

STAIR

35 Cathlán Coisithe

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Chongo

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HISTORY 35 CN COIS

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HISTORY OF 35 CN COIS IN THE REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

Jun - Dec. '61

1. Formation of the Unit

On 5 Bea '61 An Ceann Foirne authorised in CS31 & 93 the formation of 35 Cn Cois comprised of a HQ Coy, 3 coy gps and an Armd C gp. Strength - Officers 56.

NCO's	200
Ptes	396
	<hr/>
Total	652

Comds provided sub-units as follows:

A Coy gp - Ceann I
B " " - " D
C " " - CTC
Bn HQ & HQ Coy - Any Army Unit.

Bn HQ and HQ Coy formed at DUN.MHIC AOIDH on 12 Mei 61 and the remainder of the Cn at CTC on 16 Mei.

An advance party of 5 Offrs and 1 ONC left DUBLIN airport on 10 Mei '61 and the main body commenced departures on 20 Mei '61 from DUBLIN airport. The last of the Cn left IRELAND on 27 Mei '61.

2. MOVEMENT, LOCATION AND ACTIVITY

- a. General Outline. The Battalion moved by the usual stages to ELISABETHVILLE, in KATANGA Province and, except for a four-week stay by two rifle companies in NORTH KATANGA, spent its entire six-month tour in the general area of that city.

Its activity may be summed up as helping to maintain the UN presence in secessionist KATANGA, including two periods of active hostilities.

Broadly speaking, the Battalion took over its locations from 34 Inf Bn and, in due course, handed them over to 36 Inf Bn.

b. Details of Movements

- (i) Bn HQ, HQ Coy, Cav Gp HQ and Cav main body.

Date	Movement	From	To	Remarks
12 Jun 61	Bn HQ and HQ Coy established at McKee Bks., Dublin.	-	-	-
20 Jun 61	First four plane loads ("chalks") left IRELAND at 2300 hrs.	DUBLIN AIRPORT	ELISABETH-VILLE	Via WHEELUS Field, -KANO-LEOPOLDVILLE (with diversion to MALTA). First of BN main body arrive E'VILLE 23 JUNE.
27 Jun 61	Final chalks left IRELAND	DUBLIN AIRPORT	ELISABETH-VILLE	Same route less diversion.
2 Jul 61	Last chalk arrived in E'VILLE at 1300 hrs and the BN report "now complete and fully operational" Bn was scattered in five locations over seven miles throughout E'VILLE Area.	-	-	Bulk of HQ Coy in Swedish Camp.
2 Sep 61	Bn consolidated at LEOPOLD FARM (BN HQ, HQ Coy and B Coy; later joined by C Coy and A Coy (-))	Various locs	LEOPOLD FARM, E'VILLE	
29 Nov '61	Adv Party repatriated, 72 all ranks	E'VILLE	DUBLIN	
10 Dec 61	Bn HQ, HQ Coy and A Coy (-) to new area	LEOPOLD, FARM, E'VILLE	ROUSSEAU FARM (approx 3 miles NW of city centre; - 2 miles South of AIRPORT)	HQ 36 IN BN now established in LEOPOLD FARM.

Date	Movement	From	To	Remarks
15 Dec 61	First party of main Body embarked repatriation.	E'VILLE	DUBLIN AIRPORT	Via LEO-KANO - WHALWS by USAF.
25 Dec 61	Final elements of Bn arrived DUBLIN			
(2) Rifle Coys				
(a) A Coy				
16 Jun 61	Eight (8) offrs and one hundred forty one (141) Ors. reported to CTC as first stage in joining the Bn.	HQ, Seann I Athlone.	CONNOLLY BKS. CTC.	
19 Jun 61	Ceremonial Parade and Review by Taoiseach & Aire Cosanta (First assembly of complete Bn)	CTC.	McKees BKS DUBLIN.	Return to CTC to await Airlift.
22 Jun 61	Airlift to ONUC	Dublin Airport	Elisabeth ville.	Completed by 23 Jun Coy located at THE Factory Camp, Ave Usoke, E'VILLE.
1 Aug 61	Exchange of Coy locs with B Coy	FACTORY	SABENA VILLAS.	-
3 Sep 61	Establishment of UN presence in JADOTVILLE	E'VILLE	JADOTVILLE	-
17 Sep 61	Passed from UN ctl as PWS.	-	-	-
11 Oct 61	Transfer to new PW Camp	JADOTVILLE	KOLWEZI	As PWS under ctl of Kat Gend
25 Oct 61	Release as PWS and return to UN duty.	KOLWEZI	E'VILLE	Coy loc at LEOPOLD FARM
28 Nov 61	Adv party, 2 offrs and 58 ors repatriated.	E'VILLE	DUBLIN	
19 Dec 61	Repatriation of Coy commences	E'VILLE	DUBLIN	Completed by 25 Dec. 61.

(b) B. COY

Date	Movement	From	To	Remarks
16 Jun 61	Reported to CTC as first stage fmn of 35 Bn.	HQ Ceann D, Cork.	CTC.	-
19 Jun 61	Ceremonial Parade & Review by Taoiseach and Aire Cosanta.	CTC.	McKee Bks. Dublin.	Then to COLLINS BKS. DUBLIN to await airlift.
20 Jun 61	Airlift to ONUC	DUBLIN	E'VILLE	Completed by 23 Jun. Coy located at Airport and SABENA VILLAS.
29 Jun 61	Handover of Airport IS duties to C Coy. B Coy consolidated at SABENA VILLAS.	-	-	-
1 Aug 61	Take over Airport from C Coy	SABENA VILLAS	E'VILLE AIRPORT	-
30 Aug	To JADOTVILLE	E'VILLE	JADOT VILLE	Recalled next day back in E'VILLE by 2 Sep.
2 Sep	To E'VILLE	JADOT	E'VILLE	-
5 Sep 61	Occupation at new Bn Camp	E'VILLE AIRPORT	LEOPOLD FARM	-
14 Sep 61	Relief Force towards JADOTVILLE	LEOPOLD FARM	LUFIRA BRS.	Mission NOT accomplished <i>See Appx C.</i>
16 Sep 61	Second Relief Force towards JADOTVILLE	E/Ville	LUFIRA BRS.	Mission not accomplished <i>See Appx C.</i>
18 Sep 61	Def posn in gen area of "The Tunnel", KASENGA ROAD.	-	-	Posn held at Cease-fire, 21 Sep
23 Sep 61	Exchange of duties with C Coy	TUNNEL	LEOPOLD FARM	-
6 Nov 61	Replacement of 1 Inf Gp 7 offrs & 133 Ors. to Nth Katanga.	E/VILLE	NYUNZU	Via Albertville
22 Dec 61	Repatriation	NYUNZU-NIEMBA	DUBLIN	Via A'ville to LEO.

Date	Movement	From	To	Remarks
18 May 61	Coy formed at Clarke Bks CTC.		-	
19 Jun 61	Ceremonial Parade & Review by Taoiseach and Aire Cosanta.	CTC	McKee Bks Dublin.	Return to CTC to await Air Lift.
29 Jun 61	Arrival in E'ville Assumption of security duties at Airport.	DUBLIN	E'VILLE	Via WHEELUS-KANO - LEO - KAMINA.
1 Aug 61	Exchange of Coy locs with A Coy	E'VILLE AIRPORT	FACTORY CAMP.	Task, Bn Res.
12 Sep 61	Consolidation in new Bn area	FACTORY	LEOPOLD FARM	
13 Sep 61	Seizure of Tunnel as coy task in Op "MORTHOR"	LEOPOLD FARM	TUNNEL, KASENGA RD. area.	Active hostilities in progress.
18 Sep 61	Relief by B Coy	TUNNEL	LEOPOLD FARM	-
23 Sep 61	Take over of Tunnel again	LEO. FARM	TUNNEL	Ceasefire now in force
28 Sep 61	Return to main Bn Camp	TUNNEL	LEO FARM.	-
16 Oct 61	Occupation of new Coy loc	LEO FARM	SWEDISH CAMP, KASENGA ROAD.	
16 Nov 61	Move to NORTH KATANGA	E'VILLE	NYUNZU	Part of the redeployment of UN force in KATANGA.
2 Dec 61	Move to new Coy loc	NYUNZU	NIEMBA	As part of a plan to contain KAT. Gen'd forces in N KATANGA.
22 Dec 61	Repatriation	NIEMBA	DUBLIN	via A'VILLE to LEO. Completed by 25 Dec

c. Activities.

6.

Summary:- The Bn's overall mission was to maintain the UN presence in a secessionist and increasingly hostile KATANGA. The Bn was at all times part of a higher fm which directed its activities more or less closely. The execution of its mission took the following forms:-

(1) Active Ops

- (a) Def
- (b) Attack

(2) Patrols

- (a) Long-range
 - (b) Local
- } Both "fighting" and "recce".

(3) Internal Security Duties

- (a) Guarding vital instls and pers
- (b) Establishment of posts, standing patrols and road blocks.
- (c) Escorts
- (d) Arrests of subversive elements.

(4) Refugee Control Protection & Adm

(5) Training: Both refresher trg in subjects already known and new trg is subject arising from circumstances.

- (a) Arms drills with FN Rifles & Gustav SMGs
- (b) Tactical trg
- (c) Riot Drills & Mob Control
- (d) Live Range Practices.
- (e) Recreational Trg, sports & games, concerts and entertainments.

(6) Fatigues: Both by way of Interior Economy and in the provision of parties at UN demand.

Detailed description

d. Active Ops

- (1) The active ops referred to are the Bn's participation in Ops RAMPUNCH, MORTHOR and "UNOKAT", particularly OP "MORTHOR".
- (2) They cost the Bn a total of ~~THREE~~ killed and FIFTEEN wounded, and are of historic significance as the first occasion on which Irish troops engaged in active combat with an organized enemy since the inception of the army.
- (3) Fuller descriptions of these actions will be found in later paras and in Annxs as listed.

They are mainly contemporary Action Reports compiled by Coy, Pl, Patrol and Post Comds and by Liaison Offrs.

e. Patrols and Internal Security -

A separate paragraph, para 6 below covers these in detail.

f. Refugee Ctl Protection & Adm

Events during the Bn's stay in E'VILLE led to the formation of a huge Refugee Camp, which attracted world-wide attention, and which was potentially one of the gravest problems of the entire ONUC operation. While primary responsibility for the adm of this Camp lay outside Bn hands, we did, nonetheless, have many duties in connection with it for several weeks, - maintaining order, quelling riots, medical care, protection from Kat Gend. Para 6 gives statistics of Duties done, in this connection.

- (1) Also, the Bn had sole responsibility for a secondary Refugee Camp, containing six hundred refugees of a specialized type (escaped convicts, some of them political prisoners and some PWs of ANC origin but mostly unidentified and probably containing an element of civil criminals). These were a Bn responsibility w.e.f. 31 Aug 61 for protection and administration. Their numbers were considerably thinned out by evacuation, by UN agencies and by the refugees own private means, during the ensuing months.

See also Annx 'H'.

g. Training is dealt with in para 10.h. Fatigues.

A great deal of work was always necessary to make and keep the Bn's accommodation habitable and sanitary. Only a small number of the pers were ever accommodated in "villas" and then only for short periods. The "Factory" Camp, the Airport and Leopold Farm were all sources of continuous heavy work, with any laxity leading to grave medical risks. The onset of the rains in mid Oct. increased the problem.

- (1) Tactical requirements also led to much heavy work, slit trenches, crawl-trenches, weapon-pits and command posts. A high standard of skill and diligence soon became characteristic of all companies, after a somewhat casual start, and this was a contributory factor to the Bn's low casualty rate. Here again, the onset of the rains added to the work.
- (2) Handling of stores was frequent and heavy. Rations, bedding, kits, ammunition, ordnance, etc. had often to be moved. Apart from the Bn's own stores, much work of this nature had to be done daily in the early months on behalf of the UN Movement Control at the Airport and the UN Supply Depot (Indian-run).

8.
Duties - Guards, Patrols, Escorts

6. For purposes of analysis and clarity each of the above types of duty is treated separately. In reading the paragraph, however, it must be borne in mind that in many cases the various duties were all being performed at the same time and they constituted a heavy drain on the energies of all ranks.

a. Guards

Description of Guard	Strength	Dates		Remarks
		From	To	
EVILLE Airpost	1 Offr-24 ors	Arrival	5 Sep 61	Incl int surveillance of KATANGA forces.
Coy Loc at Factory	1 Offr- 8 ors	"	17 Sep 61	
Coy Loc at SABENA Villas	1 Offr- 8 ors	"	2 Sep 61	
○ Coy Loc at Ave SAVONNIERS	1 Offr. 8 ors	"	2 Sep 61	
LOUVANIUM University	Rifle Platoon	13th Jul 61	15 Aug 61	Security Congolese Parliament
SOCOPEPETROL	2 NCOs 6 men	1 Aug 61	12 Sep 61	Protection of large petrol depot.
Bn Offrs' Mess, STACQUET Hse	1 NCO 3 men	6 Sep 61	20 Sep 61	Str doubled w.e.f. 12 Sep
UN (Italian) Hospital, City Centre	1 NCO 3 men	5 Sep 61	20 Sep 61	
ditto	1 NCO 9 men		27 Oct 61	
Refugee Camp	Rifle Platoon	6 Sep 61	7 Sep 61	
ditto	1 offr 10 ors	28 Sep 61	16 Oct 61	
Bn HQ LEOPOLD Farm	1 offr 23 ors	2 Sep 61	20 Sep 61	
ditto	1 offr 15 ors	20 Sep 61	16 Oct 61	
ditto	2 offr 6 Ors	16 Oct 61	10 Dec 61	
○ Villa LES ROCHES (C-O'Brien residence)	12 Ors.	25 Sep 61	23 Oct 61	
NYUNZU Airstrip	1 offr 18 Ors	19 Nov 61	1 Dec 61	
UN Food Depot at Factory	1 offr 9 ors	27 Oct 61	mid Nov 61	

Description of Guard	Strength	Dates		Remarks
		From	To	
NIEMBA Camp ○	12 Ors	2 Dec 61	22 Dec 61	
NIEMBA Bridge	12 Ors	2 Dec 61	22 Dec 61	
NIEMBA Rey Sta.	8 Ors	2 Dec 61	22 Dec 61	
Farm	1 Offr. 15 Ors	10 Dec 61	18 Dec 61	

b. Patrols

(1) The complexity and variety of the UN activities in KATANGA, during the Bn's service there, led to a very large number of minor operations being undertaken which could be called "patrols". As is well-known by now, military terminology in its exact sense cannot always be applied with complete clarity or accuracy to all of the tasks undertaken at the behest of UN authorities.

A Military College instructional document says that "Patrolling is the most frequent operation of war". If the term "UN duty" be substituted for "war", this dictum proves to be completely true in 35 Bn's experience.

(2) Patrols of various size and composition were sent out for the following purposes:-

(a) To gain information, including

- (i) Topography, - the layout of the city and environs was the subject of much study in the early stages. A map was prepared and printed showing a variety of routes, even bush tracks, linking the Airport and City. Long-range route-finding was carried out, to DILOLO on the Angola border, to MOKAMBO and KIPUSHI on the Rhodesian border, to JADOTVILLE, KOLWEZI and TAMINA within the province. Helicopter recce as available was used to supplement this. Events proved the value of it all.
- (ii) Information of Gendarmerie movements and activities, both in "peacetime" and during hostilities was amassed by the use of standing patrols, observation posts and by recce parties. The latter might sometimes consist of nothing more elaborate than a couple of officers in civilian dress
- (iii) To investigate specific incidents as they occurred. This covers an extraordinarily wide variety of activities, sometimes important, often trivial. A few examples may help to illustrate the point.

5 Sep 61, 1650 hrs. Msg from HQ Sec B to say mob assembling before Italian Hospital. Ir Bn to send pat of pl str. (Later) Pat met hostile mob at ALBERT Commune.

Threatened tear gas. Mob moved away. Pat two cas from stones, one admitted to Hosp".

"9 Sep 61 2142 hrs. Msg from HQ Kat Comd ordering pat to go at once to VERFAILLES Garage where UN cars had been set on fire. (LATER) Pat found one UN veh burned out. All quiet now."

"7 Oct '61 - Two offrs in civ clothes to N'Rhodesia on int mission re use of NDOLA airport by KATANGAN AC and Mercenaries. Repot by Capt. Purfield att."

"30 Nov 61 - 1700 hrs. Msg from COS Sec B. Gend reported at FACTORY menacing UN-employed Balubas at work there. Pat to investigate. (LATER) Pat report NO sign of Gend or Police or Balubas in FACTORY area".

"15 Nov 61 0030 hrs. Mov reported on perimeter of Camp. Pat sent. Three refugees caught stealing Irish rations. Refugees sent to Swed prison, rations recovered".

- (b) To dominate areas. This heading includes such things as the preservation of law and order, the discouragement of violence, arson and theft, the canalization of refugee movement, the reassurance of pro-UN elements of population and intimidation of anti-Un elements. The phrase "showing the flag" is applicable to much of it. The uneasy truce period between Ops "MORTHOR" and "UNOKAT" was the busiest period in this respect, i.e. from 21 Sep 61 to 5 Dec 61.

29 Aug 61 . Patrolling of native townships initiated. Strength average one offr, four NCOs and twelve men, mounted in three jeeps. Mission, generally to show the UN presence and to encourage peace and good order among the natives at a time of doubt and tension.

1 Sep 61. The above patrol transferred to white city Same strength. The outbreak of hostilities brought this to an end.

21 Sep 61. Patrol of perimeter of Refugee Camp. Strength One offr, one NCO and ten men, in two jeeps. In conjunction with KATANGA Civil Police. MISSION: To keep the refugees within bounds, to prevent them from looting the near by suburbs and equally to safeguard them from GENDARMERIE terrorization.

Here is an example of how this duty worked out:-

"27 Sep 61 Str 1 Offr, 1 NCO, 10 Ptes, two jeeps

<u>OUT</u>	<u>IN</u>	
1830 hrs	1910 hrs)	
2010	2100	} Route:-Ir Camp - Police Camp - ELAKAT - RUASHI - Swed Camp - Ir Camp.
2215	2255	
0010	0050	
0320	0400	
0530	0700	
0825	0910	

In addition, the Patrol on duty would have to answer any emergency calls in respect of such incidents as arose. In Oct, Sect B HQ organized a Bde Duty Roster sharing this duty between the four bns of the Bde. This continued until the outbreak of hostilities in Op "UNOKAT", 5 Dec 61.

(3) Observation Posts. This device was used, especially in our first six weeks to build up a picture of Gendarmerie movement in and out of the city.

(a) CO's House, Boulevard BAUDOUIN, - One NCO and two ptes. A Log was kept of all Katangais movement on the main rd. From early Jul to early Sep.

(b) E'ville Rly Sta - Two junior NCOs. To note and report Gend movements by train. Mid Jul to early Sep.

c. Escorts

Date	Place	Strength	Purpose
13 - 20 Jul 61	To KAMINA by air and return by rail via LUENA	57 all ranks	To fetch Irish BCK Arm'd Co. w/for the Bn Cav Gp.
23 Aug-27 Aug	E'ville to DILOLO and return by road.	Rifle Pl. Three Arm'd Cars(+)- 6 Offrs 75 ors.	To rescue family of Congolese Deputy victimised by Ishombe regime.
21 Sep-20 Oct, 61	From Refugee Camp to City and return.	1 Offr 10 Ors	To safeguard BCK railway workers to & from place of employment. Daily at 0600 hrs and 1600 hrs.
28 Oct-4 Nov 61	Throughout all UN instls in E'ville	1 NCO 4 men	Despatch Rider Escort System
9 Sep - 13 Sep '61	Throughout all UN instls in City	1 NCO 4 men	Distr of Rations from Indian Supply Depot

During the months of Sep, Oct, Nov and Dec, especially during Ops "MORTHOR" and "UNOKAT" and the periods of tension before and after them, escorts were so frequent and so commonplace as to defy cataloguing. For much of this time it was unwise or even actually dangerous to go anywhere in the E'VILLE area without an armed escort. A Katanga Command Order was in force forbidding the movement of UN personnel in parties of less than four. It will be appreciated that this situation gave rise to a very large number of small, local escorts of brief duration. It is NOT proposed to list these.

d. Posts held

12.

Name	Whereabouts	Date		Strength
		From	To	
En HQ	Ave SAVONNIERS, E'VILLE	2 Jul	2 Sep	HQ Coy & Cav Gp
Airport	5 miles NNE of City Centre	2 Jul	5 Sep	Rifle Coy See Armd cs.
Factory	Ave USOKE, northeastern outskirts of city	2 Jul	18 Sep	Rifle Coy till last few days when one pl(-)
SABENA Villas	On main rd to city, WEST of Airport	2 Jul	3 Sep	Rifle Coy, See Armd cs.
LEOPOLD Farm	On CHAUSÉE KASENGA, SOUTH EASTERN outskirts of City.	2 Sep	10 Dec	HQ Coy + Cav Gp + two Rifle Coys.
STACQUET House	Ave REDJAF, off Ave STANLEY northern fringe of City	midJul	endSep	Offrs' Mess with staff and Guard.
The TUNNEL	On CHAUSÉE KASENGA immediately of main portion of City.	13 Sep	12 Oct	Rifle Coy
Swedish Camp (part of)	On CHAUSÉE KASENGA, about 2½ miles EAST of City Centre.	2 Jul 16 Oct	2 Sep 17 Nov	HQ Coy (-) Rifle Coy(-)
"SHOPS" Outpost	On Refugee Camp perimeter -WESTERN side.	23 Oct	18Dec	Rifle Pl.
ROUSSEAU Farm.	3 miles NW of City Centre; 2 miles SOUTH of Airport.	10 Dec	18 Dec	HQ Coy (-) and Rifle Coy (-)
JADOTVILLE	On Main Road, 1½ miles EAST of built-up area of Town.	3 Sep	17 Sep	Rifle Coy plus Armd C Sec.
NYUNZU	North KATANGA Town and Airstrip	6 Nov	22 Dec	Rifle Coy. Two Coys from 17 Nov. to 2 Dec.
NIEMBA	Gen area of X-rds and a hill 800 yds N of X-rds over looking Rly sta.	2 Dec	22 Dec	Rifle Coy

3. ACCOUNTS OF ACTIONSa. Gendarmerie at E'ville Airport 27 Aug '61

At 21.30 hrs 26th Aug '61, a party of 46 Gendarmerie entered the airport through a side entrance ("Air Katanga"). They were kept under observation by "B" Coy then in occupation of the airport buildings. The party dispersed towards the runway and disappeared into the bush. Subsequently entries of 'A' Coy (SABELNA VILLAS) and 'B' Coy (Airport) reported sounds of troop movement, vehicles, and digging somewhere in the bush to the WEST of the runway. A sec of armoured cars did several recce patrols and listening posts were set up around the suspected area. Sounds of digging, and weapons were heard. The listening posts noted that these sounds would cease on the approach of the armoured cars and recommence when they had passed.

At 0220 hrs 27 Aug Bn Comdr (Lt Col H McNamee) issued an order to OC 'A' Coy (Comdt. P. Quinlan) to prepare in conjunction with OC 'B' Coy (Comdt A McMahon) a force of coy strength from 'A' and 'B' Coys, supported by a sec of Armoured cars and attack at first light and capture the party which was digging-in.

The position was surrounded by two rifle pls from 'B' Coy while 'A' Coy held cut-off positions. A sec of armoured cars u c 'B' Coy covered one flank and the Sp Pl of 'B' Coy were in support. At first light 'B' Coy riflemen moved in and took 44 Gendarmerie prisoner and disarmed them. Some were sleeping. Digging had been done. Weapons had been loaded and a radio set was working. Two Mortars and two MGs had been mounted and ready to fire.

The party was made up of 2 European Officers, 1 Congolese Officer and 41 Crs. The 2 European officers were sent under escort to KAMINA and the remainder were released and their arms returned. Coy Comdrsi reports at Appx 'M'.

b. Operation "RAMPUNCH" 28 Aug '61

The objective of this operation was to arrest white mercenaries of KATANGA Gendarmerie all over the province. 35 Bn were given three tasks in E'ville.

- (1) To take Gendarmerie HQ and arrest all white mercenaries therein.
- (2) To take the "New Hospital" and arrest all white mercenaries therein.
- (3) To arrest all white mercenaries at E'ville airport.

At 0500 hrs 38 Aug '61:

'A' Coy with under comd Sec Armd Cs and Three Swedish APCs - took Gendarmerie HQ and surrounded M. MUNONGO'S hse.

'B' Coy with under comd Sec Armd C's took the 'Air Katanga' installations at the Airport.

'C' Coy with under Comd Sec Armd C's and Sec MP took the 'New Hospital'.

Col J. Waern (Swedish Comdr of Sector 'B') and Int Staff accompanied 'A' Coy. Lt Col H McNamee and Bn staff accompanied 'C' Coy. The following arrests were made and prisoners escorted to the airport for transportation to KAMINA.

'A' Coy	-	10 mercenaries.
'B' "	-	18 "
'C' "	-	13
		<hr/>
Total		41

A total of 73 mercenaries was arrested in the province of KATANGA that day by all UN units. Some shooting took place at Gendarmerie HQ in E'ville but NO casualties occurred.

c. Operation "MORTHOR" 13 Sep '61

(1) Prelude

After operation "RAMPUNCH" a vicious campaign of anti-UN propoganda was conducted by the KATANGA government in press and radio broadcasts and at public meetings. It was alleged that UN intended to disarm the Gendarmerie and force KATANGA into allegiance to the Congolese government. On 5 Sep a mob of 300-500 held anti-UN demonstrations in the centre of E'ville. They demonstrated outside UN HQ and the UN Hospital. Stones were thrown and insults shouted. On 6 & 7 Sep these demonstrations were repeated. CQMS Hamill, Armd Car Gp was injured by a stone while travelling by jeep to the Factory on the evening 6 Sep. A patrol of pl strength was also stoned by the mob on 6 Sep and two casualties resulted. During these days movement by UN through E'ville was possible by strong parties only.

On 9 Sep increased activity by Gendarmerie in E'ville became noticeable. Road blocking was reported. Two UN MT vehicles were set on fire at Verfailles garage that night. One, a truck, was destroyed. In JADOTVILLE OC 'A' Coy reported that his coy loc was surrounded by Gendarmerie who had set up road blocks. A patrol of pl strength was sent to JADOTVILLE on 10 Sep but were stopped by a strong Gendarmerie road block at LUFIRA bge.

During all this time the refugee problem which commenced 3 Sep was assuming very large proportions. Part of the refugee camp was quite close to 35 Bn HQ and problems of sanitation, feeding, water, traffic ctl etc. were getting beyond the limit of the Bn. It was estimated that there were 40,000 refugees in the camp on 10 Sep. The following are extracts from Bn Journal dated 11 Sep -

- "1005 Report from COS Sect B - 1. Arms and knives have been issued to Africans in JADOTVILLE.
2. All whites there have armed themselves against UN.
3. There are indications of an attack on UN tps being planned.
4. 'A' Coy cannot draw fresh rations from local traders as town is blockaded.
5. 'A' Coy is completely surrounded by dug-in Gendarmerie.
6. These matters are being taken up by Dr. Cruise O'Brien with Col Muke (OC Gendarmerie).
7. 'A' Coy instructed to hold out as long as possible without resorting to force.

"1100 Briefing Conference Sec B

1. Telegram from Dr O'Brien to LEO "Gradually losing initiative if it has NOT already been lost - Require clear directions as to line of action".
2. Dr O'Brien protested to President Tshombe that Col Muke had agreed to withdraw all road blocks but had failed to do so. Tshombe replied that they would NOT be moved until Gendarmerie were allowed to occupy the airport. Dr O'Brien stated that this was impossible.
3. Another meeting between O'Brien and Tshombe was arranged for this afternoon.

"1650 Msg from 'A' Coy - 20 whites in JADO are org Africans there to take action against UN.

"1815 Msg from IS Sec B.

1. Promise from Col Muke that rd blocks will be lifted around JADO.
2. Dr O'Brien says that since whites there are against UN the coy there serves NO useful purpose and will probably be withdrawn.

"1915 Msg from 'A' Coy - Alert on here. Sit very dangerous.

12 Sep 0500 Msg from 'A' Coy - Sit quiet.

10.00 Msg from 'A' Coy - Conference arranged between OC 'A' Coy and Mayor of JADO.

1350 Pat with rations dep for JADO.

1410 Pat held up 4 mls out- forced to return.

It was noted also that key points in E'ville had been occupied by Gendarmerie: Post Office, Radio Katanga, etc.,

At 20.00 hrs that day orders were issued by 35 Bn Comdr for Op "MORTHOR."

(2) Operation Order.

The following is a copy of the order:-

SECRET.

COPY NO. 11

Maps: E'VILLE 1/20,000
KATANGA 1/1,000,000.

OO NO. 6

SITUATION.

1. KATANGESE FORCES: Loc and appreciation of Gendarmerie and Police Forces as per briefing.
2. FRIENDLY FORCES:
 - 12 Swed Bn (-) 1 Dogra Bn, and 3/1 Gurkha Bn (-) will support 35 Irish Bn by:
 - a. Siezing, holding and controlling RADIO KATANGA, POST OFFICE, RADIO STATION at RUASHI and E'VILLE AIRPORT.
 - b. Arrest M. MUNONGO, M. SAMELENGE, SURETE Offrs and Staffs.
 - c. Secure refugees camps loc at SWED and IRISH lines.

- d. Arrest any whites who resist in any way.
3. ATTS & DETS: Three Arms Cs under Comd to 1 DOGRA BN.
Two Armd Cs under Comd to 12 SWED BN.

MISSION.

4. 35 Irish Bn will seize, hold and ctl:-
- Radio stn at College ST FRANCOIS DE SALES.
 - Rly Tunnel crossing at CHAUSSEE DE KASENGA and be prepared to block same.
5. Provide one Inf sec to guard ITALIAN HOSP from 121100.
6. Arrest M. KIBWE at his residence AVE DROOGMANS 835. Minister's Bureau is at corner of AVE KAMBOVE AND WANGERMEE 1492.
7. Retain at least one platoon as res in area ALBERT PARK prepared to take into custody M. KIMBA, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
8. Secure Refugee Camps at FACTORY and own lines
. Arrange for the local security of VERFAILLES Garage.

EXECUTION.

10. TASKS:

B Coy

- Secure Irish Refugee Camp.
- Secure Bn HQ
- Send at least one pl to ALBERT PARK as part of brig res, prepared to arrest M. KIMBA on order.

C Coy

- Two pls and sp elements of coy to seize, hold and ctl the Tunnel at CHAUSSEE DE KASENGA.
- One pl to seize, hold and ctl RADIO COLLEGE ST. FRANCOIS DE SALES.

Hq Coy

- One inf sec to ITALIAN HOSP to guard same.
- Det to provide local security for VERFAILLES Garage.
- Remainder to assist in bn adm and in def of Bn HQ.

Armd C

- Three Armd Cs under comd to 1 DOGRA BN,
- Two Armd Cs under comd to 12 SWED BN.
- One sub sec rover Gp to Bn Comd 35 Inf Bn.
- One sub sec to C. Coy to assist in arrest of M. KIBWE.
- One sub sec res to ALBERT PARK.

17.

COORD INSTRS:

- a. All tps to be on objs at 130400 less guard for ITALIAN HOSP and Armd Cs for 1 DOGRA BN and 12 SWED BN.
- b. Assembly area at FARM.
- c. Reveille 130230.

ADM.

12. TFT:

- a. B Coy two Trucks and one Jeep.
- b. C Coy two Trucks and two Jeeps.

13. MED:

- a. CCP loc FINA Garage at Junc SAIO/KASENGA.
- b. RAP loc ALBERT PARK.

14. FEEDING: Arrangements by Coys. Ensure that one day's pack rations carried in addition to unconsumed fresh ration. Fresh ration to be issued on 13 Sep 61.

15. MP: MP Sec less arresting party arrange TC vic ALBERT PARK.

16. AMN: 1st line only to be carried.

COMNS.

17. WRLS: As per Sig Annx attached.

18. Codeword for OP 'MORTHOR'.

ACK.

AUTHENTICATION

(Signed) J.P. Kane COMMANDANT

10 & OPS, 35 IRISH BN.

(Signed) Aodh MacConmidhe. LT. COLONEL

(A. MacCommhidhe)

A/OC, 35 IRISH BN.

Distr:

- 1 Copy - Each Coy & Armd C Gp, 35 Bn.
- 1 Copy - 12 Swedish Bn.
- 1 Copy - 1 Dogra Bn
- 1 Copy - 1 Gurkha Bn.
- 1 Copy - Sector B.
- 15 Copies - File

/WJM.

(3) Operation

All objectives of 35 Bn were taken at 0400 hrs 13 Sep '61 without encountering resistance. NOT so with the Irish armd cars detached to 1 Dogra Bn. They became involved in heavy street fighting at the Post Office and at Radio Katanga. Strong resistance was met and after capturing the two positions withstood counter attacks and sniping. The fighting was particularly heavy in the Post Office area and continued sporadically for eight days. Appx 'A' gives detail of this op in E'VILLE up to 21 Sep '61.

- (a) JADOTVILLE "A" Coy was attacked by KATANGESE forces during mass at JADOTVILLE on the morning of 13 Sep '61. Appx 'B' gives details of this part of the op as written by OC 'A' Coy. Cft P. Quinlan, in a report to the Force Comdr. The Coy plus a sec armd cars withstood a siege for 4 days by an estimated 2,000 Gendarmerie, white mercenaries and mob.

Two attempts were made by the Bn to send a relief force to the aid of 'A' Coy, the first on the evening of 13 Sep and the second on 16 Sep. Both were unable to pass the line of the LUFIRA river and had to withdraw. See Appx 'C' for details.

- (b) The TUNNEL

'C' Coy (-) org a defensive position around the tunnel on the KASENGA rd almost in the centre of E'VILLE city. At 04.07 hrs 13 Sep enemy MG fire was directed at the position from the direction of Gendarmerie Supply Depot to the WEST of the TUNNEL. At 0420 hrs enemy mortars joined in the firing. Fire of a variety of weapons was directed at the position intermittently until the cease fire on 21 Sep. APPX 'D' gives the details as recorded by Cft T. O'Neill OC 'C' Coy. Two events connected with this part of the op are also included in APPX 'D'. Sair Shaughnessy's account of the ambush in which Tpr Gaffney was killed and Sair Shannon's report on FACTORY guard during this phase.

- (c) Radio Station at College St Francois de Sales

Lt T. Ryan's pl less a sec occupied this radio station without meeting opposition.

At mid-day on 13 Sep this party was reduced to Lt Ryan and a sec. On 14 Sep a patrol was sent to this post to resupply and visit them. This patrol was ambushed and never reached the College. More on this later at sub-para (d).

A report by Lt Ryan on the subsequent events at Radio College is included at APPX 'E'.

- (d) Cft Cahalane's Patrol

As no communication was possible between Bn H. and Radio College after 1300 hrs 13 Sep (except through a Swedish patrol which was to visit the College on the evening of 13 Sep); several attempts were made to org a patrol to contact Lt Ryan there. Permission was sought from Sector 'B' to withdraw the party after putting the radio transmitter out of action. This was refused on the grounds that the station was required for UN political and propoganda broadcasts by M. TOMBERLAINE (Deputy to Dr Cruise O'Brien). A broadcast was made on the night of 13 Sep. Due to the heavy commitments involved in sending Force KANE to relieve JADOTVILLE on the evening of 13 Sep it was

impossible to carry out the patrol before 20.45 hrs
14 Sep.

At that time the patrol left Bn HQ under Cft P. Cahalane and comprised a sec Armd Cars, a rifle sec and a 84mm gun crew. The mission given to the patrol was:-

- (i) Resupply det at Radio College and collect a tape recording for Mr. TOMBERLAINE.
- (ii) Locate and recover Tpr Gaffney.
- (iii) Resupply mess staff at STAQUET Hse.
- (iv) Collect clothing from 'CURRACLOE'
- (v) Resupply det at 'FACTORY'.

On reaching Radio College the patrol was ambushed. The Armd Car in which Cft Cahalane was travelling was hit by an Atk wpn. An ambulance was seen to drive away immediately afterwards and there is a suspicion that the Atk wpn was transported in it.

Cft Cahalane and Sair Carey were wounded but succeeded in escaping from the armd car into nearby houses as did the remainder of the patrol.

However Cre Nolan and Tpr Mullins were more seriously wounded and were unable to get out of the car. Evidence came to light later that Cre Nolan recovered sufficiently to restart the car but drove it away in the wrong direction. He was subsequently killed and after some weeks his body was located where it had been buried in a convent garden by a nun. Tpr Mullins' body could not be located.

The patrol were taken prisoner with the exception of Capt F. Whyte and Sair J. Dignam who escaped and made their way across E'VILLE to 35 Bn HQ.

Capt Whyte's report at APPX 'F' gives further details.

A report by Cft Cahalane at APPX 'G' Gives an account of the subsequent events in relation to the patrol. A serious threat on the life of Cft Cahalane and **1st Ryan** evoked a most courageous intervention by Capt A Magennis which is described in a statement made by Capt Magennis at Appx "G".

(4) Aftermath of OP MORTHOR

A cease fire was agreed to by UN and Katanga to take effect from 0001 hrs 21 Sep 61. The 35 Bn continued to hold the TUNNEL until 25 Oct with a coy, while the remainder (less A Coy) with headquarters at Prince Leopold farm carried out a variety of security duties at Refugee Camp, Dr O'Brien's residence, UN Hosp etc.

Economic sanctions were imposed on UN by Katangese authorities. Electricity, telephone and water were cut off. Fresh supplies had to be flown in.

On 23 Sep Mr. Frank Aiken, Minister for External Affairs arrived at 35Bn HQ and visited scenes of recent fighting, all posts held by the Bn in E'VILLE and the Irish wounded in hospital. This visit had a morale raising effect on the unit. An exchange of prisoners was agreed to for 16 Oct but eventhough UN had all Katangese prisoners ready at the appointed place the Katangese authorities did NOT arrive with the UN prisoners 179 of which were Irish.

It was known that the prisoners had been brought from JADOTVILLE towards E'VILLE that day. Next day it was

discovered that the prisoners were in Camp MASSART. Late that evening (17 Oct) an order came from Sec 'B' to keep the camp under surveillance without causing suspicion. The coy on the TUNNEL were instr accordingly and could observe the WESTERN exits from the camp. To observe the SOUTHERN exits a party of one officer in civilians and an interpreter were ordered to take a civilian car and move through the city at a safe distance from the camp. Three officers and two interpreters in fact went out on this mission and were arrested and taken to JADOTVILLE and held with the other prisoners. This brought the Irish prisoners to 182 all ranks and 3 civilian interpreters.

On 25 Oct the Irish prisoners were handed over at the OLD AIRSTRIP on the outskirts of E'VILLE and the TUNNEL along with POST OFFICE and Radio Stn at KILOBELOBE were evacuated.

There were NO further incidents of note until 5 Dec '61 when OP UNOKAT took place.

d. OP "UNOKAT" (5/16 Dec '61)

(1) Prelude to Op Unokat By the beginning of Dec 61, relations between UN and Katanga Govt had greatly deteriorated. Kat Gend had established a number of road blocks on the SOUTH of the City thus denying freedom of movement in that direction to UN.

On 2 Dec a road-block in the TUNNEL was set up by Kat Gend and a number of UN personnel were arrested. Comdt. T. Q'SHTA and Capt. P.D. KAVANAGH were fired upon near the block, but escaped. On 3 Dec a Swed UN car was also fired upon, killing the driver and wounding three others. On 4 Dec, another road-block was erected at the ROUNDABOUT, (Ave. SAIO-STANLEY), a particularly sensitive spot lying on the route from UNHQ to the AIRPORT. A strong patrol led by Col. WAERN, SWED Bn, failed to have this obstacle removed.

- (2) (a) 5 Dec saw an attack launched from the SOUTH by a Coy, 3/1 GORKHA Bn, and a unit comprising Lt. T. QUINLAN'S Pl "A" Coy, 35 Bn. Sec Armd Cs. 35 Bn (Capt. A. MAGENNIS) two secs GORKHAS and one SWED APC all under comd of Capt. R. SALARIA (Gorkha Bn) were sent from the NORTH to sp the attack. This latter force was ambushed near the old air-strip, about one mile from the Roundabout.

See Appx "H" for report by Capt. Magennis.

The same day (5 Dec) sniping into HQ, 35 Bn at LEOPOLD PARK began, with sporadic mor. fire in the vicinity and the sound of shooting, varying in intensity, was to remain the background of all the rest of our time in EVILLE.

- (b) 6 Dec 61 A force of roughly Coy str, SWED and, IRISH, plus two Secs Armd Cs, led by Lt. Col. U. MIDE (SWED Bn) pushed towards the TUNNEL, as a prelude to a heavier attack.

On this day UN Jet Fighters appeared over E'VILLE for the first time. While they did not fire, their presence had a striking effect on the morale of 35 Bn. The bitter memories of the Sep fighting and the handicaps imposed by a single unopposed Katangan fighter over JADOTVILLE, LUFIRA, and E'VILLE were now assuaged. At least there was now an answer to Katangan strafing and bombing. A result of this was that Katangan planes confined themselves to night flying, and bombing was happily most inaccurate.

