

CONFIDENTIAL



# **33 INFANTRY BATTALION**

**In**

**THE REPUBLIC of  
THE CONGO**

**August 1960 - January 1961**

CONFIDENTIAL

THE REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>PAGE</u>
1. FOREWORD	
2. MAP : NORTHERN KATANGA	
3. CHAPTER 1: Formation of the Unit and its Move to the Area of Operations.	1.
4. MAP : ALBERTVILLE.	
5. CHAPTER 2: The Battalion in ALBERTVILLE up to the Time of Return of B Company from MANONO.	9.
6. MAP : KAMINA.	
7. CHAPTER 3: A Company in KAMINA.	41.
8. MAP : MANONO.	
9. CHAPTER 4: B Company in MANONO - PIANA MWANGA August - November 1960	48.
10. MAP : NIEMBA.	
11. CHAPTER 5: NIEMBA.	82.
12. CHAPTER 6: The Battalion in ALBERTVILLE from the Time of B Company's Return from MANONO until the End of the Operation. The Journey Home.	103.
13. ANNEX A: Nominal Roll of the Battalion	
14. ANNEX B: Unit Equipment Table.	
15. ANNEX C: Directive No. 1 Eastern Command, ELIZABETHVILLE.	
16. ANNEX D: Directive No. 2 Eastern Command ELIZABETHVILLE.	
17. ANNEX E: ONUC Operations Directive No. 6	
18. ANNEX F: Rights and Duties of Members of the Force.	
19. ANNEX G: Operations Section History.	
20. ANNEX H: A Section History.	
21. ANNEX J: Q Section History.	
22. ANNEX K: Signal Section History.	
23. ANNEX L: Ordnance Section History.	
24. ANNEX M: Transport Section History.	

CONFIDENTIAL

25. ANNEX N: Battalion Medical Section History.
26. ANNEX O: B Company Medical History.
27. ANNEX P: Welfare Section History.
28. ANNEX Q: Roll of Casualties.
29. ANNEX R: Tables of Organisation.

---

A C K N O W L E D G E M E N T.

The maps for this History were specially drawn by Comdt.  
M.F. Quinlan to whom the thanks of the Battalion are due.

---

CONFIDENTIAL

**CONFIDENTIAL**

UNITED NATIONS TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANISATION,  
DAMASCUS.

7 June, 1966.

This is the History of the first Irish Unit in KATANGA, the Republic of the CONGO. Following closely on the heels of an earlier battalion, 33 Infantry Battalion were soon to realize the very considerable difference between the peacetime, barrack life at home in IRELAND and the active service type of operation with U.N. in the CONGO. Above everything else we lacked experience, and consequently it was difficult for all of us to visualize what a U.N. Peacekeeping Mission entailed. To be equipped with and trained in the traditional infantry weapons, yet circumscribed in their use by the well-known and accepted U.N. policy of avoiding the use of force, if at all possible, in solving the many operational problems, was a situation difficult to understand in its finer points. Often it meant that our soldiers had to "turn the other cheek," when confronted by hostile tribesmen, in the performance of legitimate U.N. duties. It was difficult for many, if not all of us, coming from a country blessed with political stability, to understand the savage violence which followed the KATANGA Government decision to break away from the newly-born Republic of the CONGO. For a freshly integrated unit these difficulties posed many problems, and these when added to by the normal operational and administrative tasks bedevilled by lack of essential supplies locally, threw heavy pressures on all of the unit personnel. It is very, very pleasant indeed to recall memories of all the willing energy used unstintingly and unselfishly in an often overwhelmingly hot climate until our Battalion became and remained an efficient military machine. It is equally pleasant to recall the eagerness with which all ranks sought inclusion in the strictly military operations - often arduous and sometimes dangerous. I hope that this history will be some small tribute to the Officers and Men of 33 Infantry Battalion.

I cannot omit mention of our great tragedy at NIEMBA. This will always be our special memory, a memory made poignant by the knowledge that the small and ill-fated patrol were only carrying out to the best of their ability, the role of keeping the peace in a country torn, especially in the area of 33 Infantry Battalion, by civil war. I know that this history will help in some small way to keep their memory fresh.

The writing of this history has been undertaken by a small group. To them I am thankful for their devotion to the task despite very real and sometimes insuperable difficulties in obtaining the necessary material. Above all, I know that this small group wishes that the finished product will be a truly unit history - one fitting to the memory of all those who served in KATANGA with 33 Infantry Battalion.

---

R.W. BUNWORTH                      LIEUT COL.

OFFICER COMMANDING  
33 INFANTRY BATTALION

**CONFIDENTIAL**

FORMATION OF THE UNIT AND ITS MOVE TO THE  
AREA OF OPERATIONS.

---

1. Introduction: The initial unit, 32 Infantry Battalion, which the Government had raised and dispatched to the CONGO at the beginning of the UN Mission, had hardly cleared IRELAND when UN requested a second battalion. During the first few days of August, 1960, it was decided to raise this second battalion - the 33 Infantry Battalion - and move it out as quickly as possible. The organisation differed in some respects from the previous unit. The heavier infantry weapons e.g. 81 m.m. mortars Vickers MMG's were dropped and more riflemen were added. This decision was taken on the advice of HQ, ONUC, LEOPOLDVILLE, which had determined at this stage that the operation was one for which there was little chance of heavy infantry weapons being needed. This advice was to prove faulty as the history of this and later units was to prove.
2. The detailed Tables of Organisation are at ANNEX R.
3. The troops were generally drawn from all over the Army and in particular:-
  - a. Headquarters Company personnel were representative of all COMMANDS
  - b. A Company was drawn from the Eastern Command.
  - c. B Company was drawn from the Southern Command.
  - d. C Company was drawn from the Curragh Training Camp.
4. Initial documentation and administration were completed in the Command areas and troops reported to the Curragh Training Camp for final processing on 10 August 1960 being accommodated:-
  - a. At PEARSE and McDONAGH BARRACKS .. .. . Headquarters Company  
A Company  
C Company
  - b. At McDERMOTT and CLARKE BARRACKS . . . . B Company
5. The Nominal Roll of the Unit is at ANNEX A.
6. Departure of the Advance Party: This party comprising the Second in Command, Unit Quartermaster, and the Quartermaster Sergeants of each Company left before the main body and arrived in LEOPOLDVILLE on 14 August, 1960, for the purpose of receiving detailed directions on the deployment of the unit and for the making of all necessary administrative arrangements in the field. Such a small advance party was, later, to prove inadequate and this point is mentioned here lest it might be thought that the party was comprehensive enough to fulfil its task. The most essential member of the party was the unit commander and after that the subordinate commanders and senior staff. Because the composition of the advance party was so curtailed and so lacking in diversity, the unit was slow to get itself oriented when it arrived in the Mission Area.
7. The Advance Party Arrival and Movements in the CONGO until Arrival of Main Body: This phase is fully covered in the report of the Unit Quartermaster the relevant portion of which is:
  - "a. An Advance Party, travelling by civilian airlines arrived in LEOPOLDVILLE on the 14 August, 1960. The route was DUBLIN, PARIS, NICE, BANQUI, FORTLAMY, BRAZZAVILLE - LEOPOLDVILLE.
  - b. The following were the personnel -

COMDT. K. O'BRIEN	-	Battalion Second-in-Command
COMDT. P. KEOGH	-	Battalion Quartermaster

CQMS TAYLOR	-	A Company Representative
CQMS MURPHY	-	B Company Representative
CQMS DILLON	-	C Company Representative
CQMS MAHER	-	Headquarters Company Representative
Sgt. FENELON	-	do.

- c. Two other NCOs travelled with the Advance Party for duty in ONUC Headquarters. COMDT. O'BRIEN handed over duties of O.C. Advance Party to COMDT. P. KEOGH on the 16 AUGUST, 1960 having on that date been detailed by O/C 9 Brigade, COL H. BYRNE to take over the duties of Operations Officer KATANGA Command.
- d. The Advance Party remained in LEOPOLDVILLE until 18 AUGUST, 1960. During this period all available information on the operational and logistics situation was obtained. No information was available at this stage of the probable location of the Battalion.

During this period the following items were handed over to the Advance Party:

1. 1,800,000 francs (Imprest)
  2. 1,400 Shirts
  3. 700 Caps and UN Insignia
- e. There was a serious shortage of UN clothing at the time and no firm date could be given for the issue of the remainder of the tropical kit.
- f. No indication was given as to how the imprest was to be spent, except a general statement by the UN Finance Officer that it was for "accommodation, food, and per diem of 43 francs" for all Unit personnel and "any other incidental expenses" and that it "should last for about 14 days". As the equivalent to this sum in Irish money was about £12,600 it gives some indication of the fluid state of UN administrative affairs at that time. It meant that, until the Battalion was settled in more or less permanent quarters the O.C. of the Advance Party had to carry this money about in an attache case, and as the imprest was composed of notes of all values from 10 to 1,000 francs, the case was full to overflowing. A point that may be worth mentioning at this stage is that when the UN administrative organisation was regionalised about a month afterwards the UN Finance Officer for the KATANGA-KIVU area had no record of the issue of this imprest and the first information he got on the matter was from the Quartermaster of the Unit.
- g. On 18 AUGUST the Advance Party was detailed to go to KINDU in the KIVU Province and to prepare for the arrival of the Battalion there. The party left LEOPOLDVILLE on the morning of 18 AUGUST and arrived in KINDU four hours afterwards. COMDT. DES. HASSEY O.C. B Company 32 Infantry Battalion was stationed in KINDU with his Company at the time and the Advance Party with the co-operation of COMDT. HASSEY and his staff arranged accommodation for our Unit in the town.
- h. At 1800 hours on the same day the pilot of the aircraft received an instruction from air operation ONUC to fly to LEOPOLDVILLE on the following day. At the end of the message was an instruction for the Advance Party as follows - "the Advance Party, 33 Infantry Battalion will now proceed to KAMINA BASE". As KAMINA BASE was not under UN control at the time it was difficult to understand the implications of the message. However it was assumed that 33 Infantry Battalion would now land at KAMINA BASE. The accommodation arrangements which were made for the Battalion in KINDU were now cancelled.

- j. The Advance Party arrived in KAMINA BASE at 1100 hours on 19 AUGUST. KAMINA at that time was occupied by units of the Belgian Air Force, Army and Paratroops, and no other UN troops were in the base area. The O.C. of the Base, COL. VAN LIERDE was contacted. He was informed that 33 Infantry Battalion would concentrate at the Base in the following days. COL. VAN LIERDE was not aware of this and asked if the Irish troops would remain on the Base, as he was anxious that European troops only would be stationed there. At this point a Canadian Air Force L.O. arrived and he had information that one company of 33 Infantry Battalion would remain on the Base and that the remainder of the Battalion would have an operational area in NE KATANGA at ALBERTVILLE and MANONO.
- k. At the request of the O.C. of the Advance Party, COL VAN LIERDE provided the following facilities for the reception of the Unit:
- (1) Accommodation for A Company at BASE 1
  - (2) Twenty trucks and three buses with an officer in charge, to be available on a twenty-four hour basis.
  - (3) Food which was to be available as the planes arrived day or night.

In addition he appointed an LO (English speaking) to the Advance Party. The L.O.s name was CAPTAIN JOSEPH, Administrative Officer BASE I.

- l. Arrival of the Battalion at KAMINA BASE: Accommodation for the unit less A Company was arranged, in co-operation with the town civilian authorities at KAMINAVILLE, twenty miles from the BASE as follows:-
- (1) B Company and C Company - in large schools at the NORTH side of the town.
  - (2) Headquarters Company - at the HOTEL DE LA GARE.
- The main body of the Unit began to arrive on 21 AUGUST. On arrival all troops received a meal at the EPA buildings and were subsequently ferried to their respective locations at the BASE and in KAMINAVILLE.
- m. Move from KAMINAVILLE to ALBERTVILLE: Arrangements were made in conjunction with the Operations Officer to move the Unit, less A Company by rail from KAMINAVILLE to ALBERTVILLE. The Battalion Quartermaster and Police Officer with Company representatives left for ALBERTVILLE BY Sabena Plane on 23 AUGUST to arrange for the reception and accommodation of Battalion Headquarters, Headquarters Company and C Company and the temporary accommodation of B Company.
- n. On arrival at ALBERTVILLE the Advance Party discovered that the town was occupied by the following troops:-
- (1) UN troops - One Coy Mali Battalion
  - (2) Belgian troops - One Coy Paratroops, elements of one Battalion which was being withdrawn from outlying parts.
- o. The BALUBA population was in revolt and were trying to prevent the Belgian troops in outlying areas from rejoining their headquarters in ALBERTVILLE. Belgian civilians were concentrated in the main street. An attempt by BALUBAS to set fire to petrol stores at the railway station was prevented by Belgian troops, and there was some shooting. An added incentive to the BALUBA revolt was the fact that

CONFIDENTIAL

4.

the Belgian troops were being evacuated across LAKE TANGANYIKA to RUANDA-URUNDI. Armed BALUBAS in bands of about thirty were at the approaches to the town from the airfield, but they made no attempt to interfere with the advance party members. Relations between the UN MALI troops and the non Baluba elements had badly deteriorated.

- p. It was now about 1600 hours and no arrangements could be made as regards accommodation, or the reception of the Unit.
- q. About this time two UN representatives - LT. COL. YE GAUNG of BURMA and a civilian interpreter MR. H.F. BROCH DE ROTHERMAN arrived from LEOPOLDVILLE and a Conference with the local authorities was arranged, in an attempt to improve relations between the local authorities and the UN.
- r. The following attended:-

ONUC

BELGIANS AND KATANGESE

ONUC Headquarters Representative  
Quartermaster 33 Infantry Battalion  
Interpreters  
O.C. Mali Battalion  
Second-in-Command Mali Battalion

MR. MUNONGO - KATANGA Minister of the Interior.  
District Commissioner MR. KISSI  
Chef de Territoire  
O.C. Belgian Paratroop Battalion  
O.C. Belgian Infantry Battalion  
Belgian Advisers  
MAJOR JACQUES OC Gendarmes.

- s. The local situation was discussed, charges and counter-charges were hurled by both sides plus a threat by MR. MUNONGO to shoot UN troops if they interfered with the local authorities in the performance of their duties. However as it now seemed that Irish troops would be taking over UN duty in the NORTH-EAST KATANGA area MR. MUNONGO expressed the hope that relations would improve.
  - t. After the conference arrangements were made by the Quartermaster to meet the District Commissioner on the following day at 0800 hours to arrange for the reception and accommodation of the Irish Battalion.
  - u. At 0800 hours on 24 AUGUST, I met MR. GOERTZ, the technical adviser to the District Commissioner, and his assistant. Several locations were offered but none were accepted as the buildings were badly situated from a tactical viewpoint. Eventually accommodation was obtained in REGINA PACIS schools and some adjacent villas. This accommodation was allotted to Headquarters Company. Accommodation for C Company was obtained in Villas at QUARTIER KAKOMBA at the NORTH side of the town covering the approaches from NIEMBA and within easy reach of the airport. A large school in the centre of ALBERTVILLE was obtained as temporary location for B Company pending its departure for MANONO.
  - v. All available local transport - 2 buses and 6 trucks - were engaged to move the companies to their locations and the proprietor of a local store was employed to have tea and sandwiches available for the Battalion on arrival at the Railway Station.
  - w. Arrival of the Battalion (less A Company) at ALBERTVILLE: A C119 with the O.C. of C Company and about 20 men arrived on the evening of 24 AUGUST. The remainder of the Battalion arrived by train on 25 AUGUST."
8. At this stage COMDT K. O'BRIEN, originally gazetted as Battalion Second-in-Command was required by the Officer Commanding, 9 Infantry Brigade at ELIZABETHVILLE to join his staff. This was the beginning of several such transfers and whereas it is, now accepted that the unit was generously officered, it is NOT recommended that superior headquarters should be set up at the expense of the field units.

CONFIDENTIAL



9. Preparation of the Unit for departure: The preparation stage at the CURRAGH TRAINING CAMP fell into three broad divisions -
- a. Training: Very little time was available for training and for officers and men to become acquainted with one another. Training consisted primarily of weapon firing, wireless, and NO team training was possible. The need for this has been recognised and is now a feature with all outgoing units.
  - b. Administration: This consisted of, primarily -
    - (1) Documentation for which much credit is due to the officers of the Adjutant General's Branch and the Quartermaster General's Branch.
    - (2) Medical Processing: The bulk of the men required smallpox vaccination and the reaction which started after arrival in the CONGO was very severe indeed and reduced the efficiency of the unit very considerably for some days.
    - (3) Lectures on hygiene and sanitation in tropical countries.
  - c. Ceremonial and Recreation which comprised church parades, presentation of colours, presentations of gifts to troops. The gratitude of the unit to the ladies of the Curragh is here expressed and to the many units, BFW Staff, and others who made presentations and organised functions for the troops.
10. Unit Equipment and Order of March: Equipment Tables were prepared at Plans and Operations Section and the order of march was also prepared by this Section in conjunction with the Adjutant General's Branch. Unit Equipment Tables are given at ANNEX B.
11. Departure of 33 Infantry Battalion from IRELAND: On the morning of 17 August, 1960, the entire Battalion was transported from THE CURRAGH TRAINING CAMP to BALDONNEL Aerodrome. Here the unit was prepared for the inspection of An Taoiseach and the Blessing imparted by His Grace The Archbishop of Dublin. Great crowds of Irish people thronged into BALDONNEL to see their troops off and to wish them bon voyage. It was a colourful and emotional scene not to be repeated with later units.
12. USAFMS 124 aircraft moved the troops and equipment of the 33 Infantry Battalion on the route CHATEAU ROUX, a US BASE IN FRANCE - TRIPOLI, US Air Base in LIBYA - KANO, NIGERIA - KAMINA, KATANGA. Here it must be recorded how pleasant our short stops at the US bases were. All assistance possible was rendered and adequate accommodation and food was always provided. The same CANNOT be said for KANO, NIGERIA, NOT then an independent country, where the administration provided most inadequate food and accommodation. It is readily understood that UN troops were required to be held incommunicado but better facilities were expected than were obtained
13. Arrival of Main Body at KAMINA: Aircraft arrived out of rotation and in some cases hours and even days off schedule. However the unit Quartermaster and his Company Quartermaster Sergeants had arranged food and accommodation. The unit was accommodated as follows:-
- a. A Company at KAMINA Airport
  - b. Remainder of Battalion at KAMINAVILLE, a town some 25 kilometers away.
14. In KAMINAVILLE sub-units were deployed with:-
- a. Unit Headquarters and Headquarter Company at HOTEL DE LA GARE.
  - b. B Company at a local Convent School.
  - c. C Company at a local Training centre.
- CONFIDENTIAL

The local UN Ethiopian Battalion Commander COLONEL WORKU paid a courtesy call. Asked if he would agree to the troops of 33 Infantry Battalion going on local furlough he replied that he felt it better NOT. Language difficulties resulted in this situation prevailing and it is felt that the reason for the Ethiopian recommendation was based upon the lack of UN Emblems which our troops had NOT as yet received.

15. Political Situation in KATANGA: Apart from the news in the IRISH newspapers describing the succession of KATANGA from the REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO and the taking over of political control by the government of MR. MOISE TSHOMBE, little was known of the situation which existed. The general evacuation of Europeans and their families, the staying on of the few to protect their livelihood was NOT fully realized. The fear which existed in the minds of the non-Africans is impossible to describe but it was very real and much dependence was placed upon the Belgian Forces now withdrawing as UN forces took over. Little was known of the delicate balance which existed between the two main political parties in KATANGA - CONIKATS on one side led by MOISE TSHOMBE and the BALUBAKATS on the otherside led by the exiled JASON SENDWE now in LEOPOLDVILLE. Nothing was known of the extreme animosity which existed between these peoples and the extreme savagery with which they would meet each other on frequent occasions. The fact that NORTHERN KATANGA, in general, was BALUBAKAT-oriented and that SOUTHERN KATANGA in general, was CONIKAT-oriented was unknown. The presence of Belgian civil, police and military advisers to the TSHOMBE Government was equally unknown. First class military equipment became available to the TSHOMBE/ from Belgian sources and gradually an armed police, dressed in a grey uniform, and a military force, dressed in a Khaki uniform, emerged.

16. Directive to UN Troops: Directives to Units issued by Eastern Command Headquarters, ELIZABETVILLE, at this time and expanded from time to time clearly set out the limitations in the employment of UN troops. Direction No. 1 - ANNEX C - clearly stated:-

- a. That primary responsibility for public order rested with the authorities.
- b. UN could NOT act in their place unless requested,
- c. UN could act only by using peaceful means,
- d. UN could NOT interfere in any internal conflict in the CONGO.

A later expansion of this document quoted the principle of the use of UN forces as defined by the Security Council of UN as "..... Every effort should be exerted to avoid harm to anyone, since public reaction to the employment of force by UN personnel might well prove disastrous to the success of the entire United Nations Operation". See Directive No. 2 Annex D. Further instructions from ONUC Headquarters were later issued to the Unit - ANNEXES E and F.

17. To have one's military potential so restricted in the presence of:-
- a. The European population who relied principally and with some reason on the presence of the Belgian Forces for their protection and ascendancy,
  - b. The Tshombe police and military forces well armed and capable of independent actions of great severity,
  - c. The Balubakat tribes who could see armed UN Forces standing by when their people were engaged in the unequal military struggle in N KATANGA and could NOT realize the helplessness of those UN troops,

created great and unsolved problems and by and large, UN forces were very unpopular with the European and Tshombe regime and accepted only after

some time when actually stationed in BALUBA territory. The Battalion policy of negotiation and NON-use of force was born. It was to have some tragic results.

18. Deployment of 33 Infantry Battalion: Whilst at KAMINAVILLE the Battalion personnel suffered considerably from lack of freedom and lack of exercise. It was a welcome occasion when orders to move arrived although efforts were made by Battalion Headquarters to delay the actual date because of the physical condition of many of the officers and men who had developed the normal reaction to smallpox vaccination. The original mission for the 33 Infantry Battalion was:-
  - a. To airlift direct to KINDU,
  - b. Peacefully to occupy this area, and
  - c. On arrival of an INDONESIAN Battalion at KINDU to move to the NE Sector of KATANGA attaching one company to the ETHIOPIAN Battalion at KAMINAVILLE for duties on KAMINA BASE.
19. On 18 AUGUST, 1960, this was suddenly changed in a verbal order issued at KAMINAVILLE by COMDT. K. O'BRIEN, 9 Infantry Brigade and expanded the following day at KAMINA Base by COMDT. E. DOYLE of the same Headquarters. The orders said that 33 Infantry Battalion would:-
  - a. Move (less A Company) to the ALBERTVILLE Area,
  - b. Take over from the MALI Battalion the posts at:-
    - (1) ALBERTVILLE
    - (2) BAUDOINVILLE, some 200 miles SOUTH of ALBERTVILLE
    - (3) MANONO some 250/300 miles SW of ALBERTVILLE,
  - c. Establish a post peacefully at BENDERA - a hydro electric station serving ALBERTVILLE and some 90 miles to the NORTH,
  - d. Allot one Company, A Company, to KAMINA Base to cooperate with and assist the Belgian Commander,
  - e. Set up Headquarters at ALBERTVILLE.
20. Commanders were also required:-
  - a. To carry out active patrolling with strong jeep-mounted elements within their areas to show the UN presence,
  - b. To establish other posts if the local situation demanded and the resources permitted.
21. In the event, because of serious disturbances at ALBERTVILLE which resulted in bloody clashes between the TSHOMBE Gendarmerie and the local population, C Company (less one platoon) was airlifted into ALBERTVILLE and the remainder of the battalion, less A Company, followed by rail.
22. The work of loading the entire battalion stores on the train, less A Company, presented a considerable problem with so many men sick. Nevertheless it did give the unit personnel an opportunity of getting away from their quarters and the loading of vehicles, ammunition, food, and so on was completed most expeditiously. Insufficient carriages of an acceptable level of comfort were available and since the journey would last for a day and a half approximately insufficient sleeper accommodation also existed. A system of reliefs had to be initiated so that each man got some spell of rest in the sleeping apartments.

23. Crowds of people were present at each station. Stories and rumours were rife, especially amongst the European population, of considerable disturbances at ALBERTVILLE. Ammunition was issued as well as UN helmets, blue caps, UN armllets, bush shirts. A great wave of pessimism seemed to have engulfed those we met along the line. The bush shirts were of great value to the unit which had come so suddenly from a NORTHERN European climate into Equatorial Africa. The actual uniform problem was NOT finally solved until the unit arrived at ALBERTVILLE when arrangements were made, eventually, with a local cotton factory to supply slacks, shorts and scarves. The supply line from WEST to EAST CONGO is very long, and with so many units en route to be served the drying-up process had completed, very frequently, before the line reached ALBERTVILLE! This was to apply generally.
24. ALBERTVILLE: This beautifully situated city on the western shore of LAKE TANGANYIKA at an altitude of 2,600 feet is the headquarters of the TANGANYIKA District and Territory. It has a European population of approximately 1,000 and a Congolese one of about 30,000. This city of some hotels, restaurants and modern stores owes its progress to the Chemins de fer des Grands Lacs, where the combination of railhead and lake port make it an important economic centre. The original post at ALBERTVILLE was founded on 30 DECEMBER, 1891 by a CAPTAIN JACQUES of the CONGO Free State and later of the Belgian Anti-Slavery Society. Operations were carried on from here against Arab Slave traders in the 1890's. In 1914 it became the base of the Tanganyika Group in the East African Campaign. South African and British military bases were established there in 1940 and in 1944/45 a transit camp was set up for receiving and demobilising troops returning from the MIDDLE EAST. The local tribes were in the main BALUBA and BABEMBE.
25. ALBERTVILLE had been a thriving town after what would seem to be the fashion of typical European colonial expansion.
- It contained:-
- a. A very large railway terminal with repairs and base installations,
  - b. A dock area which served the local industrial complex in the import and export of commodities,
  - c. A large cotton factory employing 2000/2500 people,
  - d. Churches, hospitals, schools of a vocational and elementary academic nature.
- The hinterland contained a large hydro-electric scheme, cement factory, farms etc. It would seem as if the churches and hospitals were governed by the principle of racial segregation.
26. Missionaries of several denominations, but primarily Catholic, had done much to improve the lot of the Africans.
27. With the gazetted Second-in-Command transferred to Headquarters, 9 Infantry Brigade at ELIZABETHVILLE, the Battalion Commander discussed the filling of the appointment with the next senior officers, CC B Company COMDT P.P. BARRY and the Intelligence Officer COMDT P.D. HOGAN. CC B Company requested that he be left with his company and COMDT P.D. HOGAN assumed the post of Second-in-Command. The Legal officer COMDT. M. McMAHON assumed the post of Intelligence Officer in addition to his legal duties.

CONFIDENTIAL To NIEMBA 85 MLS

NEW AIRPORT 4 MLS  
FILTISAF (A Coy) 1 1/2 MLS

NATIVE CITY

R. LUKUGA

← TO NIEMBA

"C" Coy

RADIO STN

HOSPITAL

OLD AIRPORT

LAKE

CONTOURS NOT ACCURATE

POLICE H.Q.

NOT TO SCALE

(ABOUT 3 MLS LONG)

TANGANYIKA

ALBERTVILLE

AUG '60 'B' COY

WHITE SISTERS

DEC '60 'B' COY

GARAGE

C.F.L. CANTONMENT

NATIVE CITY

POOL

SARAFI

HOTEL DU LAC  
G.P.O.

RAILWAY WORK SHOPS

RLY. STATION  
7 H.Q.  
3<sup>rd</sup> Nig Bde

ALBERT MEMORIAL

BANK

CONFIDENTIAL

NATIVE VILLAGE

TO BAUDOINVILLE

BROWN VALLEY

HOSPITAL

BDE O/C

COURT HQ

RANGES

HQ

CIVIL ADM

CLIFFS

**CONFIDENTIAL** CHAPTER 2THE BATTALION IN ALBERTVILLE UP TO THE TIME OF RETURN  
OF B COMPANY FROM MANONOThe Battalion Arrives in ALBERTVILLE:

28. On the afternoon of Thursday 25 August the main body of the Battalion arrived at the railway station in ALBERTVILLE. A Company remained behind in KAMINA, and C Company less one platoon had flown to ALBERTVILLE the day before. The journey had lasted over thirty hours, in stuffy railway carriages in great and unaccustomed heat, and was very hard on the men, many of whom were now very sick from the inoculations and injections which they had received nine or ten days previously in Ireland.
29. The Battalion was met at the railway station by the Battalion Quartermaster and some members of the advance party. They marched the newcomers a few hundred yards down the main street to the HOTEL DU LAC, the principal hotel of the town, and on the side of the street all ranks were given a welcome meal of tea and ham sandwiches. When this was finished lorries appeared and the troops were driven to their new billets. This was quite a feat, when one considers that the Quartermaster and his advance party had arrived in a town torn by the most violent form of civil strife less than forty eight hours ahead of the main body. How it was accomplished was not made quite clear. It is a tribute to the hardworking Quartermaster and his staff that from that hour until we left for home none of us, with occasional exceptions, was hungry unless he was on patrol, or wanted for a place to lay his head. **Later**, the hard-pressed men of B Company, hundreds of miles away in MANONO and PIANA MWANGA were to provide the exceptions. Of which more anon.
30. Battalion Deployment on 25 August, 1960:
- a. Headquarters and A Company: The Battalion, less A Company in KAMINA, was now concentrated in ALBERTVILLE, Battalion Headquarters and Headquarters Company in the Regina Pacis Convent of the White Sisters. The convent was built on a height at the South edge of the town with views to the EAST over the surrounding villas and trees to the cool waters of LAKE TANGANYKA. On the WEST the ground dropped sharply to a small winding valley called The Brown Valley, which contained the Local Gendarmerie camp and firing-range.
  - b. B Company: B Company was in another convent belonging to the White Sisters, situated towards the NORTH edge of the town on somewhat lower ground and nearer to the lakeside.
  - c. C Company: About a mile further on C Company occupied a group of villas called QUARTIER KAKOMBA built on a height overlooking the bridge where the road to the airport crossed the RIVER LUKUGA as it emerged from the lake.
  - d. Summary:
    - (1) Battalion Headquarters and Headquarters Company - Regina Pacis Convent of the White Sisters ALBERTVILLE.
    - (2) A Company - KAMINA
    - (3) B Company - Second convent of the White Sisters ALBERTVILLE
    - (4) C Company - QUARTIER KAKOMBA, ALBERTVILLE.

31. Garrison of ALBERTVILLE:

Between QUARTIER KAKOMBA and the airport, which was built on the shore of the lake about four miles further on, was the FILTISAF cotton factory.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL

This factory was working and had a garrison of Belgian soldiers to protect both it and the white technicians who lived in a very attractive housing estate surrounding the factory. This Belgian unit appeared to be about a company plus, and was under the command of a COLONEL MAAS. The factory was owned by a Belgian-American consortium of which NELSON ROCKEFELLER, the Governor of New York, was a major shareholder.

32. In the C.F.L. housing estate near the centre of the town the Mali UN battalion was quartered. Their commander was a very urbane officer of mixed French-Senegalese blood. His name was LIEUT-COL MADEMBA. He was a paratrooper, a veteran of campaigns with the French Army in North Africa, Italy, Indo-China and Algeria. Only a few weeks before this he and all his men had been soldiers of the French Colonial Army, but since arriving in the CONGO they had become soldiers of the new state of MALI.
33. The Government of KATANGA also had an armed force in the town. In the camp at BROWN VALLEY was a force of Gendarmerie estimated at about a company with about eighty recruits in training. Their commander was a very experienced, resourceful, brave and honourable officer, COMMANDANT JACQUES. He was assisted by several young Belgian officers, amongst them a LIEUTENANT JACQUES who was no relation of his but was a grandson of the founder of ALBERTVILLE.
34. There was also a large police force in the town, numbering about one hundred, commanded by a Congolese with several Belgian officers as advisers. The police were armed.
35. Conference with Operations Officer 9 Brigade:

Whilst the troops were being driven to their company areas the Commanding Officer, company commanders and senior members of the Battalion staff assembled at the Hotel du Lac to meet COMMANDANT KEVIN O'BRIEN, our ex-Second in Command, now Operations Officer 9 Brigade, who had arrived from Brigade Headquarters in ELIZABETHVILLE with orders from COLONEL BYRNE. He briefed all on the current situation in NORTH KATANGA and passed on instructions regarding the future deployment of the unit. We were informed that the writ of PRESIDENT TSHOMBE'S KATANGA Government ran in the area, but that in many places it did so against the wishes of the people. This was particularly so in ALBERTVILLE where about 80% of the Congolese population were said to be violently opposed to his regime. **Nonetheless**, it was the administration in power, and as such we were to co-operate with it. We were to co-ordinate our patrols and other activities with it, but we were not to commit ourselves to obvious collaboration with it. For instance, we were not to carry out joint patrols with Katangese Gendarmerie or police.
36. Comdt O'Brien also informed the Commanding Officer that the Battalion was to relieve the MALI contingent as they were ordered to move to the KABALO area within a few days. We were also to take over the protection of the FILTISAF factory and housing estate; the Belgian Army garrison were under orders to evacuate the area and sail across the lake to USUMBURA or KIGOMA. He impressed on us the necessity for speed in taking over the duties of the Mali and Belgian troops. The unit was not in good physical shape that day. As already stated, a high proportion of the men could not undertake any duty because of inoculation sickness, all were weary from long journeys and from repeated loading and unloading of **several** hundreds of tons of stores in tropical heat. We had hoped for a short recuperation period, but the urgency of the work was realised and arrangements were made to shake out to our new **positions** without delay.
37. Battalion Takes Over Duties and Posts: During the next few days the Battalion took over all the duties and outposts assigned to it. The dates and numbers of troops involved are as follows:-

CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL II.

## a. B Company:

- (1) 27 August - Company advance party under Capt John Ryan was airlifted to MANONO and took over from Mali troops. Rear party of Belgian troops were still there and pulled out 27/28 August by road on route KIAMBI - NIEMBA - ALBERTVILLE.
- (2) 28 August - Convoy of four hired trucks and four jeeps with all company stores and equipment to MANONO under Capt. Croke with escort of 35 men. Journey took forty-four hours.
- (3) 28 August - Capt H. Gouldsbrough and twenty men by air to MANONO and then to PIANA MWANGA by road to take over protection of power station from Mali troops.
- (4) 29 August - Balance of Company, less Lt Enright's platoon left in ALBERTVILLE, to MANONO by air under Company Commander.

## b. C Company:

- (1) 26 August - 34 all ranks under Capt. J. Flynn and Lieut. M. Bohane to take over the protection of a hydro-electric power station from Mali troops at BENDERA, 75 miles North of ALBERTVILLE.
- (2) 28 August - Party of 21 all ranks under Lieut. J. Clarke to KABIMBA, a cement factory on the lake shore about 34 miles North of ALBERTVILLE.
- (3) 31 August - Party of 31 all ranks under Lieut. McCarthy to BAUDOUINVILLE, a small town and port on the lake shore about 120 miles SOUTH of ALBERTVILLE. The town was an administrative centre, the seat of a bishop, and contained a seminary and a convent. The detachment travelled by lake steamer which provided a regular twice-weekly service to BAUDOUINVILLE.
- (4) 29 August - Platoon of B Coy under Lt Enright attached took over garrison duties at FILTISAF.

c. On 28 August the Battalion commenced mounted and foot patrols on the streets of the European quarter of ALBERTVILLE during daylight.

38. Visit by OC 9 Brigade and Irish L.O. On Sunday 28 August COL H. BYRNE OC 9 Brigade who had set up his Headquarters at ELISABETHVILLE visited Battalion Headquarters. He was accompanied by some of his staff officers and by LIEUT-COL F.E. LEE, who was Irish Liaison Officer at the Headquarters of the Force Commander, GENERAL VAN HORN, in LEOPOLDVILLE. During the day conversations were held between members of the two staffs and many problems were ironed out. LT COL. LEE held a conference on mail deliveries, and allied subjects. Except for a brief visit with General Van Horn on 19 September, this was the only opportunity LT COL LEE got of visiting the unit during its tour of duty. COL BYRNE was briefed on the unit's activities by the Battalion Commander and staff and professed himself satisfied with the steps we had taken. He also informed us that his Headquarters had been designated SCOMEF, Sub Command Eastern Provinces. From then on both he and his Headquarters were known and referred to as SCOMEF.

CONFIDENTIAL



# CONFIDENTIAL<sup>12</sup>.

39. Departure of Mali Battalion: Sunday 28 August also saw the departure of the Mali Battalion from ALBERTVILLE. LIEUT-COL. MADEMBA called to the Battalion Headquarters to say farewell and COMDT. McCARTHY went to the railway station with the Unit pipe band to play the Mali soldiers off to KONGOLO.
40. Liaison With Local Administration: During our first few days in the town we made contact with the local administration. The District Commissioner was a Congolese named KISSI. He had as his adviser the ex-District Commissioner, a Belgian named GOLRTZ, who had with him most of the old Belgian District Staff. Each day the Battalion Commander and members of the staff attended a liaison conference with the District Commissioner and his staff. Also present at these conferences were COMDT. JACQUES and one or two of his officers, and M. MADEMBA the senior police officer of the District with his Belgian adviser. The Congolese Commissioner of the Territory of ALBERTVILLE, M. Kabemba, responsible for the administration of the urban area of the town also attended. We found all the officials, both Belgian and Congolese, to be extremely co-operative and anxious to make our task easy. We never experienced any unpleasantness from them, although our aims and theirs were sometimes at variance. These daily conferences continued regularly with few interruptions until the unit left ALBERTVILLE. Our main task during the earlier conferences was to establish a rapport with our opposite numbers and to get the "feel" of the local political and military situation. At the same time we were co-ordinating our patrol activities with those of the local administration, avoiding at all times being involved in their military or police measures.
41. Departure of Belgian Troops: On 2/3 September the unit was witness to an event of historic importance. On the 2nd a trainload of Belgian troops and military equipment from KAMINA arrived at ALBERTVILLE accompanied by an escort from A Company commanded by LIEUT. O'ROURKE. They were the last Belgian troops to leave KAMINA, the last Belgian forces in Northern KATANGA. This marked the end of the great base of KAMINA as a bastion of European power in Central Africa, a Base built with such vast expenditure of effort and treasure since the end of World War II. It was an outward visible sign of the sweeping changes which were taking place in AFRICA. The Belgian soldiers, about 300 of them, stayed in the railway station that night. They slept rough in the warehouses and stores. To avoid incidents we secured the area of the station and harbour and allowed nobody except bona fide officials and workers to enter or leave. The next day, 3 September, they loaded their heavy equipment and transport on the lake steamers and that evening they sailed across the lake to USUMBURA.
- They were not very well provided for, and their officers gratefully accepted our offer to supply the men with extra rations and soft drinks. Strangely, their compatriots in the town took no notice of them whatsoever. As far as we could see nobody came to see them off or to bring the soldiers food and drink or other comforts.
42. Report on Unit Position to SCOMEF: On 3 September the Battalion Commander submitted a brief report to SCOMEF on the situation in the unit and in our area. It outlined our transport, communications and interpreting problems and expressed general satisfaction with our accommodation. It is worth recalling that at this early date he wrote - "HQ 33 Bn must now give up its accommodation as school starts again 12 September and some difficulty is being experienced in getting suitable alternative buildings". Truth is this marked the opening shots in a five month long campaign between ourselves and the Mother Superior of the convent - a mild-looking little slip of a woman of indeterminate age with a will of iron. Her only interest was the education of young Africa and by persistent wheedling month-by-month she ejected us from one room after another, until eventually her class roll was almost as big as it had been in more peaceful times.

CONFIDENTIAL

At one stage we had conveyed to her by indirect means that the District Officer had power to evict herself and the community from the premises and would do so on our behalf if she did not leave us in peace. Nobody took this threat seriously but she did express to us her amazement that Irish Catholic soldiers would contemplate such a step. The fact that our Commanding Officer was one of the few Protestant officers in the Army added piquancy to this by-play. The bizarre nature of our occupation was exemplified by the fact that the NCO's of the Headquarters slept in a one-storey block of nuns' cells, and the nuns slept in a similar block a few yards away. One cannot see it happening in a convent in Ireland.

The following paragraph in the report is worthy of inclusion here:

"14 Effect of Occupation of Area by 33 Infantry Battalion:

- a. The occupation of the cotton factory area (FILTISAF) and KABIMBA factory has resulted in the continuation of technicians and managerial staffs at their posts. Two thousand three hundred Congolese have been kept in employment.
- b. BENDERA power station would have closed down but for our detachment being there.
- c. We are informed by Civil Administration and by local traders that ALBERTVILLE has become quiet since our troops arrived.
- d. When there arose a gap in time between the evacuation by the MALI and our occupation of BAUDOUINVILLE there was sudden panic in that area which returned to normal on the arrival of our troops.
- e. It would seem that the "Blue Helmets" are having, as far as can be judged, a good effect on the population."

Proof of 14e above was the relaxation of the ALBERTVILLE curfew hours. Very shortly after our arrival the hour of commencement was changed from 1800 to 2200 hours.

43. Relations With Local Civilians, Requests, Panic Stories: Our relations with the non-official local population both white and black were very good - in the beginning. Later, for reasons which will be apparent these deteriorated, at times to open hostility. Frequently we received requests from local white traders and farmers to perform tasks for them which did not come within our province - long escorts up country to protect the owner of a shop who wanted to find out if his goods had been stolen by his black servant, etc. It appeared that they were under the impression that we had arrived to take their part against the Congolese. As the realisation of our neutral position dawned on them so did their regard for us decline. We never refused a request which we judged to be serious and genuine. On 27 August CAPT. B. GOGARTY and a small patrol drove to a farm 130 miles south of ALBERTVILLE to rescue a farmer whose wife, with some reason, believed him to be in danger.

The white farmers and business men were very prone to panic. Many of them, certainly all the farmers, had powerful short-wave transceivers on which they chattered to each other all day, exchanging gossip and rumours. We soon became immune to their frequent visits to our headquarters with stories of disaster and impending doom.

44. Guards at Convent, Railway Station, and Airport:

- a. When B Company left the White Sisters' Convent in the town to go to MANONO we felt that the nuns should not be left entirely unprotected - the fringe of the Native City was only a hundred yards or so from some of the Convent buildings, and one of the main roads from the town "gin-mill area" to the Native City passed close by. We posted a guard in the Convent each night at sun-down, regularly at 1800 hours, and this re-assured the nuns. Again we encountered something which would hardly be considered normal in Ireland. Each nun's cell opened directly on to a long verandah which the soldiers occupied for the night. After some time we discontinued this guard, but later in our stay we put it on again after the nuns had been disturbed by nocturnal intruders.
- b. On 2 September we received a request from the civil administration to put a guard on the railway station as they had reason to fear sabotage. We posted a night guard which we were able to take off after some few weeks. For the same reason, and also to guarantee our air communications, we later placed a guard on the airport buildings.

45. Fear of ANC Attack from KIVU, Civilian Protection and Lake Evacuation Plans, Demolition of Frontier Bridges:

- a. Soon after our arrival it became apparent that the administration feared an attack by Armees National Congolais (ANC) from KIVU in the North. This it was presumed would be accompanied by an uprising by the 35000 Congolese in the Native City. The local administration had prepared a plan for the evacuation of all Europeans, and of those Congolese who wished to go, in this eventuality. They were to assemble in the railway station buildings and be brought across to USUMBURU by lake steamer. We agreed with this plan, and took over the task of holding the station and harbour area and patrolling the streets. We informed the civilians that they would have to surrender their personal weapons once they came under our protection, whether on the way to the assembly area or while there. Our plans included the evacuation of the employees of FILTISAF by land or water to join the main body in the harbour area.
- b. In the event the threatened invasion did NOT materialise. Early in September COMDT. JACQUES and his Second in Command CAPT BRIE, accompanied by a small party of men, went up to the Northern border of KATANGA and blew all the bridges in the area NORTH of BENDERA. The demolitions were carried out by CAPT. BRIE. For good measure COMDT JACQUES at one of the bridges shot and killed a few uniformed men who were observing their operations from the Northern bank of the river. It was later alleged that one at least of these was a postman. Be that as it may, the military potential of KIVU was not so serious as had been supposed, and these operations discouraged any advance Southwards from KIVU for some time.

46. Detachment of Officers from Battalion, Swedish Interpreters Join us:

- a. Having lost the services of our Second in Command, - COMDT K. O'BRIEN, to Headquarters 9 Brigade we were now to suffer further losses. Within a few weeks of our arrival CAPT B. GREER was taken by SCOMEPE, CAPT. R. HINCHY and CAPT. M. O'DONNELL were transferred to Headquarters Kamina Base Group and CAPT. B. GOGARTY was sent to KAMINA to join an Observer Group which had been set up under the Swedish COLONEL MOELLERSWARD.
- b. During our first week we were fortunate in having sent to us two interpreters who were to stay with the unit until we left KATANGA. They were two Swedish Army officers, Lieuts. STIG VON BAYER and ROLAND LINDHOLM. The former was a young regular officer who had just completed his cadet training in Sweden when the CONGO trouble broke out. The latter was a young Reserve Officer. Both had

spent their youth in the CONGO. Von Bayer's father was a Government engineer in KATANGA, Lindholm's parents had been missionaries in KIVU, and they spoke fluent French and Swahili as well as English and Swedish. They became very much members of the Battalion family. They were young men of great personal courage and devotion to duty. Since their linguistic capacities were constantly in demand they did much more patrolling than any officer in the unit and so found themselves more frequently in conditions of fatigue, discomfort and danger. No task was too strenuous or dangerous for them, and our soldiers very quickly accepted them and respected them, not just as competent interpreters but as determined, trustworthy leaders.

47. Patrols in Native City, Band Recitals: After a week or so it became apparent that our patrols in the European quarter were having the desired effect and it was agreed with the civil administration that we should send daylight patrols into the Native City. This we did, at first in some strength, but later when we found that our soldiers were well received we reduced the numbers. We also paraded the Battalion Pipe Band down the town each Sunday after Mass. At first, as with the patrols, we did this only in the European quarter. But later we extended our musical activities to the Native City where the band was even more welcome and where the delighted population turned out in their hundreds to dance, to the music of the pipes, measures which were never seen in the Mansion House.
48. Train Guards: From the first week of our arrival in ALBERTVILLE we supplied guards for trains going to KAMINA, and KABALO, and later NIEMBA. These train guards were irregular and frequent. They normally consisted of one NCO and three or five Privates, but later they were increased in strength until just before we were forced to discontinue them altogether a train guard of almost 100 all ranks was planned. Sometimes the journey was without incident and the men were away from ALBERTVILLE for only two days. Sometimes, particularly after 8 November, the journeys were full of incidents and dangers, and the guards were away from us, and sometimes even out of touch with us, for four or five days. The guards were found from either HQ or C Companies, or perhaps consisted of a mixture of both. Without exception the junior officers and NCO's who commanded these guards merited the highest praise. They were thrown entirely on their own resources, away from the control or support of their superiors for days on end in new and sticky situations. In no case did they fail to live up to the high demands made on them. Two such train guards, one commanded by Sgt. McCormack of HQ Company and one commanded by CAPT. K. SLOANE are described in detail later in this account. Train guards also operated in the opposite direction and C Company frequently played host, and very well they did it too, to Swedish and Ethiopian troops guarding trains originating from KAMINA and KABALO respectively.
49. Visitors - Lieut. Col. Neill MacLean M.P. General Van Horn, M. Godefroid Munongo, Chief Kasanga:

During September we had several visitors to ALBERTVILLE .

- a. Lieut. Col. Neill MacLean, M.P. An early visitor was Lieut. Col. Neill MacLean Conservative M.P. for Inverness in the British Parliament. He was presumably engaged on one of those foreign tours by which British M.P.'s relieve the tedium of the long summer recess and gain their expertise in foreign affairs. He was accompanied by officials of the KATANGA Ministry of Foreign Affairs and of the British Consulate in ELIZABETHVILLE. We met him at the Airport and entertained him to lunch in Headquarters Mess.

- b. General Van Horn: On 19 September we were visited by the Supreme Commander, General Van Horn. He was doing a tour of KATANGA and had visited 32 Infantry Battalion before us, so he very thoughtfully brought Lieut. Col. Buckley and Rev. Fr. Crean from that unit to visit us. He was unable to visit our Headquarters, but we had a Guard of Honour for him at the airfield and cordoned off the whole area while we held a conference in the airport building. This conference was attended by him and his entourage and the staff and other officers of the Battalion.
- c. M. Godefroid Munongo; During September the Minister for the Interior in the KATANGA Government, M. GODEFROID MUNONGO visited ALBERTVILLE with his Chef de Cabinet, a Belgian who had been Territorial Commissioner in BAUDOUINVILLE. They attended our liaison meeting with the Administration that day, and the conference turned into an inquisition during which the Battalion and the UN was under severe attack. We put them down as a thoroughly bad pair. Future events in South KATANGA entirely unconnected with 33 Infantry Battalion were to prove us only too accurate in our estimates.
- d. Chief Kasanga: In September we were also visited by Chief KASANGA, who controlled all the country from the R. LUBUYE about five miles NORTH of ALBERTVILLE northwards as far as BENDERA. Although he lived in Tshombe country he flew the Central Government flag over his village, as COMDT. P.D. HOGAN and LIEUT. VON BEYER observed when they visited it some days before. He had prevented his men from attacking the Belgian officials at the KABIMBA cement factory. He was a good, moderate chief, not to be confused with Chief Kasanga Niemba, who was one of the planners of the NIEMBA ambush.

50. Baluba Uprising in MANONO - visit of COLONEL McINERNEY from IRELAND - Reinforcement of MANONO:

- a. On 14 September the Baluba tribesmen of MANONO area rose against the Tshombe administration and garrison in the town. This event, which is described in detail in Chapter 4, was to have far-reaching consequences. What began as an act of violence in one town spread throughout Northern KATANGA until it culminated in the establishment of a separate Baluba province the next year. It isolated B Company still further from Battalion Headquarters - only one road patrol from ALBERTVILLE succeeded in reaching MANONO thereafter and all our communication had to be by air. It imposed a tremendous strain on every man in the Company until the day they rejoined us. The conduct of the Company on the day of the rising and the manner in which COMDT. PEARSE BARRY handled the extremely dangerous situation which arose aroused the admiration of all UN personnel in the CONGO. On his return to Ireland he was promoted by the Government to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel in well-deserved recognition of the outstanding qualities of leadership which he displayed during those weeks.
- b. By coincidence COL. M. McINERNEY, the Director Medical Corps, was on a visit from Ireland and was in MANONO on the morning of the uprising. He flew from there to ALBERTVILLE at once bringing with him the more contentious members of the Tshombe administration who had placed themselves under UN protection and whom COMDT. BARRY wished out of the way as early as possible.
- c. The next day the Battalion Commander flew to MANONO to visit the Company and assess the situation. He took with



BRIDGES: No large bridges except at NIEMBA where there is an iron bridge over the R. LUKUGA. Other bridges usually tree trunks covered with planks spanning dried out water courses.

NATIVES: Very friendly reception for U.N. troops at all the villages en route. No Europeans in NIEMBA. All public and private buildings still intact. Only one petrol pump in town but no petrol in it. Limited supply in 40 gallons drums available from Cotanga Agent. There is a large very clean guest house in the centre of the town for the use of European travellers. There is little or no work in the town except that provided by C.F.L. at the Rly Stn. This is also a cotton growing area and large tracts were under cultivation.

NIEMBA to SENGA - TSHIMBO

Patrol departed NIEMBA at 12.30 hours 27th and arrived SENGE-TSHIMBO at 18.30 hours same day.  
The patrol was unable to proceed any further due to -

- (a) Expiry of time limit. Patrol being then 90 Km. 4/5 hrs from KIAMBI and already 14 hrs on the road.
- (b) Insufficient petrol to enable it to continue to KIAMBI and return to ALBERTVILLE.

ROADS: Reasonable surface. Very dusty. Steep hills but suitable for vehicles not exceeding 6 tons.

BRIDGES: SOUTH of KAMANDA over the River LUWEYEYE - small concrete bridge in good condition.  
At KINSUKULU over the LUBILE River - a modern concrete bridge in excellent condition.  
NORTH of MUKANDA over the River ESA - A Bailey Bridge. This Bridge marks the boundary between the Territoire ALBERTVILLE and Territoire MANONO. The planking and the steel stringers of one span, that on the MANONO side, (SOUTH) had been removed. After a search the steel stringers were located in the brush nearby and the bridge repaired by the Bn Engineer Officer with planking brought with the patrol for that purpose Repair time - 40 minutes.  
NORTH of SENGE-TSHIMBO. Another Bailey Bridge partly demolished by the removal of planking from the southern span. Again repaired by the Engineer Officer using bridging material carried by the Patrol. Repair time approx. 35 minutes.

NATIVES From NIEMBA to the ESA River the natives in the villages on route were very friendly and crowded to the roadside to welcome the patrol. There were many signs indicative of the existence of normal life and the administration of law and order in the territory of ALBERTVILLE. However, once the ESA River was crossed it was evident that peaceful conditions no longer obtained. Villages were observed apparently deserted by the natives. At MUKANDA was seen a burned out village. Ten Km. further SOUTH was seen one native armed with a bow and arrows and another armed with a Bundookie (muzzle loader). They were both just off the road. The former may have been hunting game but it is doubtful if the latter was.

NORTH of SENGE-TSHIMBO when repairing the bridge over the River LUIZI shouting was heard from a village on the top of a hill some 500 yards SOUTH of the bridge. At the same time a native was seen running out of the bush back to the village.

The clamour in the village increased in intensity and the Patrol Commander decided to investigate the matter. Accompanied by the Interpreter, Bn. I/O, and Capt. Flynn of "C" Company he proceeded on foot towards the native village. On the way the Interpreter using a Tannoy Loud Hailer explained to the villagers that the patrol was a U.N. patrol and had come in peace to help the villagers if required. This had no effect and a few minutes later an armed hostile war party was seen approaching from the village. This party approx 80 to 120 strong, armed with bows and arrows, muzzle loaders, bicycle chains and clubs and chanting a war cry approached rapidly to within five yards of the Patrol Commander and party and only stopped when again called upon by the Interpreter. It was again explained to them that the U.N. patrol was on a peaceful mission on its way to KIAMBI; and intended to get there by peaceful means if possible or by force if necessary.

After a short period of tension the war party adopted a friendly attitude and eventually dispersed back to the village, first informing the patrol that there were road blocks on the route of the patrol and promising to have them removed. The war party complained that the Pigmies had burned one of their villages and stated that it was their intention to mount a dawn attack on the Pigmies that morning. They also stated that it was their intention to go to ALBERTVILLE soon to kill all the people there.

It was noted that the war party was using the Cartel Balubakat sign similar to that used by the natives in MANONO.

The patrol proceeded and in the next ten or fifteen Kms encountered a total of six road blocks all of which were manned by a covering party of between 8 to 15 armed natives, (bows and some muzzle loaders). These blocks were removed by the covering parties, some readily, some after argument. To expedite the removal of the road blocks one of the war party was persuaded to travel on the bonnet of one of the Land Rovers. However on reaching the first road block and seeing the muzzle leader pointed in his direction by the covering party, he declined to remain there any longer. At 18.30 hours on 27th the patrol reached SENGE-TSHIMBO where they occupied a European Guest House situated on the outskirts of the village.

#### RETURNS TO ALBERTVILLE

At 03.00 hours on the 28th the patrol dep SENGE-TSHIMBO for ALBERTVILLE. Considerable warlike activity was observed on the River ESA. All the road blocks encountered on the journey South had been re-erected and were manned by covering parties of from ten to fifteen natives. These were armed with bows, arrows, clubs, bicycle chains and old muzzle loaders. Some of them appeared to be under the influence of drugs. No great trouble was experienced in passing through the blocks. The road blocks usually consisted of bushes or rope across the road and in one instance a row of old dark chairs was used. It should be noted that the natives were extremely active during the hours of darkness, contrary to the general opinion held in this respect. It is quite evident that the natives can and may mount an attack during the hours of darkness. Once the Territory of ALBERTVILLE was entered at the ESA River the patrol was uneventful.



