Taoiseach, accompanied by An CF, reviewed the Gp under comd of the 21C at the Gymnasium, Plunkett Bks. This was followed by a reception at Plunkett Bks Offrs' Mess, at which some of the Gp offr attended.
8. The airlift to CYPRUS of the main body of the Gp by JAT airlines commenced on 19 Oct 65 and was completed on 24 Oct 65.

BRIEFING AND OTHER ACTIVITIES OF THE GP IN IRELAND BEFORE MOV TO CYPRUS

9. During its sojourn at the CTC all pers of the Gp and all branches of its

Over.....

RÚNDA

Staff were very adequately briefed on all aspects of their foreign service commitments on the basis of info sup by GHQ, other offrs with previous experience in CYPRUS and offrs of the Gp who were already in CYPRUS as members of the Adv Party. These briefings were invaluable and the members of the Gp are unanimous in their appreciation of the selfless and dedicated manner in which all those concerned assisted them so well during this period.

10. The matters covered in these briefings included the following:

- a. "A" Adm matters.
- b. "Q" Adm matters.
- c. Ops matters, incl data from marked maps sup by Ops members on Adv Party.
- d. UN SOPs, incl Ops and Adm procedures used by UN in CYPRUS.
- e. Ops role 5 Inf Gp in CYPRUS.
- f. Historical background of the then sit in CYPRUS.
- g. Political sit and geography of CYPRUS.
- h. Public relations and morale.

11. Other matters which occupied the Gp during this period were:

- a. Compilation of Nominal Rolls,
- b. Completion of LA 141.
- c. Insp and compilation of personal documents.
- d. Med processing and completion of LAs 30 and Yellow Cards.
- e. Identity Cards, Offers for External Service, Marriage Allotments, Wills, etc.
- f. Kit insps and issues of deficiencies.
- g. Issue of wpns and equipt.
- h. Issue of overseas kit.
- i. Opening of accts.

- 3 -
- j. Preparing and packing stores.
 - k. Range Practices.
 - l. Spec Trg of MP Sec, Sig Pl and Hy Mors.

OPS OF ADV PARTY PRIOR TO ARRIVAL OF MAIN BODY

12. The reception of the Adv Party at 0501 30 Oct 65 in Nicosia left much to be desired. Soldiers expect, and will gladly accept, the hardships necessarily involved in their calling, but only when such cannot be avoided by int planning and foresight. The circumstances, requiring all ranks, incl sen Offrs, to travel 40 miles over dangerous twisty rds at that hr of the morning, without the benefit of refreshment of even the most meagre kind to a camp which was not and could not in the circumstances be ready for them, showed a lamentable lack of both these desirable attributes. It would have been much more satisfactory if transit accn and food had been made available for them at Nicosia, an arrangement which could have been easily made. The foregoing is not intended, nor must it be taken, as casting a reflection on the Rear Party of 42 Bn, who received them at KATO PYRGOS and did everything that could be expected to take them in, feed and accommodate them on their arrival there.
13. Immediately on arrival the Adv Party set about picking up the threads of their MISSION as part of UNFICYP.
14. They soon found that LEFKA District, which had been assigned to them,

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was one of the most militarily sensitive areas in CYPRUS. The focal pts of tension were the Enclave at LEFKA, the bridgeheads at LIMINITIS and KOKKINA and the village of AMBELIKOU which adjoined the LEFKA Enclave, all of which were held by the Turkish Cypriots.

Access to these areas was completely interdicted to government tps, police and adm agents and to Greek Cypriots in gen except for travel across the LIMINITIS bridgehead in accordance with the LIMINITIS ROAD AGREEMENT, the terms of which had been hammered out with the opposing sides by Comdt. W. Madden of the 42 Bn (see Para 56). Each of these sensitive areas was ringed by fortified hill-top posns manned by Turkish Cypriot fighters who were enforcing their exclusive ctl over them by force of arms, against any attempted encroachment by the Government. Encircling each of these, with a bare two hundred yds, and in many cases less, intervening, were Government tps of the National Gd manning similar fortified hill-top posns. Each rd leading into them had opposing Greek and Turkish Cypriot manned barriers which tied in with the respective Greek or Turkish Cypriot posn in the particular area. The Greek Cypriots on their part generally allowed freedom of mov to Turkish Cypriots over Government controlled areas, but only subject to identification and search, which they considered necessary to prevent the build up of Turkish Fighter str and to ctl the mov of strategic materials into Turkish Cypriot

areas to travel on rds outside their enclaves. The mov of Turkish Cypriots outside their own areas was also being limited by a rigid self-segregation policy which was being imposed on them by their own ldrship.

15. In each of these sensitive areas UNFICYP was permanently deployed in small dets normally placed, in OPs, in posns interposed between the two sides. On the arrival of the Adv Party these OPs were manned as a temp measure by Canadian tps at LEFKA and LIMINITIS and by the British at KOKKINA. There was no HQ set up in the District for 5 Inf Gp and consequently no files or filing system to take over. The CO and his Staff immediately carried out an extensive recce of the whole District by car, on foot and from the air, for the purpose of:

- a. establishing a Gp HQ and an operational centre;
- b. ascertaining the operational and adm requirements of the District;
- c. deciding on the allocation of Sub-Units and their tasks;
- d. ascertaining the economic problems of the District;
- e. ascertaining comms requirements and
- f. establishing a camp for Group HQ and HQ Coy which could not be provided for in existing installations.

16. In addition, frequent briefings were arranged at UNFICYP HQ, NICOSIA whereby the Staff were brought up to date on the sit and were made au fait with operational and adm requirements, SOPs and other instrs issued for their guidance by this HQ.

17. XEROS was selected as the site for Gp HQ, HQ Coy and Ops Centre, as it was adjudged the most suitable in the District for ctl and sup of the unit.

18. No sups of tentage for this Camp were readily available from

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British Sup Deps and, with the Main Body due to commence leaving Ireland on 19 Oct, procurement of tentage and commencement of work on the Camp became a matter of some urgency.

19. Gp Ord Offr succeeded in borrowing one mug modified tent from Camp QM, HQ, UNFICYP, and this was to be the first tent to be pitched in the Camp. It was used to house the work party which commenced building the Camp and later served as a temp Sgts' Mess. Then other mugs modified tents which were surplus to CINCOS requirements were also obtained. These were standing at Trodos Rd Camp Nicosia and had to be struck by the Adv Party for use at Xeros.
20. The borrowed tent was collected on Wed, 13 Oct - one week after the Adv Party arrived, and, on the same day, the Troodos rd tentage was obtained. A small work party moved from KATO PYRGOS to Xeros on the following day and work on the Xeros Camp commenced. Other sups of tentage were then obtained from HQ, UNFICYP.
21. As part of the Winterisation plan for UNFICYP Units, Nissen Huts were made available to 5 Inf Gp. One of these was collected on Sat, 16 Oct, and a small Engr party moved into the Camp.
22. This party obviously could not build a nissen unaided. The Engr Offr succeeded in persuading the Danish Bn to provide a sec of Engrs to assist in the work. These arrived on Sun, 17 Oct, and proved to be of great assistance for the few days they could be spared to us.
23. In the meantime the Engr Offr had also been in touch with Cyprus Mines Corporation, who actually owned the Camp site and they agreed to provide an amount of Engineering assistance to the work party.

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The C.M.C. lived up to its promises and laid a water main around the Camp, installed poles and wiring for an electric mains, erected a tubular metal frame work, later to be sheeted by the Engr sec and built into a Cookhouse and NCOs' Mess. They also earned the everlasting thanks of the work party by providing a mechanical excavator which dug the fifteen foot deep latrine pits, which otherwise would have had to be dug by hand - an unpleasant job in blazing sunshine.

24. Thus the Camp grew from a real United Nations effort, with the Irish being helped on their way by Danish, Canadian and British tps, Cypriot workers and an American owned Mining Coy.

25. While the arrangements for commencing the Camp were being made, the Sigs Adv Party were preparing to set up their eqpt. As this was packed in seventy crates and stored in the Irish hanger at HQ, UNFICYP, there could be no question of unpacking it before moving to Xeros.

26. As the Gp would not become operational without adequate comms, priority was given to the provision of a Sig Centre at Xeros. Immediately accn for the work parties was erected in the new Camp, tents for the Sigs Centre, Sig stores and Sig wksp were erected.

27. In the meantime the Sigs Offr made arrangements for provision of essential sups, reced OP sites and made arrangements with Cyprus Telecomms Auth for provision of teles in the Camp.

28. On the evening of Fri, 15 Oct, the Sigs Adv Party moved to Xeros and on the next day commenced unpacking and assembling their eqpt. When the Gp became operational on 30 Oct 65 the sig set up was complete.

29. OPERATIONS CENTRE:

- a. As previously explained, the Ops Centre had to be built from scratch. Maps were obtained from United Nations HQ.

Over.....

- b. Four separate sets of maps were set up. The first set of maps gave the over-all sit on the island and details of how the island was sub divided into Zones and districts between the different contingents.
- c. The sec set gave details of the sit in LEFKA DISTRICT, sub-unit boundaries and obsn posts occupied in each sub unit area.
- d. The third set gave details of the rd network in ths district and graded each rd as first cl, sec cl, third cl, and what type of veh you could motor on them.
- e. The fourth set gave every available detail of TURK fighter posns, National Gd posns and United Nations posns for KOKKINA bridge head, LIMINITIS bridge head and LEFKA enclave.
- f. An Ops board was set up and sub divided to cater for all incoming
- b. Four separate sets of maps were set up. The first set of maps and outgoing t/c to and from the Op Centre.
- g. A filing system was evolved and at this stage it could be said that was sub divided into Zones and Districts between the different the Op Centre was a going concern. contingents.

30. Copies of some of the above maps were made and, together with other info obtained, were sent back to Ireland to bring the briefing of Main Body of the Gp up to date.

- d. The third set gave details of the rd network in ths district and graded each rd as first cl, sec cl, third cl, and what type of veh you could motor on them.
- e. The fourth set gave every available det-ll of TURK fighter posns, National Gd posns and United Nations posns for KOKKINA bridge head, LIMINITIS bridge head and LEFKA enclave.
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RECEPTION OF THE MAIN BODY IN CYPRUS

31. The main body of the Gp arrived in Cyprus between the 18th and 24th October, 1965. The fact that all elements of the Gp were successfully installed in their various Camps by the evening of the 24th was a great tribute to the industry and planning of the Advance Party. When one considers the multifarious preparations they had to make and the short time that was at their disposal one must be struck by the high degree of teamwork and military efficiency displayed by all. The work was not by any means complete as the Main Body began to arrive but their method of arrival was anticipated to such good purpose that it was possible to accommodate each new plane load on arrival and to inject them into the work so that each phase was completed on time for the reception of the next plane load. This was especially so in the building of the new camp at Xeros. The instalment of the complete HQ Coy here on the 24th was a major achievement.
32. The arrangements included the establishment of a transit camp at HQ UNFICYP capable of accommodating and feeding 120 all ranks. All personnel were fed here on arrival and those arriving after 1400 hrs each day were accommodated there overnight as well. Everyone was high in their praise of the cooperation and assistance received at this camp from the British Camp Staff HQ UNFICYP to whom no demand was too exacting, and by whom no efforts were spared to make life

as pleasant as possible for all arrivals. Their feeding arrangements were excellent and their patience inexhaustible.

33. To say that the group were all accommodated on the 24th Oct meant, barely, that they were under canvas and they had beds but they had little else. Lefka, Liminitis and Kokkina had other essentials such as light and water but these amenities had to be reinstalled, in part, in Kato Pyrgos from which they had been almost entirely removed, and completely installed in Xeros. Providing lights in each of the 52 tents at Xeros and the necessary internal lighting for the camp was in itself a major undertaking. These tents like those at all Irish Camps ranged from 180 lbs up to 4 Pole Marquees.

34. The imminence of Winter, of which the advance party and the first elements of the main body had already had a foretaste on their arrival, also carried its own problems. Much of the Canvas allotted to the group was old and unserviceable. This was particularly so in the case of the twenty odd OPs each with at least two 180 lbs. tents, which were taken over by the companies on the 30th Oct. All tents had to be surveyed immediately, the unserviceable ones boarded, and serviceable replacements found and installed. It was in the replacement of tentage at OPs that the group first got to know the worth of the U.N. Helicopter service which was to provide them with excellent assistance in this and many other ways

during their 6 months tour in the service of U.N. in CYPRUS.

35. Winterization also required that immediate steps be taken to combat the anticipated winterlogging effect which the heavy rains would have on all camp sites, and OPS. This involved laying concrete floors in tents, providing stone and concrete paths between them and along the main traffic arteries within the camps improving routes between the camps and their OPs, filling in with stones the areas most likely to become flooded, providing drainage systems and finally giving each camp and OP a military appearance.

BECOMING OPERATIONAL

36. On 19th Oct 1965 it was known that the Group would assume its operational role at 1200 hrs 30th Oct 1966. Needless to say the adv. Party had already planned well for this, and the demanding administrative requirements referred to above did not prevent the preparations for the operational role being given their place of priority.
37. When the Main Body began to arrive the sub unit commanders were already in their own ground and knew exactly what was required of them. As their officers and NCOs arrived they were immediately oriented, and the operational requirements of their role, which had already been explained to them at home, were confirmed on the ground and translated into specific tasks. The Canadian and British Units from whom they were to take over gave every assistance that could be required. Irish understudies were immediately appointed at all

operational levels right down to the men actually manning the OPs. In this way in the week or so that remained the Irish were gradually eased into their operational responsibilities and were already a very much going concern when the Canadians and British were pulled out at 1200 hrs 30th Oct. During this period friendships were established at all levels between the three contingents which were to be of inestimable value during the trying months ahead.

38. a. At the final pre-becoming operational briefing at Group Headquarters 28th Oct, 1966 Operations No.1 (See Appx "C") was issued to sub unit commanders.

The briefing itself brought the sub-unit Commanders up to date on:

- (1) the general sit, military and political,
 - (2) the mission of the Gp
 - (3) the tasks of the sub-units, and UNCIPO u/comd, and
 - (4) the economic sit in LEFKA District.
- b. At this briefing also several other important matters which had to be shelved up to this time were attended to. These included:
- (1) arranging for the production of orders for camps and outposts,
 - (2) providing arrangements for the safer custody of arms and ammunition. This was always a trying problem since certain Cypriot elements were always on the look out for opportunities to steal any

items of this nature left lying about.

The arrangements now provided for removing into secure stores in each camp all arms and ammunition except items on actual issue to members on CP., Guard or Pat duty.

This stores was so located that it was always under ctl of the Gd.

(3) Fire Precautions. This again was always a matter which required the greatest attention. Oil Heaters were provided in every tent. These and electrical faults were a constant fire hazard. Once the canvas of a tent caught fire it was impossible to extinguish it. The proximity of tents coupled with the strong breeze which always blew in Cyprus made it essential for all ranks to appreciate fully and to constantly anticipate dangers from this source.

It is to the credit of the arrangements made at this time and to the manner of their implementation that, on the two occasions when fires were experienced, damage was limited to very small proportions.

39. It was immediately obvious to every one that ours was not going to be an easy task. The situation placed a very great responsibility on every member of 5 Inf Gp right down to the most lowly private. The NCOs I/C CPs had a particularly grave responsibility.

isolated as they were to be in their lonely outposts perched precariously on hill tops, between the hostile confrontation of the opposing sides, a confrontation which had existed now for more than two years and which had not eased any in its enmity and potential menace in the course of that time. These NCOs and the men serving under them, would have to make the first decisions and take the first action in any situation. On these decisions and action would, perhaps, depend whether a minor incident escalated into a major upheaval or was safely pigeonholed in the category of solved problems. First impressions were going to be all important. These NCOs and their men would have to be put in the position of being able to make the right decisions, take the correct actions and make the right impressions. They would have to learn how to read the signs and anticipate incidents so that their officers could be in a position to avert any crisis before it arose.

a. Function and Guiding Principles:

At this briefing too, in appreciation of the fact that the ops of 5 Inf Gp had to conform to the guide lines laid down by HQ. UNFICYP and and through it by the Secretary General of the United Nations, the Gp Comdr went to some pains to explain to his assembled sub-unit Commanders what the UN function in Cyprus was, and the guiding principles formulated by the Secretary General for its implementation. Since

the success of any Unit in Cyprus, and indeed of any unit functioning as a part of a UN Force anywhere, depends absolutely on its understanding and applying these important principles it is appropriate to deal with them in some length here.

(1) Function

The function itself is defined by the Security Council in the characteristic vagueness of its resolution of 4th March 1964 as follows:

"IN THE INTEREST OF PRESERVING INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY, TO USE ITS BEST EFFORTS TO PREVENT A RECURRENCE OF FIGHTING AND, AS NECESSARY, TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE MAINTENANCE AND RESTORATION OF LAW AND ORDER AND A RETURN TO NORMAL CONDITIONS."

The threefold function imposed on UNFICYP by this resolution may be formulated more precisely as follows:

- (i) to prevent a recurrence of fighting
- (ii) to contribute to the maintenance of law and order, and
- (iii) to contribute to a return to normal conditions in Cyprus. In carrying out these functions the above resolution also directs the Force that it must avoid any action designed to influence the political situation in Cyprus, except through contributing an

improved climate in which political solutions may be sought. In order to remove some of the vagueness inherent in this resolution, and to provide the Force with more specific guide lines to regulate their ops, the Secretary General formulated certain Principles for their Guidance which may be summarised as follows:- in terms applicable to LEFKA District:

GUIDING PRINCIPLES.

- (i) The Gp is under the exclusive ctl and command of UNFICYP at all times.
- (ii) The members of the Gp carry arms, which, however, are to be employed only in self defence, should this become necessary in discharge of its tasks as already given.
- (iii) The members of the Gp must act with restraint and with complete impartiality towards members of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot Communities.
- (iv) In connection with their performance of these tasks and responsibilities each sub-Unit Comdr must maintain close contact with the appropriate officials in the Government of CYPRUS, which has the responsibility

for the maintenance and restoration of law and order, and which had been asked by the Security Council. in its resolution above referred to, to take all additional measures necessary to stop violence and bloodshed in Cyprus.

(v) The members of the Gp have no powers of arrest over Cypriots, save for the limited power to arrest persons on UN premises committing an offence or causing a disturbance there.

(vi) The members of the Gp have no powers to disarm Cypriots except in the one excepted case referred to at (v) above.

(b) Principles of self-defence

(i) Members of the Gp shall not take the initiative in the use of armed force. The use of armed force is permissible only in self-defence. The expression "self defence" included:

(a) the defence of UN posts premises and vehicles under armed attack

(b) the support of other UN personnel under armed attack.

(ii) No action shall be taken by members of the Gp which is likely to bring them into direct conflict

with either community in CYPRUS
except in the following circumstances;

- (a) where they are compelled to
act in self-defence;
- (b) where their safety or that of
other members of the Force is
in Jeopardy;
- (c) where specific arrangements
have been, or, in the opinion of
the commander on the spot, are
about to be, violated, thus
risking a recurrence of fighting
or endangering law and order.

(iii) When acting in self-defence, the
principle of MINIMUM force shall
always be applied, and armed force
will be used only when all peaceful
means of persuasion has failed.

The decision as to when force may
be used under these circumstances
rests with commander on the spot,
whose main concern shall be to
distinguish between an incident
which does not require fire to be
opened and those situations in which
troops may be authorised to use force.
Examples in which troops could be
so authorised were given as follows:

- (a) Attempts by force to compel

them to withdraw from a position which they occupy under orders from their commanders, or to infiltrate or envelope such positions as are deemed necessary by their commanders for them to hold, thus jeopardising their safety:

- (b) Attempts to disarm them;
- (c) Attempts by force to prevent them from carrying out their responsibilities, as ordered by their commanders;
- (d) Violation by force of UN premises and attempts to arrest or abduct UN personnel civil or military.

(iv) Should it be necessary to resort to the use of arms advance warning will be given whenever possible. Automatic weapons are not to be used except in extreme emergency and fire will continue only as long as is necessary to achieve its immediate aim.

(C) Arrangements concerning cease-fire agreements.

If members of the Gp arrive at the scene of an actual conflict between members of the two communities, the commanders on the spot will immediately call on the leaders of both communities to break off the conflict and arrange for a cease fire while terms which are acceptable to both communities are discussed. Mobile patrols will immediately be organised to manifest the presence of the Gp in the disturbed area in whatever strength available. All appropriate means will be used to promote calm and restraint.

40. The officers on their part would have to work harder than ever particularly during the settling

in period. Not only would they have to keep in constant touch with their men on outpost, teaching them, indoctrinating them, encouraging them and helping them but theirs also would be the task of making the first contacts with the leaders on both sides, and through these contacts establishing the relationships most conducive to the successful accomplishment of their mission. The Commander, sub unit commanders and Staff Officers had already commenced this work, but now their preliminary work had to be extended and sustained by all commissioned ranks. The main emphasis would have to be on maintaining the image already created by preceeding Irish Units. This was of a unit which could be depended on to discharge its tasks with a strict impartiality and fairness but with a firmness which would brook no nonsense from either of the contending sides. They knew that any display of weakness on their part, particularly at the early stages, would be taken advantage of. They made a point of honour between themselves and their men that no Irish Post would be relinquished to either side. Their attitude was typified by their reaction to a misguided exhortation which emanated from the Acting Force Commander several months afterwards when one of their Ops was undergoing a particular trying time. "Do not let them renege their post" he said. The reply shot back "The 5 Inf Gp do not renege their posts" It might have been added "They only win back those already lost by others" But I am anticipating my story, and after all they could not give offence to other Contingents.

DEPLOYMENT:

As anticipated 5 Inf Gp became operational at 301200 Oct 1965.

LEFKA DISTRICT: (Sit at 301200 hrs. Oct 1965).
Locstat at Appendix D.

Kokkina Br Hd:

The bridge head is a small one about one and a half miles in length organised in a half circle on the first line of high features overlooking KOKKINA village. The TURK fighters in the bridge head numbered six hundred approximately, armed with small arms, mortars and machine guns. They occupied well constructed defensive positions within a Cease Fire Line marked by United Nations on rocks and trees and outside of which the Turkish Cypriots agreed NOT to move. In turn the National Guards had two battalions, approximately six hundred in each surrounding the bridge head. They occupied the second line of high features overlooking KOKKINA village and a well had camps set up further South into the hills. The National Guard forward limits were also marked by a United Nations Cease Fire Line which they agreed NOT to cross. They were also armed with small arms, mortars, machine-guns and a Battery of Artillery which was alleged to be sited in the rear of the bridge head. Between the two Cease Fire Line was NO MANS LAND varying in width from three hundred yards to one mile approximately.

Limnitis Br Hd:

Limnitis bridge is situated approximately six miles EAST of KOKKINA and is the second TURK CYPRIOT holding in LEFKA District. The bridge head is three and a half miles in length and the organisation on both sides is much the same as in KOKKINA with less forces deployed. TURK fighters numbered approximately three hundred and fifty in the area, and they in turn were surrounded by one battalion of National Guard. Both sides were armed with the same type of weapons as in KOKKINA. No cease fire lines existed here, as no bitter fighting occurred in the area. There was a road agreement in existence for traffic movement

Limnitis Br Hd: (See Para 56).

through the bridge head (See Para 56).

Lefka Enclave:

LEFKA is a completely TURKISH CYPRIOT town with other small Turkish villages in the surrounding district.

It is an area of approximately eight square miles and TURK fighters numbered eight hundred in the enclave.

The Turkish fighters had well organised defensive positions around the enclave and in turn two battalions of National Guard surrounded the TURKISH positions.

Deployment of 5th. Infantry Groups:

5th Infantry Group was deployed as follows:-

XEROS - Gp Headquarters and Headquarters Company.

LEFKA ENCLAVE - 'A' Coy (-) with the responsibility of four observation posts within its boundaries.

LIMNITIS BRIDGE HEAD - Armoured Car Group (+) with the responsibility of three observation posts and two road check points within their bridge head.

KOKKINA BRIDGE HEAD - 'B' Company with the responsibility of seven observation posts within their bridge head.