It should be stated at this stage that 35 Bn strength in E'VILLE was now very low. Most of 'A' Coy (72 all ranks) had been repatriated since 29 Nov, 'B' Coy was in NYUNSU and 'C' in NIEMBA, leaving only HQ Coy, Armd C Gp and a pl plus of 'A' Coy. It is also noteworthy that this was the date appointed for the repatriation of 35 Bn. All preliminary packing, documentation, etc., had been completed, but plans had to be altered as a result of the sit as on 5 Dec. In fact evacuation did not start until 18 Dec.

However at this stage 36 Bn began to arrive in E'VILLE. At 1405 hrs 7 Dec 61 Lt. Col. Hogan, OC 36 Bn, some staff and two pls 'A' Coy entered camp and were greeted with a very noisy fire-fight immediately outside camp HQ.

Fire was being directed at 35 Bn HQ since early morning. At 0730 hrs five (5) mor bombs dropped in the camp and fire continued during the morning. At 0815 hrs a pat led by Capt. Purfield went out with the object of locating the source of the firing. This pat was unsuccessful and the Katangase pushed fwd and were engaged by camp defences. They were beaten off just as 36 Bn arrived in camp. While having a meal in the mess the roof of LEOPOLD FARM HOUSE was hit by a 37 mm shell and Lt. Col. Hogan's plate was covered in ceiling plaster etc.

Firing by enemy snipers, MGs, and mors continued sporadically throughout the afternoon and indeed through the night. Indian 4.2 mors loc at Swedish camp fired throughout the night (300 rds) on The TUNNEL and Camp MASSART. 35 and 36 Bns (-) were in direct line of this fire and sleep was out of the question, especially for pers of 36 Bn on their first night in KATANGA.

(c) 8 Dec '61

The harrassing of 35 Bn HQ continued by sniping, mor and MG fire and at 0950 hrs Capt. Purfield again set out with a fighting pat. This time a number of snipers was cleared from nearby villas and a party of Gendarmerie estimated at coy strn was routed from the Police Camp which was right beside Irish HQ on Ave SAVONIRS. Sair. Norris was wounded in this engagement while firing 84 mm RCL Rifle from an exposed position.

At 1300 hrs a mor bomb hit Irish HQ killing Cre. Fallon and wounding 5 other members of 36 Bn.

At 1400 hrs a composite force was led in attack towards the TUNNEL again by Lt. Col. Ulf Meide comprising:

SWEDISH	-	5 pls XII & XIV Bns
		4 APCs.
IRISH	-	1 pl 35 Bn
		1 pl 36 Bn
		1 Sec Armd Cs.

It is of note that this was the first org action in which 36 Bn was involved. Lt. Norton's pl were "blooded" in this op and under the personal obs of Lt. Col. McNamee advanced from the usual mistakes of crowding, misuse of ground and cover etc. to being a very effective unit before the op finished.

This force cleared the area from LEOPOLD FARM to within 100 yd. of the TUNNEL by 1800 hrs.

The remainder of 'A' Coy 36 Bn and 'C' Coy 36 Bn arrived in Irish camp at 2000 hrs that night.

(d) 9 Dec '61

From intercepts it was learned that a major attack on Irish and Swedish camps were imminent that day, but Swedish and Irish mors went into action on tgts at the TUNNEL, ELAKAT, etc., and apparently with some effect, as later intercepts revealed that Gendarmerie tps were "weakening and becoming discouraged". The attack never developed.

At 11.00 Col. Waern and staff arrived in APC (unescorted) and collected OC & 2 i/c 35 Bn, OC & IO 36 Bn who with OC & 2i/c Dogra Bn, OC & 2i/c Ethiopian Bn proceeded across E'VILLE to attend a conference with Force Comdr at Kat Comd HQ. En route on Ave STANLEY the APC was ambushed. It was hit by Atk fire but fortunately was not disabled and limped into Comd HQ with the Swedish gunner killed, an Ethiopian capt severely wounded and the 10 XII Swedish Bn and OC 35 Bn slightly wounded. A "fine bag" of comdrs and staff had been narrowly missed, and Force Comdr ordained that such a collection of "warriors" should NOT again travel in one vehicle.

The night of 9/10 Dec could fairly be described as a nightmare for everybody in 35 & 36 Bn HQ. Gend mors and MGs kept up a continuous conc all night long on the Irish camp. Most rounds fell short but there were some "pluses". The tps spent the night in their trenches and at this stage most trenches had anything up to a foot of water in them. However contrary to expectations no one was injured.

From intercepts it was learned that Gend were forming-up once again in the area of the police camp KASENGA Rd for an attack on the Irish camp. Irish mors went into action at 0235 hrs - successfully. The attack did not develop.

(e) 10 Dec '61

After a nerve-racking night, day light was welcome so that the source of the firing might be located. Four Gend para-troopers were seen at 1000 hrs taking cover in a nearby villa. 'A' Coy sent a patrol to the area and the paratroopers were killed.

At a conference that morning in HQ Sector 'B' a new mission was given to the much depleted 35 Bn. i. To ensure that "Route Charlie" was kept open. This was a secondary route from E'VILLE to the airport and at a certain stage was the only route open between Swedish and Irish Camps and the airport. The route was mostly a track through the bush and mainly over laterite which became very muddy as a result of the heavy rains. Tpt found the going most difficult on certain stretches of this 6 mls track and only the most skillful driving was successful. Several vehicles had to be assisted by towing.

By 1900 hrs that evening the evac of 35 Bn from LEOPOLD FARM to ROUSSEAU FARM on Route Charlie had been completed - Stores etc., by tpt, Tps marching.

ROUSSEAU FARM was about 3 mls NW of E'VILLE and was in complete isolation. No "mod cons" existed. Water had to be drawn from 3 mls away or caught in buckets and all kinds of containers from roof tops. Lighting was by candle and comms was by radio or runner. However it was QUIET and certain members of the unit were known to have slept continuously for over 30 hrs during the first few days there. Katangan a/c carried out bombing raids and the sound of mor and MG fire could be heard in the city.

(f) 11 Dec '61

A pl outpost known as the SHOPS was taken over by Lt. Leech 'A' Coy. This post served two needs. It was on Route Charlie and on the edge of the Refugee camp. Both required protection.

(g) 12 Dec '61

The unit was required to destroy a large petrol and oil depot - SOCOFETROL - on Ave USOKE. Cft. P. Quinlan lead a successful patrol and set a number of storage tanks ablaze with 84 mm rcls. Flames were rising to an estimated 300 ft. lighting up the countryside and causing some concern at the airport (5 mls to NW) because of the nightly bombing raids. However NO bombing was attempted on that night and Katangan petrol and oil continued blazing for about 4 days. This had a hampering effect on Gend mov by MT for some time.

(2) OP UNOKAT 15/16 Dec 61

This OP was carried out by two bdes (see OP Instr No. 14 at APPX "O"). The 36 Bn and part of 35 Bn were in 1 Bde Sec B at the time.

The mission of 1 Bde was given as - "1 Bde Sec B will attack and capture Camp Massart and block route Ave Katuba and Don Bosco in order to assist in sealing off E'ville City preparatory to the destruction of enemy resistance in E'ville area".

35 Bn had what may be called a minor roll i.e. "Secure CHARLIE Route between SHOPS inclusive, and WHITE PIERS CROSS ROADS exclusive". The unit was to remain on the fringe of ops until leaving the Congo on 18 Dec. A number of pats were carried out in the area of Route Charlie, some as a result of reports of enemy being seen in the bush nearby, others routine in accordance with their mission. The SHOPS outpost was mortared on one occasion and some small arms fire was directed at the post. During one of these sporadic outbursts Gnr. Scally 'A' Coy was wounded in the shoulder on 18 Dec and could not return to IRELAND with the unit which commenced repatriation on that day, leaving 36 Bn to complete OP UNOKAT.

4. ASSOCIATION WITH ORTHERU UN TROOPS

The 35/NF Battalion was fortunate from the beginning in that it had a large and varied association with other U.N. contingents. This association did not stop at just commander level; all ranks participated in making friendly contacts with troops of many nations. Some of the principal contingents with which we had meetings were:-

(i) Swedish Bns. The 12th Swedish Bn. provided our first foreign friends. They had arrived in Katanga from Sweden a couple of weeks before our unit and so we learned about the Congo together. We were quartered close to the Swedish Camp and in fact the Swedes provided accommodation for our Hq. Coy. (Comdt. P.J. Barry) in the huts of their compound - Chausse de Kasenga. We found ourselves brigaded in the South Katanga Bde. under Sw. Col. Jonas Waern from the beginning. The 12 Swedish Bn. was very favourably led by Major ULF Mide and under his wise leadership there was fostered a most enduring bond of friendship which was cemented in the fighting of Sep and Dec 1961 all over Katanga.

The co-operation between 35 Irish and 13 Swedish Bns. found its way into generous give and take arrangements in the matter of loans and swapping of equipment, ammunition and security duties, patrols, etc.

Irish staffs were integrated into S. Katanga Bde where the following Irishmen worked in great harmony with the Swedes - Comdt. S. Barrett (Bde Ops) Comdt. T. O'Shea (Bde Adj. and Personnel Officer) Capt. P.D. Kavanagh (Bde. Int.) Capt. J. Parker (Asst. Ops) and Sgt. Kelly (Asst. Adj.).

In the fighting in Sep we really got together with the Swedes of the 12 Battalion and learned to admire their fine courage, cool bravery and cheerful acceptance of all tasks. Their liaison officers and wireless operators at Irish HQ. were tireless workers and great co-operators.

Towards the end of Nov. '61, the 14 Bn from Sweden began to rotate with 12 Sw Bn and before this was completed, like the 35 and 36 Irish Bns. they became involved in the fighting from 5 Dec 61. Our Bn and this new 14 Sw Bn at once got down to the same kind of co-operative work that characterised our association with their predecessors.

(ii) The Indians

In Katanga during our stay in 1961 there was a complete Brigade formation from the Army of India. During August Battalions from this Bde who were then in North Katanga, began to arrive in Elizabethville. First the 1 Dogra Bn flew in and a coy of this battalion (Capt. Reggie Pandit) took over part of the Airport defences from A Coy. (Comdt. P. Quinlan) 35 Irish Bn at Sabena Willas. This Coy came for a brief period under command for operations of 35 Ir Bn. Later the balance of the 1 Dogra Battalion (Lt. Col. Hasari) arrived and took over the defence of the E'ville Airport area with HQ near Jadotville Junction.

Another Indian Army unit in S. Katanga at this time was the 3/1 Gorkha Bn (Lt. Col. S.S. Maitra). This Bn joined us in the last week of August, 61. The biggest thing we recall about this Bn was the C.O. He was "a character." He was known and loved all over the Congo. He was particularly friendly with the Irish with whom he seemed to have developed a special bond of association from the early days of the 34th Irish Bn and 1 Inf Group.

In "Op. Rumpunch" Aug. 27-28 1961 these two Battalions co-operated with ours in the very successful ops in the E'VILLE area. Again in "Op Morthor" from Sept. 13th '61, Irish armoured cars were attached to Coys of Gorkhas and Dogras for the taking of G.P.O E'ville and Radio Katanga. In the operations of Dec '61 our A/cars and Coys again worked with and fought alongside these Indian Bns. Many times Indian officers sang the praises of Irish endeavour, efficiency and courage. Our men too spoke of Indian planning, coolness and toughness in action.

Brigadier Raja who established his HQ for all Katanga in E'ville in August was a prominent Indian who became our Commander and our friend. His final speech to the 35th Irish Bn. on the occasion of the presentation of U.N. Service medals expressed his admiration for the resources, training and great courage of the Irish under his command.

(iii) 120 Hy mor Battery. The Arty of the Indian Army was represented by their 120 Bty of 4.2" Hy mors. This Bty was a dominating factor in the Dec '61 fighting. Its voice could be heard all over E'ville as it poured its well directed fires on to numerous targets and found enemy positions with commendable precision. Irish gunners of 35th Irish Bn complimented them on their drills speed and accuracy and silently sighed for the even finer guns and gunners that we might ourselves provide.

(iv) The Ethiopians. Two Bns of Ethiopians were poured into E'ville in Dec to increase the build-up for the final push against anti U.N forces. We did not have much direct association with these. We did meet their COs and staffs at planning Conferences preparatory to the battles for various sectors of the City. They were quiet and reserved and appeared to be competent in the use of their equipment which was mostly U.S. supplied. On visits to their lines they were always generous with presents of cigarettes and bottles of scarce and very acceptable refreshments.

(v) Norwegians and Danes. These were mostly employed in Air Ops Depts of E'ville, LEO. and KAMINA. They were most helpful and were our very good friends before we left KATANGA. Names still in our memories:- Lt Col Egge, Lt Col oyen (Med)

(vi) Canadians. These provided the sig comn at UN HQ E'ville with the outside. They were a most efficient and cheerful lot and seemed to take all snags in their stride.

(vii) The Italians. The Italian UN contact was represented mainly by the Italian Hospital in E'VILLE. These Italians were just wonderful. They were efficient, kind, considerate and very human people from the excellent Capt. Cipolat (O/C) to the lowest male nurses. They attended our sick and wounded with capable and sympathetic hands. It will be most difficult to forget the Italians of the Red Cross Hospital E'ville. On the night of 16/17 Sep. Capt Cipolat and staff worked through the night to save the lives of SS Cronin and O'Brien 'B' Coy. - successfully.

(viii) The Americans. were chiefly represented by their globemaster crews. They were highly efficient, tireless in their attention to detail and most friendly.

Association with Belgians.

Belgians from the beginning were inclined to be cool towards U.N. Troops. One got the impression that they regarded U.N. presence in KATANGA as something that would disturb their industrial set-up, their luxurious way of life and the future they had planned for themselves in the so-called "independent stat of KATANGA". There were very few cases of hospitality being offered by Belgians to UN troops. There were, however, some cases where Irish good humour and humane behaviour broke down reserve and some contact with local Belgian families was effected. After "Op. Rumpunch", 28 August, 1961, the Belgians in E'VILLE area became noticeably cooler. During and after Sep. fighting, these Belgians became frigid and they went their way and we went ours.

The other Europeans, principally Italians and Greeks were less of a social problem than the Belgians.

In fairness to the Belgians, it must be stated that in our official contacts with Belgian officials in the local administration we found them helpful and efficient.

Association with Congolese

We found the Congolese of all tribes in our Southern KATANGA area a very friendly and a very good humoured population. The Balubas were the most intelligent of the tribes. Our principal contact with the local population would have been through the Baluba Camp set up near our HQ from early Sep. '61. This camp was a big headache both for us and for the 12 Sw Bn who both had camp security and control duties therein. For further details see para 18. Generally we found the Congolese, while not unintelligent, a people who will need much administrative help and sympathetic guidance in the years to come. It struck us that the Congolese are a much tried people who display great fortitude in face of great personal hardship and privation. The Irish troops were particularly acceptable to the Congolese probably because of the image abroad of the ever friendly Irishman. In a way this is a very commendable UN image with which to be endowed.

Association with Neighbouring Countries

It must be said at once that this was somewhat restricted by the operations in which the Bn found itself involved. From the end of August, '61, there was practically no foreign travel. Some trips abroad from the Congo were:-

- (i) Tour of N. Rhodesia and Kariba Dam by Lt. Col. McNamee (O/C) Comdts. P. Wheatley, P. Cahalane and E. Condon.
- (ii) Visit to Kitwe N. Rhodesia by Comdt. M. Heffron, Comdt. P. Cahalane, Capt. M. Punfield, as guests of 3 Rhodesian Regt. for annual dinner.

- (iii) Week-end visit of 20 officers of 35 Ir Bn to Kitwe, Nr. Rhodesia, (which included some members of 1 Inf Group from Kamina. This was the occasion of a football match between the Irish and Rhodesians. Comdt. J.P. Keane 2 I/C.

On all the above visits the most generous hospitality was laid on by the Rhodesians.

There were many other outings planned to cater for tours by NCOs and men and a series of soccer, Gaelic football and hurling matches were arranged with teams in the N. Rhodesian Sector. As well as these the UN Welfare Officer had planned tours to Uganda, Kenya, South Africa, etc. Alas, these could not take place due to the situation which developed from Aug 27 '61, and the tensions and fighting that followed.

However there were visits to purchase goods and do intelligence work in Rhodesia carried out by Captains M. Purfield and T. McKeever.

Incidence of Visits by U.N. Officers

(1) In Aug '61, an Italian General Alonco - Chief of Italian Red Cross came to inspect the Italian Hosp. installations. There was a special mixed UN parade held at which the Italian officers and men were presented with their UN Sys Medals. He awarded special decorations to Col. J. Waern (Sweden) Lt. Col. O.J. McNeill (Ireland) and Major K. Carambiah (India). That evening Irish Officers attended a large reception in honour of the occasion at the Hotel Lido.

(2) General Almgren (Swedish) visited 12 Sw Bn and Irish Officers were honoured by meeting him and being invited to a reception to mark the occasion. He was most enthusiastic about the Bn Pipe Band and thanked them personally for playing at Les Roches for the reception.

(3) Lt Gen. S. McEoin came to E'ville as Force Comdr on three occasions while we were there. These visits were anything but social as there were anxious moments all through each visit in Sep and Dec '61. He did, however, visit the Irish Bn on each occasion.

(4) Mr. F. Aiken. (Irish Minister of External Affairs) Came on 13 Sep. to visit the battalion. He was met by Guard of Honour at Prince Leopold Farm, inspected the camp and stayed for a meal. He visited all posts held by Bn in E'ville and the wounded and sick in UN hospital.

Other Personnel Associated with

Dr Conor Cruise - O'Brien:

He was United Nations Civilian Representative in Katanga. The Bn had almost daily contact with him both at conferences and on visits he paid to Irish HQ. Offrs were grateful to him, not only for the daily use of his swimming pool at Les Roches, but also for his ready pressing of logistics officials to secure better accommodation for the Irish units. The fact that an Irishman of Dr. O'Brien's ability and achievements was UN Chief in Katanga was a source of pride for 35 Bn.

Mr Khiari

This Tunisian diplomat came to Katanga on many visits to arrange the cessation of hostilities (Sep 61) and secure terms of agreement for the release of the Jadotville prisoners. We met him on quite a few occasions at Dr O'Brien's viall - Les Roches.

Dr. Hoffman

He was a Swiss and an official of International Red Cross. He was most helpful in seeing to the wants of our JADOTVILLE prisoners. He paid many visits to our HQ.

Major Mathias

He was a Belgian operations Chief of Katangese Gendarmerie. He visited the Irish Mess on a number of occasions. He struck us as being an able staff officer.

Major Gen. C. Collins-Powell.

As Irish Chief of Staff he spent 4 days with 35 Bn (20-23 Nov. 61). He visited all posts and locs of the Bn incl NYUNZU ('B' Coy). He stayed with Dr. O'Brien at Les Roches but visited us daily for morning Mass and for many events and some parties. He inspected guards of Honour from Dogras, Ghorkas and Irish. He attended a ceremony at 35 Bn HQ in which an arm'd car that had been destroyed by enemy action in Sep. was handed over to its crew after being refitted by Arm'd Car Gp techs. Gen Collins-Powell also presented UN Service Medals to members of the Bn.

Col Crevecoeur

He was Chief of Katangese Gendarmerie and a Belgian Officer. A most able and courteous gentleman. He was on friendly terms with Irish staff offrs. He left Katanga with his family for a "long holiday" in Aug '61 and did NOT return.

Mr. Robinson (7th Day Advertists)

He was a friendly American and was always most helpful

Arch'ishop Cornelius.

He received the O/C and Staff 35 Bn in June '61. He was hospitable but guarded in his approach to us. He was reported to be "a Belgian first.....",

Mr. Wipple

U.S. Consul. We met him at a number of receptions. Friendly man.

Mr. Terence McNamara

U.S. Vice Consul. Proud of his Irish heritage and most helpful.

Pius Sapwe - Police Chief in Katanga

A most helpful and understanding Police Officer. A congolese who was certainly above average ability. Came to Irish HQ on many occasions.

Col T. Carroll Deputy Q.M.G.

Came out from Ireland with Gen Collins-Powell. Stayed four days with us at E'VILLE and surveyed our eqpt. and problems and requests resulting from action and prior to hand over to 36 Bn.

Mr Ivan Smith

He took over from Dr. O'Brien in Nov. 61 as UN Civilian Chief. He was a friendly and forceful character

Rev Fr. Martin

This big Flemish priest had a parish near our HQ at Prince Leopold Farm E'VILLE. He was a sincere and helpful man. Many of our Bn went to him for confessions as he had a little English.

Gen Eyassu - Deputy Force Comdr.

An Ethiopian. He visited 35 Ir Bn on 3 occasions during their tour. Was most friendly and helpful.

Guards of Honour

These were numerous and were found by all coys and cavalry group. We acquired a very high standard in this field. The drill used was that devised by the bn in the drill Hand book produced by the bn in the Congo (copy attached).

The Coys who held the Airport building were required to provide very many guards for VIPs in the comings and goings.

5: NOMINAL ROLL - See Appx 'C'

6. MORALE AND DISCIPLINE

The morale of the battalion was on a high level for most of the period. One instance of an obvious drop in morale was in early Dec '61 when the unit was due for repatriation. Planning, packing, documentation etc had been completed and the unit was ready for return to IRELAND, commencing 6 Dec. Fighting broke out in ELISABETHVILLE on 5 Dec and continued for 14 days thus delaying repatriation. The disappointment caused by having to wait an extra fortnight gave rise to some grumbling. The main cause of complaint was the absence of even an approximate new date of repatriation. When it was announced on 17 Dec that the unit would start going home on 18 Dec morale rose sharply.

A detailed report on other aspects of this subject made at the request of the Force Comdr in Oct '61 is included at Appx 'J'.

There were numerous examples of high morale, outstanding bravery, courage, and devotion to duty, by members of the unit during Sept-Dec. '61. Recommendations for awards of recognition were made in Feb '62 in the following classes:

- | | | |
|---------------------------------------|--------------------------------|------|
| a. Award of Bonn Mileata Calmachta | - 6 Offrs. 11 NCOs
& 5 Ptes | - 22 |
| b. Recognition of Meritorious Service | - 8 Offrs 16 NCOs
& 19 Ptes | - 43 |
| c. Promotion | - 5 NCOs
& 3 Ptes | 8 |

Other nationalities have long since (Mar 64) received appropriate recognition in their home countries, for acts of bravery and outstanding service performed side by side with members of the 35 Bn. Some were no more deserving than ours and some were awarded on recommendations from Irish officers.

Discipline was considered satisfactory as the low incidence of crime indicated by the following figures, shows.

Offences Tried Summarily

AWOL	- 39
Drunkenness	- 19
Breaking bounds and bks	- 18
Insubordination, disrespect, violence etc.	- 12
Disobedience, disturbance, arrest.	- 15
Relating to property	- 14
Discharging amm	- 3

Regt duties	16
Misc	29

Court Martial

165

One man was found guilty of being asleep on his post while a sentry and he was awarded 120 days detention. This was later remitted on application of the C O because of the man's subsequent excellent conduct and devotion to duty during hostilities.

A sgt was remanded for courtmartial but as a result of conspicuous conduct during hostilities later, his coy comdr requested that proceedings be dropped. This request was acceded to.

7. WELFARE

a. Welfare in our ONUC Units is divided into two distinct and separate spheres of activity viz;

a. Canteen or, as it is known in UN circles, PX.

b. Football, sports, entertainments, film shows and safairs.

In the 35 Bn the latter aspect of Welfare was organised and controlled by a Committee of Officers representing the Companies and Armd Car Group under the Chairmanship of Comdt. Cahalane, OIC, Armd Car Group while the Canteen was directed and controlled by the Bn Welfare Officer.

C A N T E E Na. OPERATION - SYSTEM OF

Due to the disposition of our Companies and Armd Car Group in the Airport, Sabena Villas, The Factory, Swedish Camp, Ave Grevilleas and later in Jadotville separate Accounts were operated in each location with each sub-unit operating its own Canteen. These sub-canteens were supplied from the main Bn Canteen Stores located originally in the Swedish Camp and later in the vicinity of ~~Farm~~ Leopold. ~~In addition an Officers~~ and NCOs' Mess each operated a separate Account and were also stocked from the main Bn Canteen Stores. The canteens operated by 'B' and 'C' Companies in the NIEMBA/NYUNZU area of North Katanga during the period November - December were also stocked and replenished from the main Bn Stores in Elisabethville. In early November the Sub-canteens of 'A' Coy, H.Q. Coy and Armd Car Gp were wound up and the remaining elements of the Bn were catered for by the Headquarters Canteen leaving the two Messes continuing to function separately until the hand-over to the 36 Bn on 1.12.'61. From this date until repatriation the Welfare Officer 36 Bn operated Canteen services for both Bns.

b. SOURCES OF SUPPLIES

(1) Taken over from 34 Bn.

A substantial stock of Merchandise including 37,200 Cans Guinness, 225,000 Cigarettes Afton, 330 Bottles Gin, 3,780 Pkts Biscuits, 1,200 Bottles soft drinks and approximately 50 other items were taken over from the 34 Bn. See statistical data below.

(2) Brought from Ireland with the 35 Bn

Included amongst 36 different items of Canteen Stores supplied by the A.C.B. in Dublin and brought direct from Ireland with the 35 Bn were:

- 688,000 Cigarettes (Players, Afton and Gold Flake)
- 654 Pieces of Cutlery.
- 16,000 Kingshead Razor Blades
- 2,088 Pkts Biscuits
- 3,600 Films

For further details see Statistical data below.

(3) Local Purchases

Merchandise from Local traders in Elizabethville included

- (a) Beer, Simba and Lembo, purchased direct from the Brasseries Du Katanga. Cooperage here was the main problem as the empty bottles and crates cost much more than the product itself.
- (b) Soft drinks including Orange, Lemonade, Citron and Coco Cola were purchased direct from the Manufacturers, Kantangese Des Boissons. Here again Cooperage presented a similar problem.
- (c) Biscuits, chocolate and sweets were purchased direct from the local Factory - TRIO.
- (d) Oranges, Apples, Matches and Washing powder were purchased from local Wholesale Traders.
- (e) Arrangements were made with the PX Officer, Swedish Bn, whereby it was possible to obtain a regular supply of soft drink and beer from the Brewery in NDOLA, Northern Rhodesia. The Swedish Officer ordered the monthly requirements of both Bns, had it paid for in sterling or other hard currency direct from Sweden and with the assistance of 35 Bn Transport had it conveyed to Elizabethville. The 35 Bn share of the consignment was then purchased direct from the Swedish PX and paid for in Katangese francs. Katangese currency is NOT a recognised payment medium in Rhodesia. Hard currencies only are acceptable.

This arrangement, when got moving, operated satisfactorily until the outbreak of hostilities in Mid-September when supply became uncertain and irregular. During the period October/November UN Trucks to the Rhodesian Border had to proceed under heavy escort to collect supplies of this commodity. On one occasion a Convoy including three 35 Bn trucks with drivers were held up at a Katangese Army road block on the main Elizabethville/Rhodesian highway and brought to Camp Massart where they were detained for a few hours before being released. As conditions regarding freedom of movement worsened towards the end of November this source of supply gradually dried up.

(f) At the outbreak of hostilities on the 13th Sept., 1961 the Bn was fortunate in that it was well stocked up with beer including Simba, Tembo, Castle and Guinness, a good variety of soft drinks, cigarettes, soap and other essential commodities. This enabled the Bn to carry on on a reasonably comfortable basis without further purchases until supplies of these commodities got moving from the main PX supply depot in Leopoldville. At no time during the period June to early October were supplies of soft drinks, beer or cigarettes sought or received from PX Leo. Following the ceasefire in Eville on Sep. 21 all traders in the city were forbidden by the Katangese Government to trade with UN contingents in Katanga. Towards the end of Sep. and early October as wet stocks began to run out and repeated requests to PX Leo to supply, failed to produce results, the Brewery and soft drink producers were approached on many occasions for supplies, but with the exception of one occasion when 80 dozen soft drinks were obtained resulting in the arrest by the Surette of the Sales Manager, these traders refused to meet our demands. On a number of occasions the Civilian Surette followed the Bn Welfare Officer into these Traders' Premises, questioned the Sales Manager as to his identity and threatened to close down the premises if they supplied him. On two occasions it was decided to proceed under escort to the Brewery and the Cola Firm, seize and pay for the goods on the spot and take into custody any Surette or Gendarmie offering resistance or intimidating the suppliers. Both these Missions were called off on the advice of the UN Civilian representative. From then until the hand-over to the 36 Bn no purchases of any description were made from local traders.

(4) Purchases in Rhodesia

A fact finding Mission to Kitwe, N. Rhodesia, in July established that certain commodities were obtainable there at prices lower than those obtaining in E'ville or in PX Leo. The A.C.B. Dublin were notified and lodged £500 sterling to an account opened in Barclays Bank D.C. Kitwe, in the name of the 35 Bn for trading purposes. The unsettled condition prevailing in Elizabethville following the arrest by UN of Foreign Mercenaries on August 28 thwarted several attempts to travel to Rhodesia for the purchase of supplies. It was the end of Sep before this trip could be undertaken and supplies obtained. Approximately £660 worth of Merchandise was purchased £160 of which was paid in sterling by the Swedish PX in exchange for Katangese Francs at the official rate of exchange. In addition to the above a consignment of spirits was also purchased on this occasion for the Swedish Bn who shared cost of transportation from Kitwe to E'ville. This was the only purchase which it was possible to make in Rhodesia apart from soft drinks and Castle beer mentioned at para (c) (v) above. See statistical data below for further details.

(5) PX Purchases

Although the official catalogue of available stores published by the PX Authorities in Headquarters Leo included a very comprehensive list of merchandise under nine different departments including

- (a) Tobacco and Smoking Accessories.
- (b) Candy, Biscuits, Nuts, Juices and Groceries.
- (c) Toilet Articles, Drugs, Lotions, Sun Glasses etc.

- (d) Stationery, Pens, Pencils, Household supplies, Films etc.
- (e) Clothing, lines and domestic and sewing accessories.
- (f) Attractive items such as Cameras, Watches, etc.,
- (g) Liquer, Wine and Champagne.
- (h) Soft Drinks and Beer
- (j) Store and Office supplies.

it was not always easy to obtain the stores demanded. Shipments at times bore little relation to requisitions either in item or quantity and on occasions requisitions were not met at all. Normally PX merchandise was shipped by Air Transport. On one occasion a substantial consignment was transported from Leo by rail about August 20 arriving in Eville in early October. Due to the heavy losses incurred on the journey due to pilferage it was decided to discontinue this means of transportation.

Although the PX were slow to commence shipments of soft drinks and beer in late Sep and early October despite repeated demands and requests by the Irish L O in Leo, it eventually turned into a deluge by late Oct and early Nov. Not only were we swamped with supplies but a sizeable proportion of the wet consignments consisted of fruit juices which were difficult to sell. As storage became a problem headquarters Leo were notified to cease temporarily shipments until further demand. The deluge continued despite further requests and a final message to effect that further unrequisitioned shipments would be refused and returned to Leo. When the position continued unchanged one large shipment consisting principally of fruit juices was refused at Eville Airport and returned to Leo immediately. The storm that followed in UN Headquarters both in Leo and in Eville in the form of queries, explanations, reports and investigations settled this supply problem and no further difficulties were experienced during the Bn's term in the Congo. At the beginning of December as the political situation worsened in Eville and all available UN Air Transport was ear-marked for the transportation of troops into the City, the Bn was again very well stocked up with all essential Canteen Merchandise. Stock to a total retail value of £4,700 was handed over to the 36 Bn on 1.12.'61. For details of items purchased from PX sources see Statistical data below.

(6) PX - Attractive Items

These items consisted in the main of Cameras, Watches, Transistor Radios, Record Players, Tape Recorders, etc., All items on the attractive list had to be ordered and paid for three to four months before delivery. Although a number of different items in this Department were ordered and paid for before the end of July, 1961 one lot of watches was not delivered before the Bn was repatriated in December causing considerable disappointment to the personnel concerned.

c. FREE ISSUES

During the period of fighting from 13 Sep. essential items of Canteen merchandise were issued to all ranks free of charge. This was necessary as personnel had not been paid and it was not possible under existing conditions to keep records of these issues to individuals. The following items were issued on the authority of the Bn Commander:-

Cigarettes, soft drinks, soap and razor blades. (See statistical data for detail).

d. LOSSES DURING THE PERIOD SEPT. 13 to SEPT. 21

During the above period losses of merchandise to a total value of £965 were sustained. These losses occurred in:-

- (1) Jadotville where 'A' Coy was stationed.
- (2) The Factory which had to be abandoned by 'C' Coy.
- (3) The Armd Car Group whose Headquarters was situated in the Baluba refugee Camp and vacated during the fighting.
- (4) Staquet House - the Officers' Mess which was also abandoned during this period.
- (5) At the Lufira Bridge where a lorry carrying supplies to the relief of 'A' Coy was destroyed by jet fighter.

The above loss which included a sum of £352 in respect of Cooperaage was notified to U N Headquarters and a claim submitted for refund. A refund in respect of the free issues mentioned at Para c. above to a total value of £345 has also been claimed from U N Headquarters.

e. SAVINGS ACCOUNT

A savings Account was opened whereby all ranks were permitted to save up to 50% of their gross U N pay received in the Congo. These savings were lodged and transferred in Sterling to an account with the A.C.B. Dublin through the U N Finance Office in Eville. On repatriation these amounts were paid out to the individuals concerned by the A.C.B.

f. RATES OF EXCHANGE - DEVALUATION

During the period June to 30 Nov the official rates of exchange were as follows:-

£1	-	140	Katangese	Francs
/\$1	-	50	"	"

With effect from the 1st Dec. 1961 the Franc was devalued the new rates of exchange being.

£1	-	180	Katangese	Francs
/\$1	-	64	"	"

The change in the exchange rates although effective from 1.12.'61 was not notified until the 3rd Dec 1961 and the last lodgement of savings made on 1.12.'61 was transferred to Ireland by U N at the new rate of 180. This matter was taken up by A.C.B. with U N Authorities in Leopoldville with a view to having the last lodgement transferred at the old rate.

g. STATISTICAL DATA

- (1) PX and Canteen Merchandise taken over from 34 Bn

Total retail value	<u>£1,666</u>
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Principal items of merchandise taken over were:-

Guinness	-	37,200	Cans
Cigarettes (Irish)	-	225,000	
Gin	-	330	Bottles
Biscuits	-	3,780	Pkts.

1. EXPENDITURE FROM WELFARE FUNDS

A sum of £124 was expended from the Bn Welfare Fund on:-

Repairs to Radios and Film Projector
 Camp Fires - Entertainment expenses.
 Cigarettes etc issued to Hospital Patients
 Inter-Coy and Bn Sports Fixtures - Prizes
 Electric Irons
 Band Equipment
 Film Processing Equipment
 Gratuities to Film Projectionists (Signals Personnel)

m. GENERAL

From the date of our arrival in Elizabethville until the 28th August the dispersal of the Unit over five different localities and the subsequent periods of tension and fighting from then until our repatriation made the effective control of Welfare equipment difficult and unsatisfactory. Details of the equipment supplied to Companies by Commands were not available in all cases. Each Sub-unit understood that all equipment supplied to it by its Command Welfare Board belonged to it alone for its sole use and not meant to supplement the Bn pool of equipment taken over from the 34 Bn.

The break-up of the Unit during the last few weeks of our Congo service with 'B' and 'C' Coys in the Albertville Area also confused the hand-over. The welfare equipment of the 1 Inf Group was handed over to 'B' Coy who with 'C' Coy handed over to the 36 Bn representative in December. No details are available of the equipment handed over by these Companies or 1 Inf Group.

n. INDOCR ENTERTAINMENTS(a) Film Shows

From 23rd June to 23rd Sept each Coy had five Film Shows per week. Thereafter one film show each night was held at Bn Headquarters.

(b) Concerts

(i) Each Coy held a concert or camp-fire once a month.

(ii) Three Bn Concerts and two Bn Camp-fires were held.

(iii) A demonstration of Irish Step Dancing was given at a Bn reception.

Up to the end of October Concerts and Film Shows were held in the open.

0. GAMES AND ATHLETICS

(1) Gaelic Football

- (i) Each Coy held its own inter platoon league.
- (ii) An Bn inter-Coy League was held.
- (iii) An exhibition game, planned for All-Ireland Football Final day, had to be abandoned because of hostilities between U.N. and Katanga.
- (iv) A series of matches which had been arranged against Irish Teams from Northern Rhodesia in the months of Sept, October, and November, had to be abandoned because of the political situation.

(2) Hurling

- (i) Each Coy ran an inter-platoon League.
- (ii) An Bn inter-Coy League was held.
- (iii) An exhibition game planned for first Sunday in September had to be abandoned because of tension between U.N. and Katanga authorities.

(3) Soccer

- (i) Each Coy ran an inter-platoon League
- (ii) A Bn inter-Coy League was held
- (iii) Coys played several games against Indian Signals, Indian Supply, Italian Hospital, an Italian Civilian Team from Elisabethville, Dogra Bn and Ghorka Bn.
- (iv) Bn team took part in U.N. inter-unit League and reached the final against the Swedish Bn. The first game was a 2-2 draw but the Swedish Bn won the replay by 3 goals to 2.
- (v) Matches which had been arranged with teams from Northern Rhodesia had to be abandoned because of the political situation in Katanga.

(4) Rugby

- (i) A Bn team was organised for competition against the Swedish Bn team and teams from Northern Rhodesia.
- (ii) The team played one game against a team from the 3rd Royal Rhodesian Regt in Kitwe and lost by 19 Pts to 3 Pts.
- (iii) Matches which had been arranged against other teams had to be abandoned because of the political situation.

(5) Volleyball

- (i) This game was introduced in all Coys and proved quite popular.
- (ii) A Bn team took part in a U.N. inter-unit League which was not completed.

(6). Table Tennis

Table tennis competitions were held in each Coy. The game was very popular and provided a most useful form of recreation for personnel confined to Camp on duty.

(7). Darts

This was a most popular form of entertainment in all Coys and many hilarious, impromptu competitions were held.

(8). Rings

Popular with personnel doing Guard Duty.

(9). Athletics

(i) Generally speaking the ground was too hard and the climate too warm for Athletics. However, each Coy held an Athletics' Meeting in July and August, in the Dom Bosco Sports Pavilion, Elisabethville. These Athletic Meetings commenced at 07.30 hrs and concluded around 10.00 hrs. They were attended by many of the civilian population - Africans and "Whites" - who showed much appreciation of the performances.

(ii) On one occasion some 200 Schoolboys marched around the sports pavilion, at the conclusion of the events, behind the Irish pipe band and then formed up facing the Bn Comdr and staff and sang the Katanga Anthem. They stood to attention and saluted while the Irish National Anthem was being played.

(iii) A Bn Sports fixture which had been planned for September had to be abandoned, as had an inter-Bn contest against the Swedish Bn.

p. Sofaris

- (1) A party of 3 Officers and 40 O/R went on a three day Sofari to LOFOI FALLS on the LUFIRA, River, one of the beauty spots in Katanga.
- (2) Several day trips were made to KINEAMA, on the LUAPULA River, by parties of section strength.
- (3) Numerous other Sofaris which had been planned were cancelled because of the political situation.

q. Visits to Industrial Establishments

Parties of Officers, NCOs and Privates made visits to the following on the invitations of the managements.

- a. Simba Brewery.
- b. Union Mineire Mines in KIPUSHI.
- c. Union Mineire Mines In JADOTVILLE.
- d. Lumbumbashi Smelting Plant.
- e. International Trade Fair.

r. Pioneer Total Abstinence Association

The Bn Pioneer Total Abstinence Members went on several outings, arranged by Rev. Fr. Fagan, to JADOTVILLE and KINEAMA.

8. TRAININGa. Standard on assuming duty:-

From the outset the 35 Bn. was a soundly selected Bn. and its officers and NCO's in general left little to be desired. This was borne out later when the unit went into action and acquitted itself so well.

It was thought that the training plan in the Irish home Army for all ranks is very soundly based and very suited to our general needs.

b) Some deficiencies noted:

- (1) Many had not been fully exercised from a battle view point in F.N. Rifle and Gustaf. This deficiency had to be repaired on the weapons range which the Katangese Gendarmerie placed at our disposal.
- (2) Our NCO's are unused to being given initiative opportunities at home and were a little at sea in the early days in the Congo. This deficiency was quickly adjusted and most NCO's rose to great heights in the operations following the end of Aug '61. More initiative should be given our ranks at home. Special exercises should be devised to develop initiative especially for young officers and NCO's.
- (3) Our men were not adequately security conscious. They were not suspicious enough as sentries, on patrol or off duty. This fault prevailed right through. They are very much inclined to be "cushy" and easygoing. They trust too much in the other fellows good intentions. This security consciousness must be drilled into all ranks in all aspects of our home training, especially U N training.
- (4) Language Training: We were lacking in this important sphere. This of course is due to our home educational system where the classics abound. We tried to overcome the deficiency by classes in French but the operations of Aug-Dec put a stop to the good work. What limited French we possessed was invaluable.
- (5) Suitable Small Arms Drills: There were no suitable drills for F N Rifle and Gustaf for all occasions. The Bn repaired this deficiency by producing an effective drill and acquainting all ranks with same. Copy attached. See Appx 'L'. These drills were used throughout the Bn for all guards of honour, guard mounting, sentries, parades, etc.
- (6) Endurance Training: Our men are not used to doing exercises over a couple or a few days. They require practice in long route marching and long exercises without sleep.
- (7) Battle Training: Pre Congo Training did not include enough of this.
- (8) Digging: Our men at home do not get enough of this. There is not enough emphasis in this most important aspect of training. "Dig or Die" they found was still a sound saying. Officers and NCO's were brought to see the superb digging of Indian units and seen copied their standards.