**CONFIDENTIAL** 20.

NIEMBA was reached at 09.30 hours and ALBERTVILLE at 15.00 hours.  
There were no casualties.  
Mechanical trouble - Nil.  
Moral of the officers and men of the patrol was excellent.

\_\_\_\_\_  
CFT.

(P. KEOGH)

PATROL COMMANDER

\_\_\_\_\_  
CFT.

(T.M. McMAHON)

Bn. I/O

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**<sup>21.</sup>

- b. ESA RIVER Patrol: On 1 October a similar patrol with a similar mission left ALBERTVILLE. The vehicles and personnel were transported by rail as far as NIEMBA. The Patrol Commander was CAPT. J. FLYNN, C Company and the men were drawn from Headquarters and C Companies. This patrol did not even get as far as SENGE-TSHIMBO. It was held up finally at the ESA RIVER bridge SOUTH OF KINSUKULU on the NIEMBA-KIAMBI road. They met the same Baluba war party who expressed the same interest in capturing ALBERTVILLE and killing everybody in it. They were now several miles nearer their objective. The patrol returned all the way by road reaching ALBERTVILLE the next day, 2 September, at 2000 hours.
- c. The Long Patrol: A routine escort by two men of Headquarters Company was the beginning of a train of events both tragic and adventurous. The full report by CAPT K. SLOANE, one of those who took part in The Long Patrol is as follows:-

On Monday 3 October, the NCO i/c of the KAMINA/ALBERTVILLE trainguard, Sgt. Nolan, reported on his return that the driver of his train had refused to drive the train through NIEMBA as he said the town was invested by a Baluba war party and that it was only after much persuasion that he had been prevailed upon to do so.

Tuesday 4 OCTOBER: At 0600 hours Sgt. Bourke and Pte Kearns both of Headquarters Company left ALBERTVILLE for NYUNZU, escorting an official of the Cotanga (Cotton Company of Katanga) Company who was bringing a large payroll to NYUNZU to pay the cotton workers in that area.

At 1000 hours, Sgt. Bourke returned and reported that the bridge at NIEMBA was broken and that a large party of Balubas was guarding the NIEMBA side. They appeared to be holding NIEMBA and said they would kill anyone who tried to cross.

At 1100 hours CFL (Chemin de Fer du Grand Lacs), the Railway Company, reported that one of their trains was held up at NIEMBA by a Baluba warparty. Apart from the value of the cargo involved, the train was manned by a number of Congolese workers, a Belgian Railway Official and carried two Portugese traders. It was feared that they would be killed.

The Battalion Commander decided to dispatch a patrol immediately to investigate. The following Headquarters Company personnel were included:-

Comdt. P. Keogh, Patrol Commander  
Comdt. J. Burke, MO  
Capt. K. Sloane  
Capt. J. Gibbons.  
Lieut S. Von Beyer (Swedish Offr. Interpreter)  
Sgt. J. Guthrie.  
Sgt. M. Mulcahy  
Cpl. Cheyney  
Pte. Fortune  
Pte. Alcorn.

The remainder was made up of personnel from C Company. Two Ethiopian Officers members of UNMOG (United Nations Military Observer Group) accompanied the patrol.

As the bridge at NIEMBA was broken and guarded it was decided that the patrol would travel by train, but would carry sufficient motor transport to move by road if it became necessary to leave the train.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~<sup>22.</sup>

At approximately 1700 hours, the train was nearing NIEMBA and was travelling through a narrow valley, with hills rising up on both sides of the track. The usual bush and undergrowth extended up to the side of the track except for an occasional small clearing.

On the right hand side of the train a native village could be seen and on the approach of the train the women began to run from the village and up the hill carrying huge bundles, wrapped in coloured blankets, on their heads and followed by their children. Lieut Von Bayer called to them on the loud hailer and told them not to run away as the train carried a UN patrol which would not harm them. They took no notice and continued to run away.

Lieut. Von Bayer continued to assure them as the train crawled on at three or four mph. Two or three men carrying bows and arrows appeared between the village and the train and Comdt. Keogh instructed Lieut. Von Bayer to call them. He did so and they came towards the train. Comdt Keogh stopped the train and prepared to alight to talk with the men. He instructed Capt. Gibbons, Lieut. Von Bayer, the two Ethiopian Observers Coy. Sgt. Sullivan (C Company) and two Privates to accompany him and instructed Capt. Sloane to take charge of the remainder of the patrol and to cover the parleying party and to protect the train.

Comdt. Keogh and his party alighted from the train and walked to the front, where the three men awaited. This was about fifty yards away from the passenger carriages in which the patrol was travelling. The intervening space was taken up by flat cars carrying the transport and goods waggons the railway company had included. The passenger carriages were at the rear, so that in the event of the train becoming derailed, the passenger carriages would be unlikely to suffer. Comdt. Keogh and his companions walked to the front of the train and the interpreter assured the men that this was a UN patrol, on a peaceful mission, and would not harm anyone. However as he did so the very ground seemed to erupt armed and furious Balubas and in a matter of minutes the train was surrounded by upwards of five hundred angry gesticulating Balubas. Some had been hiding in the bush, others came from the nearby village and more from the Railway Station at NIEMBA, which it transpired was only five hundred yards away around a bend.

The Balubas were armed with bows and arrows, bondookies (muzzle-loaders), spears, clubs etc. All appeared to be drunk or drugged or both. Foaming at the mouth and with their eyes popping out of their head, some yelled and screamed hatred at the patrol while others kept chanting their war cry "Cartel" "Cartel".

The situation was very serious. Comdt. Keogh and the parleying party was surrounded by one hundred to one hundred and fifty of them. These were screaming and threatening as they milled around the small group. One Baluba had an arrow in his bow and the string pulled back, with the poisoned tip only a few inches from Coy. Sgt. Sullivan's broad back.

The two carriages occupied by the remainder of the patrol were also surrounded, with about one hundred Balubas on each side. The remainder of the warriors ran up and down between the two groups. The whole scene was more like some fantastic film than reality.

The patrol was in a very dangerous position. Only about an hour of daylight remained and with the train stopped in what was little more than a cutting, all the advantages seemed to be with the Balubas. The track was cut immediately in front of the train.

It seemed that Comdt. Keogh's party was doomed. If a fight started they would surely be dead before the remainder of the patrol could get to them and the Balubas appeared to be working themselves up into a frenzy in preparation for an attack. Capt. Sloane climbed out unarmed on to the

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**CONFIDENTIAL**<sup>23</sup>

flat car beside the carriage to try to pacify the Balubas by showing them he was unarmed and therefore friendly but it was to no avail. They seemed determined to attack and with the parleying party cut off, it seemed that they must be killed. The remainder of the patrol included a number of very young soldiers and any accidental shot from one of them could have started a battle. It is to their credit that in spite of the tense situation no shot was fired.

The parleying group by making various friendly signs and repeating the swahili phrase "rafiki" meaning friends over and over again, managed to edge back to the engine, where they were able to put their backs to the train, thus improving their situation a little. Using the same tactics they edged their way back to the carriages and with sighs of relief from all, they clambered in.

There was only a short period of daylight remaining and with the track broken in front of the train and the place in which the train was stopped being most unsuitable if trouble started, Comdt. Keogh decided to go back to MUSWAKI, the next station, which was about twenty five miles away.

As the train pulled back the now jubilant Balubas ran alongside cheering and shouting.

At MUSWAKI, contact was made with Battalion Headquarters and Col Bunworth ordered the patrol to return to ALBERTVILLE, where it would be reinforced prior to making an attempt to go to NIEMBA by road. The Civil Administration in ALBERTVILLE was very much alarmed at the situation and had asked that the track be sabotaged. Capt. Sloane had explosives with him and blew a hole in the track.

The patrol reached ALBERTVILLE at mid-night. Here the transport was unloaded from the train and a hot meal was waiting. The patrol was also reinforced by Capt Jim Flynn of C Company and the following from Headquarters Company:

Sgt. Harrington	Pte. Kearns
Sgt. Murray	Pte. Cortibelli
Sgt. Fenlon	Pte. Ryan
Sgt. Sullivan	Pte. Fitzgerald
Cpl. Jones	Pte. Gardiner
Cpl. Reddy	Pte. Culhane
Sgt. Barron	Pte. Quigley
Cpl. Moran	
Cpl. Allen	
Cpl. Peoples	
Cpl. Mannix	
Gnr. Shields	
Pte. McDermott	
Pte. Marsh	
Pte. McCaffrey.	

Wednesday 5 October: At 0200 hours the reinforced patrol left by road for NIEMBA. In the meantime the transport and stores had been unloaded from the train and the light transport carried on the train had been added to by the addition of a new Ford 7 ton truck, which had been delivered that day.

This truck was to be the bane of the patrol for the next twenty four hours. It was overheating and nothing the drivers could do seemed to be of any use. At 0700 hours half of the 84 mile journey had not been covered and a stop for breakfast was made. At 1200 hours twenty miles still remained to be covered but in the intense heat of the day the truck had ground to a final halt.

In the meantime the Katanga Army had been active and a mobile platoon, on duty in North West Katanga was also moving through the night towards NIEMBA from the opposite side to the Irish patrol. The Katanga authorities had agreed that their patrol would not enter NIEMBA before

**CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL 24.

1600 hours so as to give the Irish patrol a chance to effect the release of the prisoners by peaceful means. When the Katanga authorities learned of the slow progress made by the patrol this deadline was lifted to 0800 hours the following day.

As the patrol ate in the shade at 1400 hours a Katanga aircraft zoomed overhead. By a neat bit of mental arithmetic, Capt Gibbons calculated which of the channels on a 31 Set would likely be on a aircraft radio frequency and within a few moments was in contact with the aircraft, which it transpired was carrying Comdt. Jacques, Commander of the Katanga Force in ALBERTVILLE. Comdt. Jacques informed Comdt. Keogh that the Katanga patrol was also delayed and asked for his radio frequency so that they could make radio contact.

As it was obvious that the Ford truck was unlikely to make much progress, Comdt. Keogh decided to establish a camp at the point where the patrol was and push on into NIEMBA with the other transport, leaving the cooks and a security party behind.

NIEMBA was reached at approx 1600 hours and as Sgt. Burke had reported, the bridge had been sabotaged by ripping up the decking (fortunately the main beams were intact) and a large party of armed Balubas stood guard on the far side.

Once more Comdt. Keogh and his parleying party went forward and once again was surrounded by a mob of armed Balubas. This time however he was in radio contact with the main body and, sitting on a jeep, was not at their mercy. As the ground was more open the main party was in a happier position too. As was usual when they did not hold all the aces the Balubas were in a somewhat more peaceful mood, although parties could be seen slipping across the bed of the river and around the patrol's flanks.

However, if the Balubas were less warlike they were utterly immovable when it came to the question of handing over the prisoners. Even an offer to exchange prisoners held by the Katanga authorities failed to move them. After  $1\frac{1}{2}$  hours parleying, Comdt. Keogh decided to move back before darkness fell.

On arrival back to where the cooks were, a hot meal was waiting and it was decided to bed down for the night there. Guards were posted and all the other necessary chores done and at around midnight everyone settled down for a sleep. The exhausted troops had been on the move since 0600 hrs on the 4th and it was now midnight on the 5th, a lapse of 42 hours.

At midnight, the Transport Officer, Capt. Flynn arrived with another truck, Sgt. Hennessy, an MT Fitter and Cpl. Heslin. Sgt. Hennessey diagnosed a defective thermostat in the Ford and fortunately had brought one with him, so that in a short time the truck was mobile once more.

The two Ethiopian observers returned to ALBERTVILLE.

Thursday 6 October: Reveille was at 0500 hours and at 0800 the full patrol was back at the bridge. There was no sign of life and the bridge was quickly repaired and the patrol pushed on into the town.

As the vehicles moved slowly through the outskirts of NIEMBA, not a sign of life greeted them. No people, no children, not even the ubiquitous goats and fowl. Then as the town proper was reached an amazing scene unfolded.

All the shops and houses, except three, in the centre of the town had been looted and most were on fire. Loot and debris of all kinds were scattered around. As the patrol passed by what had been a garage, the roof collapsed with a crash and sent a cloud of sparks skywards.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL<sup>25.</sup>

In the centre of NIEMBA is a cross roads, with a shop, a house and a Hotel de Chefferie. The Hotel is a "Do it yourself" hotel with all facilities except a staff provided. This was obviously the Balubas Headquarters and was in an indescribable state of filth. Filth of all types, half eaten food, mostly legs of chicken, loot, and a huge collection of native weapons, some bloodstained lay scattered around. Strangely enough the house was untouched although it contained food, drink and attractive items of all kinds. (It later transpired that the owner, an Indian, was married to the daughter of the local chief, a Baluba)

The shop, which was owned by the Indian, had been looted and in a room nearby lay the body of an old Congolese who had worked there. He lay on his back in bed, doubled up, with his stomach ripped open and his entrails hanging out. On the floor was the spear which had obviously done the deed. Many of the soldiers knew him as they had passed that way the previous week on another patrol and he had given them water.

Search parties searched all roads out of the town. On the road south to MANONO, two more bodies were found, one a man's and another a woman's. Both were killed by spear thrusts. In this area most of the native huts had been looted and a number broken or burned down. Loot and weapons of all descriptions covered the ground.

On the NYUNZU road, more bodies were found, about ten in all. Seven were Balubas, all armed and a number of them appeared to have been killed by bullets. The other three were natives killed with spears and clubs. All had terrible wounds. One man had the top of his head broken in like an eggshell and his brains lay beside him. Another was disembowelled. Some had just simple bullet wounds. All were beginning to decompose. On this road too native houses had been looted and destroyed. There was also a mission and a dispensary looking as if a tornado had hit it. Bottles and phials of drugs and medicines were broken, smashed and scattered around. Medical records had been ripped into confetti and all the furniture etc. broken beyond repair. The scene was one of amazing destruction. In the middle of it all lay a child's football undamaged.

At the railway station the missing train was found. It had been looted. The cargo consisted of a large consignment of Belga cigarettes and Simba beer as well as some electrical goods and some motor cars.

The cars had been damaged and one was burned. The goods wagons had been broken open and cigarettes and broken beer bottles were scattered around the yard. Apparently as soon as the Simba wagon was opened the beer was drunk. Apparently the looters had got drunk and had not bothered to remove the rest of the beer etc. In the crew's quarters there was a half eaten meal left abandoned and a pair of ivory dice were on the table.

In the station buildings, everything was smashed and broken. The telephone installation was smashed beyond repair. Among the debris lay the bodies of two more Congolese. Bales of cotton, which had been awaiting shipment were broken open and the cotton scattered to the winds.

On a hill above the station was the station office. This was also wrecked and the huge safe broken open. This massive looking safe had not been as impregnable as it must have looked, for although the outsize steel door looked unbreakable, the walls were only brick and easily broken open. Needless to say it was empty. One million francs were alleged to have been in it. The house nearly looked as if a tornado had hit it with furniture smashed into splinters.

While this recce was going on Lt-Col. Bunworth had arrived from ALBERTVILLE to make a personal inspection. He brought with him a welcome supply of drinking water and hydra containers full of hot soup. His escort included Coy Sgt. Keane.

CONFIDENTIAL

**CONFIDENTIAL<sup>26</sup>**

At this time the Gendarmerie Mobile Platoon arrived into NIEMBA also. A jeep had been sent out to tell them that the Irish patrol was in the town. Consisting of twenty seven Congolese and eight Belgians, they were a fearsome looking lot. For six weeks they had been out on patrol and in action almost daily. All had bushy beards and the floppy hats used to shade the sun from their eyes gave them a real wild west look. They were armed to the teeth.

Their rations were almost run out and they had no water. At the time they arrived, Col. Bunworth had not come so there was no water to give them. Comdt. Keogh offered a supply of Simba instead. The Belgian commander refused saying he would not allow his men to have it. When Col. Bunworth arrived they were given a hot meal.

The mystery of the shot Balubas was solved with the arrival of this platoon. A recce element had been moving into the town the night before, just before dark, and had run into a party of Balubas, who had attacked them. The recce group did not wish to get involved in a fight in the dark and after firing a few bursts to allow them to turn around, had withdrawn. This engagement had apparently precipitated the flight of the whole Baluba party. Two jeeps with about ten men had put somewhere between five hundred and a thousand Balubas to flight.

Before returning to ALBERTVILLE Col. Bunworth decided that the town would be garrisoned. Capts. Flynn and Sloane would remain with a garrison of Headquarters and C Company personnel. Capt. Gibbons would return the following day with those of the patrol who were required in ALBERTVILLE. Sgt. Sullivan would remain as wireless operator. SCOME~~P~~ had been asked to return A Company from KAMINA Base Group to 33 Battalion but pending the arrival of this unit, no pursuit of the missing prisoners could be undertaken and all concerned would have to be prepared to remain in NIEMBA indefinitely.

In the meantime the bodies were buried and the town was cleaned up preparatory to settling down for the night. One of the searchers found an old Congolese, who was too shocked to even speak. He trembled all over and even a hot meal and a cigarette could not calm him. He was in an absolute state of terror.

The only other native to appear was a railway worker, who kept repeating "Funga Matchua" (Close the train). He said that the Balubas had killed a large number of the townspeople and had taken thirty away as prisoners. They had also taken the two Portugese and the Belgian and headed south to MANONO.

Sentries were posted and the transport deployed so that its headlights could illuminate the approaches to the cross roads where the Patrol Headquarters was set up.

At about 2100 hrs the mobile platoon reported that four Balubas had been captured, while sneaking into the town. Lieut. Von Bayer confirmed this. Apparently he had been in the vicinity. He said that they were armed. About an hour later there was a burst of fire from the direction of the platoon's camp and a few moments later a jeep arrived. Two of the Baluba's had tried to escape. One had got away and the other had been shot. A doctor was required. Comdt. Burke went to their camp but on his return reported that the man was dead.

At mid-night a radio message was received from Battalion Headquarters Lieut. Kevin Gleeson and his platoon were flying in from KAMINA and would go straight to NIEMBA. Comdt. Keogh was required in ELIZABETHVILLE to make a first-hand report of the whole incident to SCOME~~P~~. He would return to ALBERTVILLE at first light. Information had been received that the Balubas and their prisoners were heading SOUTH towards MANONO. Capt. Flynn would assume command of the patrol and follow them. A patrol from B Company would head NORTH and secure the ferry for the patrol at KIAMBI. An NCO and a small party of men would be left at NIEMBA to await the arrival of Lt. Gleeson. They were Sgt. Guthrie, Cpls Kealy and Allen, Ptes (Fortune, Alcorn and Lynch.)

CONFIDENTIAL<sup>27</sup>.

Friday 7 Oct. The patrol headed south at approximately 0700 hrs. The trail was obvious for scattered all the way SOUTH was an unmistakable litter of loot, weapons, discarded clothing, half eaten food etc. The villages were all deserted except one, where the chief said that Balubas on foot and in lorries had been passing all night Wednesday and all day Thursday. He had heard that a big lorry had contained prisoners.

It soon became apparent that the Balubas were having transport trouble and two trucks were found abandoned. Each had been stripped of everything useful including batteries. Both also had empty petrol tanks, which may have been the cause of their abandonment. They were stopped near villages, all of which had been looted and wrecked. In one a dead villager was found.

The countryside appeared to be deserted but at one stop to make a routine radio report to Battalion Headquarters, the silence was broken by the loud bawling of an infant. A search revealed half a dozen women with their children hidden in the bush nearby. All were very frightened but were given food and sweets and sent on their way.

The road SOUTH from NIEMBA to MANONO, is, by CONGO standards, quite good and is well bridged with sturdy structures, some being Bailey Bridges. Accordingly the patrol made good progress. The first setback came at the ESA River, where the Bailey Bridge had been dismantled. It had apparently been guarded too for under the bridge a large quantity of bows and arrows were found. The guards, seemingly, had made off at the approach of the patrol.

The next obstacle was another Bailey Bridge, this time at the LUIZI River. Here too the damage was quickly set right. However, while work was in progress, a party of Balubas from the nearby village came and announced that the patrol could not pass. Capt. Flynn went up the road some two hundred yards to discuss the matter with them, while the remainder of the patrol repaired the bridge and brought the transport across.

While the repairs were in progress, one of the sentries reported movement from the high grass nearby. This turned out to be more women and children, who were dealt with as before.

Finally the bridge was repaired and the transport driven across. The group of Balubas was increasing every minute and they still refused to allow the patrol through. Capt. Flynn decided to drive through them. The patrol was briefed and mounted the vehicles, which were backed back to the bridge to give the maximum run forward, before meeting the Balubas. As the vehicles moved back the Balubas cheered, thinking that they had won their point. Then suddenly the convoy shot forward and was through the Balubas before they knew what was happening.

Then about five miles further SOUTH the Ford truck broke down again. This time the fan belt had broken and it ground to a halt enveloped in a cloud of steam.

The information was radioed back to Battalion Headquarters. Fortunately the plane bringing Col. Bunworth and Comdt. Keogh to ELIZABETHVILLE was just leaving and it was arranged to drop a replacement from the air. The drop was made with a weighted mailbag and it landed within ten feet of the road.

It was now obvious that KIAMBI could not be reached before dark but there was no alternative. The road allowed a fast rate of travel and no more obstacles were met with until just at KIAMBI, an unmanned roadblock had to be dismantled.

The River LUVUA at KIAMBI is almost one hundred yards wide and the only way across is by a ferry or by boat. The ferry consists of two big pontoons with a sturdy deck attached to them. It can take large trucks and is driven by a Ford V8 engine.

CONFIDENTIAL



**CONFIDENTIAL**

When the patrol arrived at the bank of the river, the ferry was there but the driver could not be found. The B Company patrol was on the far side, where it had been waiting since mid-afternoon.

KIAMBI was crowded with armed Balubas but there was no option but to camp there for the night. It was decided to camp in the grounds of the local Hotel de Chefferie. While preparations were being made for the night sentries reported large parties of armed Balubas moving around the perimeter. These reports were confirmed by both Capt. Flynn and Coy. Sgt. Sullivan. Accordingly special precautions would have to be taken.

It was decided to deploy in defensive positions for the night and that half the patrol would be awake at all times. The Hotel de Chefferie was not an ideal position but was about the best available. The transport was arranged so that the headlights could light up all the approaches. These were kept lighting all night with the engines running so as to keep the batteries charged. At intervals headlamp bulbs were removed to allow them to cool down.

As events turned out the night was reasonably peaceful with a full moon helping with the illuminations. Although occasionally a sentry saw something, nothing untoward happened. At one stage a sound like a rifleman "easing springs" alerted the patrol but nothing happened.

Saturday 8 October: At dawn a search was made of the surrounding area. It transpired that the local prison was only a few hundred yards away and that a party of Balubas had spent the night there. Fires were still smouldering in the prison yard and beds were even warm. A collection of trucks, obviously taken from NIEMBA was found one of which had been driven on a flat wheel until only the bead wires remained. In one of the trucks the bolt of a Mauser type rifle was found.

The White Fathers had been asking for a patrol to visit their Mission at KIAMBI, where only one priest, a Congolese, remained. This was done and it was found that the priest was in fact a Baluba. The Mission was deserted except for him and his houseboy and several doors had been broken in. The priest was very frightened and asked to be evacuated. He could give no information about the missing prisoners and said that the local Catholics could not do so either as even if they knew they would not talk.

A man was found, not the usual driver, who could operate the ferry and who had the rotor arm, which was missing. With his aid the transport was ferried across. Lieut. Von Bayer learned from him that a big dark coloured truck with prisoners aboard had crossed the ferry on the Thursday night. He was given presents of food and cigarettes and agreed to have the ferry available on the following day.

The trip from KIAMBI to MANONO was uneventful except that one Land Rover had to be towed for the last thirty miles. About ten road blocks were passed without incident.

Lieut. Raftery the Battalion Engineer Officer was in MANONO at the time, recovering trucks etc., which had been stolen from the local tin mines the previous month during the troubles there. During his searches he had found a truck answering the description of the one carrying the prisoners, parked outside the house of Andre Shabani, the local Baluba leader and a representative to the Congo Parliament.

Shabani was questioned but denied all knowledge of the prisoners. Various likely places in the town were searched but to no avail. Battalion Headquarters ordered the patrol to return to ALBERTVILLE on the following day.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

It was feared that the arrival of the patrol, the questioning of Shabani and the searching of the town might result in some trouble but the Orderly Officer, who made several tours of the town during the night reported that all was quiet.

Sunday 9 October: After Mass at 0500 hours, the patrol moved back to KIAMBI to find ... No Ferry. There was no other crossing of the river for several hundred miles, which would mean a 900 mile journey through unknown country. The ferry could not be seen.

Comdt. Barry OC of B Company in MANONO was contacted and he suggested calling in to Capt. Harry Goldsborough, who was OC of the outpost at PIANA on the way past. Capt. Goldsborough might have some information about the **usability** of the roads. They were only marked as tracks on the maps and no patrols had ventured over them.

As it turned out Capt. Goldsborough had no information about the roads but had a warm welcome and a meal waiting. After a brief halt the patrol passed on.

The roads soon began to go from bad to worse and the bridges became more and more rickety. The passage of the big Ford truck caused groaning beams and clouds of debris to fall from each one. However, fortunately none collapsed. At one stage the road became a track and finally almost disappeared in high grass. Near disaster struck when a section of road collapsed and the Chevrolet pick-up carrying the Engineer equipment (from its appearance this was known as the "Fire Brigade") heeled over on to its side. It was soon righted.

All the drivers were now feeling the strain of long hours at the wheel and sleepless nights. The only proper night's sleep had been got in MANONO. Accordingly it was decided to operate a system of reliefs, using anyone who could drive. Sgt. B. O'Keefe, who had been in MANONO and was now with the patrol as he had decided to come back with us proved his use here as he turned out to be an expert driver. He also had a bottle of Benedictine, which made him very popular.

This road was apparently leading to a "front area" in the war between the Balubas and their enemies the KONIKATS. At almost every village there was a road block manned by armed men. Some were quite substantial but it is doubtful if the others would stop even a determined cyclist. A number were manned by Balubas with the letters "PM" on their headband. This meant "Police Militaire".

Night fell when the patrol had reached a village called KAPONDO MUTEMBO. It was a most impressive nightfall with a thunderstorm for accompaniment. During the storm a number of the patrol sheltered in a large hut, together with a number of Balubas and a snake. Lieut. Von Bayer earned the eternal **admiration** of the villagers by catching the latter. When he let it go again there was consternation with Balubas erupting from every opening in the hut wall. However he caught it again and peace was restored.

Arrangements were made with the local chief to spend the night in the village. When the rain cleared a most fearful figure arrived trotting through the gathering gloom. This was a man who had apparently been calling the vengeance of the Baluba Gods down on the patrol about twenty miles back the road. He was dressed in a most amazing costume and carried a muzzle loader.

However his arrival in the village brought forth roars of laughter from the locals. Apparently he was the village idiot in the previous village and his "gun", consisted of nothing more than the stock of an old rifle with a bicycle pump attached. He had followed the patrol on foot for twenty miles and immediately on his arrival he launched a tirade against the Balubas, whom he said were a useless bunch of no goods (himself excepted of course). He said that the UN patrol should kill them all at once and that he would help them.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

# CONFIDENTIAL<sup>30</sup>

The next village KISELE, according to the locals, was a KONIKAT village and the Balubas boasted that on the previous week they had raided it and killed all the inhabitants. No one took a lot of notice of this.

Just as the patrol was settling down for the night the local chief came and asked if the doctor would treat some wounded. Comdt. Burke agreed and the wounded were brought to him. These were a pitiful sight. They had the most dreadful wounds and almost all had turned gangrenous. One man had the back of his calf ripped from the knee to the ankle. The flesh had turned back and was green and spongy. The bone was visible.

Another had a broken collar bone and a similar shoulder wound. Although he must have suffered agony as Comdt. Burke strapped the arm to his body, he never uttered a sound. All the wounded were accompanied by their wives as it is a Congolese custom that a wife goes to hospital with her husband.

There were other wounded in a hut in the village, who were unable to walk and Comdt. Burke went to them. These were in a very bad way and two died that night. Arrangements were made with the Chief to send them to the hospital in MANONO and MANONO was informed by radio.

To close a hectic day the chief informed Lieut. Von Bayer that the road ahead was mined.

Monday 10 October: The patrol moved off at 1800 hours. Battalion Headquarters had checked up with the Katanga authorities about the mines and had been assured that none were laid in that area. One of the locals offered to act as guide to where the mines were. When he came to the spot and dramatically pointed to the ground it was obvious that he was suffering from an overdose of imagination. The ground had not been disturbed for years.

However if there were no mines, there were plenty of demolished bridges and in an eight-mile stretch, eight bridges had to be built. These bridged gaps ranging from culverts, three or four feet wide to a fifteen foot stream. The old bridges had been burned so work had to be done from scratch. This meant felling trees for main beams, not an easy task in the broiling sun. A swamp on both sides of the road in places, added to the difficulties and to make matters worse, water was running scarce. At each obstacle the seven ton truck had to be unloaded, driven across and loaded again.

When at last, this nightmare stretch of road was passed, the patrol arrived at the village of KISELE to discover that the Baluba statements on the night before had not been exaggerated. Literally every single house in the village had been burned and an oppressive stench of death hung over the place. The reason for this was soon discovered for in the bush nearby a score of dead men, women and children were found. Even the women and children had been mutilated. Later it was learned that a Swedish patrol had visited the village two days before and had buried seventy five bodies.

From KISELE on the roads improved and good time was made. Balubas were now replaced by Konikats and the roadside villages were crowded with warriors armed with everything from bows and arrows to light machine guns. Some even wore Tshombe uniforms.

Arrangements had been made through ELIZABETHVILLE for the Swedes at PWETO to have food and water waiting. However when the patrol arrived into DUBIE some fifty miles away from PWETO, a Swedish patrol arrived from the opposite the opposite direction, carrying the welcome food and drink. The Swedes hearing of the plight of the Irish had driven out to meet the patrol.

At PWETO the river had to be crossed by a ferry similar to the one at KIAMBI and it took the patrol two hours to get ferries across. The Swedes had arranged billets at a nearby Protestant Mission.

CONFIDENTIAL

Tuesday 11 October: Venison (illegally shot by the Swedes) was on the menu today. It was decided to rest and clean up after the week's exertions, so it was very much a free day.

From PWETO there were two ways home, via BAUDOINVILLE, where Lieut. Tony McCarthy's Platoon manned an outpost. A more direct route bypassed BAUDOINVILLE but a bridge had been demolished there a few weeks previously when it was feared that a Baluba warparty was heading towards BAUDOINVILLE.

Capt. Sloane and Cpl. Reilly went to the bridge by jeep and discovered that it was beyond repair.

Wednesday 12 October: The run to BAUDOINVILLE was straightforward and except for one puncture there was no difficulty.

At BAUDOINVILLE Lieut. McCarthy and his platoon had a royal welcome awaiting and the patrol slept in beds for the first night since it had left ALBERTVILLE.

Thursday 13 October: Only 200 miles remained to be covered and although the ALBERTVILLE-BAUDOINVILLE road is hair-raising in spots, good time was made. Ironically it was on this run that the patrol had its first casualty when Cpl. Moran was taken ill. He had eaten some doubtful tinned fish and had contracted food poisoning.

Back in ALBERTVILLE a very relieved Bn OC greeted his lost patrol, which had covered 1200 miles in nine days, built eleven bridges and traversed roads where no UN patrol had set foot.

POSTSCRIPT: The missing prisoners were still alive when the patrol returned. About six weeks later it was learned from BALUBA sources, that they had been taken from MANONO back to KIAMBI, where there were held prisoner. Here they were beaten and tortured and finally in mid November, a week after the NIEMBA Ambush, were killed and their bodies thrown into the river.

d. Patrol to KAPONA:

On 21 October a strong patrol of twenty one men of C Company and an element of Headquarters Company left ALBERTVILLE for KAPONA under the command of Comdt. P.D. HOGAN. The following officers were also present COMDT. WHELAN, COMDT. B. BOYLAN, M.O., LIEUT W. RAFTERY and LIEUT S. VON BEYER, as was MR. ALAN BESTIC, an Irishman writing for "THE SUNDAY EXPRESS", who had come out from LONDON to cover our activities, with the blessing of our Army authorities. At KAPONA, which is a road junction about 230 Kms SOUTH of ALBERTVILLE on the road to BAUDOINVILLE the patrol was joined by a jeep patrol from BAUDOINVILLE under LIEUT TONLY MCCARTHY, who returned to his base later in the evening. Before dark the patrol, having learned that a Baluba party had been approaching KAPONA from the South West during the day, set off on the KILINDA road. After travelling several miles in the darkness and visiting two villages it became apparent that the war-party was a rumour and the patrol turned back and spent the night at a farm a few miles NORTH of KAPONA. The farm was one of several belonging to a Belgian-American combine called KOBELKAT and was several thousands of acres in extent. It was managed by a Belgian who had sent his wife and children home. With him were six other Belgians who had evacuated neighbouring farms. They and their Congolese farm workers were building a double barricade of barbed wire around the farm-house and with a respectable stock of small arms, including sub-machine guns, were putting the place into a state of defence. They said the Balubas were going to move up from the South-West eventually, they were just outside the Baluba controlled area, but they were not going to run away as their

fellow-countrymen had done. They were convinced the Balubas could be stopped if only determined men would stand up to them. They certainly were determined men and gave every sign of meaning to do as they said. The farm manager was most hospitable and the patrol stayed in the farm for three nights. On the second day the patrol with the farm manager and some of his companions drove SOUTH of KAPONA to another KOBEMAT farm about twenty miles away at KASONTE where there was to be a meeting of local peace-loving Baluba chiefs with leaders of the warlike Balubas from the South West. Also with the party was the Congolese Territorial Administrator from BAUDOUINVILLE and his Belgian adviser, both of whom had arrived at the farm during the afternoon. The meeting was abortive because only one chief, KAPONTE, turned up. The remainder were anxious for peace, but afraid. On the third day the same group accompanied the patrol on a journey of about fifty miles SOUTH towards PWETO. Several villages were visited including KABARE where the village elders said they had received formal messages from the Baluba war parties moving up from the SOUTH demanding their allegiance and their contribution in man-power and supplies. The chief had been summoned to a "magic", i.e. witch doctors induction ceremony, at GANIE-KASENGE 20 miles WEST. These demands they had rejected and the patrolling party were impressed by their courage and determination. That evening, 24 October - UN day - the patrol returned to ALBERTVILLE.

53. Anti-UN Demonstration ALBERTVILLE: The Belgians in ALBERTVILLE, due to their original misconception of our mission, were extremely disappointed with our recent performance in the area. They could see no reason why B Company in MANONO did not throw in their lot with the police and fire on the townspeople, and they harboured ill-will against them although they had saved and were continuing to save the lives of nearly a hundred Belgians in the town. Nor could they see why COMDT. KEOGH did not mount a savage attack on NIEMBA when his patrol was stopped outside the village. One day shortly after the sack of NIEMBA this ill-feeling boiled over and the Battalion received the ultimate accolade accorded to the occupying force. A long procession of motor cars moved passed the Headquarters with their horns honking in deafening unison. The leading car bore a huge banner with the strange device "NIEMBA-MANONO IRISH GO HOME" We had arrived. The cavalcade included every prominent male citizen of the town who was not a Government official.
54. Death of COY. SGT. GRANT: Early in October the Battalion suffered its first casualty. On 1 October COY. SGT. GRANT of B Company was flown in from MANONO suffering from acute appendicitis. He was operated on immediately by the Belgian surgeon in the Roi Albert Hospital in the town and all appeared to be well. On the evening of 3 October his condition suddenly worsened, and at about 1800 hours we received word that he had died. This was a great shock to everybody in the unit, particularly to the men of B Company to whom he was a tower of strength during the trying weeks through which they had passed. Since it was not possible to arrange for the repatriation of his body at once, he was given a full military funeral the next day. All the local officials both civil and military attended at the church for the Requiem Mass and at the graveside. The funeral cortege through the town received every mark of respect from the local people. The body was exhumed and flown back to Ireland on 21 October where it was received with due honour.
55. Indian Signals Rear Link and Italian Medical Team: During October we received two additions to our complement in ALBERTVILLE which were to prove a real boon to the unit. They were an Indian Army Signal group and an Italian Army Medical team.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

- a. Indian Rear Link: Up to now our Signal Platoon had been strained to the limit to maintain our internal communications. Our unit was dispersed in ten different locations. A Company was 330 miles away in KAMINA and B Company in MANONO was over 140 miles away from Battalion Headquarters. One of the platoons of C. Company, the one in BAUDOINVILLE, was over 95 miles away, and the one in BENDERA was over 60 miles away all as the crow flies. With a grossly inadequate number of operators and C12 sets such distances presented a serious problem without considering our contacts with ELIZABETHVILLE at all. The arrival of the Indian signal detachment settled our rear link problems for us. They had a huge set and kept us in touch with SCOMEP and, when necessary, LEOPOLDVILLE.
- b. Italian Army Medical Team: Equally welcome was the arrival of the Italian Army Medical Team. Its Commanding Officer was a Captain who was R.M.O. of a very big civilian hospital in ANCONA and was a really brilliant surgeon. His name was CIPOLAT. He was born in SOUTH KATANGA and still had a brother living there. Another member had just completed two years post-graduate study in the Rockefeller Institute in NEW YORK. Another was an extremely courteous and relatively elderly gentleman who had been Chief Medical Officer of the pre-war Italian North African Empire and was now Professor of Parasitology in Rome University. His name was LIPPARONI and he bore the exalted rank of Second Lieutenant; They were a highly qualified team, and in the next few months more than one member of our unit was to owe his life to their skilled ministrations. They lived and worked in the Roi Albert Hospital, a lovely, new, well-equipped hospital situated near our Headquarters and run by the White Sisters. In this hospital all our sick and wounded were treated. Our patients received really wonderful treatment from the devoted nuns who nursed there, and with whom we were on very good terms.

56. A Company Rejoins the Battalion at ALBERTVILLE:

- a. On 5 October LIEUT. K. GLEESON and fifteen of his platoon of A Company left KAMINA to go to ALBERTVILLE. They flew by C119 to ELIZABETHVILLE that afternoon and next day they continued to ALBERTVILLE. They were billeted with C Company for two nights and on Saturday 8 October they left ALBERTVILLE to relieve the small NIEMBA garrison under SGT. GUTHRIE of Headquarters Company. On 14 October they were joined by CPLS. ANDERSON and McDONALD with their section, and on 7 November the remaining section of the platoon under CPLS. KELLY and DOUGAN arrived in NIEMBA.
- b. During 25/31 October the remainder of A Company were airlifted from KAMINA to ALBERTVILLE, less the bulk of their stores and a rere party of one officer, Capt. Kelly, and eight other ranks remaining in KAMINA.
- c. The Company took over the school and some of the villas at FILTISAF. They also took over posts as follows from C Company -
- |   |          |   |               |   |                 |   |         |
|---|----------|---|---------------|---|-----------------|---|---------|
| 1 | November | - | No. 1 Platoon | - | LIEUT. FINUCANE | - | BENDERA |
| 2 | "        | - | No. 3 Platoon | - | LIEUT. O'ROURKE | - | KABIMBA |
- d. The Battalion Commander briefed the Company Commander COMDT. LOUIS HOGAN on his company tasks which included the defence of the airport a few miles NORTH of FILTISAF, the factory area itself, and the protection and possible evacuation of the European technicians, and any Congolese who might wish to accompany them, to the harbour area.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL

34.

57. Train Guards:

Here are two reports describing two train guards to KABALO during October:

- a. Guard commanded by Sgt. McCormack 2/11 October
- b. Guard commanded by Capt. K. Sloane 26/28 October.

TRAIN GUARD. ALBERTVILLE KAMINA ALBERTVILLE  
2 October to 11 October

While the events described in "The Long Patrol" were taking place, a train guard returning from KAMINA was marooned at KABALO due to the activity of the Balubas plus the fact that the line was blocked.

This Guard left ALBERTVILLE on Sunday, 2 October at 1830 hours for the normal run to KAMINA and back. It consisted of Sgt. McCormack and Ptes Dolan, Cannon and Cowfield. At KABALO Sgt. McCormack met Sgt. Nolan who was i/c of the guard on the train coming from KAMINA and Sgt. Nolan reported that there was unrest at KITUTE and ~~KATANGÉ~~.

Sgt. Nolan's train carried on to ALBERTVILLE and as it happened it was to be the last train to make the journey for some time as the next train was attacked by the Balubakat. There was no guard on the train that was attacked.

Sgt. McCormack's train left KABALO with a full complement of passengers and cargo and as the train neared ~~KATANGÉ~~ a truck load of armed Balubas followed it along a road that ran beside the line. At the station a crowd of approx fifty Balubas with the usual assortment of knives, pangas, bicycle chains, bows etc. were waiting but did not cause any trouble.

When the train left ~~KATANGÉ~~ the truck load of Balubas followed and at the request of the Chef de Train, M. Ferreira, Sgt. McCormack checked the coaches occupied by Congolese passengers. In one were three armed Balubas, two of whom jumped off the train when Sgt. McCormack approached. M. Ferreira took the third man into custody and handed him over to the Katangese Army Detachment at KABONGO. After this incident the truck stopped following the train.

The train reached KAMINA at 0800 hours on Tuesday 4 October without further incident.

The return journey began at 2200 hours on the 5 October after a delay of ten hours to await the arrival of a train from LEOPOLDVILLE. An extra man accompanied the train guard, he was Pte. Killeen of "A" Coy who was later killed in the NIEMBA Ambush.

KABALO was reached without incident at 0900 hours on 6 October and there Sgt. McCormack was informed that the train could not proceed any further as the line had been cut due to the trouble in NIEMBA. At KABALO at this stage there was a battalion of Mali troops plus five officers of the Observer Group.

During the night all the Europeans in the area moved into the Station Building as news had been received that the Balubas were moving in to attack the town. Among the fifty who took refuge were a Bishop, five priests and six nuns from a nearby Mission.

On the following day the situation became more tense and Sgt. McCormack made preparations to defend the station and its occupants if need be. Later on that day on the instructions of an officer from the Observer Group he moved his men to the Hotel Kabalo but following complaints from the Railway officials and the refugees he moved back to the Station.

CONFIDENTIAL

At this stage the Train Guard's supply of food was exhausted and they had no food for almost twenty four hours but the Mali battalion came to the rescue and provided some ration packs.

Later that afternoon contact was made with Battalion Headquarters at ALBERTVILLE by telephone and only then did they learn of the full situation at NIEMBA. Headquarters promised that as soon as the tracks could be repaired another train with reinforcements would be sent.

On the following morning Saturday (8th) the situation deteriorated further. Contact was lost with NYUNZU, the next town along the railroad and the priests reported that their Mission had been looted during the night. To make matters worse it was learned that the Mali Battalion was being withdrawn due to trouble in the Mali Federation and were to leave KABALO on their way home immediately. They were to be replaced by an Ethiopian Battalion but the situation around KABALO was such that there could not have been a more inopportune time to change the troops in the area.

Later that evening a train arrived from KAMINA to evacuate the Mali troops and another train arrived from NYUNZU carrying wounded Katangese Army men. Sgt. McCormack and his men helped to unload these and bring them to the emergency hospital that had been set up. Some were very badly wounded.

At 0200 hours on Sunday a train arrived from ALBERTVILLE with fifteen men to reinforce Sgt. McCormack's group. They were -

Sgt. P. Farrell,	Cpl. Smith.
Sgt. O'Connor.	Cpl. Foran.
Cpl. Martin	Cpl. Anderson (A Coy)
Cpl. Gavin.	8 Ptes.

As the train guard had been on the move for forty eight hours it was hoped to spend a peaceful night but it was not to be so as the Balubas had crossed the river and infiltrated into the town.

All round the town murders and atrocities were taking place. The local Administrator, a Congolese, was taken and his legs cut off while he was conscious and tree stumps driven into the severed ends of his thighs. At NYUNZU a Belgian, an official of the Cotton Company was skinned alive and then hacked to pieces.

On Sunday the situation improved somewhat as Ethiopian troops and a platoon of Katangese arrived and Sgt. McCormack and his men were not the only troops available to protect the refugees. Trouble broke out in the station that evening as some of the train crew got drunk and attacked the refugees but this was soon quelled and the disturbers were locked into a goods wagon for the night.

The next morning, Monday 10 October preparations were made to return to ALBERTVILLE but when all was ready the train crew refused to drive the train. The food situation was now very bad as since they had arrived at KABALO the Train Guard had been depending for food on what the Belgians could give them. The Ethiopians were asked for assistance which they duly provided but the meal that arrived, rice, horse meat and chocolate was not the normal Irish menu.

The following day Tuesday 11 October the train crew finally agreed to drive the train and the train set out for ALBERTVILLE, with two men in the engine to ensure that the crew did not desert the train out in the bush and with the rest of the guard divided into two parties, one travelling on the flat cars ahead of the train and the other in the dining car. ALBERTVILLE was reached at 1500 hours where the Guard had a welcome meal and a sleep after a somewhat hectic week.



TRAIN GUARD - ALBERTVILLE - KABALO - ALBERTVILLE 26 October to 28 Oct.

ALBERTVILLE being a port on the shores of Lake Tanganyika, which is the western boundary of both Katanga and Congo, is connected with the interior by a railway, which runs through KABALO to KAMINA and eventually right across the country to LEOPOLDVILLE. The section from ALBERTVILLE to KABALO runs right through NORTH KATANGA, which in 1960 was the heart of the Baluba troubles. Until the line was cut by the Balubas in November trains ran regularly with UN escorts, provided mostly by the 33rd Battalion. In the beginning these were of section strength but as the Balubas fanning out from MANONO spread Northwards and invested town after town, the strength of the escorts had to be increased until finally in November 1960 an escort of Company strength commanded by Capt. Harry Goldsborough, only barely managed to bring a train through.

At the end of October, following the incidents earlier in the month, which led to the "Long Patrol" trains were finding it quite difficult to get through unmolested. KABALO had been attacked and sacked and on the 25 October the Railway Company asked for a strong escort to guard a train to KABALO which apart from the normal freight, would carry one and a half million francs (a payroll for the Company workers, both black and white), the General Manager of the Company, M. Bruart and a number of Indian traders, who had to flee from the town during the troubles a few weeks earlier and who were anxious to return and inspect their property. Headquarters in ELIZABETHVILLE authorised the escort and instructed that whatever means necessary be taken by the OIC of the Escort to protect the train. UN policy towards the Balubas was getting tougher as a result of the wave of killings, torturing, burning etc. that was spreading across NORTH KATANGA. The previous day two Congolese train officials had been kidnapped at NYUNZU and were held prisoner there.

Headquarters Company was detailed to provide the escort, which consisted of twenty two all ranks, Capt. K. Sloane OIC, Sgts. McCormack, Harrington, Murray and Burke, Cpls. Chaney, Reddy, Martin & Lyons, Ptes. McDermott, Marsh and eleven men of C Company.

ELIZABETHVILLE had instructed the Ethiopian Battalion to keep all stations in their area clear of Balubas, while the train was passing through and similar instructions were issued to the late Lieut. Kevin Gleeson for NIEMBA Station. As well as the civilians previously mentioned, a newspaper correspondent, Alan Bestic, was to travel with the train. He had arrived a few days previously armed with instructions from Army Headquarters in Dublin that he was to be given all possible facilities and he was anxious to see the Baluba Territory for himself. He had previous similar experience when assigned to cover British Army operations in Malaya, and was anxious to compare the two. Col. Bunworth gave him the necessary permission.

The train left on schedule on the morning of the 26 October and all went well until the first station at MUSWAKI, half way to NIEMBA. There was no UN Garrison here and a large party of Balubas was waiting. However they were prevented from boarding the train, without undue force being necessary. They did not know what the train was carrying or it might not have been so easy to deal with them. At NIEMBA a Company had the station under control and a load of mail, provisions, welfare stores etc was delivered to them. At NYUNZU there was more trouble. The station was swarming with Balubas and although the town was garrisoned by an Ethiopian platoon, not a Blue Helmet was to be seen. In addition this was the town where the Congolese railwaymen had been kidnapped the previous day and M. Bruart demanded that their release be effected. Eventually with the aid of an Ethiopian soldier who appeared, the Ethiopian Platoon Commander was contacted and he came to the station and sent a runner to find the local Baluba chief, who was

holding the railwaymen prisoners. Finally, after a long discussion and after a few threats the Balubas agreed to release the prisoners, who were taken aboard the train, which proceeded on its way.

The next snags arose at M'BILIBILI, a watering stop for the engine, where it was discovered that a large party of Balubas was waiting half a mile up the track and were stopping all trains and searching them for Belgians. A few minutes later a train arrived from the opposite direction, with Sgt. "Jock" Farrell and a very light escort, who confirmed the news and said that his train had been stopped and checked.

It looked as if the situation was going to be sticky as the train was now one hundred and fifty miles from ALBERTVILLE and it would be quite a while before any assistance would be forthcoming, if there was trouble. If the Balubas found Belgians on the train there was bound to be trouble and if they were prevented from getting on to the train there was also likely to be trouble. There did not appear to be a great choice.

However the train had to press on. There could be no question of going back. The Balubas were in the habit of using the trackside telephone wires for communication, by hooking on portable telephones, stolen from looted trains and no doubt were getting a run down on the train, while it was filling its water tanks. Accordingly ostentatious preparations were made for defending the train. Guns were loaded and men were shuttled in and out of the train to give an impression of great strength and activity. The local Balubas were told that the Irish had come all the way to the Congo to help them but could not permit anyone to interfere with the trains.

The bluff worked and not a Baluba was seen between there and KABALO.

KABALO Station presented a strange sight when the train pulled in. The whole area for fifty miles around had been the scene of some frightful massacres in previous weeks and in accordance with the local custom, the women and children had made for the nearest railway station. Hundreds of these refugees crowded the station. Each family had its own little fire (lit on the platform) and around each fire were the family possessions and the hordes of children. Can you imagine KINGSBRIDGE Station with several hundred DUBLIN people, their goods and chattels, all crowded around fires lit on the station platform?

Contact was made with the Ethiopian Battalion Headquarters and the local Belgian railway staff. The latter were most co-operative and gave the train guard the use of a house for their stay. KABALO was a most uncomfortable place, oppressively hot and inhabited by thousands of insects, including a huge specimen, nicknamed "Globe masters" as they were a similar shape to the USAF planes, which ferried the troops to the Congo. These were inclined to bite and produced big red spots as big as a half a crown, and itchy to boot.

Sgt. McCormack had many friends among the Belgians, whom he had assisted when the town was attacked a few weeks previously. They were now billeted on the top storey of the station building and had a very expensive radio receiver. As "Dateline DUBLIN" was to be relayed from Radio BRAZZAVILLE that night they were asked if the Guard could listen in. They refused to believe that BRAZZAVILLE, a notoriously anti-UN station would broadcast a programme for the Irish troops, but after some persuasion agreed. They were quite amazed when the programme came on the air as they really did not believe the story.

Next morning Colonel Baron Von Meellersward, the Swedish Commander of the newly formed Observer Group arrived and held a conference on the protection of the railway as the keeping open of the railway lines was to be an important part of UN policy in the coming weeks.

An inspection of KABALO was made that afternoon and the full extent of the Baluba depredations were to be seen. Belgian houses had been looted and what was previously a spacious lounge bar was in shambles. Houses belonging to alleged Konikats had been razed and if the Balubas were to be believed, the inhabitants liquidated. Strangely enough the shops of the Indians were virtually untouched. In one case a cash register and an adding machine had been taken but nothing else.

One of the Indians incidentally insisted on having his picture taken with some of the Irish troops and he boasted that he had met Mr. De Valera when he visited India in the early 1930s.

On the next morning, 28 October the train was ready for the return journey, which was made completely without incident, all the Baluba parties a few days previous having disappeared into the bush.

58. Feeding, Clothing, Accommodation:

- a. Feeding: In ALBERTVILLE the food was almost always good, and in good supply. The rations were purchased from the local shops. In the outposts things were not always so good. Regular food convoys were run several times a week, but in the intense heat commodities like fresh meat, milk and butter did not fare so well. Despite our best efforts a few deliveries of meat had to be buried immediately on arrival at BENDERA.
- b. Clothing: Initially the clothing position was awful, since we had very little but our Irish Bull's Wool, and cases of heat exhaustion became alarmingly frequent. Later, due to the delivery from the FILTISAF factory of a supply of very good shorts and shirts and also due to subsequent deliveries from UN sources the position improved. The Irish Army boot did not stand up very well to the extreme heat and the rough usage and we had to requisition to UN Headquarters in LEOPOLDVILLE for a complete supply of new boots. One day we were delighted to get a radio message to tell us that a cargo of boots was arriving in a C119 at the airport. When our truck came back from the airport it had several large crates aboard and we felt very happy that the UN had answered our distress call so promptly and generously. We opened the first crate and found it full of boots - very big boots with rubber feet and leather calves. Each boot had a very thick felt insole and two others as spares. Attached to the top eyelet of each boot was a small booklet entitled - "How To Care For Your Arctic Boots"!
- c. Accommodation: In ALBERTVILLE and in all the outposts of A and C Companies the accommodation was good. In most cases the troops were accommodated in villas abandoned by the European population, and these were all fairly new, well-designed and in good sites. They were almost all deficient in furniture, particularly beds, and most of our soldiers slept on the old medical stretchers which we brought out from Ireland with us. These soon began to show signs of wear, and by the time we left most of them were write-offs.

59. Raftery Airport: The new airport in ALBERTVILLE was a fine new one a few miles NORTH of the town, with two tarmac runways, one about 1800 metres long capable of taking four-engined aircraft. Before this was constructed there had been a smaller dirt airstrip at the lakeside just on the NORTH edge of the town, and overlooked by QUARTIERKAKOMBA, C Company location. This still existed but had not been used for a few years. It was blocked by old lorries and barrels and its runway was not in very good shape. As it was so close to the town and could be easily secured in the event of trouble it was felt that it was worth while trying to get it back into running order. The Commanding Officer instructed LIEUT. WALTER RAFTERY our Engineer Officer to survey it with that end in view. He did better. In two or three days he reported back to say the runway was now fit for use. He had borrowed a dozer from the local Office of Public

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Works and in that time he and his stalwarts by a prodigious expenditure of energy had transformed the place. We got a pilot from ELIZABETHVILLE to vet the runway and he passed it fit for any aircraft up to and including a DC3 (DAKOTA). From then on it was used by UN planes frequently, although towards the end of our time there its use was confined to single engined planes. DC3s would use it if necessary, but Air Ops in SCOMEF felt it was foolish to do so unnecessarily while the big airport was available a few miles away. We were very glad to have it and it earned its keep. We named it Raftery Airport and it was opened for traffic during the last week in November.

60. Intelligence System: The operation of an efficient conventional intelligence system was extremely difficult in such a vast country with strange races, and most important, strange languages. Nevertheless our Intelligence Officer, COMDT. McMAHON, did sterling work, overcoming many difficulties. Information was collected from every available source and files were built up on all the important personalities. The NIEMBA ambush coloured this as it did every phase of our lives. After it the local European population were much more friendly towards us, and our subsequent contacts with them were less frigid, and productive of a good deal of information. In particular the senior railway officials, whose antennae seemed to reach into every village and area through which the railway line passed, took us more into their confidence. By this time the Baluba threat to the town had become our chief concern and through them we were kept fairly well up to date on Baluba movements and intentions. One of them, M. PERREIRA a Portuguese who was their catering controller, was a very rich source of information. The Balubas used the railway telephone in the areas under their control for the transmission of information and instructions. These conversations could be tapped at the line terminus at ALBERTVILLE and both LIEUT. VON BEYER and M. PERREIRA frequently spent hours monitoring them. After some time the Balubas stopped using Swahili and switched to KILUBA, a very little-known Baluba language. Fortunately M. PERREIRA was one of the very few Europeans in the area who understood KILUBA and our flow of information continued.