For further details see location Statement (Annx D attached).

MISSION:

The 5th Infantry Group in implementation of Headquarters, United Nations Force in CYPRUS mission will keep the peace in LEFKA district and assist in bringing back normal conditions of living in the district.

Unit Tasks:

'A' Coy (-)

1) Keep the peace and assist in the return to normal living conditions in its area

2) Encourage travel without escort in its area.

- (3) Man observations posts as per Operation Order No.1 and such additional posts as the situation may demand.
- (4) Liaise with other UN troops when necessary.
- (5) Report all incidents at once to Group Headquarters by fastest possible means in keeping with security classification.
- (6) Interview, investigate and negotiate where necessary when an incident is threatened or occurred.

b/ Armoured Car (+)

- (1) Keep the peace and assist in the return to normal living conditions in its area.
- (2) Maintain observation posts over TURK CYPRIOT and National Guard positions in LIMNITIS bridge head
- (3) Report all incidents at once to Group Headquarters by fastest possible means in keeping with security classification.
- (4) Interview, investigate and negotiate where necessary when an incident is threatened or occurs.
- (5) Encourage travel without escort in its area.
- (6) Liaise with other UN troops when necessary.

c/ 'B' COY.

- (1) Maintain observation over Cease Fire Lines KOKKINA bridge head.
- (2) Keep the peace and assist in the return to normal living conditions.
- (3) Liaise with other UN troops when necessary.
- (4) Encourage travel without escort in the area.
- (5) Inspect all United Nations vehicles entering and leaving the Bridgehead at observation post No. 4 (MANSOURA) and check arms carried.

- (6) Be prepared to assist in the escort and delivering of food supplies to KOKKINA including Red Crescent convoys.
- (7) Provide timely and continuous information on all happenings military and economic, in the area.
- (8) Man observation posts as per operational order No.1, and additional posts as the situation may demand.
- (9) Report all incidents at once to Group Headquarters by fastest possible means in keeping with security classification.

d/ HEADQUARTERS COMPANY:

- (1) Administer and maintain the 5 Infantry Group.
- (2) Be prepared to provide patrols in Rear Areas if situation demands.

e/ United Nations Civilian Police:

- (1) Man United Nations posts in sensitive areas.
- (2) Carry out patrols.
- (3) Observe searches by CYPRUS POLICE at road blocks and check points.
- (4) Liaise with CYPRUS Police and TURKISH Police.
- (5) Provide escorts as required by LEFKA District Headquarters.
- (6) Inquire into incidents where Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots communities are involved.
- (7) Make special inquiries as necessary in conjunction with Cyprus police and/or Turkish Cypriot Police.
- (8) Deal with inquiries relating to missing persons.
- (9) Carry out surveys, observations and make assessments of special nature.

46. ACTIVITY:

The 5th Infantry Gp. in common with other Irish units, had its mettle tested on becoming operational, by a number of minor incidents occurring during the first 48 hours. In actual fact there was a total of fifteen incidents reported during this period and all were dealt with in a capable manner. With effect from 221200B November 1965 the Eastern boundary of 'A' Coy was

expanded (See Appendix E for New Lostat). 'A' Company had now the responsibility of six observation posts, the two new ones being GHAZIVERAN observation post No. 59 and GHAZI STATION observation post No. 60. Activity was confined to routine incidents and their investigation. Incidents could be grouped under the following headings:-

- a/ Firing incidents by Turkish fighters and National Guard.
- b/ Alleged breaches of the cease fire line agreement.
- c/ Use of searchlight by National Guard on Turkish fighter positions in KOKKINA.
- d/ Evacuation of sick from troubled areas.
- e/ Providing escorts.
- f/ Alleged new fortifications.
- g/ Alleged trespass.
- h/ Water rights.
- j/ Alleged stealing of building material.
- k/ Alleged stealing of animals.
- l/ Alleged abducting of personnel by both sides.

When the 5th Infantry Group took over duties in LEFKA District relations were somewhat strained with both National Guard and Turkish leaders. With the passing of time this relationship improved in all areas, and on the departure of the Gp from Cyprus this could not have been bettered. A new observation post Hotel was opened at R 4722659I on the 10th December at 14.00 hours. The position of the observation post is one hundred and fifty yards WEST of previous observation post which had been lost to the National Guard prior to the 5th Infantry Group becoming operational. This was made possible by a long series of negotiations with both sides. During the month of January the highlight of the group activities was the successful evacuation from XEROS jetty of five hundred and twelve Turkish fighters during the night 27th./28th. January in operation "NIGHT RIDER" (Operation order Appendix 'F' attached).

The next single incident worthy of mention occurred during the month of March 1966. This incident was caused by a

Turkish fighter, his wife and child who tried to escape from LIMINITIS Bridgehead to the National Guard lines close to observation post INDIA. The husband, having escaped some days previously, was followed by his wife and child. The attempted escape of wife and child was noticed and at 050910B March 1966 severe firing broke out from both sides and lasted for a period of three hours. It is estimated that over two thousand (2000) rounds were fired and observation post "INDIA" came under fire during the battle. After some tense moments and hours of negotiation the incident came to an end with the woman and child being escorted to the side of her own choice which was the National Guard side (full report on incident - See Appendix 'G' attached). At present the main activity in 'A' Company area is the continued negotiations with both sides to get LIMKILN workings running. Some progress has been achieved, and it is expected that with a further bit of give and take by leaders of both sides, LIMKILN will be a going concern in the near future. In LIMINITIS Bridgehead the main aim at the moment is trying to get the people of SELEMANI to return to their village. The position has been arrived at where the people are going out daily to work their land in the area of the village, and it is hoped, through further negotiations, to arrive at a solution where by the villagers will return to SELEMANI to stay. In KOKKINA Bridgehead the situation has completely changed with the evacuation of four hundred and twenty five fighters from the village in operation "NIGHT RIDER". The Turkish fighter force has now been reduced to approximately fifty plus old men and boys. Negotiations are taking place here also with leaders of both sides for the National Guard to withdraw from the high ground overlooking the village and thus allow the refugees of KOKKINA to return to their holdings.

48. POLITICAL SITUATION: (See Appendix 'B' for Background of Problem)

It was obvious from a very early stage that the political situation was much more active than the Military one, and as time went by the Military confrontation gradually lost its meaning in the wealth of political activity both internal and external.

During the period, feelings between both communities ranged from suspicion and bitterness as evidenced in FAMAGUSTA in November, through a period of relative calm during which high level talks were held as a result of the UN debate on the CYPRUS question. This period progressed to an era of relative complacency with both communities satisfied that the outcome would be favourable to each of them, guaranteed by one set of great powers or another. All of these changes in outlook occurred before a back drop of a struggle for power between MAKARIOS and the Greek CYPRIOT Government on the one hand and GRIVAS, with a following of GREEK officers and some EX EOKA. GRIVAS wanted immediate ENOSIS as opposed to the MAKARIOS objective of a free CYPRUS first and afterwards ENOSIS. The TURKISH CYPRIOTS were also suffering from internal dissensions with moderates being displaced by more militant types and quite a lot of war-like talk in TURKEY itself, which appeared to be muffled to some extent by an injection of US dollars. Despite the internal unrest in both communities the power politics and International diplomacy continued to seek a solution to the CYPRUS question which would be acceptable primarily to the BIG Powers and secondly to the CYPRIOT people. The obviously over riding influence of politics on the military situation was recognised and accepted by both communities, and this was reflected in the military activity during the period.

Because of these circumstances, the mission of the 5th. Infantry Group was accomplished in the efforts made to bring back normal living in LEFKA District, rather than on the need to prevent fighting. This involved the Group in a great many incidents very few of which were military in nature.

49. OBTAINING OF INFORMATION:

The collection of information was governed by UN instructions. These laid down well defined guide lines in the matter, which discouraged any operations that might conceivably be termed spying. Thus information of a military nature could be collected if readily available but mounting operations to do so was frowned on. This did not, however, apply to LEFKA district to any great extent since the fulfilling of the unit task depended largely on the detailed observation of the largely non-military activities of both sides.

The sources of information available were, the troops in position, liaison visits, air observation, members of both communities, UNCIVPOL and the various Press releases of both sides. As well as the sources which were specifically used to collect information, all ranks were impressed with the necessity to report any casual observations and conversations that could help in making the intelligence picture clearer. In this way a more or less continuous flow of minor unconnected items of information was received, which established an overall pattern of behaviour which indicated trends in morals and intention at different times.

50. SYSTEM IN OPERATION:

Each day incidents in sub unit areas were reported as they occurred. Those considered important were relayed as received to HQ UNFICYP. Each day a situation report incorporating all the activities and incidents of the day was submitted by sub units and forwarded twice daily to HQ UNFICYP. Based on these reports and on independent observations an INFSUM was to assess the situation in the area and make comments thereon.

In turn each other Zone in the island forwarded copies of its INFSUM to LEFKA and UNFICYP supplied a weekly information summary of the overall situation.

Within LEFKA district information was disseminated by communications media available and each week a briefing, covering activities in the political, UNFICYP and Group areas, was given at the Group Commander's conference. The briefing in note form was issued to each sub unit to be used as a basis for their own briefing, and as a basis on which to check new information or amend old ones.

51. TYPE OF INFORMATION REQUIRED:

The normal information on Order of Battle was required, with particular reference to the morale and discipline factors both of the military and civilian populations. As well as this operational intelligence, great stress was laid on the reporting of day to day activities where local irritations could be magnified if early intervention and speedy negotiations were not entered into. For this type of work to be successful a very high standard of reporting was required, and, as time went by, achieved by all sub units.

52. DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY SITUATION:

When the Group became operational the level of CYPRIOT Command was, on the N.G. side five full strength infantry battalions comprising two tactical groups deployed, with one Commando Battalion in the rear areas concentrated. The deployment areas confronted to those of the 5th Infantry Group i.e. the areas of KOKKINA, LIMNITIS and LEFKA.

The TURK CYPRIOT strength was shown as a figure of approximately two thousand four hundred also divided between KOKKINA, LIMNITIS and the LEFKA area. Later this figure proved to be inaccurate.

During the period, changes in strength and in morale and in every aspect that might influence or alter the situation were accurately and speedily reported by the sub units. Changes included rotation, demobilisation, changes in command on the N.G. side, as well as belligerence and suspicion on both sides at the start. There was also the evacuation of five hundred TURK CYPRIOT fighters to TURKEY with its effects which had to be quickly assessed and reported to UNFICYP HQ. Occasionally ground observation was supplemented by air reconnaissance which was coupled with serial photo cover.

Perhaps the observation and reporting of attitudes was, in many ways, the most important work carried out, in so far as it indicated where and when further negotiations might be carried on in efforts to accomplish the mission of securing a return to normal conditions. Of its very nature, this had to involve negotiations with both sides. simultaneously, neither of whom wanted to appear to be conceding anything to the other.

The result of these operations was that at the end of the GROUP'S period in CYPRUS, an up to date strength had been checked as accurately as possible for both communities. The attitudes, outlook and morale of both communities was assessed as accurately as was possible and personalities on both sides were tabulated and accessible. Furthermore, an overall climate suitable for still more progress existed, which indicated not only the satisfactory manner in which the troops had worked, but, of necessity, a very happy relationship between the UN and CYPRIOTS of both denominations.

53.

COUNTER INTELLIGENCE:

The principal point to be made under this heading, was the lack of communication security. All telephonic and telex and radio transmission were monitored. This was freely admitted and posed many problems where information of a classified nature could not be sent by any of these methods. The Irish language proved invaluable here and there were cases of Irish speaking officers being asked by Operations Staff at UNFICYP HQ to transmit in Irish messages which otherwise would have to be sent by road with its consequent loss of time. This was especially so where discussion of a classified item would be necessary over the radio or telephone.

The normal means of transmitting classified data was by the ADS (Air Despatch Service) or by road. These systems however were time consuming.

Both communities went to extraordinary length to produce propaganda in the form of Press releases which were received each day. These helped quite a lot in assessing the local situation where the distortion of the truth about known happenings was evaluated. The propaganda was of a very naive variety.

It was the experience of the Group also that on the rotation of UN Units in the island and in LEFKA District that incidents were likely to occur for a period. This was construed as an attempt of both communities to lose no ground at such times, and perhaps make some gains.

54. So much for the General Operational picture. Now what of each sub-unit area. They had similar problems certainly but each of them had their own special problems too.

Let us now examine each in turn when these special problems will become apparent, the most efficacious methods of dealing with them will be explained, and the system of handling routine problems will also emerge.

55. KOKKINA:

a/ Since the Eylliria fighting in September, 1964, some 100 refugees from surrounding villages had been packed into KOKKINA. In addition, some 400 students arrived from Turkey during the fighting at that time, and were still in KOKKINA when 5 Inf Gp. took over LEFKA District. Apart altogether from the necessity of servicing and operating the 7 O.Ps. which intervened between the opposing GREEK and TURKISH forces confronting one another around the perimeter of the beach head many of the problems which 'B' Coy. had to deal with stemmed from the presence of these two large groups.

b/ REFUGEES:

(1) About 400 of the Refugees, men, women and children, lived in caves and tents in most unhealthy conditions. During the previous twelve months U.N. had succeeded in bringing in woollen clothing and tents into the bridge-head which had alleviated to some degree the appalling conditions under which these poor people, in common with all the other inhabitants of the beach-head, existed. The resettlement of the refugees was, and still is, prevented by the positions of the two sides on the problem; the Turkish

Leadership insists that Greek Cypriot military positions on the hilltops around the evacuated villages should be removed; The Government considers these positions essential as long as the Turkish Cypriot fighters remain in the bridge-head.

(2) Already in the previous September, President Makarios had stated that the Turkish Refugee problem had been created and existed only by the design of the Turkish Military Armed Leadership, which had forcibly compelled many Turkish Cypriots in the Island to abandon their villages and move into certain areas, where they were kept by force, in an attempt to create conditions favouring the partition of the Island. "If the Turkish Cypriot leadership really wished to solve the problem" he said "the Government was prepared to provide concrete assistance as follows:-

- (i) to repair or totally reconstruct all Turkish Cypriot houses which might have been damaged or destroyed in any village.
- (ii) to give financial assistance for the rehabilitation of all the Turkish Cypriots who had been forced by their leadership to abandon their villages.
- (iii) to provide them with the means for the exercise of their profession or vocation, to enable them to find work, and to give financial assistance to those, who owing to incapacity, were unable to find work, and
- (iv) to take all the necessary measures for their complete safety and protection.

b/ The Turkish Cypriot Leadership replied that the Turkish Cypriots would return to their homes only if the Government security forces were withdrawn, and the areas concerned were put under UNFICYP control.

c/ The Government replied that it had no objection

c. in principle to the re-occupation by Turkish Cypriot displaced persons of their homes, but that the Government would have to remain responsible for the maintenance of law and order, and that there could be no question of its relinquishing that responsibility in favour of UNFICYP.

d/ The question of supplying the Turkish Cypriots with building materials for improving the accommodation of the refugees has repeatedly been taken up by UNFICYP with the Government but the Government refuses to approve the release of any building materials for refugees, since it insists that the refugees should return to their old homes, and is therefore opposed to their settling on a permanent basis in the places where they now live.

3. The intransigent attitudes of both sides in relation to the Refugee problem typified the attitudes met by U.N. in their efforts to handle every other problem. Both sides introduced into every problem the terms of the overall political differences between them. No matter how local the problem was, very soon the U.N. Commander on the spot found that to get agreement on it he would have to solve the whole Cyprus problem. Under such circumstances there was much frustration for U.N. in Cyprus but when one became used to it, and in fact came to expect it one accepted it as an inseparable part of every task. When one failed in one direction then some new angle had to be invented and explored to its frustrating end and so on ad infinitum. At least 5 Inf Gp. showed all these people that they appreciated their problems, had sympathy with them, were anxious to do everything in their power to settle them, and by this means contributed to the creation of that climate from which overall solution of the Cyprus problem must eventually come. So it was with 'B' Coy. in relation to this and other problems. Under the direction of the Group Commander and his Staff they kept hammering away in their efforts to get a real breakthrough.

That they did not achieve this break through was not for the want of trying and this can be said with equal truth of the efforts of the other Companies in relation to their problems. In the meantime they could at least do what they could to alleviate the conditions of existence of the unfortunate Refugees and others in KOKKINA. In this connection the problems which arise practically of hourly occurrence. They might be listed as follows:-

a/ Water:

An auxiliary water system had already been installed there since the previous June, which consisted of a long pipe running along the main road through the village with taps at regular intervals. At the beginning of November a release of additional piping was obtained from the appropriate Government authorities for a second auxiliary system which is still to be completed.

b/ Food and Other Supplies:

(1) Restrictions imposed by the Government on the movement into Turkish Cypriot areas of a wide range of articles considered to be of actual strategic value was one of the major grievances of the Turks at KOKKINA in common with their brethren everywhere. As the aim of the restrictions is not only to keep the military capability of the Turkish Cypriot fighters, to a minimum but also to discourage the permanent settlement of refugees in Turkish Cypriot enclaves, the prohibited goods include not only military equipment but also all types of building materials and many items of primarily civilian application, such as plastic

pipng, black tar, all kinds of electrical cable and wire, tape recorders and external T.V. serials.

In addition, many items such as fire wood, all types of wet and dry batteries, water pipes and their accessories and automobile spare parts and tyres can only be obtained by permission of the Local District Officer. Since 'B' Coy. and the Economic Officer were the only intermediaries between the two sides, they were constantly engaged in a never ending and often abortive series of negotiations between them in this connection.

(2) During the period, food and other supplies that were allowed into the beachhead, were transported to KOKKINA every fortnight, regularly. Consignments consisted of Red Crescent supplies or products bought on the local market by the Turkish Cypriot communal chamber. The Economics Officer secured clearance for the consignments from the Government and arranged for their transport from Nicosia in Turkish Cypriot trucks. 'B' Coy. personnel together with UNFICYP supervised the checking of these consignments into the beachhead at the MANSOURA checkpoint. The problems arising here were many and varied due to the stringency of the searches instituted by Cypol at this checkpoint. They even checked the level of the petrol in the tanks of the trucks going in to ensure that no petrol was obstructed inside.

c/ Evacuation of Sick:

Since the only medical practitioner amongst the Turks in KOKKINA was one Turkish medical student, the medical personnel of 'B' Coy. were constantly on call to help the sick Turks in the beachhead. Hospital cases of which there were many were evacuated either to LEFKA

of NICOSIA. Each evacuation required certain formalities which had to be negotiated by 'B' Coy. and Group Headquarters. An M.O. had to clear each case thus putting an added load on our already overburdened Medical Officers. The number of confinement cases evacuated from KOKKINA and subsequently returned back well led one of the Irish Officers to comment - "We never took out of KOKKINA more than we put into it."

Turkish Students:

- (1) The successful evacuation of 425 Turkish Students from KOKKINA which was effected on the night of the 27/28 January is already referred to elsewhere in this history. The organisation of the embarkation of the students in UN trucks was carried out by 'B' Coy. The whole operation went extremely well.
- (2) The evacuation not only reduced the Turkish Cypriots fighting strength at KOKKINA but also its military potential.
- (3) The departing students have undoubtedly left behind a large quantity of weapons. The Government is concerned about the future of these weapons particularly the M.GS, recoilless rifles, bazookas and mortars, and has so far not reduced the National Guard surrounding the area.
- (4) The present situation would seem propitious for the demilitarization of the KOKKINA sector in accordance with a plan previously proposed which is in three phases as follows:-

- a/ Withdrawal of the National Guard from their present positions overlooking the bridgehead to concentration areas some distance away. UNFICYP would establish posts in Turkish Cypriot villages evacuated in the process.
 - b/ Withdrawal of all Turkish Cypriot Fighters in the bridgehead under UNFICYP control into KOKKINA village, UNFICYP taking over positions now held by the fighters on the perimeter of the bridgehead;
 - c/ Resettlement of Turkish Cypriot Refugees now in KOKKINA in their home villages, and establishment of UNFICYP posts on those villages.
- 5 Inf Gp. had initiated new efforts in this direction but indications were that the political bughead would create the usual result.

Freedom of Movement:

Since the end of the Tylliria fighting in September 1964 the Government had denied freedom of movement of Turkish Cypriots in or out of KOKKINA except in connection with the fortnightly consignment of goods already referred to. The Turkish Cypriots on their part prevent any traffic by Greek Cypriot civilians through the enclave. In pursuance of that part of its mandate which calls on UNFICYP to contribute to a return to normal conditions the Force Commander had addressed a communication to President Makarios in June 1965 in which he suggested the abolition by the Government of all special restrictive measures applicable solely to KOKKINA i.e. other than those in effect in the restricted area North of NICOSIA. In this connection the Government were invited to consider the following measures:-

- (1) Freedom of movement in and out of KOKKINA should be accorded to all who wished to travel and who possess valid identity documents. In addition free transit through KOKKINA area should be facilitated by all concerned.
- (2) The movement of goods to and from KOKKINA should be subject to the same regulations as those applied in all parts of the Island. This would mean freedom of movement of such commercial supplies as are allowed elsewhere.

Under the direction of Group HQ. 'B' Coy. constantly tried to bring about the situation envisaged by the Force Commander but it appears that the Greek Cypriots still persist in regarding KOKKINA as being worthy of the special restrictions they have always applied there. This appears to be caused by their fear that the arms left by the Students will be re-distributed once the restrictions are reduced which of course is a probability.

LIMITS:

Operational Situation:

1. Observation Posts: The Camp provides personnel for and services five observation posts. They are:

- a/ OP Foxtrot
- b/ OP Juliet
- c/ OP India
- d/ OP Hotel
- e/ OP Kilo

- a/ OP Foxtrot GR () Str. 1 NCO 4 Men:

This OP serves as an OP and also as a road checkpoint. Its duties as a checkpoint will be dealt with in detail under the heading "Road Agreement." Its duties as an OP are similar to the other OPs and will be covered in detail under "OP JULIET". Re-supply is by jeep. Comms by line and No. 41 Wrls set.

OP Juliet GR (448636) str. 2 NCOs. 4 Men:

This OP is situated on a mountain ridge which overlooks the Turkish village of SELAMANI. It also commands a view of the LYMINITIS RIVER VALLEY and the KATO PYRGOS RIVER VALLEY and OP India. Accommodation consists of three 180 lb. tents two of which are used for sleeping in and the third is used as a kitchen. The system of re-supply is by jeep to SELAMANI and thereafter by mule and on foot. Generally the TK/CYPS hold the North end of the ridge and the GK/CYPS the South end of the ridge. From the SOUTH end two spurs run back towards SELAMANI which are also manned by GK/CYPS. Very little trouble has been experienced in this area, and it is generally quiet except for the occasional Shotrep or shepherds and their flocks crossing the Green Line. Communication is by line and No.41 wrls set. There are two roads to SELAMANI. A high road which commences near OP Foxtrot and a lower road which commences near KATO PYRGOS and follows the river bed until it joins the high road near SELAMANI. In wet weather the high road is extremely bad going and can be dangerous. The duties of the OP pers are to report and observe on Shotreps, movement, new def constrs, shouting or any unusual circumstance. It is of vital importance that all such circumstances are reported immediately and investigated promptly. Method of investigating incidents will be discussed in a separate para. Orders for this OP are at sub paragraph of this paragraph.

c/ OP India GR (466658) Str. 2 NCOs and 4 Men:

This OP is situated due SOUTH of the TK/CYP village of XEROVOUNOS and across the LIMINITIS RIVER from OP Juliet. Accommodation consists of one Mug Tent one 180 lb. tent and part of a ruined Turkish house which has been roofed with canvass and is used as a kitchen. The tents are used as sleeping quarters. The OP is isolated and is not in view of the tents which are in telephone communication with it. Consideration should be given to moving the tents nearer the OP and abandoning the old house. Due SOUTH of the OP is a ridge which runs EAST WEST and is manned by GK/CYPS. This can lead to trouble such as one side shouting abuse at the other and an occasional exchange of shots. The system of re-supply is by jeep from LIMINITIS Camp to the OP. Communication is by line and No.41 wrls set. The duties of the OP pers are exactly similar to those of OP Juliet with the addition that the OP Comd must liaise with the TK/CYPS at XEROVOUNOS.