- (9) Military Police: Were found to be deficient in one important aspect of training for Congo duties, i.e. methods of carrying out arrests. Training in this had to be done on the eve of arrests in E'ville. Assistance from Gardai would be of great help here.
- (10) Built up area fighting not emphasised in home training. Experience was the only remedy here.

9. CLOTHING:

a. Issues from Ireland

- (1) Trunks and singlets should have been shorter and closer fitting on the style of Y front. This type was essential when wearing shorts.
- (2) Boots - the type and quality were unsuitable. An all rubber sole with a lighter and more flexible type of leather would have been better. Irish boots quickly cracked and for the most part were unserviceable when the wet weather arrived. The deficiency was overcome by a partial replacement by similar UN type boots, the issue to all ranks of jungle boots, which were canvas with rubber soles and by the acquisition by one means and another of black boots on issue to Katanganese forces. Generally, the Irish issue of boots was unsatisfactory.
- (3) The non-issue of a national tropical uniform was a disadvantage. The Irish troops were alone in this respect. All the Officers purchased an agreed pattern of tropical dress which they wore on all formal and semi-formal occasions.
- (4) Socks - It was observed that most Europeans wore socks of nylon texture. A proportion of the issue of socks could with advantage have been of this type. The heavy socks issued wore quickly at the heel and toes and were subject to undue shrinkage. Socks with nylon type heels and toes would have been an advantage.

b. U.N. Uniform.

- (1) The issue of one tropical type shirt and blouse was made in Leopoldville. Generally the sizes available were not sufficient to allow for correct fitting and our troops could be seen wearing the trousers with large waists and several turn-ups to compensate for the length of the trousers. The second issue of shirt and trousers was not made for several weeks. Since these uniforms require at least weekly washing and interim delay in making the second issue resulted in much inconvenience to all concerned. It would have been an advantage to have had two shirts and trousers of this type issued in Ireland where it could have been washed to allow for shrinkage before being fitted properly to each man. Finally we had to make a case for the issue of a third shirt and trousers. This should not have been necessary as the issue was required. Representations on these lines to ONUC HQ. would have been helpful.

Had an Irish Supply Depot been in existence at Leopoldville with ample stocks of clothing to allow for two well fitted trousers and shirts some of the subsequent difficulties in the clothing situation would have been avoided.

c. Local Purchase. We had none.

d. Clothing Life.

An issue in normal circumstances of three UN shirts and trousers and of one good national tunic and trousers would have been sufficient for a six months period. Troops sleeping under canvas were liable to suffer damage to national uniform by the action of ants. Occupation of dug-in defensive positions quickly rendered clothing unserviceable. These conditions caused considerable hardship to troops especially in the wet season. The national uniforms of over 70 men of 'B' Coy were destroyed by fire and there was no way of replacing them until the arrival of the advance party of the 36th Bn. Had this loss by fire occurred at an earlier date the troops concerned would have suffered unnecessary hardship. Had an Irish Supply Depot been in existence holding replacement stocks these difficulties of supply would have been readily overcome.

10. EQUIPMENT

Generally the equipment was not effected by weather conditions. This was not so in the case of some signal equipment, e.g. batteries (from dampness and dust), radiosets (principally from dust). Tentage has already been reported on, but, to repeat, the National Tentage was unsuitable principally because it was not doubled lined as is the Indian tentage, our canvas was unsufferably hot in the dry season and was no protection against the heavy rains. The double lined tents would have given much better protection. It is difficult at the beginning of a six-month tour of duty to know if the weapons being carried are suitable since the role of the Bn can change radically. In the case of the 35th Bn the large proportion of Gustaf SMGs carried was excessive when the Sep. type of fighting broke out. We had a very serious accident due to the accidental discharge of a Gustaf. It was noted that the Swedes kept the weapon cocked and maintained that to be the safer position. There were some not quite valid complaints that the web equipment was not as good as the lighter type Swedish plastic made equipment.

We lost the complete ordnance of 'A' Coy. after the incident of Jadotville. Other losses occurred through fire. We consumed the following ammunition:

.303 Mk 8z	-	32,000 Rds.	60 mm Mortar H.E.	-	574 Rds
" Mk 7	-	86,000 "	60 mm Mortar Smoke	-	36 "
" Mk 7z	-	2,900 "	Grenades 36 HE	-	500 "
" Tracer	-	7,000 "	" Energa HF	-	140 "
Gustaf	-	120,000 "	Projectiles 84 mm A.T.	-	146 "
7.62 F.N.	-	57,000 "	Grenades Smoke	-	47 "
81 mm Mortar H.E.	-	290 "	" Tear Gas	-	77 "
81 mm Smoke	-	42 "	" Lacramatory	-	476 "
			Plastic Explosives Lbs		220

11. ARMAMENT

a. Suitability:

The armament of the Cn was considered satisfactory generally. The following points were noted:-

- (1) FN Rifles - Strict control was necessary to avoid waste of amn. The automatic facility lead to gross over-expenditure on some occasions.
- (2) SMGs - The effective range was very limited. Targets beyond 100 yds were out of effective range.
- (3) LMGs - The Bron gun was invaluable during the Sep actions and proved quite effective at ranges up to 1,000 yds.

- (4) Mors - The 60 mm mors were found to be very accurate within their range but had NOT the weight or volume to deal with many of the targets, which presented themselves. The 81mm mors were NOT on the tables of weapons allotted to the Cn but had been handed over by 34 Bn and crews were trained to man them in Jul/Aug '61. This was a fortunate anticipation because the "81's" proved a most effective weapon during the subsequent fighting in Sep. The 14 lb bomb was introduced late in period and was more effective in many ways than the 7 lb.
- (5) 84mm Atk Recoilless Rifles These gave a very necessary sense of security in face of the Katangan Gendarmerie Armd Cs and a number of first round hits were recorded. They were most useful in dealing with enemy pockets located in buildings and in the anti-pers role.
- (6) Armd Cs - The Irish Ford had not the armour or armament to match the Katangan Staghound with 37mm gun, but with protection from 84 mm Atk Rifles and the superior skill of Irish gunners and drivers the Gendarmerie avoided clashing with them. Apart from active hostilities the Irish armd c's were most useful for patrol work during mob activities and had a very marked morale effect on the local population.

12. SUPPLY

- a. The system of supply of foodstuffs was similar to our National system, with a monthly account. An interesting point here was that we were always debited with overissues, but never credited with underissues. Should there be a UNO charge on our Dept for overissues an account of the underissues should reveal a balance to our credit.
- b. The ration scale was fair except in sugar and butter. We found that there was much use of sugar in the frequent issues of tea and that the sugar ration was never sufficient to cater properly. However the issue of tea was in excess of requirements and we were so able to bargain locally in an exchange of tea for sugar. We had no issue of butter in an area where butter was readily available. We were informed that when the "home" Government insisted that butter would be issued every effort was made to comply on the part of the UNO authorities. The troops of the Danish army were in this category. In any event the issue of margarine in lieu of butter was very unpopular.
- c. The quality of the rations issued was good.
- d. Cooking was our own affair and the standard depended upon the standard of our cooks. Generally the standard was first-rate and reflected credit on the training imparted to them in Ireland. Perhaps our cooks should get additional training in the matter of improvisation of equipment. One of our cooks managed to bake excellent bread (during the fighting) using a tar barrel and the Hydra cooker as the only means of baking.
- e. Cooking facilities available to the Coys. - the hydra cooker and sometimes electric cookers were reasonably good. The lack of a means of roasting meat was felt.
- f. Combat rations: Our Irish pack ration was the best pack ration available in Congo. When during the Sep. fighting the Swedish Bn was eating porridge and rice without meat for dinner, our men were feeding well off our Irish pack rations. On the other hand the American 'C' ration which is the general reserve ration pack in Congo, was found unsuitable to the Irish

taste. It was agreed that the tinned potatoes in the Irish pack was of very poor quality. We could with advantage have carried double the quantity of Irish pack rations to Congo.

13. Engineer - Tasks, equipment etc.

- a. Supplies of Engineer Stores for Maintenance and Field works were procured originally by local purchase after a tedious process, involving Logistics Officer (Military) and his staff and Procurement Officer (civilian) and his staff.

In August, 1961, local purchase of all Ordnance which included Engineer stores ceased and these items were then requisitioned on UN HQ., Leo with consequent delay and eventual drying up of the source. Normal maintenance goods, i.e. electric fittings, light bulbs, nails, screws, timber, galvanise iron, small plumbing fittings, etc. were then not available. Some goods were acquired by means of a local contractor but his services fluctuated with the political temperature. Generally supply of Engineer stores was poor due;

- (1) to the cumbersome system
- (2) insufficient technical liaison.

- b. Engineer tasks were mostly of a maintenance nature with little reference to field works. Emphasis was on light, water and sewage. Major breakdowns could only be rectified by the local authorities, meanwhile a skeleton service was maintained by Engineer equipment and improvisation.

In the absence of main sewers due to lack of fall and suitable outlet, disposal of sewage was confined to septic tanks. As all but the largest villas were designed for a household of 4 to 6 persons concentration of troops in an area created a big problem with regard to sewage disposal.

The only satisfactory solution to this problem is the deep trench latrine. Of utmost importance in this regard is the supply of proper materials for construction. It was impossible to obtain soft wood and the hardwood obtained were unseasoned, however with perhaps improvement in liaison a suitable timber could be obtained and with the use of electric drills instead of the hand method a sound job is possible without the ever present headach of renewal and repair.

Engineer equipment was found to be too heavy and too bulky to be cared, stored and moved by such a small party.

Water purification equipment, including Horrox boxes was in short supply. Canvas storage tanks were u/s. and further supplies of cordage were necessary. Tool kits generally were only fair. Electric cable and fittings were in short supply. Onan lighting sets while highly efficient were unsuitable for existing, 220V. installations and appliances, were too heavy to be mobile and carried too much equipment. A full complement of switches, holders, cable and bulbs alone would be sufficient. Pumping plant was found satisfactory. There was a requirement for a strong durable type of power saw for cutting firewood in the Albertville area.

Operationally, the Engineers were part of HQ. Coy, and were rarely called on to carry out technical tasks in combat. Key personnel gave assistance in demolition work in the Lufira area of J-dotville and dismantled

railway lines on the tunnel in Elizabethville.

14. TRANSPORT - Tasks, vehicles on charge etc.

a. Vehicles

Reg. No.	Type	Owned by	Remarks
ZL.1244	SWB Jeep	Irish Gov.	Left in Verfaile Garage for engine overhaul.
ZL.1238	" "	" "	Handed over to 36th Bn. Recommended for board.
ZD.5086	" "	" "	Handed over to 36th Bn
1777	LWB "	U.Nations	Handed over to Indian W/shops Elizabethville.
1780	" "	" "	Destroyed by 37 mm Shell Rue Astrid, 13/9/61.
1781	" "	" "	Handed over to 36th Bn.
1782	" "	" "	Handed over to 36th Bn.
1785	" "	" "	Captured by Gendarmerie Jadotville
1786	" "	" "	Destroyed by enemy at Radio College with De Soto Bus.
2047	SWB "	U.Nations	Captured by Gendarmerie Jadotville.
2048	" "	" "	" " " "
2051	" "	" "	Handed over to 36th Irish Bn.
2053	" "	" "	" " " " " "
2067	" "	" "	" " " " " "
2069	" "	" "	" " " " " "
2065	" "	" "	" " " " " "
2085	" "	" "	Destroyed by Fouga Jet en route to Jadotville.
2079	" "	" "	Stolen from Verfaile Garage. Court of Inquiry convened.
2123	" "	" "	Handed over to 36th Bn.
2033	" "	" "	" " " " "
2099	" "	" "	" " " " "

Regt. No.	Type	Owned By	Remarks
ZIK.120	SWB. L. Rover	Irish Gov.	Handed over to Indian W/Shops for Board.
ZIK.121	" "	" "	Stationed at Kamina for duration.
ZIK.122	LWB Rover	" "	Handed over to Indian W/shops for board.
HIK.746	" "	" "	Stationed at Kamina for duration.
HIK.748	" "	" "	Handed over to Indian W/Shops for Board.
MRI.769	" "	" "	Handed over to Indian W/shops for board.
MRI.770	" "	" "	Destroyed by enemy action. "Factory Area".
MRI.762	SWB "	" "	Handed over to Indian W/Shops for board.
HIK.757	LWB "	" "	" " " " "
MRI.715	SWB "	" "	" " " " "
ZIK.116	" "	" "	" " " " "
MRI.767	LWB "	" "	" " " " "
8137	Bedford Truck	U.Nations	Captured by enemy at Jadotville.
8150	"	" "	Handed over to 36th Irish Bn.
500329	"	" "	Destroyed 13/9/61.
500347	"	" "	Destroyed "Factory Area" by enemy action.
7893	Mer. Diesel	" "	Handed over 10th Sept to Dogra Bn. subsequently destroyed at Jadotville Cross Roads.
M.3	" "	" "	Destroyed & driver killed 13/9/61. Stadt Area.
S.I	V/W Pickup	" "	Handed over to 36th Bn.

SALOON CARS HIRED BY U.N. FROM CIVILIAN OWNERS - ELIZABETHVILLE

Chevrolet	Red	Handed over to U.N. Transport Officer.
"	Green	Handed over to 36th Bn.
Buick	Green	Handed over to U.N Transport Officer.
Pontiac	White	Handed over to 36th Bn.
Vauxhall	Blue	Handed back to U.N. Transport Officer.
"	Cream	" " " " " "
"	"	" " " " " "
Opal	Two/Tone	" " " " " "
Chrysler	Blue	" " " " " "
"	Grey	Stolen from Verfaile Garage.
Dodge	Black	Captured by Gendarmerie - Jadotville.

Floyd
Studebaker
Peugeot
Dodge

S.8
Green
Grey
Black

55.
Captured by Gendarmerie- Jadotville.
Handed back to U.N. Transport Officer.
Destroyed in fighting Radio Katanga on
13th September, 1961.
Purchased for Bn. Commander Irish Bn.
Aug. Handed over to 36th Irish Bn.ONUC.

<u>Regt No.</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Owned By</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
1. No Number	Taurus	U.Nations	In Verfaile Garage & handed over to 36th Bn.
2. " "	S/Wagon	" "	" " " " "
3. " "	"	" "	Handed over to 36th Irish Bn.
4. " "	"	" "	" " " " " "
5. " "	Taurus } Pickup }	" "	" " " " " "
6. " "	Taurus Trans porter.	" "	" " " " " "

The above-mentioned vehicles were received from United Nations in July

<u>Regt. No</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Owned By</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
S2	V/W Saloon	U.Nations	Received July and handed over to 36 Bn.
S3	" "	" "	" Aug. " " "
S5	" "	" "	" July " " "
9201	" Ambulance"	" "	" July " " "

<u>Reg. No.</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Owned By</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
1	Henschel Diesel Bus.	Commandeered	Handed over to 36th Bn.
2	"	"	" " " " "
3	"	"	" " " " "
4	"	"	Destroyed by Feuga Jet en route to Jadotville.
5	"	"	Knocked out by Feuga Jet and left immobilised.
6	"	"	Handed back to Bus Company
7	"	"	" " " " "
8	"	"	" " " " "

Reg. No.	Type	Owned By	Remarks
827	S250 Ford Pickup	UN.	Handed over to 36th En.
824	"	"	" " " "
953	"	"	" " " "
609	"	"	" " " "
610	"	"	" " " "
226	"	"	" " " "
763	"	"	" " " "
1	V/W Transporter	Captured from Katanga Police.	
2	"	"	" " " "
	Armoured Car (MType)	Captured from Gendarmarie	" " " "

b. Tasks

JUNE

The Bn TO arrived in Elixabethville on the 28th of June, 1961, with 2 Fitters and 2 M.T. Sgts., and took over the keys of vehicles from Captain McGuinness, Cavalry Corps, who was a member of the advance party and who initially took over from the 34th Irish Battalion. With the assistance of four Cavalry Fitters the 8 personnel were constantly utilised ferrying in the balance of the Battalion. Captain McPeake (1st. TO) and the balance of dvrs arrived on the 29th. During this period a survey of vehicles was carried out as a considerable number of them needed repairs and painting. Vehicles were allotted to Staff Officers and Companies.

JULY:

Early in the month the transport platoon moved into the Swedish Camp where vehicles were divided into:

- (1) Serviceable vehicles and available for Duty
- (2) Vehicles requiring minor repairs.
- (3) Vehicles requiring major repairs.

The major repairs were carried out at the civilian Verfaille Garage. Ford Taunus Station Wagons and Pickups were purchased by United Nations at the request of the Swedish Officer Commanding, South Katanga and we received 4 Ford Station Wagons, 1 Ford Pickup and 1 Ford Transporter. Accompanied by Sgt. Callopy and members of the transport platoon, TO reced the bush road to Mocambo on the Rhodesian Border where it was intended to position a platoon. This entailed driving nearly 400 miles on bush roads and was of considerable experience to the drivers. The Headquarter and each Company had its own transport and on receipt

of a list of drivers from each Company, it was arranged for United Nation Licences to be issued to them. Most of the drivers were from Irish Battalion Transport but did not hold transport positions in the Company.

AUGUST:

Sgt. Callopy and members of the Transport Pln accompanied a patrol from "A" Company to Dilole and return, a journey of over 1,800 miles. They left on the morning of the 23rd of August and all available transport was on the move. Signs of rioting were evident down town, and patrols were a daily feature in the Battalion. Baluba refugees appeared at the rear of the Battalion position and inside a matter of days hundreds had arrived. Armed patrols in jeeps circled their camp in an effort to keep order.

SEPTEMBER:

The beginning of the month saw commencement of riots and demonstrations. Drivers were constantly on patrol. A de Soto 40 Seater Bus was purchased for Irish Battalion on the 12th of September and one Truck given to Dogra Battalion. All drivers were utilised for the operation of the 13th of September. Due to the widespread activities of the Irish Battalion, losses in transport were greater than any other of the United Nations Battalions.

- 1 Peugeot Grey was destroyed at Radio Katanga on the morning of the 13th.
- 1 Bedford Truck destroyed on the 13th September.
- 1 Mercedes Truck destroyed on the 13th September at Stad Victoir - Driver killed.
- 1 Jeep was destroyed by 37 mm Shell - Rue Astrid - on the 13th of September, 1961 - Driver wounded.
- 1 De soto Bus destroyed at Radio College (Officers and occupants captured).
- 1 Jeep destroyed at Radio College.
- 2 Trucks captured from "A" Company, Jadotville.
- 1 Land Rover destroyed by enemy action at Factory Area.
- 1 Diesel Truck destroyed by enemy action at Factory Area. (both these vehicles had been immobilised for want of repairs)
- 1 Truck (on loan from Swedish Battalion) destroyed at Lufira Bridge.
- 2 Buses (commandeered) destroyed by Fouga Jet on route to Lufira Bridge.
- 1 Jeep (commandeered) destroyed by Fouga Jet on route to Lufira Bridge.
- 3 Drivers - Ptes. Doyle, Hyler and Murphy - spent one week with the Dogra Battalion assisting them in driving their vehicles whilst Ptes. Byrne and Reidy (Fitters) were captured. Towards the 20th of September, 1961, petrol and diesel stocks were running low and accompanied by Captain McPeake, Drivers and a Platoon from A Company, the TO "commandeered" 1,000 gallons of petrol and 800 gallons of diesel from Verfaille Garage.

On the 28th of September, 1961, on the express authority of Doctor Conor Cruise O'Brien, TO arranged for the delivery of 15 Ford Pickups to the Irish Battalion from civilian garage sources. These greatly increased the mobility of the Battalion.

OCTOBER:

The balance of Buses were used constantly shifting Baluba refugees. Patrols co-operated with Katanga Police in operating workers patrol to ensure law and order in the area. All supplies had to be drawn from the Airport. Due to sanctions imposed by Mr. Tshombe, no repairs could be carried out in civilian garages and due to depleted strength in Fitters great difficulty was experienced in keeping abreast of running repairs. At the end of October, all prisoners returned including 2 Fitters.

NOVEMBER:

This was an uneventful month, - there were only workers patrols and armed patrols round the City. There was little or no garage facilities and spares of all kinds were in short supply

DECEMBER:

On the 2nd of December, 1961, the Katangese set up road blocks and fighting commenced on the 5th. Vehicles were prepared for patrols and buses ran non stop to and from the Airport ferrying in the 36th Irish Battalion. On the 10th of December, 1961, the balance of the Battalion - Headquarter Company and 2 platoons of A. Company moved to Rousseau Farm to guard the back road to the Airport. Transport was divided between the 35th and 36th Irish Battalions.

Following the knock-out of an enemy armoured car by an Anti-Tank Gun of A. Company at the Old Air Strip, accompanied by Captain McPeake and drivers, TO salvaged same and drove it back to Rousseau Farm. Up to the departure of the Battalion Headquarters and remnants of 'A' Company, drivers were occupied on patrols, the ferrying in of the 36th Battalion and collection of supplies.

c. REPAIRS, MAINTENANCE, RECOVERY:

REPAIRS:

The Irish owned Jeeps and Land Rovers on take-over, due to mileage performed, etc, were really beyond economical repair. The balance of the vehicles required numerous minor repairs.

A civilian United Nations Staff comprising of a Chief Administrative Officer, Procurement Officer, Transport Officer and other kindred kind were attached to the United Nations Headquarters. In theory, in order to obtain spare parts for vehicles, the Procurement Officer was responsible for obtaining same and the accounts certified by the Civilian Transport Officer. In practice, however, this did not work as a great delay always resulted between handing in the requisition and the receipt of stores. We availed of a United Nations Regulation which permitted a Unit Commander to order up to 10,000 francs worth of repairs. In this way the civilian garages obtained, supplied and fitted the spare parts and no undue delay resulted. After September, however, it was impossible to obtain spare parts and petrol, tyres, batteries had to be flown in from Leopoldville.

MAINTENANCE (Every 1,000 Kilometers):

Servicing of vehicles was carried out in civilian garages. For a period, the Fitters available worked in one of the civilian Garages (Verfaillie Frores) in an effort to speed up matters and quite a good system of servicing, repairs and washing of vehicles existed. However, when the fighting broke out, we had little or

no facilities for servicing.

RECOVERY:

The ordinary method of recovery was towing by another vehicle. The civilian Garage, Verfaille, arranged for non-towable vehicles to be recovered by a civilian breakdown truck, as United Nations had no such vehicle. During the fighting, vehicles breaking down were immobilised permanently, so as not to fall into enemy hands.

d. DRIVING STANDARDS

All personnel driving U N Vehicles were required to be in possession of an UN driving permit. A list of Officers, NCOs and Men having ...F. 154 or an Irish Civilian Drivers Licence was drawn up on the advice of the Bn QM & Coy Commanders selected personnel in each of the Coys were issued with these permits.

e. POL:

The Bn advance party had been issued with supplies of UN petrol coupons made out to a civilian petrol distributor - Fina-Stop. Due to the fact that it was found difficult to supervise and account for the petrol drawn by these coupons they were withdrawn. Petrol and oil were drawn in bulk in barrels from the main Civilian Petrol Depot. Issues to vehs were made daily by the NCO i/c. P O L and accounted for on A Fs 441 and 294.

A monthly return of consumption of petrol and oil and mileage in respect of each veh was forwarded to Brigade HQ.

LA 74 was used to account for the mileage.

Log Books were not used.

S A E 40 and E P 80 were the oils used by all vehs.

Jerrycans were utilised on long patrols.

The average daily consumption of petrol including hydracookers was 4 barrels.

f. TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS AND INSURANCE:

Despite the number and variety of vehs and driving on the right hand side of the road, the number of accidents - 4 - was small and no great damage was done in any case.

Accidents were investigated immediately after the occurrence by either the Irish or Swedish Military Police and on receipt of the reports the Tpt Officer made out the necessary pro-formas and made recommendations. The completed forms were then forwarded to the Civilian U N Transport Officer.

INSURANCE:

All UN vehicles were insured in Leopoldville but vehs hired locally were insured by an Insurance firm in Elizabethville who insisted on a full report of an accident within 8 days.

15. SIGNALS

a. Equipment & Wireless Sets.

(1) C 12 Set. This set was required to do work well outside its normal function. At times during our period in the Congo the wireless net was spread from a mile to one substation (the Tunnel) to 500 miles (Nyunsu). By use of suitable aerials and morse this was made possible. The distances for some mobile Patrols from 20 to 105 miles were impossible to

cover on the move and could only be done by stopping and erecting an overhead aerial or by relays.

(2) No. 31 Set & 88 Set. Within the range of these sets, $\frac{1}{2}$ mile to 3 miles, they were adequate when the batteries were satisfactory, and the sets handled by operators. Their function was however severely limited by screening and the distances required to cover, and most of all by bad batteries. When fitted with good batteries they fulfilled their function during the attack on the Tunnel in December.

(3) BATTERIES.

(a) Secondary Batteries deteriorated rapidly due to bad storage facilities (they were charged and stored in the open due to lack of accommodation). The fine red dust of Africa, the heat and the heavy rain took a heavy toll. Except with the newest batteries which we brought with us from Ireland one could NOT rely on 24 hours normal working without replacement, even on "receive" only, Conservation of batteries was constantly enforced and to this purpose stations had occasionally to be put on a miscellaneous footing.

(b) Dry Batteries. It is estimated that two months at a maximum is the life of a dry battery arriving in the Congo from Ireland.

(4) Battery Charging Equipment.

This constituted our greatest headache until we were supplied with two new petrol charging plants from UN sources in October. The electric charging plants had few spare valves and it was found impossible to get spares from UN sources despite constant requisition. The large petrol charger we had was in bad condition and we could NOT get it repaired. During the time batteries were in greater demand there was NO electricity (cut off) we had to rely on chorchorses and on one occasion transport vehicles for battery charging. These snags were happily ironed out before December. The battery situation was aggravated by severe lack of transport for supplying stations.

(5) Telephones and Switchboards.

Generally satisfactory. Inert cells lasted well in store. Most of the difficulty here was in broken lines, which had to be inspected and repaired daily. Wire insulation stood up well. After September we had quite a lot of line work in P.O. installations to maintain contact with UN HQ and other extensions.

(6) Workshops Equipment.

Workshops instruments adequate. One Radio Mechanics Tool Kit was required.

(7) Spares. With the exception of Battery charging equipment and dry batteries our spares position was good.

b. PERSONNEL

(1) W/T Operators. On arrival in the Congo the Signal Pln had only three trained W/T operators outside of NCO's. This meant that the remainder had to be trained out therefor the first ten weeks and this added considerably to the work of the NCO's. Even on the 28th August we were NOT fully prepared to carry out the tasks allotted over any extended period. We were extremely lucky to have had nearly three months on hand

before we were asked for maximum effort. The task of the Signal Pln in the Congo is akin to that of a Brigade Signal Company where the Brigade is spread over hundreds of miles. Only the best operators are of any use in these circumstances. I can say that if it had NOT been for the excellent and above average skill of the NCO's of the Pln and their willingness and sense of duty the story of the Signal Pln of the 35th Bn might have been different.

As it was, as and from the 13th September there was NO incident of failure in communication where a W/T operator was handling the set.

(2) Radio Mechanics. The radio Mechanics were first class and put in a 14 hour day for the whole period. On taking over from the 34th Bn we found more than 60% of the equipment NOT working. Adding to this the great number of civilian type receiving sets held by Welfare, out of order and two projectors faulty, (Items of great importance from a morale view point), their task was greater than any other mechanics sent out from Ireland. Again we were lucky in that the requirement initially for wireless communication was small and this allowed us the vital time necessary.

(3) Linesmen. We had NO linesmen in the Pln. This fact was a handicap as the Pln's task included quite an amount of lineswork.

- c. Signal Office. This was always placed as near to the Adjutants Office as possible. A bn Comd Net and a rear link to Katanga Comd were manned by the Signal Pln plus a direct line to South Katanga Comd and an automatic phone to Katanga command. A Switchboard connected various outposts to the Duty Officer. A Swedish Liaison officer connected us later to the Swedish Bn by wireless on the Swedish net. Communication to Leopoldville and all classified messages were sent by jeep to the Katanga Comd for re-transmission. Sitreps etc were delivered by hand of officer. The Bn Adjutant's office was made the Signal Centre and all messages were passed through the Adjutant or the Duty Officer. All written messages were filed by the Assistant Adjutant. Each station kept its own log strictly and accurately. On later examination the only discrepency found in logs was in the recording of conversations in Irish between officers. After that officers were asked to enter in the log a synopsis of their conversation on its completion. This was carried on by the 36th Bn. The ops officer was unfortunately somewhat removed from the Signal Officer and this created some difficulty during operations. In the OP's officer a HRO monitoring station was set up where interpreters were put under the command of the Signals officer.
- d. Incidence of Duties. During quiet times all ranks performed normal duties and night work was counted as regimental duty. During operations, together with all other members of HQ Coy the personnel of the Pln took their places in the Trenches as required, as well as doing 12 hours on and 12 hours off, on the sets. This was due to the large number of substations required on occasions.
- e. Volume of Traffic. This varied considerably during the period. Perhaps the most interesting statistics are the daily average taken 13th and 20th September:-

Formal Messages out from Bn Hqrs	16
UR Messages " " " "	66
Formal Messages In from Substations	10
UR Messages " " " "	125
Officers Conversations	10

Total average handled by Bn Signals Officer per day
(including phone and all nets) - 318.

f. Coverage.(a) With overhead aerials stationary using morse.

NYUNZU: From 06.00 to 16.00 hours better than strength.2.
Approx distance 500 miles using cut dipole.

DILOLO: On patrol to Dilolo any time the patrol stopped.
Distance 450 miles. Dipole.

KOLWEZI: From 0.8.00 to 15.00 hrs. Distance 300 miles.
Dipole.

KAMINA: From 06.00 hrs to 23.59 Distance 350 miles.
Dipole.

JADOTVILLE: From 05.00 to 02.00 hours. Distance 80 miles.
Aerial inverted $1\frac{3}{4}$ wavelength.

LUFIRA: 60 miles. When patrol stopped. Rod lengthened to
 $\frac{1}{4}$ wave inverted L. Relayed to JADOTVILLE via
ELIZABETHVILLE. Heavy screening between LUFIRA
and JADOTVILLE.

g. VOICE

(1) Conversations between officers were possible at certain times on all stations. Failing voice due to interference, static etc key conversations were carried on.

(2) Frequencies: Due to the varied nature of the net, that is Stations needing ground (communications) wave communication and skywave mixed in one net our frequency coverage was limited to from 3 to 5 megacycles. Changes of frequency were useless from a security point of view as the enemy was so close and our net so easily identified (language, accent etc.) that they were more confusing to us than to the enemy. An Enemy intercept station was captured close to our camp by the Swedes. They were netted on our frequency. During operations on two occasions an unknown station called using one of our call signs and, when challenged did NOT come back.

h. SECURITY.

Due to having NO cypher facilities below command level and to the limited value of Slidex from a time factor point of view, a combination of the use of the Irish language plus codewords for places and people (e.g. Gendarmerie might be called F.C.A.) an effort was made to keep the net secure. In the case of Jadotville and Kamina where our unclassified W/T links were the only means of communication for some time (The Indian and Swedish stations had been abandoned) our most secure method of issuing or receiving instructions was conversations between officers using fast dialectic Irish (e.g. Lt. Col McNamee and Comdt Quinlan) which I believe gave a full measure of security as even officers with a first class knowledge of Irish found it difficult to follow the conversations. Once the key was used, this advantage disappeared. We then used veiled speech as much as possible. Other means used to fool the enemy proved useless. For instance when B. Coy joined the Ghorikas on the second effort to relieve Jadotville wireless silence was imposed on callsign 2. Another station was set up to send dummy traffic on callsign 2. We thought this very clever until the BBC (in London) announced the columns position and approximate strength while halfway to Lufira.

i. INTERCEPT

Our own interception provided valuable information which was passed on to higher command. For instance we were always informed about the location and disposition of our prisoners in JADOTVILLE and KOLWEZI.

j. CONTACTS WITH HAM RADIO

On taking over from the 34th Bn the Radio Transmitter which had been built at the Curragh was NOT working and as it was very low in priority as far as repairs were concerned it was NOT functioning on the 13th September. AC.12 Set with a high dipole cut for 7 megacycles was used to contact Northern and Southern Rhodesia. As soon as hostilities began the Rhodesian Amateurs became a directed net controlled by "ZULU" in Salisbury. They were naturally tied down by the Amateur Regulations and we were handicapped by NOT having an amateur licence and a recognised callsign. However having heard the BBC news stating the casualties we were supposed to have, we asked station 2AB of the Rhodesian Net to send a message as a "Red Cross Relief of Distress" message to Ireland advising the army that all news was grossly exaggerated. As proof that the message was genuine and could be acted on by the army and published to relieve the minds of families, the name of Lt Col McNamee as O/C (This was NOT generally known at the time) and his phone number, plus two other phone numbers of officers, including Sig Pl Comdr was used. This message got through via Capt. M. Ryan-COE on his ham set, who transmitted it to the Army Authorities. Similar messages such as "All in the West OK" to Col. Ernphy via Mrs Kane wife of the 2 i/c 35th Bn were accepted. Names of units and casualty states would, NOT be accepted.

- k. While operations were in progress we succeeded in getting the more powerful transmitter working and erected two three element Yagi beams suited to 14 megacycles and 21 megacycles. We combined Ireland and Katanga in the Callsign 9Q5EI and contacted Mr. McDermot in Newbridge who remained our Irish contact until we contacted the Curragh Amateur Station in Ceannt Bks. This enabled us to have a regular QSO at 1715 hours Irish time daily. This proved of immense value, despite the Amateur regulations which limited us.

From that time until we handed over to the 36th Bn we made over two hundred Amateur contacts as diversified as Japan, Franz Joseph Land, Canada and California. Many QSL Cards were sent to us through the Belgian Amateur Chairman of Katanga in Elizabethville. We were rather embarrassed that we had NO cards to return.

16.

MEDICALa. Standard of Fitness

The Unit was at times subjected to adverse physical conditions and their standard of fitness was adequate for conditions as met. Men over 20 and under 50 stood the strain of Active Service Conditions better than those in the younger and particularly in older age groups.

b. Climatic conditions

On transit to the Congo Irish Army Issue Service Uniform was of necessity, worn by other Ranks, until destination was reached and undoubtedly caused some discomfort. Irish Army Issue Service Leather Boots were not suitable and in many cases were not waterproof, during the rainy season.

No incapacity resulted from Sunburn, and very little as a result of climatic conditions.

Water was palatable and good. Diet was adequate and sufficiently varied.

c. Incidence of Disease.

Remarkably low, especially when adverse living conditions and unsuitable living accommodation are taken into consideration. There was an increased Daily Sick - during the Months of Oct - Nov. - due to an outbreak of Gastro - Enteritis. No specific causative organism was found in pathological investigation and cases were all of short duration. A small number of cases of suspected Malaria occurred in Niamba - Nyunzu Area and one case of Malaria from this area has been confirmed since return home.

Summary of IneffectivityBatt. Strength 647

Month	Daily Average Sick	Principal Causes	Hosp. Adm.	Repatriation (Med. Gds.-other than War Injuries)	DEATHS
July	Less than 1%	Minor Injuries	9	-	Nil.
August	less than 0.5%	Do.	1	One	Nil.
Sept.	Less than 0.5%	Gastro-Enteritis Battle Casualties	18	Two	3 Battle Casualties.
Oct.	Less than 3%	Gastro-Enteritis (97 New Cases)	9	-	Nil.
Nov.	Less than 2½%	Gastro-Enteritis (62 New Cases)	4	One	Nil.
Dec.	Less than 1%	Gastro-Enteritis	5	-	Nil.

December Returns 1st to 16th - Incomplete owing to difficulties of Communication with Detachments in Nyunzu and Niamba and refer only to Hq Coy Armd C gp and elements of A Coy.

Two Death Certificates were issued, the other man was listed as missing - Presumed Dead.

The numbers requiring Hospitalization were, with the exception of Battle Casualties, of a routine nature and were not for prolonged periods. Cases requiring Repatriation were 4.

- 1 following Surgery for Acute Intestinal Obstruction.
- 1 Epilepsy.
- 1 Mental illness.
- 1 Fractured Scapula.

Battle Casualties. All the casualties of the 35th Bn. that were taken to Hospital, survived. We had a total of 15 injured by Enemy Action and four by Accidental Discharge of Firearms.

Hospital Facilities. As supplied by U N Hospital in Elizabethville and to a lesser extent by U N Hospital in Leopoldville were excellent. Survival of some of our Seriously Wounded Casualties was undoubtedly due to the Surgical Skill of the Italian Surgeon (Capt. Cipolat).

d. Drugs and Equipment Were adequate to meet the requirements of the Unit. Large quantities of Drugs were taken over from previous Units and a large quantity of drugs were supplied to meet the needs of the Refugee Hospital, on the instructions of the UN authorities.

e. Assistance Given to Others

There was co-operation among all UN Medical Formations in Elizabethville and Medical Attention was afforded personnel of other Nationalities when and where required. Congolese UN Employees and in some cases their dependants were treated. Responsibility for Supervision of all Medical Aspects of the Refugee Camp were undertaken and all Medical Administration was our direct responsibility. A Refugee Hospital was set up, and the necessary equipment, drugs, dressings were obtained. Our Doctors, and Medical Orderlies attended Daily at the Hospital and an Ambulance Service for Surgical Cases to UN Hosp. was supplied, by the Bn.

f. Medical Platoon

The organization of the Medical Platoon was found generally to be satisfactory. One Medical NCO was seriously wounded during hostilities. He was replaced by one of the two Corporals in Hq Coy. It would be very desirable to have an NCO with Special Training in Hygiene and Sanitation appointed in each Coy of the Bn. Supervision of Sanitary Arrangements, Water Installations etc. is of the utmost importance in Camps in the Tropics. Above all Disposal of Refuse, cleanness in storage, the preparation and handling and cooking, and the handling of Foodstuffs needs very strict and constant supervision. The outbreak of Gastro-Enteritis coincided with seasonal increase in insects and its spread was in some measure due to difficulty in ensuring proper conditions for storing and cooking Foodstuffs.

g. Training

The NCO's of the Medical Platoon were in all cases well trained, conscientious and diligent in the performance of their duties. The Medical Orderlies were all young with short Service and little experience. Initially they had only a sketchy knowledge of their duties. They benefited greatly from an intensive course of Instruction in the first two months in Elizabethville and thereafter they were hard working and well disciplined.

17. Unit Establishment and Personnel

It was found that the unit established and personnel as organised were quite suitable with the following exceptions:

- a. The strength of Tpt pl was far too low in view of the large amount of driving, maintenance and repair.
- b. A sanitation squad was a requirement in the Med pl in view of the need for improvised sanitation and the large hoards of insects.
- c. A line sec in Sig pl was also a necessity.
- d. The Welfare officer's staff was found to be far too small. Large supplies of canteen items had to be handled and accounted for. Fatigue parties and clerical staff were in constant demand in welfare stores.

Weapons equipment and ammunition have been dealt with in para 11 and the Battalion Armament Table is included at APPX. "I".

18. Public Relations

- a. The Irish troops readily established cordial relations with the local population. There were invitations to private houses of Greeks, Italian, Lebanese, French, Polish residents, but proportionally NOT so many to Belgian houses. A number of officers were entertained at the home of the Belgian consul.

On 27 Jun CO, 2 i/c, Chaplain called on the Archbishop of E'ville. On 29 Jun a party of 8 officers attended a reception in President Tshombe's palace. On 2 Jul 2 officers attended a reception at Mr. Munongo's (Minister for Interior) residence in celebration of the birth of his daughter. Brasseries du Katanga invited a party of 20 from the bn to tour the local brewery and were entertained to savouries and beer.

Union Miniere invited a party of 3 to a reception in connection with the Trade Fair which was organised on a lavish scale for a fortnight in Jul. Another commercial firm Fibri Metal invited 2 officers to a similar reception.

The Belgian Consul held a reception in Sabena Guest house on 21 Jul and invited a party of 10 officers.

Union Miniere invited a party of 20 to visit their mines in Kipushi and provided transport there and back (40mls). The Sep fighting reduced this type of social activity to nil and the subsequent invitations were confined to Swedish, Italian, and American Consuls.

- b. The Refugee Camp - Elizabethville.

(1) The Origin of the Camp

The refugee camp was a direct result of hostile measures taken by the Katangese authorities against people whom they considered to be aliens. These people were, in the main Balubas from the province of Kasai.

They were reputed to be the most intelligent of the Congolese people and indeed they held some very good positions in Elizabethville. (Teachers, clerical workers, etc.)

Their first reaction to the threats of violence to themselves and their families was of course to seek refuge with the UN. Those first threatened appeared to be the most well-to-do. They flocked to the Swedish and Irish Camps. The Swedes who had more accommodation in their camp gave refuge to all who came to the two camps seeking refuge, however, the numbers became so great that the 35th Bn were asked to establish a camp in the vicinity of the Irish lines. This was done and the camp was established under the command of Comdt. P. Cahalane, assisted by Capt. S. Hennessey, both of the Armoured Car group, Aug '61.