61. Arrival of Nigerians:

- a. Brigade Headquarters Advance Party: In the middle of November we learned that 4 Battalion Queen's Own Nigerian Regiment was to relieve B Company in MANONO. Another Nigerian battalion 5 QONR would relieve our 32 Battalion in KIVU Province and the two Nigerian battalions, the Ethiopian battalion in the NYUNZU-KABALO area and ourselves would be formed into a brigade. The Brigade Commander would be BRIGADIER PAUL WARD, of the Northumberland Fusiliers, seconded to the Nigerian Army, with Brigade Headquarters in ALBERTVILLE. Soon an advance party under a young British officer, MAJOR ROBIN HONGHTON, arrived in ALBERTVILLE. With the help of our Battalion Quartermaster COMDT. P. KEOGH he took over a number of villas in the town for the men of the Headquarters, and rented accommodation in the C.F.L. building at the railway station for the Headquarters offices. He also took over a very fine villa near our Battalion Headquarters to house the Brigadier and his Brigade Major. The men of the Brigade Headquarters, plus a company of 4 Battalion Q.O.N.R., were to be quartered in a group of houses NORTH of the town near Raftery Airport. A few houses on the KAPONA road about a half mile EAST from the centre of the town was taken over for the officers. One of these houses belonged to MR. PERREIRA the CFL catering controller.
- b. Setting Up of Brigade Headquarters: On 4 December Brigadier Ward and his staff arrived by air, settled in to their new quarters and 3 Nigerian Brigade came into being. We thus found ourselves under the direct command of a British Army officer. This was a historic occasion because it was the first time a British officer had ever commanded an Irish unit. The Brigadier later confessed to **having** some misgivings but he immediately impressed all of us

CUN

CONFIDENTIAL<sup>40</sup>.


with his charm and good humour and we got on famously. He quickly became very popular with all our officers and we realised it was an honour and a pleasure to serve with him. His Brigade Major was MAJOR PHEMMI AGUNDIPE, a Nigerian and a Camberly graduate. He was a fine officer, competent, decisive and pleasant. 33 Infantry Battalion worked very smoothly under these two officers and our relations with them both on and off duty were very good. After Christmas MAJOR AGUNDIPE went NORTH to KIVU to become Second in Command to LIEUT. COL. ARONSI OC 5 Battalion Q.O.N.R.

c. Arrival of Nigerian Company Next to arrive was the company of 4 Battalion Q.O.N.R., who were to take over some of our duties. They arrived by rail from KAMINA on 9 December and brought with them the remainder of our A Company's stores which had been left behind in KAMINA. They moved into the quarters which COMDT. KEOGH and MAJOR HOUGHTON had reserved for them. They had to call on us for many items of equipment during the next few weeks and we were glad to be able to help them. They were noticeably short of such items as cooking equipment and, surprisingly, .303 ammunition.

62. B Company Rejoins Battalion: As will be seen from Chapter 4 - B Company in MANONO - that Company was relieved by 4 Battalion Q.O.N.R. during the last week in November. The airlift of B Company to rejoin us in ALBERTVILLE was completed on 28 November. They had spent three very hard, trying months away from us and we were very glad to see them back in the fold again. They were quartered in a very pleasant group of C.F.L. villas near the main street of the town.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL<sup>42</sup>

together with a patrol linking up at night resulted in company duties of 58 per day or 1 in 3.

- b. A direction to the company commander to organise a redoubt for some 10,000 refugees. Refugees were expected to move to the Base following some inter-tribal fighting. Full preparations re billeting, food, medical supplies and guards were planned and organised but happily had not to be utilised.
- c. A direction to the Company Commander to use strict control of aircraft using the airport. Sabena airlines had now perforce to close down and henceforward used the air-strip at KAMINAVILLE. The equipment of the Company with a large preponderance of S.M.G's and NO M.M.G's or 81 MORTARS now posed a problem. This company, therefore, took over from the Belgian garrison four Browning M.M.G's. with 25,000 rounds each and four Armoured Personnel Carriers. Two medium machine gun sections were established and trained and a pool of drivers trained in the handling of the APC's. These vehicles with a capacity for 12 men, with very good radio sets and mountings for twin Brownings were later to prove invaluable in control of the runways, although they were rapidly becoming unserviceable. In these tasks the experience of the Cavalry element of the Company and in particular LIEUT. O'ROURKE was particularly valuable.
- d. The departure of the majority of the Belgian garrison and their warlike stores. Two large train loads moved out on 31 August and this Company provided the escorts - 2 officers and 20 other ranks. These units entrained for ALBERTVILLE and subsequently by boat for RUANDA-URUNDI.
69. U.N. Study Group. The size and complexity of a Base like KAMINA was a problem that obviously must exercise the thoughts of U.N. Headquarters. It was no surprise, therefore, when a mixed military/civilian study group arrived there on 30 August. This was headed by MR. GALO PLAZA an ex-president of ECUADOR and late U.N. political adviser at UNOGIL in BEIRUT, LEBANON. It also included BRIG-GEN RIKHYE, Indian Army, and COL. WILANDER, Swedish Air Force who was subsequently to take over from COMDT. HOGAN as U.N. Base Commander. A Coy were instructed to liaise and co-operate with them, and if necessary to detach an officer to their staff (a task performed by CAPT. F. KELLY). This co-operation was continued until the organising of Kamina Base Group. It involved many conferences, some train guards and a limited number of extra picquets and patrols.
70. Reinforcement of A. Coy. During this period there was a growing awareness that one rifle company was not sufficient to guard this Base. Therefore, it was decided by COL. H.W. BYRNE to organise the Kamina Base Group which consisted of
- A headquarters.
- "A" Company.           33 Infantry Battalion.
- "C" Company.           32 Infantry Battalion.
- A Swedish company from the Swedish Bn at ELIZABETHVILLE.
- The decision to organise this Group was taken on 1 September, 1960.

CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL.

71. Formation of Kamina Base Group. This new formation became operational on 6 September, 1960. From 1 September until that date troops and stores of a Swedish Company and of 'C' Coy 32 Irish Battalion were flown into the Base. Arrangements for reception, billeting, transport and feeding had already been made with the Belgian personnel and this re-grouping proceeded smoothly. Following a conference with COMDT. J. ADAMS the new Commander, it was decided to allot A Coy Base I with responsibility for the airport area. The Headquarters and remaining two companies were billeted at Base 2 with responsibility for the remaining installations and for providing a reserve for internal security.
72. The situation in the CONGO generally at this time was unstable and uncertain. BAKWANGA had fallen to a quick bold attack, some Iiyushin bombers were in STANLEYVILLE and a move to seize KAMINA BASE was a possibility. It was directed, therefore, from SCOMEF that entry to the airport be strictly controlled. There now followed an extremely busy time during which tight security precautions were put in force. These in the main consisted of
- a. Blocking of Runway Number 1.
  - b. Blocking of para dropping zone.
  - c. Fortification of airport buildings.
  - d. Controlled blocking of Runway Number 2.
  - e. Digging of three company defensive positions.
  - f. Construction of a new road to one position.
  - g. Construction of a fire-free zone round Petro Congo.
  - h. Establishment of a movement control team.
  - j. Reinforcing of guards at the Airport buildings, the Hangar area, Petro Congo and the Katala barrier.

The establishment and carrying out of these duties occupied A Company in the main between 12 September and 19 October. In detail they were -

- a. Blocking of Runway Number 1. Either of the two runways was sufficiently large to take the largest of modern jet aircraft. To restrict the movement of aircraft and to make for easier control it was decided to close this runway. This was achieved by placing some 2,000 oil drums on the runway, on the parallel temporary one (but still serviceable) and on the taxi strips. Each drum had then to be smashed open on the top and filled with sand.
- b. Blocking of para dropping zone. This was a large flat cleared area some seventy-five acres in extent. It was rendered ineffective by the tactical placing of many unserviceable vehicles, of oil drums and by trenches.
- c. Fortification of airport buildings. Three machine gun positions were prepared on the flat roof, (necessitating the hauling up of hundreds of filled sandbags) and three mortar positions were prepared around the circumference of the building. All of these positions were sighted on to the company defensive plan. They were so designed that personnel on guard could rest from the intense heat inside the building while maintaining a minimum on lookout.
- d. Controlled blocking of Runway Number 2. Control had to be exercised over any aircraft allowed to enter the Base.



# CONFIDENTIAL

## CHAPTER 3 - A COMPANY

IN

KAMINA.

63. Orders. At 20.00 hrs. on Sunday 21 August the Company Commander - COMDT. L. HOGAN reported to the Battalion Commander - LT.COL. R.W. BUNWORTH at his headquarters at the HOTEL DE LA GARE at KAMINAVILLE. There, following a battalion briefing to the Company Commanders and to the battalion staff, COMDT. HOGAN was informed that although the Battalion theatre was the ALBERTVILLE-MANONO area A Company would remain at KAMINA BASE, that this company would become Command troops under Hq. Eastern Command at ELIZABETHVILLE and that its immediate mission would be "to co-operate with and assist the Base Commander at KAMINA BASE" (COL. VAN LIERDE, Belgian Air Force).

64. Kamina. This was the great NATO and Belgian Base and was laid out on a large scale. Two huge runways capable of taking the largest jet aircraft, two temporary ones (made from ground ant hills), very large hangars, large maintenance and supply shops (RRR), powerful radio transmitter and receiver, large ammunition magazine, pilot training school (EPA) and paratroop dropping zone all combined to make this base something heretofore outside the experience of the Irish troops. This area with its well-paved roads, modern messes, swimming pools, cinemas, comfortable bungalows and churches, large modern hospital, was supplied with power from KILUBI power-station some fifty miles to the north, It has its own large water-works. The tribes in the Base and the surrounding area were:

The BALUBA led by KASONGO NYEMBO who supported the CONAKAT party, and the BALUBA KASAI who supported JASON SINDWE.

65. Settling in. The ensuing days were spent on organisation of accommodation, of stores, laying down of normal routine and acclimatisation. This was hampered to a considerable extent by the growing re-action to the various inoculations and vaccinations received. The majority of all ranks suffered intensely during this period and in fact this Company could not be deemed operationally fit until August 27 when Guard Duties at the Base were taken over from the Belgian garrison. The extreme heat too added to our difficulties.

In these early days communications had not become fully organised. A Coy with two C 12's were in radio contact with Command Headquarters at ELISABETHVILLE and with Battalion Headquarters in ALBERTVILLE. Equally important was the radio link that this Company established and maintained between these two headquarters and appreciation must be recorded here of the initiative shown by the Signal personnel and of the long, arduous hours they worked.

66. Transporting of B and C Coys During these early days "A" Company (LIEUT. O'ROURKE) organised and supervised the movement of B and C Companies from KAMINA BASE to KAMINAVILLE. Tropical uniforms had not yet been made available but eventually (August 23rd) a consignment arrived. The amount proved inadequate and this company received an issue of three shirts per individual, almost our requirements in helmets and berets and a small number of forage caps.

67. Taking over. The taking over from the Belgian troops proceeded rapidly. On Thursday 25 August COMDT. HOGAN was appointed United Nations Base Commander at KAMINA by order of GEN. VAN HORN and at midnight on 29 August this Base was formally taken over from Belgian Command.

68. Resulting Commitments. The taking over of KAMINA BASE now resulted in -

- a. Much increased guard duties. A total of twelve posts were now occupied and guarded on a twenty-four basis. This

At the same time it had to be denied to unauthorised use. This runway, therefore, was blocked as follows:-

- (1) 15 large trucks were deployed on the runway in threes at intervals of 500 yards with Congolese drivers standing by.
  - (2) A permanent detachment was maintained on the runway in APC's and in an armoured jeep.
  - (3) This jeep was on the airport control tower radio net.
  - (4) On clearance of a plane to land control tower requested the A Coy Officer at the runway to clear it. The Congolese drivers were driven to their trucks and drove them off. On completion of a safe landing the trucks were replaced. A similar procedure was adopted for departing aircraft.
  - (5) The parallel old and temporary runway was blocked similarly to runway Number 1.
- e. Digging of company positions. Three company positions were constructed - one covering each runway, and co-ordinated with the fire positions at the airport building and one covering the KATALA barrier.
- f. Construction of a new road to company position. The company position covering runway number 2 had no satisfactory access. A new road, therefore, of some 500/600 yards was cleared.
- g. Construction of fire-free zone at Petro Congo. In the area known as Petro Congo there were large dumps of aviation spirit. Strict precautions were always taken here and it was surrounded by a strong protective barrier. The heavy jungle growth, however, came right up to this barrier and to guard against sabotage a fire free area about twenty yards wide was bulldozed round it and periodically kept clear.
- h. Establishment of Movement Control. With the increase in U.N. traffic it now became apparent that a check was necessary on incoming and outgoing personnel, mail and stores. A movement control was set up by A Company. This task was entrusted to LIEUT. JIM FINUCANE. Starting from scratch with no previous experience and working over many long hours he developed an eminently sound system that later became a model for other airports.
- j. Base Orders. A detailed set of orders were devised, promulgated and kept constantly up-to-date and were to form the basis of KAMINA BASE orders for many future missions.
73. Ethiopian troops. During this phase in our operations the surrounding area including KAMINAVILLE was under the control of an Ethiopian battalion commanded by LIEUT. COL. WORKU from the MINISTRY OF DEFENCE in ADDIS ABABA. Our two units had co-operated fully and this culminated in a very enjoyable function. Two soccer teams representing the Ethiopian battalion and A Company played a match at KAMINA BASE resulting in a 2-all draw. Afterwards, the visitors were entertained at two pleasant functions. Our entertainment was later reciprocated on two different occasions by COL. WORKU.
74. Arrival of GEN VAN HORN. On October 4, a group of officers led by GEN. VAN HORN from UN Headquarters at LEOPOLDVILLE arrived at KAMINA on a tour of inspection. They included the late COL. J.J. McCARTHY and LIEUT. COL. F.E. LEE. The latter was particularly helpful at this time. A list of requirements in clothing, mainly, and other necessaries was given to him and these were provided without delay.
75. Departure of No. 2 Platoon. The Company Commander was informed early on 5 OCTOBER that it was decided to send reinforcements to 33 Inf. Bn at ALBERTVILLE and that these should come from A Coy. No. 2 Platoon - stand-to platoon that day - were detailed and at 13.40 hrs. LIEUT GLEESON and 19 other ranks left by C 119 for ELIZABETHVILLE and ALBERTVILLE. They arrived at the latter town on 8 October and later

occupied NIEMBA. This same C 119 arrived back at KAMINA BASE that night with a party of 20 officers of the Armee Nationale Congolaise. They had arrived previously in ELIZABETHVILLE but since their presence was not acceptable to the Katangan authorities it was decided to evacuate them that night to KAMINA. Their billeting, guarding and feeding was the responsibility of A Company.

76. Tribal fighting in KABALO area. Severe disturbances taking place in the KABALO area were notified to Headquarters Base Group on 8 October and it was directed to be prepared to receive large numbers of refugees. These were airlifted in on Sunday 9 October to the Airport and this Company organised food, medical attention and transport.
77. Train wreck at KABONDO-DIENDA. In the intervening weeks from 31 August the Belgian authorities had been collecting, crating and loading most of the remaining military and civilian stores. These were then sent by train from the RRR to BENGUELA in ANGOLA. This train was ambushed and derailed at KABONDO-DIENDA, on 11 October. There followed for the next four days and nights a period of heavy duties when each Company were required to send strong escorts to the wreck area while arms, ammunition, civilian cars were recovered.
78. Move to KAMINAVILLE. On Wednesday 19 October A Company were instructed to hand over at Base 1 to B Company, 32 Infantry Battalion *and* *move* to KAMINAVILLE. Concurrent with this was the move of 32 Infantry Battalion from KIVU to KAMINA BASE, the departure of the Swedish Company for ELIZABETHVILLE and the disbandment of Kamina Base Group.
79. Belgian military personnel. At the conclusion of ~~the phase~~ of our story appreciation must be recorded of the co-operation and assistance of the Belgian military personnel at KAMINA BASE. All the personnel of this company have reason to be grateful for this help given in those early days before UN procedures and logistical support had been established. Appreciation must be recorded too of the friendship and spiritual help offered us by the chaplain at the EPA - REV. FR. BROULEZ - himself an active pilot and a member of RAF Coastal Command during World War II.
80. KAMINAVILLE. This town with a European population of approximately 750 and a Congolese one of about 26,000 is the headquarters of the District and the Territory. It is a trading and industrial centre with a landing strip and is a main station on the BCK railway with a Regional Manager in charge. There are a number of hotels - the one most availed of by 33 Infantry Battalion being the Hotel de la Gare. Another and important amenity being the large modern brewery producing Simba beer. It is situated in the BALUBA tribal area of KASONGO NYEMBO.
81. Departure from KAMINA BASE. The advanced platoons of A Company moved out on Thursday 20 to occupy the posts held by the Ethiopian troops. At midnight on Friday 21 and some twenty-one truck-loads of stores later, this move was completed.

Two locations were occupied - the ATHENE ROYALE a school on the eastern suburb of the town - by one platoon under CAPT. F. KELLY, and a large school on the Western suburb with the remainder of the Company.

Saturday 22 was spent on the re-organisation of the Company and in three large train guards to LUENA and BUKAMA commanded by LIEUT. FINUCANE, LIEUT O'ROURKE and SGT SEXTON. The accommodation for the main body of the Company was NOT very suitable, the plumbing was faulty and the sewerage system had broken down giving rise to health problems. As matters turned out, however, it was soon to be solved.

82. Return to Kamina Base. There now occurred one of those seemingly inexplicable contradictions that occur at intervals in military operations. At 12.000 hours on Sunday 23 A Company was instructed to move to ALBERTVILLE to rejoin the remainder of the battalion.

CONFIDENTIAL<sup>46</sup>

Since accommodation was limited, since an Indonesian battalion was arriving to take over in KAMINAVILLE and since the airlift would be from KAMINA BASE it was decided to move the Company back in twenty-one truck-loads of stores and all. This move commenced at first light on Monday 24. It was completed at midnight on Tuesday 25. The first two plane-loads of men and baggage under CAPT. LAVERY left for ALBERTVILLE on Tuesday 25.

83. Dispersion of A Company. An interesting situation now arose. Due to train guards and a variety of moves this Company was now situated in seven different locations from BUKAMA to NIEMBA, the extremes of which were 340 miles apart more than the length of Ireland, while concurrently all the normal preparations for an airlift were being planned by Company Headquarters and put into effect.
84. UN Day - October 24. It is customary for personnel of the United Nations to celebrate this day. And KAMINAVILLE was going to be no exception. Interposed into all these preparations then was a direction to A Company to organise a function. Since MR. TSHOMBE was enjoying one of his periodic fits of pique with the UN it was not expected that many invitees would accept our hospitality and the UN civilian authorities were so informed. However twelve Administration officials and their wives were included. A pleasant out-door party was arranged at the HOTEL DE LA GARE and attended by three A Company officers, two Swedish officers, a Belgian White Father and the Regional Manager of the BCK Railway.
85. Airlift to ALBERTVILLE. The airlift of this Company now proceeded. Only one D.C.3 was available and the move was slow. FILTISAF - a school five miles NW of ALBERTVILLE was occupied by A Company on 27 October. The airlift was completed on 31 October except for a rear party at KAMINA BASE of 1 officer and 8 other ranks and the bulk of the Company stores. Thenceforward this Company operated without these stores.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

47.

Organisation of "A" Company.

---

Company Headquarters.

Comdt. L. Hogan.  
Comdt. B. Heaney, Medical Officer.  
Capt. D. Crowley, Second in Command.  
Capt. J. Lavery, Administrative Officer.  
Capt. F. Kelly, Staff Officer.  
C/S. M. Brien, Company Sergeant.  
CQMS A. Taylor, Company Quartermaster-Sergeant.  
Thirty-seven other ranks.

---

No. 1 Platoon

Lieut. Finucane

Sgt. Sexton

47 Other ranks.

(in 4 rifle sections).

No. 2 Platoon

Lieut. Gleeson

Sgt. Gaynor

47 Other ranks

(in 4 rifle sections)

No. 3 Platoon

Lieut. O'Rourke

Sgt. O'Rourke


47 Other ranks

(in 4 Rifle sections)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Bush



LEGEND  
 UN. OCCUPIED AREAS [hatched box]  
 DEFENDED AREAS 33<sup>rd</sup> BN [circle with cross]

0 100 200 300 400 1/4 MILE

CONFIDENTIAL

CHAPTER 4.

B COY 33 INFANTRY BATTALION IN MANONO - PIANA MWANGA.

AUGUST - NOVEMBER, 1960.

86. To MANONO and PIANA:

- a. 26 August, 1960. B Company, 33 Infantry Battalion was detailed for duty in MANONO - PIANA MWANGA area of Northern KATANGA. There was little intelligence in the area available to the company and very little was known of the Baluba tribe and their hostility towards TSHOMBE's secessionist plans. Once in MANONO, the company learned of the rift between the vast majority of the Congolese people in the area and the Katangese administration as it then was - administered by Belgians.
- b. 27 August. Company advance party, Capt. John Ryan i/c was airlifted to MANONO and took over from Mali UN troops. The Malis had been there only a matter of days and were recalled to their homeland to meet a domestic problem.
- c. The rear party of Belgian troops pulled out on 27/28 August; the vehicles evacuated on route MANONO, KIAMBI, NIEMBA, ALBERTVILLE. Prior to leaving their camp they fired their weapons indiscriminately in the air.
- d. 28 August.
  - (1) Convoy of four hired civilian trucks and four jeeps, with Company stores and equipment left ALBERTVILLE for MANONO - 253200 miles. CAPT. CROKE was i/c and had an escort of 35 men. This journey, which included about twenty break-downs took 44 hours and OIC Convoy discovered en route that whites, even white UN troops, were not welcome. United Nations meant nothing to the Congolese people encountered en route - they had never heard of the organisation.
  - (2) CAPT. GOULDSEBOROUGH, Company Second in Command and a party of 20 men were airlifted to MANONO and they drove 60 miles to PIANA MWANGA Power Station and took over from Mali troops.
- e. 29 August. Balance of Company was airlifted to MANONO by DC 3 aircraft except one platoon, LT. ENRIGHT i/c, left in ALBERTVILLE.

87. Accommodation and Disposition. Before leaving ALBERTVILLE, the company was advised that the Belgian administrator in MANONO, MR. JACQUES and Geomines (branch of Union Miniere) officials would facilitate it in every way. They gave the company good accommodation - fine large bungalows and a school with out-buildings. But this accommodation was right in the middle of the Belgian living quarters as were also the houses of the Belgian officers with the police and gerdarmerie. The disadvantage of living in this environment was however more than offset by the fact that the company was billeted only six hundred yards from the air-strip. The company camp was spread over an area of approx. 300 yards square and owing to an abundance of shrubs and undergrowth it presented a difficult defence job. On the 29th August when the company had settled down in Northern KATANGA, it was disposed as follows:-

MANONO:	6 Offrs (plus chaplain, FR. SHINNORS)	110 men
PIANA MWANGA:	1 Offr	23 men
ALBERTVILLE:	1 Offr	50 men.

A serious deficiency in our armament was the absence of MMG and 81 MM mortar sections.

88. Interpreter. 2/LT. ROLAND LINDHOLM, the son of a Swedish missionary from KIVU joined the company on 26 August and remained with it as interpreter during its full Congo term. The company was lucky to get 2/LT. LINDHOLM. - he was young, intelligent and tactful and, having lived in KIVU for a number of years, had a very good knowledge of the Congolese people and how their problems are best dealt with. He became part of the company and a fine bond of loyalty and comradeship existed between him and all the company officers. He was a fluent English, French and Swahili speaker. His approach to the problems of the Congolese and the manner in which he got the thoughts and conversations of the company officers through to them helped considerably in building up the good-will that eventually existed between the Company and the Congolese.

89. MANONO Town.

a. On withdrawal of Belgian troops, left in MANONO town were police and Gendarmerie units as follows, recruited from areas far away from MANONO, some even from provinces outside KATANGA:

(1) Police: One platoon of two Belgian officers and thirty-five Congolese.

(2) Gendarmerie: One platoon of two Belgian officers and thirty-five Congolese.

b. Geomines. This was the tin mine, property of Union Miniere, around which the town was built. The town had a Congolese population of about 23,000 living in six townships. There were approximately eighty adult Belgian civilians, mostly men, including three priests and a small number of nuns. There were twelve Greek Cypriot shopowners and one Italian. The Belgians were all employed by Geomines, either in the mines or in the other community services - brewery, power plant, food store, etc. The whole community was built around the mines. Three thousand Congolese worked daily in three eight-hour shifts of 1,000 each. ~~The~~ Most of these Congolese workers had been recruited in areas far from the mine and they were generally contented with their steady employment. Geomines gave them free housing, free schooling and some free food. Approximately one third of the Congolese in the area were Catholic. The vast majority of the Congolese in the company operational area were of the Baluba tribe. This tribe was violently anti-TSHOMBE and anti-secession. They gave allegiance to LUMUMBA and to their own deputy at LEOPOLDVILLE, JASON SENDWE. In MANONO itself, while the mine workers were not too keen to stir up trouble against TSHOMBE's administration, they were still anti-secession. But the younger group who later termed themselves "Jeunesse" was not content at all to allow administration under white control to continue.

90. Living Standard.

a. In MANONO, the Belgian community lived it well. In the European Quarter there were about one hundred bungalow type houses - some were unoccupied. These were mostly beautiful houses with fine furnishings, conveniences and flower gardens. There was a nice hotel or club, with swimming pool, for whites only. There was a nice chapel and a good presbytery. White children went to an all-white school under Belgian nuns. There was a Post Office, public administration building and a prison. Of the two hospitals, one for whites and the other for Congolese, the white one had up-to-date and elaborate equipment.



b. The six townships occupied by the mine workers and their families, - see map - were constructed in orderly manner and consisted of groups of small two-roomed concrete buildings. There was one large recreation hall for Congolese. Once one left the European quarter, concrete walks made way for dust or sand walks. In country areas there were no isolated dwellings - huts or shelters were in clusters of ten or twenty, making a little village. In these villages there was no shop, no recreation, nothing one might say, only abject poverty - and this only a matter of a few miles from the rich mining centre. The Greek shopkeepers had a small number of country stores in Northern KATANGA - among other things, they stocked tinned food. Congolese, to the limited knowledge gained by the Company in a short time, lived chiefly on manioc, fish, banana, mango, eggs, palm oil and a little mutton and chicken.

c. Alcohol.

- (1) The chief drink was a palatable beer. There was no evidence in any store of any Irish beverage, though the Greek shopowners held a small stock of Scotch Whiskey.
- (2) The Palm tree gives off a liquid from which the Congolese used to make an intoxicating brew. During Belgian occupation it was an offence to take this liquid from the trees but after the break-down of the administration, on a journey through the country one would see where the bark of some of these trees was cut and the liquid taken off.

91. Intelligence. Reliable intelligence on the political and military situation in the area was almost non-existent. Mali troops who left the area on arrival of the Company advance party had no information to give. Information given by the Belgian administrator and by the Baluba leaders was biased and consequently limited in value. The Belgian administrator, in his annoyance at the lack of whole-hearted support for his regime by white UN troops, sometimes became offensive and sarcastic towards the company officers - consequently there was lack of trust in the information he gave re ANC troops massing on KATANGA's western border, and in Baluba preparations to overthrow his regime. The Greek Cypriot shopowners were the chief sources of intelligence in the immediate vicinity of MANONO. They kept the company in the picture regarding the number of people in town from the country villages and of the exodus of Congolese women with young children from the town. Town and country patrols also brought in information but it was far from easy to have the finger on the pulse of affairs in those early days in the area.

92. Flag of Republic of the Congo. Though the MANONO area is in KATANGA and the administrator and the white mine officials were loyal to the TSHOMBE regime, the KATANGA flag was NOT flown in the area. On the contrary, the flag hoisted at the administrative Headquarters and Geomines Tin Mines was the Congolese flag. The administration did NOT like what the Congolese flag stood for, but was still prepared to fly it in order to keep the Baluba tribe quiet.

93. Patrols. During the period of pending trouble the town was patrolled twice daily. A long distance patrol went twice weekly on trunk roads (dust roads) to areas PIANA - KIAMBI - KAFIA and MOYUMBA. On 9 September a strong patrol, Company OC in charge, went on request to KAFUMBE and evacuated 13 Belgian and Congolese missionary priests and nuns and took them to MANONO. Extract from patrol report - "Hostile crowd of up to 200, armed with bicycle chains and clubs present at mission but stayed at some distance from troops and did not interfere with evacuation work". This was the first time that a patrol observed that the Balubas were armed and apparently meant action against the Belgian-dominated administrators. There was a big demand for bicycle chains in the Greek shops; one (day) man was observed in

MANONO sitting on the saddle of a bicycle pushing it along with his legs while he held the chain in his hand on the handlebars.

94. Air Strip. The short, sand-surfaced airstrip (1500<sup>x</sup>) in MANONO played an important part in the UN activity there. Prior to 8 September the Gendarmerie controlled the airstrip, but on that date COLONEL H. BYRNE of SCOMEF (Sub Command, Eastern Province) ordered that it be closed to possible landings by ANC. Apparently aircraft with ANC aboard had left LEOPOLDVILLE or LULUABOURG for an undisclosed destination. The airstrip was taken over by a party under CAPT. RYAN, much to the annoyance of the Gendarmerie officers, and from then on it was under UN control. After the uprising on 14 September, the control tower was not staffed, the guide beacon was not working, and landings in dull light were a little hazardous. With the rains in October/November, grass grew quickly on the landing strip and it needed maintenance. There was a small stock of aviation fuel.
95. Food. The food situation during the second week of September was bad. The men were feeling the pinch - this was the worst period from the food view-point during the Company's Congo duty. Dinner for five consecutive days consisted of dehydrated potatoes and tinned peas. There was no fruit, tea nor bread; hard biscuits and coffee were available. With the food shortage, the very high air temperature and the absence of proper intelligence creating uncertainty, morale was being put to the test.
96. Geomines Officials. The manager of the mines, MR. THIRIAR and the secretary, MR. CLAEYS were both helpful to the Company. They did their best to provide accommodation, water, minerals, beer and bathing facilities for the troops. They were on good terms with the local Congolese and were included in the seven Belgians who remained on in MANONO after the Baluba uprising. As time went on, unsavoury reports about UN were reaching M. MUNONGO, Minister of the Interior in ELIZABETHVILLE. CLAEYS controlled a powerful radio transmitting set in the Geomines Club, and there was a suspicion that he was the source of the reports to ELIZABETHVILLE. Seizing his radio was contemplated. More than a year later when the shooting war was in progress, CLAEYS was arrested by Ethiopian UN troops for working in liaison with TSHOMBE's gendarmerie.
97. Conferences.
- a. During the first weeks of September we had daily meetings with M. JACQUES the administrator and his gendarmerie and police officers, with the local Baluba council and occasionally with Geomines officials - THIRIAR and CLAEYS. During these meetings, the main point put forward by the Baluba council was the expulsion of the Belgian administrator and some of the more anti-Congolese mine officials.
  - b. The Belgian administrator on his part was pressing for active UN participation on the side of the TSHOMBE regime in the event of a clash with the Baluba tribe. The impression was not conveyed to him that he could count on this participation by UN against the Congolese people. The administrator was most unpopular with the Congolese and was prepared to leave the area but decided to hold out until near the end of September. His contract period would then be up and he would qualify for a gratuity which he would not get if he did not complete his period. The Baluba leaders were confused and treated UN with suspicion. During the conferences and negotiations it was NOT conveyed to the Congolese leaders that UN was opposed to their aspirations to have KATANGA, North KATANGA at least, integrated again with the CONGO. The Congolese seemed to sense that UN would give them a fair deal and would not automatically oppose them.

98. Estimate of the Situation.

Estimate of the situation in MANONO area of Northern KATANGA, in August/September 1960.

In addition to the normal UN role envisaged, the activity of B Company 33 Infantry Battalion in MANONO area of Northern KATANGA assumed by force of local circumstances, a somewhat political flavour. So as to give an idea of the factors that governed the action of the Company, in the confused state of affairs in the area during the very early days of UN in Northern KATANGA, this brief estimate is being given.

- a. The Irish papers had reported in early August that the Secretary General of the UN had spoken against KATANGA's secession and had even implied that it could not be allowed.
- b. Secretary General also stated that all Belgian Army Officers and politicians must leave the Congo.
- c. After M. LUMUMBA, Congolese premier, had called in UN, consequent on the mutiny of the Force Publique, negotiations went on between UN and MR. TSHOMBE regarding UN's entry to KATANGA - not recognised at all as a state by UN. It was finally agreed that UN should enter KATANGA on the understanding that they would not interfere in Katangese affairs.
- d. It seemed now that an impossible situation was arising. From the Secretary General's early implication that secession would not be allowed, it was fairly evident that UN people on the spot must find it very difficult, if not impossible, to abstain from getting involved in KATANGA's affairs - at local level.
- e. All Company officers thought, generally on the same lines on the merits and demerits of secession. In the absence of specific local instructions, which were almost impossible to obtain anywhere at this early stage, the Company officers readily abided by the general tone of principles and considerations as outlined at the top in the UN and published in the home press (Irish) - the chief of these was that KATANGA's secession would not be encouraged.
- f. MANONO was the TSHOMBE administrative centre of the Baluba area of Northern KATANGA - the Baluba tribe, the local Congolese people, violently opposed TSHOMBE's secessionist scheme.
- g. Decision. In the MANONO/PIANA MWANGA area the Company adopted a line of action which was not averse to the aspirations of the local population who opposed the control of the TSHOMBE administration over Northern KATANGA.

99. Atmosphere in MANONO just prior to Baluba Uprising.

- a. Men were arriving in town in larger numbers than usual and were congregating in groups - which was not normally done. Women were leaving town. An attempt was made to ambush the police in one township on 12 September. The police threw grenades and dispersed the crowd. The Belgian Administrator's continued presence in MANONO was much resented by the Baluba leaders - he was inclined to leave but decided to take his chance and finish his contract period (till late September) in the area. At conferences held separately with the Administrator and with the Congolese, they were urged not to have an armed clash. The continued presence of M. JACQUES in the area was the one problem that would likely bring on a clash and he was advised to leave - he did not.

b. Protection of white civilians. A plan was drawn up, and approved by Battalion Headquarters, for the protection of white civilians and any Congolese seeking protection in the event of an uprising.

- (1) All Belgians were to go to the Geomines Club where a UN guard would be sent.
- (2) Greek Traders and Congolese were to come into the large school rooms of the UN camp.
- (3) The airport guard was to be reinforced.
- (4) The post office and both hospitals, white and black, were to be guarded.

Our total strength (effective) of NCOs and men was 110.

c. The position on 12 September was that an uprising seemed imminent. The Company would, within reason, refrain from shooting and would contrive to exhort both sides not to have an armed clash. Every step would be taken to protect life.

d. The police and Gendarmerie were armed with automatic weapons, rifles and grenades. The Congolese had clubs, bicycle chains, spears, bows and arrows and the odd old shot gun.

e. The Congolese attitude towards UN was interesting. When the Company arrived in the locality, being white, troops were treated with suspicion and in the country villages with hostility. In the Company's two weeks in the area, something had been done to allay that suspicion - all ranks treated the local population with courtesy as they would any human being; they had been listened to at conferences; the interpreter put their viewpoint and the UN viewpoint across well; the Chaplain said Sunday Mass for them. Above all the M.O., COMDT. BECKETT was a wonderful instrument of good will in his considerate and painstaking treatment of their sick. The Belgians were displeased at all this and afterwards gave expression of their feeling towards the Company in the Katangese press in ELIZABETHVILLE.

100. Action on 13, 14 September, 1960.

a. 13 September. The situation was tense in the town. The town was patrolled. Police had dug some trenches and cleared bushes, for fields of fire, around the administrative Headquarters and the police platoon were in occupation. The police had been going into native townships for the previous two nights and had been provoking incidents. At 23.00 hours, some firing took place in one township. LT. BLYTHE with guard of 20 men went to Geomines club where whites were to assemble for protection. CAPT. CROKE went to the administrative Headquarters to liaise with M. JACQUES. Whites did not arrive, so the guard was withdrawn at 01.30 hours. The Company was on alert up to this time and the town patrolled up to 01.00 hours. The men then rested.

b. 14 September.

- (1) 05.45 hours - Light automatic and rifle fire from Police in administrative buildings at Congolese who had assembled in area probably with the intention of storming the Administrative centre and taking the Administrator and the Belgian police officers. Fire lasted for about one hour. Just prior to the commencement of the shooting M. JACQUES arrived in Company Officers' quarters and was talking to Company OC as firing commenced. The idea here was probably to have UN also identified with the shooting against the Balubas. JACQUES asked that the Company should join forces with him. When

this was refused he drove back again to the Administrative building 500 yards away. The fact that he was able to drive to and from the UN camp, over the only route that the Congolese could attack, raises an interesting point. It gives the impression that there had been no co-ordinated attack by the Balubas on the Belgian Administrative building or prison nearby. Rather the police brought the fight to the Balubas in order to bring the incident to a head.

- (2) 05.55 - 06.30 hours. LT. BLYTHE with a guard of 20 went to the Geomines club where whites began to assemble quickly. A small guard was sent to the white hospital, to the food stores, and to the Post Office and the guard at the Airport brought up to 20. The remainder of the troops, approximately 40, rallied in camp to keep the road to the Airport open and to form a reserve for any special commitment that might arise.
- (3) By 0700 hours all Greek traders and some Congolese, including women who had close liaison with the Belgians had arrived in the UN camp for protection. The Police Platoon had now abandoned the Administrative building and prison to the Balubas and were moving through the bush to the UN camp.
- (4) By 0730 hours the Administrator and two Belgian police officers reported to Company OC that they had been in touch with ALBERTVILLE and that a message had come through on their Radio from OC 33 Infantry Battalion for OC 'B' Company that the police were to be allowed into the UN Camp and that the Company were to join the police in the fight against the Balubas. This was an obvious deceit, but playing for time it was decided to contact OC 33 Infantry Battalion on the Company wireless. He stated that no such direction had been considered or given and that the Company was to handle the situation as it saw fit.
- (5) By 08.30 hours M. JACQUES was told that the only condition in which he could enter the UN camp with his police was if he sought UN protection. If he did this, his officers and police would be obliged to hand up their arms to the Company. They would be protected in camp and would be flown out to safety on the first available aircraft. Dejectedly the administrator eventually had the police marched into camp and with due ceremony they handed their arms over to a party under LT. CONDRON, who had them put away. The police with their officers and M. JACQUES were then placed in a large room in protective custody.
- (6) 0830 - 0930 hours. The Gendarmerie camp was now getting attention from the Balubas and the two white officers with the Gendarmerie platoon opened fire on any group of Balubas they saw. They shot all they could and then came to the UN camp for protection. An interesting point here is the defection of the Congolese members of the Gendarmerie platoon. They did not rally to fight the Balubas; neither did they open fire. The Balubas did not try to harm them, their camp or their homes. From this on, the Gendarmerie platoon, with no officer, was on the Baluba side and gave allegiance to JASON SENDWE, the representative to LEOPOLDVILLE and TSHOMBE's old adversary.
- (7) By 09.00 hours the wives and families of the police platoon were in camp for protection - up to 120 in all. To give some idea of the robust nature of these women - a pregnant woman just went around the corner of a building accompanied by another woman. In fifteen minutes they were back with a newly-born baby.

- (8) By this time up to 500 Balubas had assembled at the Company camp boundary, clamouring for the Belgians and the Police. Consultation between their leaders and company officers went on for some time and they dispersed to see to their wounded and dead. Some assembled near the airport, probably to interfere with an evacuation.
- (9) By 09.30 hours a patrol went from the camp to the town centre. It got a hostile reception from the Balubas. The patrol took eight wounded Balubas to hospital. The Balubas insisted on removing their own dead - 37. There was one policeman wounded. It is regrettable that the number of dead was so high. Most were killed by the four white officers, even after they had decided that they would eventually come to the UN camp for protection. Realising that they would lose the day, they then shot all they could. Some of those killed were young boys - as young as fourteen years of age.
- (10) By 10.00 hours, a message was sent to Battalion Headquarters reporting on the situation and requesting any available aircraft from ALBERTVILLE to fly out the Belgians and the police and their families - including 60 - 70 Belgians in protective custody at Geomines club. KAMINA and ELIZABETHVILLE were also contacted for aircraft. A total of five aircraft including three Sabena DC3 commercial type, landed during the day and took away all those desiring to leave - over 200 in all. The last plane landed and took off in darkness with the aid of head lights from a number of cars channelled down the air strip. One plane which had come in with uniforms and equipment for the police platoon actually evacuated the police - this gives some indication of the uncertainty of the whole situation in the area and the rapidity with which things were moving. One plane, a 28-seater DC3, took out 83 women and children. All those evacuated on that day were very glad to be on their way from MANONO.
- c. Early in the afternoon of 14 September an attempt was made by youths to take cars in town. All cars, up to 40 of them, the property of evacuated Belgians, were taken into the UN camp for custody. This was done at the request of the Belgians and no assurance was given by us that the cars would not deteriorate. These cars were still in camp when the Nigerians took over at the end of November, 1960. They had deteriorated from lack of servicing, exposure to downpour and hot sun - tyres were rotting and were eaten by ants. A small number of cars had been taken from town and driven to country villages.
- d. 14.00 hours. A conference was held with local Baluba leaders in an effort to restore calm.
101. Immediate aftermath of rising.
- a. The few Belgians that were left behind in MANONO hated UN but were by force of circumstances obliged to do their best to get along with us. Those who were evacuated did as much damage as they could to UN through the Katangese Press. Undoubtedly some of the Belgians were quite good to the Congolese people, and were interested in their welfare and had given them a fair deal.
- b. The Balubas showed hostility towards the Company for a couple of weeks after the uprising - they blamed the Company for not fighting with them against the police.

c. During the days immediately after 14 September we had a number of visits from press and magazine men - all gave what may be termed a fair coverage except the Belgian and Katangese press. Belgians demonstrated in front of Battalion Headquarters in ALBERTVILLE carrying placards "Go home Irish". SCOMEF and his staff also came under fire at sittings of the TSHOMBE cabinet for lack of UN support to Katangese armed forces in MANONO.

d. Damage and Looting.

- (1) Some damage was done to the mining machinery in the mines - nothing substantial, chiefly superficial. An effort was made to burn two large trucks. About fourteen cars and lorries were stolen and used by Balubas in country villages until there was no more petrol available. Damage was done to some houses, though heavy damage was done only to three - the houses belonging to the more anti-Congolese Belgians. Main damage consisted of a blow of a club to a door, window, chest of drawers or wardrobe or the pulling out of electrical or plumbing fittings. The chief articles taken from houses were curtains, blankets, mattresses, chairs and saucepans - articles that would be of some practical use to the Congolese. There was not much to steal as the majority of the families, women and children, had been evacuated long before the uprising and nearly all household goods had been taken with them.
- (2) The Church was not touched. There was superficial damage to the butchery, food stores and convent - destructive rather than thieving. In the commercial centre, where the Greeks had their shops, no damage whatever was done and nothing was stolen. An evacuated Italian's clothes shop was locked up and two months after the uprising not even a window had been broken. For safety the Greek traders stayed in our camp at night for up to a month after the uprising - the Balubas posted watchmen to guard their shops during the night. The prison was burned and an attempt was made to burn the Administrative buildings on the 14th - there were no other burnings. This did not warrant the account sent abroad by the Belgians and which even appeared in Irish papers - "MANONO burning". Reports of looting too were out of all proportion. The Balubas, having suffered 37 killed, showed restraint. The defecting Gendarmerie platoon was utilised to help UN patrol the town and curb stealing or looting.

e. Visits from higher authority.

- (i) SCOMEF (COL. H.W. BYRNE) visited MANONO on 1 September and discussed the situation with the Company Commander.
- (ii) Staff Officers of SCOMEF (COMDT. O'BRIEN, CAPT. MONAHAN) visited the Company on 9 and 12 September respectively and briefed Company Officers on the outside situation.
- (iii) Battalion OC and QM (LT. COL. BUNWORTH and COMDT. KEOGH) visited the Company on 7 September.
- (iv) The Battalion OC visited the Company on 15 September and was briefed. LT. ENRIGHT's platoon was also flown in on that date. The Battalion OC was asked to try and make plans to send in African troops as well.
- (v) The Battalion OC, Second-in-Command and Adjutant visited the Company on 19 September.
- (vi) Visits from outside officers were always very welcome and their help and understanding was always appreciated.

f. Visit to ELIZABETHVILLE by Company OC.

The Company OC was summoned to ELIZABETHVILLE on 17 September and reported to MR. BERENDSEN, UN Political representative in KATANGA, and to SCOMEF on the situation and answered petty charges made by evacuated Belgians to UN Headquarters in ELIZABETHVILLE.

102. DAILY EXPRESS REPORT.

EXTRACT FROM ARTICLE, BY REPORTER DANIEL McGEACHIE, IN DAILY EXPRESS, THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 22nd, 1960.

"A THOUGHT-PROVOKING STORYIRISHMEN IN CONGO TURN THE OTHER CHEEK - AND WIN

Daniel McGeachie in a cable from MANONO, KATANGA in the strife-ridden CONGO last night revealed a strange story of the battalion from IRELAND, and the battle they won without firing a shot. It's a fantastic story and a compelling one. It is also a splendid tribute to the men, who obeying UNITED NATIONS orders, turned the other cheek - and won.

They had never been to war before: they still have to fire a shot in anger. But Ireland's army to-day realised they had won their first battle as a brief radio message was flashed to the UNITED NATIONS in ELIZABETHVILLE. It was from the 28 BELGIANS who for four days have cowered under Irish protection awaiting to be evacuated. It said 'we have decided to stay'.

In four breathless hot days B Company of the 33rd Irish Battalion has turned a bloodbath into a limping but peaceful community. I watched them do it. Undoubtedly they had justification to defend themselves with gunfire. But they did it the way the UNITED NATIONS wanted them to do it. They did it with soft-spoken words. And to-day, even the few frightened Belgians, who carelessly accused them of condoning the looting of trouble-makers, admit their respect for them.

The conditions in which the Irish have worked to evacuate the KATANGA police and send the trouble-makers back to the bush could not have been worse. The other bases that I have toured in this province, including the isolated wastes of the northern frontier, are holiday camps by comparison.

Commandant Pearse Barry and his men are based on what was once MANONO school. To-day as I left them, they were squatting under trees, resting after a tin-ration lunch and cans of tea stewed in the cook-house. The soldiers eat around the fire - it keeps the flies away. They have practically no water. What they have in a fast-emptying drum is kept for tea - they roughly wash their faces and necks in lemonade. In a far corner of the school is the armoury. In front of it a day and night guard squats with their rifles behind a barricade of kitbags painted with names like McNamara and Flynn. The guards to-day are, for example, the men who normally run the cook-house - Edmund Ryan from Cork, Kieran Sludds from Wexford, John Holden from Kilkenny and Eddie Cochrane from Mallow, Co. Cork. They wear the deep jungle-green tropical kit, light weight, but still too hot for MANONO. And they wear the blue UNITED NATIONS flashes and helmets.

The Commander of the 33rd Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Richard Bunworth said when he came here on a flying visit from the battalion headquarters at ALBERTVILLE:-



'Well you might say they've done the job asked of them. They behaved very well, every one of them. It just needed one scared soldier to fire a shot and the whole job would have been spoiled.'

But that shot was never fired.

FOR PEOPLE WHO HAVE NEVER BEEN TO WAR BEFORE, THE IRISH ARE TAKING THEIR VICTORY COOLY. MOST OF THEM, I AM SURE DON'T REALISE THE IMPORTANCE OF WHAT THEY HAVE DONE - DON'T REALISE THAT THE UNITED NATIONS HAS TAKEN A GREAT JUMP FORWARD IN THE MINDS OF MANY PEOPLE BECAUSE OF THE IRISH."

103. UNITED PRESS REPORT.

FROM RAY MOLONEY, UNITED PRESS CORRESPONDENT.

'Officers and men of the Irish Group at the Eastern Command Headquarters here seethed with anger to-day in the wake of a wave of criticism of the behaviour of the Irish troops in the North Central KATANGA trouble-spot of MANONO. The anger of the Irish was reflected also in the comments of other nationalities in the Headquarters here who spoke bitterly of the ingratitude of Belgian civilians in MANONO.

The criticism was splashed over the front pages of the ELIZABETHVILLE newspapers this morning and was repeated by Belgians in conversations in bars and restaurants around town. It ranged from accusations that the Irish contingent in MANONO had deliberately disarmed the local Katanga Police to enable dissident tribal elements to gain the upper hand, to allegations that the Irish had deliberately stood by and permitted the looting and pillaging of shops and homes. The official United Nations spokesman to-day flatly described these charges as "nonsense". This view was supported by well-informed observers who insisted that the Irish had done everything possible - and more - in the face of the savagery that erupted in MANONO earlier this week.

One of the most vocal in his criticism of the Irish Troops was the Belgian Commander of the MANONO Police Force. United Nations officials pointed out that this Commander in fact knew little about the situation since he was the first man to flee from MANONO when the trouble began. On the first plane with him were fifteen Congolese Police. Behind, at MANONO, remained the wives and families of the police. Asked why he had fled before getting the women and children out, the commander replied with startling frankness "the police were so hated that one of the best ways to try and restore order was to get them away." Possibly the best reply to the uninformed criticism of the Irish came from a Canadian officer of the United Nations Headquarters. This officer halted me on the street this morning and - almost visibly controlling his anger - "what do these people expect?". The best answer to all this nonsensical criticism is that not a single European in MANONO was even touched by the rioters, let alone hurt in any way. It would be possible here to quote Irish officers on the events but I believe that their defence, not that it is necessary, comes best from non-Irish sources.

A Burmese senior officer of the Command said this morning "To accuse the Irish of failing in their duty is not only nonsense, it is base ingratitude." They had one hundred and ten men there to keep the peace in a town with more than one hundred Europeans and something in the order of twenty-five thousand Congolese. The Irish were spread very thin on the ground protecting three vital places - their Headquarters, the area in which the Europeans took refuge, and the airfield. They protected these three places and saved all the Europeans and no troops in the world could have done more. The charge that the Irish disarmed the Katanga Police and thus allowed the tribal rioters to gain the upper hand is best dismissed in the

words of the official Katanga Government spokesman who admitted that the police took refuge in the United Nations sector of MANONO and handed over their weapons in return for United Nations protection.

The Irish Troops in the Congo have built themselves a fine reputation in a very short time. It is, presumably, to be expected that in the stress of the dramatic events now rocking this country, uninformed people will seek to criticise the very people who have travelled so far to help them. It should be a matter of pride for Ireland, that she does not lack ready and willing allies in the ranks of the United Nations to spring to her defence."

104. Criticism.

"People sitting on the fence" often criticise. B Company action in MANONO was criticised for a number of things, some unfair, but some perhaps fair.

- a. Had the UN not been in its infancy in Northern KATANGA and had there been a sincere understanding between the Belgians and the Company in matters of intelligence, then it is on the cards that more concrete steps could have been taken by the Company to forestall the clash between the Belgian-dominated administration and the Baluba tribe. A clash of this type was months later averted in KABALO, but only after days of negotiation between Belgians, Balubas and high UN officials, including MR. DURAN, MR. DAYAL's personal representative, and only then, after the gendarmerie under Belgian officers had agreed to withdraw forthwith from the area - the UN at that time knew more of the problem in KATANGA.
- b. Had there been a stronger UN force in MANONO and had B Company been less concerned with preserving life, more could have been done to curb the limited looting and damage done by Balubas.
- c. (1) Should B Company, after having been reinforced, have been more firm with the Balubas after the rising? UN did not go to the Congo to lay down a way of life for the local inhabitants or to usurp the authority of the Congolese people in their own land. After the rising the Balubas erected a number of road blocks on the chief roads in the Baluba area. These were called road blocks for want of a better name but were in actual fact fragile check-points that imposed a short delay but never interfered with our movement. These road blocks consisted mainly of a pole or branch of a tree across the road or a barrel or some such object. They were always immediately lifted for UN vehicles.  
(2) They were manned in the larger villages by a small group of men, usually armed with bows and arrows, for a period after the rising. These check-points were primarily a method of getting information or news. Occupants of UN vehicles passing through were invariably asked questions such as: "Any news?" "What is the situation in ELIZABETHVILLE?" "Where is TSHOMBE?" "Where is LUMUMBA?" "Any fighting in other areas of KATANGA?" UN did not rush into the problem of getting the Balubas to remove those blocks permanently. There was no need, as they created no hazard and were harmless. Their presence gave the Congolese a psychological sense of security - this was desirable.  
(3) These "road blocks" were of course a completely different problem from the ones erected on the outskirts of the Baluba territory - such as broken bridges, large trees, car traps, etc. - they were permanent and were for a different purpose.

105. Life in the area after the uprising.

- a. Anti-Belgian and, to a degree, anti-UN feeling was running high - the Balubas could not understand why B Company did not shoot the Belgian officers and the police who had killed so many of their men. Mistrust of, and hostility towards us was mounting. For a month or so after the uprising, there was a distinct possibility of a Baluba attack on our camp. Troops got up each morning at 04.30 hours so as to be ready for any eventuality at dawn. Guns, charged magazines, grenades, etc. were beside men as they slept, and were ready for instant use. Houses were barricaded at night so as to guard against silent infiltration from the bush. This was a period of tension. The absence of MMGs and mortars was sorely felt. The Greeks were our best intelligence source. Mulattoes were also helpful in this respect - some Mulattoes had to be evacuated for safety - the white or Belgian strain in them made them unwanted, during this period of high feeling. The remaining Belgians, who must have been well in the picture, would give NO information. The impression given was that they were hoping for a clash between us and Balubas. On M. JACQUES, the Administrator, surrendering his revolver to CAPT. CROKE, he said "Keep that, you'll want it soon."
- b. This was a very tough period for the troops - very heavy security duties, heavy patrol duties, continuous tension and insufficient rest, the death of the Company Sergeant, scarcity of food, shortage of liquids including water, lack of proper UN uniform, no laundering facilities, extremely warm temperature and above all no mail from home for a period of three weeks. Morale was put to the test but was improved with the arrival of more troops and consequent easing of duties, improvement in food and mail, getting acquainted with the Congolese through long patrolling and getting their good-will. The tension eased and the daily sick parade dropped.
- c. Incidents and Conferences. During the September-October period scarcely any day passed without a serious incident of some kind or other. Conferences, often more than one per day, consultations, negotiations and adjudications with local Baluba leaders, with Baluba leaders from far-off areas of North KATANGA and with the local Belgian representatives were very frequent. As we did not have much of a concrete nature to offer at this early stage in economic or political matters, such conferences were pretty trying. But they served one very important function in that they were a real safety valve for the Baluba leaders. They loved to talk at length and air their grievances and authority and they appreciated being listened to. Such conferences went a long way towards spreading an understanding of the UN mission in the different areas of North KATANGA. The Belgians, for their part, always wished for discussions and consultations concerning the economic affairs of the area and the security of their equipment and installations.