/ OP Hotal GR (476650) Str. 2 NCOs. and 4 Men:

Situated 200 yds. EAST of XEROVOUNOS HILL and between it and the GK/CYP village of LOUTROS, OP HOTEL is the place of closest confrontation in the area.

This OP which has been moved twice and abandoned once was re-established after long and difficult negotiations on 10th Dec. '65. In one part of this area SOUTH of the OP only 100 yds. seperates GK/CYPS and TK/CYPS. From the OP can be seen all other OPs in the area as well as the UN Camp at LIMINITIS.

Re-supply is by jeep to the village of LOUTROS and thereafter by mule and on foot.

d/ The NG Coy in this locality is part of 261 Bn with Bn HQ at GALLINI. Excellent relations exist between UN and the Coy Comd and between OP Comds and his Pln Comd and Pln Sgt. These relations have been established by frequent visits of officers to the NG Coy HQ at LOUTROS and by encouraging a daily exchange of views at Pln Sgt and OP Comd level. Efforts to establish similar relations with TK/CYPS at XEROVOUNOS have not met with the same success. The duties of personnel at OP Hotel differ from other OPs in that patrols are carried out by night to within 20 yds of the TK/CYP posns and through the GK/CYPS positions. The patrol which is a two man patrol is NOT armed and carries a UN flag and a torch or storm lantern to light the flag. Communication is by line and No. 41 Wrls set. Accommodation consists of one Mug tent and two 180 lb. tents.

e/ OP Kilo GR (478682) Str. 2 NCOs. 4 Men:

Situated near the camp overlooking the sea, this OP is directly between the GK/CYPS and LIMINITIS village and is regarded as very important by the TK/CYPS for this reason. Accommodation consists of one big Mug tent and one 180 lb. tent. Re-supply is by jeep to a position on the road about 600 yds from the OP and thereafter on foot. Communication by line and No. 41 Wrls set. The TK/CYP posn in this area is on a hill overlooking Camp at LIMINITIS. It is manned by TK/CYPS Fighters from the village. Frequently they start shouting abuse at the GK/CYPS in their OP which commands the main road to XEROS. The GK/CYPS reply in kind. It is essential to negotiate a cessation of this shouting immediately or it can easily turn from shouting to shooting. But for this problem, no troubles have been experienced in the area. Duties are as for OP

17.
Liminitis Road Agreements:

This agreement deals with the passing of GK/CYP civilians through the area. They are permitted to pass freely through the area between 04.30 and 19.00 hrs daily. Coming from the EAST they enter the area at the LIMINITIS Road Barrier which is at the extreme to the UN Camp. At the barrier drivers are shown a copy of the agreement in English and in Greek. The vehicle is searched (in a mild fashion) and they are allowed to proceed. The Reg. No. of the vehicle is then 'phoned to OP foxtrot which is the exit point and if the vehicle does not come through in twenty minutes the Duty Officer is informed and sends a patrol to find the vehicle. Vehicles coming from the WEST enter the area at OP Foxtrot where the drivers are shown the Road Agreement and the vehicle searched. The Reg. No. of the vehicle is 'phoned to the LIMINITIS Road Barrier which insures the vehicle passes through in twenty minutes. The TK/CYPS have a post at Foxtrot and at LIMINITIS Road Barrier and keep a very close eye on the carrying out of the provisions of the Road Agreement by the UN. The road closes to all NON UN traffic at 19.00 hours, daily. No further traffic is allowed through until 04.30 hrs. next day with the following exceptions:-

- 1/ UN traffic. (Subject to permission of local UN Comd).
- 2/ Greek civ vehicles in convoy under UN escort may travel from WEST to EAST at 19.00 hrs.
- 3/ Greek civ vehicles in convoy under UN escort may travel from EAST to WEST at 20.00 hrs.
- 4/ Emergency hospital cases from KOKKINA or KATO PYRGOS provided it is first cleared with UN HQ and by GK/CYPS and TK/CYPS. Such cases will always be escorted by two UN vehicles.

To ensure the proper carrying out of the terms of the Road Agreement UN provides a road patrol which by intermittent

patrols supervises the free flow of traffic in the area. This patrol consists of two vehicles and is used also for convoys and for the re-supply of OP Foxtrot and OP Kilo. According to the Agreement TK/CYPS have the right to ask UN to carry out a search of ten vehicles weekly. They notify the Camp Duty Officer the day before and they in turn notify the UNCIVPOL. Two members of UNCIVPOL come to LIMINITIS Road Barrier at the appointed time (usually 07.00 hrs) and carry out the search under the supervision of the Duty Officer and observed by the TK/CYPS. UNCIVPOL try to insist on 24 hrs notice of such searches. The TK/CYPS dislike this and try to give as short a notice as possible. Copy of Road Agreement at sub para e of this paragraph.

3. General:

Observation Posts:

- (1) By day it is essential to have one sentry always on observation duty and a UN Flag flying.
- (2) By night it is necessary to have two sentries and at all times a light lighting to indicate that the OP is occupied.
- (3) Hourly calls to Base Camp from OPs by line or wireless are very necessary.
- (4) Immediate and prompt reporting of all incidents should be insisted on so that investigation can commence early rather than late.

b. (1) INvestigation of Incidents:

The following are the type of incidents usually encountered.

- (a) Reports of shots from GK/CYP or TK/CYP Ops. (Shotreps).
- (b) Infringement of Green Line, usually by shepherds and their flocks.
- (c) Digging of new posns.

3. b. (1)

- (d) Shouting of insults from one side to the other.
- (e) Cutting of trees and telephone poles.
- (f) Cutting off water to LIMINITIS and/or XEROVOUNOS.
- (g) Infringement of Road Agreement caused by -

- (i) Vehicles stopping in area.

- (ii) Vehicles exceeding speed limit (20 MPH).

- (iii) NG in uniform.

- (iv) Forestry workers in uniform.

- (2) It is essential to take prompt action immediately any incident occurs. It may be said that any one incident by itself is a small matter and that immediate investigation by the UN has the effect of keeping it that way. If there is any delay in dealing with the incident it tends to spark off some retaliation from the other side. The following drill has been found useful in dealing with incidents.

- (a) When an incident is reported and it is known that one side or the other caused it, an officer goes immediately to the CK/TYP Leadership or the GK/CYP Headquarters as the case may be and investigates by requesting a full explanation. At the same time the incident is reported to UN HQ through the usual channels.

- (b) If an incident is reported and it is not known which side caused it, an officer should go simultaneously to both sides and investigate.

- (c) If one side makes a complaint against the other, the complaint must be fully investigated and both sides informed of the results. The important thing is to commence the investigation immediately and let both sides see this is being done.

The investigation of complaints re the Road Agreement can be left in the first instance to the NCO in charge of the road-patrol and if he fails to the Camp Duty Officer. When dealing with incidents in or near LIMINITIS, XEROVOUNOS or SELAMANI the Turkish Leadership in LIMINITIS will be contacted. These act as leaders and spokesmen for the entire TK/CYP community.

The leaders on the Greek side are located as follows:-

1/ Coy Comd of GK/CYP Coy on EAST side of Br/Head has his Headquarters at LOUTROS. 2/ Bn Comd of 261 Bn has his HQ at GALLINI. 3/ Tac Gp Comd has his HQ at KATO PYRGOS. It has been the experience of most new units that many incidents occur in the very early stages of their deployment. The 5 Inf Group have found this to be true and discovered that firm and tactful handling in the early stages resulted in a lessening of incidents. It is as though both sides try to see how far they can go with each new unit. It has also been found that troops going about bristling with weapons and with mobile radio stations blaring static or morse, causes the locals to show distrust and indeed fear. This is quite unnecessary and does nothing but harm. On the other hand if officers go about their daily business without any weapons except a swagger cane and a friendly smile and if other ranks adopt a similar attitude confidence is quickly established between the UN troops and both sides.

c. ORDERS FOR O.P. JULIET G.R. 448656General:

1. This O.P. is manned by 2 NCOs. and 4 men.
2. Each NCO and Man will be armed with an FN rifle and 5 mags, each containing 10 rounds.
3. Charged mags will NOT be fitted to weapons unless orders to this affect are issued by NCO i/c O.P.
4. The NCO in charge will be designated by the Coy.-Sgt.
5. The tour of duty will be for two weeks and will be from Sunday to Sunday.
6. The O.P. is in contact with base camp and all other O.Ps. by No.41 wrls set and by telephone.

Duties:

7. Report by wireless every hour on the hour.
8. Report immediately all shots or explosions seen or heard giving all details including Grid reference is possible.
9. Report immediately all troop movements.
10. Report immediately all NON/UN low-flying aircraft giving colour, markings and serial numbers.
11. Report immediately all new def constructions.
12. This O.P. will NOT be abandoned in any circumstances without an order from Duty Officer Camp Knockanure.
13. If the post comes under fire, pers NOT on duty will retire to the security bunker. Pers on duty will take cover in the O.P. and will continue to observe and report.
14. Ball amn will NOT be used except as follows:-
 - a. In defence of your own life or your comrades lives.
 - b. To prevent yourself from being forcibly disarmed.
15. The call-sign of this O.P. is 32.

d. YESILIRMAK (LIMINITIS) ROAD AGREEMENT.

The following are the revised terms of the agreement drawn up originally on the 6th May, 1965, at YESILIRMAK (LIMINITIS) with OC 5th. Inf Gp and the TK/CYP leaders YESILIRMAK (LIMINITIS) area.

1. The area through which the route passes will be recognised as being controlled TK/CYPS.
2. Persons except the UN, passing along the route will not wear uniforms, carry a weapon, speak, wave or gesture.
3. No photographs will be taken.
4. No leaflets, pamphlets or other form of propaganda will be distributed along the route.
5. A speed limit of 20 MPH will not be exceeded through the villages of YESILIRMAK (LIMINITIS) and GUNEBAKEN (AMADHIES). Normal road speeds through the remainder of the route.
6. No vehicle will normally stop between points of exit and entry.
7. Unescorted vehicles may move along the route at any time between the hours of 04.30 and 19.00 hrs. daily.
8. One UN escorted convoy in each direction may travel along the route as follows:-
 - a. At 19.00 hrs. from WEST to EAST.
 - b. At 20.00 hrs. from EAST to WEST.
9. Between entrance and exit points of the enclave, UN will patrol, observe and supervise the free flow of traffic, and guarantee the security of the area.
10. Standing TK/CYP will be placed along the route at agreed points to supervise the free flow of traffic.
11. If any of the terms herein are contravened, the vehicle may be stopped by either UN or TK/CYP observers. No enquiry will be taken until the arrival of a UN officer and TK/CYP leader. An inquiry will then be made under the control of the UN officer present.

- 49.
11. This inquiry will also be made in the case of a vehicle stopping through a mechanical breakdown.
 12. In exceptional circumstances, e.g. National Calamity, accidents involving serious injury etc; special permission will be granted to travel along the route outside the hours mentioned in para 7 and 8. In such cases UN vehicles escort will be provided.
 13. Approximately 10 vehicles including 5 goods-carrying vehicles will be halted by the UN once per week at a location mutually agreed on, and the UN will ensure that the terms of this Agreement are being observed. The TK/CYP leaders will notify the Commander of date and time they wish inspection of Rules of Road Agreement to take place. The result of this investigation will be fwd to TK/CYP Leaders in writing.
 14. Members of the Greek National Army will not be permitted to travel along the route.
 15. Vehicles suspected of contravening any of the Rules of the Agreement will be stopped and a check conducted by UNCIVPOL under an UN Officer with one of the TK/CYP Leaders as observer. The above check will take place in the vicinity of the UN Camp at YESILIRMAK (LIMINITIS) or at AMADHIES Checkpoint.
 16. Any or all of the terms of this Agreement may be revised at any time by either TK/CYP Leaders at YESILIRMAK (LIMINITIS) or UN, and in any event this Agreement will be reviewed again in the light of experience gained, on the 12th. August, 1966.

57. LEFKA:

- a/ The Turkish Cypriot town of LEFKA and its satellite Turkish Cypriot villages of AMBELIKOV to the WEST, PERISTEONARI, KALOHORIO and ANGOLEMI to the EAST, and ELEA and GHAZIVERAN to the NORTH EAST were the main pre-occupation of 'A' Coy. 5 Inf Gp. The Coy. Operational Area which is one of the biggest Coy. areas in Cyprus

included the large Greek Cypriot towns of MORPHOO and XEROS and hundreds of Greek Cypriot villages. Since however all problems tended to come from the areas of confrontation between Greek and Turk Cypriots the purely Greek Cypriot towns and villages were not much of a worry.

b/ The Turkish Cypriots in LEFKA and the villages mentioned were principally engaged in agricultural pursuits since this is one of the most fertile places in Cyprus. The Muktars (heads of villages) were very wealthy men. They owned most of the land around their villages, and the other villages, who worked on their land for them, were comfortably well-off also. Certainly, with the one exception of AMBELIKOU, there was no want apparent anywhere in this area. The town of LEFKA itself was housing and providing for some 3000 refugees in reasonable conditions.

c/ Some 600 Turkish Cypriots from this area were employed by the Cyprus MINING CORPORATION (C.M.C.) in their mines at MAVROUNI and APLIKI and in the transportation of the ore from these mines by rail to a half way point between LEFKA and XEROS where Greek CYPRIOTS take over. One of the O.Ps. serviced by 'A' Coy. supervises the changeover at this point. 5 Inf Gp have been negotiating with indications of some success an arrangement whereby the Turkish Cypriots will in future operate the C.M.C. trains all the way to XEROS thus enabling this O.P. to be withdrawn and, more important, enabling at least one step to be taken towards a return to normality in the area. A disquieting note affecting the operations of C.M.C. is that the MAVROUNI mine which employs about 500 Turkish Cypriots is expected to run down towards the end of 1967. Unless alternative ore deposits are found in the area it seems that LEFKS will be affected by a large scale

redundancy problem at about that time. The exploratory efforts of C.M.C. are severely hampered by the proximity of confrontation areas to the most likely places for further exploration. This means of course that, under present conditions, it will not be possible to open new mines in time to avert the redundancy problem referred to above. Despite the best efforts of 5 Inf Gp no solution to this problem has yet emerged.

d/ Every facet of existence, military and otherwise, of the Turkish Cypriots in all this area is controlled by a Committee at LEFKA, who in their turn are subject to the Turkish Cypriot Leadership at NICOSIA. Most of the problems developing at village level were referred to this Committee for decision. The Committee themselves were often reluctant to come to decisions without reference to the leadership in NICOSIA who obviously kept a very close rein on them. Under such circumstances many negotiations even on apparently simple matters were time consuming. All negotiations with the Committee were conducted through Inspector Kravas, the local Chief of Police, and although the identity of some of the other members of the Committee was suspected, they were never known with certainty.

e/ The high ground surrounding LEFKA, and between it and the other villages referred to, was, up to March 1965, under control of UNCIVPOL but on the 12th. of that month the National Guard occupied all this high ground, thus effectively isolating LEFKA from the villages. At this time too AMBELIKOU was surrounded and the Limekiln there which up to that time gave employment to all the able bodied Turkish Cypriots in that village closed down; the Turkish Cypriots refused to work it while the new National Guard positions remained overlooking it on LIMEKILN HILL. That is still the position at the present time. Before the 12th March UNFICYP had an O.P.

on LIMEKILN HILL but this was withdrawn on that date during an exchange of fire between the National Guard and the people of AMBELIKOV. The O.P. was subsequently re-established in its present position in the LIMEKILN. During some of the earlier negotiations between 5 Inf Gp and the people of AMBELIKOV the latter referred to the withdrawal of this O.P. as evidence that U.N. could not or would not help them and indicated that because of this their co-operation would not be forthcoming.

'A' Coy worked on them to such good effect however that very soon the most amicable relationships were established between them. The people of AMBELIKOV are in a very difficult position. The land there is of very poor quality being only fit for the herding of goats with little or no cultivation. Because of this, repeated efforts were made to get the Limekiln operating again but, though the LEFKS Committee were apparently favourably disposed to this, the Leadership at NICOSIA would not permit it. The Greeks, on their side, were apparently prepared to allow the Limekiln to re-open provided that similar concessions were granted by the Turks in relation to certain establishments held by them in NICOSIA. At the present time this village is little better than a large prison. There is limited movement in and out which is availed of by very few. A bus brings the children to and from school in LEFKA. The leaders have not left the village since the start of the trouble.

f/ PERISTERONARI village was largely vacated at the commencement of the troubles in CYPRUS. On arrival of 5 Inf Gp there were only two families still in it. These were augmented by about 50 Turkish Cypriots Fighters. It was a very troublesome spot at the beginning of the tour of the 5 Inf Gp due to the proximity of a Greek Cypriot position overlooking it on PERISTERONARI HILL.

Despite this however 'A' Coy succeeded in winning back a certain amount of tranquility in the area and many of the original occupants have been prevailed on to move back into the village again.

g/ GHAZIVERAN astride the main NICOSIA - XEROS RD, the scene of very fierce fighting at the beginning of the trouble in 1964, gave very little concern to 5 Inf Gp. There were a few incidents arising from armed Turkish Fighters appearing on the road there, and also from encroachments made by Greek Cypriots along the coast NORTH of the village in their efforts to construct coastal defences. All differences were soon straightened out however. The Greek Cypriots are very sensitive about any encroachments on the road by armed Turkish Cypriots due no doubt to their fear of interferences with their movement over such an important highway.

h/ The only problems arising in relation to ELEA, KALAHORIO and ANGOLEMI were in connection with water rights, the straying of shepherds and their flocks from one side on to the other's land, and obtaining fuel for Turkish Cypriot tractors. 'A' Coy found that the people of all the villages appreciated frequent visits from them, and succeeded in solving all their economical problems with the aid of the Economics Officer.

i/ 'A' Coy serviced 6 OPs. in the area at AMBELIKOV, LIMEKILN PERISTERONART, GHAZIVERAN, GHAZI STATION and the O.P. already referred to between LEFKA and XEROS on the railway line. They carried out weekly visits to all the villages and frequent pats into the TROODOS AREA. Although relative peace prevailed in all this area for the six months, minor incidents were of almost hourly occurrence during the period. In the initial stages complaints were often accompanied by threats to fire on

the other side unless the cause of the complaint was removed. This practice soon ceased however possibly because they found that 'A' Coy. were not to be fooled by threats of this nature which were only bluffs.

GENERAL:

- (1) A Coy found that both the Tk/Cyps and the Gk/Cyps had come to know all the weaknesses inherent in the United Nations position and that both sides took advantage of them. These include:
 - (a) the initial rawness of new Units following a change over of contingents.
 - (b) the restriction which prevented U.N. from using their weapons except in self-defence and
 - (c) U.N. lack of authority to enforce their decisions.

- (2) Like the other sub-units they found that the incidents which they had to investigate followed no set pattern though in the initial stages particularly they noticed a pattern with regard to trench digging which was more or less as follows:
 - (a) One side e.g. The Greek Cypriots would commence digging a trench unnoticed by U.N.
 - (b) The Turks would not protest but would commence digging an additional trench on their side also. This of course would be of little value to them except as a bargaining point. At the same time however they would commence other work which they genuinely wanted to do e.g. another trench, a new hut etc.
 - (c) The other side would then complain to U.N. and when U.N. ask that it be stopped the Turks would draw U.N.s. attention to the original trench and demand that something be done about it.
 - (d) The Greeks are then induced to stop their digging whereupon the Turks stop also, but by then they are one up, the new hut or trench etc.
 - (e) The Greeks on their part may have been carrying on other work also.

- (3) Since all this work would be carried on under cover of darkness and is camouflaged it is extremely difficult to detect. A Coy devised the following drill which they found useful in dealing with this problem.
 - (a) Keep a close watch on both sides and get O.P. personnel to report everything new and unusual no matter how trivial.
 - (b) Prevent as far as possible any grounds for complaint arising on either side.
 - (c) Have O.P. personnel so trained that U.N. detect a situation arising before it gets out of hand. U.N. must always be in a position to get in first before either side has time to make a complaint.
 - (d) Maintain an up-to-date map of all Greek and Turk Cypriot positions in each O.P.
 - (e) Make a complete study of all Greek and Turk Cypriot positions each morning and make an immediate report of any change in them.
 - (f) Ensure, on rotations of O.P. personnel, that on-coming O.P. Comdrs are completely briefed and made aware of all trenches etc., in their O.P. areas.

Over.....

- (4) A matter which accentuated A Coy's problems in this regard, was the fact that no cease fire line exists in the LEFKA Enclave area, and consequently, it was very difficult at times to decide whether trench and other constructions amounted to provocation or not. Their difficulties were added to in the early stages by the fact that winterization was in progress by both sides when A Coy first arrived in the area, and when challenged both sides inevitably claimed that any works being undertaken by them were part of this winterization programme.
- (5) Other incidents included:
- (a) Shots,
 - (b) Shouting of abuse, and
 - (c) stealing donkies, dogs, and various tupes of domestic equipment. These however did not cause much difficulty for A Coy who found that once they showed that they were not going to put up with any nonsense, both sides became very co-operative. All incidents were closed satisfactorily in a very short time.

NOMINAL ROLL - 5TH INFANTRY GROUP

OFFICERS

ED No.	Rank	Name	Appointment	Parent Unit
0.7906	Lt.	Brophy Padraig	Pl. Comd B Coy Gp	6/Inf Bn.
0.7373	Capt	Croke Patrick J.	Group Adj.	G.H.Q.
0.5139	Comdt.	Coyle James P.	Coy. Comd. HQ. Coy	E/Comd HQ.
0.7446	Capt.	Cotter Patk. J.	PL Comd, TPT PL.	4/Grn S&T.C
0.7950	"	Cobbe Patk. T.	PL Comd B Coy Gp	F/Coy S.&T.
0.7480	"	Duggan M. J.	OPs. Offr, Gp HQ.	Army H.Q.
0.8021	Lt.	Duffy Seamus P.	PL Comd A Coy Gp	5 Inf/Bn.
0.7942	"	Freeman Park. M.	Tech Offr, Armd Car Gp.	1 A/Car Sqn.
0.7937	"	Gavin Liam S.	Asst Ops. Offr.	5 F/Arty Regt
0.7945	"	Gosling Thos. G.	Pl Comd A Coy Gp.	
0.6397	Comdt.	Heffernan Ml.	Coy/ComdB Coy Gp.	13 Inf/Bn
0.7916	Lt.	Hartnett M. A.	PL Comd Sp Pl B/Coy	C.D.A.
0.8002	"	Kiely John	Asst/QM & PL/Comd also acts as Cathering Offr	4 F/Sigs.
0.7946	"	Keane Patk. J.	Asst Int Offr.	19 Inf/Bn.
0.8101	2/Lt.	Hickey Thos. G.	Sec Comd A/Car Gp.	4 Mot/Sqn.
0.7977	Lt.	Lynch Ml. F.	PL Comd A Coy	10 Btn.
0.4971	Lt/Col.	McGurk Brian G.M.	Gq Commander	12 Inf/Bn.
0.7261	Capt.	MacConchoille Columban	Int Offr.	Mil Col.
0.8005	Lt.	McCourt Kevin J.	Asst Adj & PL Comd	2/Grn.S&T.C.
0.8053	"	McCann Patrick	PL Comd Sp PL A/Coy	S.P.A.
0.8124	Capt	McCarthy Gerard F.	Pl Offr (M.O.)	
0.7558	"	Moriarty Thos. J.J.	Gp QM	2 Inf/Bn
0.5165	Comdt.	Nunan Kevin	Gp Comd A/Car Gp	1 Tk./Sqn.
0.7812	Lt.	O'Brien Park. J.	M.P. Offr.	2 Grn. MPC.
0.7552	Capt.	O'Farrell Patrick J.	Tp/Comd Hy Mor Tp	4 F/Arty Rgt.
0.8079	2/Lt.	O'Callaghan Brendan	Sec/Comd A/Car Gp	Dep Cav
0.5921	Capt.	O'Shea Roger	2 i/c A/Car Gp	Dep Cav
0.7159	"	O'Leary Thomas	Tec Stores Offr	3 Mot/Sqn.
0.4979	Comdt.	O'Neill Thomas	2/I/C 5 Inf Gp.	Dep MPC

/Over

ID No.	Rank	Name	Appointment	Parent Unit
0.7764	Capt.	Phelan Brian C	Sig Offr.	Depot Sigs.
0.7956	Lt.	Prendergast Jas .	Sec/Comd Hy Mor Tp.	4 F.A.R.
0.7789	Capt	Raftery Walter F.	Engr. Offr,	4 F/C.O.E.
0.7553	"	Ryan Thomas F.	2/I/C & Adm. Offr, A Coy	P.I.T.
0.5964	Comdt.	Ronayne John O.	O/C A Coy, Gp.	2 Bde/HQ.
0.7504	Capt.	Roche Edmond	2/I/C & Adm Offr	4 Battn.
0.6671	Comdt.	Sheahan Danl. F.	PL Comd M.O.	2 H/Coy. AMC.
0.8037	Lt.	Swan Gerald W.	Sec/Comd Hy Mor Tp.	1 F/Bty 1.F.A/ Regt.
0:7597	Cmdt.	Sloane Richard M. J.D.	Ord Offr (OME)	4 Grn/A.O.C.
0.7321	Capt.	Savino Vincent F.	Welfare Offr.	SO QMGs. Br AHQ.
0.8022	Lt.	Scanlon John M.	PL/Comd B, Coy.	4 Inf/Battn.
	Rev/ Fr.	P. McCabe	C.F.	Chaplain, C/Brugha Bks.
	Rev/ Fr.	C. Matthews,	C.F.	Chaplain, Baldonnel.