Shortly after the commencement of the refugee problem, an outbreak occurred in a Katangese prison just south of Elizabethville. Approximately 650 prisoners escaped, all of whom made their way to UN Camps, including those injured in the outbreak, claimed protection and asserted that they had been held political prisoners. Undoubtedly some were political, but many were just ordinary criminals.

The Katangese authorities asked that these prisoners be handed back to them, this request was refused by the

The ex-prisoners were housed at a location known as the "Factory" which had been vacated by 'C' Coy in an effort to concentrate the Bn in the vicinity of Prince Leopold Farm. A platoon of 'C' Coy remained in the 'Factory' as a guard over the ex-prisoners. This camp was commanded by Comdt. T. Moynihan assisted by Capt. C. O'Halloran. Capt. O'Halloran later took over command when Comdt. Moynihan was transferred to Kamina. After approximately three weeks in this camp the ex-prisoners were transferred to a section of their own adjacent to the main refugee camp. During their stay in the 'Factory' the refugees were very well behaved and co-operated in every way possible.

After approx. three weeks in the "Factory" the 35th Bn Commander decided to concentrate all his troops in the region of Prince Leopold Farm. The ex-prisoners were then allotted an area adjacent to the main refugee camp and moved there when the Irish garrison left the 'Factory'.

Among the ex-prisoners were some 22 soldiers of the A.N.C. who were taken prisoner during the independence riotings. These soldiers subsequently proved themselves very useful to the Irish Bn before they were repatriated to Leopoldville in November.

(2) The Re-establishment of the Camp

It soon became apparent that the refugees would have to be moved to another location and the residential area which they had inundated, cleared. Their proximity to the Irish and Swedish camps was giving grave cause for concern with regard to the health of the troops of both Bns as this camp was not in any way planned and was completely devoid of any form of sanitation. The sides of the roadways and the drains beside them were used as lavatories.

The Swedish & Irish Bns undertook the task of moving the thousands of people to the new location where the refugees had to construct their own shelters. They did much damage to private property during this transition period. With the commencement of the refugee problem the Medical staff of the Bn was constantly engaged in attending to the stream of refugees who reported daily for medical attention. The Chaplain was constantly engaged giving spiritual and material assistance by performing normal rites of the Church and in uniting families and in bringing about better conditions for the refugees. In this latter task he was assisted from time to time by numerous officers NCOs and men of the Bn. As time progressed many of the refugees who had relatives or work in other parts of the Congo were sent there by plane.

When the new location was established a Camp Commandant was appointed (Maj Forchland of the Swedish Bn) and the defence of the camp apportioned equally between the Irish and Swedish Bns. These defences were constantly manned until the Bn was repatriated. Many efforts were made to have Indians participate in the management and defence of the Camp, but all efforts failed, except for two short periods when a Ghorka Pln took over one of the Irish posts.

At about this time civilian experts in refugee work became associated with the camp. Frequently their efforts were the cause of much friction, chiefly because of their failure to acknowledge the Camp Comdt as O/C the refugee camp. This situation was never satisfactorily cleared though efforts were made by OC Sec B to do so.

During the months of Nov/Dec 61 the Bn Chaplain and staff were again at work repatriating refugees and the medical staff of the Bn attending to their medical needs.

There were among the refugees youths known as the "Gunesse", who were a constant source of trouble. They made frequent attacks on Katangese Police and indeed at one stage became bold enough to attack Swedish patrols and threaten Irish sentries, however, on one occasion when an attack was made on Irish sentries one of the Gunesse was killed and several were injured. This incident was the last in which Irish troops were attacked by refugees, but it was given much unfavourable publicity by European papers and was directed mainly against the Swedes.

By the end of November joint patrols of Swedish, Irish and Katangese police were being made through and around the refugee camp. These patrols were attacked in the beginning because of police participation. The patrols continued up to the December fighting at which point they abruptly ceased.

The rainy season and the renewal of hostilities brought much hardship to the refugees, many were killed by deliberate sniping and mortaring of the camp. There was little the Bn could do about this as the snipers were constantly on the move, many attempts were made to locate the mortar posns with no success. When ever it was possible food and clothing were given to the refugees by the Bn but under the difficult circumstances this was not always possible. The strength of the camp was estimated at 40,000.

19. APPRECIATION

The following is one letter of appreciation - there are other - written by Brig RAJA, OC KATANGA Comd on the departure of 35 Bn from the Congo.

No 1004/7/GS
HQ Katanga Command
Elisabethville.

CONFIDENTIAL

To:

2 December, 1961.

The Force Commander,
ONUC
LEOPOLDVILLE

Subject: APPRECIATION OF SERVICE - 35th IRISH BATTALION

On the departure of 35th IRISH Battalion from KATANGA Command I feel I would be failing in my duty if I did not express my appreciation as well as that of my staff and troops in KATANGA, of the fine work done by this very fine battalion.

2 The 35th IRISH Battalion has shown remarkable steadfastness and fortitude during the very difficult times that they have had to pass through during their stay in SOUTH KATANGA. They have been a fine example of restraint coupled with soldierly qualities in keeping with the highest traditions of the United Nations.

3 I feel that the fine example given by this battalion was in a very large measure due to the personal example, drive and soldierly qualities of Lieut Colonel McNAMEE, their commanding officer. Colonel Mc NAMEE has impressed me as being a fine gentleman with high soldierly qualities and possessing strong convictions and belief in the cause of the United Nations, which he has done his very best to uphold. This I feel contributed in no small way to the fine performance of this battalion during their six-months stay here.

4 I should like to make particular mention of Comdt QUINLAN, who was in command of the company that had the misfortune to suffer so much at JADOTVILLE. This officer needs little commendation as his performance in maintaining the discipline and high morale of his men during a particularly difficult stage of KATANGA Operations speaks for itself. I have great personal admiration for the initiative, courage, drive and restraint of this officer and I believe that he could be held as an example for all soldiers.

5. I am sorry to loose the 35th IRISH Battalion from my command, but I can draw satisfaction from the knowledge that they shall be replaced by another IRISH Battalion, which I am convinced will in every way live up to the standard created by their predecessors.

6 I trust that my feelings expressed in this letter will be conveyed to the appropriate authorities.

(Signed) KAS Raja BRIGADIER
COMMANDER, KATANGA COMMAND.

(K A S RAJA).

NOO
The Commanding Officer
35th IRISH Battalion ELISABETHVILLE.

20. LIST OF APPENDICES - HISTORY 35 BN.

- A. "OP MORTHOR" Copies wrils msggs and entries Unit Journal HQ Sector 'B'.
- B. "THE BATTLE OF JADOTVILLE" - Coy comdrs report to Force Comdr.
- C. Attempts to Relieve "A" Coy at JADOTVILLE - Force KANE.
- D. The TUNNEL - 13 - 18 September, 1961 - "C" Coy.
- E. Radio Colloge - Lt. T.F. Ryan's report.
- F. Capt. Whyte's Report.
- G. Cft. Cahalane's Report on treatment by whites and Capt. Magennis's intervention.
- H. Action OLD AIRSTRIP - 5 December, 1961 - Capt. Magennis.
- J. Report by Lt. Cor. McNamee on MORALE / INTELLIGENCE.
- K. ARMS DRILL - FN and SMG - Provisional.
- L. Armament Table, Consolidated Equipment Table, etc.
- M. Copy - Coy Comds' Reports on Incident at E'VILLE Airport, Aug. '61.
- N. ~~Op "UNOKAT" - Op Instr No. 14.~~
- O. Nominal Roll.
- P. Map of E'VILLE area.

APPX. "A"

Hist 35 Bn

HQ SECTOR 'B'
EVILLE

24/11/61

OF "MORTHOR"

1. The attached document was compiled from the following records
 - a. Copies of wireless message both IN and OUT at this HQ from 11 Sept 61 to 22 Sept 61.
 - b. Selected entries from the Unit Journal at this HQ during same period.
2. The entries do NOT include messages delivered personally or sent on the telephone, however, it is felt that the document may be of historical interest to those who were concerned directly with the events of the period.
3. It is expected that the document will be considered CONFIDENTIAL and NOT allowed to fall into the hands of unauthorised persons.

Note: Wireless messages are prefixed by letters e.g. DO etc. These are the call signs which were used on the Swedish wireless net. The Swedes had a wireless station at each battalion HQ, bde HQ, Command HQ and other important installations. Call signs are as follows:

RO - HQ Sec B (KASENGA ROAD)
WA - Tactical HQ (Mobile set which moved with Col Waern in his APC)
MI - HQ Swede Bn
IR - HQ Irish Bn
DO - HQ Dogra Bn
GU - HQ Gurkha Bn
LR - LES ROCHES
GP - HQ KAT COMD - DOGRA CASTLE
EK - Transmitter Garrison - Route de Kilobelobe
LI - LIDO

Some of the wireless messages were originally translated from English to Swedish for transmission and for record purposes, but had to be re-translated later to English, hence errors in message texts. Errors in transcribing Journal message are due to compilers inability to read various handwritings.

Distribution List

No. of copies

SWED BN	3
IRISH BN	3
DOGRA BN	3
GORKHA BN	3
IT HOSP	3
ADM & LOG GP - AIRPORT	1
CAN SIGS	1
HQ SEC B	1
HQ KAT COMD	1
FILE and SPARES	20

/OW

- 11/9 2350 hrs Telephone call from major Rosén. Comdt Barret and Capt Parker to report at Les Roches at 0700 LT on 12 September.
- 12/9 0700 hrs CLO per telephone asking for 2 trucks to the airport for transport of Garkhas. Trucks to transport Can Sigs will be postponed for the time being.
- 1700 hrs Orders (information) to unit under sect 3 should be issued to Air Ops and MC. These should be present at briefings etc.
- 13/9 0400 hrs From DO to WA. Radio Katanga not been taken.
- 0415 hrs From WA to RO via MI. Waern now in Albert Park. Arrest of Mutaka unsuccessful.
- 0416 hrs How great casualties, and where? From GU to WA.
- 0420 hrs From WA to RO via MI. Both Sureté Offices taken. Shooting still continuing at Post Office.
- 0424 hrs From LR to WA. Prisoners taken to Sabena Villas.
- 0435 hrs ADC took president Tshombe. From RO to WA.
- 0445 hrs From RO to WA. Minister Kibwe taken by Irish Bn. He is now at Sabena Villas.
- 0500 hrs From RO Gen Raja to WA. Tshombe has requested all firing to stop. He is ordering own troops to cease fire. If they do so UN troops should stop firing, but they should continue to take objectives with or without firing.
- 0505 hrs From WA to DO RO. Radio Station Francois has been taken by IR. One group now defending station. The rest on their way to tunnel.
- 0515 hrs Arrest of Munongo unsuccessful. LING-WANNERUS now with 2 pl in Albert Park. Radio Station Francois taken by IR one sect defending 2 IR pl at tunnel Anything new from Raja?
- 0525 hrs From RO to DO. One Sw group leaving Albert Park for Post Office Square and It Hospital. Transport by one Swed armoured vehicle.
- 0530 hrs From RO to WA. Irish arrest group who took Kibwe to Sabena are now on way with doctor to Indian casualties at Castle area. This group will report to Albert Park after dropping doctor.
- 0540 hrs From WA to GP via GU. One Sw patrol now leaving from Albert Park to Les Roches.
- 13/9 0545 From RO to WA. Sabena Manager at Airport has refused permission for plane with refugees to take off.
- 0550 To DO. How great infantry reserve forces? If possible Armd Vehicle will accompany.
- 0558 From LR to WA. Cpl Nilsson Pte Lindvall are at Les Roches.
- 0600 From RO to WA. Katangese armoured cars are counter-attacking at Post Office. Reinforcements urgently required by Dogra Bn including armoured cars. Notify immediately when reinforcements are on way.
- 0605 Have any refugees reached the airport? From WA to DO.
- 0640 From RO to WA. One armoured car and escort report immediately to Mr. O'Brien at OMUC HQ to take him to president Tshombe. Nobody should be allowed to leave or enter Tshombe's residence, which should be schled off.

- 13/9 0650 From WA to GU. One gendarmerie arm'd car attacked Post Office. The car now smashed. Force sent from A.P. to check on the situation.
- 0655 From WA to LR. Colonel Waern now leaving by arm'd car for Les Roches.
- 0700 From Wa to RO. Reply to telegram 130545. Reason?
- 0700 From WA to GU. Tshombe collaborates with UN. Dr. O'Brien on his way from HQ Katanga to Tshombe's residence.
- 0710 From WA to RO. One arm'd car and escort have left Albert Park for Katanga HQ to take Dr O'Brien to Tshombe. One Swed pl has left for Tshombe's palace seal it off.
- 0715 DOGU GP EK. One lorry of gendarmes has unloaded at Bon Marché. Situation at Post Office is calm. One Swed pl protecting Tshombe's Palace. Dr. O'Brien with Irish escort of one arm'd car 3 jeeps on way to Tshombe in order to negotiate.
- 0740 From WA to RO. Referring by message about plane at airport SABENA plane involved and pilots are waiting on instructions of SABENA manager. Matter will be fully investigated as soon as possible.
- 0740 From WA to Gen. Raja via RO. Shall the newspapers L'Essor du Katanga and L'Echo be taken? Order to helicopter at airport to make recce over the City. Report to Albert Park, where helicopter should go down.
- 0800 From DO to WA. For transport of ammunition etc. two arm'd cars are requested. Report to DO HQ. Can this be effectuated.
- 0800 From WA to DO. Our patrol which has been out has reported that everything is calm at the Post Office Square. We have platoon and arm'd car. We are prepared to take action.
- 0810 From RO to WA. Dogra Bn now confirms 25 gendarmes dead at Radio Katanga. One gendarme policeman dead 3 soldiers arrested by Dogra platoon at Jadotville Junction. Dogra casualties so far one NCO and 3 men wounded at Radio Katanga. One officer and 3 men wounded at Post Office and evacuated to Italian Hospital.
- 0816 From WA to DO. Vehicle for transport of ammunition will report at Sabena Villas.
- 0825 From WA to GU DO GP. Nothing new about Munongo. One Irish patrol now departing with 2 trucks to Sabena Villas in order to pick up ammunition and transport it to Post Office. Besides that everything is well. No fire.
- 0830 From RO to WA. One helicopter unserviceable. Other one now on recce over city. It will land at Albert Park if possible. No reply yet from Gen Raja about taking newspapers.
- 0830 From Swed Bn Eville to ONUC Leo. For Swedlo for FUNAV from Waern. Swed Bn has taken part in occupation of important installations in Eville this morning at 0400 hrs LT. Wounded ex Swed Bn are 3189 Ek slightly wounded with tangenical flesh wound in left shoulder and 3272 Roos 2 platoon 1 coy seriously wounded by two bullet wounds cma one through neck one through throat cma possible injury to left cervical plexus. Prognosis uncertain. All ends.
- 0835 From WA to Gen Raja via RO. 20 gendarmes attacked Irish company in Jadotville but were turned away by fire. According to Irish company chief 300 gendarmes are now surrounding the company.
- 0910 From RO to WA. One signaller at RO is ill and requests relief soonest.
- 0915 From WA to DO. Situation at Post Office is according to Chief of Dogra Bn calm and good.

- 13/9 0930 From WA to RO. In connection with the taking of the Post Office 26 Katangese prisoners were taken and 2 Katangese were killed. D Joy Dogras has 4 slightly wounded, one of them is Lieutenant Guardip.
- 0940 From RO to WA. Can you confirm report of smoke coming from area Factory/Socopetrol.
- 1000 From WA to RO and DC. Report from Irish Coy at factory. There is no sign of smoke in Socopetrol area.
- 1030 From WA to DC GU. Negotiations with Tshombe. Until further notice patrols in the City should be avoided. Situation at Post Office is calm.
- 1045 From WA to GU LI. One platoon from Gorkha Coy at Lido soonest to report at Swedish Camp Refugee Camp as reinforcement.
- 1050 From WA to RO. Sitrep at 1050 hrs. All objs taken and consolidated. Res at Albert Park reorged. One pl Gorkhas from Lido to reinforce refugee camp. Kibwe in custody. Cas. Alpha four Dogra slightly wounded at Radio sta. Brav critical so far. Charlie firing reported north and east of Swedish refugee camp. Isolated gps of gend reported. 26 prisoners and approx 4 dead area of Post Office.
- 1050 From WA to HQ Kat via RO. Radio College (Saint Francois) functions. Civilian Personnel there willing to collaborate.
- 1057 From GU to WA. One platoon Gorkhas is now on its way to Swedish Camp.
- 1100 From RO to WA. Can you give present situation at Swedish Camp and gendarmerie depot?
- 1102 From WA to DC. Inform Air Ops that missionary Dr Schaffner in a Cessner plane is coming from Kamina and wants to land at Eville airport.
- 1120 From GU to WA DO MI RO. According to Salisbury Radio Munongo has escaped over the Rhodesian border.
- 1135 From RO to WA. From Eat Comd for Col Waern. House of Mr. O'Brien is being fired on. Send two armoured cars to house immediately.
- 1145 From WA to GU. Warning order. Have one pl ready to move at fifteen minutes notice to relieve Irish pl at Irish refugee camp at Ave Grevilleas. And end.
- 1150 From RO to WA. Have two armoured cars left for O'Briens house?
- 1150 From LR to WA. General Raja asks for an armoured car to Villa Les Roches soonest.
- 1155 From WA to RO. They are leaving.
- 1159 From GU to WA via HQ Kat. At 1130 hrs the gendarmerie was repulsed by the Gorkha platoon. No losses.
- 1227 From WA to LR. The Chief's armoured car to A.P. immediately. Reply: The Chief's armoured car is not here.
- 1235 From RO to WA. Information to Katanga Command being passed direct by Dogra Bn. Our main function now appears to be to man 200 set RO to WA. Are you in contact with other stations or brigade net?
- 1237 From WA to GU. Move the Gorkha reserve to A.P. soonest.

- 13/9 1245 From DO to WA. DO requests that patrol with at least two armoured cars be sent to patrol at Radio Katanga owing to snipers. Obligated for quick reply.
- 1250 From WA to GU. Has Gorkhas left from the Lido?
- 1255 From WA to Gen Rata via RO. Two bombs exploded in Albert Park. One Swedish officer killed, one Norwegian doctor wounded. Gorkha Coy departing from Lido to Albert Park. Preparations are being made to send reinforced Irish company to Jadotville.
- 1300 From RO to WA. Katanga Command wants latest report from Jadotville.
- 1330 From RO to WA. Katanga Command demands name of Swedish Officer killed.
- 1335 From WA to RO. Mortar fire against Irish Coy in Jadotville was returned with success. They still ask for reinforcement. Reinforcement is to leave from here in a few hours.
- 1350 From WA to DO. The unit at Radio Katanga at suitable occasion leaving for Dogra Castle Brig Reserve.
- 1355 From RO to WA. From Kat Command to Sector B. Your armoured cars will be sent to the City for patrolling.
- 1405 From RO to WA. O'Shea to Barret. Is Cullen safe?
- 1420 From GU to WA. Gorkha platoon at HQ Kat does not need any reinforcement.
- 1446 From RO to WA via LI MI. Radio Station willing to collaborate.
- 1525 From RO to WA. From ONUC HQ. Two armoured cars to report to ONUC HQ immediately.
- 1520 From WA to GU. Send your 105 mm cannon to A.P.
- 1530 From HQ Kat via DO to WA. HQ Katanga Comd requests two armoured cars to report at HQ immediately.
- 1535 From RO to WA. Your telegram 131446. What Radio Station do you refer to?
- 1535 From WA to RO. Info telegram 131525. No armoured cars available for stationary works.
- 1554 From RO to WA. How is situation at Swedish Camp?
- 1805 From HQ Kat Command Eville to HQ Sector B Eville. SECRET. Following from force commander. Quote. Essential you aim at eliminating/capture foreigners leading troops against UN. Unquote.
- 1920 From HQ Katanga Command Eville to ONUC Leopoldville. Info: HQ Sector A Aville, HQ Sector B Eville, HQ Sector C Kamina. Sitrep from 121600 Z to 131600 Z. FIRSTLY. for OP Morthor plan as follows. Alpha. 1 Dogra Bn Gp with under comd one coy 3/1 GR. task. seize. one. EVILLE post office and Radio installation in vicinity. two. RADIO KATANGA studio. three. Take in UN custody minister of info SAMELENGE. four. secure air fd. five. custody of arrested personnel. Bravo. 35 Irish battalion Gp. task. seize. one. Radio transmitter at college St Francois. two. take into UN custody minister of finance. KIBWE. three. seize and est rd bloc railway tunnel. four. secure refugee camp at factory and own line. charlie. 12 SWED battalion Gp with one coy of 3/1 GR. task to seize. one. radio transmitter on route de le KIOBELOBE. two. take into UN custody minister interior MUNONGO. officers of sureté white personnel working; and African chiefs. three. secure refugee camp.

13/9

SECONDLY. first shot was fired from BELGIAN Consulate building near post office at 130400 B at DOGRA. THIRDLY. radio KATANGA studios and post office captured by DOGRA by 130500 B after heavy stiff hand to hand fighting. both places counter attacked by gendarmeries with their armd cars led mostly by BELGIANS in civilian clothes. counter attack repulsed by DOGRA S and SWEDISH armd cars. FOURTHLY. due by mortar fire and automatic fire from gendarmerie studio completely damaged beyond repairs. FIFTHLY. Irish En captured transmitter at college St Francois firmly in our hands. SIXTHLY. Swedish En captured radio transmitter KILOBELOE. SEVENTHLY. stray and automatic firing and sniping inside the town continues. EIGHTHLY. IRISH coy at JADOTVILLE attacked by gendarmeries. attack repulsed reinforcement of one coy and three armd cars sent to JADOTVILLE and coy directed to remain there till further orders. NINTHLY. KIBWE apprehended. MUNUNGO MUTAKA SAMULENGE and KIMBA have disappeared. TSHOMBE is NOT traceable at present. TENTHLY. all troops action and behavior gallant. ELEVENTHLY. no incident in refugee camp though refugees seem to be scared. TWELFTHLY. casualties. alpha. UN tps. SWEDISH. one offr (Maj Gallon 1007) killed. three other ranks wounded. IRISH. One pte killed (Tpr Gaffney), three other ranks wounded. INDIAN. one other rank killed one offr (IC 11513 Lt GURDIP SINGH) wounded. six other ranks wounded. bravo, GENDARMERIE (unconfirmed). killed 25 (25) wounded not known yet. captured 26 (26). THIRTEENTHLY. UN guard being provided for US consulate.

From WA to HQ Kat via RO. Swedle for Funav. Two Swedish soldiers wounded.

From RO to WA. How is situation at Post Office? Reply: At Post Office everything calm. No fire for a long time.

Wounded Swedish Bn: 3189 Tk, 1. coy, wounded in shoulder (slightly), 3272 Roos, 2 platoon 1. coy, wounded by shooting in neck and chest, seriously wounded, no imminent danger to life.

From IR to WA. Give address of mortuary where the body of your major was placed.

From LR to WA. The Colonel is at Villa Les Roches.

From DO to WA. Should civilian personnel at airport be controlled? DO does not know appearance of those who want to avoid arrest program of UN.

DO has in custody minister Kibwe. How to proceed with him?

From LI to WA via DO. DO position at Post Office. Reinforcement soonest. One Swedish armd car minimum claim as soon as possible. One armd car has been here but has now departed.

From LR to WA. Two questions: 1) Is radio transmitter in Kiluba outside Eville in undamaged condition? 2) How big damage to radio station in city?

From LR to WA. Please send an armoured car to American Embassy to pick up American Consular to Les Roches.

From WA to LR. The armoured car at Les Roches returns soonest to A.P. It is needed for transportation of wounded.

From LI to WA. Colonel Waern is still expected at HQ Kat. It is urgent.

From GU to WA. How does police appear and on which side do they stand?

Tshombe has demanded cease-fire. He has ordered his troops to stop shooting.

14/9 0030 From 1 Dogra to HQ Sector B. Info: HQ Sector B. PRIORITY SECRET. Op MORTHOR. sitrep from 130300 hrs. firstly. objectives. C Coy Katanga radio sta. D Coy post office and radio installation nearby. secondly. C and D coys left night harbours at 130315 and 130337 respectively and arr objectives at 0400 hrs. both met strong and determined opposition. Hy exchange of fire took place. thirdly. C coy assaulted objective and captured at 0440 hrs. fourthly. D Coy systematically cleared and captured objective at 0525 hrs. fifthly. one Pl B Coy est rd block at rd Junction Éville - Jadotville at 0410 hrs to prevent any Gendarmerie reinforcement from Jadotville. sixthly. at 0600 hrs D Coy came under intensive firing and build up Gend noticed. Gend counter attack supported by Armad cars materialized at 0615. rft from HQ Sector B requested at 0605 did not arr in time. with brave and determined efforts counter attack repulsed at 0700 hrs. seventhly. C Coy came under hy firing of MMGs and Mortars about midday but posn determinedly held on. eighthly. white civilians shouted anti UN slogans near C and D coys. dispersed after strict warning. ninthly. Gend occupied buildings around Radio Sta and post office and kept sniping at all movements UN tps. Gend armad cars occupied main rd junctions in town and fired heavily and accurately at UN movements. tenthly. due complete damage to Radio sta value of position completely cut down. C Coy on orders by HQ Sector B withdrawn to Castle by area (new ONUC HQ) at 1700 hrs. eleventhly. D Coy reinforced by C Coy 3/1 GR at 1730 hrs. situation much under control. intermittant but intensive firing with MMG and Mortars by Gend continues at post office. twelvethly. total casualties. alfa. own. one C Coy. 4 OR incl 2 seriously wounded. evac to ONUC Hosp. one OR later died in hosp. two. D Coy. 1 offr Lt Gurdip Singh and 3 OR wounded. none serious. evac to hosp. three. comdg offr with escort while visiting C and D Coys recd one stray bullet injury on thigh. injury NOT serious. one OR of escort received bullet wound on jaw. injury NOT serious. bravo. Gend. one. radio sta. killed 23 wounded not known. two. post office. killed two, wounded not known. captured 41 (41) prisoners. three B Coy rd block. captured six prisoners.

0700 From RO to WA. Sitrep for operation Morthor received from Dogra Bn only. No report from Irish, Swedish, Gorkha Battalions. No report of any kind received from Jadotville. This HQ should close down as it appears to serve no useful purpose, and only creates confusion. Link with ONUC HQ could be established from Swedish camp. Awaiting instructions. ?

14/9 0750 From Kat Command to HQ Sector B. Log Sector B commander will report to HQ Kat Command at once.

0830 From RO to WA. For continued activity we need batteries to 105 and acc to 200 soonest. We have no food. We got some rice yesterday from Dogra, but they have now left from here. We are 3 Swedes and 4 Irish.

0840 From 35 Bn to Sector B. 1 grey Bedford truck and 1 white diesel truck missing since last night. All units should be warned to guard against Trojan hors effort. The grey Bedford has No.500347.

0845 From RO to WA. From Kat Command / Transmitter station at route de la Kilobelobe most important. Increase guard if necessary. Ammunition demands of Irish and Swedish Bns to be submitted to Kat Comd immediately.

0850 From WA to GP via LI. Escort de WA will soonest pick up 2 grk from Dogra company at Castle. Grk intended against gendarmerie supply.



- 14/9 0855 From WA to RO. Send following to Swed Co from Waern: We transport major Gallon in wooden coffin to Leo. Re-arrangement into zinc coffin in Leo necessary. Arrange remembrance divine service before despatch to Sweden. Send zinc coffins to Eville, and also RA 105 batteries. Situation 14/9 at 1000 hours: slight fighting continuing. No further losses. Waern.
- 0857 from GU to WA via GP via LI. 1) request short sitrep 2) suggest that maintenance to Post Office be transported by armoured cars 3) How is situation in Swedish camp re Gorkhas? who is responsible for their maintenance? 4) Reply desired soonest.
- 0915 From WA to RO. Sitrep for Morthor sent from WA 13/9 at 2300 hours direct to HQ Katanga. Latest news from Jadotville: Company in Jadotville still surrounded 14/9 at 1000 hours. At 2220 the company at the bridge east of Jadotville intended to attack at dawn. Since 14/9 no news from bridge company. Parker with personnel to remain. Necessary with this connection. Battalion Frykman arrives probably today. Contact them.
- 0920 From RO to WA. Kat Command wants to know urgently what situation is in Jadotville. No reports received.
- 0935 From WA to RO. The battalion is intended for the refugee camp. Ammunition orders for Swedish and Irish battalions have been handed over to Katanga Commander direct from here. We are sending batteries.
- 0950 from WA to RO. Order the helicopter to go to vicinity of Swedish camp. Bring ammunition if such has arrived to airport.
- 1000 From RO to WA. Please clarify report re position of two Irish Coys in Jadotville. Last report not fully understood.
- 1010 From WA to GP GU. Jadotville company has repulsed another attack. Only one wounded. Many gendarmes wounded. Company at bridge shooting since dawn also with grenade rifles against enemy. Company commander intends to reach Jadotville. Company in Jadotville can, according to coy commander stand another 24 hrs. New subject. Gendarmerie Supply burning after grenade-thrower-shooting. (Mortared by Capt. McCorley)
- 1030 From WA to GU. Situation in refugee camp is good. Ghurkas are doing a good job. Swedish Battalion responsible for maintenance. How Gorkhas still any unit at Lido? Size?
- 1030z From HQ Katanga Comd to Sector B. Priority. One officer and two NCO of Indian signal company with Dogra. One NCO with Swede. Urgently required by HQ. Despatch first opportunity.
- 1040 From WA to DO. Order your company in Post Office to send soonest the Swedish armd car to Swedish camp.
- 1100 From IR to WA. Information: The reinforcement towards Jadotville stopped at Bridge. Were fired at during night. The fire was answered. New firing this morning. Nobody wounded.
- 1100 From RO to WA. Please reply to our cable, concerning the food question.
- 1105 Four Belgians with weapons and hand-grenades. One armd car outside gendarmerie supply depot demolished. Belgium officers and black gendarms located north east Swed camp. The enemy will be fought against.
- 1107 From IR to WA. The strength at the tunnel has reported that strong gendarmerie gathered at the railway station.

- 14/9 1110 From Duty officer to Major Rosén. Large strength gendarmeri gathered at the railway station.
- 1115 From WA to DO+DO at Post Office. Swed Bn sending one pl via tunnel to railway station and further on to post office. The object of the pl is to find out where the enemy at the railway station is located.
- 1120 From WA to RO + GP. Send following signal to Swed LO for army chief. All Swed Bn thank You for sympathizing. Officers and men have been fighting grand for e.g. defending our refugees against attacks day and night. Waern.
- 1120 Send soonest our sit rep of the 13/9 to Swed LO ONUC Leo. Confirm that it has been sent.
- 1125 From RO to WA. Completly in the dark here about overall situation depending on You through 200 on morse for information. Very little being received and no replies to queries. according to Your sit rep.
- 1130 From MITRA to WA. From LIDO can max 14 soldiers be withdrawn. More awaiting from Manono. My opinion is that guard at the American consulate is not necessary. If the guard will be moved from there another 22 men with automatic rifle will be available. Request that Gorkhas coy at Post Office receive C-rations.
- 1130 When is the ammunition coming from Leo?
- 1130 From IR to WA. The pl is on the way to railway station is going to contact strength at the tunnel. From where is the platoon leaving?
- 1150 From HQ Kat command to HQ sector B. Block all roads round the Post Office. You have permission to use civilian vehicles for this purpose, to make more effective road blocks and to stop further attacks. Arrange road blocks to check all arriving white from Rhodesia to Elisabetville.
- 1200 From WA to DO. Kat Comd requests return of one officer and two NCO of Indian Signal Company at earliest opportunity. Make your own arrangements.
- 1200 BLIXT IR from 5 coy Kamina to WA, HQ Comd Sector B. Road block at Kaminaville road attacked by two armoured cars and infantry company.
- 1200 From RO to WA. To Dogra Sector B from HQ COMD for Air Ops and MC. 10 casualties will be evacuated today to Leo or Kamina, may use one of the returning ac to Leo or Kamina. Info mil hospital through HQ Sector B.
- 1212 From WA to DO. Order from Raja. Roads to the area of Post Office and the old HQ shall be blocked. Use civilian cars. One road to that area will be left open for supply transports. Inform which road that will remain open.
- 1216 From GU to WA. Have got important papers which used to belong to Munongo. Send soonest armoured car or helicopter to collect these. Please confirm.
- 1230 From RA to WA, and sector B and Dogra. Firstly no ac except UN will be allowed to land or take off without my written authorisation. Secondly. Fire should not be directed towards floors occupied by Belgian consulate near Post Office. You are of course at liberty to fire when fired at from consulate. 1 Dogra informed.
- 1255 From WA to Commander Swed and Irish Bns. Bn Comd soonest to colonel Waern at major Mides house for planning gendarmerie supply depot.
- 1300 From RO to WA to Irish Bn. Ration urgently required by Mr. O'Brien at ONUC HQ and by Irish mess for Irish, Swedish Bns. Sitreps will be sent to Irish, Swedish and Indian contingents.

- 14/9 1312 From GU to WA. GU awaiting confirmation soonest at 141130.
- 1313 From Sunray 35th Bn to Comd sector B. Patrol returning from Jado. Has failed to take Lufira bridge.
- 1330 From IR to WA sector B. We have enemy fighter here now. Flying over head.
- 1330 From IR to MI. Mortar fire over. Report effect.
- 1340 From WA to IR. Sunray and Comdt Keane report this HQ immediately.
- 1400 From DO via LI to WA. Answer to signal 141200: The officer concerned has returned to Castle Area. The other technicians remain at the Post Office, which place they cannot leave without risking their lives.
- 1414 From WA to DO. Garkha platoon from airport group Brigade Reserve ready within one hour after receiving order. If the helicopter cannot land near Swed Bn one representative from helicopter detachment must report immediately to Colonel Waern.
- 1420 Can be brought to airport Sector B only. Please arrange safe evacuation casualties to airport in consultation with Air Ops.
- 1455 From WA to GP for MC stop Arrange aircraft this afternoon for transport of two dead bodies to Leo and further on to Sweden. Confirm departure; End.
- 1450 From WA to DO. We are sending one transport from the Swedish camp via the parting of the way to Jado to the airport within about one hour.
- 1450 From RO ONUC Leo to WA Swed Bn Eville. Stockholm requires urgent details about Major Gallon's death and the wounded. Please acknowledge immediately. Haakansson.
- 1455 BLIXT from HQ Kat Comd to WA HQ Sector B. The airport will be closed for all other aircrafts than UN. All other aircrafts must have permission from this HQ. The above mentioned concerns all airfields in Katanga.
- 1410 From RO to WA. The press of the Staff of Defence wants to have information about the situation and what has happened in Eville. Haakansson.
- 1515 From RO to WA info Raja for Waern. Send immediately reinforcement to transmitter station at route de Kilobelobe. This necessary as attack on this likely after commencement broad-cast.
- 1520 From WA to RO. One armoured car will depart 1450 hrs with Gallon and Roos for the airport. Is the Indian link still working? Confirm soonest.
- 1530 From WA to GU. One platoon from Staff Coy at the Swedish refugee camp have order to go to the tunnel north the railway station. Mission to defend the tunnel and to observe towards the railway station.
- 1535 From RO to WA. Aircraft waiting at Eville airport for transporting the dead to Leo. The Indian rear link is working.
- 1552 From RO to WA. Ammunition and C-rations have arrived from Kamina to Eville airport. Arrange transport.
- 1555 From WA to GP and RO. The company in Jadotville have been bombed by aircraft with red marks at the end of the wings. The planes also shoot against the company with rifle fire. The company has been shot at with mortars.

- 14/9 1556 From RO HQ Kat Comd to WA Sector B. OO ONUC Hosp states there is no wr-ls comm between GO at hospital and their parent unit. As telephone lines are not functioning, it is essential some wrls comm be established between them and its parent unit.
- 1601 From RO to WA info 1 Dogra. Message from HQ Kat Comd casualties from hospital not being evacuated today. Arrange armoured cars and pers carriers for conveyance ann and rations from Dogra Bn to Post Office. This is urgent and essential. Bigger ac being arranged tomorrow.
- 1605 From WA to BK. Broad-casting has started from station route de Kilobelobe. The risk of being attacked is therefore bigger.
- 1630 From RO to WA via RO from MC Eville. Your 141420. Se CTE is ready to take off every before 1600 hrs. End.
- 1650 From IR to WA. IR waiting for instructions.
- 1710 From WA to DO and RO. Inform captain Parker following: Captain Parker shall return to the Swedish Camp. Other personnel remains. Connection RA 200 to WA should be maintained. Parker will be transported by armoured car which passes Sabena Villas at the earliest 1800 hrs.
- 1740 From Doliwa to HQ Sector B. Information received from control tower at the airport. Kamina Base attacked by gendarmerie. All UN planes must be warned in advance.
- 1740 From HQ Katanga Comd to HQ Sector B. First company of the Swed Bn arrives in Eville on the 15th of September. They have ammunition for the Swed Bn.
- 1750 From WA to GP. Report from fifth company Swed Bn Kamina. Road block on the road to Kaminaville attacked by two armoured cars and one infantry company. The control tower in Eville reports that Kamina Base has been attacked by gendarmes. All UN aircrafts must be warned in advance.
- 1755 From WA to DO and RO. Eville airport may only be used by UN. The airport will be closed for all other aircrafts. Aircrafts other than UN must have landing and starting permission from HQ Kat. This order includes all bigger airfields in Katanga. Inform Air Ops and Control Tower.
- 1840 From Jadotville via RO to WA to GP. The company got ultimatum from the gendarmerie to capitulate at 1830 hrs. He refused. Jetfighters have attacked. According to information from Kolwez some pilots arrived yesterday from N Rhodesia. Intensive fire still going on.
- 1900 From RO to WA. Our accar were sent possibly at the same time as Dogra ordered accar.
- 1900 From WA to IR. Has your pl at the tunnel been relieved?
- 1900 From GP via LI HQ Kat to WA HQ Swed Bn. One company from XI Swed Bn arrives Eville 15/9. Ammunition will arrive.
- 2000 From IR BLIKT to WA. Two NCO from Verfailles garage were told UN had surrendered. Population were being armed and 200 white men are
- 2010 From GU via DO to WA. According to eye-witness 12 UN soldiers of not known nationality have been taken prisoners by the Katanga gendarmerie at the Transmitter College. Have there been any UN soldiers there today? Have you any information about this? This capturing is supposed to have been at 1700 hours today.

- 14/9 2010 From WA to GP. Is there a C-47 or a DC-3 ready at dawn for transporting ammunition, supply, water, etc.? The aircraft will be ready for loading this evening or tonight. Confirm soonest.
- 2010 To lead them in attack on airport.
- 2030 From RO to WA. From Raja for colonel Waern. Reinforce transmitter station till tomorrow. Alternative arrangements will be made.
- 2045 From LI to MI. Armoured car 777 is ready.
- 2050 From WA to LR. Pack all equipments belonging to Waern, Rosén and the drivers. Lock Les Roches. Let the light be on. The guard will be transported to Swed Bn any time during the night.
- 2115 From WA to all units. Curfew will start from 2000 - 0600 hrs today and onwards. Anybody to be seen in the streets will be shot at if they go without UN escort.
- 2135 From RO to WA. Air Ops report aeroplane capable of taking 3400 lbs is available and will be ready as ordered.
- 2150 From RO to WA. Reported from Katanga HQ that mortar fire is falling in that vicinity. Can anything be done about it?
- 2155 From RO to WA. Now we are using our last accar.
- 2200 From GU via LI to WA. Commander of GU asks about the situation at the Post Office. Post Office has received supply, ammunition and petrol.
- 2205 From HQ Kat Comd to WA via LI. DC-3 available for mission tomorrow. Arrange that previous signal is in order. Supply must be packed in a special way for dropping. Aircraft available for loading from now on.
- 2210 From HQ Kat Comd to WA. Concerning the curfew, from Mr. O'Brien. Through our transmitter we have distributed this message. Is it possible that all people concerned have not got the message the first night? Of course all dead civilians will from this case be used as anti-UN propaganda. Strong measures will be taken the second night when probably everybody knows about the curfew.
- 2225 From RO to WA. It is most important that time of arrival of loading party be arranged with commander at airport. Suggest that they report here first in order that I may clear them through. Otherwise hot reception may be expected. Loading capacity of plane 3000 lbs as already reported.
- 2235 From IR via LI to WA. Awaiting answer about wanted help to guard at the viaduct.
- 2245 From WA via LI to IR. Help has left.
- 2250 From MI via WA to RI via LI. Inform unit at the viaduct that about 1100 hours armoured cars will leave MI to get everything in order at the viaduct.
- 2300 From MI via LI to WA. Have WA any adea about the matter that not a single shot has been fired since 2120? Is the situation still critical at the viaduct? Otherwise the brigade reserve will go towards the eastern transmitter. There the larm mines have exploded.
- 2300 From WA to GP. Raja wants to speak to Chief of Staff at 2400 hours. This matter is urgent.
- 2315 from WA to MI via LI. report Brigade Reserve at WA.

14/9 2325 From MI via LI to WA. Relieving party just left for the viaduct.