106. Death of Company Sergeant GRANT. Company Sergeant GRANT was a very fine NCO. He was a man of excellent character - devoted, loyal, sincere and full of humanity towards his comrade soldiers and the Congolese. He was a thorough gentleman and was a fine ambassador for our Army abroad. Towards the end of September he was not feeling too well - he was fatigued from the continuing tension and from carrying the responsibility of senior NCO in the Company. On 1 October, after performing his normal duties up to 09.00 hours, he lay in his bed with a severe pain in the stomach. The medical officer examined him, in the presence of the Company OC, and moved him off to hospital in ALBERTVILLE by 12.00 hours. A small plane which had brought the Battalion Chaplain, FR. CROWLEY to MANONO was luckily on the airstrip at the time. He was operated on for appendicitis in ALBERTVILLE hospital on 1 October and died on 3 October.

107. ANDRE SHABANI.

- a. SHABANI, aged 24 years, was an elected deputy for the Baluba County of MANONO. For some time prior to the arrival of B Company he had been imprisoned in ELIZABETHVILLE by the TSHOMBE regime. Immediately after the uprising he was sent back to MANONO - it was the opinion in ELIZABETHVILLE that Balubas with a leader would not present the same problem as a leaderless group. He was accompanied on his return by another, jailed deputy, LEOPOLD, from MALEMBA NKULU who subsequently played little part in things, and by MR. GRANDJEAN, a former Belgian Administrator. GRANDJEAN apparently had been popular with the Congolese and his return was an effort to retain Government contact with affairs. He remained only one day.
- b. SHABANI held quite a considerable sway over the Baluba tribe in his electoral district of MANONO. For the coming months he did his best to get them back to a normal way of life. He also tried to curb the activities of the extremest group within the Baluba, though at times he himself and his family were threatened by that group.

108. GUSTAV DURAN. MR. DURAN, a Spaniard, worked in the office of MR. DAYAL, the Secretary General's Special Representative, in LEOPOLDVILLE. He represented MR. DAYAL in political affairs in KATANGA. He was of considerable help to B Company as in his dealings with the Congolese, he was an accomplished and tactful negotiator. He and SCOMEPE brought JASON SENDWE, the Baluba deputy in LEOPOLDVILLE, to MANONO to address the Baluba chiefs.

109. Jeunesse. After the uprising the young men of the populated localities banded together to form organised groups. They had leaders and sub-leaders. They had little time for the older leaders. They were loyal to LUMUMBA and were very anti-Belgian. In the Jeunesse there were fanatical sections that would not have much hesitation in resorting to murdering their opponents black or white. The Jeunesse had the appearance of an organisation that would become a problem, once organised.

110. Tin Mines.

- a. The mines had a staff of approximately 80 Belgians and 3,000 Congolese working daily three shifts of eight hours each. After the uprising, with the white technicians gone and some damage done to equipment, production in the mine ceased and for a period of two months only maintenance work on the equipment was done. During this period B Company had a 24 hours Guard on the mines, which covered an area of a couple of square miles. This was an exhausting detail and absorbed daily up to 60 troops, in three shifts. The purpose of the guard was to protect equipment, machinery and workers, and thereby introduce some security in the mine area, with the object of eventually encouraging Congolese workers to come along and continue production.
- b. During this period there were numerous conferences with Belgian staff and Baluba leaders to try and get production going again. Towards the end of November production was recommenced - to a limited degree - and arrangements were in progress to have tin ore conveyed to MUYUMBA and down the LUALABA river. Prior to Congo Independence KATANGA, with 10% of Congo population, provided 50% of Congo Revenue - Southern KATANGA, of course, provided most of this.

111. Moroccan Troops. Eighty-five Moroccan troops, including three officers, were flown into MANONO during the last week of September and the first week of October 1960. The majority of these were seasoned troops who had seen service in the hills of MOROCCO. They were older than our men and were prepared to make do with little. The officers, Lts. CHAFAI I/c, ALAL and MIMOUNI were young. These troops had quite a lot of native cunning and were good men to deal with the various problems that frequently arose with the Balubas. They struck up a very good partnership with our troops and both got on very well together.
112. Defected Gendarmerie. The Gendarmerie did not open fire on the Congolese on 14 September. The Gendarmerie platoon changed allegiance to LEOPOLDVILLE. They still continued for over a month to receive some pay from ELIZABETHVILLE. A new Congolese Gendarmerie officer, CAPT. MWIMBI, had been sent into MANONO by ELIZABETHVILLE to command the platoon. This man played a good game; he did not know how the ball was eventually going to bounce, so he was ready to go either way. After two weeks or so he was detained under house arrest by SHABANI, escorted by two of his own platoon men. He was now quite happy as he was not incurring the wrath of either side. We left the matter stand as no problem was being created, though Gendarmerie Headquarters ELIZABETHVILLE was creating a hub-hub about it. When Gendarmerie pay was finally cut off, they wanted the Geomines representative to pay them. This of course came to nothing. At another stage they and SHABANI wanted Greek traders to dispose of their goods at half price - this came to nothing either. The Gendarmerie platoon retained their arms, this created no problem, and assisted us in the early days after the uprising in patrolling MANONO and curbing looting. When food got scarce they killed a couple of elephants and the stench of elephant meat from their quarters was not nice. By and large this platoon created no problem to us and were on very good terms with the men of the Company.
113. Patrolling. During the months following the uprising the chief task of B Company was to produce an atmosphere or climate of goodwill and stability, thereby laying the foundation for the resumption of normal productive work by the Congolese. First, we had to try and obtain the goodwill and co-operation of the Baluba people towards UN and towards white people living in the company area of operations. This was not an easy problem as a situation of confusion, misunderstandings and bitterness existed after the first uprising against white-dominated authority in a good number of years. In addition to normal town patrols the Company had two to three big patrols each week, up to 160 miles return, on routes to MUYUMBA, KIOLO, PIANA, KISHIALE, KIAMBI and KAMATATU. With only two C12 wireless sets, both static at MANONO and PIANA MWANGA, there was no long range wireless contact on these patrols. By and large, while Baluba villages being patrolled for the first time were unfriendly, on getting to know the troops and their attitude on subsequent patrols, the people became friendly and felt more secure with UN in the locality. But on the odd occasion hostility was met.
- a. I quote hereunder report of patrol Commander on second patrol to MULUNGO on 20 October. It was a mixed patrol, Irish - Moroccan.
- "Patrol, LT. BLYTHE in charge, sent to interview MR. FILKENSTEIN of KABAMBULU, a wealthy crippled river trader and a native of RUSSIA. Chief of MULUNGO visited in order to get use of ferry at KABWE. Chief of local Jeunesse visited as he and not the chief proper controlled the village and ferry. During the interview 200 to 300 armed natives surrounded the patrol and despite the assurances of the interpreter, LT. LINDHOLM, and their own leader that ONU were their friends and not their enemies, began to threaten the patrol members. Bows were fitted with arrows, drawn back, and

aimed. The patrol was threatened by spears, shotguns, and in one case, a captured Belgian SMG. Patrol members were pushed and jostled in a provoking manner and SGT. MURPHY was spat on. Due to the hostile attitude of the crowd, the patrol Commander decided to go no further but return to MANONO by a slightly different route. Natives obstructed the patrol vehicles by standing in front of them but eventually allowed them to pass through. Patrol found small party of natives attempting to block new route by pushing a truck across the route. They ran to the bush on seeing the patrol approach and the truck was pushed aside without incident. The patrol observed that its original route was now blocked by a tree at which a crowd of armed natives had assembled."

- b. When LT. BLYTHE got back to MANONO he stated that this was the nearest he had come to opening fire.
- c. A complaint was then made to SHABANI about the reception the patrol got. Some Baluba leaders were coming to MANONO for a conference and SHABANI said that he would again exhort them to explain to their people the nature of the UN mission. At a conference held at Company Headquarters on 23 October with a large muster of the Baluba leaders from within the UN protected zone, two leaders, MULONGO and LEOPOLD, who had been in ELIZABETHVILLE, from the MOLUNGO - MALEMBA NKULU area expressed regret at MULUNGO incidents and asked for another patrol to the area and stated that they would accompany it. They also requested a UN garrison at MALEMBA NKULU.
- d. Hereunder extract of report on Patrol of 29 October.  
 "Patrol left Camp, CAPT. RYAN in charge also LT. BLYTHE and interpreter and DEPUTY LEOPOLD. Patrol passed through MULONGO and crossed the ferry without incident. The population along the route applauded UN and the local Jeunesse at MALEMBA NKULU sang a song of welcome."  
 This is mentioned so as to bring out the point that once the natives got some instruction on the presence and mission of the UN from their own leaders, they would co-operate. Further extract from report:-  
 "An inspection revealed that MALEMBA NKULU did not possess a water supply, power plant, sewerage scheme, housing or sufficient resources of food and milk to support a garrison. Patrol interviewed two white nuns, Daughters of the Cross, who were running a hospital in MALEMBA. A look around revealed that the nuns were trying to cope with over 200 wounded Balubas. The nuns said they were almost all casualties from Gendarmerie action during a Baluba attack on MITWABA."  
 Hospital facilities and medical supplies were totally inadequate, so patrol Commander collected a list of the most urgently required items for transmission to the medical authorities in LEOPOLDVILLE. The patrol received many presents on its return journey, a goat, bananas, mangoes, and the patrol Commander, in order to reciprocate the goodwill insisted on paying for a dirty black pig in MULONGO. This pig afterwards caused the M.O. quite an amount of concern.
- e. The following report of a patrol of 27 October is given as it shows a new element - air - being introduced by the TSHOMBE forces against the Baluba people.
  - (1) "On 27 October I investigated a report that the villages of KIOLO and MUKUBU had been bombed by a Belgian plane. In KIOLO I was shown three burnt-out huts which could have been set on fire by an incendiary grenade. I was also shown a hole in the ground which was very much like that caused by the explosion of a HE grenade.

- (2) In MUKUBU I was shown where a burst of automatic fire struck a hedge and the wall of a hut. We were also shown a smoke grenade which was 9/10 buried in the ground. The manner in which it was buried suggested that it had fallen from a height. When I tried to prize it loose it started to smoke. After taking safety precautions I unearthed the grenade. When exposed to the sun it ignited and burned out. Beside the smoke grenade I found a substance like a stick of plastic explosive. When I tested a small portion of it, it burned like an incendiary grenade. From the evidence found I formed the opinion that some sort of incendiary bombs and smoke grenades had been dropped by a plane on the village of MUKUBU - also at least one burst of automatic fire had been fired.
- (3) On our return through MUKUBU we were handed two unexploded HE grenades and one unexploded smoke grenade which the natives said had been dropped by a plane."

Signed: P. CONDRON CAPT.

114. Closing of MANONO Airstrip to Katangese Planes. For some time in September/October Belgian Sabena and Katangese planes were using MANONO airstrip. Every time such a plane landed there was a scene at the airport, especially when some whites, Belgians to the Balubas, were carried in the plane. All such planes of course had Belgian or Belgian-hired crews and these provoked the native demonstrators by frequently taking photographs of them in their wild attire. Matters came to a head on 30 September when a Sabena plane was on the airstrip. A large crowd had gathered and then a small plane, which to us was a Belgian Army plane, landed. A Belgian Army and Katangese Gendarmierie Chaplain, in uniform, alighted and approached the crowd of natives who had gathered at the exit. He spoke loudly to them. The interpreter who was present states that among other things the chaplain threatened to have their villages bombed and to have a plague brought down on them. Our chaplain made a protest to the Bishop in ELIZABETHVILLE re this chaplain's conduct. The crowd got very excited. SHABANI was sent for to control them and I think only for his arrival it would have been a problem to stop the natives from killing this chaplain. After this incident it was decided to seek authority of SCOMEF and OC 33 Infantry Battalion to close the airstrip to all but UN planes. This authority was finally given and from this on UN planes only used the airstrip.

115. Food and Supplies for Congolese.

- a. Food stocks in Greek shops had been exhausted by the end of September - the mine workers had some savings, in money, but could not get food. Geomines had a reserve stock of maize and this they gave to mine workers' families on a rationed scale. With food scarce, UN planes carrying food for UN troops and for small Belgian population always created a small stir at the airstrip; incidents were easy to start. Towards the end of October the Red Cross branch of World Health Organisation, on request, sent two plane loads of food in for Baluba population, maize, powdered milk, skimmed milk, powder and sugar. This was rationed out to Balubas over a period and sacks of maize were taken on some patrols for country villages. When food stocks, etc. were really low the Greek traders were asked by us to go to ELIZABETHVILLE to try and get food in for the population. The order of preference of commodities of Balubas was soap, sugar, cigarettes, maize and milk powder. They were a very clean people, and there was always a group of mothers washing babies and children at each waterpoint. The position of soap and cigarettes in the list of priorities is interesting. Congolese were not too much concerned about luxurious food - they were easily satisfied with native food - manioc, banana, mango, fish, eggs and mutton. All villages had a stock of hens and small sheep.

- b. The Greeks decided to go to ELIZABETHVILLE for food - by UN plane. They were also glad to get a chance to take out their money from MANONO as the Baluba leaders wanted them to hand it into MANONO Post Offices, which the Greeks did not want to do until they got an assurance from the Katangese administration in ELIZABETHVILLE that money lodged in MANONO Post Office would later be good currency in KATANGA. This assurance finally came after some delay. The Greeks did not send in food - letter of 27 November from the organiser of the expedition to Company Commander at MANONO is as follows:-

"Dear Sir,

By this letter I would like to let you know the following:- When we arrived at ELIZABETHVILLE, the very next day we went to the Sobelair to rent a plane. Everything was settled for the departure of this plane but as soon as the KATANGA Government was asked for permission to leave, we were informed by the Sobelair that it was refused. In the same time we were informed officially that if we send one kilo of goods to MANONO, we shall be 'expulse' from the country. That is the reason why we didn't send anything promised to the natives and to you.

With our best regards to you and your officers,

I remain yours respectfully,

J. ANTOINIOU."

116. Procurement of Petrol Stock and Recovery of Geomines Vehicles.

- a. Initially, petrol stocks were brought from Geomines Company, under control of Belgians. When this stock was exhausted some petrol was delivered to the Company from headquarters in ALBERTVILLE by air. Finally on 28 September we were obliged to go to MUYUMBU 40 miles away, for petrol - there were large Geomines storage tanks and a good number of 40 gallon barrels, all containing petrol, there. We got a good stock from this source. The Congolese had taken some of this stock and used it mainly for transporting fighting parties to places such as MITWABA, KRONKOLE and KABALO, where there was an amount of contact with the Gendarmerie, and for taking chiefs to meetings and conferences.
- b. A number of cars and vehicles had been taken by the Balubas during the uprising in MANONO. Early in October Battalion headquarters was asked to send a strong recovery vehicle and transport personnel to help in recovering any of these vehicles available in the area. LT. RAFTERY, the Engineer Officer, was sent along to MANONO to do the job and did a very good job of recovery work with inadequate recovery resources and in a hostile environment. Recovering vehicles that the natives had staked a claim on was a task that drew hostility from the Balubas.

117. JASON SENDWE.

- a. SENDWE was the Baluba representative to the Government at LEOPOLDVILLE. After KATANGA's election of the previous spring the Baluba party decided to quit the KATANGA Government.
- b. In the Spring election, of the 60 seats in the KATANGA parliament, TSHOMBE's CONIKAT party won 25 seats, 91,000 votes approximately. The BALUBAKAT, under SENDWE won 23 seats, 135,000.



c. At the request of SHABANI and OC UN MANONO, MR. DURAN from the Office of MR. DAYAL, Special Representative of the Secretary General, in LEOPOLDVILLE and COL. H. BYRNE arranged to bring SENDWE to MANONO in order to calm the Baluba tribe and get them at their normal work again. Towards the end of October there was a feeling in MANONO among UN and local Baluba leaders that SENDWE would be brought in. On 30 October a message came from SCOMEF in Irish, stating that "Duine Tabhachtach" would arrive in MANONO on 1 November. Word was sent to Baluba area patrolled by MANONO UN chiefly through SHABANI, that SENDWE was coming and that all chiefs should try and get to MANONO on 1 November. UN tpt was sent to one area, KIOLO-MULONGO, for them.

d. 1 November. Very early in the morning, Greek traders came to Camp with news that Radio BRAZZAVILLE had reported that SENDWE had been taken from a plane in KAMINA by Gendarmerie while Irish UN troops looked on. The Greeks expected trouble then in MANONO and all came to UN camps for protection. This report is very interesting. The KATANGA Government knew that SENDWE was coming to MANONO, very much against their will of course. This false report then was probably put out

- (1) To cause confusion among Balubas at MANONO.
- (2) To discredit Irish UN troops at KAMINA.
- (3) To cause discord between UN and Congolese at MANONO.

This report was not believed in MANONO though the Baluba leaders awaiting SENDWE's arrival were told of it - the ground was being prepared for their disappointment and anger if UN failed to bring in SENDWE. The Moroccan officer in charge of the Moroccan Company had given some credence to the report and expected fighting against Balubas that day. Approaching mid-day, a small UN plane arrived conveying JASON SENDWE, SCOMEF and MR. DURAN. Baluba people from MANONO and from the neighbouring villages had arrived near the airstrip in strength of up to six or seven thousand to welcome him. They gave him a tumultuous but orderly welcome. The leaders numbering about forty were introduced to him individually by SHABANI. The defected Gendarmerie turned out in their dress uniform, unarmed, as a guard of honour. SENDWE then toured all the MANONO native townships with a small UN escort, and the native hospital, where he saw many wounded from raids by TSHOMBE's gendarmerie. The only slight incident in the reception was as SENDWE was about to leave the airstrip on his tour in a UN jeep when one Baluba leader jumped on the jeep and wanted to get SENDWE off it, on to another vehicle - he did not want SENDWE to be seen on a UN vehicle.

e. Later that evening and early next morning SENDWE addressed the Baluba leaders at a conference which lasted seven hours. MR. DURAN, SCOMEF, Company OC and interpreter attended the meeting. The chief points SENDWE made to his audience were:-

- (1) Get working on the land and till the soil.
- (2) Open up all roadways.
- (3) Get traffic going again on the rivers.
- (4) Get back working in the mines.
- (5) Co-operate with UN.

f. SENDWE also dealt with the case of one Baluba leader, from PIANA MWANGA, who had been in camp for protection for some time, and who was suspected of being a KONIKAT, a pro-TSHOMBE. SENDWE listened to both sides of the story and had the man set free.

- g. SENDWE then had a conference with the Belgian Geomine leaders. The chief item discussed was getting the Baluba people working again, getting the mines in production. The Belgians at this conference took it now that SENDWE had to be listened to and by implication they were accepting him, temporarily at least, as the leader of their area of North KATANGA. He, with COL. H. BYRNE and MR. DURAN left by air for KABALO on 2 November.
- h. The immediate result of SENDWE's visit that could be seen by us in MANONO was a big upsurge in Baluba goodwill towards UN. Various conferences took place during the weeks following, with Geomines officials and SHABANI, with the object of getting the mines working. Towards the end of November progress had been made and limited production commenced early in December.
- j. During SENDWE's visit to MANONO all five river ferries covering entry to MANONO area were berthed on the MANONO side of rivers so as to minimise the chances of a Gendarmerie raid to take SENDWE.
- k. Taking into account the tension and confusion prevailing in the area and the lack of communications and travel facilities, MR. DURAN expressed the highest appreciation of the UN effort in getting such a large muster of local Congolese leaders, some from up to 150 miles distant, and in having the stage set for the proper atmosphere required for the conduct of such a meeting. MR. DURAN stated on leaving the Airport that he would be very pleased to report on the manner in which the Secretary General's instructions were being implemented in the area.

118. UN Protected Neutral Zones. During October, 1960 it was arranged between the TSHOMBE regime and UN HQ in ELIZABETHVILLE that the areas of hostilities in KATANGA between the Baluba people and the Belgian-officered Gendarmerie be defined and organised as UN protected zones.

- a. One such zone was the area NIEMBA - NYUNZU - KABALO - MANONO - KRONKOLE - MULONGO - MALEMBA NKULU - KABONGO.
- b. Another smaller such zone was further south in LUENA - BUKAMA area.

The general idea was that the Gendarmerie would not attack Baluba villages inside the neutral zones. MR. DURAN and COL. W.H. BYRNE, Commander of SCOMEP initiated instructions to have this neutral zone scheme put into effect. By and large this cease fire was observed within the northern zone, but resort to arms by the Gendarmerie was frequent on the fringe of the zone. During this period, accelerated recruitment and training of new Gendarmerie forces went on in the Southern region of KATANGA.

119. Assessment by UN Political Affairs Officer of the UN Congo Operation.

MR. GUSTAV DURAN, UN Political Affairs Officer in the UN Congo operation has written a brief statement on conduct of affairs in the MANONO area by B Company 33 Infantry Battalion. The statement is:-

"Statement by MR. GUSTAVO DURAN, Resident Representative of the United Nations Development Programme in GREECE and former Political Affairs Officer (1960-61) in the United Nations Operation in the CONGO.

---

Several weeks after KATANGA's declaration of secession from the REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO, the Baluba tribes of Central and Northern KATANGA rose up in opposition to the de facto regime that had been established at ELIZABETHVILLE. The uprising was quickly met by the KATANGA Gendarmerie, led by white mercenaries, with a violence which went far beyond the excesses that had been previously committed by the Baluba. Clashes between the contending parties often resulted in indiscriminate massacres.

In accordance with the mandate he had received from the Security Council, the Secretary General of the United Nations offered his offices for the solution of the situation by peaceful means and proposed the creation, under supervision of the United Nations Force, in collaboration with the local authorities concerned, of two neutral zones covering the areas effected by the hostilities. The first included the territories of NYEMBA, NYUNZU, KABALO, MANONO, the MULONGO area northeast of the territory of MALEMBA-NKULU, and the northern part of the territory of KAEONGO; the second, the region of MKULA KULU, LUENA, BUKAMA up to, though not including, KABONDO-DIENDA. The proposal was discussed with the authorities at ELIZABETHVILLE who readily gave their agreement. The accord was made public on 17 October, 1960 by the Special Representative of the Secretary General at LEOPOLDVILLE.

It then became necessary to obtain the concurrence of the Baluba chiefs and of the local representatives of the ELIZABETHVILLE regime in Central and North KATANGA, and I had the privilege of being entrusted with the task of explaining to them the purposes of the cease-fire plan, and of discussing with the Commanders of the Units of the UN Force stationed in Central and Northern KATANGA the measures required for its effective execution.

It is a matter of record that during the months that followed the establishment of the neutral zones, Company B of the 33 Battalion of the Irish Contingent succeeded in enforcing the cease-fire in the area under its jurisdiction through the exclusively peaceful means of mediation and negotiation, and in a spirit of perfect impartiality with regard to the claims of the two parties. The relatively peaceful and orderly conditions resulting from this situation made possible the resumption of economic activities in the MANONO region at a level not far below that existing before hostilities started. In turn, this served to maintain at a reasonable level the welfare of the population as a whole and thus fulfil the purposes that the United Nations Operation in the Congo was designed to attain."

120. Burning of KRONKOLE.

- a. 3 November. Report from OC PIANA that KRONKOLE, 80 km SE of PIANA, had been wiped out by Gendarmerie.
- b. 4 November. Patrol from MANONO - LT. BLYTHE in charge to investigate KRONKOLE. Extract from Patrol reports as follows:-

"Great difficulty experienced in getting to KRONKOLE due to broken bridges and felled trees. Both pick-ups had to be left 4 kilometres from KRONKOLE under small guard, as a large wooden bridge had been completely burned down. The rest of the patrol moved forward on foot. Patrol found KRONKOLE completely burned out and deserted, but found no dead or wounded or evidence of fighting. The village seemed to have been abandoned in a great hurry as cooking pots, beds, chairs, manioc, etc. were left behind in the houses. Patrol Commander estimated that village had either been burned as a defensive measure by retreating Balubakats or as a reprisal by raiding Gendarmerie or Konakats, but that there had been no fighting in the village itself. Returning by a different route patrol found local Balubakat population very much on the defensive. Many minor bridges were either burned or damaged. The patrol experienced considerable delay and trouble in detours and in repairing bridges. One long wooden bridge had all its flooring removed. After an hour's delay, during which the patrol repeatedly shouted that they were UN and friendly, some fifty armed natives appeared from the bush in the rear and after a parley with LT. LINDHOLM agreed to produce the hidden timbers of the bridge. The patrol then crossed. Natives in this region were wearing a bunch of cotton on their heads to show they were Balubakats. Two wounded Balubas, collected in the Baluba clinic at PIANA and brought to hospital in MANONO, stated

they were wounded north of KRONKOLE. In all the patrol covered 370 kilometers."

- c. KRONKOLE was a village at the meeting point of the Baluba area and the TSHOMBE controlled area and was getting a hard time from the Gendarmerie stationed at MITWABA. A UN Moroccan Sgt. Major was killed there in late November, reputedly by Gendarmerie fire.

121. 14 and 15 November, 1960.

- a. Nineteen alleged TSHOMBE sympathisers, Congolese, were killed in two different locations about fifteen miles from MANONO. They were killed by a splinter extremist group within the Balubakat.
- b. The company did not have advanced knowledge of any plan being hatched to kill these people. Being conscious of the problem of the security and safety of UN personnel after NIEMBA, local patrolling was curtailed while the situation was being assessed and consequently UN personnel did not have the same liaison with the Baluba people which they had prior to this. The Belgians must have known of this pending killing. SHABANI also suspected it as he had sent his wife and children into the country for safety and he himself as well as his brother were, as it were, on the run. Whether it was that he became afraid of the extremists or that he hoped to curtail their activity himself, he did not give us any warning of the murders. A patrol, on being asked to go there, found 13 bodies, slashed with knives on the road to MUYUMBA - they were killed early on morning of 14 November. Six others were killed in a different locality, on the road to PIANA on 15 November. These were partly burned with petrol. The few Belgians in MANONO accompanied the patrols that located the dead and took photographs of the bodies. These afterwards appeared in a special paper issued by the TSHOMBE regime to discredit the Baluba tribe.
- c. The killings were in no way supported by the population, and SHABANI, as soon as he felt that public opinion in the matter was sufficiently strong in his favour, undertook to get the names and locations of members of the extremist group. On 17 November, members of B Company, accompanied by SHABANI, arrested five men and a woman for the crimes. They were taken to the Moroccan Camp and were still in arrest there when B Company left MANONO.

122. Nigerian Troops relieve Irish and Moroccans in MANONO-PIANA area.

During the third week of November information was received that it was proposed to send a full battalion of Nigerian troops to MANONO-PIANA area. Accommodation for them was arranged with MR. CLAEYS, head of Belgian group in MANONO. The Advance Party of the Nigerian unit was flown in on 20 November and company build-up continued by air for eight days. It was planned to send the battalion in by road KAMINA - KABONDE DIANDA - MALEMBA NKULU - KABWE - MULONGO - MANONO. From a detailed aerial reconnaissance of the route, which was strongly urged by B Company, it was seen that the entrance to the Baluba territory, especially in the region of KABONDA DIANDA, was heavily blocked. This blocking was to keep out TSHOMBE's Gendarmerie, not UN. The Nigerian battalion met resistance in this sensitive area and had to open fire extensively in order to get through. This was a pity as all that was needed was to send out Baluba leaders from inside their territory so as to advise and instruct the population to leave UN through unopposed. This was eventually done and led to the smooth travel of the incoming UN troops for the greater part of the journey.

123. To ALBERTVILLE.

- a. The airlift of B Company from MANONO was completed on 28 November. The local Congolese regretted the departure of the Irish Troops - SHABANI sent a telegram to UN Headquarters in LEOPOLDVILLE asking that the Irish and Moroccan troops be left in the area. The Moroccans were due to leave shortly after.
- b. Company personnel, though not happy with being stationed in MANONO during the tough early weeks eventually got accustomed to the various problems. They got to like the local Congolese people and were not now enthusiastic about being sent to a new environment. The Company now found itself obliged to adjust itself to a new set of circumstances and to a new atmosphere, where defensive preparations were in progress against an expected attack by Balubas on the town of ALBERTVILLE.

124. Message of Appreciation.

The following message from the Secretary General's Special Representative and the Supreme Commander was received early in December:

"

ONUC,  
LEOPOLDVILLE.  
5 December, 1960.

To:

Officer Commanding UN,  
ALBERTVILLE,  
MANONO.

For the last months and in spite of the trying circumstances surrounding your mission in NORTH KATANGA, you and your troops have given constant proof of the discipline, patience and restraint which must characterise action of the UN Force and of your devotion to the principles and purposes of the United Nations Operation in the CONGO. We want you to know how much your efforts and dedication are appreciated.

Signed: DAYAL and VAN HORN."

125. Appreciation. The Company Commander here wishes to pay tribute to the Officers (including Chaplain), NCOs and men of B Company, 33 Infantry Battalion. Suffice it to say that each and every one, even that small percentage who took some time to adjust themselves to the magnitude and importance of the peace-keeping job on hand, gave of his best and spared himself little. This Company, after many hard days, which seemed to bind the Company in loyalty and dedication to the cause in hand, returned to IRELAND a smart, well disciplined, high-morale company. Soldiers who served with this Company feel proud of their performance.

REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE PIANA MWANGA OUTPOST.

126. PIANA MWANGA is situated about 60 miles South East of MANONO and on the river LUVUA. There was an electric power station there which supplied power to the tin mines and town of MANONO.
127. On the morning of 28 August, 1960 CAPT. H. GOULDSBOROUGH with 20 other ranks flew from ALBERTVILLE to MANONO, en route to PIANA MWANGA.

128. The party attended Mass at MANONO, which was at that time still held by Belgian paratroops. These paratroops were preparing to evacuate the area and some of them were firing bursts from FN rifles into tree tops and into the air.
129. PIANA MWANGA was taken over from UNITED NATIONS Mali troops on 28 August and the Irish garrison immediately set about getting the post into a clean and sanitary condition, and also getting on friendly terms with the local population. As the Mali troops were only a short time there, they could NOT give any information on local conditions.
130. The garrison began patrolling right away, first doing short route marches, through the local villages, to enable the inhabitants to become accustomed to them and let them see that the Irish were friendly and secondly to get themselves fit and acclimatised to the weather. Jeep patrols were then commenced and their distance gradually extended.
131. A small hurling pitch and basketball court were constructed nearby, and in addition all members were trained to handle every weapon on issue to the garrison.
132. From the very beginning of the occupation of the outpost the detachment received weekly visits from the Company Commander or Medical Officer or Chaplain and mostly from all three together. During these visits the Company Commander discussed with OIC PIANA the various problems arising in both PIANA area and MANONO area and they were thus able to keep their policies in line with each other.
133. The Baluba. The inhabitants of most of the villages in the area were of the BALUBA tribe. These people spoke their tribal language KILUBA and also SWAHILI and many of the younger ones spoke a little FRENCH. There was a number of pigmy villages in the area.
134. The village of PIANA MWANGA differed from the others insofar as it had been built by the Company which owned the power station and was inhabited by the Congolese workers at the power station. These had been brought to work there from many different parts of the Congo. It is interesting to note that this policy of importing workers and more or less ignoring the local tribes did NOT have the effect intended by the Belgian authorities, which was to tie the loyalties of the workers to the Company which owned the power station. In fact the village of PIANA MWANGA was the first to elect a SENAD of the BALUBAKAT in this locality.
135. The Economy.
- a. The economy of the locality depended on the work at the power station and the sale of the only cash crop grown in the area which was cotton.
  - b. The GEOMINES Company which operated the power station also operated a large supply store which sold maize, sugar, soap and other essentials to all the locality.
  - c. The natives of the locality had become almost completely dependent on this supply store and a few other smaller ones for their food supplies.
  - d. The rebellion in North KATANGA broke out just when the cotton crop was about to be sold and the villages were left with the crop on their hands and it was never sold.

- e. Food supplies ceased to reach the Geomines store very early on, so that even if the cotton crop had been sold, there was very little food to be purchased.
- f. The supply of game animals in the area was very meagre and it was a rare thing to see any live wild animal.
- g. The river might have provided an additional source of food but unfortunately fish were not expected to come up the river until November/December.
- h. During most of the time B Company occupied PIANA, the villages in the area were in a semi-starvation state.
- i. O/C B Company 33 Infantry Battalion sent O/C PIANA a supply of Red Cross food supplies consisting of maize, milk powder, sugar and soap. These supplies though most welcome were very inadequate. They were distributed to the pregnant women and young children of four local villages.

136. Geomines Company.

- a. The Geomines Company also ran a dispensary at PIANA, and large numbers of the population of local villages came there for treatment.
- b. Medical supplies at the dispensary ran out very early on and it was NOT possible to get any replacements.
- c. Soon many people came to the PIANA outpost for treatment and the Post Commander and Medical Orderly did give treatment if they thought it might be of use.
- d. Children and some adults with septic cuts were cleaned up, disinfected and bandaged. Babies were given milk made from milk powder.
- e. People with chest complaints, coughs, etc., were given a bottle of medicine made from orange juice, sugar, aspirin and water.

137. General Situation.

- a. The troops adopted a friendly but firm attitude to the local population and tried to impress upon them that while UN troops were there to help them continue a normal life, they also intended there would be NO fighting or trouble in the area.
- b. The attitude of the local villages to them was on the whole very friendly but at times it could change overnight. These changes occurred on a few occasions and were however, understandable for the following reasons:-
  - (1) Many villagers had wireless sets and what came over from BRAZZAVILLE or ELIZABETHVILLE or some other station could and did often sent them into a semi-panic.
  - (2) Messages passed by TOM TOM Drums (these were beating far into the night on most nights) often caused a change in the reception got on the following day's patrols. However, this reception would not be hostile but just a little cooler than normal.
  - (3) The passage of the Long Patrol which came from ALBERTVILLE and went South through PIANA caused great fright in the area and many villages were evacuated. It took a lot of patrolling and explaining by the PIANA garrison to persuade those villagers to return to their homes and in the case of three villages, they never returned.

- c. Constant attacks by KATANGA Gendarmerie into the KRONKOLE and MWENGE areas, about 50 miles S and SE of PIANA, kept the PIANA MWANGA area in great unrest. It was common for patrols to pass contingents from the local villages, armed only with bows and arrows and the occasional elephant gun, moving South to fight the modern-equipped forces of the KATANGA Government. The villagers often made representations to the PIANA garrison to go and fight their enemies with them and they were unable to understand why this could NOT be done. This made them a little unfriendly but the fact that the garrison was prepared to give medical treatment to their badly wounded warriors and move them to hospital at MANONO did much to restore friendly relations.
- d. When it became known to the local villagers that the IRISH TROOPS were being withdrawn from PIANA and being replaced by UN NIGERIAN troops, some of the local BALUBAKAT leaders made representations to their leaders in MANONO asking them to try and get the troops retained in the area.

138. Daily Routine. The garrison worked from 05.30 to 23.59 hours daily. They manned the defence posts around the Camp for an hour after Reveille and for an hour before Lights Out at 23.59 hours. During the day they were engaged in patrolling and weapon training. A 24 hour guard of 1 N.C.O. and 3 Ptes. was also maintained.

139. Patrolling.

- a. The garrison patrolled as much as possible in order to keep the various villages under observation and also to get the people to trust and to know the Irish troops.
- b. A patrol consisted of the Post Commander or Post Sergeant, jeep driver and 4 O/Ranks. Patrols back to MANONO were led by the Post Sergeant and all other patrols by the Post Commander.
- c. The lack of an interpreter was a big handicap especially in the early weeks. Later the patrol leaders learned enough SWAHILI to communicate with the people.
- d. The policy adopted when patrolling south from PIANA, where bridges were broken and roads blocked, was to halt the jeep 200 to 300 yards from the obstacle and the Post Commander covered by a Gustaf man went forward to investigate while the remainder of the patrol covered them both. Only when satisfied that the position was safe was the jeep brought forward.
- e. As there was only one RT set with the PIANA garrison, and it was fixed permanently at the Post, all Patrols operated without RT communications.

140. Special Patrols. A large number of patrols had their exciting moments but the following are worthy of special mention.

- a. A night patrol of 20 miles through the jungle to KIPAILA on instructions of OC B Company, to secure the ferryboat there. The Company Chaplain who was at PIANA volunteered to go with this patrol. They encountered great hostility on the route, so much so in fact that FR. SHINNORS said afterwards that he was saying the last prayers at one stage. A full report of this is included in para. 147.
- b. A patrol to KIAMBI to seek news of the wife and three children of KAZZEDI MOAMBA, Secretary of Economic Affairs for KATANGA. Only the Patrol Commander and one man was allowed across the ferry to the town of KIAMBI and here the natives were continually calling for their deaths. A full report is included in para. 148.



- c. After the Church and guest house at PIANA had been raided by night, the garrison carried out night patrols into the villages of PIANA and KAHULU on three subsequent nights and this had the effect of stopping further raiding.

141. Mercy Missions.

The PIANA garrison carried out the following mercy missions:-

- a. The Patrol to KIAMBI, para. 148, although failing to find the wife of KAZZEDI MBAMBA did locate 3 Catholic priests there and arranged their rescue by a stronger patrol a few days later.
- b. They recovered and restored the sacred relics stolen from PIANA MWANGA church.
- c. A patrol escorted FR. JOHN LOGRAND, OFM, who officiated at the local church and whose parish stretched south to DUBIE, near PWETO, through the jungle at the time the bridges were being destroyed around PIANA, so that he was able to arrive safely at DUBIE. In a letter in Latin received later from FR. LOGRAND, he thanked the PIANA garrison for the great work they did for the Church there and stated he would pray for them and for their safe return to IRELAND.
- d. They rescued Chief KABULU when a large body of BALUBAKAT from neighbouring villages, who accused him of being a Konnakat, came to kill him.
- e. They secured the release of a local villager, who was accused of being a Konnakat by the local SENAD of the BALUBAKAT and imprisoned by them.
- f. They rendered first aid to a total of 24 badly wounded BALUBAKATS from the fighting around KRONKOLE and moved them to hospital at MANONO.
- g. They distributed Red Cross supplies of milk, sugar, maize and soap to the starving population of local villages.
- h. They ensured that there was no fighting or killing in the area which they patrolled.
- j. They ensured that work continued at the PIANA electric power station and that it did not at any stage close down.
- k. They rendered minor first aid to local people when the PIANA dispensary ran out of supplies.
- l. They ensured that the Europeans working at the power station were not molested.
- m. By patrolling and persuasion they held back a big number of the local BALUBAKAT from going to MANONO, during the height of the trouble there.

142. Welfare.

- a. As the locality contained only small native villages, which were put out of bounds, outside recreational facilities did not exist.
- b. The incidence of duties and patrols and shortage of food made strenuous exercises unnecessary and inadvisable.
- c. Letters and newspapers from home were looked forward to with the greatest anticipation.

143. Bedding. The stretchers issued to the men fell to pieces very quickly. There were no mattresses. Rushes were cut and used as beds.

144. Food.

- a. For about half the tour of duty food was very scarce and very difficult to purchase locally, as many of the villages were themselves starving.
- b. The garrison did, however, purchase sheep and fowl occasionally, which they killed for use. They also purchased manioc but could eat only small quantities of it.
- c. The breakfast and mid-day meal often consisted of coffee and two biscuits, but they almost always managed to have a fairly substantial dinner meal.

145. Health.

- a. Though the area was noted for having a lot of disease including leprosy, sleeping sickness, etc., the garrison had very little sickness and this may be attributed to the strict hygiene and sanitation precautions taken at the post, and also to the value of the medical kit and medical instructions issued to the Post Commander.
- b. It was a routine instruction that each member of the garrison took a bath and washed a complete set of underwear daily.
- c. All medical inspections held by the Company Medical Officer were very satisfactory.

146. Morale and Discipline.

- a. The best illustration of the morale at the post is that when OC B Company 33 Infantry Battalion gave all members of the Unit the option of returning to MANONO after two months at PIANA only eight elected to go.
- b. There was no case of crime at PIANA during the whole period.
- c. Drunkenness caused no problem as any drink which could be procured was strictly rationed by the Post Commander.
- d. There was NO fraternizing with the local population.
- e. The standard of training may be judged from the fact that, despite constant patrolling, guards, stand-to and strain, not a single round of ammunition was discharged by any member of the garrison.
- f. All men were trained to handle every weapon issued to garrison, as it was necessary to change over weapons depending on the task allotted to the men.

147. Other Matters.

- a. The lack of an interpreter was at first a big handicap but the garrison soon were themselves forced to learn enough of SWAHILI to make themselves understood. In this connection the phrase book issued to each member was of great value.
- b. Early on also, they received aid in interpreting from the local Belgian engineer at the power station, who spoke English and Swahili. However, when trouble started the Balubas would not speak in his presence, so the garrison were thrown back on their own resources.

- c. This Belgian engineer, M. BESLN, gave great help by setting up two searchlights to cover the approaches to the post.
  - d. M. BESLN also had a high-powered radio set with which he could contact various friends in many parts of N. KATANGA. From his contacts OC PIANA was able to send back much valuable information of movements of Gendarmerie and Balubakats to Company Headquarters at MANONO.
  - e. About a month before leaving PIANA the cook was moved to hospital, however Private Hurley was soon trained to be quite a satisfactory replacement.
148. Night Patrol from PIANA MWANGA to KIPAILA. This is OC PIANA's account of the abovementioned patrol:-
- a. ~~KIPAILA~~ was a large village about 20 miles South from PIANA MWANGA. There was a large ferry boat there for crossing the river LUVUA. Heavy fighting had been going on South of KIPAILA between Balubakat tribesmen and Katanga forces.
  - b. SENDWE JASON the Balubakat leader was invited to come to MANONO by UN authorities, in the hope of pacifying the North KATANGA area.
  - c. For some weeks the fighting tribesmen of the Balubakat had been collecting in the KIPAILA area.
  - d. At 18.00 hours on the day prior to SENDWE JASON's arrival OC PIANA received on RT a message from OC B Company to take a patrol from PIANA MWANGA to KIPAILA and ensure that the ferry boat was brought to the left bank of the river LUVUA and kept there for at least two days, and so prevent any attempt by Katanga forces to cross the river and interfere with the conference.
  - e. As there was not any interpreter with the outpost, REV. FR. SHINNORS who was visiting PIANA MWANGA at the time, and who spoke some French volunteered to go and try to get through the road blocks.
  - f. Darkness was falling as they set out. The patrol consisted of CAPT. GOULDSBOROUGH, REV. FR. SHINNORS and one NCO plus four men. The jeep had no RT set.
  - g. For the first ten miles there was little difficulty in getting through the road blocks, but after that they began to meet tribesmen who were apparently recent arrivals in the area and who did not know them and who became less friendly as the patrol advanced.
  - h. Within about 6 miles of ~~KIPAILA~~ they reached a very heavy road block where the Balubakat tribesmen refused on any account to let them through. They saw many camp fires in the bush and soon there seemed to be hordes of tribesmen yelling and shouting all around. They appeared to have been drinking palm wine and were in a most unfriendly mood.
  - i. FR. SHINNORS tried hard to make himself understood in French but no one appeared to speak this language.
  - j. It was now far more dangerous to try and retreat than to go forward as the tribesmen placed very large numbers on the road behind the patrol.
  - k. After a considerable time the Patrol OC found one man more friendly than the others and using the limited amount of Swahili he had acquired, he agreed to take a few of their warriors aboard the jeep and they were then allowed forward.

- l. These warriors succeeded in getting the Patrol through the road blocks to KIPAILA. At KIPAILA, however, the warriors were of little value and the Balubakat here more or less ignored them.
- m. REV. FR. SHINNORS, however, succeeded in finding a French speaking Baluba and after a time succeeded in calming the tribesmen and allowing them to carry out the mission.

149. Patrol to KIAMBI.

- a. On 20 September, 1960, OC PIANA outpost received a radio message from OC B Company to try, as a matter of urgency, to go to KIAMBI to investigate the whereabouts of the wife and children of KAZZEDI MOAMBA, Secretary to the Minister of Economic Affairs for KATANGA.
- b. At this time the Balubakat had taken over a large area of North KATANGA and held the town of KIAMBI, which lay about 40 miles from PIANA and at the opposite side of a large river, the LUVUA. A motor ferry existed at KIAMBI and was capable of taking a heavy vehicle across the river.
- c. CAPT. GOULDSBOROUGH set out with an NCO, CPL. McNAMARA, 3 MPC and four men by jeep on 21 September.
- d. Nearing the ferry they found the villages deserted, and any tribesmen they saw ran immediately into the bush.
- e. At the ferry they found that the boat was on the opposite side. After some time they found a fisherman in a canoe and sent him across to tell the leader of the Balubakat in KIAMBI that they wished to speak with him and eventually the ferry arrived with a large force of tribesmen, armed with bows and arrows, elephant guns and other tribal weapons.
- f. Their leader MWUAMBA AUGUSTIN OF MANONO was armed with a Belgian service revolver. The Patrol Commander explained to this leader that he had business with the Chief of KIAMBI and wished to take the jeep across the ferry. He and his men appeared very unfriendly and he refused. Eventually after much talk he agreed to allow CAPT. GOULDSBOROUGH and one man over. The Patrol Commander called for a volunteer from the jeep and while all the men moved to volunteer, TPR. KEALY, 1 Mot. Scn., was first off and over to him, so he took him.
- g. The Patrol Commander told TPR. KEALY that the job would be dangerous but to keep close to him and do as he did and also to keep close to their leader. He instructed CPL. McNAMARA that if they had not returned within two hours to go to MANONO and report to OC B Company as they had no wireless on the jeep.
- h. When they reached the KIAMBI side of the river there was a large gathering of tribesmen who appeared so unfriendly that they were forced to hold their guns trained on the leader, who drew his revolver and cleared a passage for them. He got them on board a lorry which drove them to the village about a mile from the river. They passed through about three road blocks manned by tribesmen and could hear the Swahili word for "KILL" being shouted a good deal.
- j. When they reached the Chief's house there was another large gathering of tribesmen and the Chief refused to speak with them. However, on an order from the political leader, AUGUSTIN, he came out and later produced chairs for OC PIANA and TPR. KEALY. The Patrol Commander soon found he had not enough Swahili to make himself understood, so he enquired if there was a Catholic priest nearby, and soon they produced a Dutch priest who spoke some English.

- k. When they understood the mission the tribesmen became angry. They took it that the patrol were friends of the KATANGA Government and therefore enemies. The Chief had the chairs taken back into the house and went back in himself. The priest told the Patrol Commander it was now very dangerous and they had better leave. He wished to speak further but the political leader silenced him. The Patrol Commander understood, however, that he felt himself in danger.
- l. The Patrol Commander decided he would have to speak further with the priest so he told AUGUSTIN he wanted coffee and suggested the priest's house.
- m. All proceeded then to the priest's house, where the tribesmen lined the walls of the room they used. AUGUSTIN would not allow the priest to speak to the Patrol Commander any further.
- n. However, the Patrol Commander noticed native paintings on the walls and addressed himself to AUGUSTIN pointing to the paintings. As he could not understand he allowed the priest to speak. By pretending to be talking about the pictures it was possible to get further information from the priest. He said there were two priests with himself and they wished to get away but would be safe for a few days more. He was then assured that a large patrol would be got into KIAMBI within this time.
- o. The patrol then left the village but on reaching the ferry a large number of tribesmen tried to prevent them leaving, but as they kept close to AUGUSTIN he had no option but to clear a passage for them by brandishing his own revolver at his men. The jeep was reached just as the two hours limit expired.
- p. During all of this period TPR. KEALY displayed the greatest calmness and courage and followed original orders to the letter and were it not for his watchfulness in keeping close to AUGUSTIN at all times, especially when the Patrol Commander was otherwise engaged, they might not have got back.
- q. OC B Company sent a patrol to KIAMBI a few days later which succeeded in taking out the priests.

50. CHAPLAIN SERVICE.

- a. On the first two Sundays after its arrival at PIANA the garrison heard Mass in a small local church. This Mass was celebrated by a Belgian priest, REV. JEAN LEGRAND O.F.M., whose parish stretched from DUBIE, near PWETO, up to PIANA.
- b. FR. JEAN also heard Confessions for the garrison and gave Holy Communion. He was most impressed by the way the troops attended to their religious duties and said so to the Post Commander. When the trouble started on 14 September a patrol from PIANA preceded FR. JEAN's car to get him back through the road blocks to DUBIE. He was never able to come to PIANA again.
- c. On each Sunday and Holy Day after this the Company Chaplain, FR. SHINNORS, visited the post and celebrated Mass in the post and sometimes stayed a few days. His presence was of great benefit to all, and in addition he proved of great value during the night patrol to KIPALLA.

151. LETTER FROM REV. FR. LEGRAND.

- a. The following is a summary of a letter written, in Latin, by FR. JEAN LEGRAND to CAPT. H. GOULDSBOROUGH. The letter was written in ELIZABETHVILLE and posted on 24 December, 1960.

b. My Dear Friend,

"I received a letter yesterday from M. BASLN (this was the Belgian Engineer at PIANA power station). The great work you have done in the church there is a source of great joy to me. I thank you most sincerely for your wonderful spirit and for your concern about all things pertaining to the Church.

It gives me great pleasure to know that you have secured the sacred relics and other items of church equipment in the United Nations post at PIANA.

In five villages my churches have been desecrated and destroyed. I am now in DUBIE mission near PWETO.

I shall remember you and your men in my prayers and in the Holy Mass, in return for the good work which you did for the Church in PIANA.

May the Lord Bless you and send you peace,

Yours in the Lord,

FR. JEAN LEGRAND, O.F.M."

c. FR. JEAN LEGRAND had built the five churches mentioned in his letter, by his own efforts and with the help of the local population. He had also built a small school beside each church and had employed a native teacher in each. He told OC PIANA that he had received no Government aid for these projects. The school at PIANA consisted only of a thatched roof on timber supports. The seating consisted of branches of trees driven into the ground. The children were making mud bricks to build the walls of the school. The church at PIANA had NO seating or kneeling facilities and NO ornamentation.

152. A few days after arriving at PIANA the troops stopped a car which contained a Belgian nun and two Congolese nuns. These nuns were visiting local villages to collect girl students for a Convent near PWETO. They stayed overnight at the Church at PIANA. They had practically NO food and despite our own shortage of food, the men of the garrison asked the Post Commander to give them some of our stock. This was done and it was very thankfully received.
153. a. Towards the end of November, 1960, Moroccan troops took over PIANA MWANGA on a temporary basis, pending the arrival of NIGERIAN troops in sufficient strength. The NIGERIAN liaison officer who had arrived at MANONO had stated that he would NOT occupy PIANA with less than a Company of Infantry.
- b. The PIANA garrison rejoined B Company at ALBERTVILLE on 28 November, 1960.
154. The Company Commander wishes to have it recorded that the conduct of UN affairs in the areas of influence of the PIANA MWANGA garrison under command of CAPT. H. GOULDSBOROUGH was of the highest order. This was a low-strength, isolated outpost and being near the fringe of the Baluba territory, not far from KRONKOLE, in MITWABA territory where clashes between Baluba and Gendarmerie were frequent, was a very sensitive area. Yet CAPT. GOULDSBOROUGH and his men were largely instrumental in keeping the garrison patrol area free of violence.
155. The Battalion Commander joins in this tribute to CAPT. GOULDSBOROUGH and his gallant garrison who did such wonderful work in such difficult conditions and with such slender resources.

REPORT OF FR. SHINNORS C.F.

156. Introduction. I went to the CONGO in August 1960 as one of the Chaplains to the 33 Battalion. The other Chaplain was FR. JOHN CROWLEY of Collins Barracks, Cork. For just over three months I served with B Company exclusively. Thereafter, when this Company had rejoined the Battalion at ALBERTVILLE, I assisted FR. CROWLEY in ministering to all the members of the 33 Infantry Battalion. This report will deal mainly with the time I spent exclusively with B Company.
157. Location. A week after our arrival in the CONGO, B Company moved to MANONO in Northern KATANGA. This is a mining town with a population of about 25,000. Of these about ninety were European - mostly Belgian except for ten or twelve Greek traders.
158. Religion.
- a. The Catholic Church seemed to be well established here. As far as I could ascertain, about fifty per cent of the population were Catholics. How many practised I do not know as conditions were not normal when we were there; judging, however, by the number of churches and their capacity a fair guess would be 50% (Congolese).
  - b. The principal church was a substantial and imposing building located in the middle of the European section. It was erected in 1947 by Geomines, the Tin Mining Company, which owned virtually all property in MANONO. Its capacity was between seven and eight hundred and was used by Africans and Europeans. This church, called St. Barbara's, was served by three Holy Ghost Fathers whose mission house was close by. MANONO was in the diocese of KONGOLO and was staffed mainly by Holy Ghost priests with the assistance of a small number of African secular priests. It was the clergy of this diocese who were massacred by Congolese soldiers in January, 1961. Whether the Fathers we knew at MANONO were amongst these martyrs, I cannot say, but it is a distinct possibility.
  - c. In addition to St. Barbara's there were two other churches on the perimeter which catered entirely for Africans. They were wood and tin structures but one of them was being replaced by a spacious concrete building. This work, however, was suspended on account of the troubled conditions. One Congolese priest of the Baluba tribe ministered in these two churches but it is likely that he had an assistant before Independence.
  - d. On the outskirts of the town was a clinic which was run by four Belgian nuns. This was looted and damaged during the Baluba Rising in mid-September, 1960. No harm came to the Sisters as they had taken refuge some days earlier. Since they could no longer operate in this area they agreed to evacuation to ELIZABETHVILLE.
  - e. Besides the Catholic Missionaries there were at least two non-Catholic ministers in MANONO; one was from BELFAST and the other from NEW ZEALAND. I have no idea of what size their congregations were.
159. People.
- a. When I speak of the people I mean the Africans. In general it can be said that they were quite friendly and well disposed towards us, especially once they understood our mission. On the other hand, they were capable of changing their attitude quite suddenly. This, we felt, was due to their immaturity. I gathered that very few of their women folk would have any education at all and, with rare exceptions, the men would only have attended primary schools.

- b. Economically the people of MANONO seemed to have a fair standard of living and were reasonably well housed - all the housing being provided by Geomines. There was no evidence of malnutrition and people were generally well-dressed. In personal cleanliness they would compare favourably with European standards.

160. The officers and men of B Company.

- a. As Chaplain my chief concern was the spiritual welfare of our troops. I am happy to record that I got every facility and the maximum of co-operation from the Company Commander, COMDT. BARRY. Added to this was his encouragement and his good example. As for the rest of the Officers of the Company, they were, without exception, a credit to their country and their faith; they were everything that one would like to find in educated Irish Catholic men abroad. It is hardly necessary to add that a good, friendly, homely atmosphere prevailed in our simple mess at all times.
- b. With regard to the NCOs and Men the general picture is equally good. Their attendance at Mass and Sacraments was satisfactory and their conduct was generally very good. Taking into account the difficult conditions in which they had to live and work, the trying climate, the crowded accommodation, the lack of proper beds - only stretchers for months on end - the complete absence of recreational facilities, the indifferent food, the long and frequent tours of duty on guard and on patrol, and, last but not least, the prevailing tension; keeping all these adverse factors in mind a very good standard of efficiency, discipline and loyalty prevailed. It would be untrue to say we had no problems. We had. But some of the "problems" existed before we left Ireland at all. Otherwise, this was an excellent Company.


161. Religious Services. Practically all our religious services were carried out in our camp - daily Mass, Confessions and the Rosary. Even though St. Barbara's, the principal church was only a few hundred yards away, it was more convenient from a security point of view to stay in camp. On many occasions, however, I said Mass in the parish church as the Congolese priest had to supply the other two churches mentioned earlier. The Belgian missionaries were evacuated from MANONO early in October.