NOMINAL ROLL - 5th INFANTRY GROUP.

HEADQUARTERS COMPANY

Service No.	Rank	Name	Parent Unit
76288	S/M.	Galvin M.	Dep. Cav.
82937	C.Q.M.S.	McAllister, C.	" "
76985	C/S	Byrne, A.	4 F.A.R.
75432	"	Cronin B.	3 Grn. M.P.C.
424266	"	Kiernan, M.	6 Inf. Battn.
209714	C.Q.M.S	Brennan, P.	4 F.A.R.
75739	"	Carolan, T.	18 Bn.
425605	"	Coyle C.	3 Fd. S. & T.
94275	"	Kelleher, C.	11 Inf. Battn.
435871	Lgt.	Barron J.	2 Grn. M.P.C.
96577	"	Bartley, C.	C.T.C.
98109	"	Byrne P.	McKee Bks. Coy.
217173	"	Cowley J.	G.T. Dep.
90136	A/C.S.	Connolly, C.	2 Hospt.
75481	Sgt.	Daly, J.	4 Bde. H.Q.
805925	"	Dalton, T.	Dep. A.O.C.
812695	"	Dennis, O.	2 F.A.R.
99920	"	Durney, C.	1 H/Coy.
803388	"	Fleming, T.	4 Fd. Sigs.
77468	"	Grimes, T.	4 F.A.R.
80174	"	Hayes, L.	3 Garr. A.O.C.
80471	"	Johnston, A.	Dep. C.O.E.
425316	"	Kelly, B.	C.H.Q. (W).
99165	"	Murray, T.	1 F.A.R.
90334	"	Mills, J.	4 Fd. S.&T.
94072	"	McGrath S.	2 Battn.
435362	"	McGrath W.	Dep. Sigs.
86605	"	McEntee C.	Dep. A.M.C.
86758	"	Mc Donald M.	McKee Bks.

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Service No.	Rank	Name	Parent Unit
74057	Sgt.	Nolan, M.	2 Inf/Btn.
802958	"	O'Flaherty, P.	5 Fd./C.O.E.
86692	"	O'Reilly, J.	4 Fd./C.O.E.
89740	"	O'Reilly, R.	4 " S.& T.
414162	"	O'Mahony, J.	C.T.D. (S).
93184	"	Roche, M.	11 Fd./S.& T.
88069	"	Smart, P.	Dep. A.O.C.
76956	"	Taaffe, L.	Air Corps.
88217	"	Tobin, P.	3 Battn.
812996	Cpl.	Aulsberry N.	1 Grn./A.O.C.
810832	"	Barrett, V.	Air Corps Sigs.
815063	A/Sgt.	Brady, M.	2 Fd./Sigs.
809722	Cpl.	Baldwin, J.	Dep. S.&T.
95853	Sgt.	Colton, M.	2 Bn.
807426	Cpl.	Cunningham, P.	2 Fd./S.&T.
814157	"	Cullen, J.	2 Grn./M.P.C.
804393	"	Corbanny, B.	2 Bn.
812603	"	Creevy, T.	4 F.A.R.
89516	"	Downey, J.	2 G./M.P.C.
86759	"	Doyle, T.	2 Fd./C.O.E.
431688	"	Fennell, W.	Dep S.&T.
810103	"	Flynn, J.	3 Bn
813772	"	Gordon, P.	4 Garr/M.P.C.
806951	"	Geraghty, D.	5 Fd.Sigs.
90068	A/Segt	Gartland, P.	3 Garr/M.P.C.
801129	Cpl.	Hynes, T.	Dep. S.&T.
809566	"	Hamilton, M.	3 Garr/A.O.C.
807664	"	Hanlon, J.	Dep. A.M.C.
815234	"	Kirwin P.J.	4 Garr/M.P.C.
91711	"	Lacey, W.	1 Fd. Sigs.
813773	"	Lafferty, J.	4 Fd. Sigs.
810813	"	Moran, M.	No.1 Hospt. Coy.
98337	"	Masterson, T.	5 Fd. Regt.
809917	A/Sgt.	Maher, J.	1. Fd. Sigs.
804413	Cpl.	Murphy, D.	Dep. A.M.C.
90613	"	Murphy, P.	4 Battn.
807301	A/Sgt.	McNally, P.J.	1 Battn.
809596	Cpl.	McKenna C.	4 Garr/A.O.C.
809609	"	McLoughlin, S.	4 Fd./C.O.E.
811471	"	McCarthy, J.	1 Fd./Sigs.
92447	"	McGivern, D.	2 Fd./S.&T.

Service No.	Rank	Name	Parent Unit
89748	Cpl.	O'Brien J.	4 Garr/S.&T.
77001	"	O'Keefe, J.	4 Battn.
805184	"	O'Callaghan, J.	1 Fd./C.O.E.
810933	"	O'Neill, M.	4 Fd./C.O.E.
811296	A/Sgt.	O'Mahoney, C.	1 Fd./Sigs.
802571	Cpl.	O'Mahony, D.	3 Garr/M.P.C.
94829	"	O'Flanagan, T.	4 Hosp. Coy.
98216	"	Prince, M.	Air Corps.
814575	"	Prenderville, P.	3 Garr/M.P.C.
808879	A/Sgt.	Perry, J.	3 Garr/A.O.C.
808013	"	Poynton, L.	4 F.A.R.
805794	Cpl.	Phelan, J.	Dep Sigs.
76595	A/Sgt.	Quirke, J.	4 F.A.R.
809576	Cpl.	Ready, J.	2 Fd/S.&T.
77255	A/Sgt.	Ryan, H.	4 Grn/M.P.C.
77139	Cpl	Riordan, M.	Mil. Col.
814319	"	Shields, S.	2 Grn/A.O.C.
813004	"	Sheridan, S.	3 Bn.
812296	"	Swamley, C.	1 Fd/Sigs.
810031	"	Whelan, E.	Dep. M.P.C.
812523	Pte	Brophy, M.	Dep. Sigs.
815495	"	Baker, J.	4 F.A.R.
813878	"	Barron, C.	3 H/Coy. A.M.C.
815101	"	Barry, J.	4 Fd/Sigs.
815198	"	Carroll, J.	No. 2 G/
815079	"	Carroll, E.	Dep. S.&T.
809419	"	Carroll, J.	5 Bn.
813850	"	Carr, P.	5 Bn.
811807	"	Clarke, J.	4 Fd/C.O.E.
808107	"	Craig, M.	2 Bn.
809376	"	Crowley, T.	2 Mot/Sqn.
815997	"	Cahill, M.T.	4 F.A.R.
815492	"	Cassidy, N.J.	4 F.A.R.
808073	"	Cunningham, T.	4 F.A.R.
810905	"	Comerford, J.	1 Fd/S.&T.
814210	"	Cleary, P.	4 F.A.R.
814038	"	Clyne, T.F.	4 F.A.R.
816145	"	Curran, G.	No. 2 G/S.&T.
800970	"	Cunningham, J.	4 H/Coy. A.M.C.
815558	"	Daly, S.	2 Hosp. Coy. AMC.

HEADQUARTERS COMPANY (C6ntd.)

4/

Service No.	Rank	Name	Parent Unit
813994	Pte.	Delaney P.	2 Fd/S.& T.
814012	"	Duncan, G.	2 Hosp. Coy.Amc
87989	"	Dillon, S.	3 " Coy.AMC
813184	"	Devaney, M.	4 F.A.R.
811842	"	Duffy, J.	No.2 E/S.&T.
812436	"	Deasy, D.	1 Fd/Sigs.
814974	"	Elliott, P.D.	4 Fd/S.&T:C.
810818	"	Flanagan, L.	1 Fd./C.O.E.
810805	"	Fitzpatrick, W.	1 Hosp. Coy.AMC
87855	"	Fitzpatrick, P.	Dep S.&T.
814664	"	Friel, A.J.	4 G/S.&T.
93346	"	Fitzgerald, A.	4 G/S.&T.
811905	"	Hart, W.N.	3 Grn/S.&T.
812837	"	Harris, P.J.	3 Grn/S.&T.
812501	"	Harte, V.J.	4 F.A.R.
815083	"	Howe, D.	Dep.S.&T.
812707	"	Hughes, P.	4.FAR.
84471	"	Hegarty, H.	"
810917	"	Hanlon, J.	1 Fd/C.O.E.
77866	"	Houlihan, J.	1 H/Coy.
813271	"	Kelly, J.	6 Bn.
816030	"	Kenny, J.	2 Bn.
814268	"	Keogh, J.	Dep Sigs.
813464	"	Kennedy, E.	4 Hosp. Coy.
91247	"	Kiernan, E.	4 F.A.R.
815503	"	Keneghan, J.Φ.	4 FD/Coy.S.&T.
813792	"	Lawlor, P.	3 Hosp. Coy.
810925	"	Lennon, J.	Dep. C.O.E.
811604	"	Mulvey, R.	4 Fd/Sigs.
803983	"	Murphy, F.	Dep.S.&T.
813717	"	McClay, P.	Air Corp Sig.
814878	"	McCormack, P.	4 Fd/Sig.
815121	"	McGuinness, J.W.	4 F.A.R.
809035	"	McSweeney, T.	4 Bn.
810767	"	Neylon, D.	1 Fd/Sigs.
816042	"	Noonan, J.	4 Bn.
809575	"	Nolan, J.	2 Fd/C.O.E.
815455	"	O'Brien, M.	4 F.A.R.
86000	"	O'Brien, J.	5 Bn.

<u>Service No.</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Parent Unit</u>
816084	Pte.	O'Keeffe, J.	4 Bn.
811070	"	O'Connell, D.	1 F.A.R.
814315	"	O'Connor, G.	Clancy Bks. Staff.
812259	"	Strong, C.S.	2 Mot/Scn.
810939	"	Slevin, C.	2 G/S.&T.
813001	"	Sheridan, S.	3 Bn.
811342	"	Treacy, M.	Dep. S.&T.
92262	"	Tobin, J.	3 Grn/A.O.C.
814047	"	Walsh, P.J.	4 F.A.R.
815078	"	Whelan, J.	Dep S.&T.
814608	"	Wilton, J.J.	4 F.A.R.
98776	Sgt.	Whelan, P.	No. 1 G/A.O.C.
<u>"A" COY</u>			
76755	C/S.	Sheehan, D.	Mil. Col.
803672	COQS	Broe, N.	2 Bn.
801579	Sgt.	Barnes, J.	5 Bn.
99813	"	Dawson, D.	S.P.A.
92176	"	Murphy, J.	2 Bn.
92437	"	O'Neill, T.	8 Bn.
809295	"	Redmond, G.	5 Bn.
96676	Sgt.	Rochford, R.	3 Bn.
88010	"	Shannon, J.	P.I.T.
79185	"	Wilson, T.	3 Bn.
806293	Cpl.	Anderson, A.	2 Bn.
803348	"	Boyle, J.	21 Bn.
813617	"	Cody, P.	3 Bn.
808392	"	Delahunty, J.	3 Bn.
810020	"	Fitzpatrick, M.	HQ. 6 Bde.
811893	"	Fogarty, G.	Dep. S.&T.
809735	"	Grant, D.	Dep. C.O.E.
812957	"	Hunt, G.	2 F.A.R.
809033	"	Hendrick, J.	2 Bn.
95716	"	Kavanagh, P.	2 F.A./Rgt.
815670	"	Kielt, P.	G.T. Depot, (E).
811137	"	Lacey, M.	Dep. Sigs.
814951	"	Lynch, J.	P.I.T.
813182	"	Molloy, B.	10 Bn.
803899	"	Mooney, P.	2 Bn.
811230	"	Murphy, E.	3 Bn.

HEADQUARTERS COMPANY (CONTD).

Service No.	Rank	Name	Parent Unit
87017	Cpl.	Nevin, M.J.	Dep. Arty.
812953	A/Sgt.	O'Sullivan, J.	5 Bn.
814946	Cpl.	O'Neill, J.	3 Bn.
813616	"	Phelan, T.	3 Bn.
804907	"	Robinson, C.	McKee Bks. Coy.
812079	"	Smith, W.	3 Bn.
814011	"	Sunderland, M.	2 Bn.
808236	"	Tuck, J.	2 Bn.
816025	"	Tracey, J.	5 Bn.
811522	Pte	Byrne, J.	5 Bn.
813794	"	Byrne, F.	5 "
814784	"	Byrne, E.	2 "
800205	"	Bracken, M.	P.I.T.
815134	"	Brady, O.	5 Bn.
815416	"	Browne, J.	5 "
814830	"	Bowe, P.	5 "
809308	"	Boiland, J.	Dep. C.O.E.
815766	"	Bolger, R.L.	HQ. 6 Bde.
801821	*	Canning, M.	3 Bn.
814771	"	Canavan, W.	3 Bn.
811856	"	Carty, W.	HQ. 6 Bde.
815233	"	Callinan, F.	2 Bn.
81438	"	Cullinane, T.	C.HQ. Cgh.
807277	"	Clarke, M.J.	HQ. 6 Bde.
815178	"	Cosgrave, P.J.	Dep. Arty.
811635	"	Doran, J.	4 Fd. Sigs.
813405	"	Doran, W.	3 Bn.
807386	"	Donnelly, E.	1 A.A. Regt.
813520	A/Cpl.	Doyle, D.	5 Bn.
814681	Pte.	Doyle, T.	3 Bn.
815642	"	Dunne, C.	3 "
813482	"	Dunne, J.	3 "
815532	"	Dwyer, J.	5 "
814986	"	Duncan, J.	2 Fd/Sigs.
814542	"	Doyle, M.	3 Bn.
807667	"	Elstone, P.	Dep. S&T.
816107	"	Fitzpatrick, J.	3 Bn.
812052	"	Foley, M.	6 Bde, H./Q.
805111	"	Flynn, N.	McKee Bks. Coy.
814486	"	Fagan, J.	2 Bn.

HEADQUARTERS COMPANY (CONTD.)

71

Service No.	Rank	Name	Parent Unit
808152	Pte	Foley, P.	Dep. Cav.
812891	"	Cately, J.	Dep. S.&T.
816076	"	Gethings, P.	2 Bn.
814593	"	Hennesy, J.	2 Bn.
812534	"	Higgins, C.	3 Bn.
811600	"	Horohan, P.	6 Bde./H.Q.
812809	"	Hughes, J.	Dep. S.&T.
815550	"	James, T.J.	3 Bn.
814769	"	Johnston, P.	P.I.T.
803660	"	Johnston, C.	5 Bn.
814682	"	Jordan, P.	Dep. Sigs.
814658	"	Keogh, P.	5 Bn.
816037	"	Keegan, T.	2 G/A.O.C.
811367	"	Kelly, P.	2 G/S.&T.C.
806247	"	Killoran, J.	Dep. S.&T.
816246	"	Kavanagh, J.	2 F.A.R.
814059	"	Keenan, E.	2 Mot/Sqn.
815092	"	Kinsella, S.	P.I.T.
810100	"	Kavanagh, D.	3 Bn.
815472	"	Lennon, P.	P.I.T.
815904	"	Leddy, P.	2 Bn.
813680	"	Lynch, J.	C.T. Depot. (E).
814749	"	Mann, C.	5 Bn.
808499	"	Mohan, P.	3 Bn.
800905	"	Moore, L.	5 Bn.
816094	"	Mulhall, I.	2 F.A.R.
94449	"	Murphy, M.	5 Bn.
814004	"	Murtagh, D.	2 "
815353	"	McCarthy, J.	5 "
815909	"	McCarthy, M.	2 "
815038	"	McCarthy, J.	2 Mot/Sqn.
813082	"	McCaffery, S.	3 Bn.
814521	"	McDonald, F.	2 Bn.
814568	"	McDermott, C.	3 Bn.
801896	"	McGrath, R.	Dep C.O.E.
807810	"	McGeown, D.	2 Bn.
808750	"	McGarry, K.	HQ, 6 Bde,
814659	"	McGealy, M.	5 Bn.
813087	"	McHugh, N.	Dep S&T.
816131	"	McMahon, J.	2 Bn.
813911	"	McQuaid, C.	5 Bn.
814936	"	McNally, J.	3 Bn.
815012	"	Nolan, F.	5 Bn.

"A" COMPANY. (CONTD.)

6/

Service No.	Rank.	Name.	Parent Unit
815440	Pte	Nugent, J.	5 Bn.
810217	"	O'Brien, P.	2 Bn.
815325	"	O'Brien, M.	2 Bn.
814948	"	O'Connor, C.	HQ, C.T.C.
812293	"	O'Donnell, J.	Dep.Arty.
815947	"	O'Doherty, P.	Dep.S.&T.
814758	"	O'Neill, J.	1 H/Coy.
815547	"	O'Neill, J.	3 Bn.
816077	"	O'Neill, P.	2 Bn.
815133	"	O'Reilly, J.	5 Bn.
808842	"	Power, T.	HQ. E/Comd.
96733	"	Paisley, P.	Base W/S&T.
814552	"	Reck, P.	3 Bn.
815422	"	Reilly, E.	5 Bn.
803047	"	Roche, W.	Dep. S.&T.
815013	"	Smyth, J.	2 Fd/Sigs.
815641	"	Stacey, A	3 Bn.
815343	"	Stack, P.	5 Bn.
815166	"	Smith, P.	5 Bn.
815551	"	Troy, S.	3 Bn.
815077	"	Watson, M.	HQ. 6 Bde.
815043	"	Walsh, P.	McKee Bks. Coy.
814694	"	Wall, C.	HQ. C.T.C.
802749	"	Vickers, D.	2 F.A.R.

"B" COMPANY

SERVICE No.	Rank.	Name	Parent Unit
208618	COMS	Cunningham, B.	13 Bn.
808500	Sgt.	Brennan, J.	19 Inf Bn.
81965	"	Daly, J.	1 F.A.R.
806303	"	Geary, M.	4 Bn.
804143	"	Kelleher, J.	1 Fd/Sigs.
97192	"	Manning, J.	McKee Bks. Coy.
807690	Sgt.	Murphy, J.	4 Bn.
91380	"	Murphy, M.	C.T.D. (S).
79703	"	Meehan, J.	12 Inf/Bn.
86755	A/C.S.	Maher, M.	C.T.D. (S).

"B" COMPANY (CONTD).

Service No.	Rank.	Name	Parent Unit
808284	Cpl.	Byrnes, M.	3 Bde/HQ.
808655	"	Butler, P.	13 Inf/Bn.
96336	"	Butler, J.	3 F.A.R.
94821	"	Cummins, J.	C.T.D. (W).
811582	"	Chaaman, M.	19 Bn.
815888	"	Cusack, D.	12 "
809374	"	Cotter, M.	23 Inf/Bn.
810956	"	Drought, R.	11 Bn.
810794	"	Finlas, S.	6 "
809515	"	Foley, J.T.	4 Bn.
805848	"	Gallagher, J.	18 Bn.
807860	"	Hogan, P.F.	6 Inf/Bn.
813603	"	Kilmartin, B.	1 Fd/Sig.
814084	"	Moran, J.F.	6 Bn.
803253	"	Moroney, J.	4 Bn.
810645	"	Morrissey, J.	5 F.A.R.
812612	"	McLoughlin, P.	6 Bn.
802882	"	McSweeney, C.	12 Bn.
81802	"	O'Keefe, D.	14 "
94780	"	Roche, P.	4 "
96905	"	Ryan, M.	12 "
807192	"	Ryan, C.	12 "
807250	"	Sharpe, E.	4 "
808336	"	Sheehan, M.	12 "
805265	"	Thompson, M.	C.T.D. (S).
815677	Pte.	Ahern, W.	4 Bn.
813952	"	Butterfield, J.	12 Bn.
815691	"	Barry, M.M.	4 "
815673	"	Brennan, M.	4 "
808554	"	Boland, F.	17 "
815428	"	Berrigan, L.J.	HQ. W/Comd.
810046	"	Bowe, J.	12 Bn.
808061	"	Buckley, T.	4 "
814934	"	Corroon, P.	4 Fd/S.&T.
815338	"	Corbally, J.	1 Bn.
810907	"	Corrigan, P.	4 G/A.O.C.
804078	"	Coote, P.	22 Inf/Bn.
815724	"	Coyle, J.	12 Bn.
81376 7	"	Coleman, T.	1 Fd/C.O!E.
810621	"	Cremin, M.	4 Bn.
815145	"	Cleary, J.	1 Fd/Sigs.
806492	"	Doyle, A.	C.T.D. (S).
813610	"	Doyle, J.	12 Bn.

Service No.	Rank.	Name	Parent Unit.
814716	Pte.	Dunford, J.	13 Bn.
814838	"	Dineen, W.	4 "
808815	"	Doherty, P.	12 "
816090	"	Dorney, T.	12 "
813474	"	Denehy, R.	1 Fd/Sigs.
814405	"	Duggan, M.	1 Fd/Sigs.
803841	"	Duffy, J.	12 Bn.
810912	"	Egan, R.J.	4 G/A.O.C.
8147988	"	Forde, J.	4 Bn.
813425	"	Frahill, C.	12 "
815267	"	Ferguson, J.	1 "
92153	"	Fanning, P.	12 "
815682	"	FitzGerald, T.	12 "
811534	"	FitzGerald, P.	12 "
815527	"	FitzGerald, R.	1 F/C.O.E.
807957	"	FitzGerald, J.	12 Bn.
807300	"	Houlihan, B.	12 "
812292	"	Harrington, A.	Dep. Sigs.
803668	"	Hogan, R.	4 Bn.
815890	"	Hurley, P.	4 Bn.
815688	"	Healy, P.	6 Bn.
813897	"	Harte, J.	1 Bn.
93234	✓	Kelleher, L.	1 Fd/S.&T.
815444	"	Kenneally, M.	4 Bn.
807445	"	Kiernan, J.	4 G/A.O.C.
805966	"	Kiernan, J.	1 FD/C.O.E.
417348	"	Kenny, J.J.	1 F.A.R.
810558	"	Kelly, J.	15 Bn.
814905	"	Lawton, J.C.	1 Bn.
815369	"	Lucas, J.	12 Bn.
814159	"	Morrissey, G.	12 Bn.
816014	"	Meehan, C.	4 Bn.
811870	"	Mooney, S.M.	4 "
815256	"	Maher, A.	4 "
815035	"	Maher, N.C.	1 "
812441	"	Marshall, W.	12 "
815829	"	Mulcahy, W.	12 "
813847	"	Murphy, P.	4 Bn.
806862	"	Murphy, J.J.	4 Bn.
813356	"	Mullane, W.	1 Fd/C.O.E.
815519	"	MCDonagh, J.	McKee Bks.Coy.
814603	"	McEvilly, M.	6 Bn.
808478	"		

"B" COMPANY (CONTD).