2335 From WA to MI at the viaduct. Send immediately armoured car to MI for important transport to HQ Comd.

From GP to LI. Two interpreters, three dog guards and WO/2 Lautrup stuck at the airport. They want to go to the Swed Bn.

From HQ Kat Comd to HQ Sector B. 1) RI transmitter is the most important point and must be defended against any attacks. Make sure that strong defence will be there all the time. Report immediately when this has been done. Also check that the transmitter will not be hurt by fire from the enemy. 2) Details required about situation in Jadotville.

From HQ Comd to HQ Sector B. Rear ops B 142 of the 14th of September. If possible destroy the armoured car and take the Belgians and the crew, also dead. All white gendarmes and similar will be captured.

From HQ Comd to Sector B. From General Raja query. Why is the Irish company returning from Lufira river to Eville? Report about Irish company in Jadotville? Losses? Requirements of reinforcements? Ammunition available? Supply? Send all details about enemy jet fighter observed in Jadotville. What type? Jet or propeller? What nationality? Details urgently required.

Following personnel at the airport: Capt 1664 Willen, doctor, Sgt 1099 Walett, Pte 1123 Weinberg. These three belong to the Bn in Leo. Lt Johansson, Lt Hjalte (interpreter), these two have arrived from Kitona. They belong to technical group. Mj Norman and WO/2 Lautrup arriving from A-ville. 3520 Juvel, 3371 Berglund and 3055 Neslander. What to do with them? Can they be transported to the camp?

To MI. Two NCO from Indian Signal Coy who are now at the Post Office to be collected and transported to HQ Kat.

From IR (Capt Mellbris) to WA. According to news from Radio Rhodesia airplanes have flown the wrong direction and flown over Jadotville.

From Raja to Sector B. How is the transport going with the wounded to the airport? More important that those still living will leave for Leo. Confirm immediately measure for evacuation.

From HQ Katanga Comd. To Sector B. Info Waern from Raja. Deeply regret death of private Lindau. Request my condolence be conveyed to the bereaved family of the deceased.

15/9 0015 What is the situation about the prisoners? Radio Francois?

0100 From WA to DO via RO. Be prepared at very short notice to supply 5 trucks to Irish HQ. State location of trucks so that they can be picked up by escort. Chief of Staff on his way to ch DO.

0100 From LI to MI. Rumours coming from worried Indian Supply Chief. No Ghurkas have been seen here. From Zachari.

0115 From GP Mj Rosén to WA. The general has recommended the plan.

0300 From WA to DO. Message for Kat Comd. Irish patrol consisting of two armoured cars and bus which left at 142100 hrs has not yet returned or reported. Patrol route Radio College - Irish Mess - Factory.

0300 From DO to WA. First Dogra had 5 trucks. 4 of them are climbed down at Post Office area. It has been lent to Irish and not been brought back. Present number of trucks at first Dogra 15.

0347 From RE via EK to WA. Major Rosén leaving for Dogra Castle. Try to get the trucks back from the Post Office. Use available expedient.

- 15/9 0435 The operation delayed. Briefing at GP CO 0930 today. Now we leave for Lido and from there to Sector B.
- 0530 From WA to DO. For Kat Comd. Reference Irish patrol reported missing in previous message. Two survivors got back on foot at 0500 hrs approx. They report but cannot confirm that two are dead and at least two wounded. Total strength of patrol nine. Patrol was fired on by anti-tank gun from ambulance on two different places all in area Ave Churchill. Two armoured cars, two jeeps and bus are missing, presumed destroyed. A strong patrol left Irish lines at 0600 hrs to find missing persons. One of two officers survived.
- 0700 From WA to IR. Have the helicopters left with their 400 kgs of equipments?
- 0737 From WA to GU. Why has not the helicopter from Lido arrived at the Irish farm? Inform Lt Hovden that the helicopter immediately shall go there.
- 0752 From GU to WA. The helicopter cannot take off. Front wheel damaged.
- 0758 From GP to WA. There is one Indian hygienic team at the airport. Can the team be transported to the refugee camp? Reply immediately.
- 0805 From 35th Bn to Sector B. Two Belgian officers captured by our coy in Jado. Info that gendarmerie forces in Jado are under direction of Belgians.
- 0930 From IR to WA. Situation in Jado desperate. (Last night Haja changed his mind and gave order that the reinforcement to Jado should wait until the briefing had been held at 0930 at the Castle). Rosén.
- 0945 From WA to GP. Waern delayed, will leave sector B at 1000 hrs. Collect mitra 1015 hrs.
- 0950 From GP to WA via LI. IR want a Swedish armoured car for collecting two killed in the town. Reply immediately. Units food supply desperate. Will armoured car be sent to this HQ?
- 0950 From GU to WA. Lido under fire.
- 1015 From RO to WA. One Fuga jetplane with red markings on the wings has dropped two bombs at E-ville airport.
- 1050 From RO to WA via LI. The telephone is working now.
- 1125 From RO to WA. He further reports that all the remainders of the patrol were taken prisoners this morning except Capt White and Sgt Dignan.
- 1140 From GU to WA. Lido under heavy mortar and machine gun fire.
- 1240 From WA to GP. Info Mr. O'Brien. The gendarmerie fire at the Kasai's in BCK camp near the tunnel. The Kasai's flee now to Swedish refugee camp.
- 1315 From GP to WA. HQ Comd needs immediately armoured car for collecting isolated troops in danger.
- 1355 From IR to WA. The company in Jado has been bombed from the air.
- 1415 From HQ Comd to ONUC Lco. Info: HQ Sector B for Madan from Raja. Request arrange immediate despatch of Swedish and Irish ammunition to E-ville. Our logs 5210 of the 14th September refers.
- 1425 From Swed Kamina to Swed Bn E-ville. How do they suppose to get ammu there?
- 1430 From RI to WA. Colonel Waern, Major Rosén or Comd Barret shall phone number 4258 Air Ops. To get to this number you have to dial 4800, then you shall order 4258. If they don't succeed with the telephone IR wants to have a talk with any of them.

- 15/9 1500 From WA to RO and GP. Inform Kat Command and Chief Air Ops that supply drop from DC-3 at Jado not considered feasible. Suggest plane could be used for recce flights to Jado and along Rhodesian road.
- 1505 From DO to WA. Aircraft has attacked the airport and bombs have been dropped.
- 1520 From WA to IR. The helicopter is now leaving for the airport from the Irish camp to find out if Commander Sector B has the right to give order or if the Commander for all aircrafts in the Congo has the right. The Chief of the helicopter detachment at the airport in E-ville can give the answer to this question. In case Colonel Waern has the right to command the helicopter he is intending to give order for transporting ammunition, food supply etc. to the surrounded company in Jado. Inform company at Jado to watch towards E-ville if the helicopter is coming and give them order to give all help required for landing by giving fire, throw hand-grenades, and tear gas.
- 1530 From RO to WA. Sabena has agreed to lease the helicopters without pilots and without fuel subject to opportunity for maintenance. Maintenance crews on way to airport now. Air commander at airport has orders from Leo which forbid him to allow anyone near these planes. He says that you must get instructions from Leo before this can happen. Please send further instructions.
- 1530 From RO to WA. Katanga Command has requested sitrep. Can you send direct or through me? No info here.
- 1607 From GU to WA. Why didn't Colonel Waern come at 1315 hrs with two armoured cars? When can we have two armoured cars at the Lido? answer wanted immediately.
- 1608 From RO to WA. Have been informed by Air Ops that helicopter now at Lido. Pilot Lt Hovden could undertake Jado mission. Could you contact Lt Hovden and ask him to return to airfield?
- 1620 From HQ Kat Comd to Sector B. Your ops/B 54 of 15 Sep our msg that aircrew is willing to undertake this mission? This should have gone early this morning as informed COS your HQ. Not understood why mission not taken so far. Take immediate action send ac to drop supply and ammu. Jado. In case recce required before drop may do so.
- 1635 From LR to WA. If possible stop helicopter to Jado. Not possible to land because there is heavy firing.
- 1705 From GU to WA. Ghurka Bn Comd phone Sector B 3108.
- 1707 From GU to WA. GU wants to have immediately news about the political situation.
- 1715 From WA to GU. Kibwe has promised Mr. O'Brien to try persuading Tshombe to stop attacks against company in Jado. Dr. O'Brien has told the company in Jado to carry on.
- 1735 From GU to WA. The US Consulate has been fired at.
- 1740 From IR (Jado) to WA. Find out with HKP if the bridge is damaged and if the biggest units are between the bridge or us.
- 1745 From RO to WA. RO asking for sitrep from all stations soonest possible.
- 1800 From GP to WA. Do you know anything about the damage and losses at the tunnel that was bombed.
- 1805 From EK to RO. Sitrep. Guard 31 men. Buildings of fortifications have been done. No enemies.

- 15/9 1845 From WA to GP. Has captain Braunerhjelm with two armoured cars been to GP? HKP matter ought to be under command of HQ Sector B otherwise it will be more difficult for supplying unit in Jado. The gendarmerie gathers into the crossing Stanleyville - Churchill.
- 1930 From HQ Kat Comd to Hq Sector B. Info 35 Irish. DC-4 ac available for sup dropping 16 Sep. Send sups ammu and other stores to airport properly packed for free drop. Contact air ops for further details.
- 2110 From WA to GU. Answer Yes. Armoured car may stay and carry on with the earlier ordered mission. After this returning to the brigade staff at the camp.
- 2115 From WA to RG for transmission to ONUC HQ. Swed LO for FUMV. Friday has for the Swedish Bn been more quiet. No further losses. The morale is exemplary. Waern.
- 2130 From Stockholm to Swed Bn E-ville. We are all thinking about you in the fights you are forced to. The Army sympathize for the killed and has sympathy for those who have been wounded.
- 2135 From HQ Command to Sector B. Unconfirmed reports that all routes to UN camps are mined. Please confirm info all concerned to the cautions.
- 2135 From IR Jado to WA. We have no more water. When can we get help? Answer soonest.
- 2145 From GP to WA. Answer tgm 151805 concerning the Gurkas at US consulate. They shall remain there for the moment until General Secretary Hammarskjold gives other orders.
- 2228 From EK via LI to WA. EK arrived at destination 2210 hrs.
- 2228 From EK via LU to WA. One escort is leaving from here towards the camp. Please confirm. From IR to WA. The connection with the unit at the bridge is out of order probably due to the last fire.
- 2300 From WA to GU and DO and IR and LI. From Hq Kat Comd. According to not reliable sources all roads leading to UN camps are mined. Be careful.
- 2345 From Leo to WA. Grateful for all news concerning the situation at the Bn, the wounded and facts what is going on in L-ville. Rumours in Sweden that our soldiers are dazed with horror about methods that have been used and complain to command. Report situation. Maakanson.

From comd Barret to WA. I have 16 soldiers ready.

Disgussed position with coy comd. He refused to break. He thinks it will be foolish. He would loose too many lives. He would prefer to capitulate if forced. Few casualties. He has withstood attacks for a week now. HKP with supply will leave today. O'Brien has spoken to Kibwe and Kibwe said that he will persuade Tshombe to withdraw his attacks on Jado coy. O'Brien told MacNamee to tell his coy to hold and not capitulate.

1) Supply Depot emergency

So far no communications and help has reached us. Heavy firing is taking place on the Supply Depot from Gendarmerie Depot and Wksp area since 13 and 14 Sep evening

- 2) Yesterday i.e. the 14 Sep the Gendarmerie in civilian clothes came to.... our depot from the Labelco shed, which is adjunct to our shed. From this I deducted that the Supply Depot would be attacked during the night 14-15 Sep 1961. But fortunately nothing serious happened.

15/9

- 3) You please send us reinforcements, wireless communications and ammunition as quickly as possible.

From RO to WA. A Fuga plane with red wing markings has dropped two bombs on airfield.

From DO to LI Sector B. Was Sector B received following message from HQ Kat Comd to Sector B, info Dogra date and time 141601. Casualties from hospitals not being effectuated today. Arrange armoured car, armoured personnel carrier for conveyance of ammunitions and rations from Dogra Bn to Post Office. This is urgent and essential.

From EK2 to LI. EK2 now leaving as escort.

From IR to WA. From Irish 35 Bn to Comd Sector B. Inform Ghurka Bn that Ghurka platoon at tunnel has not been fed for two days.

From LI to MI. Approximately 300 gendarmes have been seen north Swed Bn on the way towards the camp.

From IR to WA. Answer yes no. 151425. RO to IR.

16/9 0015

Mr. O'Brien informed that Mr. Tombelaine is staying at the Transmitter Station for the night.

0020

Message from Duty Officer Command - Go ahead with Jado Op.

0020

Efforts to contact OC Gurkha by phone failed. He has been given warning order by Comdt Barrett at approx. 2320. At 0130 Lt von Bayer left with APC + 2 jeeps to contact Gurkha Bn O/C and make tpt arrangements + replacement of airport coy.

0130

Capt Parker contacted Comdt Kane O/C Jadotville OP GP and was told that Comdt Kane would make final arrangements with Gurkhas at Jadotville Junction at 0545 hrs. Helicopter now partly loaded at airport to take on water in morning.

0500

Capt Parker Comdt Condon - Irish + Gurkha have been liaising on OP Jado and will RV at Jado Junction at 0600. Radio contact with Jado has failed since 0045 hrs.

Tombelaine wants us to secure Soglect with troops. Troop will be taken from DO Bn to hold and control the place.

0650

Group Jadot left for Lufira bridge.

0810

3 Irish Soldiers to be picked up by KP = APC at Castle.

6 men from Sect B at Sabena villas be picked up and tpt to Sect B.

0820

HKP departed from Irish HQ to Jadotville with am etc.

One signaller at Sabena villas ill.

Four Belgian Officers throwing stones at unit to Castle.

Swed Bn Brigade Reserve 1. coy and in case of need 1 Ghurka coy.
One telephone man from Sect B to Post Office.

Batteries to signal man at HQ Kat.

One HKP man from Sect B to airport.

0800

Water Supply cut in Eville.

One dead Do soldier to be transported from It hosp to Do Bn HQ in farm.

0930

Airps HKP arrived, AC arrived.

- 16/9 0945 Bolin picking up spare parts to armd car from Verfaille.
- 1000 Helicopter has landed at Jado. Staying on ground as there is aircraft overhead.
- 1000 Firing in vicinity of Irish Farm. Mortar fire being directed against tunnel. Gendarmerie armd car at BCK Camp.
- 1015 From HQ Kat. 16100, A 2327 Dead body of Dogra Pte at It. Hosp must be evac to Dogra Bn at Farm today without fail for cremation.
- 1130 Diesel oil 2 x 200 litre to major Sollenberg. Sollenberg will tell us the type of oil.
- Report from Irish Coy. Dr. O'Brien to HQ Kat.
- 1050 Priority Nations from HQ Kat to HQ Sec B. Unclas 02389 Raja to Maern. Please arrange two APCs to report to Dogras before 1500 hrs today to take water rations and amm to Post Office. Same vehicles will be used to evacuate 42 prisoners from P.O. These prisoners will be kept in a barrack in Swedish Camp till further orders.
- 1055 Two chaplains arrested when spying by Gu/Lido.
- 1055 40,000 pounds of supply have arrived at airport (mainly ration) Log. Off.
- If tp goes to Indian supply juice should be picked because of lack of water.
- 1140 one RA 200 should be sent to HQ Kat to have a reserve connection to HQ Sect B. Rear link now in Sabena villas should be moved to HQ Sect B. Commandant O'Shea should stay as liaison.
- 1200 Order to tunnel: Officer in charge is entitled to check all civilian passing the tunnel.
- 1200 Comdt Barrett Capt Parker. Reports indicate that Gendarmerie are advancing along Ave Luxembourg with armd car + attack on the tunnel could take place. Tunnel under mortar fire all morning and many civilians passing. Rumours being spread that Tshombe has ordered Gendarmerie to lay down arms but Belgian Consul opposes this.
- 1200 Reports from Jado Relief group they have now reached vicinity of bridge. Have been bombed from Air. 1 casualty. Things are quiet in Jado for the moment.
- 1230 a) O'Shea on phone Sabena liaison with airport.
b) Radio 200 with two signal men (Swedish) to HQ Katanga reserve set to HQ Sect B.
Indian rear link stay as an emergency set if HQ sect B has to go there.
- 1240 Report from Tunnel that all is quiet after much activity. Attack may be expected this evening or to-night. Civilian traffic to be checked but allowed through. Katangese police to be allowed through for present.
- 1245 Tp of Indian hygiene team from airfield to Swedish refugee camp.
- 1255 Report from Mr Flad that paratroppers are in the area of Tabucongo and Luena park. A road block is established north of Tabucongo.
- 1300 HQ Kat wants names of prisoners held by Irish Coy at Jado for Mr. O'Brien urgent also type and weight of bomb dropped at Tunnel yesterday.

- 16/9 1310 Priority From HQ Kat to HQ B. Info Ind Sig Coy 161200 unclas Q 1061. Owing to failure of electric supply one signal generator plus 7 drums of petrol fining in old UN HQ required for maintaining communication matter urgent. Request utilize armoured car taking body to Dogras at Post Office be utilized to carry these stores this Hq by 1400 today.
- 1405 Two sconicars have arrived at airport.
C-ration has arrived from Lville 2000 we can have 1800.
Hq Kat request two APC to take Do pl to airfield as reinforcement.
- 1430 Request for ammunition from Swed Bn sent by phone to Log Off HQ Kat for furthering to Leo.
- 1430 Indians (Log Off) wants to have rations from Indian Supply tonight.
- 1525 Air Ops wants to know what the present position about helicopter is.
- 1545 Order to cpt Carlstand/Gu Bn. Prepare attack on the two houses opposite Indian Supply Depot. One APC will be attached. Task and H-hour will be given later. List of task will follow APC when reporting Lido.
- 2130 Sec Sitrep from 151600 to 162130 which covers move to Jadot of Gurkha & Irish coys, their withdrawal and ambush at Seven Sources.
- 17/9 0525 Message from Airport that Force Commander has arrived there. Requires transport.
- 0800 Mr. O'Brien wants latest news from Jado urgently for Mr Aiken in Leo.
- 0830 Latest report from Jadotville is that water has NOT been turned on and if it is not 24 hrs is max. time they can hold out. Jet is overhead trying to provoke them. Holding helicopter until assurance is given re grounding of Jet.
- 0830 Firing opened up again north of Swedish Camp. Firing for a few minutes.
- 1000 Air Ops have the names of helicopter pilots for major Rosén.
- 1000 Present state of food, petrol & amn in Irish Bn?
- 1050 Request from Irish Bn for armoured car to escort party of about 40 from airport to Bn HQ at 1300 hrs.
- 1220 Message from Jadot Coy handed in by Omdt Gondon re change in sit query re ac sp, shortage of food and water, when a break through by him could be made, if necessary enquiring about political sit and stating that the coy were more or less hostages. Finally seeking advice.
- 1240 Passed names of two Belgian prisoners held by Jadot Coy to Mil Info Kat Comd as follows:
Pauchean Michel
Pierre van der Wager(n)
- 1515 Casualty State Irish Bn. 3 dead (?) Hosp. 8. Injured 6. Prisoners 25.
- 1515 Report from airport that it has been attacked by Jet. A number of explosions. Details to follow.
- 1545 Latest from Jadotville. Surrounded by about 2000 Gendarmerie. Cease-fire agreement has not been kept due, Coy comdr thinks, to the fact that Bridge has not been taken. Some solution must be found fast otherwise he cannot hold out.
- 1620 From Kat Command. Water may be cut off again tonight. Units should be warned.
- 1630 Air Ops want 4 drums of diesel. Major Sollenberg for Major Rosén.

- 17/9 1640 From Comdt O'Shea. Air Ops at Airport - Helicopters cannot be used without written permission from Air Ops, Leo.
- 1650 Firing from South of Swedish Camp.
- 1705 Col Waern to Force Commander. Meeting has been arranged with Tshombe.
- 1730 Staff Conf - Points.
a) Sup State - some units have NOT sent in returns.
b) Helicopters - Use of Sabena ac
- 1740 To Kat HQ. Air Ops request written permission from Air Ops Leo before HKP leaves for Jadotville. Sect B request answer to this so that hkp can leave first light tomorrow for recee or resupply of Jadotville. Infor IR Bn.
- 1745 To IR Bn: Withdraw IR 3 soldiers and Italian personnel (7) tonight to IR Bn. Info Dr Oyen.
- 1810 Message from Jadotville. "You don't understand the problem. The heli cannot go now. Help is too late. I am trying to keep up talks. We are not in a def position now. We have no food and no water. We will have to go to a "hotel" with our personal arms. There is no def position there. There is no way out now except high level talks. It is a decision for Aiken, McKeown"
- 1820 Passed to Mr. O'Brien and Gen McKeown individually on phone. Latter asked to have msg clarified by Irish Bn.
- 1835 Phoned Irish Bn to have message mentioned above clarified.
- 1825 IR request tpt for msg to airport.
- 1830 Rumour re attack in Swedish camp.
- 1830 Request Major Forslund to check leakups in water pipes and fill up for tonight as water will be cut off. Actually whilst phoning it was found to be already cut off.
- 1850 HQ Kat Comd to HQ Sec B. Unclas A233 7 w cas report to reach this HQ by 0800 hrs daily. Report to incl name no rank of pers killed cma wounded cma missing or taken prisoner. For those wounded it should specify whether injury is serious or light. And end.
- 1900 IR MP bring in prisoner (white) found with one rifle .303 one hunting shot-gun. MP say that they have been watching this man for some time as a suspected sniper. His ho is opposite Irish Camp. This man has been on very friendly terms with UN offr and mentioned to an Irish offr earlier today that he was changing from his ho. He also gave some info re Gend activity. He felt he was not safe. Name Stanislas ZURKOWSKI - a Polish offr.
- 2010 Message from Jadot Coy: "Coy has surrendered - surrender honourable - left personal wpns - surrender made K 'Munongo' - treated well.
- 2015 5 Drums each 200 litres for Air Ops Maj Sollenberg.
- 2210 Irish Coy plus one APC nominated as Bde Res.
- 2230 One Gend AC plus some gendarmed shelled with own mortars.
- 2250 Report of attack on PO. No details yet.
- 2255 Officer I/C Bde Res called for briefing NOTE. In future Bde Res must be nominated in the morning.
- 2300 Rang Kat HQ re PO but got no reply from OPS.
- 2300 Verbal message from Comdt Hefferman IR Bn that A Coy IR Bn were now patrolling the streets of Jadotville together with Gendarmerie. Message not confirmed.

- 18/9 0600 Ring from Ops Kat Comd asking for info.
- 0635 Ring from Comdt O'Shea. All quiet - query about helicopter - now sit in Jadotville ends all worries about helicopter air sup.
- 0750 Msg from O'Shea re heli-pilot injured during attack on airport yesterday. No op available as regular op is now in Jadotville. Unconfirmed report of destruction of two Kat planes by ETM J trs at Kolwezi.
- 0830 Permission granted by Force Comdr to use Sabena helic - Message from HQ Kat.
- 0835 Relayed info to O'Shea - O'Shea states that there is a heli pilot in NVILLE who would be willing to come and fly heli here.
- 0845 Message from Dogra re mortaring by Dogras of enemy positions SOUTH of airport - same positions were also motared last night - Enemy reported digging in.
- 1000 Report from refugee at Tunnel that Gend were shooting upon people in Katuba Commune.
- 1000 Ring from major Savny re evac of It stores to Ind Supply.
- 1000 Report from Capt Stuvant re loc of Gend who intend to attack refugee Camp.
- 1030 Report from Kat that Sec Gen's plane had not yet reached Ndola. It left at 1645 yesterday.
- 1030 Major Savny and major Ayen again pass on Gen Raja's order to evac It stores & Ind Sup - only C Rations to be collected.
- 1035 M Flad reports mors in posn outside Base Sup Depot prepared.
- 1040 Ring from Col Egge re fate of heli pilot in Jadotville - discussed arrest of prisoner "STAN" last night.
- 1100 Report from Irish Bn. All well no need for food etc. - all now in hotel - holding per arms - arm held pending Peace talks. Heli being guarded by Irish Gd (mutual arrangement) - Lack of food and water, fatigue had driven them to surrender or be wiped out by another attack.
- 1110 Report re escape of 1 cpl + 3 men from It stores - party arrived.
- 1120 Ac overhead. Irish report of fire on Dogra Cas - followed by report of aerial bombing of same.
- 1135 Spoke to Carlstrand on radio re plans for evac of Ind Sup Dep.
- 1345 Col Waern. Staff and OC Irish Bn to Castle for conf with FC and Raja. Re dis posn of forces discussed - Initial moves at once as follows: Gurkhas (Lido) to Castle, Dogras (Castle) to Airport. Gurkhas PO to Jado delay, Gurkhas Swed Camp to Jado delay. Evac Ind Sup Depot.
- 1430 FC and party visit It Hosp and tour city.
- 1500 Conf - FC + Bde Staff at Sect B HQ.
- 1530 FC tours Refugee Camp.
- 1600 Palemeal orders for moves today - Gurkhas & Dogras to coord own moves.
- Tp of Lorry (small) to Lido. Transport of helicopter material from Lido to airport. Major Sollenberg (before 0500, preferably tonight)
- 1930 Transport of Major Singh and Mishi and 6 soldiers from Swed Camp to airport (to receive men from Leo).

- 18/9 1820 Nineteen saloons move to center of town past Fina Rd about
- Seen by Tunnel Gd.
- 1830 Mr. Tombelaine reports death of Mr Hammarskjold.
- 1830 Report from Dogra HQ that mors were firing on airport from SOUTH
of it - Dogras request Irish mor sp - This could not be given as
fire ctl or direction could not be guaranteed.
- 1910 Major Rosén reported that Gen McKeown had ordered shelling of
Base Sup Depot - This was a result of Dogra Bn report direct to
Brig Raja. Irish mors were ordered to fire at the same time.
- 1930 Report from Dogra Bn HQ that mors which shelled airport earlier
did NOT come from Base Depot area but from area of Native Village
SOUTH of Airport - he was quite certain as they had observed this
for some time.
- 1930 Report that Capt Eric Jungholm Swed offr LO K Dogras had taken a
plane piloted by a Swed Cpl at approx 1500 hrs. They had not yet
returned. It is presumed that he had gone to recce the
Jadotville area.
- 2020 Reported to Brig Raja the Jungholm incident.
- 2100 Name of Cpl who piloted plane taken by Capt Jungholm is 3516
Henrysson.
- 2155 Report from Kat Comd at Castle that there is firing at Lido.
- 19/9 0130 Transair plane landed w load of amn, fuel and coffins.
- 0200 Malaya plane landed.
- 0315 Firing was heard from direction Indian Supply.
- 0410 Armoured car and truck left for It Hosp to pick up wounded for trp
airfield.
- 0430 DC-4 landed at airfield.
- 0813 Jungholm and Henrysson have landed in Ndola. They have been seen
by Major Harris from USA. DC-3 Leo. Harris was in Ndola to see
Hammarskjold. Jungholm supposed to have taken off by Piper Club.
- 0900 Message from representative of Union Minière through Irish Bn:
Union Minière wants to help us with food and water refugees or
anybody that needs it. One official / UMHK arrived IR HQ to discuss.
- 0930 Plan being made to rescue main party of food holdings in Indian Supply.
- 1130 One Indian corporal from Sect B to airport. We will inform Sect II
Swed Bn when tp available. Mail to airport at same time.
- 1130 Major Sollenberg wants to go from airport to HQ Sect B and HQ Kat.
- 1140 Report from Maitra: Gurkha coy still in PO. Gurkha and MAC now in
airport area ready to attack enemy on Jadotville road. Recce is now
being done on Jadotville road to decide dispositions. Political
discussions are in progress.
- 1145 Rifle and machinegun fire from Swedish camp (Kasenga road positions)
against gendarmerie patrols and snipers. Swed patrols pursuit enemy.
- 1234 42 prisoners in Post Office move from PO to airport, where prisoner
camp is to be established. In same move C-rations to CO. Resupply
if needed from airport C-ration.

19/9 1315 Col Waern and Comdt Barrett went on following tour - Following is Comdt Barrett's report:

- a. ITALIAN HOSP where some wounded natives (two) were deposited. - Col visited hosp.
- b. CASTLE. Col spoke with Mr. O'Brien and Gen Raja.
- c. AIRPORT. Where Col was briefed on sit and plans for immediate def - inspected Malayan Ferret armoured cars and also discussed plans with OC Gurkha Bn incl Jadot Delay Force. Recce for latter in progress.
- d. DOGRA Bn HQ. Inspected defs and layout of sub-units-plans discussed. A junior Gend offr who was trained in Brussels was held as a prisoner at this HQ. He was introduced as a cooperative type as it is said most of the same type of offr are. We took him to Kat HQ where he was later interviewed and decided that he be used as an LO for talks etc. Medical supplies and some food were collected for transport to Dogra unit at Post Office and amn for Gurkha unit at Kat HQ.
- e. CASTLE - KAT HQ. Col Waern and Comdt Barrett were briefed by Gen McKeown on his estimate of the sit. He said that he was very pleased with our actions and especially with the current conc of units which has been planned for some time. He stressed the following points:
 - (1) Gend are well led particularly by people trained in Psychological Welfare.
 - (2) He said that unit comds should get offr to speak to soldiers and explain this type of action. Soldiers must not be allowed to become upset and harassed by continuous probing attacks, sniping, air attacks, etc and should avoid becoming tensed and tired by org reliefs and rest.
 - (3) The Fuga Gend ac has been grounded temporarily by Tshombe.
 - (4) The main reason for difficulties in getting in sups of tpts, vehs, stores etc has been the reluctance of charter pilots to fly because of FUGA attacks.
 - (5) He (Gen McKeown) will try once back in Leo (today) to reinforce Eville with the remainder of the Jat Bn and the Eth Bn. He would send in adv elements of each initially to give them an opportunity of getting acquainted with the sit, layout, etc. Then he would complete fly-in of JATS followed by fly-in of remainder of Eths.
 - (6) RETALIATION. A limit must be placed on this. It should be specifically against mil tgts and we should be careful of women and children - Warning should be issued if possible. This will be done by informing KAT HQ who will emp LOs and Mr Samelange for this purpose.
 - (7) Actions from now until further notice must avoid jeopardy of talks which are pending.
 - (8) Soldiers should be briefed on the political background.

NOTE. The Dogra and Gurkha units in the airport area were exceedingly well dug-in - some particularly well-dug CPs were seen at Dogra Bn HQ.

19/9

Col Waern's AC escorted jeeps with stores back to Post Office, It Hosp and ONUC HQ (Old). A check was made of disposns in this area at present. They are gen as follows:

(1) Dogras

Two pls - Post Office
 One pl - Radio sta across from PO
 One ad loc pl - ONUC HQ
 (not from coy)

(2) Gurkhas

Two pls - Post Office
 One det (one) RCL do
 Two MMGs do
 and 42 prisoners (all para commandos).

(3) The Dogra Coy Comd requested relief of prisoners. Also that when Gurkha elements leave that he be given one det RCL and two MMGs - This would make him happy.

1430 Conversation Force Commander Col Waern. Operation Supply Depot is ON. Avoid casualties and withdraw if necessary.

1430 Force Rejsby left to carry out op Supply Depot. Major Rosén, Capt Tornérhjelm, Lt von Bayer.

1445 Machine gun fire started again south of Swedish Camp.

1515 Force Comd wants 2 APCs at HQ 1720 hrs.

1530 Operation Supply Depot going smoothly and calmly.

1615 Third Ferry load now being loaded at Supply Depot.

1615 Machine Gun Fire south of Swedish Camp.

1630 Ten days rations for all units retrieved from Supply Depot.

1715 Machine Gun Fire from snipers resumed South of Swedish Camp.

1730 Tele conversation O/C Gurkha and major Rosén.

a) Coy / Gu less platoon will move from PO at choice of Gu Bn commander. He will give this HQ 3 hours notice to arrange transport. He prefers night.

b) He suggests one section (two MMG/Do Bn) be attached to Do PO unit.

c) Gu Bn locations

- (1) Coy / airport
- (2) Coy less plat PO
- (3) Coy / airport
- (4) Odds and sodds 60 rifle airport
- (5) Recce has been made direction Jadotville

2115 Irish Bn to have one platoon on stand to transport available in Swedish Camp if required.

2245 Report from HQ KAT that mortars at Castle had fired on area of Rly station at request of Dogra Coy comdr at Post Office!!!

2300 Irish and Dogra mors at Castle instructed not to fire mortars without prior permission from this HQ.

- 20/9 1000 Operation Charlie. O/C Gurkha Bn visited Sect B. It was agreed
1. That recce should be made on white Piers Xrds area and establish exact position of AA gun there.
 2. Swedish Bn to do recce towards White Piers Xrds from Swedish Camp End.
- More Supplies from Supply Depot.
- 1110 From airport. 30 barrels of gasoline each for Irish and Swedish Bns available at airport.
- 1115 Five planes arrived last night. - C-rations, barbed wire, gasoline?
- Mail. - 1 Ferret.
- 1430 From Mr. O'Brien Capt Parker. British consul will see senior representative of British missionaries. Armoured car to be provided to bring him there.
- 1500 Swedish Recce Patrol prior to operation Supply Depot returned with one man slightly injured having been sniped at from long distance on Ave Industrielle.
- 1500 Capt Nanda from Kat HQ requesting permission to use mortars on Rt Rly Sta on request of commander at Post Office who states he is under mortar fire.
- Irish at Tunnel want to know is it Indian or Gendarmerie are using mortars?
- 1500 Indian Supply Operator is called off as report that Balubas are attacking people at Kasonga Rd must be investigated.
- 1530 Black smoke emerging from general direction of Tunnel - Camp Massart - Rly Station.
- 1630 No water at Tunnel for Irish or refugees there. Water is also cut off at Irish and Swedish Camps. Water cart available to Swed Bn at old Irish HQ at Ave Greveilleas.
- 1635 Msg re cease fire.
- 1645 Report from WO Thurdin in PO (phone 4800)
- a) 1415 hrs enemy firing with rifle against PO. PO not hit. Shots were fired at a far distance.
 - b) Supply of diesel oil put into fire by gendarmes. Location of supply: 50 - 100 yards south rondel at railway station.
 - c) No mortar fire against PO.
 - d) No losses.
 - e) Prisoners in PO:

policies	(MP police)	12
gendarmes	(paratrps)	28
civilians		2
		42
 - f) Water and electricity in PO cut. Water supply only for 1 day.
 - g) One gend (prisoner) will come from Hosp to PO.
- 1650 Prisoners should be transported to Do Bn soonest (airfield area).
- 1705 From Maitra: Belgian civilian in White Piers Area. Saw no UN move in day.
Maitra is doing ground recce at night to sunrise. We keep out. Planes are landing at night. In daytime no gendarmerie but guns are there at night (in neighbourhood of White Piers)
- 1705 Gu Bn wants rations!

- 20/9 1815 CO3 phone 5226 captain Chipolat according to question of evacuation It hosp tomorrow 1100 - 1500. Truckloads? Personnel? Inform Dr Øyen HQ Kat about decision.
- Ten Swedish airops wishes juice or similar.
- Many sandbags to Italian hospital from ? to It Hosp. Phone Øyen about sandbag, 2 wheelbarrows, 6 shovels, 6 picks.
- 2205 From HQ Kat: Flash. Dr. O'Brien, Raja for all chiefs down to group chief. Cease-fire has been agreed upon between Tshombe and representatives of UN. Cease-fire goes into effect 21/9 at 0000 hours LT, that is in 2 hours' time. All chiefs down to group chiefs must ascertain that ceasefire is going into effect. UN troops are not allowed to open fire after this hour unless they are fired at.
- 2325 From Captain Braunerhjelm to Sect B: Refugees are expected to go to Ruashi tomorrow morning 0330 and kill. Brigade Reserve and all Swed LFC are placed at the disposal of Swed Bn to take care of refugees. Lt von Bayer shall report at Staff Coy tomorrow to help Swed Bn with refugees.
- 21/9 0130 Got terms of Cease Fire Agreement for info from "Josie" for my Swed/Irish boys - Translation into English to follow - Message by phone from HQ Kat Dogra Castle.
- 0635 5000 lbs VIP medicals 6 aircrafts have arrived during night. Transport for maj Sollenberg to Lido soonest for repair of helicopter.
- 0800 Has the hygienic team arrived to Refugee camp yet?
- 0815 4000 lbs to be picked up at airport, by one truck and go to Italian hospital.
- 0830 Sporadic sniping has been taking place in vicinity of Swedish Camp since early morning.
- 0830 Col Waern and maj Rosén to HQ Kat for conference.
- 0900 Camp Commandant Swedish Refugee Camp has made an agreement with refugees that they should hand in all offensive weapons. Similar effort to be made at Irish end.
- 0900 O/C Irish Bn requesting removal of Rd block on Ave Savonniers near Kasenga Junction in order to avoid refugee camp and ease movement between Swedish and Irish camps.
- 1100 Conference - Swedish and Irish Bn O/C at this HQ 1200 hrs today.
- 1115 Two pls of Gurkha Bn from airport area to take over radio transmitter from Swed Bn. Transport needs to this HQ immediately.
- Malayan armd cars and one Irish ac to patrol city.
Balubas from refugee camp must be prevented from looting/killing confined to compounds.
- 1200 Briefing about that American relief food will be taken from marshalling railstn to refugee camp today.
- 1200 Conf of Bn Comds and Bde Staff re orders issued by Gen Raja earlier.
- 1) Two pls of Gorkhas from airport to relieve Swedesat Transmitter sta West.
 - 2) Swedes to investigate pillage of farmer's ho & disappearance of daughters.
 - 3) Four Malayan armd cars to report for patrolling of city- under bde ctl - briefing by Comdt Barrett.
 - 4) Sups from Sup Depot to be evac to airport.
 - 5) Refugee sups storage of Swede & Irish lines.
 - 6) Prisoner state incl details to be submitted to Kat Comd HQ by 1600 hrs.
 - 7) Sitreps from this HQ daily by 1800 hours.

- 21/9 1250 Comdt Barrett rang the Dogras re Malayan arm'd cars - arranged to send Irish arm'd car to lead Malayans here for briefing.
- 1250 Same call - Dogra Comd suggests relief of h&s coy at Post Office by Gurkhas during Cease Fire. This allows for conc of Dogras on airport.
- 1500 No 1 pat consisting of two Mal arm'd cars, one Irish A/C and one jeep mounted atk gun left to pat NORTHERN half of city No 2 pat incomplete as two other Malayan cars fail to arrive - Sent IR A/C & jeep (atk) to pat Kasonga/Savonniers rds only until arrival of Malayan cars, when this pat would cover SOUTHERN half of city.
- 1550 Seven wounded to be evac from It hospital to airport today.
- 1630 No 2 patrol now complete pat SOUTHERN half of city.
- 1645 Firing South of Swedish Camp - just a few bursts preceded by an explosion.
- 1645 No 1. Irish/Malayan patrol reports all quiet in city. Only two gendarmerie seen at ho at junc of Savonniers /Luxembourg - rd block seen on ave Kato just a few yds south of Ave Mahenge - little or no tfc - only gathering of people at tunnel.
- 1700 No 1 pat departs on second run - Pat comd carries despatches for all bus and Kat Comd incl SITREP.
- 1755 No 1 and 2 patrols give final reports on patrol activity - all quiet - NTR - patrols dismissed - ordered to resume patrols from this HQ at 0830 tomorrow. All rds in white city covered by pats. Tp of 12 congolese from It hosp to refugee camp.
- 2050 Transport of Gurkhas to Kilobelobe and relieve of Swedes achieved at 2040 hrs.
- 2105 Ambulance with Mr Farrach and Italian NCO left for OXEKAT at 1330 hrs, they are still not back. The Italian and British Consuls have been informed. Info received from Mrs Berntzen.
- 2215 From Mrs Bernstein at Italian Hosp. Supply of oxygen at hosp has run out and efforts to get some have failed. As operations are not possible without it, a supply from somewhere is essential.
- 2215 Duty Officer instructed to send wireless to Gurkhas at Radio Transmitter immediately.

22/9 0110 Mr Wegge a Belgian living in Ave Araucarias near Ave Violettes reported to this HQ and stated that Jeunesse stripped to the waist had knocked at his house. His wife and two sons aged 14 and 15 are there. He escaped in his car to come here for help.

0130 Patrol reported back that all was quiet at the house. Two Swedish soldiers left in house with the family.

These jeunesses are obviously terrorising the white population and are controlling the rest of the refugees. Their immediate removal will ease the running of the camp and prevent lawlessness. It would appear that we have a serious obligation to act at once!

0230 WO of Swedish Police reported to me and said as he only had two men he requested that men from the stand-to platoon should be used for patrolling.

I was surprised to find that no night patrolling was being carried out especially under present circumstances. Due to language difficulties and the non existence of proper communications it was impossible for me to establish the exact position re what measures were being taken to prevent incidents such as those described in last page.

22/9

A tightening up all round in vigilance is necessary as the natural reaction to the past week is one of relaxation but it does not appear to be generally realised that vigilance is required now more than ever.