162. PIANA-MWANGA. This report would be incomplete without a brief reference to the outpost at PIANA MWANGA for which the Company was also responsible. The hydro-electric power station which supplied MANONO was located here and had to be protected. CAPTAIN HARRY GOULDSBOROUGH with nineteen men filled this post. To me, anyway, this did not seem a very enticing place to spend three months. It was more than sixty miles from MANONO, the nearest town. There was not even one shop in the place. The post itself consisted of one house in which accommodation was very limited. Water had to be boiled and filtered and food had to be husbanded very carefully as communications were very bad. Yet, this house was always very much in order. I usually went there on Sundays for Mass and I was always impressed by the cleanliness and good order as well as by the morale of the men. Their practice of religion was equally satisfactory. About a quarter of a mile from the post was a little mission church. Here, our soldiers, under the direction of their officer, did a good job of cleaning and renovating. CAPT. GOULDSBOROUGH had a letter in Latin from the Franciscan priest in charge, commending him and his men for their generous efforts. The PIANA situation was a credit to all concerned.

163. Conclusion. B Company returned to ALBERTVILLE towards the end of November. Though I continued to live in the Company mess I now worked jointly with FR. CROWLEY for the whole Battalion. I would like to conclude this report by recording my appreciation of the courtesy and co-operation which I received at all times from our Battalion Commander, LT. COLONEL BUNWORTH.



# NIEMBA



Scale  
3 inches = 10 miles

7 Nov 1962  
Tpt. Brown's Remains  
Recovered Here by  
IRISH PATROL

ROADSIDE MEMORIAL CROSS ERECTED  
NOV 1961 BY 1<sup>ST</sup> INF GP  
AT SCENE OF AMBUSH

CHAPTER 5 - NIEMBA.

164. Introduction. The name of this tiny village in KATANGA is known to almost everybody in IRELAND. The story of its ill-starred garrison, the ambush and its aftermath deserves a special place in any chronicle of 33 Infantry Battalion.
165. The Village. NIEMBA is situated due WEST of ALBERTVILLE, about 60 miles by rail and 85 miles by road. It consists of a railway station and a group of administrative buildings, and about three hundred yards away the business section of the village consisting of one street of shops and stores. Surrounding the village itself are several native villages, at distances ranging from one hundred yards to a mile. The River LUKUGA cuts the road at the Northern edge of the village. From NIEMBA one road continues SOUTH to KIAMBI and MANONO, and the other WEST to NYUNZU and KABALO.
166. Occupation of NIEMBA by Our Troops. As related in the report by CAPTAIN SLOANE on "The Long Patrol" the village was occupied on Thursday 6 October by the men of SERGEANT GUTHRIE'S party who were left there when CAPTAIN FLYNN started SOUTH on his long journey the next day. On 8 October LIEUT. GLEESON and part of his Platoon, No. 2 Platoon A Company, took over the village. He was joined by the remainder of his men on 14 October *and 7 November.*
167. No. 2 Platoon Settles Down. LIEUT. GLEESON and his men soon settled down in NIEMBA and made the place as comfortable as its dilapidated condition would allow. LIEUT. RAFFERTY installed a lighting plant for them and under his supervision they erected a very efficient water filtration plant so that they could use the water from the LUKUGA. They received regular ration supplies by road and rail and were visited by officers of the Company and of the Battalion staff. Both FR. CROWLEY and priests of the White Fathers from ALBERTVILLE went out on Sundays to say Mass and to administer the Sacraments. Towards the end of October the Battalion Second in Command visited them and on his return reported in glowing terms on the efficient manner in which the primitive conditions in the post were being overcome and on the very noticeable happy family atmosphere which prevailed.
168. Incidents.
- The life of No. 2 Platoon in NIEMBA was not without incident. On 18-20 October LIEUT. GLEESON and a small party rescued a White Father, FR. PEETERS, from NYUNZA, and on 26 October a Baluba was shot and wounded in NIEMBA by a soldier of No. 2 Platoon. Both events are related hereunder, the first in a letter from FR. PEETERS to MRS. GLEESON, the second in a report by LIEUT. GLEESON to Battalion Headquarters.
169. The Rescue of FR. PEETERS.

Albertville.  
7/3/62.

Dear Mrs. Gleeson,

Excuse me for the poor English of my letter.

For three months I met here Chaplain Father T.J. Fagan (from Dublin or about Dublin) and he told me

CONFIDENTIAL

83.

that he knew very well Lieut. Gleeson. He told me also that he was married. I asked him when he was going back to Ireland, to bring you my condolences and congratulations for your heroic husband. I also asked him a photograph or a memoriam card of him.

Now I got your letter and also the memoriam card. I thank you very kindly. I may assure you that every day, since his death, I remember Lieut. Gleeson in the Memento of my Mass. And now I have to answer your letter. I hope that my letter may bring you a little consolation in your great pain. I tell you the events.

The 10 October, 1960 all Europeans left Nyunsu; we were three White Fathers on the Mission, and I send my two colleagues with them to Albertville because of the insecurity, and I remained to watch the mission in the hope it may pass.

But the danger increased every day.

On Tuesday 18 Oct. in the morning a Jeep came from Niemba (about 35 miles) with Irish soldiers - (In Nyunsu we had 33 Ethiopians unable to protect us) - The Irish came to ask me to go to Niemba for the Mass on Sunday. They were three: Lieut. Gleeson and two comrades. I said him that I would come to Niemba if he will come to take me in his car and bring me back. But I told him also that it began to be dangerous for me in Nyunsu; but I wanted to wait some days if the situation may change. Then Lieut. Gleeson said: I will come back here tomorrow in every case and if the situation will become too dangerous I will take you with me" - Very well - I was quiet, but for a long time. That same day they began to make prisoners (natives) and I afraid to be taken also. I began to make my valises.

Wednesday 19 Oct. - I was waiting for the Jeep of Niemba - Other prisoners were taken and I must not come out of house. But the Jeep came not; I waited till night.

Thursday 20 Oct. - Early in the morning during the Mass, many people (hundreds) passed before the Mission with their weapons (arrows, spears, sticks with chains..). After Mass I took my two valises and fled to the house of Ethiopians to ask protection and to wait there until the Irish will come from Niemba. On that moment I did not know what was happened on the way of Niemba.

At 9 h. I went to the railway station with Ethiopian escort, to have a conversation on telephone with Niemba. It was yet possible. The Irish in Niemba said that they were coming. I thought that they will come within one hour (35 miles) - Midday passed. At 3 o'clock again to telephone - "They are coming" - But I heard that the people said that the way was barricaded. I was shut in. It would be very dangerous for a few Irish to come at Nyunsu if several hundred men were on this way. My hope was rather small.

At 5 o'clock there happened something. The Ethiopians mount in their lorry going in the direction of Niemba. A few minutes passed and they came back escorting the Irish Jeep, with 5 or 6 men. They were all dirty, in sweat and very tired. The jeep was full of spades, shovels, picks, axes, saws and chains, all

CONFIDENTIAL

tools to open the way. There was not many place in that little jeep. But Lieut. Gleeson would take also the Mass-box with the necessary to say Mass. We turned up to the Mission to take this box and then on way to Niemba. The Ethiopian lorry escorted us for two miles. There the way was blocked. For a distance of half a mile 6 trees were cut along the way, no vehicle could pass. But the Irish had cut a way through the bush to go around the obstacle. The lorry could not follow us and went back to Nyunsu.

The darkness was fallen. The tools were fastened outside and inside; each one choose a little place with a packet on his knees; I was before with the driver and the Lieut. Gleeson, each one a valise on his knees, and we could start. Now I could see the hard work the Irish had done in two days. For a distance of 10 miles, more than 30 trees were cut to block the way - They had to saw and cut them and pull in the border of the way. We passed several little villages but every where it was very quiet. I think that the men were elsewhere; they were convinced that this way was definitively blocked and they were working on another way - a very luck - They could not believe that a few men could clear away 30 trees - The Irish did it! And so we came to Niemba about 8 o'clock. That it was really a dangerous trip, the events of 8 Nov. showed that eventually.

After supper we go to sleep. Lieut. Gleeson gave me his own chamber for the night.

21 Oct. - Early in the morning we opened the altar in the saloon, and I said Mass for my Irish friends. Lieut. Gleeson would have the honour to serve my Mass, an example for his comrades.

In the morning I made an excursion in the village - nobody - many houses were burned and destroyed. Our school was upright but school furniture was destroyed. Our house, with straw roof, was completely burned - the chapel was upright but tabernacle and candlesticks were broken. The house of our teacher was intact, but himself and his family were in the bush - Desolation.

The Irish had their lodgings in two European houses who were still upright, the other houses were also destroyed.

After dinner a little train came from Albertville with Comdt. Keogh and an Irish escort to take me and bring me to Albertville. In Niemba many photographs have been taken and certainly with Lieut. Gleeson. I got one (without the Lieut.) and have sent it to my family in Belgium. I think you can get some one from his comrades who were in Niemba or Albertville, but I don't know any name.

The 6 Nov. - Sunday - I had again the luck to go to Niemba on lorry with an Irish escort to say the Mass. We arrived before dinner and again Lieut. Gleeson served my Mass. Photographs were also taken that day.

It was the last time I saw my friend who rescued me.

Two days later he was killed. We never heard an account of this ambush. I know only that they send to repair a bridge and they were surprised by a troop of tribesmen.

CONFIDENTIAL

85.

I heard from Father Fagan that you have two children. You may tell them that father has given his life for the peace. May the Lord accept his sacrifice.

"They were in the same tradition as our missionaries, men who came to serve even those who in their ignorance might misinterpret their motives and actions and destroy them!" (Memoriam card).

"There is not greater love than to give his life for his brother".

Tell also your children that they have a big friend in the Congo, who was rescued by their father and who likes to remain for ever

Yours sincerely in Christ.

(Sgd) J. Pecters

Mission Catholique

Albertville,

CONGO.

FR. PEETERS refers to MRS. GLEESON'S having two children. In this he was mistaken. She has one daughter CELINE who was nearly six years of age when her father was killed.

The following were amongst those who accompanied LIEUT. GLEESON on the rescue mission to NYUNSU:-

SERGT. GAYNOR  
CPL. M. COSTELLO  
PTE. J. CRAMP  
" P. DONNELLY  
A/SGT. J. REILLY  
CPL. P. ANDERSON

170. . The Wounding of KAKULI MATAFALI.

NIEMBA  
26 Oct '60.

To:  
O.C.  
33 Bn.

SHOOTING OF KAKULI MATAFALI.

Sir,

While returning from visiting sentries at the NIEMBA RAILWAY STATION at approx 10.00 hrs. I heard two short bursts of gun fire. I rushed to the scene of the shooting and learned that one of the sentries on the NYUNZU road block fired at an escaping Balubacat and shot him. The Balubacat was conscious and received first aid treatment. The wound itself would appear to be a flesh wound on the skull.

I questioned the sentry and he told me he was aware of his orders NOT to shoot except in self defence. He became suspicious when he saw the words "Balubacat" and "NYUNZU" written on his identity card. While the Sergeant was being sought the Balubacat made to escape but was told by the sentry

CONFIDENTIAL

to remain where he was. He ran away and was pursued by the sentry. The Sergeant and one man made a run to cut off the retreat of the escaping Balubacat and the Sergeant shouted NOT to fire. The sentry did not hear his order as brick buildings separated him from the Sergeant. He now admits he fired two bursts over the head of the Balubacat and one shot accidentally hit him. He says he got confused when he saw the Balubacat escaping and thought the best means of halting him was to fire over his head. The wounded man's name is Kakuli Matafali and he lives in BENZE - this village is midway to NYUNZU and is deserted at the moment. The inhabitants, I hear, have gone to NYUNZU and are strong LUMUMBA supporters. The wounded man in question is, in my opinion, a Balubacat scout.

0.7500 KEVIN GLEESON, LT.  
O.C. NIEMBA.

26 Oct. 60.

171. Patrol from ALBERTVILLE to NIEMBA and River LUWUYEYE on Sunday/Monday 6/7 November.

During the first week of November LIEUT. GLEESON'S signals contained a note of concern about the number of road blocks around NIEMBA. On each patrol he found that the road blocks were coming closer to the village. The Battalion Commander decided to mount two simultaneous patrols, one Southwards from NIEMBA and one Northwards from MANONO, to clear the road.

COMDT. P.P. BARRY, the Commander of B Company, was to command the one from MANONO and COMDT. P.D. HOGAN, the Battalion Second in Command was to command the one from NIEMBA. The two patrols were to start on the morning of Monday 7 November and link up at 1200 hours at SENGE-TSHIMBO on the NIEMBA-KIAMBI road. Both patrols were to start their return journey at 1300 hours, whether they met or not.

172. From ALBERTVILLE to NIEMBA - SUNDAY 6 November.

COMDT. HOGAN'S patrol, consisting of about twenty all ranks, left ALBERTVILLE on Sunday afternoon. Included were COMDT. HEANEY, M.O. of A Company, CAPT. SLOANE of Headquarters Company and LIEUT. VON BEYER. They arrived at NIEMBA during the evening, had dinner, and, since this was a reunion of comrades who had not met for many weeks, the meal was followed by an impromptu concert. All retired to bed at about 21.30 hours. The ALBERTVILLE contingent was accommodated in the administration buildings overlooking the railway station.

173. Journey SOUTH to the Bridge on the River LUWUYEYE - Monday 7 November.

Next morning COMDT. HOGAN'S patrol, reinforced by LIEUT. GLEESON and twenty of his platoon left NIEMBA at 05.45 hours. The party travelled on eight vehicles, a mixture of trucks, Chevrolet pick-ups, and Land Rovers. By 12.15 hours they had cleared the following road blocks, one stalled truck, eight felled trees, and five trenches which had to be filled in or bridged - fourteen blocks in all. At a few road blocks they

**CONFIDENTIAL** 87.

were helped by local villagers who complained that owing to the activity of the Balubas they were left with no market for their cotton, no money, no soap, no tobacco and very little food. Although now six and a half hours on the road the patrol had covered only about fourteen miles and had reached the River LUWUYEYE, SOUTH of the village of KAMANDA.

174. At the Bridge, and the Return to ALBERTVILLE.

The bridge, which had a span of about twenty feet, was down and all the beams except two or three had been thrown into the bed of the river. CPL. O'REILLY, the Engineer Corporal, who had performed Herculean tasks at the road blocks during the morning, attempted to repair the bridge, helped by the men of the patrol. It was obviously a task which would take several hours, and when COMDT. HOGAN reported this by radio to the Battalion Commander he ordered him to return to ALBERTVILLE. Before leaving the area COMDT. HOGAN and LIEUT. VON BAYER crossed the river to talk to some unarmed Congolese who were standing on the roadside about thirty yards SOUTH of the river. While they were there some members of the patrol shouted from the NORTH side of the bridge that there were Balubas in the bush. The unarmed natives said they were only pigmies who were running away because they were frightened by the vehicles. The two officers immediately returned across the river and COMDT. HOGAN deployed portion of the patrol into the bush on each side of the road. In a few minutes CPL. McGRATH of LIEUT. GLEESON'S platoon brought out on to the road a native whom he had surprised and captured. The man was carrying a bow and some arrows which could be seen to be poisoned. When questioned by LIEUT. VON BAYER he said that the poisoned arrows were for hunting. When asked about the other natives in the bush who appeared to be wearing Baluba headgear he replied that they were also pigmies and that the headgear was not Baluba. He was an extremely small man, and as his story appeared plausible he was released. Before leaving the area the patrol gave food to the unarmed natives as they said they were hungry. The patrol were unaware of it then, but these men, and the armed men in the bush, were members of the Baluba war party who were to murder LIEUT. GLEESON and his men next day. This fact emerged at the trial of some of the miscreants in ELISABETHVILLE in 1961. The patrol returned to NIEMBA where it was learned that CPLS. KELLY and DCUGAN had arrived with their section from A Company in ALBERTVILLE to reinforce the garrison. COMDT. HOGAN carried on with his party to ALBERTVILLE. When he arrived there he reported fully to the Battalion Commander and the Intelligence Officer. He was informed that COMDT. BARRY'S patrol, as related in Chapter 4, had reached SENGE TSHIMBO on time and had even pushed on a further 30 Kms to the River ESA at MUKANDA before returning to MANONO. It was decided that LIEUT. GLEESON should reconnoitre the same route again the next day and that night he was instructed by radio to do so. The mission in the words of the message was:

"To continue to patrol along route travelled by COMDT. HOGAN'S patrol on 7th Nov - to see if in time could push a patrol as far as KINSUKULU. No terrific urgency."

**CONFIDENTIAL**

175. The Ambush.

The next morning, Tuesday 8 Nov, 1960, LIEUT. GLEESON sent KAKULI MATAFALI, the Congolese who had been wounded by Gunner Downes on 26 Oct. 60, back to his village. He had recovered from his wound and had been sent out from ALBERTVILLE to be returned to his mother.

176. At about 1330 hours LIEUT GLEESON and a patrol left as instructed to reconnoitre the road SOUTH towards KINSUKULU. They were mounted on a Land Rover and a Volkswagen pick-up. The patrol comprised the following:-

0.7500	LIEUT. GLEESON
NO.804359	SGT. H. GAYNOR
" 804234	CPL. L. DOUGAN
" 809839	CPL. P. KELLY
" 806115	TROOPER ANTHONY BROWNE
" 808508	PTE. T. FENNELL
" 810242	" G. KILLEEN
" 804536	" M. FARRELL
" 802900	" M. McGUINN
" 808214	" JOSEPH FITZPATRICK
" 808457	" THOMAS KENNY.

177. For all of them, except FITZPATRICK and KENNY, it was to be their last journey. About an hour after they left, PIERRE, the Congolese houseboy employed by LIEUT. GLEESON, came to CPL. J. LYNCH, who had been left in charge of the post, and demanded his pay as he wanted to go home to his village. CPL. LYNCH did not want to give it to him at first but PIERRE was so insistent that he eventually paid him off. PIERRE left and was never seen by any of the garrison again. Later, with hindsight, we presumed that he had been warned by his people that something was about to happen.

178. The story of the patrol and its terrible ending is best told in the words of the two survivors. COMDT. P.J. LIDDY, Legal Officer, 32 Infantry Battalion was in ALBERTVILLE at the time and the following statements were taken down by him a few days after the events which they relate:

808214 PTE. JOSEPH FITZPATRICK. 'A' Company, 33 Infantry Battalion.

I was a member of a patrol led by LIEUTENANT GLEESON, my Platoon Commander, which set off from NIEMBA about 13.30 hours on the 8 November, 1960. The patrol was 11 strong, including the patrol Commander and three NCOs. We were mounted in one land rover and one pick-up. So far as I could remember the Officer and the three NCOs carried Gustaf guns. PTE. BROWNE also carried a Gustaf. We had two Bren Gunners and two Bren Guns. PTE. McGUINN and PTE. FENNELL were the gunners. I was a Rifleman. LIEUT. GLEESON led in the pick-up. SGT. GAYNOR drove it. CPL. KELLY drove the second car. I was in the back of the second car. We carried the two Bren guns and the two Bren Gunners in the second car.



CONFIDENTIAL

89.

We moved out along the road SOUTH from NIEMBA. It is the NIEMBA-MANONO road. We passed a good many road blocks, four or five, I think. The blocks were big holes and trenches dug in the road.

When we were about an hour and a half on the road the front vehicle stopped and we stopped behind it. LIEUT. GLEESON hopped out of the front car along with SERGT. GAYNOR and ran up the road. He was running up to meet three Balubas who were on the road and whom I saw going into the bush. These were the first Balubas I had seen on the road. The Balubas were carrying bows and arrows. LIEUT. GLEESON was calling "JAMBO" as he went up the road, but the Balubas disappeared into the bush.

LIEUT. GLEESON came back down the road and ordered us all out of the vehicles. There was a road block in front of us. I didn't see at the time that it was a broken bridge. LIEUT. GLEESON posted me on guard at the back of the second vehicle. PTE. BROWNE was with me. BROWNE had a Gustaf. I was observing to my right along the road down which we had come. I saw Balubas moving all around in the bush, and after about ten minutes a big party of them came out on the road down which I was looking. I would say there were thirty five or forty of them. They were all armed, some with hatchets, some with bows and arrows and some with clubs. They kind of formed up on the road - about six abreast. They were about 100 yards away from me at this time. They began screaming and shouting.

LIEUT. GLEESON and the rest of the patrol came up at this stage to where BROWNE and myself were. The Balubas began running towards us, shouting and screaming. LIEUT. GLEESON told us not to fire, until he gave the order.

LIEUT. GLEESON called out to the Balubas "JAMBO", and some other things. The Balubas continued to come on. When they were half way towards us LIEUT. GLEESON gave the order to fire. They were almost on top of us when LIEUT. GLEESON gave the order to scatter.

We ran back down the road a few yards to a path on the right, looking at the road from the NIEMBA direction. The path led down to a small river. I think we were all together at this time. We went across the river and up a slope on the far side. I don't know really whether we were all together at this stage because I was about the third man across the river after FENNELL and BROWNE. I went on a few yards down the far slope, and then turned around. I saw LIEUT. GLEESON standing on the hill and SGT. GAYNOR. There was an arrow sticking right through LIEUT. GLEESON'S left arm. There were Balubas all around the hill now in a complete circle. There were many more than there had been on the road.

I saw LIEUT. GLEESON drop his Gustaf. He had no more ammunition. I heard him shout to us "Run for your lives". Along with some others, PTE. KILLEEN, PTE. FENNELL, PTE. BROWNE and the medical orderly I carried on down the slope. We were followed by Balubas. PTE. KILLEEN fired a burst from his Gustaf and told us to carry on. At the foot of the slope I turned and saw a Baluba almost on top of me with a hatchet raised in his hand. I shot him with my rifle. The bush is very

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

90.

dense here and the grass and weeds were as high as my chest. We could'nt keep together. As I carried on I saw PTE. BROWNE firing his Gustaf on my right. A few yards on I saw TPR. FENNELL with an arrow sticking out of him. He also was on my right.

I carried on across a narrow swampy piece of ground and PTE. FENNELL ran around it on my right. There was a long kind of hedgerow and I took cover in it. I could hear many Balubas now all around me. They were all shouting and roaring. Some went to the left and some went to the right. Some were searching in the bushes. I realised they had found one of our lads when I heard screams. I heard PTE. KILLEEN'S voice. He was on my left about ten yards away. I looked up and saw KILLEEN bleeding from the head. He had an arrow in his shoulder. He was surrounded by Balubas. The Balubas were beating him with clubs and hatchets. He was screaming. I opened up fire with my rifle. KILLEEN came across to where I was and fell down beside me.

I tried to pull out the arrow but I knew it was a fish hook because the flesh was coming out with it. KILLEEN was in great pain. KILLEEN died beside me in about ten minutes after this. By this time it must have been after four o'clock. There was still occasional bursts of Gustaf fire.

I continued to remain where I was. At about nine o'clock I heard the noise of jeep engines and I let off a round into the air.

At about midnight I moved into thicker bush. By this time I had blackened by face and body. I stayed in the bush and heard singing and roaring in the native village near at hand all through the night.

In the light of the moon, just before dawn, I saw that I was close to two native houses, so I moved off to try and find the river. I stumbled over four bodies on my way. They were PTE. FARRELL and TPR. FENNELL and two black men.

I carried on and found the river just about dawn. It took me nearly two more hours to find the road. I crossed and recrossed the river several times. I was nearly drowned and my rifle and ammunition got soaking wet. I had only 23 rounds of ammunition left at this stage. I had started off with 50.

In the meantime I had heard the noise of jeeps. I eventually found the road. I hid in some bushes at the side of the road in the hope that the jeeps would come along the road where I was. I changed my position several times. I heard noises down the road and I knew that it was the sound of oil drums moving down at the road block where we had been attacked the day before.

I went down the road and found that it was the rescue Patrol from Battalion Headquarters.

Signed: J. FITZPATRICK

Witnessed P.J. LIDDY, COMDT.

CONFIDENTIAL

808457. PRIVATE THOMAS KENNY, 'A' Company, 33rd Infantry Battalion.

States:

" I was a member of the patrol, led out from NIEMBA by LIEUT. GLEESON in the afternoon of 8 November, 1960. There were eleven of us in the patrol altogether, in two vehicles - a land rover and a pick-up. LIEUT. GLEESON and SERGT. GAYNOR were in the leading vehicle. I was in the second vehicle with CPL. KELLY (the driver), TPR. FINNELL, TPR. BROWNE, PTE. McGUINN and PTE. FITZPATRICK. We had two Bren Guns and ammunition in the car, two Gustaf gunners and two riflemen. I was one of the riflemen.

We went down the NIEMBA-MANONO road. We crossed three obstacles; each time it was the road dug up. We crossed two trenches, laying down planks and big oil drums, and another trench we filled in with earth and drove across.

We carried on down to a village. The front car stopped at the village. The village was on the left of the road about six miles from NIEMBA. LIEUT. GLEESON and SERGT. GAYNOR went into the village unarmed and spoke to some natives there. We remained in the cars. LIEUT. GLEESON and SERGT. GAYNOR came back after a few minutes and we carried on again.

Further down the road we stopped again. There were Balubas running across the road into both sides of the bush. They were dressed in ordinary native clothes but they had clubs in their hands. LIEUT. GLEESON got out of the leading car but the Balubas disappeared at this time into the bush. LIEUT. GLEESON got back into the car. We waited for some time and then moved on. We went a few miles and then stopped again. There was a big number of Balubas on the road and again they scattered into the bush. They were armed with clubs and I think, bows and arrows. There were about thirty of them. We waited here in the car for about half an hour.

LIEUT. GLEESON got out of the car. He had a Gustaf in his hand. It was loaded and cocked. I did not see him carry a pouch of ammunition.

He walked up past our car eight or nine yards, that is in the direction back towards NIEMBA. He told us to get out of the cars. He asked us did we think that the Balubas were armed. We said "Yes". LIEUT. GLEESON then turned around and went back past his own car towards a bridge 12 or 15 yards further down the road. The bridge was broken down. LIEUT. GLEESON called me to accompany him down to the bridge. SERGT. GAYNOR came with us. LIEUT. GLEESON took me with him because I am attached to the Engineers in Clancy Barracks. He asked me how we could repair the bridge to take the cars across. I suggested going down the river bank a bit to try to find a shallow spot in the river to drive the cars across. We did that and found a place. The three of us crossed the river and walked over the ground to the road on the SOUTH side of the bridge to see if the ground was firm enough to take the cars. CPL. DOUGAN and CPL. KELLY joined us there.

LIEUT. GLEESON and the three others continued SOUTH up the road to see if there were any more obstructions. I remained where I was. They went on about 100 yards

up the road. They came back quickly to report that there were Balubas on the road further SOUTH approaching us. LIEUT. GLEESON told SERGT. GAYNOR to cross over the river and get the cars turned back towards NIEMBA. CPL. KELLY went with SERGT. GAYNOR.

LIEUT. GLEESON, CPE. DOUGAN and myself then went back over the river to get into the cars. I heard SERGT. GAYNOR start the car and then I heard screams and shouts from Balubas coming down the NIEMBA road towards us. SERGT. GAYNOR stopped his car and jumped out. He had no gun in his hand. We were all now standing in front of SERGT. GAYNOR'S car facing towards NIEMBA. The other car, still facing the bridge, was six to ten yards in front of us and between us and the Balubas. LIEUT. GLEESON shouted "Hold your fire, We have to wait until they fire at us first". There were about forty Balubas coming at a run towards us at the time and they were screaming.

They got up as far as the back of the car in front of us and then they fired their arrows. They were now past the car, the car in front of us, and almost on top of us. LIEUT. GLEESON gave the order to fire. We all fired except SERGT. GAYNOR, McGUINN and FENNELL and the medical orderly. McGUINN and FENNELL were the Bren gunners. Their guns were in the car in front of us and it was now over-run with Balubas.

We paused for a moment after firing. Then LIEUT. GLEESON told us to take cover. We dispersed towards a path leading down to the left hand side of the road. We crossed the river and halted on the other side on a rise in the ground. As I crossed the river, I felt an arrow pierce my right buttock. I saw LIEUT. GLEESON, SERGT. GAYNOR, CPL. DOUGAN, CPL. KELLY, the medical orderly, PTE KILLLEN, TPR. FENNELL, TPR. BROWNE and PTE. McGUINN on the hill. I didn't see PTE. FITZPATRICK. The Balubas were lining the near bank of the river. I couldn't say how many of them there were. They were only about ten yards away. They were shouting and LIEUT. GLEESON spoke back to them.

LIEUT. GLEESON had an arrow in his knee. He turned to me and told me he was going to die. We all knew that Baluba arrows were poisoned. I saw that he had no ammunition for his Gustaf. The Balubas rushed us then. LIEUT. GLEESON shouted at us to get away. I turned to run over the hill and then I felt a second arrow pierce me in the same place as the first one. LIEUT. GLEESON, SERGT. GAYNOR, CPL. KELLY, CPL. DOUGAN, PTE. McGUINN and the medical orderly stayed on the hill.

As I went down the side of the hill, I caught up with PTE. FENNELL. FENNELL was also wounded by an arrow. FENNELL stopped me as I reached him and spoke to me. He said "I'm going to die. The arrow is poisoned". I told him to carry on. He started off again to the right of where I was. I stood for a while and TPR. BROWNE caught up with me. He had a Gustaf. He was turning round to fire the Gustaf as he ran. The two of us continued on into the bush. I fell down. BROWNE was behind me. There were Balubas following us. BROWNE stood to one side of me as I lay. I couldn't see the Balubas through the high grass, but I could hear them coming and cheering very close to us. BROWNE let off a burst. I got up and with BROWNE alongside I ran on into the bush. I fell down again. I tried to crawl into the cover. BROWNE

**CONFIDENTIAL**

93.

stood on one side. I heard the Balubas slashing their way in towards us. BROWNE moved off towards the right. The Balubas moved in on top of me. Another arrow pierced me in the neck. I felt a Baluba pull the arrow out of my neck and then the Balubas began to beat me on the head with clubs. I had no weapon at this time. They beat me for some time on the head and then they began to beat me on the arms and legs. At that point a Gustaf opened up again. I knew it was BROWNE on my right. The Balubas backed away from me and then made a charge over me towards the sound of the shots. I didn't hear the Gustaf any more. There was silence for a while.

Some time later I heard moans on my left. I couldn't move with pain. Then about half an hour afterwards I heard a single rifle shot.

I lay in the same spot for a long time. It became dark. I thought I smelt fire and the smell of burning flesh. I must have become delirious. I tried to get up in the darkness but I wasn't able to rise off the ground until morning.

In the morning I managed to get up. The two arrows were sticking in me and causing me great pain. My head was numb and the back of it was bleeding badly. There was blood in my eyes and I couldn't see very well. My hands and arms were swollen and very painful. I managed to walk along a path to my left and found myself after a while deep in the bush. I would walk a few yards and then rest for a long time. I was very thirsty. I wandered about until I reached the river which I recognised. I crossed over the river to the right hand bank. I knew if I kept on the right bank I would eventually reach the road.

In the afternoon I saw two aircraft, one big white one and one small red one but they didn't see me although I tried to attract their attention by waving my helmet and hankie and shouting.

Later in the afternoon I lay down and eventually went to sleep. I must have slept all night. In the morning it was difficult for me to get up. After some time I made it. I continued walking along the river bank very slowly. As I walked I collected rain water from the top of the long grass in my helmet. I drank the water. It helped me a lot. I went up the river bank a long distance, crossed the river and re-crossed again and came back again to the path in the field where I had slept the night before. I crossed the river again, followed a path and eventually came out on the road.

On the road I heard the sound of guns and the noise of cars approaching. I lay down in a channel on the side of the road. I still had no weapon, but I had my bandolier of ammunition and my bayonet. As I lay there some U.N. jeeps passed and then stopped. I saw an Officer come over to where I was. It was COMDT. P. HOGAN, the Second-in-Command of the Battalion. He asked who I was. I saluted and reported to him that I was 808457 PTE. KENNY, T.

Signed: T. KENNY.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

# CONFIDENTIAL

179. First Patrol from Battalion Headquarters, LIEUT. J. ENRIGHT in charge.

At about 1830 or 1845 hours that same evening the Duty Officer at Battalion Headquarters received a message from CPL. J. LYNCH whom LIEUT. GLEESON had left in charge in NIEMBA, to say that LIEUT. GLEESON'S patrol was overdue. This message was conveyed to COMDT. P.D. HOGAN who, being of the opinion that LIEUT. GLEESON was delayed by some of the road blocks which he himself had to contend with the day before, sent word to CPL. LYNCH not to take any steps but to contact the Duty Officer again in an hour or so if the patrol had not returned by then.

180. At about 2000 hours CPL. LYNCH came on the air again to say the patrol had not yet returned, and again at about 2100 hours. At this stage it was decided to send out a patrol from ALBERTVILLE to find LIEUT. GLEESON and help him and his men back to NIEMBA. LIEUT. J. ENRIGHT was placed in charge of this patrol which consisted of COMDT. B. HEANEY, Medical Officer, 'A' Company, a new interpreter COPELAND CHONGO, three sergeants and nine men. They were mounted on two pick-ups and one jeep, and were well supplied with ropes, picks, shovels etc. as it was presumed that one of LIEUT. GLEESON'S vehicles was stuck on the road and that he had wisely decided to sit tight awaiting help, rather than split his forces.

181. At about 2230 hours LIEUT. ENRIGHT'S patrol left ALBERTVILLE and arrived at NIEMBA at 0345 hours. CPL. LYNCH had been warned of their coming and had tea and sandwiches ready for them. At about 0445 hours, reinforced by CPL. LYNCH and eight others of the NIEMBA garrison they set off down the KIAMBI road. At about 0630 they reached the bridge over the River LUWUYEYE. After posting his men LIEUT. ENRIGHT reported his position to Battalion Headquarters and with some of his NCOs started a search of the area. SGT. NOLAN of Headquarters Company discovered a pool of blood and some Gustaf cartridges on the road just NORTH of the river. Shortly afterwards LIEUT. ENRIGHT found an empty Gustaf magazine and an arrow in the bush beside the road on the SOUTH side of the bridge. He reported these facts at once to Battalion Headquarters and then organised an intensive search of the area. At about 0830 hours CPL. LYNCH found four bodies in the bush on the SOUTH side of the river about sixty yards to the WEST of the road. Three of the bodies were recognisable as those of LIEUT. GLEESON, SERGT. GAYNOR and CPL. DOUGAN, but the fourth was not at that time identified, as some of the finders thought it was PTE. McQUINN and some thought it was PTE. KENNY. COMDT. HEANEY and some of the men remained with the bodies and LIEUT. ENRIGHT reported by radio to Battalion Headquarters. He was instructed to remain at the spot.

182. LIEUT. ENRIGHT assembled his men near the bridge. It was now 0900 hours. As the men were grouped in a defensive position around their vehicles a man dressed in the uniform of the Irish Contingent came out of the bush a few hundred yards NORTH of them and walked towards them down the road. It was PTE. FITZPATRICK, who although in a shocked condition, was able to tell them about the ambush.

183. Within a few minutes LIEUT. ENRIGHT became aware that there were large numbers of Congolese moving about in the close bush surrounding his position. He reported

CONFIDENTIAL

this and the finding of PTE. FITZPATRICK to Battalion Headquarters and was instructed to return to NIEMBA at once. This he did, but as his vehicles were very much overloaded he was unable to bring the bodies with him.

183. Second Patrol from Battalion Headquarters, COMDT. P.D. HOGAN in charge, and the Evening and Night of Wednesday 9 November in NIEMBA.

184. The Patrol Leaves. On Wednesday morning, the Battalion Commander having heard the early details of the ambush ordered COMDT. P.D. HOGAN to set up a forward Battalion Headquarters at NIEMBA. At 0930 hours COMDT. HOGAN left ALBERTVILLE with:

- a. Headquarters Company: COMDT. T.M. McMAHON, REV. FR. JOHN CROWLEY, C.F., LIEUT. WALTER RAFFERTY, LIEUT. STIG VON BEYER, COMPANY SERGT. KEANE, two other NCOs and thirteen Privates - Total 21.
- b. A. Company: CAPT. DAN CROWLEY, thirteen NCOs and thirty six Privates - Total 50.  
Total strength of Patrol - 71.

185. Arrival at NIEMBA.

At 1510 the patrol reached the bridge over the River LUKUGA just at the edge of NIEMBA. The planks had been torn up at both ends of the bridge for a distance of fifteen feet. The troops deployed and LIEUT. RAFFERTY and his men recovered the planking and repaired the bridge. COMDT. HOGAN got in touch by radio with LIEUT. ENRIGHT in the village and told him to expect the arrival of the patrol in the village in a short time. LIEUT. ENRIGHT informed him that there was a large Ethiopian reinforcement from NYUNZU of two officers and thirty five men with him and that there were over a hundred Balubas in the railway station. When the bridge was repaired the patrol crossed and marched up to the village on foot followed by the transport, arriving at 15.40 hours. LIEUT. ENRIGHT informed COMDT. HOGAN that the Ethiopian officers had gone down to the railway station to telephone their Headquarters in NYUNZU. Two of the NIEMBA garrison had gone with them, but the Balubas had refused to allow the Irish soldiers to enter the station and they had to return to the village. They did not prevent the Ethiopians from entering the station and using the telephone. COMDT. HOGAN had decided to clear the railway station and had begun to discuss ways and means with COMDT. McMAHON when LIEUT. ENRIGHT handed him a radio message from SCOMEF ordering him to:-

1. Act in accordance with UN Directive - No reprisals.
2. Recover bodies and identify.

The railway station operation was abandoned.

186. Two Patrols to Bridge.

At 1620 hours the Ethiopian officers, LIEUTS. GIRMATESMA and ABAGAZ with their own men and three of ours left for the ambush area. They declined to take more than three Irish soldiers and the three men who volunteered were SERGT. NOLAN, CPL. LYNCH and CPL. McGRATH. The two first named had already been out there with LIEUT. ENRIGHT. At 1645 hours CAPT. D. CROWLEY followed them with LIEUT. W. RAFFERTY, seven NCOs and twenty eight

Privates. Both parties returned at 2100 hours. They brought with them the bodies of LIEUT. GLEESON, SERGT. GAYNOR, CPL. DOUGAN, PTE. KELLY and PTE. McGUINN. On the way back they had met several road blocks which were not there on their way out, including a felled tree only one mile from NIEMBA. As far as could be ascertained the Balubas were still in the vicinity of the railway station. Before sundown they could be seen in the surrounding villages, and now in the darkness the soldiers could see the fires and the lights in the huts; the native inhabitants of those villages had fled to the bush. COMDT. HOGAN sent LIEUT. ENRIGHT and LIEUT. RAFTERY with a party down to the LUKUGA bridge where they set a few grenade booby traps to discourage anybody from removing the planks again during the night. In this, as in the many dangerous tasks which he performed during these few days and nights LIEUT. ENRIGHT displayed a courage and resourcefulness deserving of the highest praise. The troops occupied the three big houses in the centre of the village, setting up posts at windows, roof-tops, verandahs, etc. Trip wires with empty tin cans attached were strung along the edge of the bush, which in most places came right up to the back of the houses. The drivers placed their vehicles so that their headlamps could be used to light up the approaches. During this time FATHER CROWLEY was a great comfort to the men, visiting them in the defence posts, talking to them and hearing Confessions. The garrison settled down to an uneasy night with a large proportion of all ranks manning the defences.

187.

Wednesday 9 November in MANONO Area. B Company got news of the ambush from the Battalion Commander early in the morning, with instructions to send a search patrol NORTH on the KIAMBI-NIEMBA road. This patrol, commanded by COMDT. P. BARRY, set off at 09.20 hours. It got as far as SENGE TSHIMBO where it was instructed by the Battalion Commander in a radio signal to return to MANONO as the bodies were being found at the bridge. Before returning the patrol met two lorry loads of armed and excited Balubas from the KAMATATU area. The party, about 120 strong, said they were on their way NORTH to join the fight at NIEMBA. When told what had actually happened at NIEMBA they were confused and disappointed and said it could not be true. They were advised to return home. When the patrol left them to return to MANONO they remained on the road bewildered, not knowing whether to continue NORTH or not.

188.

Thursday 10 November.

" '57 Kenny. At 0650 hours, after an uneventful night COMDT. HOGAN moved off with a strong force for the ambush area. He had with him COMDT. HEANEY, M.O., CAPT. D. CROWLEY, LIEUT. W. RAFTERY, LIEUT. VON BEYER, seven NCOs and twenty-eight privates, plus the complete Ethiopian patrol. COMDT. MALACHY McMAHON remained in NIEMBA with the remainder of the Irish troops. A few miles NORTH of KAMANDA the patrol saw an Irish soldier standing by the roadside at the edge of the bush. The vehicles stopped and COMDT. HOGAN went forward and having told the soldier he was glad to see him asked him his name. " Fifty seven Kenny, Sir, and I'm glad to see you", he replied. He said that TROOPER BROWNE had saved his life by firing on the Balubas while he, KENNY, was being beaten by them. He said that the Balubas then turned on BROWNE and killed him. KENNY was a truly pathetic sight. His head was badly battered and his hair was matted with blood. His right arm was also badly



battered and swollen, his legs were cut and turn, he had an arrow wound in his neck and two barbed arrows were hanging from his buttocks. He had been wandering around in the bush in this condition since the ambush forty one hours earlier. COMDT. HEANEY, CPL. ROCHE, A.M.C. and the Ethiopian medical orderly treated him on the roadside, removing the arrows and dressing his wounds. LIEUT. COL. BUNWORTH was immediately contacted by radio and informed of this second survivor. He arranged to have a helicopter land at a village clearing a few miles NORTH of the spot. The helicopter landed with COMDT. J. BURKE, M.O. and PTE. KENNY was evacuated to NIEMBA and then ALBERTVILLE, accompanied by COMDT. HEANEY who had been almost continuously on the move since Tuesday night. His duties with the patrol were now taken over by COMDT. BURKE.

NSD.

Three More Bodies are Found. As soon as the helicopter, manned by two Norwegian officers, took off for NIEMBA the joint patrol turned round again and pushed on to the ambush bridge. Leaving a security party with the transport the patrol, organised in search parties, moved into the bush in the direction indicated by the survivors as the most likely to contain the remaining bodies. With a small party of Irish soldiers COMDT. HOGAN went with the Ethiopians. Their skill as trackers was wonderful and in a short time they had located three bodies about a half mile in from the road. They were those of the medical orderly, PTE. FARRELL and PTES FENNELL and KILLEEN. COMDT. BURKE and CPL. ROCHE, A.M.C. wrapped them in blankets and they were moved to the road by a stretcher party. The patrol continued the search covering a very big area of the bush very thoroughly but without any success. They returned to NIEMBA reaching there about 1630 hours.

190.

NIEMBA, Afternoon, Thursday, 10 November. At NIEMBA the patrol was met by COL. H. BYRNE, COL. WORKU, O.C. Ethiopian Battalion, and COMDT. KEVIN O'BRIEN. During the day there had been a false alarm in the village when one of the sentries thought he saw a Baluba attack and fired his Gustaf. In the shooting which followed PTE. SHIELDS was accidentally wounded in the hand and stomach by a Gustaf round fired by CPL. PLUNKETT. Both he and a young soldier called HUGHES who had become hysterical were treated by COMDT. HEANEY who had just landed in the helicopter with PTE. KENNY. Immediately COMDT. HEANEY took off in the helicopter again for ALBERTVILLE with HUGHES, SHIELDS and the two survivors KENNY and FITZPATRICK. All four were rushed to hospital on arrival. During the afternoon the eight bodies which had been recovered were wrapped in canvas by SGT. DUNNE of HQ Company and CPL. LYNCH of A Company and from there were flown back to ALBERTVILLE by helicopter. Before the bodies were covered up they were positively identified by CPL. LYNCH with the aid of clothing, letters found in pockets etc. COL. BYRNE was present throughout and witnessed the identification and covering of the bodies. Before flying away from NIEMBA COL. BYRNE ordered COMDT. HOGAN to evacuate the village next day, Friday 11 November, and close the post there. He also said that he intended to send a very big patrol out from ALBERTVILLE on Saturday 12 November to resume the search for TPR. BROWNE'S body. He arranged with COL. WORKU to send an Ethiopian reinforcement to this patrol. At about 1700 hours COL. BYRNE and his party left for ALBERTVILLE by helicopter and COL. WORKU and the Ethiopian patrol left for NYUNZU by road. REV. FR. CROWLEY had earlier in the day returned to ALBERTVILLE by helicopter.

191. NIEMBA, Evening Thursday 10 November. When the visitors had left the officers organised the defences of the village for the night. In this task and in the rostering and posting of the sentries they were greatly assisted by COY. SGT. KEANE. His energy was unflagging, he slept hardly at all. He was on the move at all hours of the night, as he had been the night before, visiting the defence posts and encouraging the men. His selfless devotion to duty during this period considerably lightened the task of COMDT. HOGAN and the officers, and deserves the highest commendation. The energy and devotion to duty of CPL. LYNCH during all this period also cannot be praised too highly.
192. NIEMBA, Night, Thursday 10 November. Death of No. 806785 Pte. W. DAVIS. About 2100 hours there was an alert when a rooftop post opened up on some movement observed in the bush about fifty yards away. At once there were bursts of fire from several other posts. All the officers dashed out of the house and shouted at the men to hold their fire. The lighting was extinguished - later it was discovered that one of the first shots fired severed the line from the lighting plant. The firing stopped within a minute or two and the lights of the trucks were switched on. It was discovered that during the outburst of firing, PTE DAVIS, occupying a Bren post on a verandah had been shot by PTE. DOWNES who was sleeping in a room leading off the verandah. It would appear that PTE. DOWNES woke up suddenly when the firing started, saw a figure against the glass of the door leading from his room to the verandah, took up his loaded Gustaf and fired a burst at it. DAVIS was immediately attended to by COMDT. BURKE who formed the opinion that he was seriously wounded and would not survive the night in NIEMBA. He said that he would have a chance if he could be got to hospital in ALBERTVILLE. The patient was placed on a mattress in a well-sprung pick-up and was sent in to ALBERTVILLE with an escort under LIEUT. RAFFERTY. COMDT. BURKE and a medical orderly travelled in the pick-up. LIEUT. ENRIGHT and another escort went as far as the LUKUGA bridge at the edge of the village to assist and protect LIEUT. RAFFERTY'S party in case the bridge had been damaged again. They found that it had and they carried out the necessary repairs. On the way the party stopped every hour and COMDT. BURKE checked the patient's condition. PTE. DAVIS never regained consciousness and did not survive the journey. About thirty five miles from ALBERTVILLE the party was met by FR. CROWLEY and COMDT. BOYLAN who had come out with an escort and ambulance to meet them. FR. CROWLEY administered the Last Rites. Regarding the initial firing from the roof-top the officers who were present were of the opinion that it was unlikely that an attack on the post was imminent at the time. They were also of the opinion that in view of the dangerous situation the men were right in opening fire on the movement which they observed. The sentries were convinced that they observed white-shirted figures in the bush and they fired only after shouting challenges in the direction of the figures.
193. Thursday, 10 November in MANONO Area. On this morning a patrol under the command of LIEUT. P. CONDRON, who was accompanied by LIEUTS. V. BLYTHE and R. LINDHOLM, set off for KABEKE, NORTH of SENGE TSHIMBO on the NIEMBA road - a round trip of 360 Kms. On the MANONO side of the River LUYUA they met a truck containing ten wounded Balubas who had taken part in the ambush. They were all natives of the NIEMBA-NYUNZU area, and had bulat

wounds. They gave a brief account of the action - from their point of view. They were permitted to carry on to the Baluba hospital in MANONO, the only such hospital operating in Northern KATANGA. The patrol searched KIAMBI and found one Congolese dead, from a burst of SMG fire in the stomach. They also found LIEUT. GLEESON'S two vehicles, the jeep and the pick-up, which they towed to MANONO on their return journey. The ignition keys of these vehicles were handed in to B Company in MANONO by KIAMBI Balubas three days later. This patrol met a confusing situation amongst the villagers on the road to KABEKE, ranging from bewilderment to hostility. The Chief of KIAMBI stated that people now accepted that there was a clash between NIEMBA Balubas and UN.

194. Friday 11 November, NIEMBA.

Evacuation of NIEMBA. The next morning CAPT. SLOANE arrived out from ALBERTVILLE with an escort and transport for the move in. Everything was packed up, the flag was hauled down, and the troops left at 12.05 hours. At a spot about thirty miles from NIEMBA the convoy was stopped on the road by a small party of Balubas armed with clubs. They were very much under the influence of the local narcotic and they wanted the party to ask their permission before proceeding. They were disarmed and the patrol pushed on, reaching ALBERTVILLE at 18.00 hours without further incident.

195. Arrival at ALBERTVILLE. On arrival at ALBERTVILLE the men were assembled and addressed by REV. FR. C.P. CREAM, who as well as being chaplain to 32 Infantry Battalion was Head Chaplain to the Forces at home. He had flown from GOMA as soon as he learned of the ambush. His words of sympathy and commendation were listened to with rapt attention by the men and were obviously appreciated by them. Shortly after this COL. BYRNE told LIEUT. COL. BUNWORTH that he had decided to cancel the joint Irish-Ethiopian patrol which was to go to the ambush area next day to resume the search for TPR. BROWNE'S body. He had come to this decision because he was convinced that the search of the day before was sufficiently thorough to locate the body if it were in the area. LIEUT. COL. BUNWORTH communicated this decision to COMDT. LOUIS HOGAN, O.C. A Company, who had been chosen to command the patrol.

196. During the operations of Thursday/Friday 10/11 November all ranks engaged were much cheered and comforted by the almost continuous cover afforded by helicopters and conventional aircraft. The troops felt re-assured that the chances of being surprised from the bush were very much reduced by their presence. A system of Verey light, signalling and note-dropping was organised at short notice and officers of the Battalion travelled in the aircraft to act as observers. On one occasion CAPT. SLOANE was able to give the search party at the bridge early warning of a lorry load of Balubas approaching from the SOUTH. The quick and efficient manner in which the helicopters located the patrol and evacuated PTE. KENNY was amongst the most heartening features of the whole operation.

197. Friday 11 November. MANONO Area.

- a. COL. BYRNE and M. SHEBANI. On Friday morning COL. H. BYRNE flew to MANONO to interview M. SHEBANI the Baluba leader. He submitted written questions to M. SHEBANI asking for his explanation of the ambush and enquiring about steps taken to punish those responsible. M. SHEBANI in his replies alleged that the Irish troops had fired first. He did not propose any measures for the apprehension and punishment of those responsible. He did, however, express regret that the ambush should have occurred, and at his request Requiem Mass was offered in the church at MANONO for the repose of the souls of our men killed at NIEMBA.
- b. Letter from MR. DURAN. That same day COMDT. BARRY received a letter from MR. DURAN which read in part as follows:-

"The news of the ambush at NIEMBA came as a terrible shock. Having been so close to all of you for the last few weeks there was something more in my feelings than the mere sense of solidarity towards a group of fellow members of the UN operation in the CONGO. I cannot help thinking that if the visit of MR. SENDWE had been extended to KONGOLO, NYUNZU and NIEMBA, as originally planned, the disaster might have been averted.

With deepest sympathy to you and all of your colleagues.

GUSTAVO DURAN,  
Office of the Special Representative of the  
Secretary General.

M. TSHOMBE visits ALBERTVILLE.

198. At the Airport. On the Wednesday of the week after the ambush M. TSHOMBE, President of KATANGA, visited ALBERTVILLE in the course of a political tour of Northern KATANGA. When he arrived at the airport he called to pay his respects at the hangar where the nine bodies were being confined. He laid a wreath, and in a short but moving speech to the Battalion Commander he expressed his sympathy with the unit and with the families of the dead men.
199. In the Town. From the airport M. TSHOMBE drove into the town where he addressed a big meeting. On the road in, and at the meeting, he was greeted by very large crowds with tremendous enthusiasm. The size and enthusiasm of the welcoming crowds caused us to revise our opinions of the measure of political support he enjoyed in the ALBERTVILLE area.
200. Repatriation of Bodies. On the morning of Friday 18 November a full battalion parade was held at the airport. Mass was celebrated by REV. FR. JOHN CROWLEY, the Battalion Chaplain, in the presence of M. TSHOMBE and a large congregation of townspeople. The President laid two wreaths, and many representatives of local organisations and firms also placed floral tributes on the single coffin on the tarmac - eight of the nine very heavy coffins had been loaded on the plane the night before. When Mass was concluded the Battalion Commander addressed the Battalion and the last coffin was loaded on

**CONFIDENTIAL** IOI.

to the Seven Seas chartered airliner. The bodies were accompanied on their journey home by the following escort from A Company:-

CAPTAIN D. CROWLEY  
CPL. COLTON  
CPL. ANDERSON  
PTE. KENNEDY  
PTE. DONNELLY  
TPR. FEENEY.

Dublin - The Funeral.

201. Baldonnell on Saturday evening. During the following two days tens of thousands of citizens filed through the hangar where the bodies were lying in state. On Tuesday 22 November the funeral took place from BALDONNELL to Glasnevin cemetery. The cortege was led through the streets of DUBLIN by CAPT. CROWLEY and his party.

ENVOI

202. The story of the NIEMBA ambush was not yet ended. TPR. BROWNE'S body had not yet been found. Information which we had received from Baluba survivors in MANONO hospital led us to believe that he had been killed immediately after saving PTE. KENNY, and that his body had been removed from the scene by the ambushers.

203. In the Autumn of 1962 COMDT. P.J. LIDDY, at that time Legal Officer, 37 Infantry Battalion, visited the Palais de Justice in ELIZABETHVILLE. In conversation with a Belgian advocate, M. de BRUYN, who had been concerned in the trial of the NIEMBA murderers, he learned that the location of BROWNE'S body was known. After numerous enquiries in early November a team of four officers was sent to the NIEMBA area with a marked map to locate the body. They were COMDT. S. GALLAGHER, 37 Infantry Battalion, COMDT. M. McMAHON, ex Legal Officer, 33 Infantry Battalion, who was sent out from IRELAND specially, COMDT. B. HEANEY and CAPT. LAVERY both ex A Company, 33 Infantry Battalion, who were now in the advance party of 38 Infantry Battalion. With an escort of Malayan U.N. troops and a small party of A.N.C., the area was at this time under the control of the Central Government, they arrived at NIEMBA on Tuesday 6 November. After an anxious night surrounded by openly hostile villagers who denied all knowledge of an ambush or of the body of a white soldier, they set off next morning for the village of TUNDULA. After a stormy conference with the NIEMBA civil administration and the village elders, during which they were surrounded by large numbers of trigger-happy young warriors with arrows at the ready, the search began. After some journeying through the bush between the main road and the river the Administrator led them to the spot where TPR. BROWNE'S body lay. The date was 7 November '62, two years almost to the day from the ambush. Apparently some days after the ambush, wounded, exhausted and starving he had called some women at the outskirts of the village and asked them for food and directions to the railway line, offering them 200 francs. They took his money but instead of helping him they told the young men of the village who came out and killed him. A miserable death for the young hero who by his bravery and selfless conduct at the bridge a few days before had earned the first Bonn Calmachta to be awarded in our Army. His remains were placed in a box and taken

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

102.

to ELIZABETHVILLE. From there they were flown home to Ireland for a soldier's funeral and a Christian burial beside his comrades in the Congo Plot in GLASNEVIN.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

## CHAPTER 6

THE BATTALION IN ALBERTVILLE FROM THE TIME OF B COMPANY'S  
RETURN FROM MANONO UNTIL THE END OF THE OPERATION.  
THE JOURNEY HOME.