11/

Service No.	Rank	Name	Parent Unit
815229	pte	McManus, J.	6 Bn.
815165	"	McMahon, S.	1 Bn.
809594	"	McDonagh, M.P.	4 G/A.O.C.
815587	"	McNamara, J.	1 Fd/C.O.E.
804353	"	McInerney, P.	3 Bde/HQ.
815535	"	McGann, J.	1 Fd/C.O.E.
805544	"	McCarthy, J.	4 Bn.
815261	"	Nolan, M.	1 Bn.
815689	"	Norris, P.	6 Bn.
814979	"	O'Grady, R.	1 Bn.
806409	"	O'Brien, B.	4 Bn.
813863	"	O'Brien, G.	4 Bn.
207463	"	O'Brien, J.	1 Fd/S.&T.
812268	"	O'Brien, T.	4 Bn.
808243	"	O'Connor, P.	12 "
815975	"	O'Doherty, M.	12 "
815212	"	O'Doherty, P.	1 "
815623	"	O'Donoghue, J.	4 "
814805	"	O'Shea, W.A.	4 "
814243	"	O'Mears, E.	12 "
815442	"	O'Sullivan, D.	McKee Bks. Coy.
95024	"	Ryall, E.	1 Fd/C.O.E.
815668	"	Reen, G.	11 Bn.
807164	"	Reddin, C.	3 Bde/H.Q.
813048	"	Ryan, A.	12 Bn.
815221	"	Slattery, F.	1 "
815439	"	Sweeney, E.	6 "
814086	"	Smith, M.P.	1 F.A.R.
814700	"	Smith, M.	12 Bn.
815493	"	Sammon, M.	6 "
812376	"	Thompson, J.	4 "
805651	"	Wallace, M.	4 "
815986	"	Wallace, W.	6 "
812567	"	Wash, P.	12 "
814851	"	Warren, F.P.	4 "
815624	"	Wensley, G.	4 "
815575	"	Askins, E.	12 "

ARMD. CAR GROUP

12/

Service No.	Rank.	Name	Parent Unit.
81916	C/S	Gleeson W.	1 Tr/Sqn.
87688	CGMS	Dignam, P.	4 Mot/Sqn.
97060	Sgt.	Byrne, J.	Dep. Cav.
805278	"	Evans, D.	2 Mot/Sqn.
804643	"	McCafferty, J.	2 " "
807359	"	O'Keeffe, J.	2 " "
806043	"	Broe, W.	4 " "
814024	"	Doherty, M.	1 A/Car Sqn.
811931	"	Hayes, J.	4 Mot/Sqn.
802518	"	Hayes, G.	2 Mot/Sqn.
808765	"	Landy, J.	1 A/Car Sqn.
809447	A/Sgt.	Loughman, M.	Dep. Cav.
814186	Sgt.	McAllister, J.C.	1 TK/Sqn.
805316	"	McElroy, E.	4 M/Sqn.
809573	A/Sgt.	McHugh, M.	Dep. S.&T.
815941	Cpl.	O'Neill, J.	1 Tk/Sqn.
800331	A/Sgt.	O'Callaghan, C.	Dep. Cav.
815447	Cpl.	Rowe, B.	2 M/Sqn.
812650	"	White, J.	Dep. Cav.
415909	A/Cpl.	Chambers, M.	1 Mot/Sqn.
813931	Tpr.	Cousins, J.	1 TK/Sqn.
815273	"	Fitzpatrick, J.	2 M/Sqn.
811974	"	Gaffney, P.	Dep. Cav.
813904	"	Gahan, S.	1 Mot/Sqn.
813854	"	Harris, C.	2 " "
813041	"	Herlihy, M.	1 " "
814063	"	Heffernan, M.	1 " "
814063	"	Heffernan, M.	1 " "
806867	"	Kenny, T.	2 " "
815456	"	Moore, J.	1 TK/Sqn.
815775	"	Nolan, P.	4 Mot/Sqn.
811947	Cpl.	O'Keeffe, W.	Dep. S.&T.
809706	Tpr.	Rafter, J.	2 M/Sqn.
808791	"	Rellis, R.	Dep. Cav.
812516	"	Reid, R.	4 Mot/Sqn.
414473	"	Whealey, R.	1 Mot/Sqn.

DEFINITION:

5th Infantry Group has arrived in CYPRUS and will be deployed and established in the LEFKA District.

MIS SION:

2. 5th Infantry Group in implementation of HQ INFICYP mission will keep the peace in LEFKA and assist in bringing back normal conditions of living in the District.

EXECUTION:3. General Outline:

- a. Lefka District will be divided into three sub Unit Areas:-

- (1) To the North West - KOKKINA area - 'B' Company
- (2) In the CENTRE - LIMNITIS area - Armoured Car Gp (+)
- (3) In the EAST - LEFKA area - "A" Company (-).
- (4) HQ Company will be located at XEROS.

- b. Sub Unit Commanders will maintain close liaison with both Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders and will be responsible for the investigation of incidents in their own Areas and the easing of local tensions, when they arise.

"A" Company (-) (One Platoon):

- Location: As per APPENDIX

Tasks:

- (1) Keep the peace and assist in the return to normal living conditions in its area.
- (2) Encourage travel without escort in its area.

- (3) Provide timely and continuous information on all happenings military and economic, in the area.
- (4) Man observation Posts as per Appendix and such additional posts as the situation may demand.
- (5) Liaise with UN troops MORPHOU District.

Company: As per locstat (APPENDIX).

Tasks

- (1) Maintain observation over cease fire lines KOKKINA Bridgehead.
- (2) Keep the peace and assist in the return to normal living conditions.
- (3) Liaise with UN troops PAPHOS District.
- (4) Encourage travel without escort in the area.
- (5) Inspect all UN vehicles entering and leaving Bridgehead at Observation Post 4 (MANSOURAS) and check arms carried.
- (6) Be prepared to assist in the escort and delivery of food supplies into KOKKINA including Red Crescent convoys..
- (7) Provide timely and continuous information on all happenings military and economic, in the area.
- (8) Man Observation Posts as per Appendices, and such additional posts as the situation may demand.

Armoured Car Group (+ One Platoon "A" Company + Hy mor)

Location: As per locstat (Appendix).

Tasks:

- (1) Keep the peace and assist in the return to normal living conditions.
- (2) Continue to encourage travel without escort in the area.

- (3) Provide timely and continuous information on all happenings - military and economic, in the area.
- (4) Man Observation Posts as per Appendices and such additional posts as the situation may demand.
- (5) Liaise with 'A' and 'B' Companies.

Heavy Mortar Troop:

- a. Location: As per locstat (Appendix).
- b. Tasks:
 - (1) Group Rec
 - (2) Security of Group HQ Area
 - (3) Prepared to assist HQ Company in supplying patrols.

Headquarter Company:

- a. Location: As per locstat (Appendix).
- b. Tasks:
 - (1) Administer and maintain the 5th Infantry Group.
 - (2) Be prepared to provide patrols in Rear Areas if the situation demands. (Assisted by Hy Mor tp if necessary).

UNCIVPOL:

- a. Method of Operation: Deployed in LEFKA District and will operate in direct Support Command LEFKA District. The duties of UNCIVPOL will be divided between Uniformed and Inquiry branches.
- b. Tasks:
 - (1) Uniform Brancy:
 - (a) Man UN posts in sensitive areas
 - (b) Carry out patrols
 - (c) Observe searches by CYPOL at Road Blocks and check points.
 - (d) Liaise with CYPOL/TK Police.
 - (e) Provide escorts as required by LEFKA District HQ.

(2) Inquiry Branch:

- (a) Inquire into incidents where Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities are involved.
- (b) Make special inquiries as necessary in conjunction with CYPOL and/or Turkish Cypriot Police.
- (c) Deal with inquiries relating to missing persons.
- (d) Carry out surveys, observations, and make assessments of special nature.

(3) UNCIVPOL SITREP:

Will be submitted at 17.00 hrs daily to HQ 5th Infantry Group for inclusion in District SITREP, as appropriate.

- (4) UNCIVPOL will report all incidents by the quickest means in keeping with Security Classification, to District HQ.
- (5) UNCIVPOL will liaise daily with District HQ. Instructions will be issued by Operations Branch on the authority of District Commander.
- (6) Duplication of UNCIVPOL and Military Police duties will be avoided. In the allotment of duties the nature of the tasks will be taken into account.

Operations Economic:

Tasks:

- (1) Assist in solving economic problems in LEFKA District so as to bring about a return to normal living conditions.
- (2) Liaise with all sub-units 5th Infantry Group.

11. Co-Ordinating Instructions:

a. Group becomes operational - Time Later.

b. Orders:

(1) Orders for each sub Unit will be produced and signed by each sub Unit Commander.

(2) Special attention to:-

(a) Security:

(b) Care, custody of arms and ammunition.

(c) Fire precautions.

(d) Control of troops towards the furtherance of UN mission.

c. Reporting: (APPENDICES)

(1) Incidents will be reported by fastest possible means in keeping with security classification.

(2) Incidents reported will be submitted in accordance with format issued.

(3) Times of Reporting:

a. Incidents as they occur (C.I. above.)

b. Sub Unit SITREP - Daily to 1500B, to arrive at District HQ NOT later than 1600B.

d. Directions and Instructions:

(1) Unit SOP

(2) UNFICYP SOP and Instructions (APPENDIX).

e. Sub Unit Boundaries:

f. Restricted Areas:

ADMINISTRATION:

12. Transport, Ammunition, Pol & Sups as per Adm Order.

COMMUNICATIONS:

13. a. Per Signal Annex.

b. Group Headquarters XEROS.

INCIDENTS REPORT PROFORMA

1. Normally reports of incidents and other significant happenings are passed initially to a superior headquarters by telephone. This proforma is intended to save time. Its use should enable all essential information to be passed in a minimum of time and should avoid unnecessary questioning. It is NOT intended to replace the log at Unit TC level but should be used as a guide when recording information in the log.
2. It is suggested that sub-units should design their own proforma on the lines of this specimen.
3. All offrs and NCOs should be briefed on this form of reporting.
- 4.

SERIAL	TIME OF INCIDENT	PLACE	INSTIGATORS	EVENT	REACTION	UN FOLLOW UP/REMARKS
a.	b.	c.	d.	e	f	g
<u>FIRST EXAMPLE:</u>						
A.	At 0900B	At GIN S003823	Nat Gd.	Accidentally fired three LMG shots towards TK/CYP on WHISKEY R997820.	No Tk CYP Reaction	Local Nat Gd Leader stated firer will be disciplined.
<u>SECOND EXAMPLE:</u>						
B.	At 1123B	On KOKKINA Bridgehead at R346991	TK/CYP Fighters	Reported by Nat Gd to be constructing new slit trench over cease fire line	Not Gd state that unless work stops they will fire	Officer patrol investigating Nat Gd agree to take no action until investigations are completed.

a. b. c. d. e. f. g.

THIRD EXAMPLE:

c.	At 0740B	At MIA MILIA Cyp Police S0972	Convoy of 8 Landrovers each carrying six armed policemen passes towards NICOSIA at high speed.	-	Unable to ascertain destination.
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FOURTH EXAMPLE:

d.	At 2103B	At YPSONAS Check Pt R677147	Cyp Police and Nat Gd.	Stopped and despite protests of crew, thoroughly searched UN Landrover 06 UN 97. Vehicle delayed 18 minutes. UN stationed at check pt also protested to police Sgt. in charge.	-	INCREP will be forwarded in about 1 hour.
----	----------	-----------------------------------	------------------------------	--	---	--

5. NOTES:-

- | | |
|----------------|---|
| Coln C, Para 4 | If possible give nearest reference point and grid reference. |
| Coln D, Para 4 | Give complete identification e.g. Nat Gd. Cyp Police, Gk Cyp Civilians, Tk Cyp Fighters etc. |
| Coln E, Para 4 | If report not received from UN source state here who did report it. |
| Coln F, Para 4 | State here reaction of one community at the actions of the other. |
| Coln G, Para 4 | If possible, state here time at which follow up report (if any) is likely to be available.
If digging is NOT observed or reported by the other side, state whether digging is
provocative, or protective. |
-

APPENDIX

Sub Unit: _____

DAILY SITREP

_____ Date/Time Gp B

Situation:

pts: (Note: Incidents already reported otherwise will be confirmed here).

on Incidents:

OS:

O/C Sub Unit.

Ops INSTRUCTIONS

DATE:

SUBJECT MATTER:

- 19.10.'64 Unit & Rank Identification (Cyp Forces)
- 19.10.'64 ORBAT: Tk Cyp/GK Cyp Forces
- 28.10.'64 Personality list Gk forces (Nat & Cyp)
- 17.5.'65 Locstat & Artystat NG/TK Cyp.
- 22.5.'65 Gk Cyp Aircraft
- 13.3.'65 Relations between UNFICYP & local Population.
- 4.5.'65 Policy on Escorts and transport assistance
- 24.5.'65 UN Operations at Night.
- 3.6.'65 Evacuation of Tk Cyp patients by Helicopter.
- 3.7.'65 Crashed Aircraft - Alert Procedure
- 9.7.'65 Restrictions - private photography
- 10.7.'65 Policy on Escorts and Transport Assistance.
- 10.7.'65 Official interpreters
- 21.7.'65 Amdt No. 54 to UNFICYP SOP (See Pers/7)
- 24.8.'65 Occupation of houses - Confrontation.

AREAS

- Operations
- Security
- Military Information
- Logs
- Personnel
- Restrictions
- Summary of Returns.

APPENDIX D.

Locstat for Lefka District as at 301200B November,
1965.

Serial	UNIT/SUB UNIT	GRID REF.	PLACE	STRENGTH OFFRS.	Ø/RKS.
1/ a.	<u>HQ 5th Inf.Gp & HQ COY.</u>	R 562649	Xeros	22	112
b.	HQ Coy	R 970676	Nicosia	1	7
2/ a.	<u>A Coy (-)</u>	R 579612	Lefka	5	66
b.	OP 11	R 526633	AMBELIKOU		7
c.	OP 58	R 534624	Limekiln		6
d.	Op 57	R 588645	PERISTERONARI		5
e.	OP 12	R 558640	Railway		5
f.	OP 59	R 634684	Ghaziveran		6
g.	OP 60	R644688	Chazi Stn		5
3/ a.	<u>Armd Car Gp (+)</u>	R 480680	Limnitis	8	71
b.	OP Juliet	R 446655	Juliet		6
c.	OP INDIA	R 462657	INDIA		6
d.	OP KILO	R 487683	KILO		6
e.	OP FOXTROT	R 452683	FOXTROT		5
f.	Check Point LIMNITIS	R420680	LIMNITIS		8
4/ a.	<u>B Coy</u>	R 404709	KATO PYRGOS	4	76
b.	OP 1	R 339688	Kokkina		6
c.	OP 2	R 349687	KOKKINA		6
d.	OP 3	R 363688	KOKKINA		6
e.	OP 4	R 380705	KOKKINA		6
f.	OP 5	R 372706	KOKKINA		5
g.	OP 6	R 355695	KOKKINA	2	27
h.	OP L	R 366704	KOKKINA		6

APPENDIX E

LOCSTAT FOR LEFKA DISTRICT AS AT 101400b December,
1965

SERIAL	UNIT/SUB UNIT	GRID REF	PLACE	STRENGTH OFFRS.	O/RKS.
1/	a. <u>HQ 5 Inf GP & HQ Coy</u>	R562649	Xeros	22	112
	b. <u>HQ Coy</u>	R970676	Nicosia	1	7
2/	a. <u>A Coy (-)</u>	R579612	Lefka	5	66
	b. OP 11	R526633	Ambelikou		7
	c. OP 58	R534624	Limekiln		6
	d. OP 57	R588645	Peristeronari		5
	e. OP 12	R558640	Railway		5
	f. OP 59	R634684	Ghaziveran		6
	g. OP 60	R644688	Chazi Station		5
3/	a. <u>Armd C Gp (+)</u>	R480680	Limnitis	8	71
	b. OP JULIET	R446655	Juliet		6
	c. OP HOTEL	R47226591	Hotel		6
	d. OP INDIA	R462657	India		6
	e. OP KILO	R487683	Kilo		6
	f. OP FOXTROT	R452683	Foxtrot		5
	g. Check Point- LIMNITIS	R420680	Limnitis		8
4/	a. <u>B Coy</u>	R404709	Kato/Pyrgos	4	76
	b. OP 1	R339688	Kokkina		6
	c. OP 2	R349687	Kokkina		6
	d. OP 3	R363688	Kokkina		6
	e. OP 4	R380705	Kokkina		6
	f. OP 5	R372706	Kokkina		5
	g. OP6	R355695	Kokkina	2	27
	h. OP L	R366704	Kokkina		6

APPENDIX F.

HQ Lefka District

UNELCYP - Evacuation of Turks

251300B Jan 1966.

OPS

1/ MISSION:

General Outline: OC No. 2/66

The group will provide transport for Turks, from NICOSIA (50) KOKKINA (350) and LIMNITIS (50).

(1) One Co. and two pls Inf on Standby basis at Xeros Camp for possible protective duties in embarkation area.

1/ Sit:

(2) The Cyprus Government has agreed to permit the repatriation to TURKEY of approx five hundred Turks, from NICOSIA (50) KOKKINA (350) and LIMNITIS (50).

b. The evacuation will be conducted exclusively by UN and as unobtrusively as possible.

(5) c. The evacuation will take place on the night 27/28 Jan '66 using MT and the CMC harbour facilities at XEROS, where a TURKISH ship will complete the operation.

d. The following UN troops will be involved:-

(1) HQ UNICYP - Ctl HQ

(2) UNCIVPOL - Policing the operation.

(3) CDN RECCE SQDN - Marshalling of convoys en route.

(4) 5th Infantry Group - Transport for Turks in LIMNITIS and standby.

OPS

2/ MISSION:

OC No. 3/66
The 5th Infantry Group will assist in the evacuation of Turks from Cyprus on the night of 27/28th. January 1966.

3/ EXECUTION:

a. General Outlines

The Cyprus Government has agreed to permit the repatriation to TURKEY of approx five hundred Turks, from NICOSIA (50) KOKKINA (350) and LIMNITIS (50).

(1) One tp. Arm Co and two pls Inf on Standby basis at Xeros Camp for possible protective duties in embarkation area.

(2) Two WCCs and eight men as baggage party in embarkation area.

c. The evacuation will take place on the night 27/28 Jan '66 using MT and the CMC harbour facilities at XEROS, where a TURKISH ship will complete the operation.

(4) MO and Ambulance on standby at XEROS Camp.

(5) Provide reserve area for up six vehicle loads of Turks in the event that it is necessary to divert serials from the Jetty.

(4) 5th Infantry Group - Marshalling of convoys en route.

(4) 5th Infantry Group - Transport for Turks in LIMNITIS and standby.

251300B Jan 1966.

b. Tasks:

- (1) A Company - provide:-
 - (a) One standby Pl at Xeros Camp by 1900B D day.
 - (b) Baggage as detailed in(A) above, in Xeros by 2000B D day.
- (2) B Company - provides:-
 - (a) Two three ton vehicles to Limnitis Camp by 1900B D day.
 - (b) One fitter MT to LIMNITIS Camp by 1911B D day.
- (3) Cav Group - provide:-
 - (a) One three ton vehicle at Limnitis Camp by 1900B D Day.
 - (b) One officer to control Group transport during evacuation Operation.
 - (c) Provide one tp Armd Cars standby in Xeros Camp by 1900B D day.
- (4) HQ Company - provide:-
 - (a) One standby Pl at Xeros Camp by 2000B D day.
 - (b) Two three ton vehicles as standby at Xeros Camp by 2000B D day.
 - (c) One three ton vehicle to LIMNITIS Camp by 1900B D day.
 - (d) MO and Ambulance as standby at Xeros Camp from 2000B D day.
 - (e) Provide reserve area for six vehicle loads of TK/CYPs and supervision of same.
- (5) Group HQ - Provide -: One officer to co-ordinate Group activity during the operation.

4/ Coord Instrs:

- a. Ctl of mov - RCB and UNCLV POL.
- b. Assembly area for evacuation - Soccer Pitch LIMNITIS (R480680).
- c. Tpt to arrive assembly area 2245 D day.
- d. Offr co-ordinating Gp activity during the OP-Comdt. T.O'Neill.
- e. Proposed time of departure from assembly for Xeros 2330B D day. This convoy will be known as serial 2.
- f. Lights will be full on during operation.
- g. Res- all vehicles should be equipped with tow chains.
- h. Officer i/c Gp Tpt at LIMNITIS - To be detailed by O/c Cav Gp.
- i. D day - 27 January 1966.

5/ ADMINISTRATION:-

- a. Rations - QM to ensure supper as required for standby troops.
- b. Amn - Normal personnel holding of amn for standby troops.
 - Gp amn in Xeros Camp will be available as res supply.

6/ Coms:

Coms for Op will be supplied by the unit I/C mov.

APPENDIX F.

HQ Lefka District
UNFICYP

251300B Jan 1966.

OPS

OO No. 2/66

Maps. Edition A, CSOS, Sheet 8.

1/ Sit:

- a. The Cyprus Government has agreed to permit the repatriation to TURKEY of approx five hundred Turks, from NICOSIA (50) KOKKINA (350) and LIMNITIS (50).
- b. The evacuation will be conducted exclusively by UN and as unobtrusively as possible.
- c. The evacuation will take place on the night 27/28 Jan '66 using MT and the GMC harbour facilities at XEROS, where a TURKISH ship will complete the operation.
- d. The following UN troops will be involved:-
 - (1) HQ UNFICYP - Ctl HQ
 - (2) UNCIVPOL - Policing the operation.
 - (3) CDN RECCE SQDN - Marshalling of convoys en route.
 - (4) 5th. Infantry Group - Transport for Turks in LIMNITIS and standby.

APPENDIX F.

UNFICYP

251300B Jan 1966.

OPS

2/ MISSION:

The 5th Infantry Group will assist in the evacuation of Turks from Cyprus on the night of 27/28th. January 1966.

3/ EXECUTION:

- a. General Outline: The Cyprus Government has agreed to permit the repatriation to TURKEY of approx five hundred Turks, from NICOSIA (50) KOKKINA (350) and LIMNITIS (50).
- (1) One tp. Armcd Co and two pl's Inf on Standby basis at Xeros Camp for possible protective duties in embarkation area.
- (2) Two WCCs and eight mtr's baggage party in embarkation area.
- (3) Four three-ton vehicles and drivers for evacuation from LIMNITIS. They will complete the operation.
- (4) MO and Ambulance on standby at XEROS Camp.
- (5) Provide reserve area for up six vehicle loads of Turks in the event that it is necessary to divert serials from the Jetty.
- (6) Marshalling of convoys en route.
- (4) 5th. Infantry Group - Transport for Turks in LIMNITIS and standby.

UNFICYP

251300B Jan 1966.

OPS

2/ MISSION:

The 5th Infantry Group will assist in the evacuation of Turks from Cyprus on the night of 27/28th. January 1966.

b. Tasks:

- (1) A Company - provide:-
 - (a) One standby Pl at Xeros Camp by 1900B D day.
 - (b) Baggage as detailed in(A) above, in Xeros by 2000B D day.
- (2) B Company - provides:-
 - (a) Two three ton vehicles to Limnitis Camp by 1900B D day.
 - (b) One fitter MT to LIMNITIS Camp by 1911B D day.
- (3) Cav Group - provide:-
 - (a) One three ton vehicle at Limnitis Camp by 1900B D Day.
 - (b) One officer to control Group transport during evacuation Operation.
 - (c) Provide one tp Armd Cars standby in Xeros Camp by 1900B D day.
- (4) HQ Company - provide:-
 - (a) One standby Pl at Xeros Camp by 2000B D day.
 - (b) Two three ton vehicles as standby at Xeros Camp by 2000B D day.
 - (c) One three ton vehicle to LIMNITIS Camp by 1900B D day.
 - (d) MO and Ambulance as standby at Xeros Camp from 2000B D day.
 - (e) Provide reserve area for six vehicle loads of TK/CYPs and supervision of same.
- (5) Group HQ - Provide -: One officer to co-ordinate Group activity during the operation.