- 0830 From Les Roches - Mr O'Brien wants escort arm'd car. Prisoners in Post Office 42 will be sent to Do Bn (order to WO Thurdin in Post Office)
- 0930 No 1 pat Irish left to patrol northern sector also given task of carrying despatches and escorting a number of people various places.
- 0945 No 2 pat (Irish) left in similar mission as no 1 to southern sector.
- 1045 Visit of Police Comm Fred De Sooth to arg police/UN pats 30 each in Refugee Camp area. Swedes to sup first pat - Irish to relieve Swedes. Free passage through tunnel of Police and coop with same in prevention of looting near tunnel. Gend of less than pl only to be allowed through tunnel.
- 1100 Info re last entry passed to Irish Bn via Capt Meginness - also told him to tell Irish and warn refugees that Police/UN pats would be in action and would deal firmly with culprits - Major Mide has already got similar instrcs re Swedish Refugee Camp. Pats expected to commence at about 1400 hrs.
- 1100 Gen comment - a number of whites have sought escorts to investigate the position of friends residing within Refugee Camps - killings etc. continue within camps.
- 1115 Message of 1030 hrs contradicted by It von Bayer who states that sit was as follows: "approx 1000 Jeunesse attempted to attack Ruashi - Gend fired at Jeunesse - fire returned fire on Gend by Swed pat - v Bayer & Co tried to parley with Jeunesse who threatened to kill everybody with UN whom they say did nothing for them - After parley th returned - sit is NOT nice.
- 1150 Five-in-one to Castle from Swed Camp for four Swedish personnel in HQ Kat.
- 1150 Contacted O/C Gurkhas & Malayan arm'd cars which were due at 0830 and still not here. Informed that they were taken to escort sups from Ind Sups to Airport. Ascertained that Brig Raja had countermanded order. Major Rosén also spoke to Dogra OK.
- 1200 Post Office was fired at 220130 hrs. 15 shots came from the west and some from the railway station. Meeting was arranged today between commissaire en chef Sapwe and major Rosén by Swedish consul.
- a) Maj Rosén first told Sapwe Colonel Waern and his own sympathy because of the loss of police during the battle.
 - b) Now there are about 350 policemen in camp on Kasenga Road. Some work in town, some will be used to mixed patrols.
 - c) 150 police are moreover located to the north junction Araucarias and Scieries.
 - d) As of 1600 hrs mixed patrols (UN and Police) will be organised, UN 30 police 30, Police Camp on Kasenga Road. Route for patrol will be among other Kasenga, Savonniers, Scieries, and around the camp. First in wide circle, afterwards in more narrow circles. Refugees with arms will be disarmed and arrested.
 - e) In future these patrols could eventually be extended to other parts e.g. Ruashi.
 - f) Area Bel Air where now gendarmerie Lt Bunga and two platoons + IAC is, will be cleaned by Swed consul who will tell gendarmerie. Afterwards police will be responsible for this area.
 - g) IR Bn, Swed Bn are told that police (even in strength) are allowed to pass tunnel and UN installations. UN now cooperates with police.
- 1200 From HQ Kat Command
To HQ Sect B Ref 221200
Two ferrets were used to escort supply convoy to Post Office.
They may be used by you after that mission.

- 22/9 1400 Mr Flad confirms that the 20 mm AA outside gendarmerie supply depot was destroyed. Gendarmerie have again established road block outside this depot.
- 1415 AC with 1200 pounds of mail for Swed Bn.
One Swed platoon and one Irish platoon with AC organised to disarm jeunesse in refugee camp.
- 1620 Food on way for refugees.
- 1600 Operation Jeunesse proceeding according to plan - No incidents other than one native shot when attacking Irish soldier. Jeunesse are now in camp centre - camp is surrounded.
- 1710 One truck from Irish Bn to pick up fresh vegetables etc between 1000 - 1200 tomorrow.
- 1720 Following troop movements will take place in night: Gurkha (airport) to PO, Do Coy (Post Office) to airport. Gu Bn chief responsible for transportation. Refugee to be moved to airport at same time.
- 1810 Received a call from airport concerning an incident in which two civilians there had a gun (rifle) and a hand grenade. Informed that they were two civilian members of UN Staff. Instructed that they be disarmed and returned to UN HQ with a full report on the incident.
- 1820 The Gurkha Comdt at airport informed me that everything was now under control.
- 1900 Mr Pastor Robinson rang to inform us that one or two trucks with powdered milk for the Refugees would be coming in tomorrow morning between 0800 and 0830. He said that the Irish Bn had no warning of his arrival today and as a result the reception was such that most of his drivers refused to come again.
- 1910 Lt Gisle rang to request that major Rosén or Colonel Waern should ring Dogra Comd. Asked Dogra Comdr to state his problem which is as follows: The four Malayan armd cars had been ordered to report to Sector B HQ tonight. The Dogra Comdr stated that he would require two of these to act during tonight's operation: only two would report as ordered. He requires Col Waerns agreement to this.
- 1915 Dogra Comdr rang requesting Col Waern to ring him.
- 2015 Telephone connection broken off. Listening alternative 3 informed DO, HQ Kat, Gurkhas and IR through Radio Station in Swedish Camp.
- 2020 Message to Dogra HQ: "HQ Sect B orders that four Malayan armoured cars report to this HQ by 2200 hrs. This order is urgent and final. Colonel Waern authorizes. And end.
- 2105 From GP to WA: to major Norman. OUNC Leo intends to send all kinds of merchandise, amm, food, etc. to Eville. Judge the need and inform HQ Kat. a list of requirements with priority stated for each kind of merchandise, at latest 0800 hrs on 23/9. Major Rosén.

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THE BATTLE OF JADOTVILLE.THE BATTLE 13-17 SEPTEMBER 1961

1. At approximately 7.25 hours on Wednesday 13 September I received a signal from Bn HQ informing me of OP MORTHOR and that it had been successfully accomplished. This was the first indication I had of any operation or action planned to take place in E'ville. At this time all the men except those manning the trenches were assembling for Mass. Everything seemed to happen together at this stage. A group of Gendarmerie, approximately 30 strong, rushed our forward positions in jeeps and on foot. They appeared to have been taken unaware when they found some of our men concealed in trenches. The Gendarmerie opened fire and our men returned fire. After about 10 minutes fighting, the Gendarmerie broke and fled. I am convinced that the Gendarmerie got a telephone signal from the Garage depot that we were assembled for Mass and they hoped to get us off-guard. All our men who were attending Mass carried loaded weapons and were in action almost immediately.
2. There was a lull in fighting for approximately two and a half hours but we observed large forces of Gendarmerie moving into position on our flanks. We could have inflicted heavy casualties at this stage but I ordered MMGs and mortars to hold fire as the news from E'ville was good and there was a chance that the attack of the morning was the action of some hot heads.
3. Immediately after the action had started on the morning of the 13 September I ordered every container within our locality to be filled with water. We filled every bath, bucket, bottle and any vessel that could contain water. We were fortunate to have taken this precaution because that day the water was cut off.
4. We received information from my Baluba house-boy, who went by backways to Jadotville, that the Gendarmerie were expecting heavy reinforcements and preparing to launch a major attack on my position at 1130 hours. At approx 1130 hrs the attack opened with very heavy mortar and small arms fire. Our mortars, MMGs and LAs returned the fire and the heavy artillery weapon, already located, was destroyed after it had fired two rounds. The ammunition dump with this gun must have got a direct hit as it burned all day and that night. There were several attacks on this sector during the day but all were broken up at long range. The other sectors of our location were under continuous SA fire and sporadic mortar fire during this day. Our mortars, MMGs, armoured cars and LAs destroyed at least three enemy mortars and crews on this day.
5. Our position was untenable if the enemy attacked in strength or infiltrated at night. I decided to withdraw our forward platoon at last light into a new defensive position. We got every man who could be spared to dig trenches in the new position. At last light we thinned out the forward positions and one hour after last light our new position was fully organised.
6. Our new defended location was approx 250 yds by 120 yds. It was on fairly high ground, and there was thick bush and dead ground at ranges from 600/1500 yds. On our rear, on the E'ville road, however, we had no observation and only approx 20 yds field of fire. A hill, about 300 ft high and a mile on our rear, was very strongly held by enemy. Our plans were to break up all attacks at long range and as far as possible prevent the enemy from getting into the dead ground and thick bush surrounding our position. We had trenches and fortified villas within the location to deal with any break-in by the enemy.
7. At about 1600 hours the enemy succeeded in gaining possession of a house about 300 yds in front of our forward position from where they brought heavy fire to bear on one platoon. Under cover of MMG fire an anti-tank crew destroyed the enemy in this house. At

this stage the enemy asked for a cease-fire, which I agreed to. They sent ambulances to collect their dead and wounded out of this building, and immediately that mission was accomplished they opened fire again without warning.

8. Firing continued during the night with small arms and MMGs. At approx 0525 hrs on Thursday we were subjected to a very heavy and very accurate mortaring. The enemy used 81 mm mortars and what we think were 4.2" mortars. This mortaring was accompanied by very heavy machine gun and small arms fire and continued for approx 45 mins before we were able to locate the enemy mortars which were concealed in a grove and garden approx 900 yds from our position. Once the enemy mortars were located they were completely destroyed by counter-bombardment by our 60 mm mortars. The enemy crews were cut down by our armoured cars and LAs as they tried to run away. Further mortar fire continued from many different positions during the day. The enemy now adopted the tactics of firing three or four shells from one position and moving immediately to another position. Some of this fire was accurate but most was inaccurate. We believed that we destroyed all the mortars on this day as they did not use mortars against us on Friday. However, they brought up mortars on Saturday morning which they located in a native compound and fired on us from that position. Fire orders and fire corrections were passed from trench to trench to our mortar position. Our No.31 wireless sets had failed on Wednesday. The co-operation between the men in trenches in forward positions and our mortar crews was of a very high standard. In many cases private soldiers passed back fire orders and corrections to the mortar position.

9. At approx 1300 hrs on this day Thursday, a jet plane came over on recce. We identified it immediately as Katange Air Jet. I evacuated the tall building over the garage as I expected this would be a target for the jet. The jet arrived again at approx 1500 hrs and again 1700 hrs; each time it came in and dropped two bombs and did two or three strafing runs. The bombing on this day damaged the two buses and all our transport. Some of the bombs dropped very near trenches and it was on this occasion that Pte. Tahaney and Pte Gormley were injured by a bomb which dropped very close to their trench.

10. Each time the jet plane came over it came in out of the sun and we prepared a barrage of small arms fire should it come again. On Friday morning the jet came in low and into our barrage of SA and MMG fire from armoured cars. It dropped two bombs but failed to come in on strafing run. We felt that we had hit it. This was confirmed later as it returned to KOLWEZI with bullet holes. After this attempt it bombed and strafed from very high altitude and was inaccurate.

11. When hostilities opened on Wednesday morning I telephoned the Burgomaster from a nearby villa and asked him to use his influence to stop the fighting. He replied that we would have to surrender or that the mob would attack us as well. I informed him that surrender was out of the question and that the mob or any others attacking us would be cut down without mercy. I told him that I would hold him personally responsible for the terrible slaughter that would result from such an attack. He asked me to leave the telephone intact and that he would see what he could do. I agreed to this, foolishly perhaps, because this telephone was used after as a means of waging psychological warfare. Each night they rang with appeals and threats of all sorts and asking for our immediate surrender. I was playing for time and hoping always that reinforcements would get through. The man who usually telephoned purported to be a member of the Red Cross and always tried to make it appear that he was endeavouring to help us. We did not believe this of course. He spoke perfect English

but I did not speak to him directly until Friday evening. At this time we were tired of their threats and I got on the telephone and told him to do his worst.

12. At approx 1700 hrs on Thursday we captured two white mercenaries named PIERRE VAN DER WEGEN and MICHAEL FAUCHEUN. These men were in civilian attire and had travelled from E'ville by car. They had two machine guns, two FN Rifles, grenades and revolvers. They told me they had been with President Tshombe that morning, who informed them that an Irish coy had been taken prisoner at Jadotville and were to be held as hostages by Katange. On coming to the Lufira bridge they were told the same story by the Gendarmerie garrison there and so they came right to our position unsuspecting. These prisoners also informed me that a car had left E'ville on Wednesday and went to Rhodesia to hire two jet pilots. They did not know who the man was who went on this mission.

13. During Thursday and Friday the enemy made eight to ten separate attempts at attack. The pattern was much the same each time. Fire would be opened from all sides and a group of 50/60 would come forward from their assembly area. This assembly area was out of range of our 60 mm mortars. We could not bring MMG fire to bear on it as it was behind the rising ground. As soon as these groups came within range of our weapons we broke up every attack with devastating fire from our armoured cars, MMGs, LAs and mortars. These groups may have been the first wave of an attack or they may have been uncoordinated efforts. I would like to mention here that we found the Bren gun an excellent weapon. Its fire was devastating at ranges up to 1000 yds. The accuracy of our 60 mm mortar crews and the handling of these weapons was of an extraordinary high standard. The credit for our safety, were it to be attributed to human endeavours, must be given, to a very great extent, to our mortar crews.

14. Our casualties occurred as follows:

Pte Reidy shot in the leg on the morning of Wed 13th.

Ptes Tahaney and Gormley caught by aerial bomb as already mentioned, on Thurs 14th.

Sgt Hegarty injured by a mortar shell which dropped within a few yds of him as he was visiting his platoon positions on Thurs 14th.

Pte Manning shot in the shoulder by a group which infiltrated within 20 yds of his trench on the night of the 14th.

This group were destroyed by grenades.

15. On Friday evening I received a signal from Katanga HQ that heavy reinforcements would be available to take the bridge on Saturday morning. During this Friday night, and again on Saturday morning, we observed large convoys moving on a back road around our position towards the Lufira bridge. We could observe this road at two points, one at a range of 1500 yds and another at a range of 1250 yds. We hit up these convoys with mortar fire and MMG fire from armoured cars and Coy MMG section. Some of this fire was very effective and succeeded in blocking the road on Saturday. There was, however, another road six to eight miles north of our position which we could not observe and it is possible that large enemy forces moved on this road. The paratroopers who captured Capt Ryan and his group at Radio College passed by one of these routes to E'ville on Thurs 14th.

16. Cooking of food was impossible during daylight and extremely difficult at night. Nevertheless, our cooks, who manned their trenches and fought all day, left their trenches at last light and did their best to cook a meal which was served in the trenches at approx 2000/2100 daily. This meal consisted of a kind of stew with a little meat, potatoes and biscuits. Tea and biscuits were served again at 0400 hrs in the trenches. During the remainder of the time the men had to survive on bottles of water which were placed in each trench. Thirst became our greatest enemy. Men who were all day under the sweltering heat of the trenches, due to perspiration, excitement and lack of sleep required a lot of water. By Friday the water which we had was very stale. By Saturday it was almost putrid and on Sunday what was left made the men sick. There was a grave danger of disease due to burst sewers from bombing and shelling. There was a vile smell and flies were swarming everywhere.

17. On Saturday 16th a helicopter came in at approx 0900 hrs. Fifteen to twenty mins before they landed the crew had heard ground to air instructions to the jet pilot to intercept the helicopter and shoot it down. It had scarcely touched down when the jet was over. The jet kept high on this occasion, however, and caused no damage. Immediately the helicopter appeared over our position all enemy weapons, including .5" MMGs, opened fire. The enemy disclosed all their positions with this fire and we retaliated with every weapon which could be brought to bear. Some enemy positions were very close - 50/100 yds. The helicopter was not hit. Our men unloaded it under fire but covered by fire from our own weapons. 20 gallons of water which the helicopter carried was our most urgent requirement, but, of course, this was scarcely enough to supply 20 men with water for one day under our conditions.

18. The enemy, having disclosed their positions with this fire on the helicopter, we proceeded to hit with accurate and devastating fire. The battle continued for approx 2 hours and after a lull of another hour we hit him again for another hour with concentrated fire. The enemy appeared to have become completely demoralised by this fire. We now know that large numbers fled into the bush where many died of wounds later. The white officers shot and wounded some men in an attempt to stem this retreat or to get the men into the attack again. Two Africans showed me thigh wounds still undressed on Sunday, which they stated were inflicted by white officers who were ordering them to attack.

19. During this day Saturday the jet passed over our position on a number of occasions and we know it was attacking reinforcements coming to our aid. We arranged a signal, ZETO, to Bn HQ each time it passed. 3 mins from ZETO to arrival over Lufira, approx 10 mins to arrival over E'ville. We did not have radio contact with reinforcements. We also heard a long rumbling explosion from the direction of the bridge approx 18 miles distant and we believed that the bridge was blown. We now know that it was a smaller bridge about 100 yds north of the bridge on the main road that was in fact blown up at this stage.

20. At approx 1400 hrs on Saturday the Burgomaster, Mr. AMISI, or rather his white "adviser" rang on the telephone asking for a cease-fire. I refused to discuss anything on the telephone at this stage and told him if he genuinely wanted a cease-fire, he would come under a flag of truce to No-Mans Land. He said he also wanted to send an ambulance to evacuate some civilians. I refused this and told him we had plenty of evidence of the use of ambulances by Gendarmerie in E'ville. We learned later from Mr. KEARNEY, an Irishman who was in Jadotville at this time, that the Gendarmerie had an ambulance in Jadotville with a machine-gun mounted inside and manned by two white mercenaries. Perhaps this

is the ambulance they wanted to send to my position.

22. At 1500 hours the "adviser" rang again and asked for cease fire. *He said they were going to withdraw their troops from around my position. I warned him that any man who would move forward or backward would be shot. He asked for permission to send officers forward to a position to get Gendarmerie to stop firing. I told him to get these people to walk upright and to carry a white flag. He agreed to come to an appointed place in No-Mans Land at 1600 hrs, with the Burgomaster and OC Gendarmerie to discuss cease fire terms. Almost immediately after this telephone conversation a white officer got his leg shot off with a burst of MMG fire. They claimed that he was going forward to get the men to stop firing. That may be so but I doubt it very much. He did not carry a white flag. They were very annoyed over this as it would appear he was a very senior or very useful man. They did not, however, press the point too far. I believe this man lived but his leg was amputated.

22. At approx 1620 hrs the Burgomaster and OC Gendarmerie and white "adviser" arrived at the appointed place. Fr. Fagan, (the chaplain) and Lt. Froberg (Swedish interpreter) accompanied me. I informed them at the outset that discussion was useless unless they agreed to ground the jet and also that their troops on the Lufira bridge would cease firing. They did not want at first to discuss the action on the Lufira bridge as they said they were fighting Indians there. I refused to consider a local cease fire, stating emphatically that the jet must be grounded and that I would fire on any troops moving around my position towards the bridge. After some time they stated that the troops fighting at the bridge were not under their command as they had come from North Katanga. After some time, however, they agreed to get the troops on the bridge to cease fire if I could get UN troops there to cease fire also. I undertook to convey this to my HQ. At this time it would appear that they were unaware, as I was, that reinforcements had been beaten back at the bridge.

23. At this time I had information from Bn HQ of high level cease fire negotiations, and that this cease fire was being observed in E'ville at that time apart from some sniping. My intention was to negotiate agreement of a local cease fire pending the outcome of these high level cease fire talks and were agreeable to local cease fire pending the outcome.

24. The following points were agreed:

- a. Gendarmerie would withdraw from around my position to their barracks.
- b. A joint patrol of ten Gendarmerie and ten Irish would patrol the road area which was hitherto No-Mans Land. This was to impression the people that all was well and the fighting was over.
- c. A cordon of unarmed police, accompanied by some Irish troops, were to form a cordon between our position and Jadotville to keep back sightseers and other undesirables.
- d. The water was to be turned on to my position immediately. This they claimed would not be possible for some time as the pipes had been burst. They undertook to get a tanker of water conveyed to my position that night. The water was not turned on and the tanker did not arrive that night but they sent me 30 doz minerals to tide us over the night until water could be arranged in the morning.
- e. Police Chief and Asst Police Chief (English speaking) were to tour the town and native compound with me at 10 a.m. on Sunday to assure everybody that all was well.

25. At approx 2000 hrs a number of white Gendarmerie arrived to form a patrol with my troops. I refused to recognise them and the Burgomaster ordered them away. Later, ten African Gendarmerie arrived and the joint patrol was set up. Sometime after this a lorry-load of white Gendarmerie arrived at our cordon. They were very loud and demanded to be allowed through to E'ville as the fighting had stopped in Jadotville. (They wanted further action in E'ville). I sent instructions to these people that anyone coming within our area would be arrested. The Chief of Police approached me and asked for an escort to come with him to disarm these mercenaries. I agreed immediately. The Sgt who was to take charge of the escort, in briefing his men, was very business-like. He appeared to frighten the Chief of Police who now asked me to allow him to endeavour to get these mercenaries to go away. He stated that he was afraid of the consequences if further fighting started, and that these people would be disarmed by the Gendarmerie in Jadotville as they had been thrown out when the Gendarmerie mutinied against them. The Chief of Police approached them and after a long discussion and when our escort eventually moved up, they left.

26. I signalled terms of cease fire to Bn HQ and asked that our reinforcements should concentrate at the bridge as a precautionary measure. We intercepted several messages from Bn attempting to contact reinforcements, with instructions to consolidate at the bridge. At approx 1900 hrs I received a signal from Bn stating that reinforcements had returned to E'ville.*

27. On this Saturday night we still manned our trenches, but apart from one sentry in each trench the men slept in the trenches. Approx two-thirds of the men assembled for Mass on Sunday morning at 0730. The others still held the trenches. While at Mass the jet came again and we suspected a break of the cease fire. The jet did not attack. Later we observed large groups of Gendarmerie still around our position. These included many paratroopers on this date. The Burgomaster and "adviser" arrived at approx 0830. I protested very strongly about the jet and the location of the Gendarmerie. The "adviser" stated that it was a mistake about the jet and the Gendarmerie would be withdrawn. We discussed the accommodation to be occupied by us. Some of our villas had been badly damaged and the Burgomaster was to requisition other villas in the same area for us. All seemed well at this stage. Some time later Major MAKITA arrived and I suspected his attitude. He demanded that we store our heavy weapons in one villa. I asked for water to be turned on in accordance with the original agreement. He insisted we store weapons first and then he would turn on the water. I now knew this was a trick and they had no intention of keeping the cease-fire agreement. I refused to move from our position and I continued negotiations and arguments hoping to get relief as soon as possible.

28. I informed the Bn of our position and I was informed that three UN jets were arriving in E'ville on that day. I was also instructed to tell the Burgomaster that UN jets would be over Jadotville if they attempted anything. I asked that these jets would be sent over as soon as possible as a show of force. When I informed the enemy of UN jets they wilted visibly. Nevertheless they now became more harsh in their demands and now insisted that we move to a hotel in town. There was still no question of surrender. They claimed the reason why we should move to town was due to the fact that no suitable accommodation was available elsewhere. They said that they could not turn on the water because it was Sunday and no plumber was available to repair the pipes. I was very suspicious at this stage that the Gendarmerie were planning another attack on my men, some of whom were now out of the trenches. I knew also that a large group, at least a coy of paratroopers, were on my very vulnerable rear. These paratroopers had been withdrawn from the Lufira bridge. I am satisfied that the Burgomaster was responsible for preventing the Gendarmerie from

attacking again at that time. Later that night and again on Monday 18th, the Burgomaster had to hide from Gendarmerie who wanted to shoot him. Because they claimed he favoured UN.

29. I continued to keep up negotiations and arguments and insisting on written cease fire agreement. I was still hoping for some information on reinforcements to come to my assistance. The men at this stage were very fatigued - all had lost considerable weight and suffered from lack of sleep. Our only food now was some biscuits and we had absolutely no water whatever. At approx 1400 hrs I insisted on going to Jadotville town on the pretext of buying some beer for the men. My real reason was to get the feel and the attitude of the people. I asked two policemen to accompany me and I took W/O Eric Thors (Swedish co-pilot of the helicopter) as interpreter. I drove through the town. It was an armed camp with several hundred Gendarmerie and armed civilians on the streets. One group of civilians jeered us. The police showed me a bar where I could get beer. There were approx 100 Gendarmerie in the street outside. I pulled up the car and when I got out a murmur went through the crowd. Then someone shouted "le majeur Irlandai", and they all rushed forward and began to shake my hand and to cheer me. They appeared to be friendly. I went into the bar where there were approx 80 inside and someone called them to attention. I was cheered again and offered drink. Some Gendarmerie showed me their wounds, of which they appeared to be very proud. I bought one case of beer and left. My police escort were very worried and advised me to leave.

30. I continued to insist on written cease fire agreement and demanded the presence of the Burgomaster to sign the cease fire as it was he who had initiated the negotiations. The Burgomaster, however, had not been available since approx 1130 hrs.

31. I was still hoping for the UN jets to come over in a show of force. We estimated that there was little or no hope of ground assistance for at least some days and even without fighting we could not hold out another day without water. If we were attacked at this stage it would develop into a massacre. I summoned all my officers and held a conference. There was no doubt now but that our surrender would be demanded any time. We were all agreed that if we could get acceptable guarantees of our safety we would have no choice but to accept, as there was absolutely no hope of help arriving in time. We also knew of the high level cease fire talks in progress and in view of that further fighting with the resultant heavy loss of life would be unjustified. We were determined not to surrender to MAKITO as we were not prepared to trust him and if we could not get acceptable guarantees from the Burgomaster or some other responsible person, we decided to fight to the last.

32. At approx 1700 hrs Mr. MUNONGO arrived and asked me to come to his hotel in the town for discussions. I took Fr. Fagan, Capt. Donnelly and Lt. Froberg with me. After paying tribute to us for doing our duty as soldiers they demanded our immediate surrender. I protested that there was a cease fire and that this demand was outrageous. He made it clear that there was no alternative. He made a long speech mainly criticising the Indians and praising the actions of the Irish and Swedes. He guaranteed our safety on pain of death to any person who attempted to injure one of us. He agreed that we keep our arms stored with us in the hotel. This was written into the terms of the agreement. But this and many other promises were broken immediately we laid down our arms. We decided at this stage that the only road open to us was to accept this surrender as further action would have resulted in the complete annihilation of our men.

33. Enemy Strength and Casualties

Our estimate of enemy strength opposing us was approx 2,000. We observed many whites, some in uniform and some in civilians. Mr. KEARNEY, an Irishman who was working in Jadotville and resigned his position when they attacked us, watched the battle from the enemy side. His report should be very interesting. He has informed me that several hundred white people in Jadotville took up arms against us and his estimate of Gendarmerie forces was between 4,000/5,000.

Casualties

During the cease fire negotiations I was informed by one man that they had lost over 150 killed. This was one of the white advisers. He stated that they had lost 7 white people killed. Later he contradicted this figure and said they had only one or two people killed altogether. Dr. LE COQ, Belgian Dispensary Doctor, who befriended us while we were prisoners, gave the casualty figure as "many, many, very many". A white father expressed the casualty figures to Fr. Fagan in the same terms. Mr. KEARNEY'S estimate of the casualties is also about 150. He was informed that 80 of the wounded in hospital were not expected to live. Mr. KEARNEY also saw 30 coffins taken from Union Miniere. Coffins are used only for white people in that area. We do know that three or four days after the fighting they discovered many dead and wounded in the bush surrounding the position. These people had evidently fled on the Saturday.

34. Imprisonment

During the first few days paratroopers formed a guard. These were good soldiers and did everything possible to make us comfortable. When the Gendarmerie took over, conditions deteriorated steadily, but still while we remained in Jadotville we had no complaints about our treatment and the food was of a very high standard. During the early days our mail was allowed in uncensored, but later our mail was censored and very much of it was confiscated. On Sat 23 Sep the UN prisoners, 25 Irish and 6 Italians, taken in E'ville, joined us at Jadotville. On the date that the Change of prisoners Commission arrived our conditions were altered drastically. Immediately the Commission left our radios were seized and the guards became strict and somewhat belligerent. We managed to hide one transistor radio and the news we received on this was not encouraging.

35. We had plans to take over the guard in the event of any attempt to relieve us; we also had plans to defend ourselves to the last in the event of any attempt on our lives. Most of the men still had jack-knives or daggers and we prepared fuel for Molotov cocktails from petrol provided for our cooker, candle grease from some candles that we had and oil from the sump of a car.

36. During our imprisonment we kept the men occupied as best we could with PT, lectures, discussion, question-time and indoor games. We were not allowed to drill, we were forbidden unarmed combat practice and we had no facilities for outdoor games.

37. The morale of the men was very high throughout; even later when we got very rough treatment the morale never faltered. I would like to record here that every man had a deep religious feeling because our emergence from the battle with only five wounded was considered by all to be a miracle. The enemy still do not believe that we had no dead. On several occasions, even up to the day before our final release, we were approached on this subject by doctors, priests and others. All insisted that we had

50 dead and they wanted to know where we had buried them. We have been told that they dug up likely burial places in our defensive localities.

38. Dr. HOFFMAN of the Geneva Red Cross visited us twice in Jadotville. On his second visit on 9 Oct he was very worried about our safety. He confided in me that he did not trust the Katanga authorities with regard to exchange of prisoners. He stated that these people did not want their prisoners back. He wanted to get us transferred to Rhodesia or some neutral country and he wanted me to try and contact the Irish Government to work on this. He did not want his name mentioned as he said it would appear that he was not being neutral as a Red Cross man.

39. On one day president TSHOMBE visited the prison camp at Jadotville. The white population were fawning on him and he adopted a jeering attitude towards us. He asked me how we were being treated and I replied that we had no complaint with regard to the food or our treatment by the guard. I protested very vigorously against the breaking of not only the verbal promises but also the written guarantees of the surrender. He refused to discuss the matter and turned his back in a sneering attitude.

40. On 11 Oct we were transferred to KOLWEZI. This journey lasted all day from approx 0900/2300 hrs. We had no food for the journey and very little water. All our equipment except personal belongings was confiscated on this morning. We were first taken to a Gendarmerie Camp at NZILO, approx 20 miles north of Kolwezi. There we were subjected to all kinds of abuse and threats from hundreds of undisciplined Gendarmerie and women. We were, however, after some time, taken back again to Kolwezi much to our relief. At Kolwezi prison camp we were subjected to a search which lasted for hours and during which two of our men were punched in the face by a Gendarmerie lieutenant. Very forceful protests were made by Capt. Donnelly and myself, and with the assistance of the civilian Commissioner, Mr. MUTEBA BESTON, the beatings were discontinued. We had a rough time for two or three days with frequent searches, but eventually the situation eased. We had no beds or mattresses for two days. Eventually we got 76 mattresses and some beds. We distributed these as far as possible so that each officer and man had either a bed or a mattress.

41. On 15 Oct the six Italian prisoners were released. On 16 Oct at approx 0700 hrs we were given ten minutes to be ready to move to E'ville for our release. We had no food to take on the journey and no water bottles, but we filled some containers with water for each bus. After a hurried breakfast we were ready but we did not leave until approx 1000 hrs. We arrived in Jadotville at approx 1630 hrs and were told we would have to stay in Jadotville for the night as there had been a hitch in the cease fire talks. We got some food at approx 1900 hrs. At 2330 we were ordered to get ready to move again and we left about 0300. All the officers were put in one bus. We travelled by the main road to the "Seven Sources" within a few miles of E'ville. From there we travelled by back roads and were taken to every African compound in the native city in E'ville where thousands of men, women and children were thronged in organised demonstrations to jeer and insult us.

42. We arrived at Camp Massart at 0800 hrs and there again hundreds of Gendarmerie, women and children were massed to jeer and insult us. We were kept in the buses until 1430 hrs. Water was refused and the men were even refused permission to go to the toilet. A Gendarmerie 2/Lt, aide to Col MUKE, was in charge. He is a sadist.

43. At 11.30 hours we were marched between lines and fixed bayonets to the canteen. After a few minutes Mr. Khiary arrived with British, American and French Consuls. When they left we were

marched again in groups to the buses and remained there until 16.30 hours. This day was a terrible experience and I was very worried about the effects on the men. We were not allowed to communicate between buses. We were denied water and men were allowed to travel only in groups of four under heavy guard to the toilets and this was such an ordeal that they did not avail of it.

44. At 16.30 hours we left Camp MASSART and returned by the same route to a repeated performance from the mob of the native city.

45. It would have been possible to make a mass escape anywhere on the return journey up to the LUFIRA river if we had had plans. However, we had no plans as we did not anticipate such a turn in events. We were left incommunicado all day; a hasty plan at this stage would have ended in disaster.

The strength of our escort was approximately 50 with a NCO in charge. The escort were all so tired and rather disgusted with the treatment we had got, they gave some of the tinned food which they had got for their lunch to our prisoners. When they arrived at KOLWEZI they complained very strongly to their officers and the Commissioner of the events in Camp MASSART.

46. We arrived in Jadotville at approximately 2030 hrs and I bought some biscuits and tins of cooked beef for the men. The Italian owner of the shop where we bought this food gave all his minerals and a lot of sweets and biscuits free of charge to the men.

47. At approximately 22.30 hours we left again for KOLWEZI where we arrived at 5 a.m. The Commissioner, Mr. MUTABA arrived at 6 a.m. and made immediate arrangements for food for us. This man was very kind and considerate throughout our stay in KOLWEZI. He did everything possible to make our lot comfortable. He sent his staff on distances of about 50 miles to secure vegetables, potatoes and meat for us.

48. I submitted a written demand to the Commissioner to acquaint Dr. Hoffman of Geneva Red Cross of our position and I asked that he be allowed to visit us and bring in mail. My demand was taken to Tshombe and he refused.

49. On the morning of 19 October the three Irish Officers and 2 civilians (Mr. C. KEARNEY and Mr. H. MATTERSON) were taken to our Camp. They gave us the first news of the outside world we had had for about 4 weeks. On the 20th October, the order came from Tshombe that these prisoners were to be taken away and he asked me to organise some means of isolation for them at our Camp. I did this and I know that he was responsible for getting this sanctioned. It was agreed to temporarily but in fact they were not transferred from us at any time.

On the first night the guards took their watches, and made life very unpleasant for us. I learned of this and I made vigorous protest immediately. The watches were returned and the guards treated them well thereafter.

50. At 21.00 hours on 24 October I was informed by the Commissioner that we were to leave for E'ville at 09.00 hours on the 25th October for release.

I had already asked for a supply of tinned beef to be taken with us in the event of another journey. This was supplied and we made sandwiches.

We left as planned and arrived by the same route in Camp MASSART at approximately 16.20 hours. There were no demonstrations this time and we were released at Old air Strip at 16.50. I may add that this time we had made plans and if there had been a hitch in the release arrangements, we were determined that we would not go back.

51. In this report I have refrained from mentioning names of men who deserve recognition for the part they played in the battle and during the period of imprisonment. This will be the subject of special recommendation for meritorious service.

I would, however, like to mention the very important part played by our Chaplain, Father FAGAN, in maintaining the morale of the men during the battle and even more important during the period of imprisonment. Also the part played by our Medical Officer, CPT CLUNE in his treatment of the wounded who were kept with us all the time and whom he refused to have admitted to hospital in Jadotville and in his care for the health of the men throughout our periods of imprisonment.

52. All I wish to state here is that I never once saw any man waver. All the officer have the same to report. Every man gave his very best and tried to do more. Their steadfastness and coolness under heavy fire was extraordinary.

My most lasting impressions are of the complete loyalty and devotion to duty on the part of every officer and man,

SIGNED: Padhraig S. Ó CAOINDEALBHÁIN
Cphort.

O/C Compl "A" 35 Cn ONUC

30.10.61

COPY/EC

S E C R E T

HQ,
35th Irish Bn (ONUC)
Elizabethville.

1/10/1961.

Report on Operations of Force Kane : To
Relief of A. Coy 35th Irish Bn at KADOTVILLE.

1. These operations mounted to relieve A/Coy at Jadotville fall into two parts -

Part I - 13 Sep. and 14 Sep., 1961.

Part II - 16 Sep., 1961.

2. PART I - 13/14 Sep. 1961:

(a) Composition:-

Comdr.	- Comdt. J.P. Kane.
2 i/c.	- Comdt. M. Heffernan.
No. 5 Pln. B. Coy 35th Bn.	- Lieut. M. Farrell.
No. 6 Pln. B. Coy 35th Bn.	- Lieut. M. Shannon.
Sp. Pln. 35th Bn B/Coy.	- Capt. C. McQuillan.
Sec. Cav Gp: 35th Irish Bn.	- Capt. M. Carroll.
Sec. AP.C's 12 Swdes Bn.	- Capt. M. Purfield.
Sec: Medicals	- Comdt. H. O'Shea.

(b) Tpt:-

2 AP.C's (Swedish); 2 Armd Cars (Irish); 5 Trucks;
1 Omnibus (Passenger).

(c) DESCRIPTION OF THE ACTION AT LUFIFRA RIVER BRIDGE.

- (i) During the fighting in the city of E/Ville a decision was taken to send a force to the Relief of A/Coy 35th Irish Bn, due to the latter force being isolated and hard pressed in JADOTVILLE. A hastily organised force was collected and withdrawn from the action in the City proper to Prince Leopold Farm Irish HQ. where tpt was put at the disposal of the Force.
- (ii) At 16.15 hrs. the force set out and raced without incident towards JADOTVILLE.
- (iii) At 18.35 and just after last light the force reached the vicinity of the Road Bridge over the LUFIRA RIVER 96 Kms out from E/Ville.
- (iv) It was immediately decided that an attempt should be made to try and cross the bridge with a force composed of armour with a supporting Inf. Pln. The Bridge was quickly reached and found to be heavily Road Blocked. Many of the Blocks were negotiated and our leading armoured cars were actually on the Bridge when they were confronted with heavy machinery of Road construction nature and large tree trunks which formed obstacles too formidable to negotiate.

- (v) On our first appearance at vicinity of Bridge fire was opened on our force from the area of the Bridge. By the time we reached the actual Bridge there was a wall of fire from Front, Right and Left directed towards our vehicles, many of which were soft skinned. This fire came from M.MGs, LA.s and automatic rifles as well as from Grenades. All our troops returned the fire hastily with every weapon working overtime.
- (vi) It was seen that the Bridge could NOT be forced then and a retreat from the Bridge was undertaken. A special force under Comdt. Heffernan was now formed to move into the Bridge area and engage the large obstacles with 84 mm RCL. These were engaged with good effect, the large veh-blocks being set on fire.
- (vii) 19.15 Hrs. Another force was sent towards Bridge. This time it consisted of an Irish Armd Car with search light. Comdt. Heffernan i/c. Their special mission was to do a close in recce of the Bridge obstacles with the use of search light. This recce showed that the Blocks were still in position and formidable and could not be removed by any means at our disposal. During these actions the enemy continued to engage the recce and 84 mm parties.
- (viii) Due to physical strain (the troops had been engaged from 0230 hrs. in action in E'VILLE.) at 1945 hrs. it was decided to make the next effort at first light and a defensive position was taken about 6 Km from the bridge for the night. An Officers' conference was held and plans for next day discussed.
- (ix) Force was fed and retired for the night with a scheme of all round security (22.00 Hrs.).
- (x) 04.30 Hrs. Reville and food. Transport gave great difficulties and many vehs had to receive attention. This delayed for many hours the move to the start line.
- (xi) 08.30 Hrs. First daylight attempt made at Bridge with Sec Armd Cars and Pln of Inf. It met the same fate as the night probes. The same withering MG. LA. and Rifle fire was directed at our troops from strongly placed enemy positions.
- (xii) 09.30 : It was now fully realised that the force at our disposal could not force the crossings by the LUFIRA. It was estimated that the main crossings were held by more than a well equipped Coy with well directed command.
- (xiii) A return to E'VILLE was now decided upon. But before this move was commenced a plan was devised to bring the complete enemy position under MG and Mortor fire. All the Armd Cars were used in this task from a commanding position some 1,000 metres from the Bridge. A sec of 81 mm Mortors was brought into action further back with O.Ps. on the high ground near the Armd Cars. All known enemy posn were treated with well directed and accurate fire for a period of 30 Mins, the mortors firing smoke and H.E.

(xiv) 10.30. 14 Sep 1961. Orders to return to E'VILLE were issued and the column set off at 11.00 Hrs.

(xv) CASUALTIES: UN. FORCE - NIL.
ENEMY - Credited with 50 cas. in vicinity of Bridge.
Vehs. - 1 Truck.

(xvi) GROUND AT AREA OF BRIDGE:

Open ground on both sides of Road for 2000 metres on SOUTH of River Left and Right of Rd there is high grass which would afford ample cover to a defender. To the north of the main road and Bridge the ground rises slightly. The River flows into Lac de RETENUE de la LUFIRA to the North East. The river is deep at the point where it passes under the Road and Railway Bridges.

WRLS: At long ranges it was difficult to get communication either to E'VILLE or JADOTVILLE. The wrls operator in my Comd Car was a most willing able worker.

PART II. - OPERATIONS OF FORCE KANE TO RELIEVE
A/COY AT JADOTVILLE, 16 Sep, 1961.