204. Military situation in ALBERTVILLE area, ambushes of Gendarmerie,  
Scheme of Defence Rehearsals.

- a. Since the evacuation of NIEMBA the Baluba threat to ALBERTVILLE, first issued by the war party which COMDT. KEOGH's patrol met on the road at SENGE TSHIMBO in September, had been growing. During November and December it became very serious. Large Baluba forces were massing in the NIEMBA area and moving EAST towards the town. Each day brought word of their activities which included raids on villages, interference with rail traffic and destruction of bridges on the NIEMBA-ALBERTVILLE road. One night in the middle of December they raided the village of GREINERVILLE, which was only 11 km from the town. Several times a week the strong Gendarmerie patrols which were operating out from the town were ambushed on the NIEMBA road. These patrols consisted mainly of Katangese troops but were led by European officers and NCOs., a mixed bag of Belgians, Germans, Hungarians, Poles, and some French veterans of the Algerian war. These Europeans were a tough crowd of mercenary soldiers. They drank hard in the ALBERTVILLE hotels by night and fought hard on the NIEMBA road by day.
- b. As described earlier 35 Infantry Battalion had from our arrival planned to defend the railway and port area in case of an attack and an evacuation of European and Congolese civilians. In November the Battalion Commander prepared plans for the defence of the town itself against a Baluba force. A proper scheme of defence was drawn up and rehearsed on 22 November. On the arrival of B Company the scheme of defence was revised to include that Company.

205. End of Our Train Guards

- a. Train guards to KABALO and KAMENA continued, but it was becoming increasingly clear that white troops were unwelcome on the railway line and were a positive cause of friction. Our last train guard was to KABALO and back and lasted from 29 November to 1 December. The commander of our last train guard was Capt. H. GOULDSBOROUGH, B Company and his report is as follows
- b. CAPT. H. GOULDSBOROUGH Commands Our Last Train Guard.
  - (1) "This train was to bring food supplies from KABALO to ALBERTVILLE. It was the first train guard through NIEMBA since the ambush and was therefore very strong, consisting of one platoon each from A, B, and C Companies. The journey lasted from 29 November to 1 December.
  - (2) Two attempts to attack the train were made at NYUNZU on our outward journey by Baluba tribesmen, but were held off by the local Ethiopian garrison. Prior to our arrival at KABALO a much stronger effort to capture the railway station there was also made by a large force of tribesmen, but this was likewise prevented by the Ethiopian garrison there.

CONFIDENTIAL

104.

- (3) On our return journey the Ethiopian commander placed a further force of forty all ranks on the train and under my command.
- (4) On leaving NYUNZU I instructed the train drivers that they were NOT to stop at NIEMBA. However, the train did stop at NIEMBA. At this station one side of the track is a large clearing, whilst the bush comes right down to the track at the other side. In the clearing there were about three hundred wildly excited and apparently drugged tribesmen in a very threatening and aggressive mood, whilst in the bush on the other side of the train were many more with drawn bows. The drivers had left the train and joined the tribesmen.
- (5) Any discharge of weapons by my men would have led to a massacre of tribesmen and also some loss to ourselves from the tribesmen in the bush. The control and leadership displayed by the Platoon Commanders prevented this.
- (6) After a considerable time we succeeded in calming the tribesmen and I spoke with their chiefs through an interpreter. They agreed to send the train drivers back aboard and we then got on our way.

H. GOULDSBOROUGH, Capt."

- c. The fact that our very strong guard had to be accompanied on the return journey by forty Ethiopian soldiers led to the decision that this was to be our last train guard. It was quite clear that the immunity of the train to attack depended not on the strength of the guard but on the colour of the soldiers' skins. From this date on all train guards out of ALBERTVILLE were done by 4 Battalion Q.O.N.R.

206. Road Patrols It is worth recording here that our train guards and patrols were not entirely commanded and manned by the people whom one usually regards as the fighting soldiers, that is the infantrymen, cavalrymen and artillerymen. Headquarters Company were normally represented on such guards and patrols as were found from ALBERTVILLE. This meant that the specialists of the other Corps, i.e., Engineers, Supply & Transport, Signals, and Ordnance, as well as clerks and storemen from the administrative sections, had to put down their books and pens and shoulder their rifles or Gustafs. This they always did with tremendous enthusiasm and competence, in most cases performing both their own specialist function and that of the skilled infantryman in an outstanding manner. Specialists within the companies played the same dual role. All patrols and train guards were accompanied by Medical Officers, NCOs or Orderlies who always showed the devotion to duty, which we have come to expect from soldiers of their high calling.

207. Operation "SHAMROCK"

a. The Operation

On 30 November - 1 December the Battalion mounted an operation aimed at the removal from the Baluba hospital at MANONO of the Balubas who had been wounded in the NIEMBA ambush. The operation was commanded by COMDT. PEARSE BARRY. OC B Company.

CONFIDENTIAL



**CONFIDENTIAL**

I05.

b. Report on Operation by COMDT BARRY

OPERATION SHAMROCK

(1) After consultation with OC 33 Battalion at ALBERTVILLE on a date in December 1960 it was decided that I was to command a party in an operation that had as its object the taking of the NIEMBA Ambush Baluba wounded from MANONO Hospital. I asked that Battalion Headquarters and A Company of 33 Battalion also have some representation in the party.

(2) The group finally consisted of:-

0.4938	Comdt.	BARRY, P.P.	B Company 33 Bn
0.6874	"	QUIGLEY, E.J.	Battalion Headquarters
0.638 <del>3</del>	"	HOGAN, L.	A Company
0.7485	Lieut	CONDON, P.	B Company
86750	Sgt	RYAN, M.	B Company
209824	"	MAHER, W.	B Company
805510	Cpl	ROCHE, M.	B Company
805256	"	FOX, E.	B Company
96110	"	BLAKE, W.	B Company
802172	"	CUNNINGHAM, T.	B Company
805148	Tpr	O'CONNOR, J.J.	B Company
808239	"	HARRIS, J.	B Company
	Lieut	LINDHOLM/ROLAND	Attached B Company - Swedish Interpreter
0.6740	Comdt	BECKETT, A.	M.O. - B Company joined the party on its arrival at MANONO.

(3) We left ALBERTVILLE airport by DC3 UN aircraft 17.00 hours 30 November approximately, arriving MANONO 18.00 hours. On arrival at MANONO after consultation with the Nigerian Company Commander MAJOR EDGE and the Moroccan Company Commander LIEUT CHAFAI, a plan was made to raid the hospital on the following morning at 04.30 hours and bring out as many as possible of the ten (10) Baluba wounded there.

Some details of the plan were

(a) By pre-arrangement by COMDT. BECKETT with a Belgian doctor Bed Cards of the NIEMBA wounded were marked with a red "X"

**CONFIDENTIAL**

- (b) If men were not got actually in the bed we could not take them as there was no other method of identification.
  - (c) Group from B Company was to enter the hospital, different Officers Commanding small groups to go to each of three wards where wounded were housed. Approx 20 Nigerian troops were to go as far as hospital gate and remain there until wounded were taken out.
  - (d) The Moroccan platoons were to go to Airport and remain there until the plane had taken off for ALBERTVILLE with the wounded.
  - (e) It was expected that the hospital gate, (a large iron gate) would not be locked. In actual fact it was open. Had it been locked it was intended to endeavour to have it opened by a ruse - LIEUT CONDRON was dressed up as a badly wounded UN man. (Shooting the lock off would awaken the sleeping patients - they would get out of bed in the commotion and we could not identify the NIEMBA men from others).
  - (f) For the movement from Camp to the hospital (2 miles) we borrowed jeeps from the Nigerian Company.
- (4.) Plans worked out well but in all billets we found only seven bed cards marked with a red "X". We took the seven, but two of them protested that they were not from NIEMBA but had been wounded by the Katanga Gendarmerie at MONGA. After consideration I decided to bring all seven along though I felt that the two MONGA men were telling the truth. It was afterwards established that two of the beds were wrongly marked or that some occupants had changed beds for the night. (The MONGA men were later returned by UN aircraft from ALBERTVILLE to MANONO).
- (5.) Three of the wounded were not in a good physical state and were unable to walk.
- (6.) We left MANONO Hospital with the wounded at about 05.15 hours leaving the airport at 06.00 hours approx. arriving ALBERTVILLE 07.15 hours approx.

The Battalion OC and 10 arrived at ALBERTVILLE Airport. The Katanga Gendarmerie also arrived - arrangements had been made that wounded would be taken away by them - this was done.

P.P. DE BARRA. Lt.Chornal

O.C. "B" COMPANY, 33 BATTALION.

c. The Trial

- (1.) The five Balubas who were detained after the operation were brought to trial in ELIZABETHVILLE in September 1961. The trial was adjourned because at the time the city was the scene of bitter fighting between U.N. and KATANGA forces. It speaks well for the KATANGA legal system that despite the attitude of the Government towards the U.N. the trial was resumed on 12 October 61 and proceeded to a conviction.

CONFIDENTIAL

107.

- (2.) Judgement was pronounced at the ELIZABETHVILLE District Court by Judge A. DE BEVERE on Monday 13 November 1961. The accused, all from the NIEMBA area, were found guilty of murder and attempted murder, without pre-meditation, as well as the offence of carrying arms in an insurrectionist movement. Two of the accused were sentenced to three years' penal servitude. The other three received sentences of two years' penal servitude.

208. CAPT CROWLEY and Escort Return On 5 December CAPT CROWLEY and the NCOs and men of A Company who escorted the bodies of the NIEMBA victims home to IRELAND returned by civil airline.

209. Visit of Chief of Staff, Quartermaster General and Party

- a. On 5 December MAJOR GEN. SEÁN MAC EOIN arrived to visit the Battalion. He was accompanied by COL SEÁN COLLINS POWELL and COMDT. GARRY FOLEY who had come out from IRELAND with him, and by COL BYRNE who had joined him at ELIZABETHVILLE. He remained with us until 8 December and in the few days he and his party, visited every company and every outpost in the Battalion. The journeys to BAUDOINVILLE, BENDERA, KABIMBA were made by helicopter. On the night before he left his party attended a dinner in Battalion Headquarters Mess. This dinner had been planned to celebrate the return of B Company, and to enable the officers of Headquarters, A and C Companies to welcome their comrades back after their long absence. It was a happy occasion, made doubly happy by the presence of the visitors from home, and of our new Brigade Commander.
- b. During their visit the Chief of Staff and Quartermaster General held a conference with the Battalion Staff and Company Commanders to discuss various aspects of the mission, the suitability of our organisation, equipment, etc. Several of our recommendations, i.e., the need for armoured cars, machine guns, mortars etc. were accepted, and we found that when 34 Battalion arrived to relieve us they were armed with these weapons.
- c. The visit of these officers from IRELAND did a tremendous amount of good throughout the Unit. On their inspections of companies and outposts they spoke to the NCOs and men and one could see how much this contact with home was appreciated.

Trouble at BENDERA

210 Reinforcement During the first week in December LIEUT. J. FINUCANE who was in charge of the outpost at BENDERA reported that large Baluba war parties were massing to the WEST of BENDERA causing great unrest in the area. They had concentrated in LAMBO-KILELE, a village between BENDERA and NIEMBA and had blocked the roads leading NORTH and WEST from BENDERA. Their aim was to take over the area of the local Babembe tribe, a large number of whom were gainfully employed in the power station. They also aimed to exact tribute from the Babembe. Threats were issued against the power station and its European and Babembe employees. On 9 December LIEUT. FINUCANE reported that these threats had become serious and that the whole area was unsettled. It was decided to reinforce the BENDERA garrison. The next day, Saturday 10 December, a detachment of sixty five all ranks from A Company, the maximum that available transport would carry, under the Company Commander COMDT. LOUIS HOGAN moved to BENDERA.

CONFIDENTIAL

211. Recesses and Patrols The village of LAMBO-KILELE had grown considerably in size during the previous weeks and local Belgian and Babembe opinion had placed the numbers of warriors at the disposal of Kifiakio their leader at 2,000. The Company Commander and officers carried out helicopter recesses of the district, and from these and their experience estimated them at about 300/500 - much smaller, but still a sizeable group. On Monday 12 December a large patrol under LIEUT. FINUCANE went to the KIVU border to examine some demolished bridges, to show the flag in the numerous small villages on the way, and to give confidence to the peaceful people en route. Between then and the departure of the Irish garrison on 2 January these patrols were undertaken at least four times weekly.
212. Food Feeding the troops in BENDERA was at all times something of a problem. The overland journey took four hours and perishable items rarely withstood the intense heat. The men frequently had to fall back on the Irish pack ration, which was incidentally far and away the best pack ration carried by any contingent in the CONGO. Nevertheless food patrols left ALBERTVILLE twice each week and were met half-way by patrols from the local garrison. At these half-way meetings both the supplies and the lorries which carried them were handed over, and the BENDERA transport was brought back to ALBERTVILLE by the escort for servicing. On 20 December a comprehensive system of road-blocks had been set up near the village of MAHILA about twelve miles SOUTH of BENDERA, and the food patrol was held up. These were unceremoniously removed and were not again placed on the perimeter in A Company's time. On some occasions the rations were delivered to the post by helicopter.
213. Duties In this post there were three requirements - a guard at the company area, a guard at the power station three miles away, and a night patrol linking both and patrolling the entire camp area as well. The strength of these guards varied with the situation but normally came to 3 NCOs and 18 Privates each day. These guards experienced no untoward difficulty until the night of 28/29 December when at 0200 hours the patrol was challenged by a party armed with muskets and assorted weapons at a lonely point on the road midway between both guards. The stand-to party was immediately alerted. An intensive search was carried out but nothing was found.
214. Visit of GENERAL FOSTER On 11 December GENERAL FOSTER, a British officer seconded as Chief of Staff to the Nigerian Army visited ALBERTVILLE. Our Battalion provided him with a Guard of Honour at the airport. That evening Brigadier Ward held a dinner party in his honour at his villa which the Battalion Commander and Second in Command attended.
215. B Company Takes Over KABIMBA On 13 December LIEUT. ENRIGHT's platoon of B Company took over the job of guarding the cement factory at KABIMBA and LIEUT O'ROURKE and his platoon returned to A Company at FILTISAF.
216. Activities in ALBERTVILLE During December our strictly military activities in ALBERTVILLE were few and far between. The Nigerians were handling all train guards, and even though the twice-weekly food patrols to BENDERA were carried out in strength, up to fifty men each time, time began to hang on our hands. To prevent the development of a morale problem the Battalion Commander wisely decided to step up our activities in other directions. More football and basket-ball matches were organised between companies, and between our men and the local teams. A very successful series of Soccer matches were played between the different companies and the team organised by the European employees of FILTISAF. These matches were well attended by the men of the unit and the

CONFIDENTIAL 109.

locals. Swimming in the town swimming pool continued as the favourite off-duty occupation of all ranks. Concerts were organised in each company area, and the supply of films from ELISABETHVILLE improved. A very welcome addition to the films shown was one of the All Ireland Football Final which had been sent out from IRELAND. On 17 December Rugby devotees were able to hear the Lansdowne Road match between IRELAND and SOUTH AFRICA which was broadcast from the South African stations. On Tuesday and Wednesday 20/21 December the Battalion Commander carried out a formal inspection of troops and installations in each company. These inspections were most encouraging, as they showed that the morale in the unit was high. The turn-out and bearing of the men was superb and their billets, cook-houses, canteens, stores etc. were as tidy and ship-shape as the most exacting inspecting officer at home in IRELAND could desire.

217. B Company Officers' Mess Dinner A few evenings before Christmas the officers of B Company invited the other officers of the Battalion to dinner. It was a merry and memorable evening and the meal was voted by everybody to be the best since our arrival in AFRICA.
218. Death of CPL. KELLY, C Company. During the night of 23/24 December a fatal accident occurred in C Company. A member of the Company No. 806855 CPL. L. KELLY from THOMASTOWN, COUNTY KILKENNY was killed in the Guard Room by a single shot accidentally discharged by a comrade soldier. His death cast a shadow over C Company's Christmas festivities.

Christmas Day

219. ALBERTVILLE

- a. Christmas Day began with Midnight Mass celebrated by REV. FR. JOHN CROWLEY, C.F. in the lovely chapel of the Regina Pacis Convent at Battalion Headquarters. In addition to all members of the Company this Mass was attended by the Mother Superior and her community and by several civilians from the town.
  - b. In the morning the Battalion Commander was up early and took off by helicopter to visit BENDERA and KABIMBA, bringing one of the Battalion chaplains with him to say Mass in each post.
  - c. During the day the traditional festivities occupied everybody's time. Officers and NCOs served the men's dinners in the company dining halls and the officers visited the NCOs' Messes. In the late afternoon we had a Soccer match against the CPL team.
  - d. During the day the platoon of C Company which had occupied BAUDOINVILLE arrived in town by lake steamer. They had evacuated BAUDOINVILLE on Christmas Eve and closed the UN outpost there. They had spent the night of Christmas Eve sailing up the lake.
220. BENDERA Apart from the visit of the Battalion Commander and the Chaplain and the fact that it was Christmas the day was distinguished by two unusual events. A team of twenty juvenile dancers in beautiful costumes arrived to entertain A Company troops. It was a popular and, from their point of view, a lucrative display. In the evening a party of twelve local chieftains arrived in camp from the villages to the NORTH requesting asylum for themselves and their village communities. The difficulties were so obvious and so many, and accommodation was so limited that COMDT. L. HOGAN

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

was unable to agree. It was possible however to do more active patrolling in the ensuing days, and with this arrangement they departed reasonably content. This further increased patrolling Northwards did not reveal any further signs of hostile developments.

221. Boat Trips On 26 and 27 December the Battalion Welfare Officer chartered one of the big CFL lake steamers and several hundreds of the men went out each day on a trip up to KABIMBA where a meal was served.
222. Visit of BRIGADIER RIKYE. On 27 December BRIGADIER RIKYE, Military Adviser to the Secretary General, visited ALBERTVILLE. He was accompanied by Mrs. Rikye, his secretary and a UN security guard. In company with BRIGADIER WARD, the Battalion Commander and Second in Command he called on C Company, took the guard, and had tea in the Officers' Mess, where the military and political situation in Northern KATANGA was discussed. He left next day to continue his tour of the CONGO.
223. Nigerians recover the Dressein at GREINERVILLE-MAKALA. The first station on the railway out of ALBERTVILLE was about 11 Kms out. It was called GREINERVILLE by the Belgians and MAKALA by the locals. On 31 December a platoon of Nigerians went out by train to GREINERVILLE to collect a dressein, a type of Diesel rail car, which had been abandoned there some days before. When they arrived the place was in the hands of a Baluba band who told the Nigerians that they would not surrender the dressein, and that they, the platoon, were to return to ALBERTVILLE at once. They threatened if the platoon were reinforced the Nigerians could not travel by train any more. The Lieutenant in charge of the platoon got on the railway telephone at once to MAJOR AGUNDIPE in Brigade Headquarters at the CFL building and asked for reinforcements. MAJOR AGUNDIPE immediately organised the remainder of the Nigerian company and sent them out on a train. The dressein was handed over and brought back to ALBERTVILLE. The later stages of this operation were watched by the Brigadier and our Battalion Commander who were in BENDERA when it started and came down to MAKALA by helicopter when informed of the position. Several members of our Battalion staff were present in the Brigade Operations room when the telephone call came in from GREINERVILLE and were most impressed by the actions and orders of the Nigerian officers in this emergency. The decisiveness and clear thinking of MAJOR AGUNDIPE was particularly impressive.
224. New Year's Eve Night New Year's Eve Night was fairly quiet in all the messes and canteens. Our minds were turning to thoughts of home, and wondering if our departure would be long delayed. At about midnight some bright spark got the notion that the New Year should be properly ushered in whether in AFRICA or in IRELAND. He mobilised the Battalion Pipe Band who appeared in a hurry in varied forms of dress. They played on the lawn of the Headquarters Officers' Mess for a while and then took off down the road accompanied by an appreciative audience of all ranks. At the Brigadier's villa the band turned in and serenaded him for about ten minutes before returning to the Convent. He was sleeping the sleep of the just and did not hear them. Not so the numerous Belgians who appeared on their balconies in their night attire to gaze in amazement at the wild Irish who play such wild music in the middle of the night. It was a harmless interlude enjoyed both by us and the Belgians whom we woke from their beds. The opinion of the Mother Superior and her community was not sought.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

111.

225. Balubas Attack Nigerian Train Guard. On 3 January a train returning from KABALO was ambushed at MAKALA by Balubas. The train guard was a Nigerian platoon. The two big Diesel engines were derailed and a fight broke out in which one Nigerian soldier was wounded and about ten Balubas were killed. BRIGADIER WARD flew out and deployed the Nigerian train guard on a hill giving tactical control of the area. That evening B Company was alerted and with a platoon of Nigerians went out on the railway line early next morning. They deployed in open order and advanced through the bush to occupy a large hill feature in support of the train guard. There were no Balubas there; they had evidently dispersed during the night. A party of CFL railway engineers and a working party moved out, as did our Engineer Officer LIEUT. RAFTERY. The C.F.L. engineers estimated that it would take five days at least to put the Diesels back on the line and in running order, but the Brigadier declined to keep troops out in the position for that length of time and ordered that they withdraw to ALBERTVILLE. Strangely, neither the police nor the Gendarmerie took on the job of guarding the engines. Next day the Battalion Second in Command returning by air from ELISABETHVILLE saw a column of black smoke coming from the railway line near MAKALA. A closer helicopter recce later in the day confirmed that the smoke came from the two Diesel engines which had been fired by the Balubas.

226. Preparation For Journey Home - First Stage

ALBERTVILLE - KAMINA.

- a. Since Christmas preparations for the first stage of our homeward journey had been going on. This was the journey from ALBERTVILLE to KAMINA. We were informed that we would go back to KAMINA as we had come, by train. This journey presented very great problems to us. For a start we were well aware that no Congolese train driver would drive the train. The Balubas had made it quite clear to all the C.F.L. drivers that if they drove the white soldiers they would be killed. With very good reason they took the threat seriously. LIEUT RAFTERY collected a number of volunteer potential train drivers from the Battalion, ex tractor and bulldozer drivers, and with the co-operation of the C.F.L. engineers started a train drivers' course.
- b. The second serious snag, or series of serious snags, was the journey itself. Under the most favourable conditions it would take as long as our journey of the August before - thirty hours. And the conditions were far from favourable. Almost all the country between us and KAMINA was in Baluba hands. They had made it known to us that they would oppose our passage with all their strength. We could expect the tracks to be torn up at frequent intervals, and we could also expect ambushes. To say the least this would impose considerable delay on us, and we knew that the water tanks at all the intermediate stations were empty and their pumping systems almost certainly destroyed. We were faced with a long and hazardous journey during which we could suffer so many delays that we would run out of food and water. Most of all, we would be faced with fighting. Whilst we did not relish this we did not shirk it, but we had no desire to lose more of our men during our last week in AFRICA, nor did we wish that last week to be one in which we would kill a lot of Africans - as we undoubtedly would if we were attacked.

CONFIDENTIAL

- c. The Battalion staff made out a detailed plan for the protection and stocking of the train, and in co-operation with the C.F.L. officials planned the make-up of the train and the journey, stopping places for greasing, fuelling etc. stocks required for track repair etc. Arrangements were made for sandbagging weapon posts on top of and inside carriages, and for putting flat-cars in front of the engine to foil the Balubas' derailment plans.
- d. Whilst we were all ready for, and in most cases looking forward to this journey, the Battalion Commander realised that it would be better from all points of view if the unit could be flown to KAMINA, and with this end in view he sent the Second in Command to ELISABETHVILLE to present his views to SCOMEF.

Evacuation of Outposts

227. BENDERA: Handed over to Nigerians 2 January by OC A Company. The Company regrouped at FILTISAF.

228. KABIMBA: Evacuated by Capt Ryan of B Company between 7 and 10 January and left without a garrison.

229. Battalion Commander Goes to ELISABETHVILLE -

Decision to Fly to KAMINA On 7 January the Battalion Commander flew to ELISABETHVILLE to re-state to COL BYRNE the case for an airlift from ALBERTVILLE to KAMINA. COL BYRNE agreed with him and told him that the necessary aircraft would be available. He wirelesslyed this welcome news to ALBERTVILLE, and before he arrived back the arrangements for the flights were being put in train by the unit.

230. Handing Over All our transport and some heavy equipment was handed over to the Nigerians. Such quarters and installations as they needed - this included C Company's QUARTIER KAKOMBA - were also handed over to them. The remaining houses were handed back to their owners or to the administration as their representatives. The Nigerians had already been given some Browning machine guns and ammunition which A Company had "liberated" in KAMINA, and LIEUT C. O'ROURKE had trained them in their use.

231. Airlift to KAMINA The airlift started on 8 January - the day after the Battalion Commander's journey to ELISABETHVILLE. Stores had already been packed and crated. The aircraft which was to do the job turned out to be the same Seven Seas charter DC4 which had flown the bodies of the NIEMBA victims home to IRELAND. Even the crew was the same.

The task was completed in four days as follows:-

Sunday 8 January - 100 men of H.Q., C Companies and 12000 lbs of freight

Monday 9 January - 200 men of H.Q., B and C Companies and 24,000 lbs of freight

Tuesday 10 January - 200 men of H.Q., A and B Companies and 24,000 lbs of freight

Wednesday 11 January - 200 men of H.Q., A Companies and 24,000 lbs of freight.



CONFIDENTIAL

113.

Both the Battalion and the crew of the aircraft were anxious to complete the airlift as quickly as possible and so the turn round of the aircraft at ALBERTVILLE was executed with the utmost dispatch. As soon as a load of men and freight had departed a new one was sent out to the airport, where, with CAPT KERRY SLOANE the Battalion Ordnance Officer in charge, they were loaded up with the minimum of delay when the DC4 returned. This high speed activity was not confined to the hours of daylight. At least one load each day was dispatched after sundown. This presented no difficulties at KAMINA where the tower and runway lights were in operation. It was a different matter in ALBERTVILLE where there was no tower and no runway lights! There we dispensed with the former, and a jeep with driving lights on at each end of the runway did duty for the latter until the pilot got down low enough to use his landing lights. One's heart missed a beat watching the pilot bring the huge four-engined machine in under such conditions. It missed several beats watching him take off again fully loaded with soldiers and stores under the same conditions! However, it was the beginning of the long voyage home and we would not be delayed.

232. KAMINA Again. In KAMINA we took over quarters from 32 Infantry Battalion at Base 2 while they moved up to Base 1 beside the airfield in preparation for their move home, which was to take place before ours. For most of us it was a time of re-union with our comrades of 32 Infantry Battalion whom we had not seen for a long time. For A Company in addition it was a brief visit to the scene of their labours for two eventful months. On 10 January a party under CAPT J. FLYNN took over the guard at KILUBI power station from 32 Infantry Battalion. On 14 January they handed it over to 34 Infantry Battalion.
233. Arrival of 34 Infantry Battalion - We leave KAMINA. On the evening of 13 January a large crowd of officers and men of 32 and 33 Infantry Battalions assembled at the airfield tower to witness a very welcome sight - the arrival of the first plane load of 34 Infantry Battalion. Just before sunset they were rewarded as the big U.S.A.F. C124 flew in from the WEST, touched down and taxied to the tarmac. The first man down the ramp was the new Battalion Commander, LIEUT. COL. EUGENE O'NEILL, and all present gave him and his men a great welcome. During the succeeding few days KAMINA was a scene of intense activity. We made out our load manifests, handed over our stores to 34 Infantry Battalion and prepared to depart as soon as the last man of 32 Infantry Battalion was airborne. All the KAMINA guards which we had taken from 32 Infantry Battalion were handed over to our successors by 15 January. Our Battalion Commander was on our first flight out on 14 January and by mid-day on 16 January our last man was airborne. A good proportion of the strength of our little Army passed through KAMINA during those days 13 to 16 January. One battalion arrived and two battalions left - about 2,100 men in all. It is an interesting thought that they handed over control and security of a great airforce and army base twice during that short time, and completed two complicated airlift operations - without any directing staff!
234. Remainder of Journey Home. The journey home was via LEOPOLDVILLE, and WHEELUS, a U.S.A.F. base outside TRIPOLI. At KAMINA we had collected some of the Irish officers and NCOs, who had formed the SCOMEF staff in ELISABETHVILLE and in LEOPOLDVILLE we picked up some Irish NCOs who had served in ONUC Headquarters there. At LEOPOLDVILLE Airport the Battalion Commander was met by our Chief of Staff, MAJOR GENERAL SEÁN MAC EOIN who had just arrived there as the new Supreme Commander, in succession to GENERAL VAN HORN.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

114.

By midnight 18 January all our men had arrived back in DUBLIN, safely, by the dispensation of a kind Providence and the skill and care of the officers and men of the Military Air Transport Service of the United States Air Force.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX A:

to

33 INFANTRY BATTALION  
UNIT HISTORY

NOMINAL ROLL

33 INFANTRY BATTALION

- a. Bn HQ  
OC & Staff:
- |               |        |        |                        |
|---------------|--------|--------|------------------------|
| OC            | 0.4914 | Lt/Col | Bunworth, Richard H.W. |
| 2 IC          | 0.5394 | Comdt. | O'Brien, Kevin         |
| Ops Offr      | 0.6874 | Comdt. | Quigley, Edward J.     |
| Asst Ops Offr | 0.5789 | Capt.  | O'Donnell, Michael J.  |
| Engr Offr     | 0.7789 | Lieut. | Raftery, Walter F.     |
| Welfare Offr  | 0.7208 | Capt.  | Gibbons, Ivor J.       |
- b. 'A' Platoon
- |            |        |        |                     |
|------------|--------|--------|---------------------|
| Adjt       | 0.4742 | Comdt. | McCarthy, James     |
| Legal Offr | 0.6536 | Comdt. | McMahon, Thomas M.  |
| Asst Adjt  | 0.5871 | Capt.  | Greer, Basil J.     |
| MP Offr    | 0.5743 | Capt.  | Gogarty, Bernard J. |
- c. 'Q' Section
- |                |        |        |                        |
|----------------|--------|--------|------------------------|
| QM             | 0.5156 | Comdt. | Keogh, Patrick         |
| Asst QM        | 0.6689 | Capt.  | Fitzgerald, Michael J. |
| Ord Offr (OME) | 0.7597 | Capt.  | Sloane, Richard M.J.D. |
- d. Intelligence Section
- |         |        |        |                    |
|---------|--------|--------|--------------------|
| IO      | 0.4957 | Comdt. | Hogan, Patrick D.  |
| Asst IO | 0.7331 | Capt.  | Hinchy, Richard A. |
- e. Signal Section
- |              |        |        |                |
|--------------|--------|--------|----------------|
| Section Comd | 0.7454 | Capt.  | Gibbons, James |
| Section Offr | 0.7720 | Lieut. | Daly, Kevin M. |
- f. Transport Section
- |              |        |        |                     |
|--------------|--------|--------|---------------------|
| Section Comd | 0.7284 | Capt.  | O'Flynn, William J. |
| Section Offr | 0.7630 | Lieut. | Byrne, Denis J.     |

CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

2.

g. MEDICAL SECTION

Section Comd	O. 5065	Comdt. Burke, J.
SO (2)	O. 6740	Comdt. Beckett, Arthur J.
	O. 5028	Comdt. Heaney, Patrick J.B.
	O. 7559	Comdt. Whelan, John M.A.
	O. 5916	Comdt. Boylan, B.A.

'A' Company Group

a. Company Headquarters

Coy Comd	O. 638 <sup>3</sup>	Comdt. Hogan, Louis
2IC	O. 7375	Capt. Crowley, Donald F.
SO	O. 7412	Capt. Kelly, John F.
Adm Offr	O. 7168	Capt. Lavery, James K.

b. Rifle Platoon (3)

Pl Comds (3)	O. 7500	Lieut. Gleeson, Kevin M.
	O. 7511	Lieut. Finucane, James I.
	O. 7617	Lieut. O'Rourke, Charles P.

'B' Company Group

a. Company Headquarters

Coy Comd	O. 4938	Comdt. Barry, Patrick P.
2IC	O. 6393	Capt. Gouldsborough, Henry
SO	O. 7423	Capt. Ryan, John A.
Adm Offr	O. 7373	Capt. Croke, Patrick J.

Rifle Platoon (3)

Pl Comds (3)	O. 7485	Lieut. Condron, Patrick A.
	O. 7493	Lieut. Enright, Jeremiah
	O. 7727	Lieut. Blythe, Vincent L.

# CONFIDENTIAL

**CONFIDENTIAL**

3.

"C" COMPANY GROUP

a. Company Headquarters

Coy Comd	0.4954	Comdt. HANLON, Thomas M.
2IC	0.6478	Capt. CROWLEY, Michael J.
SO	0.7107	Capt. FLYNN, James
Adm Offr	0.7377	Capt. McMAHON, Liam J.

b. Rifle Platoons (3)

Pl Comds (3)	0.7490	Lieut. CLARKE, John
	0.7494	Lieut. McCARTHY, Anthony
	0.7768	Lieut. BOHAN, Michael G.

CHAPLAINS

Rev. Fr. CROWLEY, John C.F.

Rev. Fr. SHINNORS, Joseph C.F.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

a. HQs Coy

"A" PLATOON

58536	BSM	Douglas, D.	3 Cn Cois
404311	C/S	Keane, E.	2 " "
78964	COMS	Duggan, J.	5 " "
88672	Sáir	Cushnan, P.	6 " "
90314	"	Harrington, J.	Iosta Ceann I
435871	"	Barron, J.	2 Comp Gar Cór PA
433820	"	Whelan, E.	do.
76466	"	Burke, J.	16 Cn Cois
89312	"	O'Connor, G.	5 " "
74057	"	Nolan, M.	2 " "
90255	"	Farrell, P.	6 " "
92951	Cré	Martin, T.	5 " "
94245	"	Scully, J.	Iosta Ceann O
800846	"	Foran, J.	do
809418	"	Mannix, D.	2 Cn Cois
810040	"	Curran, P.	12 " "
205650	"	Peoples, W.	Roinn Cosanta Complacht
802550	"	Cullagh	2 Com Grn S&I
217190	"	Moran, L.	6 Cn Cois
804230	"	Chaney, D.	Roinn Cosanta Comp.
806154	"	Kealy, P.	2 Com Grn S&I.
89226	"	O'Meara, E.	12 Cn Cois
802484	SS	Sheehan, D.	12 " "
806871	"	Weston, M.	12 " "
806465	"	Church, W.	2 " "
800425	"	Stevenson, J.	5 " "
402157	"	Ambler, W.	Iosta Ceann O
806578	"	Groarke, T.	2ú Mot Scn
91695	"	Bowe, M.	3 Com Grn S&I
808323	"	Marsh, H.	Iosta Ceann O
808569	"	Forde, J.	Roinn Cosanta Comp
808598	"	Johnson, J.	6 Cn Cois
808352	"	Alcorn, K.	2 Com Mre Inlr
805834	"	McCracken, M.	6 Cn Cois
806009	"	Gaffey, T.	6 " "
810082	"	McKeen, C.	1 " "
805365	"	Forde, V.	6 " "
808460	"	Foran, N.	1 Rmt Mre Airt
809511	"	Ryan, T.	1 Rmt Mre Airt
808247	"	Shields, J.	1 Rmt Mre Airt
106676	"	McSweeney, G.	3ú Com Oisp
807139	"	Culhane	4 Com Mre Inlr
807173	"	Kenny	4 Com Mre Inlr
806219	"	Bourke	12 Cn Cois

"Q" SECTION

82957	BQMS	McAllister, C.	Iosta Mre
76589	CS	Maher, M.	1 Com Grn Ord
79939	COMS	Mullins, T.	Príomh Iosta Tr.
417528	Sáir	Bray, H.	3 Com Grn Ord
93854	Sáir	McCormack, P.	4 " " "
435362	Sáir	McGrath, W.	Iosta Corí
84284	Sáir	Murray, T.	Iosta Inlr
74863	Sáir	Mason, F.	6 Cathlán
402644	Sáir	Dunne, W.	2 Com Grn Ord
803932	SS	McGuire, T.	do
804560	Cré	McGivney, J.	Iosta Inlr
429646	"	Lyons, M.	1 Cn Cois
801074	"	Wren, C.	5 " "

Ar lean/

**CONFIDENTIAL** SECTION (AR LEAN)

808347	SS	Fortune, P.	2 Com Mre Inlr
801691	"	Lynch, E.	2 Mot Scn
806441	"	Creagh, T.	1 Tanc Scn
99913	"	White, J.	Ceanncheathrú, CTC
99075	"	Houlihan, P.	1 Gar AOC
809767	"	Doyle, P.	Foireann CC, Dún Uí Phlannchadha
209674	Cré	Lynch, J.	2 Comp Mre Inlr
424180	SS	Donnelly, J.	4 F.A.R.
93937	"	Lynch, T.	1 Comp Mre Inlr
807969	"	McCaffrey, J.	4 Comp Mre Inlr
807279	"	Cortobelli, L.	2 Comp Mre Inlr
809783	"	Kearns, D.	2 Comp Mre Inlr
804715	"	Gilbride, P.	4 Comp Mre Inlr
809376	"	Crowley, T.	2 Mot Scn
96057	"	Wall, P.	12 Cn Cois

INT SECTION

96384	Sáir	Fenlon, M.	6 Cn Cois
97161	"	Guthrie, J.	CT Depot, Ceann Iar.
91063	Cré	Jones, F.	4 F.A.R.
98991	Cré	O'Connor, M.	4 Comp Mre Corí
807753	Cré	Gavin, T.	4 FAR
808156	Cré	Curran, P.	1 Cn Cois
806640	Cré	Reddy, J.	18 " "

SIGNAL SECTION

91116	Sáir	Sullivan, M.	Iosta Corí
88148	"	O'Keefe, B.	do
805254	Cré	Hurley, T.	4 Comp Mre Corí
804509	Cré	Cronin, P.	2 Comp Mre Corí
804624	SS	Dwyer, K.	Iosta Corí
807928	SS	Hoyne, N.	do
808903	SS	Quigley, J.	do
806660	SS	Windsor, G.	do
809616	SS	O'Regan, T.	1 Comp Mre Corí
806513	SS	Creighton, P.	Iosta Corí

TRANSPORT SECTION

801231	Sáir	Mulcahy, M.	1 Mre S&I
415292	"	O'Dwyer T.	3ú Gar Comp S&I
204987	Sgt.	Hennessy, J.	2 Comp Mre S&I
92233	Cré	Kearns, W.	2 Comp Mre S&I
96855	Cré	Gannon, A.	2 Gar Comp S&I
412382	SS	Talbot, J.	3 Gar Comp S&I
414453	Cré	Heslin, P.	1 Mre S&I
803850	SS	Fitzgerald, M.	1 Comp Mre S&I
808375	SS	McDermott, M.	2 Comp Mre S&I
97241	SS	Ryan, P.	2 Comp Gar S&I
805386	Cré	Costello, M.	Iosta S&I

MEDICAL SECTION

79563	Sáir	Greensmyth, P.	2 Comp Oisp
89816	Cré	Hennessy, L.	2 Comp Oisp
800959	SS	Gardiner, P.	3 Comp Oisp
808438	SS	Purcell, J.	do
800760	SS	Kingsley, P.	4 Comp Oisp
806793	SS	McCormack, M.	4 Comp Oisp
96723	Cré	Flynn, S.	1 Comp Oisp

**CONFIDENTIAL**

COMPLACHT "A"

72811	C/S	O'Brien, M.	2 Cn Cois
404399	CQMS	Taylor, A.	2 " "
809269	Cré	Donovan, H.	5 " "
803674	Cré	Crosbie, T.	7 " "
804202	Cré	Grayley, P.	8 " "
90839	Cré	Graham, J.	2 C Grn PA
808644	Cré	Fitzhenry, M.	2 C Grn PA
800232	Cré	Plunkett, J.	2 C Grn PA
88546	Cré	Jameson, E.	2 C Grn PA
96506	Cré	Smith, J.	5 Cn Cois
78922	Sair	Keating, D.	11 C Mre Corí
804358	SS	O'Reilly, J.J.	2 Com Grn S&I
424848	Cré	Roche, P.	3 Com Oisp
94169	Cré	O'Byrne, S.	Ios Inlr
807813	SS	Fitzpatrick, V.	Pears CE, Cn O
808351	SS	Boyle, F.	2 Mot Scn
800992	SS	Foley, J.	10 Cn Cois
806115	SS	Browne, A.	2 Mot Scn
808802	SS	Whelan, L.	2 Mot Scn
808516	SS	Murray, P.	2 Mot Scn
805950	SS	O'Carroll, J.	2 Com Mre Inlr
804736	SS	O'Brien, J.	2 Com Mre Inlr
810242	SS	Killeen, G.	1 Tr Cn O
806014	SS	Murray, J.	2 Cn Cois
91063	SS	McAney, T.	2 RAM
809846	SS	Frawley, P.	1 C Mre Corí
809146	SS	Menton, J.	2 C Mre Corí
809642	SS	Nolan, W.	1 C Mre Corí
806145	SS	Curran, G.	2 C Grn S&I
804225	SS	Henry, S.	2 C Grn S&I
807945	SS	Morrissey, J.	5 Cn Cois
211247	SS	McGinn, P.	2 C Grn S&I
804536	SS	Farrell, M.	2 C Oisp
808213	SS	Mullin, W.	2 C Oisp
807701	SS	Bailey, W.	2 C Oisp
803884	SS	Slemmon, M.J.	2 C Oisp
809623	SS	Carptenter, D.	5 Cn Cois
211409	SS	McLoughlin, T.	5 " "
93004	SS	Bolger, M.	2 " "
92963	SS	Kelly, S.	5 " "
807368	SS	Cullen, J.	2 C Grn Ord
88533	Sair	Sexton, J.	10 Cn Cois
95855	Cré	Colton, M.	DOD
808829	SS	Bowes, J.	2 Mot Scn
803789	SS	Galvin, J.	2 Mot Scn
807142	SS	Boland, B.	2 Mot Scn
802643	SS	Browne, P.	Foir Champa, Dún Uí Phlannchadha
807167	SS	Connolly, N.	2 Mot Scn
91470	Sair	Keavey, P.	5 Cn Cois
808828	Cré	O'Sullivan, J	5 Cn Cois
801374	SS	Cush, J.	Ceann O
807205	SS	Murphy, F.	Ceann O
809526	SS	Smith, H.	5 Cn Cois
808827	SS	Ayres, P.	5 " "
809425	SS	Hyland, P.	5 " "
803807	Cré	Fitzgerald, J.	3 Com Mre Corí
807060	SS	Kirby, P.	3 Cn Cois
809520	SS	Buggy, G.	5 " "
910166	SS	Farrell, J.	5 " "
808799	SS	Moore, J.	5 " "

Ar lean/



COMPLACHT "A" (AR LEAN)

808723	Cré	O'Rourke, P.	Ios CT
806079	Cré	O'Grady, V.	10 Cn Cois
809280	SS	Kavanagh, J.	5 " "
809271	SS	Brady, T.	2 C Mre Inlr
809675	SS	Cushnahan, M.	2 C Mre Inlr
808982	SS	Dillon, F.	2 C Mre Inlr
809368	SS	Geoghegan, G.	2 C Mre Inlr
808316	SS	Williams, N.	2ú FAR
809294	SS	McMahon, A.	2 C Mre Inlr
806304	Cré	O'Sullivan, J.	1 Rsmt Frith-Aer
93169	Cré	Connell, M.	5 Cn Cois
809244	SS	Rafferty, P.	2 C Mre Inlr
809371	SS	Ryan, W.	2 C Mre Inlr
93637	SS	Bairnes	3ú Cath Coisithe
806643	SS	Kennedy, P.	2 C Mre Inlr
806753	SS	Keogh, N.	2 C Mre Inlr
808487	SS	Martin, P.	2 C Mre Inlr
808367	SS	Menton, S.	2 C Mre Inlr
808427	SS	Fallon, J.	2 C Mre Inlr
807329	Cré	Coombes, J.	C.C. Ceann O
801988	Cré	Monaghan, M.	20 Cn Cois
808344	SS	Flynn, P.	5 " "
808520	SS	Bolger, C.	2 Mot Scn
808601	SS	Compton, N.	2 Mot Scn
94284	SS	Hynes, K.	2 Cn Cois
807186	SS	Corbally, C.	2 " "
807307	SS	Walsh, J.	2 Mot Scn
93034	SS	O'Brien, W.	9 Cn Cois
804359	Sáir	Gaynor, H.	2 Mot Scn
807273	Cré	Anderson, P.	7 Cn Cois
804344	SS	Condra, P.	2 Mot Scn
803928	SS	Dalton, B.	2 Mot Scn
806867	SS	Kenny, F.	2 Mot Scn
90181	SS	Kennedy, J.	2 Cn Cois
807598	SS	Feeney, P.	2 Mot Scn
94516	Sáir	Fogarty, K.	5 Cn Cois
803670	Cré	McDonald, P.	CC Ceann O
802900	SS	McGuinn, M.	2 C Mre Inlr
809696	SS	Breen, J.	2 Cn Cois
808459	SS	O'Brien, J.	2 C Mre Inlr
808458	SS	Stapleton	2 C Mre Inlr
808371	SS	O'Neill, K.	2 C Mre Inlr
809469	SS	Wood, H.	2 C Mre Inlr
806805	SS	Rafferty, A.	2 C Mre Inlr
801730	SS	Bartiley, M.	2 C Mre Inlr
99803	Cré	McGrath, D.	9 Cn Cois
809839	Cré	Kelly, P.	5 " "
806146	SS	Widdis, E.	2 C Mre Inlr
806181	SS	Fergus, O.	2 Mot Scn
806479	SS	Butler, M.	2 C Mre Inlr
808346	SS	Byrne, N.	2 C Mre Inlr
808394	SS	Molloy, P.	3 Cn Cois
809653	SS	Cramp, J.	2 C Mre Inlr
809954	SS	Daly, J.	2 C Mre Inlr
806785	SS	Davis, W.M.	2 C Mre Inlr
809786	Cré	Lynch, J.	2 Cn Cois
807262	Cré	Bulger, H.	2 " "
808425	SS	Donaghy, K.	2 C Mre Inlr
806737	SS	Donnelly, P.	2 C Mre Inlr
806741	SS	Braddish, J.	2 C Mre Inlr

Ar lean/

# CONFIDENTIAL.

## COMP "A" (AR LEAN)

808491	SS	Brady, J.	2 C Mre Inlr
809257	SS	Bradley, D.	2 C Mre Inlr
809621	SS	Brennan, E.	2 RAM
806904	SS	Cleary, C.	2 RAM
809485	SS	Downes, F.	2 RAM
804234	Cré	Dougan, L.	5 Cn Cois
808548	SS	Fennell, T.F.	2 Mot Scn
808878	SS	Kavanagh, P.	2 Mot Scn
808457	SS	Kenny, T.	2 C Mre Inlr
807062	SS	McKenzie, D.	Comp Dún Uí Fhlannchadha
805677	SS	Kearns, J.	2 Mot Scn
808214	SS	Fitzpatrick, J.	2 Cn Cois
95147	SS	Kelly, J.	5 " "
105522	SS	Purcell, J.	5 " "
803716	Sáir	O'Rourke, P.	2 Mot Scn
806558	Cré	Mernagh, P.	2 Cn Cois
809665	SS	Denton, P.	2 Mot Scn
808525	SS	Duffy, W.	2 Mot Scn
807092	SS	Smith, M.	2 Mot Scn
808292	SS	Fenlon, F.	2 RAM
809699	SS	Fearon, P.	2 Mot Scn
87631	Sáir	Duffy, P.	2 Mot Scn
802413	Cré	Kiernan, A.	6 FA Regt
92065	SS	Fitzgerald, J.	2 RAM
805415	SS	Fylan, P.	2 RAM
809484	SS	Fletcher, T.	2 RAM
806865	SS	Miskella, P.	2 RAM
808342	SS	McAuley, O.	2 RAM
807162	SS	Morris, J.	2 Mot Scn
809654	SS	O'Reilly, M.	2 Mot Scn
808492	SS	O'Toole, P.	2 Mot Scn
92785	Cré	Scott, T.	2 Mot Scn
806234	Cré	Noble, F.	5 Cn Cois
808883	SS	Kennedy, T.	5 " "
809523	SS	Hughes, W.	5 " "
810085	SS	Casey, D.	2 " "
809970	SS	McGinley, J.	2 RAM
809808	SS	Byrne, N.	5 Cn Cois
804930	SS	Farrell, J.	2 RAM
802770	SS	Gallagher, J.	2 Cn Cois
807975	SS	Griffin, J.	2 " "
802448	Cré	Hayden, J.	2 RAM
92176	Cré	Murphy, J.	2 Cn Cois
807256	SS	Lynch, P.	2 " "
807349	SS	Smith, J.	2 Mot Scn
808527	SS	Traynor, J.	2 Mot Scn
809937	SS	O'Sullivan, J.	2 RAM
809620	SS	Lawlor, W.	2 RAM
808297	SS	Murray, K.	2 RAM
809519	SS	Mullen, J.	2 RAM
809482	SS	Moore, J.	2 RAM
77696	Cré	Reidy, W.	2 Cn Cois
801829	Cré	Feeney, T.	2 Mot Scn
800500	Cré	Cummins, J.	Comp Dún Mhic Aoidh
807130	SS	Rogers, D.	2 Mot Scn
806379	SS	Seagrave, D.	2 Cn Cois
809148	SS	Maxwell, D.	2 Mot Scn
807810	SS	McGeown, D.	2 Cn Cois
807796	SS	Murphy, T.	2 " "
809381	SS	Burke, J.	2 " "
806117	SS	Byrne, J.	2 " "
808942	SS	Hayes, P.	2 Mot Scn
808444	SS	Casey, G.	2 Fd Engrs

20

'B' COY

80322	S/Com	Grant, F.	12 Cn Cois
80122	CS/Com	Murphy, P.	do.
808159	Cré	O'Connor, J.J.	do.
89619	Cré	Moloney, J.	do.
808309	SS	Bowler, M.	do.
805256	Cré	Fox, E.	do.
805346	Cré	O'Brien, P.	do.
804096	Cré	McNamara, M.	do.
803483	Cré	McCarthy, T.	do.
75051	Cré	Byrne, P.	do.
801763	Cré	Connolly, A.	do.
802969	Cré	Dowling, J.	do.
810645	SS	Morrissey, J.	do.
90968	Cré	Casey, P.	do.
95024	SS	Ryall, E.	1 Pd COE
98933	SS	Gleeson, S.	12 Cn Cois
809514	SS	O'Sullivan, P.	do.
805121	SS	McCarthy, T.	do.
809239	SS	Hogan, J.	do.
808246	Cré	Mulligan, T.	do.
804776	A/man	McGoldrick, P.	do.
805687	SS	Murphy, J.	do.
415841	SS	Guerin, J.	do.
87262	SS	Downey, R.	do.
810238	Sgmn	Cleary, G.	do.
808127	SS	Lonergan, E.	do.
809930	Sgmn	Hurley,	do.
801981	SS	Corcoran, E.	do.
75786	SS	Flood, W.	do.
93234	SS	Kelliher, L.	do.
801350	SS	Kennedy, E.	do.
800786	SS	Hurley, M.	do.
803931	SS	Mulcahy, J.	do.
809027	SS	Larkin, W.	do.
808895	SS	Flynn, W.	do.
806629	SS	Jordan, M.	do.
807015	SS	Farrelly, J.	do.
806798	SS	Wright, T.	do.
808602	Tpr	Keegan, D.	do.
806165	SS	Roche, J.	do.
204762	Sáir	Coy, J.	do.
800600	SS	Kelly, J.	do.
809894	SS	Walsh, D.	do.
800227	Cré	O'Sullivan, P.	do.
800128	Cré	Barnes, E.	do.
806213	SS	Keogh, P.	do.
806322	SS	McNamara, J.	do.
806191	SS	Burke, E.	do.
808439	SS	Ryan, P.	do.
808176	SS	McCoy, J.	do.
808144	SS	Maher, C.	do.
808200	SS	Phillips, C.	do.
807959	SS	Moynihan, M.	do.
803649	Cré	McGee, W.	do.
87429	Cré	Fox, E.	do.
808640	SS	Ryan, J.	do.
808463	SS	Byrne, J.	do.
803635	SS	Leehy, T.	do.
96372	SS	Power, E.	do.
804804	SS	Ryan, P.	do.

Ar lean/

CONFIDENTIAL

10.

'B' COY (AR LEAN).

805447	SS	McGrath, T.	12 Cn Cois
806192	SS	O'Brien, J.	do.
803648	Cré	McMahon, W.	do.
96110	Cré	Blake, W.	do.
802301	SS	Histon, J.	do.
804418	SS	Nagle, T.	do.
808269	SS	Halvey, B.	do.
808239	Tpr	Harris, J.	do.
808559	SS	Mitchell, J.	do.
809465	SS	Hartigan, M.	do.
809529	SS	Cunningham, J.	do.
808892	SS	O'Shea, M.	do.
99377	Sáir	Woods, P.	do.
805189	Cré	Kenneally, T.	do.
805192	SS	Kennedy, J.	do.
805486	SS	McNamara, G.	do.
809024	SS	Ryan, E.	do.
810556	SS	O'Brien, M.	do.
805448	SS	Daly, A.	do.
806133	SS	Eviston, J.	do.
810413	SS	Cleary, M.	do.
808705	SS	Delaney, J.	do.
808284	Cré	Byrnes, M.	do.
808132	SS	Campbell, T.	do.
808437	SS	Noonan, E.	do.
808991	SS	O'Malley, J.	do.
95600	Sáir	Dillon, J.	do.
808129	SS	Corrigan, T.	do.
808330	SS	Hickey, M.	do.
807192	Cré	Ryan, C.	do.
806918	Cré	Considine, T.	do.
808672	SS	Brennan, J.	do.
808889	SS	Donnellan, S.	do.
808286	SS	Ledger, G.	do.
808560	SS	Forde, P.	do.
809343	SS	Fogarty, M.	do.
808478	SS	McMahon, J.	do.
805611	SS	Roche, J.	do.
808476	SS	Cribben, J.	do.
802255	Cré	O'Sullivan, J.	do.
803540	Cré	Dingley, R.	do.
808911	SS	Power, M.	do.
809201	SS	Fitzgerald, M.	do.
806662	Gnr	McNamara, P.	do.
800645	SS	McNamara, K.	do.
807817	SS	Clancy, T.	do.
803793	SS	O'Sullivan, M.	do.
807381	Gnr	McGrath, E.	do.
806022	SS	Murrihy, J.	do.
805446	Cré	Whelan, W.	do.
806390	Cré	O'Neill, A.	do.
804874	SS	O'Connor, P.	do.
805609	SS	Ward, M.	do.
809702	SS	O'Donnell, F.	do.
806008	SS	Corbett, F.	do.
804157	SS	Boyce, J.	do.
810053	SS	Nugent, J.	do.
809278	SS	Cuddihy, P.J.	do.
86750	Sáir	Ryan, M.	do.

Ar lean/

CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL<sub>1</sub>.