4/ Coord Instrs:

- a. Ctl of mov - RCB and UNCI VPOL.
- b. Assembly area for evacuation - Soccer Pitch LIMNITIS (R480680).
- c. Tpt to arrive assembly area 2245 D day.
- d. Offr co-ordinating Gp activity during the OP-Comdt. T.O'Neill.
- e. Proposed time of departure from assembly for Xeros 2330B D day. This convoy will be known as serial 2.
- f. Lights will be full on during operation.
- g. Res- all vehicles should be equipped with tow chains.
- h. Officer i/c Gp Tpt at LIMNITIS - To be detailed by O/c Cav Gp.
- i. D day - 27 January 1966.

5/ ADMINISTRATION:-

- a. Rations - QM to ensure supper as required for standby troops.
- b. Amn - Normal personnel holding of amn for standby troops.
 - Gp amn in Xeros Camp will be available as res supply.

6/ Coms:

Coms for Op will be supplied by the unit I/C mov.

THE "RETURN" OF HILMI AHMED IBRAHIM

On the 3 March 1966, Tk Cyps in LIMNITIS asked permission to stop and inspect GK/CYP vehicles at OP FOXTROT. This being contrary to the terms of the Road Agreement, was refused. Subsequently CYPOL protested that two armed Tk/Cyps stopped three Gk/Cyp buses near AMADHIES and inspected the passengers before allowing them to proceed. While this was being investigated an outbreak of firing occurred in the area of XEROVOUNOS, in which both sides proved to be involved. A full investigation showed that all these incidents were related.

When questioned about the matter, the Tk/Cyp authorities admitted that a prisoner, HILMI AHMED IBRAHIM, had escaped. They had been looking for him but did not catch up with him until he had reached the NG position SOUTH OF XEROCOUNOS. They also admitted firing at HILMI.

The NG when questioned admitted firing because they thought the Tk/Cyps were firing at them. They also admitted receiving the escaping HILMI.

A UN Officer was allowed to interview HILMI on the morning of 4th March in GALINI and had the doubtful honour of breakfasting with HILMI. In handcuffs, a CYPOL Sergeant from XEROS and Major ELIADES, O/C 261 BN NG, HILMI'S only story is thought to be basically correct and some of the embellishments may have been prompted by the NG. This is what HILMI says: Sixteen days previously he had returned to LIMNITIS and for six days he was free but under surveillance. The leadership then got a directive to lock him up, which they did in a cave SOUTH OF LIMNITIS Village. He was in the cave until the evening of 2nd March, when he was brought towards the sea coast where there were some caves. The reason for the transfer was that a Gk/Cyp had defected from LOUTROS and the Tk/Cyps wished to vouch for the Gk/Cyp. However, having gone a distance his captor suggested that they would have to blindfold HILMI so as to hide his destination from him. Unfortunately at this point they had arrived at a spot where two other Tk Cyps were digging an ominous looking hole. Hilmi decided that he now had a fairly good idea of his destination so he made a break and disappeared into the falling dusk.

He remained at liberty till 032015 when at last he reached for the second time in his career, the sanctuary of the National Guard positions being speeded on his way by the bullets of his compatriots.

Over.....

Hilmi was still in handcuffs when interviewed, and while he was cut and bruised from his flight there were no marks on his wrists which would normally be present if handcuffed for a minimum of two whole days. The CYPOL Sergeant explained without being asked that the National Guard did not have handcuffs on issue ! He also said that he was bringing Hilmi to Xeros to try and get the handcuffs off. He subsequently departed without him.

Everyone including Hilmi agrees that he was a head-case to return to Limnitis having left with a selection of guns in the first instance.

With regard to his wife, Hilmi says she wishes to get out, and that she has only been said to have refused as translated by local interpreters, whom he has accused of interpreting incorrectly.

One item of major importance that has emerged from the saga of Hilmi, is the existence of hitherto unknown military leader in Limnitis. Hilmi describes him as a Major Assalan (Turkish for Lion) and he is alleged to be Turkish Army, aged fifty, bald with spectacles. His house in Limnitis was also described, and Hilmi stated that he does not appear in public other than to wash himself in the open at about 0600 hrs each morning.

This information will be checked out as soon as possible.

A FURTHER EPISODE IN THE HILMI CASE

At 050910 there was an outbreak of automatic and rifle fire between the Tk Cyp positions near XEROVOUNOS Village and the National Guard positions SOUTH of OP INDIA. This lasted for twenty minutes continuously. After a lapse of two minutes the firing recommenced and continued without a break till 051000B. By this time all the National Guard and Tk Cyp positions had been reinforced and all National Guard positions SOUTH and WEST of OP INDIA were engaging the Tk Cyp positions in the area of XEROVOUNOS and OP INDIA.

The OP itself came under fire and was hit by bursts of fire but the NCO i/c feels it was not aimed fire and it is quite conceivable that the hitting of the OP was unintentional.

By ten hundred hours (1000 hrs) the leadership on both sides had been contacted. The Tk Cyps admitted starting firing. The reason given was that the wife of Hilmi Ahmed with her eighteen months old child had attempted to cross the green line to the National Guard positions. The National Guard had attempted to send a patrol to bring her in and the Tk Cyps opened fire to prevent them. When the firing started the woman went to ground at R464655, on the National Guard side of the green line. The Tk Cyps wanted her back, and said they would fire if she moved towards the National Guard lines.

The National Guard did not know who the woman was but were equally determined that if she wished to come to the Greek side she should do so.

Over.....

The UN got a promise of cease fire from both sides at 1000 hrs and this lasted one hour. Heavy firing broke out at 1105 initiated by the Tk Cyp positions at XEROVOUNOS and lasted without stopping till 1210 hrs when UN got an agreement to another cease fire. During this period all National Guard positions on the bridge head engaged all Tk Cyp positions. It is estimated that several thousand rounds were expended by both sides.

It transpired later that the cease fire at 1000 hours was agreed to by the Tk Cyps so that they could get up more ammunition.

The UN decision was that a UN patrol should go out and find the woman, who would be questioned by a UN interpreter. She would then be escorted to the side of her own choice.

At 1300 hours a patrol was sent into the green line and the woman was found. When questioned by the interpreter she opted for the National Guard side and the UN patrol escorted her to the National Guard Positions.

The task was accomplished at 1525 hours there were some rather tense moments when it appeared that the Tk Cyps would not accept the result of the interpreters interview, but on what seems to have been a direction from higher authority, they accepted the situation.

The UN found it necessary to be very firm with both sides but both expressed their thanks and apologies for the trouble caused when the affair was over. Let us hope the incident is over.

M. J. Duggan CAPT.
(M. J. Duggan)

OPS 'A' LEFKA DISTRICT.

MESSAGES OF CONGRATULATIONS TO 5 INFANTRY GROUP ON THE HILMI CASE

===== 5th MARCH 1966 =====

1. From HQ UNFICYP From A/Force Commander. Please convey my thanks and congratulations to those who handled the recent incident in LIMNITIS with such skill and courage. I look forward to the opportunity of thanking them personally later this week.
2. FROM HQ UNFICYP. Duty Officer UNFICYP conveyed thanks to CYPRUS Government and of the Force Commander on the success of operation to-day.

SIGNAL PLATOON
=====

FORMATION OF THE UNIT:

1. The Signal Platoon assembled with HQ Coy at the Curragh on 27 Sept '65.
2. The main activities of the Platoon prior to departure were as follows:
 - (1) Final selection of personnel
 - (2) Adm details.
 - (3) Star testing.
 - (4) Refresher Courses on comms eqpt.
3. The main difficulty at this stage was the composition of the Platoon. Some of the Wrls Operators allotted to the platoon had only just completed their training and did not qualify for grading in their final tests. However since no replacements were available **they** remained with the Platoon.
4. Experience has shown that no one should be considered for service with an overseas unit unless he is fully trained and qualified and he has had adequate practical experience in his trade.

ADVANCE PARTY:

1. The advance Party of the Sigs Pl consisting of the Sigs Officer and 4 NCOs. arrived in NICOSIA on 5 Oct '65 and immediately moved to KATO PYRGOS.
2. All sigs eqpt had been packed ready for shipment to Ireland and stored in NICOSIA so that no immediate take over or checking of eqpt could be carried out.
3. The period prior to the setting up of the Gp HQ was spent assessing the comms problems of the area, arranging for issues of stores from UN HQ and checking Wrls Stns, sites and line routes.
4. Work commenced on the construction of the HQ Camp at XEROS on 13 Oct. On 15 Oct. all sigs stores consisting of 70 large crates were moved from NICOSIA to XEROS.
5. The advance party then began unpacking, checking and testing all comms eqpt. The main body arrived on 20 Oct. '65 and the issue of eqpt to Coys and the setting up of the Group comms system began.

Over.....

COMMS TASKS:

1. Since the Gp were taking over a new District the following were the principal tasks undertaken by the Sigs Pl.:
 - (a) Unpacking and testing of all Sigs Eqpt.
 - (b) Est. rear wrls and line comms from HQ at XEROS to UN HQ NICOSIA.
 - (c) Est Sigs centre at Gp HQ.
 - (d) Est Wrls and Line Comms to Coy locs.
 - (e) Est " " " " within Coy areas.
 - (f) Est tech Wkps and Bry charging facilities at Gp HQ.
 - (g) Est internal line comms at HQ and Coy locs.
2. The Platoon was assisted during the initial stages of the operation by signallers from the British 644 Signals Troop who provided Wrls technicians and also by a Canadian line crew who assisted in laying line to Coy locs.

WRLS:

1. All wrls nets were established and opened when the Unit became operational at 12.00 hrs. on 30 Oct. '65.
2. All wrls eqpt in use was National except the C 42 and C 43 rear link sets.
3. An 80 ft. Mast was constructed at HQ to support our rear link VIIF aerials which gave excellent 24 hr comms with UN HQ NICOSIA.
4. End fed long line aerials were used with the C 11 at Gp HQ and with C 12 at Coy locs which made voice comms possible most of the time.
5. Within the Coy areas the A 41 with remote aerial provided excellent comms with all Ops.
6. The Australian Police operated their VHF Control Station from our Sig Centre.
7. Both the rear link VHF Set C 43 and the control set (C.11) for the Gp net at Gp HQ were rerouted to the Ops Room.

LINE:

1. Line comms was our greatest problem for the following reasons:
 - (a) We had only one Linesman.
 - (b) There was very little existing line comms in our area and what line we did take over was in very poor condition and had to be relaid.
 - (c) The difficulty of getting spares for field telephones.
2. Our aim was to provide line comms to all Coys and Ops and we were successful in doing this.

Over.....

From Gp HQ to Cav Gp and 'B' Coy we were able to use existing poles but from 'B' Coy to KOKKINA a complete new route was constructed using Hop poles. Most of the OP lines were laid on the ground and the main problem here was goats eating the cable. On the Coy routes on two occasions the Turks and Greeks cut down our poles to use as firewood.

4. In January we repaired and put into operation between XEROS and LIMNITIS a dosised CYTA open wire line. This was a big improvement on the D. 10 line and gave us two line exts to Cav Gp.

WORKSHOPS:

1. The use of a tent as a workshop was not ideal but the two radio mechs were able to cope with all maintenance problems.
2. The main source of trouble was eqpt used in OPs, A 41 sets and J Telephones.
3. Battery charging was done in a separate galvanised shed. When we arrived there was only one serviceable PE charging plant and since all batteries had been drained battery charging was held up until a mains supply was installed in the Camp. Considerable difficulty was experienced maintaining charging plant due to the fact that no manuals or spares were available.
4. Coys held a three day supply of batteries but all charging was done at HQ. This was satisfactory but it is considered that Coys should be equipped with light duty mains and PE charging facilities.

STORES:

1. Signal stores was also located in a tent fitted with a wooden floor which was satisfactory for storage.
2. We had sufficient eqpt to carry out our tasks, however the condition of some eqpt such as charging plant, projectors, field telephones was very poor.
3. Initially the supply of spares and essential materials from UN sources was very poor but improved in the latter three months. Here again we were handicapped by the lack of manuals and spare parts lists.

ESTABLISHMENT:

1. Wrls.: The number of wrls operators was not sufficient due to the fact that the Cav Gp were operating as a separate unit and they had no allotment of operators like the other coys. A Cpl. and one Sgmn were supplied by HQ Coy and these were supplemented by two Cav operators. This however was not entirely satisfactory since the Cav operator did not have morse. HQ Coy were also obliged to supply a Cpl and Sgmn to 'B' Coy which was split between two locations.

Over.....

ESTABLISHMENT:

1. Line: One linesman Sgt. was completely inadequate to fulfil our line commitments. Even when the line Network had been complete the amount of maintenance was considerable. Of necessity wrls operators were required to do this work but they did not have the training or the necessary skills required especially when dealing with switchboards, overhead lines and civilian systems. It is considered that a standard line section of 1 Sgt. 1 Cpl. and 2 Linesmen should be included in the Sigs Pl.

PROJECTORS AND FILMS:

1. Three 16 mm projectors were taken over from the 42 Bn and one was received from Ireland. These projectors need considerable maintenance and the supply of spares was a big problem.
2. Due to the fact that the Gp was located in a remote part of the Island films were the main source of entertainment and were very popular. For the first three months three films per week were shown at each of the five locations - XEROS, LEFKA, LIMNITIS, KATO PYRGOS, KOKKINA. For the last three months this was increased to four films per week.

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PAY AND ALLIED SUBJECTSGENERAL:

Cash transactions for the Unit were carried out through Barclays Bank, NICOSIA.

This was carried out by requisition from Unit Cashier to Colaiste Caoimhin who lodged to the credit of Unit Cashier in Barclays Bank each week.

DISBURSEMENT:

- a. Unit Cashier drew required amount, per diem and Credits, in bulk from Bank every Friday morning at 08.30 hours and distributed same to paying Officers of each Company at Unit Headquarters XEROS at 12.00 hours. Completed pay rolls returned to Unit Cashier were checked and posted to IRELAND each Wednesday morning.
- b. Unit pilgrimages to Holy Land: Requisitions for Credits for this purpose required lists of people requiring Credits to be with Unit Cashier at least 2 weeks before flight day. These Credits were cleared or otherwise by Soldiers' Pay Section, Colaiste Caoimhin, beforehand and money lodged to Unit Account. Colaiste Caoimhin notify Cashier whether cleared or not. Credit money paid out morning of the flight. If persons don't avail of money, reload in Bank for return to home Credit Account.
- c. Special Christmas allotment for all Officers, NCOs and Privates (7/6) included in Per Diem Pay Roll at Christmas.

OFFICIAL POSTAGE:

For Official Correspondence a sum of approx £30 is drawn monthly from Barclays Bank and held by Unit Cashier. Amounts paid out are claimed monthly from UN Finance Officer UNFICYP Hqrs. and lodged to Unit Account in Bank.

GENERAL:

Due to long distances especially in bad weather and perilous roads Pay Returns to IRELAND were sometimes a day overdue. It usually took Paying Officers Friday to Monday to complete pay.

A word of appreciation is due to Company Commanders for their co-operation in so arranging outpost Duties so that Holy Land Pilgrimages were free to travel on days booked, except in exceptional circumstances.

Numbers who travelled to Holy Land = 196
Credits drawn for Pilgrimages = £10,440

'A' BRANCH

The 'A' Branch got off to a slow start on arrival in Cyprus due mainly to:

- a. No handover between incoming and outgoing Adjutant.
- b. Change of location of new Unit to an area other than that occupied by old Unit.
- c. Lack of accommodation and furniture for Adjutant's Office and Orderly Room, due to entire HQ Coy and Gp HQ Camp having to be built from ground up.

The main tasks of the Adj. -

- a. Producing Routine Orders, these to include necessary UN Instructions, already in force and binding on our Unit. These were contained in UN S.O.Ps. and Force R.Os, dating back to the commencement of UNFICYP operations.
- b. Setting up a Postal Service.
- c. Compiling and issuing Standing Orders.
- d. Compiling and Issuing Orderly Officer, Guard Commander, etc. Orders; dress instructions; Tours Instructions, Instructions re Duty Free Items. Copies of these instructions are available.

The following notes are inserted to assist an incoming Adjutant:

- a. Postal Service: All outgoing post will be carried by daily aircraft from NICOSIA, if cleared by 08.30 hours in NICOSIA G.P.O. A daily mail run leaves this Camp each day at 07.00 hours, and the post NCO clears the mail in NICOSIA G.P.O. then collects the incoming mail bags, returns to UQ UNFICYP, where the mail is segregated and HQ mail handed over. The Gp mail is placed in Coy bags at Orderly Room and collected by Coy representatives at 10.30 hours daily. Outgoing mail from Coys is delivered to Orderly Room each evening for dispatch the following morning. Official mail is paid for and stamped by Post NCO who keeps a book of same, being reimbursed by Gp Cashier, who claims monthly against his Bank A/C.
- b. Entertainment A/c C.O.: A monthly allowance for Entertainment, not exceeding £35 is claimed for from Chief Finance Officer, UNFICYP, through IRCON L.O. This claim should be supported by detailed account of the occasions upon which people were entertained, the numbers involved, type of function, and cost of each, showing a grand total and signed by the Mess Secretary.
- c. Other Claims:
 - (i) Officers may also claim refund of monies spent on meals partaken at HQ MESS UNFICYP, while on duty there. These claims are submitted at the end of each month to the Adjutant who forwards them in concise form to L.O. IRCON for transmission to Chief Finance Officer. These claims must be accompanied by a signed Certificate from the Unit O.C. to

the effect that the meals being claimed for were partaken of in the course of official duty.

- (ii) All ranks are allowed 150 mils per week for private postage. This amount is also claimed monthly and should show roll of persons in Unit for month, number of weeks being claimed for (including fractions e.g. -- a normal month would be 4 3/7 weeks). The total amount claimed monthly will not be divisible among the Unit, as Cyprus currency caters for lowest coinage of 5 mils. Hence, each month, all will lose a small amount, in the share out. In this unit the remaining balance is lodged to the Films A/c. Efforts to have Finance pay out on a system of weeks rather than by Calendar months were not successful.

d. Leave:

All ranks entitled to 7 days in 3 months period, not to be availed of before six weeks on Island. All leave must be notified to Personnel HQ UNFICYP.

e. Hospitalization:

It is very important that Coys report admission to and discharges from Hospital to the Adjutant as soon as possible, as this information must be transmitted per Telex to Ireland. Data required - No. Rk. Name, Nature of illness, whether serious, condition of patient, name of hospital and date of admission.

Minor injuries are also a very important aspect of the Adjutant's work, as they become very numerous with the advent of organized field sports. They are handled as at home.

f. Inspections:

It was found quite satisfactory to conduct COs. Inspections once per month in each Company. During these inspections, Coy Officers were checked and documents checked, paying particular attention to records of minor injury, rolls of ID Cards and Discs and Bath Books.

g. Repatriation:

Individual repatriations will occur from time to time, and are handled as per Adm Instruction issued from AGs. Branch. In addition a letter requesting repatriation must be sent from Contingent Comd to Chief Adm Officer.

h. Medals:

These may be requisitioned, by first applying for authority to Chief Personnel Officer, who will give the necessary sanction. On receipt of this, the medals are requisitioned from Ordnance, HQ UNFICYP. In order to ascertain those of the Unit entitled to such an issue, a list showing all personnel of the Unit should be dispatched to OIF Personnel Section, GHQ, for clearance, at an early date.

Over.....

Stationery:

Stationery is requisitioned from 2 sources -

(1) Ord Depot HQ UNFICYP, e.g. UN Headed Notepaper & Envelopes.

(2) Ord Depot (Stationery & Publications) Four Mile Point,
Famagusta

Duplicating paper - various sizes.

Thin Typing - assorted sizes.

Carbon Paper.

SO Books

File Covers

Sellotape

Envelopes assorted (not suitable for use by our contingent).

(3) There are also facilities available at REME Workshops, HQ UNFICYP for the repair of office equipment such as typewriters and duplicators,

Morale:

The morale of the troops was very good. The main factors which effected morale were mainly -

(1) Bad Postal facilities. The post to and from Ireland was generally speaking very erratic and seemed to conform to no fixed system. Efforts to correct this met with failure. Many days mail from home often arrived on the one day here, following sometimes up to five days absence of mail.

(2) Domestic worries. It was observed that many men were selected for service, despite the fact that in some cases there was previous evidence of domestic worries, such as pregnancies, nervousness of wives, etc. The Telex system at HQ UNFICYP was used to check on conditions of NOK in several cases.

General:

One of the main contributory factors to the difficulties of the Adjts task was the absence of any sort of lockable press for files, confidential documents, etc., these having to be kept in six soldiers boxes. Since the office of the Adjts and Orderly Room were unsecured, incapable of being secured, the contents were always at the mercy of anyone who chose to acquire stationery etc.

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MILITARY POLICE SECTION - 5th INFANTRY GP.

1/ STRENGTH:

The MP Section consisted of 1 Officer, 1 Company Sergeant, 3 Sergeants and 7 Corporals. The numbers of the Section were all drawn from the Military Police Corps and represented the all the Garrison MPC Companies of the various Commands as well as the Depot MPC.

2/ CONCENTRATION OF MP SECTION ON FORMATION OF 5 INF GP:

The MP Section concentrated in PLUNKETT BARRACKS, CURRAGH TRAINING CAMP, on the 28th September, 1965. With the assistance of the COMMANDANT, MILITARY POLICE SCHOOL, CTC a short refresher course for MP personnel due for Overseas Service was conducted at the MP School. This Course lasted for a duration of two weeks and covered the following subjects:-

Report Writing.

Traffic Accident Procedure.

Map Reading.

Weapon Training (9 mm Pistol and Gustav SMG).

Close Order Foot Drill

During this period of training Annual Range Practices were conducted by the Section in both Pistol and SMG.

The normal administrative tasks and documentation for personnel proceeding on Overseas Service were also conducted during this period.

PARTICIPATION IN ADVANCE PARTY 5 INF GP:

MP element of the Advance Party consisted of Lt.P.J.rien and Sgt.Barron, J. This party departed from MIN AIRPORT on the 4th October, 1965 and arrived in the ALIC OF CYPRUS on the morning of the 5th October, 1965.

ON arrival they immediately departed for the Camp of the Rear Party 42 INF BN located at KATO PYRGOS in LEFKA DISTRICT on the North/North West coast of the island. On the following day, 6 Oct. '65, the MP element of the Advance Party reported to HQ, UNFICYP at NICOSIA to liaise with MOVEMENT CONTROL personnel during the airlift of the Main Body 5 Inf Gp. and to assist in the establishment of a Transit Camp at NICOSIA. Whilst awaiting the arrival of the Main Body, briefing conferences were held between LIEUT.-COL. DOWSETT (CANADIAN ARMY PROVOST CORPS AND PROVOST MARSHAL UNFICYP) and LIEUT. O'BRIEN MP Officer. As a result of these conferences it was decided that the MP Section of 5 Inf Gp would be regarded as UNFICYP MILITARY POLICE with LEFKA DISTRICT as their sector. As such LT. O'BRIEN was designated PROVOST MARSHAL LEFKA DISTRICT.

ARRIVAL MAIN BODY 5 INF GROUP:

The airlift of the Main Body 5 Inf Gp was completed between 19 Oct 65 and 24 Oct 65. On the 23rd. of October the remainder of the MP Section under Coy/Sgt. CRONIN, B.A. arrived in the REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS. Due to prior arrangement with the FORCE PROVOST MARSHAL and O/C, UNFICYP MP Company the MP Sec 5 Inf Gp remained in NICOSIA from the date of their arrival until 1st November 1965. During this period they were attached to UNFICYP MP Coy for duties. Duties included Traffic Accident Investigation, Speed Checks, and the normal MP Disciplinary Patrols. This period served well as a period of orientation on MP Duties peculiar to the CYPRUS situation.