1. During the afternoon of 15th Sep., 1961, I was appointed to take command of a Force to move after first light on 16th Sep., 1961, to the relief of A/Coy, 35th Irish Bn at JADOTVILLE.
2. The Force was composed:-

Comdr.	-	Comdt. J.P. Kane.
B/Coy 35th Irish Bn.	-	Comdt. McMahon.
B/Coy 3/1 Gorkha Bn.	-	Major Mangla.
Sec Irish Armd Cars	-	Capt. M. Carroll.
Sec Swedish APC	-	Capt. M. Purfield.
Sec Engrs.	-	Sgt. J. Byrne.
Sec Medicals	-	Comdt. H.P. O'Shea.
3. 07.45 Hrs. The Force married up at JADOTVILLE JUNC (6 km from E'VILLE with B/Coy 3/1 Gorkha Bn. Orders were issued to move to an assembly area south of LUFRIA RIVER BRIDGE.
4. 10.00 Hrs. This assembly area was reached without incident and the Force fed while "R" Gp did recce and orders issued to "O" Gp.
5. During the halt dispersed in this covered area the force was attacked for the first time by a Fouga Jet Fighter. This aircraft used heavy machine guns and bombs. There were no casualties in this attack. Later a second attack was made in the same manner as the first. In this attack Sgt. Gallagher of Medical Sec received injuries to his legs. He bore his wounds manfully and was evacuated to E'VILLE and to LEO.
6. A recce fwd in force towards the bridge was made in pln str by the Swedes and Irish Armd Cars, the high ground overlooking the bridge was reached. Some local men were met and questioned. They pointed out that:-

- (1) There had been very heavy casualties in the vicinity of bridge over LUFIRA RIVER in the attacks of 13/14 Sep. 1961.
 - (2) The Bridge area had been heavily reinforced with fresh troops - some from KOLWEZI.
7. Another attack by Fouga Jet was made in the same fashion as at 5. above. The air watch was now very alert and men were able to take cover in time to avoid being caught in the open. A Jeep was the only casualty in this action by the Fouga.
 8. When the recce had been proceeding for some time the recce party came under heavy fire from the east of the road. The fire was immediately returned by the accompanying Inf. The enemy meanwhile fired from the front and the west of the road. In a short time the Armd Cars joined in the fire fight and relieved the Inf and "O" Gp caught in the open. The Armd Cars under Capt. M. Purfield (Swedish Sec) and Capt. Carroll (Irish Sec) with accurate fire brought the positions from which fire was coming under a punishing hail of M.M.G. bullets. The Cars moved through bush tracks to seek out the enemy positions in a native village and continued to fire into the areas from which the enemy was firing. The enemy fire slackened. Under cover of the cars the accompanying Inf were able to withdraw to safety without casualties.
 9. When the recce party returned to the assembly area and during orders another attack was made by jet during which 3 Gorkhas were killed and five injured. A Bus and a truck were disabled also.
 10. It was now apparent that -
 - (i) A Daylight attack to force the crossings without Air Support was NOT possible without very serious losses.
 - (ii) A Bn minus was NOT adequate to force the river outposts, extending 2,000 yds. fwd, take and hold the crossings and send forward a force to JADOTVILLE to relieve A/Coy and attachments and lift all back through the LUFIRA Crossings to E'VILLE.
 11. Consideration was now given to a right flanking move to east of Lac RETENUE. This was not readily possible because the Eng Detachment had returned and reported that a thorough demolition job had been done on those flank roads. It was estimated that it would take 2/3 hrs. to make one of these roads possible to heavy tpt.
 12. 16.30 Hrs. This was ruled out, the final posn was reported to Bn. HQ. and Force ordered to return to E/Ville.
 13. The return journey was uneventful till after last light when the force reached "Seven Sources Area" some 12 Km from E/Ville and north of Jadotville Junction. The column ran into an Ambush. Severe fire from MMGs, LAs and Rifles was opened on the column from both sides of the Road but more especially from the West of the Road. The Road was mined and mines blew up now and again as tpt hit them. Atk Rockets were also used. Our men on the buses and other vehs returned the fire at once with great vigour. The Armd Cars joined in the return of fire individually and after a while we managed to get all the Armd Cars into the main ambush area when the fire of cars was pooled and poured into the area of the greatest enemy source of fire. Capts. Purfield and Carroll were very prominent in directing the Armd Cars in this action. The Cars can truly be described as saviours in this and the earlier actions. This allowed the soft skinned vehs to proceed towards JADOTVILLE Junction and safety. The number of casualties sustained in the Ambush were:-

5.

Irish	-	5 Wounded.
Indians	-	5 Wounded.
Swedish	-	Nil.

Casualties were all rushed to the Indian Camp in the vicinity of Jadotville Junction for attention and later to Italian Hosp.

14. Some time after reaching the Junction the Gorkha Coy had an accident involving a collision between 2 vehicles when some shells exploded killing two and wounding 10 of the Gorkha Coy.

APPX. 'D'

Hist 15 Bn

"C" COMPANY,
35th INFANTRY BATTALION,
ELISABETHVILLE.

27/9/61.

OP MORTHOR

DATE & TIME

ACTIONS

13. Sep
03.35. Company less 1 Platoon Mortar and MMG Sections moved on foot to occupy TUNNEL position. Arriving there at 04.00 hrs. One truck carried Coy Stores. No. 1 Platoon on separate Mission to RADIO COLLEGE. Mortar and MMG Sections remained at FARM ready to be moved to the TUNNEL by a truck after it had despatched No. 1 Platoon to RADIO COLLEGE.
- 03.45. No. 1 Platoon less 1 Section moved to RADIO COLLEGE. 1 Section of No. 1 Platoon left to guard the FACTORY CAMP. 2 Pl. and 3 Pl. and A/Tank Section in position. Road block erected and manned at EAST and WEST side of Tunnel. No. 2 Pl. EAST Side covering routes Kasenga and SAVONNIERS. No. 3 Pl WEST side covering routes SAIO and INDUSTRIELLE
- 04.07. A/Tank Section, One Sub Sect. to No. 2 pl.
Two Sub Sect. to No. 3 pl.
Enemy M.G. fire from SUPPLY DEPOT very high.
- 04.20. Mortar and MMG Sections held up by enemy fire enroute to TUNNEL.
- 05.30 Mortar and MMG Sections arrived and took up positions in vicinity of TUNNEL.
- 13.00 Sniper fire from vicinity of AVE CHURCHILL area - searched by 3 Pl. Fire ceased.
- 13.15. Sgt Shaughnessy and eight Privates to ALBERT PARK with two trucks.
- 14.00 Sgt O'Neill of 3 Pl. fired on when returning from a nearby house. Injured in back and legs. He moved to the house without being covered by fire. Area searched but no enemy found.
- 14.00 Message to Bn. H.Q. to inform that Sgt Shaughnessy and Party had not reported back, and requested that they be located. Further inquiries made of Bn. H.Q. during P.M. See report of Sgt Shaughnessy attached.
- 18.00 Heavy enemy MMG fire on BRIDGE from direction of CAMP MASSART and RAILWAY STATION and from SUPPLY DEPOT. Fire returned by our MMGs and enemy fire ceased after a short time.
- 19.00. A few enemy Mortar bombs landed near our position.
NIGHT
- 13/14. A lot of enemy small arms fire, snipers and MMGs on our
Sep. position - Mostly inaccurate. Some enemy approached 3 Pl position from firection of RAILWAY STATION. Fire was returned. A little Mortar fire from vicinity of CAMP MASSART. It ceased quickly when our Mortar Section returned the fire.

14/9/51
08.00 Bn. H.Q. instructed that enemy SUPPLY DEPOT be engaged by our Mortars Section. Targets heavily engaged and set on fire. Harrassing fire. Subsequently to support attack on Bks by U.N. Troops.

09.50 Mortar fire from CAMP MASSART. Our Mortar Section returned fire, enemy fire ceased.

10.00 Enemy armoured car fired on our position from vicinity BCK CAMP, it was forced to withdraw by our small arms fire.

10.15 Under fire by enemy armoured car from RUE LUXEMBOURG and a few 60 mm Mortar bombs dropped in area. Enemy withdrew.

10.30 Sporadic enemy sniper fire. Fire returned.
to
19.00 Company relieved by Gorkha Platoon.

15 Sep
06.00 2 Platoon and Support Platoon reported back to the TUNNEL.

07.00 Enemy fire from direction of RAILWAY STATION. Fire returned with M.M.Gs and 60 mm Mortar. Enemy fire ceased.

14.00 3 Platoon reported back to the TUNNEL.

14.30 Support Platoon reported back to the FARM to be ready to travel with FORCE KANE to JADOTVILLE.

14.45 Under enemy Mortar fire, and bombed from the air. Requested BN. H.Q., to send back Support Platoon.

16.15 Support Platoon in position. Mortar Section engaged CAMP MASSART and SUPPLY DEPOT. Enemy Mortar fire ceased.

NIGHT
15/16 Sep. Some erratic Sniper and M.G. fire.

16 Sep.
05.30 (Gorkha Platoon withdrew from TUNNEL.

03.50 Enemy Mortars in vicinity of SUPPLY DEPOT. Engaged by our Mortar Section.

10.00 Enemy rifle fire on 3 Platoon position, Anti-Tank sub Section returned the fire (One Round) and enemy fire ceased. A small enemy Patrol approached at rear of Hospital, it withdrew when fired on.

12.00 Anti-Tank Sub Section engaged enemy Armoured Car on RUE INDUSTRIELLE, the range was too great and the Armoured Car withdrew.

18.00 Sniper fire from direction of RAILWAY STATION - Fire returned.

NIGHT
16/17 Sep Very little enemy fire.

12.00 Enemy Troops crossing RUE KASENGA, engaged by our M.M.Gs and 60 mm Mortars.

NIGHT
17/18 Sep Very quiet.

18 Sep
10.00 Enemy activity in RUE LUXEMBOURG, engaged with M.M.Gs.

18. Sep
16.00

"B" Company commenced to take over our position. Due to enemy fire from vicinity of BCK CAMP and RAILWAY STATION, relief was not completed until 22.00 hrs. fire was returned with small Arms and 60 mm Mortars.

19 to 21
Sep

Company in the FARM.

"C" COMPANY,
35th Inf Bn.

To O/C.
35th INF BN.

REPORT TRUCK ESCORT - SGT. SHAUGHNESSY

Sir,

After we leaving the TUNNEL on the 13 Sep '61 to go to ALBERT PARK on the road Via AVE. CHURCHILL we were ambushed by an enemy armoured car. I halted the Patrol and shouted to dismount and take cover. All members of the leading truck dismounted with the exception of the driver Pte Gaffney who was hit in the driving cab. I shouted to Pte Gaffney to get out of the truck, he made an attempt to get out, he got as far as the door on the drivers side, and as far as I know and to the best of my knowledge he was hit the second, and fell into the back of the truck, and that was the last I saw of Pte Gaffney. When we dismounted we took cover in a trench which was running by the side of the road. I told the three men whom were in the leading truck to crawl up along the drain away from the enemy armoured car, when we got as far as the second truck I noticed that there was three men still in the rear of the truck, I again shouted to them to get off the truck and take cover in the drain. As they were getting down off the truck I noticed that Pte Ffrench was bleeding from a wound in his left arm. During this time we were under very heavy machine gun fire from the enemy armoured car. We crawled further up the drain until we came to a dead end. I told the men who at this stage were all in the drain with me as soon as the firing stopped to get out of the drain, and get into the bush which was about ten yards away, because I was afraid that the armoured car would advance up along the road and we would be all captured in the drain. I dashed out of the drain and into the bush followed by three men. When I got into the bush I discovered that we had no cover from fire, so we dashed across to an opening a distance of about a hundred yards to the back of a house. When I got there I told the three men that were with me to take cover behind the house. I went out again and saw two men lying in a drain, I shouted to them to come and join me, they then ran across and jointed the other three. I kept shouting for the other two who at this time were in the bush beside the road to come and join us, and all during this time I was under heavy fire. I had positioned myself behind a gate pier, I had to leave there and go back to the five men who were still behind the house, and I had a look at Pte Ffrench's arm. I saw he had two bullet wounds in the arm and was bleeding freely. I then told the men that we would go to the Officers Mess through the bush, as it was the only place we could go with cover and try to get treatment for Pte Ffrench, and get him to Hospital.

We started out for the Officers Mess but we had'nt gone far when we were fired on again from our left and right. We then started running through the bush until Pte Ffrench collapsed, I shouted to the other men to take cover, and I went to assist Pte Ffrench, after a few minutes he came to and was straight. I asked him to take off his equipment and to give me his rifle, but he would'nt give it, I told him he had'nt far to go and that we had to get out of there. We started again and when we got to the Officers Mess we had to go through the hedgerow as the gate was closed owing to the firing. I then reported to Lt Col Cullen and informed him of what had happened, and he dressed Pte Ffrench's arm. He told me that the phone was out of order and that we would have to wait until some of the Officers came. That evening Captain Kavanagh and another Irish Officer came and they left to get an armoured car to take Pte Ffrench to the Hospital, but they failed to get one, because they were all on Patrol. Next morning they got Pte Ffrench to Hospital in a civilian car. The other four men and myself remained all night in the Mess and helped out with the guards there.

We were there for two days until a Swedish APC brought us to UNO H.Q. When we got there, we erected a tent and dug trenches for ourselves. We were with the Indian contingents for two days and nights and stayed in the trenches. On the second night there we were attacked by enemy fire. Next morning we were moved back to the FARM by a Swedish Patrol where we joined our Unit.

(Sgd.) G. Shaughnessy SGT.

G. SHAUGHNESSY.

REPORT ON FACTORY CAMP GUARD - SGT SHANNON I/C

- 12 Sep '61 Lt Ryan and two Sections left the FACTORY.
19.00 Under my Command to guard the FACTORY.
2 Cpls. 6 Ptes. - No 1 Platoon.
1 Cpl. 2 Ptes. - Signals.
1 Cpl. 1 Pte. - Medical.
1 Sgt. 2 Cpls. - With Refugees.
1 Pte Cook.
TOTAL GUARD:- 2 Sgts, 6 Cpls, and 10 Ptes.
TOTAL NUMBER of Refugees approx. 600.
On seeing the Coy depart the Refugees became restive and did not calm down until a Sentry was put on each of two doors.
- 13 Sep To allay suspicion the normal guard of 1 NCO, 6 Ptes was
03.30 mounted until this time. Thereafter all personnel was turned out.
- 18.00 Some shots believed to be enemy struck the FACTORY.
- 20.00 Full compliment on post up to this. To avoid fatigue 5 men were allowed to rest in the guard room at all times.
- 14 Sep Distant firing heard. All posts manned and remained as such
02.00 until dawn, when the resting procedure was resumed.
- 09.00 Frequent reports of enemy movement by A N C. All day on investigation none proved correct.
- 15 Sep One A N C Man stayed in most of the pits during the night
01.00 and proved a good morale booster to the slender garrison. Cpl Kelly the signaller ran short of batteries at this time, but found one in an abandoned car nearby.
- 09.00 Our food supplies exhausted but had a small meal from supplies brought in by the Refugees. Wireless message received to send 6 Refugees to the Irish Camp, this Party was halted by Sentries and were not allowed through. They returned to the FACTORY at 11.00 hrs approx.
- 11.00 Two Refugees again despatched after the position was explained to Bn H.Q. re earlier Party. This Party returned with food supplies and with orders to proceed to the Irish Camp at 19.00 hrs. The Refugees were to follow at 20.00 hrs.
- 16.00 Cpl Kelly again ran short of batteries, but found one in the Police Barracks nearby.
- 17.00 Patrol to investigate reported Gendarmerie activity near Railway. None found.
- 19.15 Left FACTORY CAMP with A N C guide for Irish Camp.
- 19.45 Arrived safely at Irish Camp without accident and joined with Unit.

(Sgd.) Simon Shannon SGT.

(S. SHANNON).

Account of Capt. T.F. Ryan C. Coy 35th Bn.
Captured at the Radio College 14.9.61.

At approx 14.30 hrs on 14.9.1961 a woman living in the vicinity of the Radio College approached the NCO in the hallway and asked him if we had food and drink. We said we had food but would like some water to make tea. After giving the NCO some cigarettes she left promising to send some boiling water. At approx 15.00 hrs her husband brought over a container of boiling water with which we made tea. At 16.00 hrs the husband returned for the container accompanied by another man dressed in civilian clothes. When the container was handed to him he asked to see the "Commander". The NCO sent for me and when I came to the hall they asked to be allowed in to talk as the firing was going on in the city. I let them in and the husband interpreting for the other asked me if I understood the position I was in. I said I realised fully the position I was in and that if those were the type of questions they wished to ask they could leave at once. They then told me that for the past twelve hours I was completely surrounded by Katangese Troops. I denied this and said they were bluffing and asked what was their interest in this as civilians. The newcomer then informed me that he was an Officer of the Katangese Army (I later learned he was a Lieut, San Paul, a Frenchman) and was here to save our lives. He was informed that he could be put under arrest and held as hostage and he replied that he took that chance but that he had no fears as we stood no chance. At this moment, a phone connecting the Radio College to the priest's residence rang and one of my men answered it and said I was required. One of the priests who was interpreting for another Katangese white Officer (a Capt) spoke to me and repeated much of what Lt. San Paul had said. The priest assured me that what the Capt said was true and that I was outnumbered. The Capt then asked that the two of us meet on Avenue Wangermere without arms to talk. I agreed to this and stated I was leaving Lieut. San Paul in the College as a hostage. I met the Capt and the priest on the Avenue and he repeated the fact that I was surrounded. He then told me how many men I had and what weapons I had. He also said that I had no communication with my unit. This information I strongly suspect was given to him by the Priest who had visited the College the previous night with M. Tomberlaine to make a Broadcast. He then told me that he had men in every house around the College and that the Priest's residence across the road was also occupied. He said he had an Arm'd Car at one and an anti-tank weapon on a jeep on the other. At a signal from him, a jeep appeared with a weapon mounted on it, an Armoured Car appeared on Ave Ruwe and in the doors and windows of every villa black Soldiers and whites, not in Uniform appeared. I also noticed from 10 to 15 whites in civilians on Ave Wangermere whom at first I thought were civilians, but who were taking more than a curious interest in the proceedings. The Capt then gave me five minutes to decide between surrender and being blasted out of it. I left him then and returned to the College and I released Lt. San Paul and the other civilian. I went around to my men and explained the situation. They all said they would be guided by my decision. In view of the lack of communication and the fact that I had only one Bren Gun I decided that we could not hold the position against the odds without my men being slaughtered and I decided to surrender. On notifying the Captain of this he asked us to leave all our weapons in the building and to come out on the road. When we did we found that the "civilians" we had seen there previously had turned their cars and parked them by the College. We were surrounded by 40 to 50 Paratroopers and Gendarmerie who threatened us and pushed us around and manhandled us. The intervention of a priest, the two white Officers (The Capt and Lt San Paul) and a journalist saved us. The remainder of the

whites did not seem to care what the soldiers did to us. We were put into two civilian cars and a Gendarmerie troop car. During this time a party of Gendarmerie numbering about 30 came around from Ave Kambove and entered the College grounds. We were driven from Ave Wangermere across Ave Kambove and down Ave Leopold to Limite Sud and walked in a road to the left for about two miles to a large farmhouse occupied by two Belgian ladies. I was instructed to remove my shirt and was given a red civilian shirt. My shirt was taken away by a black Officer. On it were my rank markings and my brassard with the UNC flash. We were given a meal by the two ladies in the house and every effort was made to make us comfortable. Sgt. O'Driscoll and myself were allotted a bedroom in the house and the men were shown a type of stable with straw on the floor. This place was quite clean and we were told it was temporary. We went to bed at 20.00 hrs and were called at 07.00 hrs on 15.9.61 and instructed to get dressed and get outside the front door. There we were made to sit on the steps guarded by a number of paratroopers and at 08.30 hrs a breakfast of bread and milk was provided. As we were finishing this meal some cars appeared along the drive and when they pulled up I saw that they contained Comdt. Cahalane and his party of men. They were escorted by the Capt and Lt San Paul who left again. Comdt. Cahalane's party had breakfast with us and when they had finished a civilian journalist arrived in a car. This journalist, Dr. Gumani, a German, wanted to film a T.V. Interview. Only black soldiers were there at the time and they objected strongly and told him to go back to Elizabethville and film the Katangese soldiers killed at the Post Office. They became so menacing that Dr. Gumani had to pack his camera again. Meanwhile a party of soldiers under a black Lieut dressed in civilians rushed over to us and cocking their rifles ordered us to line up against the wall. The Lieut shouted abuse and insults at us and threatened us. We had to remove our boots and socks and watches, the footwear being thrown into a heap and the watches being distributed among his men. For some time they menaced us and argued among themselves as to what to do with us. While we were being treated like this Dr. Gumani was driven off and some fifteen minutes later returned followed by a jeep driven by Lt. San Paul. San Paul at once called off the soldiers and an ECO who was with him told us to put on our socks and boots again. He also got back our watches. San Paul spoke sternly to the black Lieut about his conduct and they told me he would stay with us to ensure our safety. At this time I requested to have Comdt. Cahalane put to bed as he was badly shelled and shocked and was completely deaf. This was agreed to and a bed was fixed up in the house. Shortly after the Capt arrived back with Mr. Munungo who proceeded to tell me how shocked he was by the "treachery" of UN and particularly how hurt he was by the action of "our friends" the Irish. I told him I was a soldier and not a politician and would NOT discuss the actions or intentions of UN. He said he understood and accepted my attitude. He said he was a nobleman and I had his word that I would NOT be harmed. He further warned the Paratroopers that he would personally deal with any man who interfered with us. I thanked him for his assurance of our safety and he then left. Our conversation was carried on through Mr. Mike Nolan the UN interpreter.

The remainder of that day was quiet and the men rested as the second party of prisoners had no sleep the night before. Lt. San Paul stayed in the house but we had no contact with him. Late that evening some rations arrived for us and we cooked our evening meal in the open. The same held for the next morning Sat 16/9/61. Shortly after breakfast a jeep called and took Mike Nolan away. He arrived back about half an hour later. He had with him the headings of a letter which we were to write to Mr. O'Brien. (The headings are in Comdt Cahalane's possession). After reading through the headings we decided that we could not as soldiers, write such a letter and instructed Mr. Nolan to inform the Capt of this. However just then the Capt arrived and told us not to mind the letter now but that some people would arrive soon to "interview us".

When I left the room I saw a car arriving and from it a "civilian" approached me and asked me was I an Officer. I said I was and he introduced himself as Lt. Col. Fulk (phonetic). He gave me some American Pack Rations and asked for a Roll of the Prisoners for notification to the UN and to the Irish Government. I had Sgt. O'Driscoll make a roll giving No. Rank, Name and hometown of each man which I then gave to him. He then left in the car.

Shortly a party of whites arrived who were described as Judges of Katanga Court, and Government officials and they interragated Comdt. Cahalane. They wanted us to admit that we knew of alleged UN atrocities. This we refused to do.

Later that day we moved further South. During the next few days I was taken to E'Ville by the white officers on three occasions. The first time I was asked to go to talk to three Irish soldiers who had left the UN Hospital to try to get back to the Irish Camp. They informed me that they were in the area of Ave Kato, the Factory or the native quarters between the Factory and the Irish Camp. They told me that some natives were trying to locate them to kill them. We searched the area for an hour but could not find them. Some whites in Ave. Kato area told us that they had been there the night before but had left early. On our way back across the city heavy firing started and we took cover in a house at the junction of Ave Leopold and Ave Kambove where we stayed for some hours. I again met Lt. Col. Fulk at this house.

The next time I was accompanied by Lt. Valerio of the Italian Hospital. We went to the Italian Depot on Ave Industrial where Lt. Valerio collected his medical kit. We again went to the house and again met Lt. Col. Fulk. We also visited a garage on Ave. KYBATI and had the car filled with petrol.

The third occasion I was taken to town without being told why until we were on the outskirts. They then told me that they had another "errand of mercy" for me. We went to the house again and I met more white "civilians". I was told that some Irish soldiers at the tunnel had not been relieved for two days and that food and water could not be got through to them. They also said that some of them were wounded. I was told that the bridge was to be attacked that night and that all of them would be killed. I said that I suspected that this story was not true and that I knew they would not surrender, but they insisted that it was true. I said I would go if I was allowed to remove any wounded and have them moved to hospital. At no time since my capture had I heard how the fight was going in E'Ville and therefore I was not in a position to know how much was lies and how much was truth. I also saw that I had a chance to warn those at the bridge of the attack. The Capt. a black officer and another officer and myself drove as far as the Simba Brewery. The white officers and myself walked towards the posns on Ave Industrial. When about 20 yards off I identified myself and I noticed that the men looked well. I asked the white officers to stay where they were to which they agreed and I went forward and asked the men how they were. They said they were in good form and I asked to see the officer in charge Lt. O'Farrell arrived almost at once and I told him why I had been brought. I told him that an attack was intended for that night. He asked me if I wished to escape but I said I couldnt as reprisals might be taken against the remainder. At this stage the two officers had approached the posn. Lt. Farrell asked to take them away which I did and we walked back to the car and drove back to the house. Some time later I was taken to a yard in Ave. KATO where I saw 2 UN jeeps being painted yellow. The two jeeps were driven over to Ave. Leopold and parked in the yard of houses in the vicinity of the "HQ house".

On Friday night 22/9/61 we left for JADOTVILLE and on arrival there the Capt. and Lt. San Paul left us and I have not seen them since. On Friday last 20/10/61 Lt. Col. Fulk called to the prison camp at Kolwezi and asked to see me. He asked me if I was being well treated and having assured him that I was he told me we would not be many more days there. I inquired about the Capt and Lt. San Paul and he told me that they were still in E'Ville.

APPX F.

HIST 35Bn.

HQ Coy,
35th Irish Battalion, ONUC,
Elisabethville,
15/9/61.

CO,
35th Inf Bn.

Sir,

At 20.00 hrs on the 14th Sept 1961, I was instructed by the Bn QM to travel with a patrol to the "FACTORY"

The patrol left at approx 21.00 hrs with Comdt. Cahalane i/c. It was disposed as follows:-One Armd Car, One Willys long base jeep with 84 mm Anti-Tank Gun, One Motor Bus, with escort of 3 NCOs and six men, and a turretless Armd Car. In the front Armd Car were, Comdt. Cahalane, Sgt. Carey, a Cpl. and a Trooper. In the jeep were two NCOs and Four Men and in the rear Car was a Cpl. driver, the civilian interpreter, Mr. Nolan and myself.

We proceeded via the "Bridge", Ave. Tabora, Ave. Wangermer c. At Radio College the column slowed at the intersection. There was an Ambulance stationery at the corner. I was observing to the rear with a bren gun when the leading car was immobilised by an Anti-Tank Gun. I ordered the driver to reverse and swing the gun around but could see no target to engage. The rest of the column had dismounted and taken cover beside Radio College. As I had seen no one leave the immobilised Armd Car beside Radio College I thought all were dead. I had the men search for the enemy gunner and told the Cpl. driver to turn the rear Armd Car. In the meantime I discovered that Comdt. Cahalane and Sgt. Carey had escaped. I subsequently discovered that Sgt. Carey was wounded in the Left Tigh. Comdt. Cahalane appeared deafened by the explosion. While the search was proceeding I was joined by Cpl. Holbrook and the civilian interpreter. The Armd. Car stalled in turning.

We moved into the grounds of the flats adjoining Radio College. I succeeded in gaining entry to a flat in the ground floor and Comdt. Cahalane disposed the men covering the front and rear.

The men were still shocked but were recovering. I dressed Sgt. Carey's wound. Comdt. Cahalane decided that since no radio message had been sent back somebody would have to go for assistance and inform Bn of the position.

The flat was occupied by a man, his wife and family and his brother-in-law. Radio College was occupied by Gendarmerie. During the original search an enemy soldier was captured but he subsequently escaped in the dark. Comdt. Cahalane decided to stay put until daylight and asked for volunteers to make a break for it. Sgt. Dignam and myself volunteered. I ordered the two Belgians to hand over the key of the civilian car in rear. I was going to make a break for it in the car but decided against that as the anti-tank gunner was still outside. I ordered the civilians to hand over their coats and we put them on. We were covered from the back door and made a dash across the back garden, over the wall and into the grounds of a house in the rear. Keeping to the back gardens, generally, we made our way slowly in the general direction of our own lines. During the course of our travels I again observed the ambulance dashing

down the street and backing into a house at another intersection. While I definitely could not say so, it occurred to me that this vehicle was being used to transport the enemy anti-tank gun and crew and set up ambushes. When I observed it the second time it was too far away to make an immediate investigation. We arrived at the Indian Supply Depot at approx 02.30 hrs. The Sub-Major i/c gave us tea and cigs but refused to give us any transport in the yard. He was not in wireless communication with anybody. After a short halt we made our way from the back of the Supply Depot across the railway yards in front of the Gendarmerie Ord Depot, Elakat and back to our own lines. I immediately informed Lt.Col. McNamee and the time was approx 04.00 hrs.

It took approx 6 hrs to return to Camp. Of necessity we had to move slowly and remain under cover at all times.

I would like to take this opportunity to pay tribute to Sgt. Dignam who did not hesitate to volunteer, and who during all that time, showed great courage, initiative and unfailing good humour.

I trust this Report is complete and to your satisfaction.

Edward F. Whyte CAPTAIN
(EDWARD E. WHYTE)

ASST QM, 35TH IRISH BN, ONUC, ELISABETHVILLE

/WJM

REPORT OF COMDT. CAHALANE ON HIS CONTACT WITH
AND TREATMENT BY WHITES DURING HIS PERIOD OF
CAPTIVITY

1. Before I commence I would like to state that my recollection of events subsequent to 14th Sep for several days are hazy, due in the main to the explosion of an anti-tank weapon on my Armd Car on the 14th.

Many of my actions and things I said are only known to me from hearsay.

2. My first contact with whites after my capture was with a French Gendarmerie Captain who consistently refused to give his name, nor would others give it, either then, or since. He arrived at the place where I, and others taken prisoner at Radio College, were being held captive. This was a place about 35 miles SOUTH OF EVILLE in the direction of the Rhodesian Border. It was a huge house on a cattle farm of 1600 acres in the heart of the bush country and owned by two elderly Belgian ladies who had been there for 34 years, one of whom had a glass eye. It had all the appearance of a Guest House with a swimming pool in the process of completion.

Both of these ladies were scared of UN and Gendarmerie (in case of reprisal) and were most un hospitable.

I protested to this French (Algerian-French) nameless officer hereinafter called 'Raponillie', that watches, footwear and socks, had been removed from all prisoners by a black civilian under armed threat from Paratroopers.

Raponillie apologised and took immediate steps to have these articles restored to us and it was done.

He remarked that I looked very ill and asked me if that was so. He ordered one of the Belgian women to prepare a meal for me and remarked to Mr. Nolan that he would look after me. He also demanded and got a mattress for me so that I could lie down.

Later that same day Raponillie loaned me his razor and towel so that I could wash and shave.

Sgt. O'Driscoll of 'C' Coy will tell of my next white contact.

3. Quote "A man (German) who was referred to as "the Doctor" arrived and proceeded to interview Lt. Ryan. His first question was, "Why did you and your men stop fighting?" Lt. Ryan replied, see statement. While Lt. Ryan was replying Comdt. Cahalane intervened protesting that there would be no such interview without his (Comdt. Cahalane's) permission. The Doctor became very angry, banged the table with his fist and shook it at Comdt. Cahalane. He said we were traitors, and addressing himself to Comdt. Cahalane said, "Commander, you do not understand what has happened - the Irish shot and raped white women in the Town". Again Comdt. Cahalane intervened, protesting against the statement, and said, "Can you prove it?" No reply from the Doctor. Continuing Comdt. Cahalane said he would guarantee that no Irish soldier would shoot and rape white women in the Congo - an Irish soldier never did such a thing.

The Doctor then addressed himself to Lt. Ryan and asked him, "How were you treated when you were captured? See Lt. Ryan's statement.

My next contact with whites was through Mr. Mike Nolan. Mr. Nolan will now give an account of the events.

4. Quote "I was exercising outside when a Jeep with Para Commandoes and a driver enquired where was the French-speaking European? I was beckoned on to the Jeep, got aboard, and was taken to a farm house 3 miles away, where I was brought before Capt. Raponillie. He said to me, "Mr. Nolan, I've got the worst possible information about you. You are the only interpreter I have, I need you so please don't jeopardise my actions of protecting you and the other prisoners".

I then asked him, was it official information, hearsay, or what was it all about. He told me it was not official, but that the Belgian civilians wanted to shoot me. I asked him why. He replied, "You know better than I do - they want to shoot you because you are an information agent for UN. Please do not cause me any trouble and do not try to escape." Then he said, "I have here a statement which I want Comdt. Cahalane to sign and which you will write (translating) the headings are as under:-

1. Write to Dr. O'Brien.
2. Stating that UN had opened the firing.
3. Our state of conscience in the matter.
4. To state that the Indians were committing atrocities.
5. To inform Dr. O'Brien that if he did not remove all UN troops from Katanga that he (Raponillie) could NOT guarantee our safety and that every 24 hours delay jeopardised our chances of safety,
6. We were to request Dr. O'Brien to remove the troops.

I brought the synopsis of this document to Comdt. Cahalane, Lt. Ryan was present. I translated the document.

When Comdt. Cahalane had considered the points mentioned he refused categorically to write or sign such a document.

Later I informed Raponillie of Comdt. Cahalane's decision. He simply waved me away". UNQUOTE.

My next contact with whites was on the afternoon of Sat 16th. On this occasion there were 8 whites, including Raponillie, and several black civilians. All the prisoners, including myself, were herded into a large room. I was invited to sit at the head of the table with an interpreter on my right. I was told that "this was a Court Proceeding". A fair trial was the expression used, that there was one white attorney to represent me and one to represent Katanga authorities and the Africans and a white appointed as a Judge in the Katanga Administration, would preside. In addition there was a further interpreter allotted to me. I shall now let Mr. Nolan and Sgt. O'Driscoll carry on from here:-

Mr. Nolan. - The proceedings were opened by the Judge who said, "We Europeans have got to get together to fix things up (this remark obviously embarrassed the Africans present).

5. Sgt. O'Driscoll - The first questions asked were addressed to Comdt. Cahalane -

Q. What do you think of UN actions in the Congo?

A. Being an Officer of the Irish Army all the information I can give you is my Number, Rank and Name and that applies to every man under my command.

Q. The Judge is NOT satisfied with your answer and demands a reply.

Mr. Nolan - I would like it known that Raponillie was most active during the trial and passed comment on all.

Comdt, Cahalane replies -

Sgt. O'Driscoll -

Firstly, I should NOT be asked such a question. Maybe some of you people here are officers and as officers you are bound by oath and you must know that all the information a prisoner can give is his Number, Rank and Name.

Q. Raponillie - I am NOT satisfied.

A. You can torture me if you wish, as was alleged the Germans did to Belgians during the last war. I would like also to remind you of the Geneva Convention.

Raponillie - you are in Africa now. In Africa the Geneva Convention is unknown, we are trying to protect you from the civil population.

Cahalane - You claim to be a Civilised State - Behave like one.

Q. The Judge demanded to know how were you treated when you were taken prisoner?

A. In accordance with International Law and I expected such, but I would like to thank you for that.

Q. An officer of your rank must know the disposition of UN Troops in Katanga - what are they?

A. This question should not be allowed. I admit I know most of them but I will NOT tell you.

Q. The Indians are NOT behaving according to International Law. They are committing atrocities - Will you NOT condemn them?

A. I do not accept the statement that the Indians are committing atrocities - I have no knowledge and have never witnessed any atrocities committed by the Indians, anyway I am a soldier NOT a politician and am not permitted to make any comment except give my Number, Rank and Name.

Q. Can you, Commander, put all you said in writing and sign it?

A. Yes, and that goes for my men as well.

These proceedings lasted an hour or so with a repetition of most of the questions, particularly questions about who opened fire first and about the Indian atrocities. In fact the whole proceedings were an utter farce.

The best information I said I could give was that the Gendarmerie opened fire first, because I saw Verrey lights from a number of Gendarmerie Posts before any firing commenced.

Raponillie congratulated me on my performance (through Mr. Nolan) and gave his word of honour as one officer to another that he would guarantee our safety.

As this juncture everyone was handed a sheet of paper to write a letter which they said would be posted.

One of the Attorneys read my letter and remarked, "You are being very flippant - you don't seem to realise the serious position you personally are in".

I ended the proceedings there and then by warning him and those who were with him that if they laid a finger on me or on any of the prisoners they would answer for it to UN. This might be another Nurembergh.

6. In the course of the next few days I met numerous people alleged to be Reporters from mostly Rhodesia, South Africa and France (Paris Match). All were violently anti-UN and vitriolic about Dr. O'Brien and in particular about Mr. Tomberlane who, they said, was a journalist unfit for employment in any newspaper or magazine with a circulation of over 120,000. He was sacked from several journals, was a Communist and a Crook. He had no previous training or experience to fit him for the position as deputy to Dr. O'Brien. While admitting that Dr. O'Brien was a trained diplomat and a man of culture and intelligence, nevertheless an Army Officer with military experience similar to Dr. O'Brien's diplomatic experience would only have reached the rank of second-lieutenant (All this mostly came from the PARIS MATCH correspondent).

They said Dr. O'Brien was NOT a man of his word and had fooled Mr. Tshombe several times - going so far as to ring him the night before the firing started to say he was going to see him the following day - O'Brien was drunk with power and had acted beyond his mandate from UN and Hammersjold.

These reporters were around almost every day for food and liquer from the Gendarmerie.

They wrote their reports in the presence of the white officers. In my opinion they wrote what the white officers told them to write. The Paris Match correspondent accompanied the white officers on the night we were moved from Brickfield to Jadotville. He took flashlight 'photos on the way and got great assistance from the white officers.

There were a few English reporters from time to time who never commented one way or another about the UN. They did not have the same friendly relations with the white officers.

From the time I was taken prisoner until I was removed to Jadotville, Raponillie had a mistress, a Belgian aged about 30 with 2 children living in all places we stayed. They slept in the same room. She told me her husband was a Belgian Officer who had returned to Belgium.

Mr. Nolan - One one occasion the German Dr. wished to take photographs of the prisoners but the paratroopers became angry. I heard them saying, "What is the meaning of photographing all the white prisoners making heroes out of them, while our prisoners are being thrown to death by the Indians". They pushed the Dr away peaceably.

It was quite evident all through that the white officers had great control over the paratroopers.

Comdt. Cahalane - I met Lt. Col FALCK a few times and he asked once what did we do to the French man arrested by UN in a Hotel in Elisabethville some days before the fighting started.

I said I didnt know and Falck said, "I hope you cut the Bastard's throat and save us the bother of doing it."

I again met Falck in Jadotville last Saturday, he told me he called to see how I was. He told me that the French Lt and Pa Raponillie were still in Katanga.

I asked Falck what Raponillie's real name was. He said, "I will not tell you".

I related to Falck our experience in Camp Massart last week and said to him that the rabble will cut all your throats yet. He said, "Yes, they are bad, they are bad."

I could not fail to notice how much Falck has disimproved in appearance and had lost all his earlier cockiness.

On my first and subsequent meetings with Falck he gave me the

impression that he was directing operations in E'VILLE against the U.N. I never saw him in uniform or any of the white officers for that matter.

7. Intervention by Capt A Magennis

On 15 Sep'61 a Dr GUMANI, a German television reporter asked to see Capt Magennis who was att to Dogra Bn at the Post Office in E'VILLE. He said he had a message from Mr. MUNONGO, Minister for the Interior, Katanga Government, for Dr Cruise O'Brien Civil UN Rep Katanga.

Capt Magennis contacted Dr Gumani at the hospital. The Dr had a pass from Mr Munongo to go through the lines with info that Comdt P. Cahalane and Capt T. Ryan were held prisoner in a villa. Mr Munongo threatened to have these two officers shot unless two civilian Katangese named REDIVO and MAURRAS then held prisoner by UN were released by the night of the 15th Sep. A reply from Dr. O'Brien was required by the night of the 15th and was to be brought to a secret rendezvous to Munongo by an Irish or Swedish officer.

Capt Magennis thereupon volunteered to undertake this mission and brought the following message from Dr O'Brien to Mr Munongo under most hazardous circumstances - "Mr Munongo should be informed that Mr Redivo and Mr Maurras are in no danger provided no harm comes to the Irish prisoners or any other UN prisoner they may have. If Comdt Cahalane is shot, contrary to all laws of war, one or both Redivo or Maurras will be shot. Mr. Tomberlaine (Asst to Dr O'Brien) did not say that all whites and Africans caught carrying arms will be shot. The Africans who are prisoners are in no danger whatsoever and will be treated according to the Geneva Conventions. White civilians carrying arms are in a different position. They are therefore liable to penalties but they are not being "shot".

Capt Magennis was accompanied by Dr Gumani in a car. On reaching a Gendarmerie barrier near Union Minere he was blindfolded and changed to a jeep. After some distance he was changed again to a car. He was then introduced to what he was told were a black and a white liaison officer to Mr. Munongo. He continued his journey and at 21.30 hrs he was taken to a house. He was asked for Dr. O'Brien's reply to Mr. Munongo.

A Gendarmerie officer engaged Capt Magennis in conversation on the following lines -

The Gendarmerie were fighting according to the laws of war. Irish Armd cs were fired on from an ambulance (Capt Magennis). This was denied and the Gend offr said he tried to rescue survivors from the car that was hit (This presumably was the car in which Comdt Cahalane was travelling and fired on at Radio College on the 14th Sep)

Indian tps had carried out atrocities on civilian population. Indians had fired on civilian car carrying red cross flag. The press had been fired on.

Everyone who moved on Ave Etoile were fired upon. The native population of the city had threatened to kill any UN tps they could.

Two Irish offr who escaped from Comdt Cahalane's pat (presumably Capt Whyte and Sgt Dignam) were dragged through the street by civilians and killed.

UN tps were not as well equipped as Kat.

He would abide by usage of war if allowed have control.

Capt Magennis should contact Dr O'Brien to get Irish and Swedish tps out of E'VILLE.