## 'B' COY (AR. LEAN).

802882	Cré	McSweeney, C.C.	12 Cn Cois
800586	SS	Fennessey, P.	do.
806149	SS	Holdrn,	do.
806677	SS	Maher,	do.
806944	SS	Whelan, R.	do.
805260	SS	Cronin, F.	do.
806142	SS	Brassil, J.	do.
808955	SS	Brett, T.	do.
803123	SS	Horgan, D.	do.
805370	Cré	Franklin, A.	do.
804568	SS	Roche, P.	do.
97957	SS	McMahon, E.	do.
809534	SS	Long, G.	do.
91380	Sáir	Murphy, M.	do.
808124	Cré	Leahy, T.	do.
801694	SS	Broe, T.	do.
808709	SS	Mahony, P.	do.
808812	SS	O'Mahony, W.	do.
99221	Gnr	Stokes, E.	do.
809395	Tpr	O'Keefe, T.	do.
80433	Cré	O'Driscoll, W.	do.
809356	Cré	Kent, P.	do.
808341	SS	Murphy, E.	do.
808340	SS	Cambridge, D.	do.
807310	SS	McGrath, J.	do.
809160	SS	Sweeney, P.	do.
802765	SS	O'Connor, F.	do.
809374	SS	Cotter, M.	do.
808659	SS	Cahill, P.	do.
808866	SS	Laste, M.	do.
802172	Cré	Cunningham, T.	do.
802377	Gnr	Madden, A.	do.
806340	Gnr	McElligott, T.	do.
809183	SS	McGrath, C.	do.
808557	Gnr	O'Callaghan, J.	do.
807004	SS	Maher, C.	do.
805510	SS	Roche, M.	do.
809498	Gnr	O'Connell, P.	do.
808462	SS	Flynn, J.	do.
94759	Cré	Barry, R.	do.
802295	Cré	Griffin, B.	do.
98426	Tpr	Enright, A.	do.
805148	Tpr	O'Connor, J.J.	do.
807003	Tpr	Doody, P.	do.
810339	Tpr	O'Callaghan,	do.
809658	Tpr	O'Sullivan, J.	do.
808612	Tpr	Kealy, J.	do.
808980	Tpr	Pierce, D.	do.
808804	Tpr	Mulhern, A.	do.
99625	Cré	Murray, T.	do.
808337	Tpr	Ryan, P.	do.
803355	SS	Brennan, M.	do.
806148	SS	Walsh, M.	do.
806688	SS	Galvin, J.	do.
808936	SS	Hoare, B.	do.
809493	SS	Hurley, T.	do.
806962	SS	Roche, J.	do.
809116	SS	Roberts, P.	do.
809958	SS	O'Regan, T.	1 C Mre Airt
806387	SS	Smyth, J.	do
802736	SS	Costelloe, G.	12 Cn Cois
96511	Cré	Sludds, K.	3ú Cath Cois
209824	Sáir	Maher, W.	12ú Cn Cois

CONFIDENTIAL

**CONFIDENTIAL**

12.

'C' COY.

91189	C/S	O'Sullivan, M.	Iosta Marcra
75915	CSC	Dillon, P.A.	Priomh Ios Tr.
805210	Cré	Price, J.	Priomh Ios Tr.
806417	Cré	O'Neill, J.	lú T/Scn
98484	Cré	Graham, S.	Iosta Marcra.
809326	Cré	Allen, J.	Iosta P.A.
804967	Cré	Smith, B.	4 C Grn PA.
806024	Cré	Hand, J.	2 C Grn PA
93256	SS	Phoenix, J.	2 C Grn Ord
86692	Cré	O'Reilly, J.	4 C Mre Inlr
91460	Cré	McDonagh, M.	4 C Grn PA
804625	Cré	O'Connor, T.	4 C Mre Cori
92195	Sáir	Hamill, M.	1 C Mre Cori
804799	SS	Flanagan, P.	2 C Grn S&I
804646	Cpl	O'Sullivan, F.	1 Com Osp
809727	SS	McGlynn, N.	Ios Inlr
88097	SS	Hannigan, P.	Col Mileata
436293	SS	Salmon, J.	CC CTC
108400	SS	O'Sullivan, M.	1 C Grn Ord
78361	SS	Doolan, C.	3 Cn Cois
810627	SS	Smullen, B.	4 C Mre Inlr
804697	SS	Brennan, J.	4 C Mre Inlr
95462	SS	Doheney, T.	Ios S & I
802147	SS	Costello, S.	6 Cn Cois
809344	SS	McCarthy, T.	6 Cn Cois
803352	SS	Maguire, J.	Ios S & I
91330	SS	Kearney, J.	Ios S & I
806152	SS	Anderson, M.	Ios S & I
807665	SS	Burke, N.	1 Com Osp
805252	SS	Kavanagh, N.	1 Com Osp
807843	SS	Jordan, N.	1 Com Osp
801355	SS	Hurlcy, M.	3 Com Osp
808228	SS	Coogan, S.	3 Cn Cois
806243	SS	Hayde, P.	Ios Airt
430446	SS	Moran, J.	1 C Grn Ord
808216	SS	O'Shea, J.	Ios Corí
808894	SS	Cronin, T.	Ios Corí
810169	SS	Cosgrove, P.	Ios Corí
803160	SS	Bevan, T.	Ios Corí
86692	Cré	O'Reilly, J.	Engrs
809219	SS	Fortune, D.	Rmt AA
803023	SS	Griffin, F.	Ios S&I
87045	Sáir	Keane, L.	3 Cn Cois
808348	Cré	O'Hara, T.	3 Cn Cois
805587	SS	Kenny, J.	3 Cn Cois
808496	SS	Coleman, G.	3 Cn Cois
808397	SS	Donohue, M.	3 Cn Cois
806503	SS	Lakes, V.	3 Cn Cois
808022	SS	Colbert, K.	Ios Corí
87555	Sáir	Conlon, T.M.	3 Cn Cois
805225	Cré	Whitley	1 Scn Arm
809022	SS	O'Brien, P.	3 Cn Cois
807010	SS	Walsh, O.	3 Cn Cois
807065	SS	Mullalley, P.	3 Cn Cois
803743	SS	Byrne, P.	3 Cn Cois
808224	SS	Kinsella, N.	3 Cn Cois
808229	SS	O'Halloran, P.	3 Cn Cois
77597	SS	O'Regan, J.	3 Cn Cois
806960	SS	McGuire, J.	3 Cn Cois
99814	Cré	Kelly, J.	Priomh Ios Tr.

Ar lean/

**CONFIDENTIAL**

# CONFIDENTIAL

## 'C' COY (AR LEAN)

808502	Cré	Lockeman, J.	3 Cn Cois
99423	SS	Flynn, J.	3 Cn Cois
806275	SS	Talbot, T.	3 Cn Cois
808030	SS	Murphy, T.	Priomh Ios Tr.
806083	SS	Caffrey, M.	Priomh Ios Tr.
88044	SS	Cuddy, M.	Priomh Ios Tr.
809444	SS	Mahon, K.	Priomh Ios Tr.
806169	SS	Morrissey, F.	Priomh Ios Tr.
808016	SS	Arrigan, T.	Priomh Ios Tr.
802604	Cré	Redmond, J.	3 Cn Cois
806855	Cré	Kelly, L.	3 Cn Cois
807603	SS	Kickey, B.	3 Cn Cois
807656	SS	Dempsey, S.	3 Cn Cois
807013	SS	Glasheen, S.	Priomh Ios Tr.
809540	SS	Harris, S.	Priomh Ios Tr.
809443	SS	Leigh, J.	Priomh Ios Tr.
807380	SS	Lafferty, J.	Priomh Ios Tr.
808919	SS	Walsh, L.	Priomh Ios Tr.
806596	SS	McGuinness, N.	Ord.
806368	Cré	Lysaght, M.	1ú Scn Tanc
807063	Cré	Durney, T.	3 Cn Cois
807580	SS	Kealy, T.	3 Cn Cois
808383	SS	Carroll, S.	3 Cn Cois
98731	SS	Casey, P.	Col Míleata
809719	SS	O'Neill	Ios Corí
807675	SS	Hackett, B.	Ios Inlr
806884	SS	Bolger, W.	CC CTC
99384	SS	McSweeney, R.	Ios Inlr
806568	SS	Rossiter, P.	Ios Inlr
200920	Sáir	Ambrose, M.	Priomh Ios Tr.
808393	Cré	Lambert, M.	3 Cn Cois
807076	SS	Keedy, K.	3 Cn Cois
808410	SS	Harris, F.	3 Cn Cois
807588	SS	Conroy, J.	3 Cn Cois
90597	SS	Caffrey, S.	Priomh Ios Tr.
809725	SS	Foley, P.	Ios Inlr
93494	Sáir	Connelley, P.	Priomh Ios Tr.
810333	Cré	Byrne, M.	3 Cn Cois
806993	SS	Rafferty, D.	3 Cn Cois
806424	SS	Delaney, W.	3 Cn Cois
808227	SS	Deegan, B.	3 Cn Cois
808380	SS	Hayden, J.	3 Cn Cois
808508	SS	Ennis, C.	3 Cn Cois
98448	SS	Canavan, J.	3 Cn Cois
807031	SS	Landers, P.	3 Cn Cois
99070	SS	Rafter, J.	3 Cn Cois
807528	Cré	Ronan, P.	1 Rmt AA
808385	Cré	Conway, M.	3 Cn Cois
807064	SS	Reid, D.	3 Cn Cois
807069	SS	Flood, P.	3 Cn Cois
800768	SS	Goff, E.	Priomh Ios Tr.
809221	SS	Finn, D.	1 Rmt AA Airt
809455	SS	Keyes, P.	1 Rmt AA Airt
807534	SS	Williams, J.	1 Rmt AA Airt
809230	SS	Costello, A.	1 Rmt AA Airt
809074	SS	Doran, J.	1 Rmt AA Airt
803552	Cré	Cullen, G.	Iosta Airt
805042	Cré	Hall, R.	Priomh Ios Tr.
808403	SS	Dreeling, P.	3 Cn Cois
808504	SS	Donohue, E.	3 Cn Cois
806659	SS	Drohan, F.	Ios Airt

Ar lean/

# CONFIDENTIAL

'C' COY (AR LEAN)

805793	SS	Byrne, J.	Ios Airt
808412	SS	Nolan, J.	Ios Airt
803387	SS	Nolan, S.	Ios Airt
808515	SS	Rooney, P.	Ios Airt
807056	SS	Phillips, J.	CC CTC
806836	Cré	Kennedy, J.	Ios Inlr
805250	Cré	Sweeney, T.	Priomh Ios Tr.
808411	SS	Quirke, P.	3 Cn Cois
808225	SS	King, P.	3 Cn Cois
801136	SS	Bohan, W.	Ios Inlr
806621	SS	Connerny, O.	Ios Inlr
808762	SS	Dempsey, D.	Ios Inlr
806557	SS	Fortune, T.	Ios Inlr
806670	SS	Gorey, E.	Ios Inlr
803578	SS	Hall, R.	Ios Inlr
79185	Sáir	Wilson, T.	3 Cn Cois
436149	Cré	Ging, J.	3 Cn Cois
801821	SS	Canning, J.	3 Cn Cois
808499	SS	Moran, P.	3 Cn Cois
808415	SS	Whelan, P.	3 Cn Cois
81438	SS	Cullinane, T.	CC CTC
807577	SS	Dolan, J.	1ú Scn Arm
99093	Sáir	Hamill, J.	4 Mot Scn
804877	Cré	Ging, J.	3 Cn Cois
806854	SS	Connolly, J.	3 Cn Cois
806995	SS	O'Rourke, D.	3 Cn Cois
808497	SS	Nolan, M.	3 Cn Cois
807067	SS	Hickey, A.	3 Cn Cois
801830	SS	Kelly, J.	3 Cn Cois
803754	SS	Canning, W.	3 Cn Cois
808395	SS	Curran, C.	3 Cn Cois
808220	SS	Daly, T.	3 Cn Cois
807390	Cré	Kavanagh, P.	1ú Rmt AA Airt
805626	Cré	Broderick, J.	Priomh Ios Tr.
808232	SS	Jordan, E.	3 Cn Cois
807075	SS	Cahill, P.	3 Cn Cois
807920	SS	Kenny, M.	Ios S&I
807660	SS	Lawless,	Ios S&I
805784	SS	Walsh, M.	Ios S&I
807837	SS	O'Neill, C.	Ios S&I
808032	SS	Gainfort, T.	Ios S&I
807137	SS	Gleeson, C.	1ú Scn Arm
806669	Cré	Folan, P.	Ios Mar
808916	Cré	Sparrow, P.	Priomh Ios Tr.
807032	SS	Green, P.	3 Cn Cois
807600	SS	Oates, T.	3 Cn Cois
801913	SS	Cullen, P.	Ios Marcra
804415	SS	McGuire, T.	Ios Marcra
806170	SS	Murphy, P.	Ios Marcra
809827	SS	Conway, D.	1ú Scn Tanc
809549	SS	Goff, T.	1ú Scn Tanc
809436	SS	Ryan, M.	1ú Scn Tanc
95878	Cré	Timpson, M.	4 Mot Scn
808567	Cré	Bolger, T.	Priomh Ios Tr.
808396	SS	Clancy, M.	3 Cn Cois
807574	SS	Kenny, J.	3 Cn Cois
806043	SS	Broe, T.	4 Mot Scn
808785	SS	Caulfield, J.	4 Mot Scn
808923	SS	Rochford, D.	4 Mot Scn
808930	SS	Ryan, J.	4 Mot Scn
807079	SS	Tyrell, W.	4 Mot Scn
807143	SS	Kelly, T.	1 Scn Arm
808388	SS	Goggin, P.	3 Cn Cois
808017	SS	McLaurence, D.	Depot Sigs, Curragh



**CONFIDENTIAL**

ANNEX B  
to  
33 INFANTRY BATTALION  
UNIT HISTORY

BATTALION EQUIPMENT TABLE

ITEM	Battalion HQ Allotment		Company Gp. Allotment		Three Coy Gps Allotment		Total Allotment		GRAND TOTAL	
	Combat	Res	Combat	Res	Combat	Res	Combat	Res		
<u>ARMAMENT</u>										
.303 Rifles										
No. 4	61	10	(93)	-	279	-	340	10	350	
Gustaf SMGs	58	9	(75)	-	225	-	283	9	292	
Revolvers .38	2	-	(1)	-	3	-	5	-	5	
Energa Launchers										
No.4	-	4	(28)	-	84	-	84	4	88	
Bren LMG, Mk.III	4	2	(13)	-	39	-	43	2	45	
60 mm Mortar - Brandt	-	1	(3)	-	9	-	9	1	10	
<u>COMMS EQUIPMENT</u>										
Wrls Sets No. C12	2	2	(2)	-	6	-	8	2	10	
Wrls Sets No.31	-	9	(6)	(1)	18	3	18	12	30	
Wrls Sets No.88	-	9	(4)	(1)	12	3	12	12	24	
Telephones 'J'	-	9	(4)	(1)	12	3	12	12	24	
Switchboards										
WD.10 Line	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	
Cable D.10 Twin Miles	-	7	(4)	(1)	12	3	12	10	22	
Apparatus Cable Laying No. 6	-	3	(1)	(1)	3	3	3	6	9	
Battery Charging Plant	4	-	(2)	-	6	-	10	-	10	
<u>INSTRUMENT &amp; FD EQUIPMENT</u>										
Binoculars	26	-	(6)	-	18	-	44	-	44	
Compasses	26	-	(6)	-	18	-	44	-	44	
Map Cases	26	-	(6)	-	18	-	44	-	44	
Protractors	26	-	(6)	-	18	-	44	-	44	
Romers	26	-	(12)	-	36	-	62	-	62	
Torches Complete	26	-	(20)	-	60	-	86	-	86	
Watches	14	-	(15)	-	45	-	59	-	59	
Whistles	28	-	(20)	-	60	-	88	-	88	
Verrey Light										
Pistols	6	-	(4)	-	12	-	18	-	18	
Verrey Lt Ctges - Red	24	24	(16)	-	48	-	72	24	96	
Do. - Green	24	24	(16)	-	48	-	72	24	96	
Do. Illuminating	36	108	(24)	-	72	-	108	108	216	

**CONFIDENTIAL**

# CONFIDENTIAL

ANNX E  
to  
33 INFANTRY BATTALION  
UNIT HISTORY

	Battalion HQ Allotment		Each Coy Gp Allotment		Three Coy Gps Allotment		Total Allotment		GRAND TOTAL
	Combat	Res	Combat	Res	Combat	Res	Combat	Res	
<u>ENGR TOOLS AND EQPT</u>									
Axes Felling or hand	6	-	(6)	(6)	18	18	24	18	42
Axes Pick	12	-	(34)	(12)	102	36	114	36	150
Crowbars	4	-	(3)	(2)	9	6	13	6	19
Cutters Wire	5	-	(12)	(2)	36	6	41	6	47
Hooks Slashing	10	-	(21)	(6)	63	18	73	18	91
Saws Cross Cut	5	-	-	(2)	-	6	5	6	11
Saws Hand or folding	5	-	(6)	(5)	18	15	23	15	38
Shovels or spades	25	-	(47)	(18)	141	54	165	54	219
Sledges Steel	8	-	(3)	(2)	9	6	17	6	23
Wedges Steel									
Astd	48	-	(18)	(12)	54	36	102	36	138
Sandbags	-	2000	-	-	-	-	-	2000	2000
Ropes 50 ft Lengths	9	-	(3)	(3)	9	9	18	9	27
<u>AMMUNITION</u>									
.303 Rifle - On the man	3050	-	(4650)	-	13950	-	17000	-	-
.303 Rifle - Coy Res	-	6100	-	(9300)	-	27900	-	34000	
Do. - 2nd Line	-	3050	-	(4650)	-	13950	-	17000	
								51000	68000
<u>BALLISTITE</u>									
On Man	-	-	(280)	-	840	-	840	-	-
Coy Reserve	-	-	-	(280)	-	840	-	840	1680
<u>.303 IMG BALL</u>									
With Gun	3000	-	(9750)	-	29250	-	32250	-	-
Company Reserve	-	1800	-	(5850)	-	17550	-	19350	
2nd Line	-	4000	-	(13000)	-	39000	-	43000	
								62350	94600
<u>.303 IMG BALL</u>									
With Gun	3000	-	(9750)	-	29250	-	32250	-	-
Company Reserve	-	1800	-	(5850)	-	17550	-	19350	
2nd Line	-	4000	-	(13000)	-	39000	-	43000	
								62350	94600
<u>.303 IMG Tracer</u>									
With Gun	300	-	(975)	-	2925	-	3225	-	-
Coy Reserve	-	180	-	(585)	-	1755	-	1935	
2nd Line	-	400	-	(1300)	-	3900	-	4300	
								4300	9460

**CONFIDENTIAL**

3.

ANNEX B  
to  
33 INFANTRY BATTALION  
UNIT HISTORY

ITEM	Battalion HQ Allotment		Each Coy Gps Allotment		Three Coy Gps Allotment		Total Allotment		GRAND TOTAL
	Combat	Res	Combat	Res	Combat	Res	Combat	Res	
<u>.38 Amm Revolver</u>									
On Man	36	-	(18)	-	54	-	90	-	300
Coy Reserve	-	60	-	(30)	-	90	-	150	
	-	24	-	(12)	-	36	-	60	
								210	
<u>.9 MM Amm Gustaf SMG</u>									
On Man	12528	-	(16200)	-	48600	-	61128	-	244512
Coy Reserve	-	12528	-	(16200)	-	48600	-	61128	
2nd Line	-	25056	-	(32400)	-	97200	-	122256	
								183384	
<u>60 MM Mortar HE Amm</u>									
With Gun	-	-	(192)	-	576	-	576	-	1,692
Coy Reserve	-	-	-	(192)	-	576	-	576	
2nd Line	-	-	-	(180)	-	540	-	540	
								1116	
<u>60 MM Mortar Smoke Amm</u>									
With Gun	-	-	(48)	-	144	-	144	-	396
Coy Reserve	-	-	-	(48)	-	144	-	144	
2nd Line	-	-	-	(36)	-	108	-	108	
								252	
<u>Energ. Atk Grenades</u>									
On Man	-	-	(56)	-	168	-	168	-	420
Coy Reserve	-	-	-	(28)	-	84	-	84	
2nd Line	-	-	-	(56)	-	168	-	168	
								252	
<u>No. 36 Grenades</u>									
With Rifle Group	-	-	-	-	432	-	432	-	864
Coy Reserve	-	-	-	(144)	-	432	-	432	
<u>Smoke Grenades - 600</u>									
								600	600
<u>Tear Gas Grenades 200</u>									
								200	200
<u>Hand Generators 2000</u>									
								2000	2,000
<u>Veroy Light Pistol Cartridges Red and Green (each)</u>									
With Gun	24	-	(16)	-	48	-	72	-	144 (each)
Coy Reserve	-	24	-	(16)	-	48	-	72	
<u>Illuminating</u>									
With Gun	36	-	(24)	-	72	-	108	-	216
Coy Reserve	-	36	-	(24)	-	72	-	108	

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**33 INFANTRY BATTALION  
UNIT HISTORYEASTERN COMMAND HEADQUARTERS  
ELISABETHVILLE,

22 August 1960.

CONFIDENTIALDIRECTIVE NO. 1

(TO be issued to all UNIT and SUB-UNIT Commands)

Primary responsibility for public order belongs to the local security authorities. Upon their request for assistance made to our units, however, United Nations troops may take action in their place. Such assistance is to be given only in matters directly relating to the maintenance of public peace and security and will be carried out by peaceful means only. In addition, United Nations forces will by their own independent action and by continuous operations and patrolling endeavour to promote public peace and security. They will regularly report to this HQ, through appropriate confidential channels, the situation as regards public peace and security in their respective areas.

All other normal police and civil functions rest entirely with the public authorities, without either interference or assistance from the United Nations. Police and civil authorities may not control, regulate or in any way interfere with United Nations operations, personnel, property, vehicles or aircraft; United Nations troops may not in any way interfere with police control of all other persons and property. They are, however, to report to this HQ, through appropriate confidential channels, any incidents arising from the exercise by the local authorities of their police powers.

United Nations Units and Sub-Units will maintain liaison with the corresponding local security force units and sub-units for the purpose of coordinating activities with them. Such coordination is not, repeat not, for the purpose of mounting joint operations or patrols with the local authorities. No joint operations or patrols are to be carried out. The coordination has as its purpose to prevent any conflict of competence, between the United Nations troops and local security forces and also to enable United Nations to exercise peaceful methods to be brought to bear in areas where the local security forces might otherwise be inclined to use forceful methods.

In no case shall United Nations troops intervene in any internal conflict in the Congo, constitutional or otherwise or be used to influence the outcome. Thus the United Nations troops in Katanga cannot be a party in any way to the differences between the Central Government of the Congo and the Katangese authorities.

If representatives of the Central Government arrive in Katanga, United Nations troops are not, repeat not, to interfere with any action which may be taken against those representatives by the local authorities, but are to report any incidents which may occur to this HQ, through appropriate confidential channels.

<u>Distribution:</u>	12 copies for Swedish, Irish and Ethiopian Battalions	(36)
	12 copies HQ	(12)
	25 copies spare	(25)
	TOTAL:	(73)

**CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX D

TO

33 INFANTRY BATTALION  
UNIT HISTORY

HQ,  
SCONEP,  
ELISABETHVILLE.

29 September, '60.

To: All unit commanders SCONEP

DIRECTIVE NO. 2

SECURITY

1. "The principle of the UN Force in the Congo as defined in the proposal of the Security Council is to assist the Government (of the Congo) in maintaining law and order. In pursuing this purpose the UN Operation in the Congo should exhaust all possible peaceful means of keeping order before any resort to force. Every effort should be exerted to avoid harm to anyone, since public reaction to the employment of force by UN personnel might well prove disastrous to the success of the entire United Nations Operation."
2. It is evident from recent events in Katanga that troops of ONU must henceforth take a very determined stand in assisting in maintenance of law and order. Restoration of law and order where rioting and serious acts of indiscipline have taken place.
3. With a view to achieving the maintenance or restoration of law and order Commanders should:-
  - a. Institute vigorous patrol programmes.
  - b. Where necessary erect road barriers and set up control posts.
4. The purpose of patrols will be:-
  - a. To collect all possible information on activities within the area patrolled.
  - b. To provide advance information on possible developments in the area.
  - c. To establish contact with local leaders with a view to paving the way for negotiation at a later stage should this be necessary.
  - d. To show the UN presence.
5. Road barriers should be erected for the following purposes:-
  - a. To control or restrict the movement of groups of persons whose intention may be to interfere with law and order by armed or unarmed effort.
  - b. To control or restrict the movement of groups of persons known to have been responsible for disorder, riotous conduct, looting etc.
  - c. To facilitate UN troops in their search for stolen or looted vehicles or goods.

CONFIDENTIAL

- d. To enable the local ONU Commander to negotiate on the spot with leaders of groups whose motives may be doubtful.

Commanders are advised that every effort short of use of arms must be made to persuade people in improper possession of arms to surrender equipment and to return peacefully to their homes.

6. Control posts may consist of small bodies of ONU troops with an N.C.O. in charge. These posts will be established, as deemed necessary by the local Commanders for the purpose of:
  - a. Exercising a degree of control over movement which is suspect.
  - b. Interrogating persons known or suspected as being responsible for subversive activities.
  - c. Demonstrating to the public that ONU troops intend to actively implement a policy of assisting the Government in maintaining law and order.
7. Whilst these instructions apply generally to all Units in SCOMEF they have a particular application in certain parts of the country. So far there has been little or no evidence of widespread unrest in KIVU or in Southern KATANGA. Should a reasonably peaceful situation continue in those parts then the active implementation of instructions contained in this Directive in regard to barriers and control posts is NOT immediately called for. On the other hand the series of events which have occurred during the past few weeks in Central and Northern KATANGA indicate a serious state of unrest there which may continue for some time. In these circumstances Commanders must pay immediate heed to the instructions contained herein.

Troops must show a firmness and determination in dealing with cases of disorder and indiscipline. They must convey to the people concerned that they are serious in their intent to prevent incidents.

#### SECURITY OF UN POSTS

8. For the added security of UN Posts the bounds of such posts should be clearly defined with large notices in English, French and the local language on each road leading to the Post. The bounds of the Camp should not be confined to the simple perimeter of the area occupied by UN troops and installations but should extend all round at least outside the range of small arms weapons. Instructions should be made quite clear that the discharge of firearms in this area or "neutral zone" will bring UN fire on the perpetrators no matter who they are. This is A BASIC SECURITY REQUIREMENT.
9. Local conditions may influence a commander to extend the bounds of his UN Post or Posts even beyond the limit of small arms range but should a commander think it necessary to take this step he must be certain that distance will not prejudice his ability to carry out retaliation in the event of the discharge of firearms within the neutral zone surrounding his Camp.
10. An example of the instructions to be displayed on such sign posts is attached - ANNEX "A".

#### CONCLUSION

11. The following instructions issued in previous Directive are repeated:-
  - a. Contact and maintain liaison with local authorities.
  - b. Contact and maintain liaison with local security forces.

- c. Coordinate the activities of your force with those of local security forces and so avoid unnecessary duplication of patrols, guards etc.
- d. Do NOT mount joint operations or joint patrols with local security forces.

(Signed) H. W. Byrne COLONEL  
 (H.W. BYRNE)

OFFICER COMMANDING, SCOMEF.

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX "A"

TO DIRECTIVE NO. 2

W A R N I N G

THIS BOUNDARY MARKS THE BOUNDARY OF THE UN CAMP

OF .....

NO FIREARMS WILL BE DISCHARGED INSIDE THIS BOUNDARY MARK.

UN TROOPS AT THE CAMP WILL FIRE ON ANY PERSON WHO DISCHARGES A  
FIREARM WITHIN THE AREA MARKED BY THESE NOTICES.

ANNEX "A"

TO DIRECTIVE NO. 2

AVERTISSEMENT

CET AVERTISSEMENT MARQUE L'ENCEINTE DU CAMPAMENT DES NATIONS

UNIES DE .....

AUCUNE ARME A FEU NE SERA DECHARGEE A L'INTERIEUR DE CETTE  
ENCEINTE.

LES TROUPS DES NATIONS UNIES QUI OCCUPENT CE CAMPAMENT

OUVRIRONT LE FEU SUR TOUTE PERSONNE QUI DECHARGERÁ UNE ARME

A FEU A L'INTERIEUR DE L'ENCEINTE DELIMITEE PAR CES AVERTISSEMENTS.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIALONUC OPERATIONS DIRECTIVESECURITY AND THE MAINTENANCEAPPLICABILITY

1. This Directive replaces all previous instructions issued to officers regarding their responsibility and the maintenance of law and order in the Congo in amplification of the various instructions issued.

GENERAL

2. The UN Force in the Congo serves at the request of the Government of the Congo under the mandate of the resolutions of the General Assembly of July and 9 August, and resolution 1812 (XVII) of the 14th Session of the General Assembly. Its purpose is to assist the Government in the restoration and maintenance of law and order, particularly to take all possible measures for the protection of life and property throughout the territory of the Republic of the Congo, with the ultimate purpose of safeguarding international peace and security.
3. The UN Force in the Congo is a peace force. It carries arms in order to lend weight to its authority and as a deterrent, but these arms may be used only in self-defence, as explained in the Directive. The UN force is in no sense an occupying force. It seeks only to help achieve conditions of security in which government and administration can function effectively. Thus, its main purpose is to assist the government in creating conditions of peace in which Congolese people may themselves be able to develop their political freedom and economic prosperity. The UN force therefore must respect the sovereignty, independence and national integrity of the Republic of the Congo.

RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE CONGOLESE AUTHORITIES

4. The UN Force shall not, repeat not, be a party to or in any way intervene in or influence the outcome of any internal conflict, constitutional or otherwise. This, of course, does not, repeat not, preclude the UN from humanitarian measures to prevent bloodshed, such as serving as a buffer in inter-tribal conflict, lending its good offices to local disputants, and arranging cease fires. Where more than one authority claims to exercise the powers of government, at whatever level, the UN can take no position as to which authority should be recognised. The UN Force, in pursuance of its efforts to maintain law and order, may take necessary contacts for this purpose with those officials on the spot who may be exercising authority, without, however, thereby implying any attitude or position with regard to the legal status of such officials.
5. The responsibility for the maintenance of law and order is primarily that of the Congolese authorities. The aim of the UN Force is to assist these authorities in the carrying out of their responsibilities. Therefore, in the event of a disturbance, actual or potential, UN commanders wherever possible, will in the instance rely on the appropriate competent Congolese authorities, administrative, political or military, to take the necessary lawful measures, or if necessary, try to induce them to do so, and may give them assistance towards that end.

6. Should the Congolese authorities be unable to deal with the situation adequately, or when it is apparent that they intend to apply or when they do apply harsh and repressive measures not sanctioned by law and in violation of humanitarian principles, then and only then will the UN Force take further appropriate steps to fulfil its responsibilities in the protection of life, law and order.
7. As a peace force the UN Force may not take the initiative in the use of armed force. It is however, entitled to use force in self-defence, but only as a last resort after other means viz., negotiation or persuasion, have failed. In the following types of cases UN troops are entitled to respond with force to an armed attack upon them:
- (a) attempts by force to compel them to withdraw from a position which they occupy under orders from their commanders, or to infiltrate and envelop such positions as are deemed necessary by their commanders for them to hold, thus jeopardising their safety;
  - (b) attempts by force to disarm them;
  - (c) attempts by force to prevent them from carrying out their responsibilities, as ordered by their commanders;
  - (d) violation by force of United Nations' premises and attempts at arrest or abduction of UN personnel, civil or military.

The minimum force necessary will be used in all such cases in order to prevent as far as possible the loss of human life or serious injury to person.

8. In the event of firing being resorted to for purposes of self-defence, the following principles shall apply:-
- (a) the object throughout is to deter and not to cause loss of life;
  - (b) it follows that firing should be low and not aimed at vital parts;
  - (c) in the case of mob attack, the leaders should be picked out for deterrent action;
  - (d) firing must at all times be controlled and not indiscriminate;
  - (e) the officer in charge will keep a record of the number of rounds fired;
  - (f) firing into the air should be avoided as it may be provocative without strengthening respect for the force.

#### PROTECTION AGAINST MARAUDERS OR ARMED BANDS

9. (a) Whenever a threat of attack develops towards a particular area either by marauders or armed bands, UN commanders will endeavour to pacify the area through the Congolese authorities as described in para. 5 above, or failing that, where possible, by direct approach to the attackers. Mobile patrols should be immediately organised to manifest the presence of UN in the threatened or disturbed area, in whatever strength is available. Loudspeaker vans and other appropriate means may be used to calm and restrain public excitement.
- (b) If all attempts at peaceful settlement fail, UN commanders may recommend to the Supreme Commander that such threatened areas be declared as under UN protection by means of the deployment of UN troops. In the event of their receiving specific instructions to that effect, the UN commanders will announce that the entry into such area of marauders or armed bands, as the case may be,

will be opposed by force, if necessary, in the interests of law and order.

- (c) If, notwithstanding these warnings, attempts are made to attack, envelop or infiltrate the UN positions thus jeopardising the safety of UN troops, they will defend themselves and their positions by resisting and driving off the attackers with such minimum use of force including firing, as may be necessary.
10. It follows from para. 9 that if UN units arrive at the scene of an actual conflict between marauders and civilians or between opposing armed bands, they will, in the interests of law and order, immediately call on the participants to break off the conflict. If the participants fail to comply, UN commanders will immediately take appropriate steps to separate the combatants and to prevent further lawlessness, bloodshed, pillaging or looting. If the UN troops are then attacked, they may use such degree of force as may be necessary for the exercise of their right of self-defence, including firing.
11. Persons observed to be engaged in looting, but not fighting, on the scene of such conflicts will be called upon by UN troops to desist and surrender. If they desist from looting and flee, firing should not be resorted to in order to apprehend them. On the other hand, if they refuse to desist from looting, force may be employed to stop them and, if they attack, the principle of self-defence applies and resort may be had to the minimum firing necessary.

#### DISRUPTION OF AGENCIES OF PUBLIC ORDER

12. The obligation of the UN Force to assist in the maintenance of law and order is in no way diminished where it happens that elements of Congolese forces may themselves be engaged in general lawlessness. Where soldiers, gendarmerie or police have broken away from their command and are no longer under the control of the authorities, or where they engage in the unlawful killing of unarmed civilians or the pillaging and burning of towns and villages or in any flagrant violation of elementary human rights, they constitute a danger to public order and safety and an immediate report on the situation should be sent to the Supreme Commander. If such units appear to be operating under any form of leadership, UN commanders will use their good offices to stop all such activities, by direct consultation with that leadership or by reference to the nearest authorities of the civil government, the ANC or the gendarmerie. If these endeavours fail, every effort should be made to disarm or neutralise the lawless elements and to confine them to barracks. Any further action should be taken only on receipt of specific instructions from the Supreme Commander.

#### UN PROPERTY AND EXISTING INSTALLATIONS

13. UN troops are responsible for the protection of UN property. In addition, essential public utilities such as electricity works, waterworks, etc., should be given such protection as may be necessary when they are threatened by public disorder, and where any damage or destruction to them would cause hindrance to the UN operation or acute hardship to the civilian population.
14. (a) Protection of UN or other essential installations may be provided by means of mobile patrols or static guards, as appropriate.
- (b) Physical force may be used, if necessary, to protect such installations.
- (c) Such force may extend to the minimum degree of firing necessary, as a last resort.

CONFIDENTIAL 4.

CONCLUSIONS

15. In carrying their responsibilities for assisting in the maintenance of law and order in the Congo, the UN troops are expected to act with tact and moderation at all times. The very presence of armed and disciplined troops, skilfully deployed, can act as a powerful deterrent to the forces of disorder and violence. When force has to be used it should be kept to the minimum required for the attainment of the objective. It is expected that the action of the UN troops will always be inspired by the aims and purposes of the United Nations in the Congo.

\_\_\_\_\_  
GEN. SUP COMDR.

(Carl Carlson Van Horn)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX B

TO

33 INFANTRY BATTALION  
UNIT HISTORY

P/5302/1

Chief of Personnel (Mil)  
HQ ONUC  
LEOPOLDVILLE  
23 August 1960.

To: List A, B and C.

From: Chief of Personnel (Mil)

Subject: RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF MEMBERS OF THE FORCE.

CONDUCT BEFITTING INTERNATIONAL STATES

1. Members of the Force shall keep in mind that their service with the Force involves international responsibility. They shall avoid any actions by word or deed, which might adversely reflect on their integrity and neutrality or on the independent and impartial character of the Force. While members of the Force are not expected to give up their national sentiment or their political or religious convictions, they shall avoid expressing such sentiments or convictions in public or in conversation with persons of another nationality.

RELATIONSHIP WITH LOCAL INHABITANTS

2. ONUC is not an occupation Force and all local inhabitants shall be treated with utmost courtesy and consideration. Commanding officers will ensure that troops under their command act in conformity with operational standing orders when attacked or provoked by local inhabitants. They will also ensure that procedures used by their troops in dealing with or delivering offenders or suspects are not unnecessarily harsh or offensive to the dignity of the individual concerned.

NON-FRATERNISATION

3. Members of the Force will avoid close contacts with the local population and bear in mind that local inhabitants seen frequently in their company may suffer considerable inconvenience as a result. In particular, they shall not visit the homes of local inhabitants, including locally recruited ONUC employees, unless clearance for such visits has first been obtained through the ONUC LOCAL COMMAND. In any event, members of the Force should not enter any dwelling unless invited to do so by a male member of the household. It is strictly prohibited to accost, attempt to enter into conversation with or interfere in any way with local women and girls. Violations of this order may create incidents and will be treated as a serious breach of discipline.
4. This order shall be published in formation/unit routine orders for information of all ranks.

Chief of Personnel (Mil)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

33 INFANTRY BATTALION  
UNIT HISTORY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OPERATIONS SECTION HISTORY

1. Standard on assuming duty. A reasonably high standard of individual training was evident in 33 Infantry Battalion from the moment it was assembled in the CURRAGH TRAINING CAMP.

During the period of preparation in the CURRAGH, the only training which could be attempted, because of the time factor, was weapon training and range practices. Resulting from this training, every soldier and officer acquired the ability to maintain and fire his personal weapon. No training higher than individual training could be attempted.

2. Congo training. Within fourteen days of leaving the CURRAGH TRAINING CAMP, 33 Infantry Battalion was deployed as follows:-

Battalion Headquarters	ALBERTVILLE
A. Company	KAMINA
B. Company ( - )	MANONO
One platoon B. Company	PIANA MWANGA
C. Company	ALBERTVILLE
One platoon C. Company	BENDERA
$\frac{1}{2}$ platoon C Company	BAUDOINVILLE
$\frac{1}{2}$ platoon C Company	KABIMBA

As a result, NO unit training was ever possible.

Sub-unit training was carried out by company commanders to suit the requirements of their tasks in their widely separated locations, whenever the opportunity arose. In the case of all companies, including Battalion Headquarters; operational pressure from the moment of arrival in their company locations was such that NO sub-unit training of any consequence was completed.

- a. A Company. KAMINA BASE, guard and patrol duties, Airfield protection duty to the extent of one platoon per day, prevented any effective sub-unit training being carried out. Limited platoon training only was possible. However signal training, training in MMG (Browning), APCs and driving was carried out.
- b. B Company. Local post security duty, airfield protection duty, outpost administrative supply responsibilities, coupled with the early outbreak of disturbances in MANONO made effective sub-unit training impossible. Very heavy patrol duties later on did little to ease the situation.
- c. C Company. Local post security duty, town patrol duty (foot and MP), train duty to KAMINA and KABALO, airfield security duty, railway station and Convent protection duty, in conjunction with administrative supply responsibility for three far-removed outposts effectively prevented sub-unit training of any consequence being carried out.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

d. Bn HQ

- (1) Personnel of Battalion Headquarters worked in conjunction with C Company, in sharing all the above-mentioned duties, in addition to the administrative duties of a battalion headquarters staff.
- (2) Signal training. The situation with regard to WT operators was critical from the start, and the Battalion found itself with three times more outposts than the available trained WT operators could properly man. As a result, communication with outposts could be maintained only on a time schedule. It was only by over-working control personnel that even a 24-hour listening watch could be maintained. The situation improved when INDIAN signallers with CANADIAN equipment took over the operation of control at Headquarters.

3. Training requirements

- a. Immediate operational duties such as MT patrolling, foot patrolling and train guard duties necessitated special training and the development of new procedures. These procedures, though sketchy at first, were constantly revised in the light of experience gained. Towards the end of the Battalion's period of service, the units operational procedures had been developed into detailed, but flexible, procedures. The procedure for train guard duties was much appreciated by MALAYAN troops who were forwarded a copy on request. The MT patrol procedure was also much appreciated by Headquarters personnel who served in KATANGA during 35 Infantry Battalion's period there.
  - b. The most serious deficiency in all operational tasks performed was the shortage of interpreters for 3½ months. Battalion outposts (MANONO excepted) had to rely on local native interpreters, none of whom could be properly designated as interpreters. In normal circumstances these interpreters could never be considered an acceptable security risk, but Battalion outpost officers had NO choice other than accept them. During this period, a great deal of MT patrolling and train guard protection was carried out without any interpreter. Efforts were made to train officers of battalion HQ to speak French and though progress was made in this direction - operational pressure severely curtailed the availability of instructor and pupil, so much so, that the course had to be discontinued.
4. Officer training. From an operational viewpoint, the standard of individual training of officers of the battalion, was very good.
  5. NCO training. Placed in a new environment and required to take more responsibility than had been customary at home the NCOs. took some time to find their feet. However much thought and effort was devoted to this facet by all commanders and by means of train guards, outpost duty on their own, and airport protection duties leadership qualities were fostered and developed.

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX H  
TO

33 INFANTRY BATTALION  
UNIT HISTORY

A. SECTION HISTORY

1. Formation of unit The formation of the rifle companies commenced in the first days of AUGUST 1960 in the various Commands and the Battalion concentrated in the Curragh on the 10 August 1960. The organisation of Headquarters Company presented some difficulty as the personnel were drawn from all Commands in the Army and were largely strangers to one another. It took quite some time, after arrival in the Congo, to sort out the company into its various branches. This task was impeded by the efforts of the various injections which were beginning to tell shortly after our arrival in KAMINA.

2. Movement and activity. A number of our officers were moved to other appointments outside the unit and these transfers forced A and other Branches to work short-handed from then on. Those who left were:-

Comdt. K. O'Brien	to	Headquarters SCOMEF
Capt. B. Greer		do.
Capt. M. O'Donnell	to	Headquarters KAMINA BASE Group
Capt. R. Hinchy	to	do.
Capt. B.J. Gogarty	to	KATANGA/KIVU OBSERVER Group

3. Welfare. On the 5 SEPTEMBER the first mail arrived from IRELAND. Deliveries were pretty regular throughout our stay in the CONGO and were looked to anxiously by all ranks. Canteen facilities were generally good and the per diem allowance sufficed for cigarettes and beer. Social activities outside barracks were nil. The unit was fortunate in having some good entertainers among its members and ran some very good concerts for all ranks.

4. Living Conditions. These on the whole were reasonable. As time went on our troops learned to make the most of the amenities available and were, generally speaking, comfortable.

5. Associations with UN: Belgian and Congolese Our only difficulty was with the BALUBA tribesmen who, knowingly or otherwise identified or confused us with the BELGIANS. A lack of French-speaking personnel among our troops was a drawback and may have been the cause of some misunderstanding with the native population.

6. Breaches of discipline These were not infrequent, and from an early date it became apparent that a firm hand was necessary. I give hereunder an analysis of the crimes which were dealt with summarily.

Absence	26
Drunkenness	23
Insubordination	23
Conduct to the prejudice.	54

This latter embraced a large number of crimes from improper dress to fraternising with local females.

CONFIDENTIAL



**CONFIDENTIAL**

2.

The unit had 9 cases of trial by court-martial. These cases concerned the more serious breaches of discipline such as striking of superiors, unauthorised firing of weapons and interference with civilian property.

7. Personnel Assessment. Prior to its return to Ireland the Unit catalogued each man and analysed his suitability for tropical service, taking into account the man's standard of training, conduct and medical grading. This was a help in the processing of further Units for Congo Service.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

ANNEX J  
33 INFANTRY BATTALION  
UNIT HISTORY

2 SECTION HISTORY

1. Posts occupied by 33 Infantry Battalion for period of one month and upwards.

<u>POST</u>	<u>Type of Accommodation</u>
<u>a. KAMINA AREA</u>	
KAMINA BASE - Company Post -	Belgian Air Force Quarters ( EPA Buildings)
KAMINAVILLE - Company Post -	Schools
<u>b. ALBERTVILLE</u>	
REGINA PACIS - Headquarters and Headquarters Company-	Schools
QUARTIER KAKOMBA- C Company	Villas
FILTISAF - A Company	Cotton Factory Villas & School.
C.F.L. - B Company	Villas Railway Company
HOTEL RESIDENCE - Headquarters Officers' Mess -	Hotel (8 bedrooms, ) diningroom, lounge and gardens.
VILLAS - Headquarters Company Officers -	Vicinity REGINA PACIS.
<u>c. MANONO</u>	
AIRPORT AREA - B Company -	Villas
<u>d. OUTPOSTS</u>	
NIEMBA -	Villas
KABIMBA -	Cement Factory Villas
BENDERA -	Mixed Villas and Billets.
PIANA MWANGA -	Villas
BAUDOINVILLE -	Schools & Villas.

Rents, depending on whether the owners, in the case of private property, were still residing in CONGO, ranged from:-

5,000 francs per month for a villa  
30,000 francs per month HOTEL RESIDENCE  
45,000 francs per month REGINA PACIS.

NOTE - Approximately 40 villas were used by the unit during the period that it was concentrated in ALBERTVILLE. Not all the occupied villas were rented as the owners were not available. Troops were at all times housed in buildings. No canvas was used, except for C Company Dining Hall.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

2.

2. Imprest

- a. The Unit QM operated an imprest from the time of arrival in CONGO until the unit returned to KAMINA BASE on the 8th - 10th Jan 61.
- b. A total of 11,338,520 C. Francs was issued (£80,000 approx). This money was used in accordance with UN instructions as follows:-
  - (1) Payment of UN CONGO allowance of 43 C. Francs per day to all ranks.
  - (2) Purchase of food, (as rations were NOT issued) for 33 Bn and ETHIOPIAN BN at KABALO.
  - (3) Rent for accommodation, except for accommodation owned by the local authorities and CFL Railway Company.
  - (4) Purchase of items of equipment - delph, clothes, irons, and cookhouse equipment.
  - (5) Purchase of small amounts of POL, and local repairs to vehicles.
  - (6) Payment of local labour (35 CONGOLESE)
- c. Receipts in triplicate had to be obtained for all cash payments. These receipts were forwarded to the UN Finance Officer in ELISABETHVILLE.

3. Expenditure other than on items covered by imprest. In addition to items covered in paragraphs 2 other expenditure of approximately £120,000 was certified by the Battalion Quartermaster for payment by UN. This expenditure concerned the hiring of accommodation from local authorities, large train movements, purchase of vehicles (5 ton and 3 ton trucks from USUMBURA), purchase of tropical uniforms from FILTISAF Cotton Factory, purchase of POL.

4. Total Cost to UN Approximately £200,000 was either paid or certified for payment by the Unit quartermaster. This sum does NOT include the charges by the BELGIAN Army authorities for the accommodation and food used by A Company during its stay at KAMINA BASE.

5. Food

- a. All food was purchased locally. Ample supplies of all commodities were available. This was not true of MANONO, which was supplied in part from headquarters.
- b. A UN ration scale was in existence but it bore NO relation to local conditions and so was amended by the battalion Q staff.
- c. The Q staff were also responsible for the purchase of £3,500 worth of meat for the Ethiopian Battalion stationed in KABALO. The cattle were purchased and despatched by train on the hoof.
- d. The battalion also carried 21 days pack rations (Irish made) which were of excellent quality and design.
- e. The Administrative Officers of each Company were responsible for the purchase of food. Receipts in triplicate were obtained and forwarded to the Unit Quartermaster for certification.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL

3.

6. Tropical Clothing

- a. 2 shirts per individual available initially.
- b. Unit purchased 1,600 shirts, shorts and pants from Filtisaf ALBERTVILLE.
- c. When UN supplies became available in October 1960 all personnel had a total issue of 5 shirts, 5 slacks, 2 shorts and 2 caps.
- d. 720 pairs of ARCTIC boots were issued by UN.

7. Armament Heavy weapons (81 mm mortars, and MMG's) were NOT issued to the Battalion. Armament consisted of:-

No. 4 Rifles  
Gustaf SMG's.  
Bren L.M.G's.  
Grenades HE  
Grenades Emerga (Anti-tank).

8. General The logistic position of the Unit was unique for the following reasons:-

- a. It occupied locations NOT previously occupied by UN troops (this includes KAMINA BASE)
  - b. As there was NO UN supply system at the time the Battalion procured and paid for all food used by the unit.
  - c. The Battalion was responsible for procuring all accommodation (sleeping storage and dining) used by Unit personnel.
  - d. It was permitted to purchase expensive equipment (trucks, uniforms etc.)
9. I would like to place on record my appreciation of the work done by the officers, NCOs., and Men of the Battalion & Platoon during our Service in the CONGO.

CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX K  
33 INFANTRY BATTALION  
UNIT HISTORY.

## SIGNAL SECTION HISTORY

1. Before leaving Ireland the equipment and personnel of the Signal Platoon of 33 Bn were distributed among the three company groups and Battalion Headquarters. The signallers and their equipment, with the exception of the Battalion Signal Officer, travelled in CHALK 5 under Capt. M. O'Donnell the assistant Operations Officer. It was intended to have this plane arrive with the advance contingent to establish communications as quickly as possible. This aircraft was delayed en route but it did eventually reach KAMINA late on the night of 25 August. By now the entire Battalion had moved by rail to ALBERTVILLE except A Coy who would garrison KAMINA, and CAPT GIBBONS who waited to meet this plane and arrange transport to ALBERTVILLE. At 0230Z 6 August CAPT GIBBONS with Battalion Headquarters signallers and signalling equipment left KAMINA in a DC3 for ALBERTVILLE which they reached at approx. 0530. KAMINA at this time had an excellent radio link with ELIZABETHVILLE, provided and operated by Belgian Army personnel, and to which UN personnel had free access. Indeed it was this link, that provided 33 Battalion with communications to ELIZABETHVILLE during its stay at KAMINA. Before leaving KAMINA CAPT. GIBBONS arranged with the Signallers of A Coy to listen for a tuning and netting call at 1200 hrs. exactly that day.
2. The arrival in ALBERTVILLE was noticeable for the fact that the guard at the airport there was provided by the MALI battalion and by the Belgian Army. There was a very long delay at the airport awaiting transport; eventually the signallers and equipment were lifted to REGINA PACIS Convent, the ground was examined and acrials erected. The site was not a good one for radio communications as the reverse slope of a steep ridge was occupied and was just at its worst in the direction in which we wished to communicate. The alternative sites were worse so this it had to be. At 1200 hrs. Sgt. O'Sullivan sent his call for A Company at KAMINA, 375 miles away, a much greater distance than any previously attempted at home with C 12. The tuning call was longer than the regulation 30 seconds. After an interval at 1203 A Company made its first transmission saying we were strength  $3/4$ , he had two formal messages; were we ready? His signal was also strength  $3/4$ , not perfect; but good and workable. The first message of 33 Battalion was passed. We now had a link with our only outstation and through them with higher headquarters in ELIZABETHVILLE.
3. This scene was repeated each time a new post was occupied and all stations joined the net on schedule. The reliability of the Unit command net could not be better and communications were possible at all times during the hours of duty of operators. This situation existed right throughout the full tour of 33 Battalion.
4. Later, a rear link was established with ELIZABETHVILLE, manned at first by Irish operators, and then by a UN civilian operator who arrived complete with a BC 610 transmitter the power output of which was more suited to the range than that of the C12. He was later relieved by a detachment of Indian signallers who manned this link until the time of the units departure from the Republic of the CONGO.
5. Equipment Suitability The signal equipment of the unit could be divided as follows:-

WS C12

WS 31

WS 88

CONFIDENTIAL

Battery charging equipment

Switchboard, Telephones and Field Cable.

Test Equipment.

- a. Ten WSC 12 were allotted to 33 Infantry Battalion but this number was inadequate as the unit at one time occupied eight posts. To allow one spare set at each post as well as a pool for patrolling a total of twenty sets of this type would be required. However ten should be adequate for any battalion with a more conventional mission. The sets gave excellent service and worked for the full period almost without giving trouble.

In addition one station with a transmitter of approximately 100 Watts CW power should be allotted to each battalion as a rear link. Lack of such a set was a grave handicap at the early stages until a BC 610 was provided from UN sources in October.

- b. 15 WS 31 sets were allotted. The number was adequate but the performance of the sets was not satisfactory. They gave considerable valve trouble and were insufficiently robust for Infantry signallers and required a good deal of servicing.
- c. 24 WS 88 sets were allotted. The number was adequate and their performance was satisfactory.
- d. Battery Charging Equipment. The allotment of this equipment was adequate. The performance was far from satisfactory and four (of a total of eight) Chord Horse charging plants were placed before a Board of Survey. However, the age and condition of these plants on arrival in the CONGO was such that they could NOT be expected to give satisfactory service for a prolonged period. They were replaced by small mains chargers purchased locally.
- e. Telephones. The allotment of telephones, field cable and switchboard ~~was~~ adequate and the performance of all items was satisfactory. However the ten-line switchboard was insufficient; a twenty-line board would have been much more satisfactory.
- f. Test Equipment. The test instruments allotted were adequate to perform all the servicing and maintenance necessary.

- 6. Incidence of Duty This unit left Ireland with (9) nine trained Wireless operators, 8 NCOs and 1 Signaller. Two other Signallers were partly trained and might be fit for duty after further training. The remaining WT personnel were completely untrained and could not perform any communications function without further training. Of these nine operators two remained at KAMINA with A Company leaving seven (7) to man the following stations:

BENDERA	C Company
KABIMBA	C Company
MANONO	B Company
PIANA MWANGA	B Company
ALBERTVILLE	Battalion Headquarters
ALBERTVILLE	Rear Link to Higher Command

Battalion Headquarters station worked for 24 hours daily and the rear link for 18 hours daily making a total of 42 hours daily duty

CONFIDENTIAL<sup>3</sup>.

including a night duty to be divided among three operators. This situation obtained for about six weeks when the rear link was manned first by a UN civilian operator and later by an Indian detachment. This eased duties considerably but by this time the same personnel were required to man two extra stations, BADOUINVILLE and NIEMBA. The two partly trained operators were now able to take up duty at KABIMBA and NIEMBA and gave satisfactory service from then onwards.

Substations were manned in all cases by one operator only, whose daily hours of work were from 0730 hours to 2230 hours with breaks from 1200 hours to 1500 hours and from 1800 hours to 2200 hours. These hours were worked in each case by the same man for seven days weekly from the day of opening a post to the day it closed. In an emergency this operator had to remain on duty until that emergency ended as there was no question of relieving him. In one case one operator was on duty for over thirty six continuous hours.

7. Effect of Climatic Conditions The effects on personnel were as for the remainder of the battalion while the effects on equipment were slight. Some slight growths of fungus were observed on some equipment components such as switches but were easily removed with Servisol or Carbon-tetrochloride.
8. Standard of Operators The standard of training of the operators was well below that of operators of other contingents encountered. This was most apparent in morse telegraphy, both in speed and quality. The signal personnel of other contingents were infantry signallers while those of the Battalion were Signal Corps personnel, which should make the difference in training a cause for even greater concern. A detachment of Indian Army Signal Corps personnel operated the rear link for some months and their average standard was considerably higher than a similar detachment of Irish Signallers. The Irish operators also compared very unfavourably in knowledge of procedures, security, net discipline, message handling and worst of all, handwriting. On the other side of the scale the Irish signallers had much more initiative and sense of responsibility than those of other contingents, who, in some cases were slightly over-disciplined and wooden. Generally the Irish signallers were prepared to try anything and would not be content to sit and wait for someone else to fix their equipment if something went wrong. With sufficient training and practice they would probably develop into first class operators.
9. Statistical Data It is very difficult to give comprehensive figures for the traffic handled but on a normal day, somewhere between thirty and forty formal messages would pass through both links. In addition one or two unregistered conversations were normal. On eventful days the figures were much higher reaching a peak on 9 Nov with 123 formal messages and about 30 voice conversations.
10. Contacts with Ham Radio During the term of duty no amateur radio operation was permitted by the KATANGA Government so no contacts were made.