MILITARY POLICE OPERATIONS - LEFKA DISTRICT:

a. Duties and Responsibilities UNFICYP Military Police:

See attached Military Police Instruction No.1
Annex "A").

Following their period of duty with UNFICYP MP Coy. the MP Sec reported to XEROS CAMP on the 1st November 65 to take up duties in LEFKA DISTRICT. Throughout their period of service in the Republic of Cyprus the MP Section was located at Gp HQ, 5 Inf Gp. The immediate task taken in hand was that of security of Gp HQ. and the route signing of routes To and From Gp HQ. As XEROS CAMP was a newly established camp, MPs were required to establish a traffic circuit and signpost locations. At the outset it was also required of MPs to establish their own accommodation and duty quarters using MUG Tents and to provide cement floorings in them. Until such time as these normal billeting problems were overcome the MP Section could only provide a half-section for Police duties.

b. Allocation of Duties within MP Section:

(1) Security - Gp HQ:

1 Sergeant and 4 Cpls. of the Section performed these duties.

A Military Policeman was on duty at entrance to Gp HQ from 07.00 hrs. to 23.59 hrs daily. This detachment also provided the MP Ord/Sgt. and on NCO for MP Duty Room duties.

(2) Mobile Traffic Patrol:

A Mobile Traffic Patrol was on duty daily from 08.00 hrs. to 17.00 hrs. These patrols consisted of a team of 1 Sgt. and 1 Cpl.

Their duties covered spot checks on vehicles

to ensure that they were on authorised journeys as well as the normal function of cultivating safe and courteous driving on the part of UN Service drivers. The daily presence of such a patrol helped in no small way to limit the number of accidents in the LEFKA DISTRICT.

Speed checks were also carried out by these patrols, as well as the investigation of any accidents. In order to carry out speed checks it was necessary to strengthen the patrol by the addition of two extra Cpls.

(3) Town Patrols:

A Mobile Town Patrol was on duty from 19.00 hrs to 23.59 hrs. or as required during special leave periods or the granting of late passes. The Patrol consisted of 1 Sgt. and 1 Cpl. ON week-ends and on special holidays it was strengthened by the addition of one further Cpl.

Their duties covered visits to all places of amusement, etc. used by troops as well as visits to the various Company locations at LEFKA, LIMNITIS, and KATO PYRGOS.

Special Disciplinary Patrols were also carried out to FAMUGUSTA, LARNACA, and other locations visited by tours from 5 Inf Gp. On such patrols liaison was made with the SWEDISH MILITARY POLICE and Joint Patrols were established. The particular function of such patrols was the enforcement of "Out of Bounds" regulations with particular emphasis on brothel areas. In this regard close liaison was also maintained with the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot Police. On certain occasions joint searches and patrols were conducted with the Civil Police.

(1) Detention Duties:

On 3 Nov 65 a Detention Centre was established at XEROS CAMP and was staffed by MPs. During the period of operations of the 5 Inf Gp in CYPRUS, the provision of MP staff for this duty, in addition to their already numerous other tasks, proved to be a strain on MP resources ---in fact, during any period when a detainee was undergoing sentence it was not possible to allow any "days off" to MP personnel and in some cases double shifts were required of MPs. Here again, the established devotion to duty of Military Police overcame this obstacle.

(5) Escort Duties:

Joint Escorts with UNCIVPOL (Australian Contg) were carried out fortnightly. These escorts were to provide security for the CYPRUS mining Corporation payroll to the various mining locations at SKOURIOTISSA and MAVROUNI through Gk Cyp and Tk Cyp locations. This escort duty was normally carried out by the Traffic Patrol of the particular day.

(6) Investigation of Traffic Accidents:

All traffic accidents involving UN personnel or vehicles in the LEFKA District were investigated by MP Section 5 Inf Gp. In this regard close liaison was maintained with both Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot Police and the cross serving of statements and reports was common practice. However, in most cases, the entire investigation was conducted solely by MPs. The documentation and normal investigation work involved in such accidents occupied a large proportion of MP man

hours. A very high standard of investigation was maintained and all accidents were normally cleared within a fortnight. The fullest co-operation was received from the Civil Police in obtaining statements from civilians, and on occasions MP personnel were required to give evidence at Civilian Courts.

MP DUTIES - GENERAL:

Due to the size of the section it was necessary to have all Patrols interchangeable. It was common practice for a Patrol mounted at 08.00 hrs to have to cope with normal traffic duties, traffic accident investigation, pay escorts, and Town Patrol duty - all within its 14 hour tour of duty.

MILITARY POLICE SECTION 5 INFANTRY GP.INSTRUCTION NO.1UNFICYP MILITARY POLICE - DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES.

1/ The aim of this instruction is to detail the duties and responsibilities of the UNFICYP MILITARY POLICE.

2/ Duties of the UNFICYP MILITARY POLICE includes:-

a. TRAFFIC CONTROL:

(1) Executive duties in the control of UN vehicles including the control of convoys on public roads and streets.

(2) Maintenance of statistics and records concerning UN vehicles.

b. DISCIPLINE:

Assistance to Commanders in the maintenance of discipline by -

(1) Static, mobile and foot patrols in all places frequented by troops exclusive of unit lines.

(2) Apprehension, temporary detention and return to unit of military offenders.

(3) Investigation of alleged offences by UN servicemen.

(4) Control of docks and airfields during large scale movement of troops.

(5) Advice on areas to be placed "Out of Bounds".

c. PHYSICAL SECURITY :

(1) The physical security of such military installations detailed from time to time by the FORCE COMMANDER and ZONE/DISTRICT COMMANDERS.

(2) The provision of VIP escorts as required.

d. LIAISON:

Co-ordination with Cypriot, Police, UNFICYP Civil Police, RAF Police and RMP.

Badminton Ball Championship:

Senior Winners

Kato Pyrgos

Runners up

Lefka

Junior Winners

Kato Pyrgos

b. Soccer: Inter Post League and Championship (knock-out)

were held. Teams were evenly matched and games were very keenly contested, resulting in many draws. In all (12) inter-Post games were played. A cup donated by Keo Breweries was awarded to the champions.

Results:

(1) Soccer League:

Winners

Kato Pyrgos

Runners up

Limnitis

(2) Soccer Championship:

Winners

Runners-up

c. Gaelic Football: As only one suitable pitch was available within a reasonable distance of our Post - at Morphou which was 10 miles from the nearest Post, the number of games had to be curtailed. However, an inter-Post knock-out competition was held. The competition was more popular than any other. All games were played at Morphou.

Winners:

Lefka

Runners- up

Kato Pyrgos

d. Hurling: As the number of hurleys was limited - only sufficient to equip two teams, no inter Post competitions could be held. An exhibition match was played at MORPHOU prior to the Gaelic Football final between a team from Kato Pyrgos and Limnitis and a team from Xeros and Lefka. A large number of civilians present were very interested in the games.

Group Trophy:

A cup for the best all round sub-unit at games was won very convincingly by 'B' Company. The cup was donated by Mr. Torossian, a trader of LARNACA who presented the cup to the Coy Comd. Comdt. Heffernan, at a function held to mark the occasion at KATO PYRGOS on Sat. 12 Mar. '66.

Games versus Civilians and Service Teams:

Many games were played against civilian teams, both Greek and Turkish Cypriots, and service teams.

a. Coy Teams:

Teams from the four Coys engaged the local village teams in Soccer, Volley Ball and Basket Ball. These games did much to maintain good morals and helped to further good relations with both communities.

b. Group Teams:

(1) Soccer:

One soccer team had games with MORPHOU, LEFKA, TURKISH CYPRIOTS, FAMAGUSTA, XEROS and Greek NATIONAL GUARD. Our team though not very strong, always acquitted themselves very well - winning half their matches. Captain Savino i/c.

A team drawn from our Signal personnel took part in an Inter Signal Corps league organised by HQ UNFICYP. In all twelve teams from all contingents took part. To date our team has played five matches - winning four and losing only to the Swedes.

(2) Basket Ball and Volley Ball:

In these two games our Group teams were of a high standard. They played all the stronger teams in the District and were beaten only once - the Basket Ball team by Morphou, although it won the return game.

Our Basket Ball team also took part in an UNFICYP League (unbeaten to-date).

Liaison and co-operation with the UN and local health authorities in the control of VD.

POWERS OF ARREST:

Powers of arrest by Military Police and Civil Police are detailed in the following documents:-

- a. Status of Force Agreement dated 31 Mar '64, paragraphs 14 to 17 inclusive (See Annx "A" att). UNFICYP Routine Order No.4 dated 9 May '64 (See Annx "A" att).

Members of MP sec 5 Inf Gp are to make themselves conversant with their powers and restrictions.

4/ SPECIAL INVESTIGATION:

Any crime or unusual incident should be investigated as soon as possible. While this initial investigation may be started by any Military Policemen, the following cases, real or suspected, will be turned over to the Special Investigation Unit as soon as possible.

- a. Murder/Manslaughter.
- b. Sexual Offences.
- c. Unnatural Deaths.
- d. Offences involving the use of firearms or other lethal weapons.
- e. Arson or malicious damage to UNFICYP property or property on UNFICYP premises.
- f. Losses or thefts of public property including arms and ammunition.
- g. Currency offences.
- h. Black Market activities.
- i. Any other serious crime or incident requiring the service of an experienced investigator.

RESTRICTIONS AND PROHIBITIONS:

Military Police will not normally undertake any work in connection with:-

- a. Non-criminal sexual relationships.
- b. Private debts.

APPENDIX L.

RECREATIONAL TRAINING:

Games:

1/ Despite many difficulties, chiefly the high incidence of duties, preparation of Camps for Winter and lack of playing pitches, a very comprehensive series of games were played.

Inter Post Games:

2/ Competitions in the following games were held on an inter-post basis, i.e. Kato Pyrgos ('B' Coy), Limnitis (Armd Car Gp + Hy Mor + Rifle Pln 'A' Coy), Lefka ('A' Coy - Rifle Pln) and Xeros (HQ Coy):-

- a. Volley Ball
- b. Basketball
- c. Soccer
- d. Gaelic Football

Competitions:

Volley Ball and Basketball: With a view to catering for as many as possible two teams (Senior and Junior) from each post competed. A League and championship (knock-out) in each code held. Medals were awarded to winning senior and junior teams.

Results:

Volley Ball League:

Senior Winners	Kato Pyrgos
Senior Runners Up	Limnitis
Junior winners	Xeros

Volley Ball Championships:

Senior Winners	Kato Pyrgos
Runners Up	Xeros
Junior winners	Xeros

Basket Ball League:

Senior Winners	Kato Pyrgos
Runners up	Xeros
Junior Winners	Kato Pyrgos

(3) Rugby:

Our Rugby team, in the capable hands of Captain Savino, were very successful in games against teams from the British Bases and RAF NICOSIA. The team mainly composed of officers had five other ranks.

-5/ Other Recreational Activities:

a. Recreation Halls - NCOs and Privates:

Each Camp had well appointed recreational rooms for NCOs and Ptes. Equipment included Radio, T.V.Bar, Darts and Rings. Two inter Post Dart Leagues were run - one for NCOs and one for Ptes. Both proved highly interesting.

b. Tours:

Tours to places of interest in the island were organised by each Post. In addition to MT, civilian buses were often hired at a reasonable cost. These tours were very popular.

c. Camp Fires and Concerts:

These were held occasionally in each Post, particularly at Christmas, St. Patrick's Day and Easter.

d. Farewell Dinners:

All officers and men attended a farewell dinner. They were held on a Coy basis at XEROS (for HQ Coy) and on a pl basis in the other posts.

TRAINING:

Pre Cyprus Training:

The Group was concentrated in CTC on 30 Sep 65. It was airlifted to Cyprus during period 19 Oct - 24 Oct 65.

Despite many interruptions - medical processing, issue of clothing, photographing and other adm details - some worthwhile training was carried out. It was based on the likely tasks which the Unit would have to perform in Cyprus. Main subjects were:-

a. Range Practices:

Due to the temporary cancellation of the decision to send the Group to CYPRUS the training of personnel in their own Commands had been adversely affected. In most cases, personnel had not fired their particular weapons as they had been issued to them only a few days before concentration. Accordingly all weapons had to be zeroed and all personnel fired some range practices in order to become familiar with their weapons. About 30% of the men had not fired the range practices for the weapons with which they were armed for CYPRUS and these were exercised in the complete range practices.

b. Observation Training and Reporting:

Exercises were carried out on terrain similar to that of the operational area of the Group in CYPRUS. Training included observing and reporting pers and vehs crossing a simulated ceasefire line. Training in the use of the 41 set was given to all officers and men.

c. Patrols:

Exercises included small recce patrols on foot and section and Pl mobile patrols supported by a section of Armd Cars. A cloth model exercise on Inf/Cav co-operation was carried out by the Cavalry School. The exercise dealt mainly with the operations of mobile patrol consisting of an Inf Pl and a Sec of Armd Cars.

d. Briefing:

Comdt. S. Barrett, Mil. Col, who had been Operations Officer, 41 Bn UNFICYP, briefed the officers of the Group on operations in Cyprus generally, and, in particular, on the operational tasks in our area of operations in Cyprus. He gave a further briefing to all NCOs on Gp and escort duties.

e. Road Blocks:

Exercises included setting up, manning and security, the searching of pers and vehicles and reporting.

f. Riot Drill and Anti Gas Training:

All plans were exercised in Riot Drill, Smoke and tear gas grenades were used. All respirators were tested for serviceability.

g. Drill:

A period of COFD and arms drill was carried out each morning - initially at section and platoon level and later at Coy and Group level in preparation for An Tabiseach's parade.

h. Hygiene and Sanitation:

Lectures were given by the M.O. to all Coys.

j. Specialist Training:

- (1) Sig pers underwent a short course in the School of Signals.
- (2) Arm'd Car Gp and Hy Mor Pl carried out Training applicable.
- (3) MP pers underwent a short course in MP School.
- (4) Med Pl training was supervised by the M.O.
- (5) MP Pl underwent training in vehicle maintenance and all pers were exercised in driving over mountain roads, similar to the roads in our area of operations in Cyprus.

2/ TRAINING IN CYPRUS:

Due to heavy incidence of duty, little time was devoted to training.

a. Arms Drill:

The new drill was introduced on 1 Feb. 66. In January a course of 20 hours duration for selected NCOs. of all sub-units - a total of 40 - was held at Gp HQ. These in turn instructed the other NCOs and Ptes of the Group. By the 1 Feb a good standard of arms drill was achieved throughout the Group.

b. Helicopter Training:

A UN helicopter was made available for one day to each sub-unit for training. This training proved most interesting.

c. General:

All Officers and men got very good practical training in the course of their various tasks and duties - the Coys and Armd Car Gp in the operation and adm of Camps and Ops, and the conduct of escorts and patrols. The various elements of HQ Coy gained a great deal of experience.

The Engr. and Ord Sections were very busy during the whole period, establishing the Camp at KEROS, improving the other Camps and OPs and maintaining equipment and weapons.

The Sig Pl were employed full time on the communications network. Tpt personnel got invaluable experience in driving various types of vehicles on very difficult roads.

3/ GUARDS OF HONOUR:

Two Guards of Honour were produced, each of 2 Officers and 50 other ranks. The first was for Gen Thimayya,

Force Commander on the occasion of his first visit to the Unit and the second was for Brigadier General Wilson, Acting Force Commander, when he came to present the Cyprus Medal to the Group. Both Guards, drawn from HQ Coy, 'A' Coy and Armd Car Gp, were the subject of favourable comment. An escort of 2 Offrs and 50 other ranks was provided for the funeral of General Thimayya.

APPENDIX N.

RELATIONS WITH OTHER CONTINGENTS:

1/ The Unit took over two Camps from other Contingents. 'A' Coy. took over Lefka Camp from the Canadians and Armd Car Gp took over Limnitis from the British. In both cases the outgoing troops were most accommodating and helpful as a result a very good fund of friendship and co-operation existed between our Group and these two Contingents.

The Danish Contingent gave us the services of 6 Electricians to help install the lighting system in our Camp at XEROS.

The Swedish Bn invited a number of our Officers to an Arty Demonstration.

Our Officers and NCOs were invited to social functions by all the contingents. This hospitality was returned by our Group.

RELATIONS WITH NATIONAL GUARD AND TURKISH CYPRIOTS:

2/ a. National Guard:

Officers of the National Guard invited our Officers to social functions at Kato Pyrgos, Gallini and Xeros. Their Officers were invited to social functions at Xeros Camp and to the St. Patrick's Day function held at Nicosia.

b. Turkish Cypriots:

Officers of our Group were entertained by Turkish Cypriots at Lefka, Limnitis and Kokkina. The Turks were frequently invited to our functions.

ADVANCE PARTY:

1/ The Advance Party of the Group was as per the roll hereunder. Generally speaking its composition was satisfactory. In view of the fact that the Group had to establish a new Camp in Xeros and to prepare the other Camps for winter, a greater proportion of NCOs and Privates, particularly Engr and Ord personnel would have been an advantage.

Advance Party - 5 Inf Gp.GP HQ

OC

Ops Offr

IO

QM

Welfare Officer 5HQ COY

Engr Offr

Ord Offr

Tech Stores Offr

Cpl Storeman 4A PL

Asst Adjnt.

MP Offr

Sgt Ops

Sgt Int

Sgt Teleprinter 5Q PL

CQMS

CQMS Welfare

Sgt Engr

Sgt Ord

Sgt Storeman - Driver

Cpl Cook

Pte Cook 6TPT PL

Pl Comd

Sgt Fitter

Two Ptes Drivers 4MED PL

MO

Coy Sgt 2ARMD C GP

Gp Comd

Stores Offr

CQMS

Sgt Futter

Two Tprs Drivers 6A COY

Coy Comd

Sgt

Sgt ("Q" Duties)

Cpl Sig

Pte Driver

Pte Cook

4 Ptes 10

APPENDIX

HY MOR TP

Offr Sec Comd

Cpl Storeman 2

SIG PL

Pl Comd

Sgt Op Wrls & Line

Sgt Radio Mech

Two Cpls Op, Wrls & Line 5

B COY

Coy Comd

Sgt

Sgt ("Q" Duties)

Cpl Sig

Pte Driver

Pte Cook

4 Ptes 10

17 Offrs 26 NCOs 17 Ptes 1 Chaplain = TOTAL 61.

ENGINEERS

1. ESTABLISHMENT:

The Engineer establishment for 5 Inf Gp consisted of 1 Offr. 3 Sgts. 4 Cpls. 1 Ptes. All NCOs of the Section were graded as follows:

Sgt. Carpenter	-	2
Cpl. "	-	2
Pte. "	-	3
Pte Electrician	-	1
Sgt. "	-	1
Cpl. Mason	-	2

The Establishment for the amount of work that was to be done was by no means satisfactory. There was neither plumber or fitter with the section, which made it almost impossible to have water supply and plant in good order. A Basic Engr. Section of 16 men should be organised, for service with overseas Groups and should not be changed. If it so happens that work is not available for them, then those who would be considered surplus could be employed on non technical duties.

2. ADVANCED PARTY:

The Advanced Party of the Engineer Section consisted of 1 Offr. 1 Sgt. 3 Cpls and 1 Pte. Arrived in NICOSIA on 5/10/65 and on the same date moved to KATO PYRGOS. As the Camp at KATO PYRGOS was partly demolished work began immediately on the repair of water supply and electrical installations. Existing diesel fueled cookers had also to be stripped and repaired. This work having been completed an immediate start was made on the procurement of materials and plans for the "Winterisation Programme," and the erection of a new Camp at XEROS. Most of the plant and materials for the initial jobs was drawn prior to the arrival of the main body. The remainder of the Engineer Section arrived on 21/10/65 in the first plane of the main body.

3. SELF HELP:

Due to the shortage of engineer technicians and because of the sizeable "WINTERISATION PROGRAMME" planned, all Coys were requested to give as much help as possible to construct their Camps. A considerable amount of help was given for the mixing and hauling of concrete which ensured that there was rapid progress made in construction work in each Camp. Also it was very fortunate that there were a number of Technicians and Tradesmen with each Coy who devoted most of their time to Engineer work. Thus in many cases it was only necessary to supply the materials and the jobs were completed successfully without Engineer Technicians

being involved. If "Self Help" was not given, not even 20% of the work would have been completed.

WORK COMPLETED

4. HO. COY CAMP, XEBOS:

- a. Water mains laid to cookhouse, wash-houses, and transport wash. Supply taken from C.M.C. water main at perimeter of Camp.
- b. 100 K.V.A. Transformer installed. Three phase line laid through centre of Camp. Distribution lines and connections made to all buildings and tents. Electrical supply was taken from 1100 K.V.A. line which was situated at the Southern end of the Camp. This line was the property of C.M.C. No charge was made by them for Electrical or Water consumption.
- c. Camp site cleared and levelled and excavations made for D.T.Ls. by Dozer and 10 R.B. shovel.
- d. Camp Structures Erected:

See Annex 'A'.

e. Tents, Floors:

Concrete:

28 No Mug Tents	-	896 sq. yards.
7 No Two Pole Tents	-	294 sq. yards
2 No. 4 Pole Tents	-	168 sq. yards
2 No. 180-lb Tents	-	<u>22 sq. yards.</u>
TOTAL:		<u>= 1,380 sq. yards.</u>

Timber:

10 No. Mug Tents	(Timber from these floors was taken from surplus stocks at Danish Camp)
1 No. Two Pole Tents	-

- f. Hardstandings and Paths: Approx. 100 tons of gravel was drawn and spread to improve these.

5. KATO PYRGOS:

- a. Camp completely rewired. A 3 phase wire was laid along Camp axis, and connections were made to all tents and Camp structures. Electrical supply was from a 27.5 K.V.A. Generator which was most satisfactory.
- b. Water mains were relaid and extended. The Camp is now fed by gravity flow from main tanks which can be filled direct from the water truck. This system eliminates all pumping by hand.

Over....

5. c. A new D.T.L. was excavated and the structure of the existing one placed over it. A cement floor was also installed.
- d. Camp Structures Erected:
See Annex 'A'.
- e. Flooring for new tents was available from Timber flooring of previous Camps.

f. KOKKINA:

One Nissen Hut (66' x 24') erected. Details as in Annex 'A'.
One 6' x 3' toilet structure erected. Repairs and extension carried out to electrical wiring. Electrical supply was obtained from 7.5 K.V.A. Hampson Generator. This Generator worked reasonably well after a large fuel tank had been fitted.

Concrete Floors:

2 No. Mug Tents - 64 sq. yards : One at KATO PYRGOS
: One at KOKKINA.

6. LIMNITIS:

a. A main drain was excavated through centre of Camp Area. This work carried out by MICHICAN L. W. T. with back acter attachment.

b. The Camp was completely rewired. Some of the materials from the existing wiring were used in the new layout. Electrical Supply - as at KATO PYRGOS.

c. Roadways:

Approximately 500 tons of gravel was hauled and spread to improve roadways and handstandings in Camp area. A 10 ton tipping truck and a loading shovel hired locally was used for this work. 220 sq. yards of concrete laid around Kitchen and Nissen Hut and for pathways in tented areas.

d. Camp Structures Erected:

See Annex 'A'.

e. Tent Floors:

Concrete

17 No Mug Tents	-	544 sq. yards.
2 No Two Pole Tents	-	84 sq. yards.
1 No 4 Pole Tent	-	84 sq. yards.
1 No 180 lb Tent	-	11 sq. yards.

Timber:

1 No 4 Pole Tent
6 No Mug Tents (4 in Ops).
7 No 180 lb. Tents (All in Ops.).

Timber obtained from surplus at KATO PYRGOS AND DANISH CAMP.

Over.....