CONFIDENTIAL

TO

**CONFIDENTIAL**33 INFANTRY BATTALION  
UNIT HISTORY.ORDNANCE SECTION HISTORY

1. Although the primary role of this group was to provide the normal Ordnance services to the Battalion, they found as did the other personnel of Headquarters Company, that they had to spend a lot of time on patrolling and train guards and other military duties, as well, of course, as carrying out their own work. The tasks which the unit had to carry out, were such that this Company, as well as carrying out the functions of a Headquarters had to patrol an area almost as big as Ireland. Thus armourers, clerks, storemen and even transport drivers had to put away their tools, pens and ledgers and fill the role of infantrymen, when required, which was more than often.
2. The one hundred and forty tons of stores carried by the unit gave the Ordnance section their first headache. The battalion had left IRELAND in a fleet of US Air Force Globemasters and these landed in the Belgian Base at KAMINA at all hours of the day and night. KAMINAVILLE is some twenty-five miles from KAMINA BASE and as the planes landed the stores were unloaded put into trucks and driven to KAMINAVILLE where they were dumped in one huge mound all mixed up, with the lower layers buried under tons of other stores. To add to the confusion no colour-code to indentify different Corps lots had been laid down. Some crates had not been indexed and some had not got packing notes on the outside listing the contents. Some crates were almost unmanageable-containing up to 600 lbs of stores and where any attempt had been made to colour code crates, all except S & T, who used bright yellow seemed to have plumped for the same colour... the ubiquitous Battleship Grey. Thus when anyone wanted supplies of a certain item, there was nothing to make them easy to locate. The Ordnance Section was given the task of segregating them and with the assistance and co-operation of the other corps, the different lots were segregated and where necessary distributed to the various Companies.
3. Finally everything was as it should be and the various Companies had been checked to ensure that they had all the stores they should have. Then came orders for the battalion to move by train to ALBERTVILLE. The train was to leave at 0700 hrs on 24th AUGUST and it would not be available for loading until 14.00 hrs on the previous day. This Section was given the task of getting the 140 tons aboard in the 17 hours available with little transport except jeeps and no cranes or other such machinery available.
4. The task commenced at 14.30 hours on 23rd AUGUST and with the co-operation of loading parties from the rifle Companies all stores except those needed up to the last minute were put aboard. This was completed by 02.30 hours on the following morning. It was complicated by the fact that only a limited number of wagons were available. As the train might be held up on the way and also as reports had come in of fighting in ALBERTVILLE the Unit might find itself in action on arrival, the loading had to be done so that ammunition and other vital supplies had to be easily available. Also Company lots had to be kept segregated.
5. At 0300 hours when all concerned were about to go to bed a rumble of Belgian Army Trucks from KAMINA BASE announced the arrival of UN helmets, caps, bush shirts and associated badges.

**CONFIDENTIAL**



For some strange reason there were no slacks. The arrival of these supplies put paid to any hope of sleep for the night as they had to be sized and segregated into Company-sized lots for issue before the train left at 0700 hrs.

6. Thirty hours later the train arrived in ALBERTVILLE. As was stated earlier there had been trouble in the town on the previous day and two platoons of C Company had been flown in to hold the Railway Station for the Battalion if necessary. It proved not to be so as the Gendarmerie Katangese had the situation in hand when the unit arrived.
7. The first task on arrival was the off-loading of the stores and the segregation of these when loading at KAMINAVILLE paid dividends. As each truck was loaded a representative of the Section to which it belonged travelled so that the mixing up process was not repeated. The transport situation was easier also as Comdt. KEOGH had procured eight trucks, and apart from the physical task of unloading the only other problem was to ensure that each sub-unit got its correct allotment. The Ordnance Section settled in at battalion headquarters in the CONVENT de REGINA PACIS and this was to be our headquarters for the remainder of the period. In addition to the equipment brought from Ireland, an electric drill, an electric welder, painting equipment and stencils were added to set up a workshop.
8. ZEROING. The first task on settling in was a programme of zeroing all the weapons. This was quite a problem as the only range available boasted two firing points and a target system whereby two counter balanced targets revolved around a central axis. Two foot high grass obscured the view from the firing point and this had to be beaten down to reveal numbers of holes in the ground which the Congolese pointed to and declared ominously "snakie". However all weapons were eventually zeroed although some needed considerable correction.
9. Ammunition Testing. Periodically all ammunition was tested to see if it was standing up to the heat and rough handling. One such test ended very humourously. Tear Gas Ammunition was being tested to check on its serviceability and in preparation for a demonstration of its use and effectiveness to the personnel of Battalion Headquarters and C Company. The test was being carried out behind battalion headquarters with the wind blowing nicely away from the building. Suddenly a mischievous gust of wind blew the wrong way and wafted a cloud of tear gas into the building from where erupted tearful and angry staff officers and NCOs.
10. Hydra Cookers. For Sergeant Bray in particular and the Company armourers in general the CONGO will always mean Hydra Cookers. With the unit spread over nine locations and patrols constantly coming and going these were a recurring headache. They were, in most places, the only means of cooking and were extremely allergic to travelling. In addition they were going for a least fifteen hours every day, which was not the type of use for which they were designed. The continual moving and heat would regularly loosen all the joints in the burner units and flames would shoot in every direction except the one required, and the armourer would have to start off on the dreary routine of cleaning, decarbonising and tightening up. Inevitably after a while threads would strip from the constant tightening and with spares in short supply the armourer would have to improvise quickly or face the anger of a dinnerless Company. With the provision of hot meals hanging in the balance this work was most important for in most cases they were the only means of cooking.

11. Inevitably there was many a heated argument between cooks who claimed that the armourers did not know how to repair the cookers, and the armourers who claimed bitterly that the cooks were ill treating them. On one famous occasion Sgt. Mc Cormack was bringing a repaired cooker to C Company and as he approached the cookhouse he spied a cook tightening the filling cap with a shovel. He shouted at the cook to stop and the latter looked around and forgetting that he was wielding a lethal weapon took a lump out of his shin, much to Sgt. Mc Cormack's delight.
12. Wooden Armour. The role of 33 Infantry Battalion was to a large extent a patrolling one. With the bush stretching right down to the roadside it soon became obvious that the Baluba warrior armed with a bow and arrow was a possible hazard to the Irish UN soldier who had orders not to shoot first. As a result it was decided that some form of protection should be attached to the sides of the Jeeps and Land Rovers and the Ordnance Section was instructed to provide it.
13. Steel was out due to the weight and the fact that it would make the already hot jeep almost unbearable. Timber appeared to be the answer so boards of various thicknesses and a supply of bows and arrows were obtained and an amazed native population looked on as a number of "ONIE Irlandais" proceeded to shoot arrows into planks of wood. Finally a suitable type of board was found and wooden sides fitted to all Land Rovers, Jeeps and Pick-Ups and those using them for patrolling purposes felt much more protected.
14. Undertakers. One of the least pleasant tasks that were allotted to the Ordnance Section was the confining of the thirteen men of the Battalion who died in the CONGO. International Health Regulations decreed that these bodies had to be sealed into lead lined coffins and as the Ordnance personnel were the only group of skilled soldiers available they were an automatic choice for the job. The main task in this line was of course the confining of the victims of the NIEMBA ambush. The first task was the transporting of the bodies from NIEMBA to ALBERTVILLE. Canvas holders were made from tents and Sgt. DUNNE volunteered to undertake the task of sewing the bodies into these at NIEMBA. They were then flown by helicopter to ALBERTVILLE. The Ordnance group consisted of Capt. Sloane, Sgts. McCormack, Bray and Dunne, Cpl. Jameson and Ptes. Phoenix and Maguire.
15. A hangar at ALBERTVILLE Airport was converted into a mortuary and the bodies placed there. Due to the fact that the coffins and their contents would weigh three quarters of a ton each it was necessary to have them at the Airport to facilitate the final flying out on their way home to IRELAND.
16. Supplies of lead were short and as the special coffins had to be manufactured locally the rate of supply rarely exceeded one per day. Accordingly zinc lined coffins of the type used for local funerals were obtained and the remains were soldered into these as a temporary expedient. The final coffins were built large enough to take these smaller coffins and the whole lot was sealed up by soldering the leaden lid on to the lead lining.
17. The whole NIEMBA incident had come as quite a shock to the local Belgian population and many wreaths and floral tributes were placed on the coffins by them as they awaited. The employees of the CFL Railway Co., who were making the coffins were most co-operative but one of the most touching tributes was paid by a platoon of KATANGA Gendarmerie, President TSHOMBE'S personal escort who moved into ALBERTVILLE on the occasion of the President's visit to the town.

They were waiting for their chief to arrive at the Airport one day and while they were waiting moved over to the Hangar Mortuary. Just as they arrived a lorry containing another coffin arrived also. They refused to allow the Irish to unload it but insisted on doing it themselves and placed it in position on the blocks waiting for it. They then stood for a moment, said a prayer and saluting moved off. Not a word was spoken by either side. This was a simple but touching tribute from one group of soldiers to another.

18. Mounting a Browning After NIEMBA the BALUBA war parties ran amok in NORTH KATANGA and it looked as if ALBERTVILLE itself might be attacked. The Gendarmeried Mobile Platoon was in action daily and air recce by helicopter showed that the BALUBA tide was moving steadily towards the town. As the original UN plan did not envisage this situation the Battalion was without machine guns and mortars. Four Browning MMG's had been taken over by A Company in KAMINA and personnel of this Company had been trained on them. Mountings on the roofs of trucks were now prepared for these weapons.
19. Sandbags. As the situation deteriorated the cry went up for sandbags as well as MMG's. Many of those originally brought out had rotted and the few left did not go too far. Once more improvisation was the order of the day and with the aid of a sewing machine from one of the local tailors and bales of latrine canvas brought from IRELAND an adequate supply of sandbags was made available.
20. Routine Overhauls. Concurrent with patrols, train guards, the routine Ordnance work went on. In the six months every weapon was overhauled and checked at least once and all rifles were stripped and greased. All equipment for handing over to the 34 Infantry Battalion was checked and serviced and all boxes and crates were clearly marked. The best of the hydra cookers were overhauled and the few remaining spare parts put into them. They were repainted and stencilled and put to one side to act as an initial supply to keep the new Battalion going during its early days. The normal routine of Ordnance in IRELAND was in fact carried on.
21. Ammunition. The unit ammunition NCO, C.S. MAHER works in the Ammunition Depot in IRELAND. This is the most orderly place imaginable, perfect stores, ledgers, tally cards and so on. Ammunition is stacked neatly in huge stacks and once issued never comes back again. Everything is most orderly. He found life in the CONGO somewhat different. A very large quantity of ammunition was carried and it spent its life moving from one place to another. Proper storage was non-existent and vouchers were unheard of. A truck would back up to the store that contained everything from Boot Leather to Energa bombs and an officer would shout "Ten boxes of 303 CS" out would come ten boxes in a flash. No requisitions, no vouchers, no nothing. An accounting officer's nightmare. Still, in spite of this CS MAHER always knew exactly what ammunition was in his store and what was in any of half a dozen locations spread over a thousand miles of NORTH KATANGA. The final account was correct and this was quite a feat for an ammunition sergeant considering all the movement and seeming confusion.
22. AIRLIFT TO KAMINA. The Ordnance Section supervised the movement of Battalion stores. A reception centre for stores and troops at ALBERTVILLE airport and a field kitchen were set up. The co-operation of the airmen, who were civilians working on charter to UN was first class. They were being employed on a trip basis and their main concern in life seemed to be getting the planes loaded and away in the minimum of time. In between flights, trucks were loaded with the next plane's load and each time they landed the trucks would be backed up to the planes even before the plane doors could be opened.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

5.

Before long it became a matter of "oneupmanship" between the aircrews and the loading parties to see whether the loading parties could be at the plane before the crews got out.

23. The hazards faced by these airmen is best illustrated by the following story. On the day the first plane arrived, the pilot pestered the OIC Loading Party, asking if he was sure that it was lbs he was loading and not kilcs. He checked half a dozen times. Apparently the previous job he had done was to airlift stores for a Battalion of another contingent and as the planes raced down the runway, it failed to take off at the expected point and finally just **lifted** a few yards from the end of the runway. The Battalion concerned had been given a take-off weight in lbs and had mistakenly loaded that number of kilos so that the plane was carrying two and half times the weight it was supposed to have. However, there were no hitches to this airlift and everything went ahead on schedule, so that at the end of the allotted time, all men and all stores and equipment, except the vehicles, which would not fit into the aircraft, had been moved to KAMINA, with one flight to spare. Then as the last plane arrived, came the unkindest cut of all. This was a passenger plane, which was to carry out the Ordnance Loaders and the Battalion Headquarters Company personnel, who had borne most of the work of running the airlift and cleaning up after the remainder had moved. When all was finished all changed into their best uniforms and waited for the plane to bring them on the first leg of their journey home. When the plane stopped and the doors were opened, it was found to contain ten tons of flour, for the Nigerians who had relieved 33 Infantry Battalion. There were no Nigerians to unload it and tired or not and in best uniforms and all the **rearguard** had to set about unloading the ten tons of flour. However, they did not care, they were on their way home.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX M  
TO  
33 INFANTRY BATTALION  
UNIT HISTORY.

TRANSPORT SECTION HISTORY.

1. Organisation. The total allotment of vehicles to the Battalion leaving IRELAND was 10 Land Rovers and 5 Jeeps. This was inadequate to meet the tasks the Battalion was called upon to perform, and throughout its sojourn in the CONGO the Unit was continually hampered by the lack of reliable transport. The shortage was acute in the matter of heavy transport, because for a considerable portion of the time, locally-hired trucks had to be employed, which proved unreliable and unsuitable for the needs of the Battalion.
2. Suitability. The Land Rovers and Jeeps gave excellent service and proved very suitable for the tasks allotted to them.
3. Maintenance. The fitters were issued with very good kits before leaving IRELAND and these were brought back to IRELAND as the fitters of 34 Battalion had their own kits. A set of metric size spanners should be included in these kits for dealing with hired or impressed vehicles of continental manufacture

It was found more satisfactory and economical to have each vehicle serviced weekly by local garages under the supervision of its driver.

Engine oil was changed every fortnight as a matter of course, and gearbox and rear axle oil once per month.

4. Repairs. In Battalion and Company headquarters facilities were not available for establishing proper workshops, and while all the fitters did excellent work within the compass of their capabilities, the heavier repairs were carried out by local contractors, which in the main proved satisfactory.

The repairs necessary to the vehicles showed up NO unusual fault nor was there any preponderance of failure of any particular component. Such repairs as had to be carried out could only be regarded as normal in vehicles operating in arduous conditions.

5. POL consumption. I found that the most satisfactory method of obtaining petrol was on a "chit book" system operated by the local garage. The number of the vehicle, the amount of petrol purchased, and the driver's signature was recorded on the chit and these were forwarded to me with the bill, for checking and certification, twice per month.

1,000 gallons of spare petrol in 40 gallon drums was held at Unit headquarters and 500 gallons at Coy headquarters for use on patrols and as a reserve stock. Semi-rotary pumps for emptying these drums are essential and should be sent out from Ireland, as suitable types are not readily available in the CONGO.

6. Accidents. Only one serious vehicle accident occurred when a jeep struck a wall in MANONO, under very adverse road and weather conditions. This vehicle was so badly damaged that I considered its repair an uneconomic proposition, taking into account its worn out

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

condition prior to the accident. Fortunately neither the driver nor passengers were seriously injured.

This accident was investigated by the company commander in question who exonerated the driver from blame.

7. General. The road conditions in NORTHERN KATANGA where 33 Infantry Battalion was stationed were extremely poor, and the wear and tear on vehicles as a result was considerable. A speed limit of 35 mph was set for all vehicles at all times.

Due to the frequent changing of drivers on vehicles, loss of tools was high at first. For local running the tool kit except for jack, handle, and wheel brace was withdrawn.

For patrols or for running outside the precincts of camps and towns a full tool kit was issued together with a small spares kit (fan belt, spare coil, points and plugs).

Before starting on any journey, whether short or long, drivers were instructed to carry out a brief check drill of six points. Petrol, oil, water, spare wheel, tool kit, spares.

I should like to pay a tribute to the NCO's and men of the Transport Section. They gave excellent service, working long hours under the most arduous conditions without complaint. The low accident rate is evidence of the skill and care they devoted to driving, and patrol commanders without exception, praised their efficiency, loyalty and courage even in the most trying circumstances.

The fitters also carried out excellent repair work under very difficult conditions. Their work cannot be praised too highly.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX N

TO

33 INFANTRY BATTALION

UNIT HISTORY

MEDICAL SECTION HISTORY

1. Medical

- a. Standard of Fitness. Where men did not stand up to the temperature they were found to come from those under 21 years and those over 45 years who had no previous tropical experience.
- b. Dermatoses - The minor Dermatoses of temperate climates flared up, i.e. one ringworm case spread at a most astounding rate. Furunculosis was difficult to heal satisfactorily - a history of repeated furunculosis at home should be a definite bar to tropical service - but this does not apply to acne vulgaris. Sunburn was stubborn in its slow response to treatment. Only one case of foot infection needed hospitalization.
- c. Gastritis, non-specific diarrhoea, worm infestation were commoner in the last six weeks than during the rest of the period. A milk diet - no meat - with alkali oral therapy worked well with the Gastritis cases. One Haematemesis occurred on the last day of the Long Patrol. Conservative treatment in hospital with a milk diet worked well with this case. Roundworm and thread worm were a nuisance. Pepelerix or its equivalent was not available. Deworming before departure overseas would have eliminated a lot of the trouble. Haemorrhoids - with or without bleeding - was more frequent than normal due to constipation - from dehydration, I think. No case requiring operative treatment arose. The diarrhoeas were treated with Sulphsuxidine and Entero vioform and responded well.
- d. Naso-pharangeal and chest infections - chronic antral and sinus complaints cleared up in the tropical climate. No serious case of pneumonia, bronchitis or catarrh occurred. Sore throat was common but small doses of sulphas relieved the infection speedily.
- e. The Rheumatoid group presented no problem nor did any case occur.
- f. Malaria - The predominant variety in KATANGA was Malignant form - up to 1 JULY, 1960 the Belgians had an excellent record of dealing with malarial breeding grounds, but this collapsed when the administrative machinery collapsed. By January 1961 Italian and Belgian experts estimated that it would take five years to restore the excellent standard of malarial and sleeping sickness extirpation that existed prior to liberation. PROFESSOR LIPPARONI, Italian Red Cross Mission, carried out a blood

CONFIDENTIAL

investigation on over 600 men. His findings were 7% malaria positive - mostly malignant but a few P Vivax. This latter was probably picked up in KANO NIGERIA. It is much more resistant to anti-malarial drugs than the other two forms. Both LIPPARONI and VAN BERENDONCK (the Belgian Malariologist) were most emphatic that Irish troops must be regarded as totally non-immune and the dose of suppressive must be the bigger doses, i.e. over 600 mgm weekly. The late C/S GRANT had an attack of cerebral malaria 48/72 hours after his operation which resulted in complete collapse of his Thermo Respiratory centre in a dramatic fashion. One severe case of Hepatitis followed an acute attack. Nets were largely disregarded in the later months as men on patrols, night guards and train guards did not use nets and were inclined to discount their value.

2. The climatic conditions varied with height above sea level, and proximity to large bodies of water. BENDERA "the Place of Many Fevers" at the foot of the KIVU/KATANGA escarpment and KABALO on a sandy plain beside a river were dreadful places for Europeans, whilst climatically BAUDOUINVILLE KABIMBA and ALBERTVILLE all overlooking the Lake were relatively comfortable.
3. None of our soldiers contracted any tropical disease.
4. Dental The Dental Officer worked in the Congolese Hospital the Royal Albert Hospital. His services were greatly appreciated not least by the Missionary Fathers and Sisters.
5. Hospitalization - The ROI ALBERT HOSPITAL, ALBERTVILLE run by the White Sisters is magnificently equipped and staffed. No words of mine can describe the devotion and the high standard of efficiency rendered by the Sisters and Dr. VAN BERENDONCK to our patients. The Hospital at BAUDOUINVILLE had no resident doctor so that it was necessary to bring patients by boat (one weekly) or road 212 miles. This applies to all our outposts except KAMINA BASE.

On Arrival at ALBERTVILLE after the train journey 14 men were very ill with post vaccinia pyrexia - Temperature 107 recorded in two cases - heat prostration and exhaustion. It was necessary to open a rest centre. Later this catered for casualties from MANONO and convalescents (various) discharged from Hospital or men on prolonged light duty. This, of course, was an inconvenience to the unit and was a function of a higher headquarters but distance, bad communications and administrative snags made it more practical. It worked out better than was expected

6. Adequacy of drugs. The supplies which we took out were excellent in quality and quantity as far as was practicable. Experience soon showed up our deficiencies however but at no time did we suffer seriously.

The heavy drain on our supplies was due to the demands of MANONO. UNO Medical Headquarters in early September sent us a list of drugs and dressings to be requisitioned. It was late November when anything arrived. The quantity was miserly in the extreme. The quality of many drugs was doubtful - unfamiliar names and unfamiliar manufacturers - countries of origin unknown. The supply continued to be erratic. We were sent not so much what we requisitioned but what the people in LEOPOLDVILLE thought we ought to want whether we did or not. It was truly a case where the promise exceeded the performance.



CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

7. Assistance received and given - The Staff of the ROI ALBERT were a staunch support to us. The Italian Red Cross team that arrived in November were of considerable use. The Norwegian helicopter pilots carried out many life saving missions. In Particular, PTE. SHIELDS owes his life to the helicopter service and Italian surgery. On the Long Patrol twelve wounded BALUBAS were dressed and arrangements made to evacuate them to MANONO. Sick CONGOLESE were attended by orderlies at NIEMBA, BENDERA and KABIMBA. Our services were not required in Albertville but we occasionally helped the Sister in Baudounville. Ethiopians depended on us for drugs, and Medical Boards. The Swedes were always helpful and friendly. Before our departure the M.O. of the Nigerian Brigade requested that we give him a supply of drugs as UNO had failed to do so.
8. Public relations We had no trouble with representatives of the medical profession of any nation we met but the civilian chemists were rather surly and would have been offensive if they dared. The CFL's co-operation in furnishing coffins for our dead was efficient and reliable.
9. Unit establishments Our main post was ALBERTVILLE. There we ran a rest centre and worked in closest co-operation with C Company. We supplied BENDERA, FILISAF, KABIMBA, BAUDOUNVILLE with medical orderlies or Medical NCOs to relieve the strain on C Company's Medical Staff. We worked a common roster of Medical Officers and other ranks for patrols and train guards.

CONFIDENTIAL

**CONFIDENTIAL**

MEDICAL STATISTICS

Date	Total Sick Parade	E.D.	L.D.	M&D	Local or Barrack Hospital Admissions.
27.8.60.	52	40	2	1	9
3.9.60.	35	27	6	2	
10.9.60.	21	11	4	5	1
17.9.60.	7	5	1		1
24.9.60.	5	4		1	
1.10.60.	4	3	1		
8.10.60.	7	5		2	
15.10.60.	5	2		3	
22.10.60.	7	2	2	2	1
29.10.60.	21	10	1	3	7
5.11.60.	9	4	1	1	3
12.11.60.	12	10		1	1
19.11.60.	3	2		0	1
26.11.60.	11	5	1	4	1
3.12.60.	1		1		
10.12.60.	1	1			
17.12.60.	3		1		2
24.12.60.	4	1		3	
31.12.60.	11	9	2		
6. 1.61.	10	7	2	1	
13. 1.61.	3	2		1	

**CONFIDENTIAL**

# CONFIDENTIAL

ADMISSIONS TO HOSPITAL, HEAD QUARTERS COMPANY,  
33 INFANTRY BATTALION, FROM 13.9.60. to 14.12.60.

Malaria	-	5
Enterocolitis	-	3
Heat Exhaustion	-	1
Foot Condition	-	2
Furunculosis	-	1
Hepatitis	-	1
Abdominal Pain	-	1
Haematemesis	-	1
Injuries	-	2
Appendicitis	-	2
G.S.W.	-	1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNX O  
to  
33 Infantry  
Battalion  
Unit History.

MEDICAL HISTORY - "B" COMPANY

MEDICAL

1. Standard of fitness. The men of this Company under 21 years of age and over 35 years did not physically stand up to the extreme heat of MANONO (average temp 110-120°) as well as those (the vast majority of the Company) over 21 years and under 35 years.
2. Chronic minor skin ailments. These flared up in MANONO. Small healed ear drum perforations or old history of Otitis media without perforation became acute in this very warm climate.
3. Psychological medicine. Our Company had two hidden schizoid types who were triggered off into typical schizophrenia by the extrinsic mental stress of the long air journey to AFRICA. At least three others under the trying conditions of MANONO were on the verge of acute hysterical attacks and were definitely saved from this illness, which is the most psychogenic and therefore most difficult to cure of all illnesses, by early evacuation to the Rest Centre at Battalion Headquarters in ALBERTVILLE.
4. Gastritis. This was a common complaint in MANONO, probably much more common in the man with a previous history. This again was probably a climatic factor, loss of fluid through constant sweating and inability fully to replace this loss, as our water supply was limited. The chronic gastritis patient under these conditions had a concentrated stomach acid content for much longer periods than he would have had under more temperate conditions. Our frequent shortage of food was another factor, which meant the gastric type missed this natural stomach barrier to excess acid.
5. Chest complaints. During our 15 weeks in MANONO I did not see one case of influenza or common cold. This I attributed to the dry heat. On our return to ALBERTVILLE on the 29.11.60 we had the normal head and chest colds. In a discussion with a Belgian doctor I ascertained that lung Tuberculosis is common in young white adult males during their first 12 months in the Congo.
6. Foot complaints. Tinea Pedis (Athletes' Foot). In a normal Company here in IRELAND there is usually the 2% Athletes' Foot infection. Prior to our Company leaving for CONGO we had a foot inspection and treatment with Mycil or other modern fungicide was given to the infected members. The remainder of the Company were issued and instructed in the use of Mycil. This prophylactic effort and the use in CONGO of cotton socks and their daily change gave us a 100% freedom from this most common tropical foot infection. A Moroccan Company stationed with us in MANONO had a very large number sick each day with this complaint.
7. Rheumatism and allied complaints. No fresh case was noted of acute rheumatism or rheumatic joint conditions in our Company during CONGO service. This is probably understandable as we were stationed in a hot dry area, except for the rainy season.
8. Malaria. MANONO was definitely a malaria area and our figure of seven (7) clinical malaria cases could be looked on as an average. The men took their prophylactic tabs and used their nets but had very frequent night guards during which they could not use their nets.
9. Climatic conditioning. Intense dry heat (desert-like terrain and low bush around town) during our 15 weeks in MANONO (which is recognised by experts as the warmest area on the Continent of AFRICA). Cause of this dry heat was nearness to Equator, vast distance from sea and situation on a 2,500 foot plateau. Late October brought the rainy season - frequent, almost daily, heavy thunderstorms of 1-3 hours' duration.

CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL 2.

10. Typhus. We had 3 (three) cases in Unit. As the incubation period is 8-14 days, and these patients were infected after four days in MANONO, the infection must have occurred during their overnight stay in KANO. No other cases occurred during our stay in AFRICA as a rigid "de-fleaing" ritual was continued during our stay.
11. Sickness. The daily sick was high during the 15 weeks in MANONO and this I attribute to
  - (a) climatic conditions;
  - (b) poor water supply;
  - (c) poor fresh food supply;
  - (d) long hours of duty especially from the 14.9.60 until our return to ALBERTVILLE ;
  - (e) post small pox vaccination sickness for first three weeks.

The above factors must have been the cause, as on return to more normal conditions in ALBERTVILLE after 15 weeks in MANONO our daily sick was well below average even for a temperate climate.

During our stay in MANONO we had two outbreaks of diarrhoea and acute gastritis (duration of illness 24 hrs - 36 hrs) probably due to mild ptomaine poisoning from fresh meat brought by plane from either ALBERTVILLE or ELIZABETHVILLE and not frozen during flying time. We had two cases of dysentery; both made an uneventful recovery after 10-20 days hospitalisation in ALBERTVILLE and ELIZABETHVILLE. Had three (3) cases of acute appendicitis. It was also a malaria area and we had seven (7) cases of mild malaria.

12. Hospitalisation. The hospital in MANONO was unfit for use after the fighting of 14.9.60. Therefore all hospital patients were flown to ALBERTVILLE or ELIZABETHVILLE. The figures were high as I sent men to Battalion Headquarters in ALBERTVILLE even with a minor illness such as heat and stress fatigue as they could not be rested in this strife-stricken town.
13. Adequacy of drugs. There was a definite shortage of anti-malaria drugs during most of my period in MANONO. Due to the severe climatic conditions salt tabs properly coated, and vitamin tabs, were always required and our stocks when depleted were not replaced. We also had a big drain on our Company stores by the constant demand of the sick portion of a Congolese population of 27,000 without any medical supplies at all. The tin mines in the town had their own Belgian doctor and medical supplies, which were kept almost exclusively for mine workers and their families. I would like to state that this Belgian doctor gave me every assistance with Congolese casualties brought to MANONO who were wounded by the Katangese Government Forces.
14. Vichy water or its equivalent and carbicol (charcoal and glucose compound) are absolutely essential for non-specific gastroenteritis but were not in our supplies. An excellent drug was later supplied by UNO, entero vioform. A more acute shortage did arise ultimately as a result of the native population constantly calling for medical aid. Plaster of paris and anti-tetanic serum, also I.M. Pencillin, were in frequent demand by the native population of 27,000 people.
15. Facilities. One Congolese Hospital (black patients) not for use of our troops. No white hospital in the area, nearest 250 miles, after 14.9.60.
16. Assistance given to other contingents. One Company of Moroccans in town got medical treatment and supplies as required, having no medical unit with them except one Med Sergeant, with very limited supplies.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

3.

Also one Company of Nigerians for two weeks who had only a minimum medical stock and a few Med Lance Corporals.

17. Assistance given to Congolese. Average morning and evening surgery was one hundred (100), men, women and children. Daily visits were made to the sick at home of the seven native villages of MANONO. Daily treatment in the Congolese Hospital was given to 130 Congolese badly wounded defending their villages against the Katangese Government Forces raiding 130 miles South of MANONO by land and air. These wounded were collected by our patrols in the out-lying villages and received immediate first aid treatment and then brought back to MANONO for surgical treatment.

Refugees in our Camp (roughly 230) consisting of Belgian, Congolese, Greek and one Russian family received treatment as required.

Public Relations.

18. These were excellent with Manonase (Belgian and Congolese) during our stay. All were very grateful for medical assistance and very often showed their appreciation with gifts of eggs. The local Baluba leader and the Belgian manager of the Geomines thanked me personally for the work our Medical Unit had done for the civilian population.

Unit Establishments.

19. Main medical post at MANONO until 29.11.60.  
Outpost at PIANA (60 miles away) with one Medical Orderly until 29.11.60.  
Main medical post at ALBERTVILLE from 29.11.60 until 11.1.61.  
Outpost at KABIMBA from 29.11.60 until 11.1.61 with one Medical Orderly

Training.

20. This was reasonably good; we would have preferred a more thorough course in nursing for medical orderlies. This is essential as we had to treat one very acute appendicitis case in the Medical Hut. All his nursing had to be done by Cpl Casey and Pte Hurley and myself for his critical post operational period of one week, and the normal routine medical duties as well. If the whole staff were fully trained in this form of nursing it would have relieved the situation. This man had to be operated on in MANONO as he was too ill to evacuate to the Hospital in ALBERTVILLE, and our only means of evacuation was by air, which at that period was impossible to obtain for 6-12 hours. All orderlies on completion of their CONGO service had learned how to attend, treat and care for a seriously ill acute abdominal case or other serious illness and also had learned how to feed <sup>and</sup> cook for <sup>patients</sup> and inject intra muscular antibiotics and keep a proper hospital diary.

Medical personnel of B Company were able to obtain enough information in Swahili to know the complaint of a Congolese patient.

Movement.

21. Our Company had a large area to patrol and some days we had two all-day patrols going in different directions. For the medical staff, these patrols - from a total medical strength of one Medical Officer, one Medical Corporal and four Privates - were most difficult. We always had two posts and even without patrols had unlimited calls from the civilian population. I have already given location of my men but it would be impossible to give a full list of their activities.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

4.

Actions and incidents.

22. Battle of MANONO 14.9.60. The casualties from both sides were treated by the Medical staff of B Company. In all 37 Balubas were killed. The vast majority of these were dead when found, a few cases got morphia to relieve their death agonies. Eleven (11) Balubas were seriously injured. All gunshot wounds received full immediate first aid treatment and later surgical treatment in the small Congolese Hospital. All recovered.
23. One Katanganese Government policeman was treated for a shattered right arm, received a drip transfusion and was flown to ELIZABETHVILLE after primary shock had been treated and there made an excellent recovery after amputation.
24. There was an almost daily collection and immediate treatment of wounded Congolese from the surrounding villages, 60-80 miles radius, as a result of tribal war. In all 130 Congolese were collected and brought to MANONO Congolese Hospital for major and minor surgery.

Morale & Discipline.

25. This was very high with the medical personnel of B Company. Their bravery and devotion to duty cannot be over-stressed.
26. PIANA MWANGA

Here I must refer to our outpost PIANA, 50 miles from MANONO. This was manned by 20 soldiers, one Officer - Capt GOULDSBOROUGH - and one Medical Orderly. The isolation of this outpost cannot be over-stressed as we had to pass through a large number of check road blocks to reach PIANA from MANONO. Capt GOULDSBOROUGH's wonderful coolness in any medical problem amazed me; he helped, advised and controlled the giving of medicines and the treatment and diagnosis of men sick in this outpost. He, when required, gave a very clear picture of any sick patient to me by radio. I therefore knew exactly the urgency and equipment required before leaving on this long journey. This, needless to say, lessened my work and worry immensely and a routine weekly visit to this difficult outpost kept the medical situation well in control.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNX P  
to  
33 INFANTRY BATTALION  
UNIT HISTORY

WELFARE SECTION HISTORY

The Battalion Welfare Officer was located at Unit Headquarters for the full period of operations and consequently the narrative which follows relates largely to the Welfare conditions at Headquarters although all the early transactions and later the limited Px operations available were at Battalion level. The other companies operated their own Canteens and paid into the Battalion A/C only cash for goods received.

1. Canteens.

- a. 33 Infantry Battalion left Ireland on 17 AUGUST 1960 and on board one aircraft in each Company lift there was a consignment of duty-free cigarettes which was calculated to provide cigarettes for every man at the rate of 20 cigarettes for 40 days. In addition to this a further allotment of cigarettes was consigned with the Battalion Welfare Officer with some gifts of beer and spirits. A small consignment of goods such as blades, soap, polish, laces etc. was included for sale to troops until local supplies could be made available in the CONGO. These allotments of canteen goods were designed to enable the Irish troops to have certain essential goods available on landing in the CONGO and to fill in the gap until these supplies could be replenished from United Nations Px Stores or home bases.
- b. Cigarettes. At Battalion headquarters ALBERTVILLE, Irish cigarettes were available until end of October, ~~which was a period of 10 weeks~~ after arrival. In November the supply position worsened considerably and even local sources which had been tapped for all makes and brands dried up and we were forced to buy poor quality cigarettes at a price considerably higher than usual. In early December the U.N. Brigade Headquarters in ELIZABETHVILLE kindly came to our assistance with large consignments of cigarettes on a few occasions. Px stores were opened and a large and varied quantity and quality of cigarettes were then available to the troops. Cigarettes sent from home sources did not reach the 33 Infantry Battalion until the Unit was about to board aircraft for home and consequently were never distributed and were left for our successors.
- c. Refreshments.
  - (1) In the matter of refreshments the Unit carried with it 422 Dozen Time Ale and 98 dozen Phoenix Ale and these supplies lasted only the first week. But local supplies of beers such as Simba, Primus, Export 58 were readily available from brewery agents and were purchased by each of the Company canteens which were established as soon as permanent or semi-permanent quarters were reached. Minerals were purchased through the same agents and in some cases from the big stores. In December through transport and political difficulties beers and minerals were scarce but by judicious purchases and some foresight these supply difficulties were overcome and until the battalion left the CONGO there was never an occasion on which the "No Stock" sign was up.

CONFIDENTIAL



# CONFIDENTIAL

- (2) One of the greatest problems met there was the provision of glasses - contrary to practices pertaining in other provinces or areas our Unit had to pay for all glasses required. On a few occasions we received small quantities of gift glasses which bore the trade marks of the breweries.
- (3) The Canteens as organised did not stock souvenirs, goods which were at a premium in the area served by our Battalion. Stocks were confined to normal items such as cigarettes, beers, minerals, polish, combs, mirrors, lighters, sweets and chocolate.
- (4) Minerals, blades and cigarettes were provided on a limited scale free to our patients in hospital and to prisoners in detention.

- d. Staffs These canteens were manned by whatever NCOs were available. In the case of the Battalion Headquarters - 3 NCOs were employed one each to Men's Canteen, NCOs' Mess and Officers' Mess Bar. The Battalion Welfare Officer made daily purchases using the Men's Canteen as a central store and supplied the other two messes from there. This had the advantage of fairness in distribution and the benefits of bulk purchasing. In the case of Officers' and NCOs' Messes there were no mess funds concerned and all sales were cash sales, the cash being recorded daily by the Welfare Officer in the cash book and accounted for in the same way as in the Canteen.
- e. Sales and Buildings Villas were taken over in ALBERTVILLE for Officers', NCOs' and Men's Messes and these were furnished to the best of our ability with the available furniture and were generally comfortable. Open air lounge facilities were always available and on most nights the weather and moon provided the ideal setting for a restful evening after a hard day's patrol, train guard or other duty. The hours of business in the Officers' and NCOs' Messes were those generally pertaining to messes in Ireland. In the case of the men's canteen it was open usually for sale of cigarettes at midday for one hour but beers were not generally sold except between the hours of 20.00 - 22.30 hrs..
- f. Minerals were provided in large quantities (in lieu of water) for train guards, patrols and at airports for air craft crews. The cost of this was reimbursed by United Nations imprest. The Battalion Welfare Officer lost 100,000 Cfrs, Army Canteen Board property, when he was held captive on 22 NOVEMBER 1960 in LEOPOLDVILLE by ANC Troops.

## 2. Welfare

- a. Outdoor sports. The following Welfare Equipment was carried:-

4 Dozen Playing Cards.	4 Draught Boards.
4 Dart Boards.	4 Sets Draughts.
4 Dart Sets.	4 Sets Rings.
4 Ring Boards.	4 Footballs.
4 Sets Boxing Gloves.	8 Bats Rounders.
4 Rugby Balls.	2 Sets (XL5) Jerseys and Knicks.
7 Balls Rounders.	30 Pairs Football Boots.

This equipment was divided amongst the companies and was found to be inadequate. Some of the companies had however an allotment from their own Command Welfare Boards. The greatest shortage experienced in sports equipment was in footballs and bladders, which had a high mortality rate. Facilities for Swimming, Basketball, Hurling and Football (G.A.A. and Soccer) were readily available in nearly all the posts occupied by our troops.

CONFIDENTIAL

- b. Indoor Games and Amusements. These were hardly catered for at all in the matter of equipment. Film projectors were available from Signals for each company but films of quality and in quantity were non-existent, until December when the United Nations Welfare Organisation got things moving. Before our departure we enjoyed several good films, some of which were kindly lent by 3 Nigerian Brigade. In order to provide some form of entertainment Whist Drives were held once weekly and a set of Pongo was devised and "House" games were held twice weekly with the Chaplain acting as "Fear-a'-tighe". Curfew was imposed by the Civil Administration in ALBERTVILLE for a long period which required outside social activities to close early and consequently we had a great need for amusements in the camp areas.
- c. Radios and Tape Recorders. Due to the kindness of Messrs. Philips our Battalion received 5 transistor radios which were allotted one to each company and one to the Hospital in ALBERTVILLE, where we always had one or more patients. In addition to these, the companies, with funds provided from a float handled by Battalion Welfare Officer from Army Canteen Board, purchased radios cum record players as required. Four of these were purchased and handed over to 34 Battalion with all the transistors on charge. In the Battalion Officers' Mess at ALBERTVILLE a radio was used which was kindly loaned to the Mess by a local citizen. Tape recorders were in great demand but were only available to us through the courtesy of an NCO and of locals. The need for this type of equipment was emphasised after the NIEMBA ambush when it was necessary to obtain early accounts of the opinions and actions of the search party and other interested personnel.
- d. Newspapers, Periodicals and Books. After expected teething pains in July, August and September the scheme for sending newspapers from a central agency at home clicked into gear and from October the newspapers were arriving regularly at least once weekly, and often twice weekly. Included in these consignments were copies of Irish magazines such as Dublin Opinion, Irish Digest, The Pioneer, An Cosantoir and some paper backs. Those newspapers, periodicals and books were distributed equitably amongst the companies. As will be easily appreciated the paper backs were highly "classified material" in the Welfare orbit. The value of a large and varied selection of paper backs cannot be too much emphasised to fill in hours of long train and aircraft journeys, resting off guard duty in camp or at airports or even relaxing in quarters when no other form of entertainment was available. Irish Shell Ltd. kindly donated consignments of books and these were supplemented to a large extent by the British Consulate in ELIZABETHVILLE who sent us boxes of magazines and books on several occasions. After 1 DECEMBER copies of American magazines such as Newsweek and Time arrived regularly from United Nations Welfare Officer in Leopoldville. The U.N. Welfare allowance in the case of Irish troops was controlled by Army Press Authorities who purchased the newspapers and sent them direct to the troops in the CONGO.
- e. Mail. The non-arrival of mail for 33 Infantry Battalion was a serious factor affecting morale in the early weeks in the CONGO. The Department of Posts and Telegraphs took an active interest in this problem and wrote several times to us explaining their position. The problem was mainly an internal one in the CONGO and consequent on the setting up of our own Post Office at 9 Brigade in ELIZABETHVILLE a marked improvement came about. The difficulties in staff and lack of aircraft added considerably to the delays and when these were finally overcome a system of notification of aircraft was established so that we were aware of arrival times of mail, and could plan to forward our own outgoing mail back in the same aircraft.

CONFIDENTIAL

4.

- f. Boat trips. Two boat trips on LAKE TANGANYIKA were organised and about 300 members of the Battalion availed of this opportunity. Lunch was provided on board for which the passengers paid but the cost of hiring the steamers was borne out of Welfare Funds allotted to the Battalion through courtesy of Command Welfare Boards and Congo Fund, Cork.
3. General While it was appreciated that the ONUC Welfare operations were initially hurried, badly organised and concentrated largely in LEOPOLDVILLE and KAMINA previously occupied Military Bases, the intervening period from our arrival until about the end of November was a serious morale testing time for our troops. Whereas arrival of mail improved gradually the position of welfare supplies such as films, books and indoor games made no headway and the shortages of these main items directed our NCOs and men more to the canteens. When the supply position of these items improved in December a marked improvement in morale was noticeable. The lack of welfare facilities as a morale losing factor cannot be stressed too much. Where our troops had all the facilities such as in KAMINA the problems were minimised.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX 1  
to  
ANNX R

List of Items Carried in Aircraft Ex Baldonnal.

Value - £1,838. 4. 0.

422 Doz.	Time Ale
98 Doz.	Phoenix Ale
220,000	Players Cigarettes
156,000	Sweet Afton Cigarettes
40 Lbs.	Carrolls Tobacco
10 Lbs.	Players Tobacco
72 Bottles	Gold Label Whiskey
72 Bottles	Gin
12 Doz. Tins	Polish
12 Doz. Pairs	Laces
10,000	Blue Gillette Blades

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX 2

to  
ANNX R

List of Items Donated by Irish Firms as Gifts.

- (1) 120 Doz. Canned Guinness by A. Guinness & Co.
- (2) 100 Doz. Canned Phoenix Ale by Cherries Breweries.
- (3) 14.000 Cigarettes (20 Per man on departure) by Army Canteen Board.
- (4) Sunday "People" London every week by Editor.
- (5) "The Echo" Enniscorthy weekly by Editor.
- (6) Complementary copies of all Irish papers by Messrs KLM.
- (7) Books (paper backs) by Irish Shell Ltd.
- (8) Films (Documentaries) by National Film Insitute.
- (9) Tape Recordings by Miss Nita Norry.
- (10) Films All Ireland Final 1960.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX 3  
to  
ANNX R

---

List of Gifts Donated at Christmas 1960.

Irish Government Allowance	32,657 cFs	£233. 5. 0
Irish Troops Overseas Fund	29,400 cFs	£210. 0. 0
Cork Congo Fund	21,000 cFs	£150. 0. 0
Eastern Command Welfare Board	13,650 cFs	£97. 10. 0
Officers' Messes Western Command	3,780 cFs	£27. 0. 0
3 Brigade Headquarters Messes Limerick	1,323 cFs	£9. 9. 0
Naval Service Welfare Board	700 cFs	£5. 0. 0
County Sligo Association	770 cFs	£5. 5. 0
Messrs Smithwick Ltd.	7,000 cFs	£50. 0. 0
P & H Egan Ltd. Tullamore	3,150 cFs	£22.10. 0
Curragh Camp Welfare Fund	7,000 cFs	£50. 0. 0

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX 4  
to  
ANNX R

---

Value of Sales to Officers, NCOs & Men

- |    |   |   |               |   |             |
|----|---|---|---------------|---|-------------|
| a. | Sale value of goods sold on behalf<br>of Army Canteen Board                               | - | 1,043,673     | - | £7,490.10.0 |
| b. | Value of goods sold on behalf of<br>Px. including sales to all companies<br>and 9 Brigade | - | 347,562 cFs   | - | £2,482.10.0 |
| c. | Combined sales Army Canteen Board<br>and Px. goods  | - | 1,396,235 cFs | - | £9,973. 0.0 |

CONFIDENTIAL

**CONFIDENTIAL**

ANNX Q  
to  
33 Infantry Battalion  
Unit History.


ROLL OF CASUALTIES  
33 INFANTRY BATTALION

80322	COY SGT	GRANT, T.	B COMPANY	3 OCTOBER
0.7500	LIEUT	GLEESON, K.	A COMPANY	8 NOVEMBER
804359	SGT.	GAYNOR, H.	A COMPANY	do
804234	CPL.	DOUGAN, L.	A COMPANY	do
809839	CPL	KELLY, P.	A COMPANY	do
804536	PTE.	FARRELL, M.	A COMPANY	do
808548	PTE.	FENNELL, T.	A COMPANY	do
810242	PTE.	KILLEEN, G.	A COMPANY	do
802900	PTE.	McGUINN, M.	A COMPANY	do
806115	TPR.	BROWNE, A.	A COMPANY	An unknown date a few days after 8 November.
806785	PTE.	DAVIS, W.	A COMPANY	10 NOVEMBER
806855	CPL.	KELLY, L.	C COMPANY	24 DECEMBER

**CONFIDENTIAL**



CONFIDENTIAL



SCALE: -

1 inch = 45 miles

LEGEND

Posts occupied by 33 M BN

SHOWN THUS

[KAMINA]

CONFIDENTIAL

**ANNEX R**  
to  
**33 INFANTRY BATTALION**  
**UNIT HISTORY**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

CÓR COISITHE.

33 CATHLÁN COISITHE.

CEANNCHEATHRÚ CATHLÁIN

(Comhdhéanta de Oifigeach i gCeannas agus Foireann, Buíon "A", Buíon "Q", Buíon Faisnéise, Buíon Comharthaíochta, Buíon Iompair agus Buíon Liachta).

**TÁBLA 15D.**  
**Leasú Uimh. 1.**  
**10 Lúnasa, 1960.**

SONRAÍ.	(1)	Oifigeach i gCeannas agus Foireann	Buion "A"	Buion "Q"	Buion Faisnéise.	Buion Comharthaíochta	Buion Iompair.	Buion Liachta.	Iomlán Ceanncheathrú Cathlái.	FONÓTAÍ
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Leifteanant-Chornáil	..	1 (a)	-	1 (d)	-	-	-	-	1	(a) Oifigeach i gCeannas.
Ceannfóirte	..	2 (b)	2 (c)	2 (j)	1 (e)	-	-	2 (h)	8	(b) 1 Leas-Oifigeach i gCeannas.
Captaein	..	3 (g)	2 (h)	-	1 (k)	1 (f)	1 (i)	-	10	1 Oifigeach Oibríochta.
Leifteanaint	..	-	-	-	-	1 (m)	1 (n)	-	2	(c) 1 Aidúnach and Oifigeach i gCeannas.
IOMLÁN OIFIGEACH	..	6	4	3	2	2	2	2	21	Céimseana eile, Ceanncheathrú Cathlái.
Maor-Sháirsintí Cathlái	..	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1 Oifigeach Dlí.
Ceathrú-Sháirsintí Cathlái	..	-	-	1 (n)	-	-	-	-	1	(d) Ceathrúnach.
Sáirsintí Complaachta	..	-	1 (p)	-	-	-	-	-	2	(e) Oifigeach Faisnéise.
Ceathrú-Sháirsintí Complaachta	..	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	2	(f) Ceannasat Boinc.
Sáirsintí:										(g) 1 Leas-Oifigeach Oibríochta.
Saoir Armála	..	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1 Oifigeach Innealltóireachta.
Armadóirí	..	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1 Oifigeach Leasa.
Banna (o)	..	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	1	(h) 1 Leas-Aidúnach.
Clairigh	..	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	3	1 Oifigeach Póilíní Airm.
Cócáirí	..	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	1 Leas-Cheathrúnach.
Tiománaithe IM	..	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	1	(k) Leas-Oifigeach Faisnéise.
Innealltóirí-Toineoírí	..	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	(l) 1 Ceannasat Búime (Oifigeach Liachta).
Feisteoírí IM	..	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	2	1 Oifigeach Fiaclóireachta.
Dualgais-Chinearáilte	..	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	(m) Oifigeach Búime.
Faisnéis	..	-	1	-	2	-	-	-	1	(n) Scrúdóir Lóin-Lamhaigh.
Giollad Liachta	..	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	(o) Tréineálta mar sírteáinítho freisin.
Póilíní Airm	..	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	(p) IC Banna agus Dualgais Riarcóidín.
Oibrítheoirí—Radio agus Líne	..	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	

# CONFIDENTIAL

CÓR COISITHE.

33 CATHLÁN COISITHE.

CEANNCHEATHRÚ CATHLÁIN.

(Comdhéanta de Oifigeach i gCeannas agus Foireann, Buion "A", Buion "Q", Buion Faisnéise, Buion Comharthaíochta, Buion Iompair agus Buion Iasachta).

TÁBLA 15D (ar lean).  
Leasú Uimh. 1.  
10 Lúnasa, 1960.

Sonraí.	(1)	Oifigeach i gCeannas agus Foireann	(3) Buion 'A'	(4) Buion 'Q'	Buion Faisnéise	Buion Comharthaíochta	(7) Buion Iompair	(8) Buion Iasachta	Iomlán Ceanncheathrú Cathlái	Fonóraf
<i>Sáireintí (ar lean)</i>										
Radio-Mheicneoir	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Stóráilaithe	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Post	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Deisitheoirí Tealta	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Iompair	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
<i>Ceannairí:</i>										
Arnaidóirí	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Banna (e)	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Cléirigh	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Tiománaithe IM	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Innealltóirí-Teicneoirí	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Dualgusa-Ghinearálta	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Faisnéis	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Giollai Iasachta	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Póilíní Airm	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Oibritheoirí—Radio agus Líne	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Radio-Mheicneoirí	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Stóráilaithe	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
IOMLÁN ONC	..	1	20	13	8	5	6	3	56	

# CONFIDENTIAL

CÓR COISITHE.

33 CATHLÁN COISITHE.

CEANNCHEATHRÚ CATHLÁIN.

(Comhdhéanta de Oifigeach i gCeannas agus Foireann, Buion "A", Buion "Q", Buion Faisnéise, Buion Comharthaíochta, Buion Iompair agus Buion Liachta).

**TÁBLA 15D (ar lean).**  
**Leasú Uimh. 1.**  
**10 Lúnasa, 1960.**

SONRAÍ	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
		Oigéarach i gCeannas agus Foireann	Buion "A"	Buion "Q"	Buion Faisnéise.	Buion Comharthaíochta	Buion Iompair.	Buion Liachta.	Tomlán Ceanncheathrú Cathlái.	FONÓRAÍ
<i>Saighdiúirí Singil :</i>										
Banna (o) .. .. .	15	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	15	
Bearboíri .. .. .	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	
Gréasaíthe .. .. .	2	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	1	
Cléirigh .. .. .	2	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	4	
Cócuiri .. .. .	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	3	
Tiománaíthe IM .. .. .	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	3	
Innealtóirí-Teicneóirí .. .. .	-	-	5	-	-	-	3	-	5	
Foisteóirí IM .. .. .	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	
Dualgais-Ghinearálta .. .. .	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	
Giollai-Liachta .. .. .	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	4	
Oibrithoóirí--Radio agus Lámó .. .. .	-	-	-	-	-	5	-	-	5	
Giollai agus Reathaithe .. .. .	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	
Grianghrafaíri .. .. .	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	
Táilúirí .. .. .	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	
<b>LOMLÁN SAIGHDIÚRÍ SINGIL</b> .. .. .			28	12	-	5	5	4	54	
<b>LOMLÁN CÉIMEANNA UILE</b> .. .. .		7	52	28	10	12	13	9	131	
<i>Ar Cheangal :</i>			(2)	-	-	-	-	-	(2)	
Séiplínigh .. .. .										





Nótaí: Tarraingear na pearsana sa Tábla seo 6 Fhóto agus Aonaid eile atá in iomlán na mBunachtaí Stochana agus fanfaidh siad ina gcomhaltas des na cúl seirbhíse ón ar tarraingeadh iad.

SONRAÍ	TOMLÁN GÉIMHÁNNNA UILE		131	(191)	TOMLÁN SAIBHDUIRÍ SINÉIL		468	704
	673	414			(138)	414		
(1)	SONRAÍ	Ceanntarí (ar lean):	2	(1)	3	15	15	15
(2)	Ceanntearchnú Chathlái	Ceanntarí IM	2	(1)	1	1	4	4
(3)	Grúpa Complaachta Ardháin.	Ceanntarí IM	2	(1)	1	3	3	3
(4)	Tri Grúpa Complaachta.	Dualgais-Chincerialta	6	-	-	-	2	2
(5)	Tomlán Cathlái	Uimhreachta Gunna IGE	36	(12)	36	36	36	36
(6)	FONÓTAÍ	Ceanntarí (ar lean):	5	(1)	3	5	5	5
(1)	SONRAÍ	Ceanntarí (ar lean):	2	(1)	1	1	4	4
(2)	Ceanntearchnú Chathlái	Ceanntarí IM	2	(1)	1	3	3	3
(3)	Grúpa Complaachta Ardháin.	Ceanntarí IM	2	(1)	1	3	3	3
(4)	Tri Grúpa Complaachta.	Dualgais-Chincerialta	6	-	-	-	2	2
(5)	Tomlán Cathlái	Uimhreachta Gunna IGE	36	(12)	36	36	36	36
(6)	FONÓTAÍ	Ceanntarí (ar lean):	5	(1)	3	5	5	5
(1)	SONRAÍ	Ceanntarí (ar lean):	2	(1)	1	1	4	4
(2)	Ceanntearchnú Chathlái	Ceanntarí IM	2	(1)	1	3	3	3
(3)	Grúpa Complaachta Ardháin.	Ceanntarí IM	2	(1)	1	3	3	3
(4)	Tri Grúpa Complaachta.	Dualgais-Chincerialta	6	-	-	-	2	2
(5)	Tomlán Cathlái	Uimhreachta Gunna IGE	36	(12)	36	36	36	36
(6)	FONÓTAÍ	Ceanntarí (ar lean):	5	(1)	3	5	5	5

TABLE 15F (ar lean).  
 Leasú Uimh. 1.  
 10 Lúnasa, 1960.  
 CÖR COISITHE.  
 33 CATHLÁIN COISITHE.  
 TABLE CATHLÁIN COMHDHUITHE.  
 (Comhdhéanta de Ceanntearchnú Cathlái agus Tri Grúpa Complaachta).

CONFIDENTIAL