COY. LEFKA:

- a. Water main extended to Office, Wash and Living Hall.
- b. ~~Camp completely~~ A single phase ring main was extended around the Camp and connections made to all installations and tents. There were 195 light points and 8 power points installed. Electrical supply was taken from local technical school which supplied by 10 K.V.A. Transformer. Much trouble was experienced due to excessive loading, however, with the ring main the problem was relieved considerably.
- c. Approximately 80 tons of gravel and slag was hauled and spread to improve pathways and hand standings in Camp Areas.

d. Tent Floors:

Concrete:

4 No Mug Tents	-	128 sq. yards
2 No Mug Tents (OPs).	-	64 sq. yards
2 No Two Pole Tents	-	84 sq. yards
2 No 180 lb Tents (OPs)	-	<u>22 sq. yards.</u>

TOTAL: 298 sq. yards.

Timber Floors:

3 No Mug Tents.

The remainder of tent floors in Lefka Camp were from previous Camp.

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ANNEX 'A' TO WORK COMPLETED

CAMP STRUCTURES ERECTED, KEROS.

SERIAL	building	Floor Area	Type	Remarks
1.	Dining Hall and Mens' Canteen.	66' x 24'	Steel and Timber framed covered C.G.I. and lined.	
2.	NCO s Mess	30' x 30	Timber framed C.G.I.S. with pitched roof and lined internally with softboard and canvas.	Divided by partition and decorated.
3.	Kitchen, Store and Wash	30' x 18'	Timber framed C.G.I.S. with pitched roof.	15' x 8 leanto used as Bar and store.
4.	Mens wash and shower	25' x 9'	Timber framed with C.G.I.S. with leanto roof, fitted with 4 showers and 3 wash troughs.	25 Gl hot water tank and wash unit installed 50 cu.ft. fridge.
5.	Mens P.T.L..	12' x 9	Timber framed C.G.I.S. with 10 seats	Hot Water Unit made up from 40 Gl Oil Barrel fitted with immersion unit.
6.	Offrs L.T.L.	9' x 6	Timber framed C.G.I.S. with 4 seats.	Concrete floor.
7.	Battery Charging Shed.	12' x 10'	Timber framed C.G.I.S.	Partitioned internally, Concrete floor.
8.	Offrs Wash and Shower	12' x 9'	Timber framed C.G.I.S.	Erected from sections of Old Shed. Timber floor.
9.	Transport Wkps and Store	33' x 22' +12' x 10'	Timber framed C.G.I.S. with open front and leanto roof.	Complete with 2 showers and wash troughs. Concrete floor.
10.	Pollicemans Hut	6' x 6'	Timber framed C.G.I.S.	Constructed on existing concrete floor, 12' x 10' leanto to be as store. Concrete floor.

CAMP STRUCTURES ERECTED, KATO PYRGOS:

SERIAL	BUILDINGS	FLOOR AREA	TYPE	REMARKS
1.	Dining Hall	54' x 24'	As at Xeros	Divided by Partition into NCOs and Mens. Decorated internally.
2.	Kitchen and wash	20' x 18'	Timber framed C.G.I.S. with leanto roof.	Portions of existing kitchen used in new construction.
3.	Offrs Wash & Shower	8' x 6'	Timber framed C.G.I.S. with leanto roof.	Wash trough and one shower. Concrete floor.
4.	Mens Showers	-		Repairs carried out to existing shower units. Partitions installed. Hot Water from immersion units in 40 Gl. tank.

MINI-TENTS:

1.	Canteen Dining Hall & NCOs Mess	66' x 24'	As at Xeros	Divided by one partition & 1 counter into 3 compartments. Decorated internally.
2.	Kitchen	24' x 12'	Timber framed C.G.I.S. leanto roof	Attached to Nissen Hut.
3.	Mens D.T.L.	9' x 9'	Timber framed C.G.I.S. with leanto roof.	& Seater.
4.	Mens Showers	-		Existing partitioned, 5 Showers installed. 2 Immersion units installed in 40 Gl. tank for showers.

ANNEX 'B' TO WORK COMPLETED

CAMP STRUCTURES, LEEKA:

SERIAL

1.	Dining and Recreation Hall.	66' 24'	As at XEROS.	Divided by partition into NCOs. and Mens Dining Hall and Games Room.
2.	Officers wash and Shower	8' x 6'	Timber framed C.G.I.S. with lean to roof.	Wash trough and one shower. Concrete floor.
3.	Officers D.T.L.	6' x 5'	Timber framed C.G.I.S.	Two seater with doors.
4.	Mens Showers	————	————	Repairs carried out to existing showers. Partitions installed. Hot water from immersion units in 50 Gl. tank.

T R A N S P O R TESTABLISHMENT:

The first problem which the T.O. dealt with on his arrival in CYPRUS was to agree a M.T. establishment for 5 InfGp. At that time the intended operational commitment of the Unit was not clear, and the initial establishment was decided on the basis of the 5 Inf Gp organization i.e. A.H.Q. Coy. two Rifle Companies and an Armd. Car Group. On that basis the following M.T. establishment was decided.

L/Rs. ¼ Ton Cargo	17
Do. Do. FFR	6
L/R Do. FFS	1
Bedford 3 Ton Cargo	9
" " " " WW	1
Austin 1 " "	8
" " " Water	3
Ford 3 " AMB	1
Humber 1 " Armd.	4
Mercedes Benz Saloon	1
Trailers ½ Ton	4

At first this establishment seemed adequate but when the operational commitments of the unit were clarified and particularly when it became necessary to establish an additional operational sub-area serviced by an Ad Hoc Company comprised of the Armd. Car Gp. the Mor Pl. and an Inf Pl. from 'A' Coy. it soon became apparent that it was very inadequate. Representations were immediately made to UNFICYP HQ for additional transport but unfortunately they could not see their way to easing our problem until the

following January when they gave us two additional Land Rovers.

2. VEH CONDITION:

All vehs with the exception of 14 L/Rs Cargo were MK 3 vehs and were approximately 10 years on the road. At the beginning when the weather was good we experienced little mechanical trouble and the vehs performed well as they had been overhauled prior to being issued by V. S. D. However as time went on more and more mechanical was experienced. Most of the trouble stemmed from the fact that the vehicles were old. If the original allotment had been made on a three Coy basis plus HQ Coy we would have had sufficient vehicles to replace off the road vehicles without having to repair everything in a hurry.

3. ALLOTTMENT TO COYS:

"A" COY LEFKA	1 Bedford 3 ton Cargo
	1 L/Rover $\frac{3}{4}$ ton Cargo
	4 L /Rovers $\frac{3}{4}$ ton Cargo
	1 L/Rover FFR ($\frac{1}{4}$ ton)
	1 Trailer

"B" COY KATO	2 Bedford 3 Ton Cargo
PYRGOS & KOKKINA	2 Austin Water carriers (200 Gl)
	1 L/Rover $\frac{3}{4}$ Ton Cargo
	4 L /Rover $\frac{1}{4}$ Ton Cargo
	1 L/Rover $\frac{1}{4}$ Ton FFS
	1 L/Rover $\frac{1}{4}$ Ton FFR
	1 Trailer $\frac{1}{2}$ Ton
	1 Humber 1 Ton Armd.

CAV GP LIMNITIS	1 Bedford 3 Ton Cargo
	2 L/Rovers $\frac{3}{4}$ Ton Cargo
	3 L/Rovers $\frac{1}{4}$ Ton Cargo
	1 L/Rover FFR
	1 Austin 1 Ton Water Carrier (200 Gl)

Of the three operational Coys "B" Coy had the heaviest commitment and were given extra transport. They were also almost an hour's journey from HQrs. at XEROS and consequently required more vehs to do local Coy details as the routine daily details to XEROS required most of a working day to perform. Due to insufficient vehicles in HQrs. if a vehicle was put off the road for repairs a replacement vehicle could only be supplied with difficulty

4. SCHEME OF OPERATION:

Vehicles on charge to the Coys were operated in the same way as a transport section in Ireland. There was an NCO i/c each Coy. Tpt and he operated a detail book and a Petrol and Oil account as normal. "B" Coy had a Cpl. Fitter attached. Cav Gp had their own fitters in the HQ M.T. Platoon. Transport orders covering the operation of vehicles in CYPRUS and additional orders not covered in Drivers Standing Orders were issued.

5. DETAILS:

There were on average 2000 details approximately a month at an average of 40 miles per detail. Efforts were made to have vehicles requisitioned at least 12 hours before required so as to gain the maximum benefit from co-ordinating journeys. However, this did not work out, very well. There were many factors contributing to this the most important of which was that one camp (XEROS) had to be constructed from scratch and the other three main

camps had to be completely overhauled and permanent buildings erected in each of them. This necessitated an enormous amount of work for Engineers and Ordnance and the carriage of material on very short notice as it became available. The operational requirements of the mission demanded that vehicles be available at very short notice so that incidents would be investigated as soon as possible after being reported. Where requirements were known the day before requisitions were submitted before 19.00 hours on the previous day.

6. P.O.L.

All fuels including diesel and paraffin for generators and heaters were drawn in bulk from Ord. Dep. NICOSIA. A requisition for our requirements was submitted two days prior to date of receipt.

There was also a 600 gallon tank located at XEROS and this was refilled twice a week or a third time if necessary. A mobile tanker did this job and again a requisition was required. All issues and receipts were recorded as per our own system within the unit. Each Coy accounted for POL on a 294 and copies were submitted to HQ Coy each month. The British system did not demand that this be done and it was felt by the M. T.O. that greater control of stocks would be maintained if our own system was adapted internally. Packed POL only was issued to outlying Coys. A reserve of 100 miles petrol per vehicle was held in each Coy area to guard against an emergency. There was no problems in connection with POL.

7. TECH STORES: - The HQ Camp in XEROS had no permanent buildings to house stores of any description. A Nissen Hut was provided in UNFICYP HQ, NICOSIA, as a temporary

Technical Stores in Oct. and this was adequate for our needs. The bulk of stores held on charge was National as we indented for British stores only as required. The British system as operated in Cyprus (UN) does not allow units to hold non-expendable items on stock. For example, if a starter motor becomes U/S in a unit it must be removed off the vehicle, taken to REME workshops to have it certified as U/S before a replacement can be drawn. This holds up the repair work in the unit and makes it imperative for the Tech Stores NCO to be on the spot all the time. Tec stores are indented from the Ord Dep, NICOSIA. In the event of items not being available the Ord Dep indent on Ord, Famagusta. It was found that by having the Tec stores in NICOSIA rather than in XEROS some time could be saved in procuring spares and it was decided to locate the Tech stores permanently in NICOSIA. To date the arrangement has worked out satisfactorily.

8. WK/SHOPS: - The Irish unit in Cyprus have the use of a hanger in UNFICYP HQ, NICOSIA. When the Tech stores was located in NICOSIA it was decided to locate a workshops in the hanger near the Tech stores and the REME W/shops. The fitter Sgt. and a Pte fitter were located there and between them and REME W/shops all repairs except first line repairs were handled. All repairs complete overhaul jobs can be handled by the REME W/Shops responsible for doing our unit repairs. This arrangement has been very satisfactory and only minimum delays of repairs were experienced. In XEROS at HQ Coy we had two fitters (Cpl and Pte) who carried out all 1st line repairs for HQ Coy and "A" Coy in LEFKA, approx 4 miles away. The Cav Gp at LIMNITIS were capable of looking after their own first line repairs and one Cpl fitter was

at "B" Coy at KATO PYEGOS approx 45 minutes journey from HQ. Coy. Most of the repair work in the Coy. areas was on the Bedfords and Austins. These vehicles were ten to eleven years old and nearly all repairs were due to old age. The fitters in the Group area were constantly doing checks on all vehicles for brakes and steering particularly, as the inspection requirement under UN and British logs instruction was once every two months. It was considered that this was not sufficient because of bad roads and weather conditions. These frequent minor inspections did turn up at least half a dozen cases of faulty brakes or steering that might have not been noted otherwise. The only flaw in the repair position was the undue delay at times in procuring replacement parts, but this was out of our control. Generally it could be said that the /shops organisation was satisfactory.

9. N.C.O. STAFF:

The N.C.Os. were generally very satisfactory but none of the Corporals had much experience of Petrol and Oil account. It is felt that if possible N.C.Os should be selected at home for specific jobs i.e. - Petrol & Oil N.C.O. who has been on that particular job prior to coming overseas. This is most important in the case of tech stores N.C.O. as it is difficult enough for an experienced man to familiarise himself with the British system. It might also be possible to select a detail N.C.O. who has some experience of typing. A large volume of returns and reports are required each month and much delay is caused by the Orderly Room Staff being overlooked in this regard. It is felt that in comparison with the CONGO operation the responsibility of all staff is

much heavier in CYPRUS. In this regard it is desirable that the senior Sgt. be promoted acting C/S for the period of overseas service and that an extra Sgt. be added to the establishment. The present establishment allows very little scope for the Pl Sgt. to do the job he should be doing i.e. supervision of all sections. He is too much involved in specific jobs and supervision is lacking. While on this point it is also felt that there would be ample work for an assistant T.O. (Lieut). His main responsibility would be the running of the Hq Coy and GP Hqs transport. This job taken off the shoulders of the Gp T.O. would allow him more time for checking on all Gp transport, tech stores, w/shops, and he could devote more time to reports and correspondence which is considerable. Again it must be pointed out that the majority of units in the Congo had an assistant T.O. where the need for one was not as pressing as it is in CYPRUS.

10.

DRIVERS: - The establishment of fifteen (15) drivers in the LT Pl is not sufficient. There is an average of three drivers per day either on guard or resting off guard. To them can be added one driver per day resting off late night detail plus the usual late excused because of illness. Drivers in the Group are working extremely long hours over difficult roads for seven days a week. To have had drivers reporting sick with fatigue and being awarded from 48 to 72 hrs A.D. Many of the details are not arduous because of the mileage performed but rather the length of time taken to complete the detail due to waiting for an officer who is on operational duty. To allow for duties other than driving a figure of at least twenty (20) to twenty-four (24) is desirable. This would allow drivers to be rested off one day a week and thereby keep them more alert. No driver can be 100% efficient under existing conditions.

The standard of driving at the beginning of the tour ranged from excellent in the case of 40%, good in the case of another 40% and only fair for the balance. Care was taken to send these latter drivers on all the details over main roads for the first month. From there they were gradually given more difficult details and at time of writing it can be fairly said that these drivers have attained a very good standard. None of them was involved in an accident as they were encouraged to drive at speeds less than the maximum speed limit. The overall standard of driving is now very good. It would be wise for any T.O. to check on the driving experience of his drivers before becoming operational so that the gradual building up of driver efficiency among the below average driver be effected.

APPENDIX R.

The chaplains to the 5th Infantry Group were Father Phelim McCabe, Cathal Brugha Barracks, and Father Colm Matthews, Baldonnel. Their faculties to serve the Irish troops in Cyprus came from our Head Chaplain, Very Rev. P. Duffey who in turn received them from the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem through his Vicar General, at the Franciscan Church, Paphos Gate, NICOSIA. The present V.G. is the Very Reverend Doctor Flavian Randon.

Father McCabe was stationed at XEROS serving both HQ Coy and also 'A' Coy. at LEFKA, while Father Matthews stayed at KATO PYRGOS with 'B' Coy, and also at LIMNITIS. He also looked after the camp at KOKKINA.

Sunday Masses were celebrated as follows:-

7.30 a.m. at Xeros Camp: 9.30 at Xeros Church: 12.30 at Lefka:
8 a.m. at Kato Pyrgos: 10 a.m. at LIMNITIS: 11.30 at Kokkina.

Daily Mass was celebrated each morning at XEROS at 7 a.m. and at LEFKA on Mondays, Thursdays, Fridays and Saturdays at 8.30 a.m. Mass was also offered at LIMNITIS on Mondays, Tuesdays and Wednesdays at 8 a.m. and at Kato Pyrgos on Thursdays, Fridays and Saturdays at 5. p.m. Mass was also said at Kokkina on two mornings.

The members of the Irish Contingent stationed at HQ UNFICYP attended Mass either at Franciscan Church, Paphos Gate or at RAF Church in NICOSIA. Mass was celebrated for them also on each Tuesday evening and on 1st Fridays by one of the Irish Chaplains at 5 p.m. at the Contingent Office and later at the Conference Room.

The Rosary was recited at each camp at a suitable hour in the evening either before or after the evening meal.

The Canadian Chaplain Father M. Legendre was very helpful to us and came to hear confessions at all camps on the 1st Thursdays of each month. The 9.30 Mass on Sundays at Xeros Church was often said by a Franciscan, Father Massimino who also heard confessions before Mass.

After some early delays due to pressure of other works, a separate tent with good lighting and flooring was provided in each camp to serve as chapel.

A Branch of the Pioneer Total Abstinence Association was established within the Group which proved very successful in its work. It held its monthly meetings at the Chaplain's tent in Xeros and they were attended by representatives of all locations.

A Pioneer outing was held on 2nd. March to Paphos and Episcopi.

Both chaplains have attended a monthly Ecumenical meeting in NCCOSIA which was attended by the Orthodox Bishop and clergy, Franciscan Fathers, Maronite, and Anglican Clergy, as well as most of the UN chaplains Lutherans and Catholic. At the February meeting Father McCabe gave a talk to a very well attended meeting of 23, on "Religion in Ireland" and in particular on the Catholic Church.

Both chaplains went to the Holy Land with official groups. They felt that the pilgrimage aspect of these trips should be more emphatic. The stay in Beirut would be better allotted to another tour or at least arranged for the opening days. This would have the added advantage of ensuring that Friday the traditional day for performing the Stations of the Cross would be spent in the Holy Land. It is also desirable to have a chaplain on each pilgrimage even for a couple of days if that can ever be arranged.

Masses for all the Deceased members of the Defence Forces including those who died in the Congo as well as in Cyprus, were celebrated on 2nd. November.

On ~~8th~~ December Father McCabe took part in a concelebrated Mass at Paphos Gate which was attended also by Orthodox, Armenian and Anglican clergy. This marked the close of the Vatican Council.

At Christmas Midnight Mass was celebrated by both Chaplains.

At Xeros the Missa de Angelia was sung, and in all locations, Christmas Carols were sung during the Masses.

On Ash Wednesday ashes were blessed and distributed to all troops. It was observed as a day of abstinence on a voluntary basis.

On St. Patrick's Day Mass and the Ceremony of Blessing the Shamrock took place in all locations. Mass was also celebrated with military honours at 6 p.m. at the Franciscan Church, Paphos Gate, by Father McCabe at which a sermon in Irish and English was preached by Father Matthews.

The Chaplains would like to pay tribute and express their thanks to the many members of the Contingent who helped to furnish their chapels, arrange Masses and their attendance, served Mass and in many other ways assisted them in their work.

UNFICYP CIVILIAN POLICEDUTIES:

- a. Man UN posts in sensitive areas.
- b. Carry out patrols supplementary to patrols by military.
- c. Carry out street patrols in towns and villages in sensitive areas.
- d. Act as observers at Cyprus Police road blocks and otherwise as appropriate.
- e. Liaise as appropriate with Cyprus Police/Turkish Cypriot police.
- f. Carry out routine economics duties at the request of Zone/District Commanders.
- g. Carry out joint patrols with Cyprus Police.
- h. Carry out convoy duties.
- j. Inquire into incidents where Greek and Turkish Cypriots are involved with the other community.
- k. Make special inquiries as necessary in conjunction with Cyprus Police/Turkish Cypriot police as appropriate.
- l. Deal with inquiries relating to missing persons.
- m. Carry out surveys, observations and made assessments of a specialist nature.

2. It is essential that United Nations Military Police and UNCIVPOL duties should not be duplicated. Duties assigned to UNCIVPOL are confined to those which require close co-operation of a continuing nature between UNFICYP and the Cyprus Police, or to those which experience has shown can be more suitably carried out by an UNFICYP Civilian policeman than by an UNFICYP soldier.

COMMAND AND LIAISON:3. Command:

The Police Adviser, under the Force Commander, co-ordinates the duties of all UNFICYP Civilian Police. He exercises this function through Police Detachment Headquarters deployed in Military Zones/Districts,

4. Use of Armed Force:

UNFICYP Civilian Police are normally subject to the same operational orders as troops of UNFICYP as regards the circumstances in which armed force may be used.

5. UNCIVPOL Headquarters:

This is established in Wolseley Barracks, NICOSIA, and includes a Report Centre (which is manned twenty four hours a day) and a Records Section.

6. DETACHMENT HEADQUARTERS:

These are located as follows:

- a. Nicosia East - Acropole Hotel - Austria
- b. Nicosia West - Saray Hotel, Denmark
Wolseley Barracks - HQ and Report Centre.
- c. Famagusta Zone - Famagusta
- d. Limassol Zone - Limassol - New Zealand
Ktima - Australia.
- e. Lefka District - Kakopotria - Australia.
- f. Kyrena Zone - Hesperides Hotel - Denmark.

METHOD OF OPERATION: - UNCIVPOL is deployed in Zones/Districts and operates in direct support of the Zone/District Commander concerned, carrying out tasks, as in para 5 above, as mutually agreed, between the local UNFICYP military and police commanders and the Police Adviser. The tasks which UNCIVPOL are to carry out in a Zone or District are to be listed and a signed agreement made. One copy is to be kept by the Zone/District HQ and two copies by UNCIVPOL.

REPORTS:

ALL UNCIVPOL reports, whether they be on routine investigations or of a special nature, unless otherwise ordered by HQ UNFICYP, are to be forwarded to the Zone/District Headquarters, which the Police Detachment is supporting. It is the responsibility of the Zone/District Headquarters to forward Police reports, or extracts from the reports, in the Daily Military SITREPS, or as a special report to HQ UNFICYP. Police Detachment Commanders are also to forward copies of all their reports except completed reports of major intercommunal incidents, direct to the Civilian Police Liaison Officer HQ UNFICYP for the information of the Police Adviser. Completed reports of major intercommunal incidents are to be forwarded direct to the Police Adviser. Zone/District HQ are not to send copies of UNCIVPOL reports to any Cyprus Authorities without the concurrence of the Police Adviser.

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APPENDIX 'T'
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SPEECH BY BRIGADIER GENERAL A. G. WILSON ON THE OCCASION OF
PRESENTATION OF UNITED NATIONS CYPRUS MISSION MEDALS TO 5th
INFANTRY GROUP ON 3rd MARCH 1966.

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It is always a great honour to be invited on behalf of the Secretary General to present U.N. awards for service in Cyprus. There are two things about the medal which are worth stressing. First the words on the reverse of the medal itself: "In the Service of Peace." There is no doubt that by your presence in Cyprus you have played an important part in preserving the peace in this potentially explosive part of the world. This is good service and rightly deserves to be recorded. Secondly, it is worth remembering that these medals represent the thanks not of your own country alone, but of all the 117 member States of the United Nations. For this reason, I am sure you will come, like me, to regard this particular decoration with especial pride.

I would like now to say a little about the magnificent contribution made by Ireland to UNFICYP over the past two years, and in particular about the work of your own 5th Infantry Group over the past five months. For its first 18 months UNFICYP was lucky to have the services of over 1000 Irish Officers and men, a wonderful effort, by Ireland having regard to the comparatively small size of your country's armed forces. Now the improved situation on this island has allowed UNFICYP to reduce its numbers, but we are still fortunate in having an Irish Contingent, smaller in numbers but of equal distinction, serving with the Force.

I think there is something in the Irish character which makes you particularly well suited to the task of peace-keeping. Your own national history naturally gives you a special insight into the struggles and aspirations of others. Even more important, perhaps the Irish temperament allows you to teach others one of life's greatest lessons: "to take everything seriously, but not too seriously."

Whatever the reasons your success in Cyprus has been plain to see, and is currently displayed in the greatly improved situation in Lefka District. I should like to take this opportunity of thanking you for your fine work in this area, and congratulating you on what has been achieved here, and in particular on the high esteem in which you are held here, both by the Government of Cyprus and the two local communities.

It is therefore with special pleasure and pride that I find myself here to-day faced with this agreeable task of presenting you, on behalf of the Secretary General, with medals for your service in Cyprus.