To-night or to-morrow the sit would get out of hand.

Algerians had more concern for rules of war than Indians.

He would not have fired on our armd cs if he knew the crews were Irish.

After this conversation the Gend Offr left, Capt was unblindfolded and given food and a bed. The household appeared to be Italian. At 05.30 the following morning (16th) the Gend Offr returned had Capt Magennis blindfolded and was brought back to hotel Leopold II. This Gend Offr was alleged to be French and had resigned from French army for political reasons.

Whether this intervention by Capt Magennis saved the lives of Comdt Cahalane and Capt Ryan is difficult to say, but the fact that he voluntarily went into enemy territory to make the effort indicates a high standard of loyalty and courage.

Operation Report - 5 Dec. 1961.

09.30 Received orders from Bn Ops to report without delay to HQ. Sector B with one Sec. A. Cars and one Pln Infantry (Lt. Quinlan).

10.00 Reported to Sector B and was briefed on the general situation:

Gendarmerie on SAIO block, had been reinforced and continued to refuse free passage to UNO troops. Ghurka Bn operating from Ave STANLEY would clear block. Irish contingent supported by Churkas and Sweeds would be (1) prepared to assist the Ghurka Bn effort by operating against SAIO block from NORTH, (2) prepared to seize and hold WHITE PIERS CR.

Column formed up in following order:-

One Sweedish APC carrying 20 Ghurkas and Column Comdr.
One Jeep with AT Rifle and Sweedish Crew.
One Irish A/Car.
Irish Pln in 4 Jeeps with two 84 mm ~~Rcls~~ rifles
Irish A/Car.

11.30 Orders from Bde Comdr to move against SAIO road block via CHARLEY route. Move at 12.00 hrs.

12.00 Moved as ordered.

12.30 Head of Column halted at road block as per sketch and Gurkas dismounted into drainage trench on right of road. I sent leading Armd Car to head of Column to enquire about position there and then deployed the infantry pln:- one Sec to rt of road, one Sec to left and one Sec covering rear. Soldier from Section on right of road reported a Gendarmerie Armd Car (37 mm Gun) in camouflage posn beyond air strip. Posted one 84 mm AT Rifle as per sketch. Moved up to the Column Comdr in an Armd Car. He was awaiting orders from his Bn. Indicated posn of Gendarmerie Armd car - moved back to Pln posn.

12.45 Gendarmerie A. car fired at Sweedish APC and missed. I ordered AT crew to fire and observed 2 hits. No.2 on the gun was hurt by the back blast and was evacuated to hospital. Heavy automatic fire opened up from Gendarmerie posns on both sides of road. Lt. Quinlan led a section and cleared up isolated Gendarmerie locs and Ant hills on left of road. Sgt. Hegarty, Pln Sgt. led a section through the bush to locate Gendarmerie Left flank. Both sections accomplished missions. Sgt. Hegarty reported strong Browning M.G. Posn on Gendarmerie left flank. In the meantime the remainder of the column was developing the ambush posn by fire. Indications were that the posn was held by about one Coy Gendarmerie and they appeared to be dug in.

14.00 Orders from Colmn Comdr to place two Irish Armd Cars at head of Column to sp Ghurkas as the guns on Sweedish APC were defective and could not be repaired. It was his intention to attack on the LEFT flank with the Ghurkas supported by Irish Armd Cars from entrance to Runway and supported by the Irish Pln from the RIGHT. Objective - large Ant hill approx. 1,000^x deep. Attack to go in at 15.00 hrs. after a Mortar preparation by 4.2's of Indian Dogra Bn. Issued orders to Irish attachment.

- 14.30 Mortar preparation started.
- 15.00 Ghurka attack moved off but bogged down after 300 yds and asslt troops got into cover in vicinity of an Ant hill. Gendarmerie were resisting strongly despite mortar fire.
- 15.20 Communication with asslt element was difficult and it was 15.20 hrs before I learned that the Column Comdr was believed killed leading the asslt and the Ghurkas had many wounded. Moved forward covered by Irish A. Cars and found Column Comdr dead and seven Ghurka O/Rs wounded. Took over command of Column. Remaining Ghurkas were reluctant to move with their officer dead - none of them could speak English - despite many attempts to call for mortar fire by wireless, I had to give up because those at Dogra base plate could not speak English. Dead and wounded evacuated to U.N. Hospital.
- 15.45 Info Irish Bn by C/12 of posn - requested English speaking Indian officer to control Mortar fire. Bn info me that Air Strip posn was held by 150 Gendarmerie and that wireless intercepts indicated they were looking for rfts.
- It was planned to attack the Gendarmerie posn after mortaring his strong points. Irish Pln to secure a SL on the Rt. flank and occupy the original Ghurka objective after first securing two intermediate objectives. Ghurkas in sp from their posn on the LEFT. Irish A. Cars to sp from the Runway.
- Sgt. Hegarty cleared M.G. posn that was menacing the S.L.
- 16.45 Radio message from O/C 35 Bn. My message re requirement of FOO had been passed to Sector B. A Sector B intercept indicated that Gendarmerie in this posn were calling for urgent help and were exaggerating the str of the UN Force attacking their posn. In the light of this info it was decided to attack the Gendarmerie as already planned at 17.30 hrs whether mortar sp was forthcoming or NOT.
- 17.29 F.O.O. did NOT arrive.
- 17.30 Pln secured obj I (a bank 150^X from S.L.)
- 17.45 Pln secured obj II (Heavy earth moving eqpt used to block the runway).
- 17.45 L.O. arrives from Gen. Raja with orders to withdraw from posn. I pointed out (1) the progress made in clearing the area, (2) there was NO Gendarmerie fire at this stage at all, (3) a very short march would enable my force to link up with Ghurka Bn who at this time had reached SABENA GUEST Ho.
- 18.00 L.O. received orders that there would be NO further offensive action but present posn would be held until relieved around 20.30 hrs.
- 18.30 Orders from Gen. Raja to evacuate from and be clear by 19.00 hrs - that it was his intention to occupy area with Indian troops at first lt on Wednesday 6 Dec.
- 19.00 Cleared posn and reported to Gen Raja at Dogra Farm as ordered.
- 20.30 On return march to H.Q. 35 Bn via CHARLIE route, one armoured car bogged down in heavy mud and could not be recovered. All equipment was removed from it and the car was abandoned. It was recovered on Wed. 6 Dec.

I learned later from officers of Dogra Bn that 42 Gendarmerie dead were counted on the Old Air Strip posn. Captured equipment included automatic rifles and Browning .300 MGs. A supply of 84 mm AT Amm on an Armd C with 37 mm gun.

In concluding this report I would like to mention the excellent work done by Lt. Quinlan, Sgt. Hegarty and the pln of A Coy 35 Bn. All orders I gave them were carried out quickly and precisely and without regard for personal safety, despite the fact that at this time they understood they would be on their way home in 48 hours.

A.J. Magennis CAPTAIN.

A.J. Magennis.

APPX "J"

History 35 Bn

Tagairt: 35/IR/101.

Ceannceathru,
35 Cn Cois,
CATHAIR EILIS.

21 Deire Fómhair 1961

Ard Cheannasai.
Forsai FMA sa CHONGO.

MEANMA 35 CN COIS

Uasail,

As requested I report as under:

The morale of the Bn continues high in spite of many adverse factors, e.g., casualties, prisoners, poor living conditions, inferior tentage, absence of steel helmets and jungle boots, heavy duties, etc.

1. PRISONERS

For a while in September there was an atmosphere of despondency mainly due to the large number of prisoners lost, but when it became known through the agency of International Red Cross, Irish Press reps, cease-fire commission; US, British and French Consuls, etc. that they were well, worries diminished.

2. CASUALTIES

Our wounded were another factor which tended to lower morale but due to excellent medical attention they all made remarkable recoveries, and morale went up again. Some of our wounded made strong representations to the hospital authorities to be allowed return to their units, Cre. Coughlan, SS Ffrench, etc. I believe Sair Carey was the only exception to this attitude but he had a particularly nerve-racking experience. Our men are aware of the outstanding hospital treatment available here and consequently have confidence in the Medical Services.

Our fatal casualties did affect all ranks for a while but when it was pointed out to them that many more should or could have been killed they realised that we came off very well. The example of the ambush on the Jado road (16 Sep) was quoted to them. I asked the officers to put it to the men that if we had laid an ambush and that 300 Gendarmerie passed through it without fatal casualty would we feel satisfied.

3. SICKNESS

The sick rate in the Bn is very satisfactory. A possible epidemic of Enteritis was developing about the end of Sep. An average of 7 sick each day occurred but this quickly abated and for the past week the average daily sick is 2.5 which is 6% of our strength.

One incident caused much worry. A Guard from Les Roches of 1 Sair, 1 Cre and 10 SS of 'B' Coy, on being rotated, were detailed for duty with the Coy on the Tunnel. To a man they went sick, complaining of "fatigue". They received M & D and proceeded to the Tunnel and we have had NO further complaints from the pers concerned.

The incident seems to have been of the Sair's doing and his Coy Comd has recommended his removal from the Coy. The matter is now the subject of investigation.

4. LIVING CONDITIONS

Irish tentage is NOT suitable for tropical climate. Indian tentage was requisitioned 13 Jun and on several occasions since but without success. On the night of 6 Oct we had our first experience of tropical rain. I personally inspected all tentage next morning and found that over 90% of it was US. Men's bedding, clothing, etc., was saturated. The acquirement of villas, garages, sheds, etc., was undertaken immediately and by that night we succeeded in providing the men with roofed accommodation locally. The improvement in morale was quite evident.

Prince Leopold Farm was taken over in the first week of Sep and the Bn, less one Coy, was concentrated for the first time. The fact that the Bn had a strong secure base at last helped morale. However the unsanitary conditions which prevailed were a matter of concern which was pointed out to UN Civilian Adm staff as early as July. Repeated requests to have drains cleaned mechanically, farm and animal refuse cleared, fumigation carried out, etc., were without success and still are. But for the efforts of our troops the living conditions on the farm, which are still far from good, would be unthinkable.

5. PERSONAL EQUIPMENT.

Such items as steel helmets have never been supplied to this unit. Jungle boots were only supplied about a week ago. The fact that these items were seen by our men with Swedish and Indian units possibly had a demoralising effect. The jungle boots came in two sizes and are too small for a large number of the troops. The uniforms issued earlier on showed a similar lack of consideration and understanding on the part of those concerned. They required considerable alteration by our tailors.

6. TRANSPORT

The continued lack of combat tpt has been a headache for this Bn all during its service. In OP RUMPUNCH and MOR THOR troops had to march on foot to their objectives as far as 3 to 4 miles. Ferrying was resorted to. After MOR THOR the Bn TO commandeered 5 buses. But for them the second attempt at the relief of JADOTVILLE could NOT have been undertaken. We are being continually pressed by KAT Comd Log to return the buses but I've refused to return them until we get suitable replacements. Recently we've been sup with 2 X 3 ton trucks and 8 X 1 ton trucks and 4 of the buses are ready for return to the owner.

This deficiency of tpt had a most frustrating effect on all ranks especially on Bn Staff.

7. CRIME

The following table shows the incidence of crime for the sub-units of the Bn, less "A" Coy. The crime record of "A" Coy was quite satisfactory, and I think the figures below are evidence of a healthy record.

Jul 61	-	57
Aug 61	-	22
Sep 61	-	14
Oct 61	-	12
(to 20th)		

8. HEAVY DUTY

A proper analyses of the duties of the Bn would require elaborate statistical evidence but I am satisfied that since the night of

26/27 Aug the men have been fully engaged on Op and Grn duties. Ops RUMPUNCH and MOR THOR had every man engaged, Refugee Camp patrols, Occupation of Tunnel since 13 Sep. Les Roches guard, Italian Hospital guard and Camp security have all stretched the resources of the unit considerably. An indication of the extent of duties may be gleaned from the fact that 3 days ago the shortage of troops was so acute that we were compelled to put 2 men, who were on LD, on OP duty.

9. REFUGEE CAMP.

This Camp has been a heavy burden on the unit. Its close proximity to the Irish Camp from the sanitary point of view had caused much worry. The recent outbreak of enteritis was attributed by at least one MO to that cause.

In the last week refugees have been moved away about $\frac{1}{2}$ mile from our Camp.

Another aspect of the refugee camp is the continuous and sometimes violent unrest which exists. This atmosphere demands a constant state of alert on the part of our men and the strain is noticeable.

10. RESILIENCE

The resilient spirit of our men is quite evident. An outstanding example is the recommissioning of one of the two armd cars captured, burned, disarmed, and damaged by KAT forces on Sep 14. The two cars were recovered and towed into Irish Camp. The Armd Car Gp. fitters under Capt. Lawless worked untiringly to refit one of these two cars. Parts not available were scrounged and improvised. A captured Browning MMG was fitted. The car, suitably named PHOENIX, was returned to service on 10 Oct.

The second car which was more extensively damaged by A tkfire and burning, is now being refitted. I do NOT hope for a second success in this case, but I regard the effort as a healthy indication of the determination of our men to overcome adversity.

In every Op in which this unit has participated I've experienced the highest standards of enthusiastic cooperation from all ranks. Certain people had to be restrained from action above the call of duty. Adm pers had to be prevented from participating in actions.

A recent example was on the night of 17 Oct when Sector 'B' instructed us to keep the exits from Camp Massart under surveillance. Part of my orders provided for one officer and one civilian interpreter being sent on this mission. In fact, three officers and two interpreters went out and I must conclude that their subsequent capture by Gendarmerie was due to audacity and boldness.

11. MORALS.

I've discussed the whole problem with Fr. Clarke and Bn MO and they both assure me that the moral standards of the men are of a high order. Furthermore, they both agree in toto with my opinions as expressed in foregoing paras.

12. CONCLUSION.

I feel that there is NO need to worry about the morale of this unit.

AMcA/LSM.

LT. CHORNAL GNIOMHACH
(Aodh MacConmidhe)
OIFIGEACH CEANNAIS, 35 CATHLAN CHOISITHE.

INTELLIGENCE

35 IRISH BN ONUC

JUNE 61 TO DEC 61 KATANGA
(E'VILLE JADOTVILLE)1. ORG OF INT SEC:

The OR personnel allotted to this section were not selected with a view to their usefulness as Int pers. At least one of the ORs was more fitted for an uncomplicated fatigue party than a pot skilled member of an Int staff. In the event it did not matter as the ORs pers of Int staff were taken to fill jobs on Welfare Offrs Staff. The latter staff was painfully short. Also the asst I.O. Capt. Parker (Mil Col) was taken to form part of Swedish/Irish Bde Staff of S. Kat. Bde.

2. WORKING OF STAFF:

In practice the Int Staff worked with ops to form an Int/Ops Section. The work was so interlaced that this was the only workable arrangement. The ops offr Comdt. S. Barrett was also taken to S. Kat. Bde and the ops Int Staff was Comdt. J.P. Kane and Capt. Jas. Stewart. This scheme worked reasonably harmoniously and w/o any unovercomable difficulties.

3. INTELLIGENCE GEN:

- a Each Coy and each offr NCO and man was asked to be observant of all activities and movements of civs and Kat mil. Each coy submitted a daily report to Bn H.Q. Daily reports sent to S. Kat Bde. List of headings prepared to each coy reports.

5.

b Measures were taken by Ops/Int Staff to promote internal security in the Bn. It was found difficult to make Irishmen suspicious even after the Sep fighting. They are a cushy decent open-hearted lot and accept all comers to the main gates, posts, etc. as honest to God humans. This was not always so and it was a whole-time job checking on this kind of security.

In July to 13 Sept 61 OPs were est at "Curraclloe" (CO's Ho on Airport Rd.) and at Main Rly Sta to report on mil movs. These posts were manned by a cpl and 3 ptes. From these posts the build up of opposition for Sep outbreak was noted.

4. LANGUAGE TRG:

A knowledge of French was essential. It was not available to any great degree in our Bn. There is a lot of room for Army language trg as part of our home trg. We did start language classes in July 61 only to have this excellent work (Instr was Capt R. Gregan) cancelled by the ops leading to the gen arrests 27/28 Aug 61.

5. CASH ALLOWANCE:

The only way to get a certain and most valuable type of int was to go out and meet the people. This means money as we found out to our cost. A pers allowance to an I.O. is a must. One cannot sit and talk and sip without buying an odd round. An application to UN did not meet with success.

6. CO-OPERATION:

We had contact with Malayans, Indians, Ethiopians, Swedes and Civ Int Officers. The highest level of co-operation was available at all times.

7. HAND OVER:

I.O. 35 Bn arrived in Congo and passed I.O. 34 Bn in the sky above Kamina. There was NO hand-over provided for. This was more than just a pity as we took at least 2 months to find our feet. Comdt. J. Garvey (I.O. 34 Bn) had an excellent set of contacts made but we were not really able to make full use of them at all.

8. COMMNS:

The range of wrls sets inadequate for commn outside Bn. Within Bn the Coys sets were O.K. in E'Ville area.

9. OTHER INT SECTION FUNCTIONS:

- a. I.O. kept coy comdrs and S.Os. briefed on happenings pclit and mil outside Bn.
- b. A.H.Q. (P&O) were kept posted each week by I.O. reports covering all Bn activities, mil sporting and gen sit. "Congo Chronicle" R.E. prog was fed by I.O. Staff.
- c. A radio monitoring procedure was est in Nov 61 at Bn HQ to gain info from KAT radio net. This was manned by Sig pl pers with civilian interpreters and revealed some useful info.

HQ. 35 IRISH BATTALION:
ELIZABETHVILLE:
20th JULY. 1961.

ARMS DRILL - F N RIFLE AND GUSTAF SMG - PROVISIONAL

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Lieut-Colonel.

(Olaf J. McNeill)

Officer Commanding. 35 Irish Bn. O.N.U.C.

(Signed) J.P. Kane Commandant
(J.P. Kane)

Ops/Int Officer. 35 Irish Bn. ONUC.

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Director of Trg 2 Copies.
Director P.&O..... 2 Copies.
Spares.....10 Copies.

/POH'

PART I. INTRODUCTION

1. The following Arms Drill for FN and Gustaf SMG's will be adopted immediately in the 35th Inf Bn. It is a provisional drill and subject to review. No variations of this drill will be used.

Amendments if considered necessary will be issued from this Headquarters.
2. The FN and SMG Drills are designed to coincide as far as possible to facilitate instruction and uniformity especially where mixed guards i.e. Men armed with FN's and Gustafs are employed.
3. As far as possible Drill Movements with No. 4. Rifle have been retained.
4. Initial instruction with the FN Drills with particular reference to the Port and Examine Positions should be very carefully supervised and if necessary individual supervision exercised.

PART...II. FN. DRILLS

5. General
 - (a) Slings: Slings will not be used for ceremonial occasions including Guards of Honour, Guard Mounting and Sentry Duty.
 - (b) Magazines: Empty Magazines will be inserted in the Rifle for Guards of Honour.
 - (c) Dress for Sentries: Normal Drill Order less Right Hand Fouche and Cross Strap. Two Magazines in Left Hand Pouch. One on Rifle. In isolated Posts the sentry will carry two extra Magazines in his Pockets.
 - (d) Sentry Duty: Normal Sentinel Drill remains in force. Flying Sentries may use the carry or advance positions after dark.
 - (e) BAYONETS: Bayonets will not be fixed or Unfixed as a Drill movement on Guard Mounting or Dismounting. Sentries will Fix and Unfix when being posted and relieved. For normal drill instructional periods and Guards of Honour, bayonets will be fixed and unfixed as laid down for No. 4. Rifle.
6. DRILL MOVEMENTS:

Position of attention. (a) Detail as for No. 4. Rifle.
Stand at Ease. (b) Points to Note: Fingers of Right Hand together extended along outer casing.
7. SLOPE FROM POSN: 1st Mov:
OP ATTENTION
2 MOVS
 - (a) Detail. The Rifle is brought smartly upwards vertically along the Right Side of the Body, at the same time the right hand is transferred from the outer casing to the Pistol grip, the left hand grasping the outer casing immediately below the Upper sling swivel.

7. (b) Points to Note. The Rifle is held in a vertical position against the Body, Magazine to the Front the butt slightly forward, the cocking handle against the waist belt. Thumb of right hand around pistol grip, back of hand to the right.
- (c) 2nd Mov: The left hand is cut smartly to the side, thumb to the front etc., as for normal position of attention.

8. ORDER FROM SLOPE:

3 MOVS: 1st Mov. (a) Detail. Holding the rifle perfectly steady, the left hand is brought smartly across the body, gripping the outer-casing as close as possible to the magazine.

(b) Points to Note:

- (1) No move of Rifle. (2) Left Arm parallel with ground.
(3) Elbow close to Body. (4) Back of Hand to Front.

2nd Mov. (a) Detail. The right hand is transferred from the Pistol grip to the upper portion of the outer-casing immediately below the upper sling swivel.

(b) Points to Note.

- (1) Right Elbow close to Body.
(2) Fingers to Front.
(3) Thumb underneath gas-regulator.
(4) Right shoulder must NOT be dropped.
(5) Rifle held steady.

3rd Mov. (a) Detail. The rifle is lowered smartly to the ground, at the same time cutting the left hand to the side.

(f) Points to Note.

- (1) Butt must NOT be banged.
(2) Other points as for normal position of attention.

9. PRESENT FROM SLOPE: 1st Mov.

3 MOVS (a) Detail. The left hand is brought smartly across the body, gripping the outer-casing above the Magazine.

(b) Points to Note.

- (1) Left Arm parallel to ground and close to the Body.
Note: This movement is as for 1st Mov of Order.

2nd Mov.

(a) Detail. The right hand is transferred smartly from the pistol grip to the small of the butt.

(b) Points to Note.

- (1) Rifle Steady. (2) Fingers pointing to front and downwards close together. (3) Right Elbow to Rear and inwards, close to body.
(4) Rifle controlled by left hand.

9. PRESENT FROM SLOPE: 3rd Mov.
3 MOVS (a) Detail. The rifle is brought smartly from the left side to a vertical position in front of the Body, magazine to the front.
- (b) Points to Note.
- (1) Backsight 6 inches from waist.
 - (2) Foresight level with the eyes.
 - (3) Back of left hand to front.
 - (4) Fingers of right hand extended along woodwork, back of hand to right.
 - (5) Both elbows close to side.
10. Slope from the Present. 3 MOVS 1st Mov. (a) Detail. The rifle is brought smartly back to the right side, hands retaining original grip.
- (b) Points to Note. As for completed 2nd Mov. of Present.
- 2nd Mov.
- (a) Detail. Transfer right hand from small of butt to the pistol grip, making the hand "toll".
- (b) Points to Note. As for completed 1st Mov of present.
- 3rd Mov.
- (a) Detail. Left hand is cut smartly to the side.
11. PORT ARMS FOR INSPECTION.(ONE MOV) (a) Detail. As for 1st Mov of slope with No. 4 Rifle.
- (b) Breech will NOT be opened by Men. The Inspecting Officer only will manipulate the cocking handle while inspecting.
- (c) There is NO necessity to take the time from the right hand man.
- NB Inspecting Offrs should NOT examine the rifle at the time of Inspection. "The examine Arms" should always be given as a separate word of Command.
12. EASE SPRINGS FROM PORT. Detail. Using the left hand the change lever is put at R. The trigger pressed, the change lever returned to S and the Port position resumed.
13. ORDER FROM PORT 3 MOVS. Detail. As for No. 4 Rifle.
14. SLOPE FROM PORT 3 MOVS. Detail. As for Slope from Present.
15. Examine Arms (From Port)One Mov. (a) Detail. The left foot is carried off to the left front (as for No. 4 Rifle) at the same time transferring the Rifle to the front of the body. Magazine towards the ground, heel of Butt at Right Groin, NO change of Grip.

15. Examine Arms (b) The cocking handle will NOT be
(From Port) One Mov. pulled back until Inspecting Officer
reaches individual man.

(c) When the inspecting Offr, approaches each individual the cocking handle will be pulled smartly to the rear by gripping it with forefinger and thumb of left hand. The remaining fingers of left hand will grip the Trigger guard. The right thumb is then inserted in the ejection opening. The holding open device is NOT applied, the cocking handle being held back by manual control of the left hand.

(d) When the Inspecting Officer passes to the next man the right hand is returned to the small of the butt, the cocking handle is smartly released and the original examine position resumed.

NB: This drill is designed to eliminate unnecessary strain and movement and to obviate the possibility of injury if the cocking handle is released while the right thumb is inserted in the ejection opening. It should be impressed on men that the right thumb will NOT be inserted until full control has been established over the cocking handle by the left hand and that the Right Hand is removed to the small of the Butt before releasing the cocking handle.

16. Ease Springs Details. Using the left hand, the change lever
From Examine is put at "R", the trigger pressed,
the change lever returned to "S" and the examine position
resumed.
17. Order from Detail. As for No. 4. Rifle except that the
Exam. (3 MOVES) Rifle will be steadied with the left
hand in the second movement as in the order from the port
position.
18. Slope from examine Detail. As in slope from Present.
3 MOVES. The left foot will be carried into the
Right in the first movement.
19. Loading Detail. As for No. 4. Rifle. The Magazine is
(From Order) removed from Pouch or Pocket with the left hand
and inserted in the Rifle. The examine or load position is
then assumed.
20. Order from SEE PARA.....17.
Load Position
21. Slope from Load SEE PARA.....18.
Position
22. UNLOADING: (a) As for No. 4. Rifle. The Magazine is removed
with the left hand, thumb bearing against the
Magazine catch. The Magazine is put into the
left pocket, arms are ordered and Men Stand
at Ease in their own time.
- (b) "For Inspection Port Arms" see Para. 11.
Rifles are inspected for safety only,
Orderly Officer manipulating the bolt.
- (c) "EASE SPRINGS" See Para.....12.

23. FIXING AND UNFIXING
BAYONETS

As for No. 4. Rifle.

24. CARRY OR ADVANCE
FROM SLOPE: (3 MOVS)

- (a) 1st Mov: As for first movement of present.
- (b) 2nd Mov: Transfer right hand from pistol grip to carrying handle and open handle to rear.
- (c) 3rd Mov: Both hands cut smartly to the sides, rifles parallel to the ground.

NOTE: This movement will NOT be carried out from the Order Position.

25. SLOPE FROM CARRY OR
ADVANCE. (3 MOVS)

- (a) 1st Mov: Rifle is brought to a vertical position by the right side, at the same time the left hand grasps the outer-casing.
- (b) 2nd Mov: The right hand is transferred from carrying handle to the Pistol grip.
- (c) 3rd Mov: The left hand is cut away. The carrying handle is left open.
- (d) Carrying handle left open-will not interfere with subsequent moves or with firing.

26. CHANGE FROM CARRY OR
ADVANCE. (4 MOVS)

1st Mov:

- (a) Detail. The rifle is brought to a vertical position in front of the body, Magazine to the front.
- (b) Points to Note
 - (1) Right Arm close to Body.
 - (2) Foresight in line with mouth.

2nd Mov:

- (a) Detail. Left hand grasps outer casing in central position.
- (b) Points to Note
 - (1) No movement of RIFLE.
 - (2) Both elbows close to Body.

3rd Mov:

- (a) Detail. Position of Hands on Rifle are quickly reversed, Right hand from carrying handle to outer casing, left hand from outer-casing to carrying handle.
- (b) Points to Note
 - (1) NO Change in position of Rifle or of Arms.

26. CHANGE FROM CARRY OR ADVANCE. (4 MOVES) 4th Mov:
Detail. Both hands cut smartly to side,
Rifle parallel to ground.

Vice-Versa for change from LEFT TO RIGHT.

27. SECURE ARMS FROM SLOPE (4 MOVES) 1st Mov:
(a) Detail. Left hand to upper portion
of outer-casing.
2nd Mov:
(a) Detail. Right hand to lower portion
of outer-casing - no change of rifle position.
3rd Mov:
(a) Detail. Rifle placed smartly under
right arm.
(b) Points to Note
(1) Rifle parallel to ground.
(2) Right elbow resting on pistol
grip.
(3) No change of Grip with hands.
4th Mov:
(a) Detail. Left hand cut to side.

28. SLOPE FROM SECURE (4 MOVES) 1st Mov:
(a) Detail. Left hand is brought to
upper portion of outer-casing.
2nd Mov:
(a) Detail. Rifle is brought to a
vertical position by right side.
3rd Mov:
(a) Detail. Right hand to pistol grip.
4th Mov:
(a) Detail. Left Hand cut to side.

29. CHANGE ARMS FROM SECURE As for No. 4. Rifle.

30. CHANGE FROM SLOPE (4 MOVES) 1st Mov:
(a) Detail. Left Hand to LOWER portion
of outer-casing.
2nd Mov:
(b) The rifle is brought in front of
Body and at the same time the right hand is transferred
from pistol grip to upper portion of outer-casing.
3rd Mov:
(c) The rifle is brought to left side,
and left hand to pistol grip.
4th Mov:
(d) The Right hand is cut to side.
(e) Vice-Versa for change from LEFT
to RIGHT.

31. SALUTING The left hand is brought smartly across the Body to the outer-casing, back of hand to front, fingers and thumb close together left arm parallel to ground.

PART ...III. GUSTAF DRILL

GENERAL:

1. The following drills, designed to coincide as far as possible with the F.N. Drills, will be employed with the Gustaf.
2. The Gustaf will NOT be used for Guards of Honour, except in exceptional circumstances. Bayonets will NOT be fixed when so employed.
3. FIXING AND UNFIXING BAYONETS: Will only be carried out by individual sentries when being posted and relieved. The following procedure will be adopted.
 - (a) When the old Sentry sees the Gd Cmdr and new Sentry approaching he will unfix his bayonet and fold butt. If necessary the Gd Cmdr, will halt six paces from the old Sentry and wait until the old Sentry has unfixed.
 - (b) The new Sentry will NOT fix until the old Sentry has marched off six paces from him.
4. PAYING COMPLIMENTS ON CHANGING OF THE GUARD.
 - (a) Where the Guard consists of men armed with Gustafs only and is required to pay compliments on changing of the Guard, the salute with the hand will be given and NOT the present.
 - (b) Where the Guard is mixed i.e. armed with Gustafs and F.N's, the F N's will present arms and the men armed with Gustafs will salute on the last movement of the present and cut away the hand on the last movement of the slope.
 - (c) F N's will pay normal compliments.
5. PAYING COMPLIMENTS TO SENIOR OFFICERS AND ARMED PARTIES:
 - (a) When a Gustaf Guard is required to turn out and pay Compliments to Senior Officers or Armed Parties the Guard will be turned out with butts extended but NOT with bayonets fixed, compliments will be paid by presenting arms.
 - (b) In a "MIXED" guard as far as possible two ranks should be formed, one of Gustafs (in rear) and the other of F.N's.

6. NORMAL CARRY POSITION:
Position of attention
- (a) The gun with butt folded, sling around neck and adjusted to suit individual will be carried in front of the body, gun parallel to ground, right hand gripping the pistol grip, back of hand to front, the left hand gripping the barrell, back of hand towards ground, little finger of left hand bearing against stop in rear of milled nut.
- (b) Position of feet as for normal position of attention.
- (c) The normal carry position will be used at all times other than on Sentry duty and as outlined in para. 5 above.
7. NORMAL CARRY.
Stand at Ease.
- Left foot carried off as in normal posn of Ease, no change of grip with gun.
8. NORMAL CARRY
- MARCHING.
- Right arm will be swung. At the halt right hand is returned to pistol grip.
9. NORMAL CARRY
- SALUTING.
- Normal salute with hand over right eye or peak of Cap.
10. CARRY POSITION FOR
SENTINELS (WHEN POSTED)
- The gun, with butt extended, bayonet fixed (where bayonet bosses are provided) magazines inserted, cocking handle forward, the safety lug pressed in, will be carried in front of the body as for normal carry but the right hand will grasp the butt stock immediately in rear of butt stock catch, back of hand facing upwards.
- The hands will retain this position at all times while on the beat right or left hand will NOT be swung.
11. SALUTING BY SENTINELS.
- The gun is brought smartly across the body to a vertical position by the right side, magazines to front, muzzle in line with the shoulder at the same time the fingers of the left hand are extended, back of hand to front, elbow and fingers in straight line and parallel with ground, thumb retaining position around milled nut - pause - the original carry position is resumed by bringing the gun smartly down.
12. PRESENT FROM CARRY:
(3 MOVES)
- 1st Mov:
- (a) As for salute except the fingers of the left hand are NOT extended and the left elbow close to the body and left hand in line with right shoulder.

12. PRESENT FROM CARRY:
(3 Movs)

2nd Mov:

(b) The right hand is transferred to the end of butt stock, grasping it with palm of hand, thumb to front and around toe of butt.

3rd Mov:

(c) The gun is brought to a vertical position in front of the body, foresight in line with the eyes, gun six inches from waist belt, elbows close to body, magazine to front.

13. Carry (Slope or Order)
from Present. 3 Movs

1st Mov:

(a) The gun is brought to a vertical position by the right side. Points to note as for completed 2nd Mov. of Present.

2nd Mov:

(v) Right hand is transferred from end of butt stock to position below butt catch.

3rd Mov:

(c) The carry position is assumed by bringing the gun smartly downwards.

14. Port Arms for
Inspection.
One Mov.

(a) Command given from normal carry position.

(b) The gun is brought upwards to an angle of 45° (as for FN). Both elbows close to side no change of grip.

(c) The bolt will be manipulated by the inspecting officer.

15. Ease Springs
from Port.

(a) Using the right hand the stud is pulled out, the bolt pulled back until the gun is cocked, the trigger, pressed, the stud pressed in and the Port position resumed.

16. Carry (Order, Slope)
from Port (One Mov.)

The gun is brought smartly down to the normal carry position.

Note: If working with FN Rifles this mov will be carried out on the last mov of the order or slope from FN's.

17. Examine from Port
(One Mov)

(a) As for FN Rifle except that the right hand is transferred from the pistol grip to a position with fingers around trigger guard and thumb over safety slot in rear of backsight.

(b) As Inspecting Officer approaches each individual, using the right hand, the safety stud is pulled out, the cocking handle pulled to rear and put in safety slot and the right thumb inserted in ejection opening.

BATTALION ARMAMENT TABLE

Appx "I"

Hist 35 Bn

1. BATTALION HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTER COMPANY

a. BATTALION HEADQUARTERS

1	Lieutenant-Colonel	-	1	Gustaf Sub-Machine Gun
6	Commandants	-	6	Gustaf Sub-Machine Guns
1	Captain	-	1	Gustaf Sub-Machine Gun
1	Battalion Sergeant-Major	-	1	Gustaf Sub- Machine Gun

b. HEADQUARTER COMPANY

Company Headquarters

1	Commandant	-	1	Gustaf Sub-Machine Gun
1	Company Sergeant	-	1	FN Rifle
1	Company Quartermaster Sergeant	-	1	FN Rifle
1	Sergeant - General Duties	-	1	FN Rifle
1	Corporal - Storeman	-	1	FN Rifle
1	Private - Clerk	-	1	Bren Light-Machine Gun
1	Private - General Duties	-	1	F.N. Rifle
4	Privates - Orderlies/ Runners	-	4	Gustaf Sub-Machine Guns
1	Private - Photographer	-	1	F.N. Rifle
<u>'A' Platoon</u>				
2	Captains	-	2	Gustaf Sub-Machine Guns
3	Sergeants - Clerk	-	3	FN Rifles
1	Sergeant - General Duties	-	1	FN Rifle
1	Sergeant - Post	-	1	FN Rifle
2	Sergeants - Police	-	2	Gustaf Sub-Machine Guns
1	Sergeant - Band	-	1	FN Rifle
1	Corporal - Clerk	-	1	Bren Light Machine Gun
2	Corporals - General Duties	-	1	F.N. Rifle and 1 Bren Light- Machine Gun
8	Corporals - Military Police	-	8	Gustaf Sub-Machine Guns
4	Corporals - Band	-	4	F.N. Rifles
1	Private - Barber	-	1	F.N. Rifle
13	Privates - Band	-	13	F.N. Rifle

'Q' Platoon

4	Captains	-	4	Gustaf Sub-Machine Guns
1	Battalion Quartermaster- Sergeant	-	1	Gustaf Sub-Machine Gun
1	Company Quartermaster- Sergeant	-	1	F.N. Rifle
1	Sergeant - Armament Artificer	-	1	F.N. Rifle
1	Sergeant - Ammunition Examiner	-	1	F.N. Rifle
1	Sergeant - Cook	-	1	F.N. Rifle
1	Sergeant - Engineer Technician	-	1	Gustaf Sub-Machine Gun
1	Sergeant - Storeman	-	1	F.N. Rifle
1	Sergeant - Tentage Repairer	-	1	F.N. Rifle
3	Corporals - Armourer	-	3	F.N. Rifles

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BATTALION ARMAMENT TABLEBATTALION HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTER COMPANY"Q" PLATOON (CONTD)

4	Corporals - Engineers Technicians	-	4	Gustaf Sub-Machine Guns
2	Corporals - Storemen	-	1	FN Rifle and 1 Bren Light-Machine Gun
1	Private - Clerk	-	1	Bren Light Machine Gun
3	Privates - Cooks	-	3	F.N. Rifles
8	Privates - Engineers Technicians	-	8	F.N. Rifles
1	Private - Tailor	-	1	FN Rifle
1	Private - Boot Repairer	-	1	FN Rifle

Intelligence Platoon

1	Captain	-	1	Gustaf Sub-Machine Gun
1	Sergeant	-	1	FN Rifle
2	Corporals	-	2	FN Rifles

Signal Platoon

1	Captain	-	1	Gustaf Sub-Machine Gun
1	Lieutenant	-	1	Gustaf Sub-Machine Gun
2	Sergeants - Operators Wireless and Line	-	2	FN Rifles
1	Sergeant - Radio Mechanic	-	1	FN Rifle
1	Corporal - Operators Wireless and Line	-	1	Bren Light Machine Gun
1	Corporal - Radio Mechanic	-	1	FN Rifle
4	Privates - Operators Wireless and Line	-	4	FN Rifles

Transport Platoon

1	Captain	-	1	Gustaf Sub-Machine Gun
1	Lieutenant	-	1	Gustaf Sub-Machine Gun
1	Sergeant - Driver MT	-	1	Gustaf Sub-Machine Gun
2	Sergeants - Fitters	-	2	F.N. Rifles
1	Sergeant - Transport	-	1	F.N. Rifle
2	Corporals - Drivers MT	-	2	Gustaf Sub-Machine Guns
2	Corporals - Fitters MT	-	2	FN Rifles
3	Privates - Drivers MT	-	3	Gustaf Sub-Machine Guns
2	Privates - Fitters	-	1	FN Rifle and 1 Bren Light-Machine Gun

Medical Platoon

2	Commandants	-	2	Gustaf Sub-Machine Gun
1	Company Sergeant - Medical Orderlies	-	1	Gustaf Sub-Machine Gun
2	Corporals - Medical Orderlies	-	2	Gustaf Sub-Machine Guns
4	Privates - Medical Orderlies	-	4	Gustaf Sub-Machine Guns

NOTE: Two 84 mm Atk Recoilless Rifles are allotted to HQ Coy. Personnel to form two Atk Sub-Sections will be nominated by Officer Commanding, HQ Coy.

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3.

BATTALION ARMAMENT TABLE

BATTALION HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTER COMPANY

SUMMARY - Battalion Headquarters and
Headquarter Company

WEAPON	Battalion Headquarters	Company Headquarters	"A" Platoon	"Q" Platoon	Intelligence Platoon	Signal Platoon	Transport Platoon	Medical Platoon	TOTAL
FN Auto-Rifles	-	6	26	24	3	8	6	-	73
Gustaf Sub-Machine Guns	9	5	12	10	1	2	8	6	56
Bren Light Machine Guns	-	1	2	2	-	1	1	-	7
84 mm Atk Rifles	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2

2. COMPANY GROUP

a. COMPANY HEADQUARTERS

1 Commandant Company Commander	-	1 Gustaf Sub-Machine Gun
1 Commandant Medical Officer	-	1 Gustaf Sub-Machine Gun
3 Captains	-	3 Gustaf Sub-Machine Guns
1 Company Sergeant	-	1 Gustaf Sub-Machine Gun
1 Company Quartermaster-Sergeant	-	1 Gustaf Sub-Machine Gun
1 Corporal - Clerk	-	1 Bren Light-Machine Gun
1 Corporal - Storeman	-	1 Bren Light-Machine Gun
1 Corporal - Signaller	-	1 Gustaf Sub-Machine Gun
1 Corporal - Cook	-	1 FN Rifle
1 Corporal - Operator - Wireless and Line	-	1 FN Rifle
1 Corporal - Medical Orderly	-	1 Gustaf Sub-Machine Gun
1 Private - Clerk	-	1 Bren Light-Machine Gun
1 Private - Orderlies/Runners	-	1 Gustaf Sub-Machine Gun
1 Private - Signaller	-	1 Gustaf Sub-Machine Gun
3 Privates - Cooks	-	1 FN Rifle (Energa)
		2 FN Rifles
3 Privates - Operators - Wireless and Line	-	3 FN Rifles
3 Privates - Drivers MT	-	3 Gustaf Sub-Machine Guns
4 Privates - Medical Orderlies	-	4 Gustaf Sub-Machine Guns
1 Private - Tailor	-	1 FN Rifle (Energa)
1 Private - Boot-Repairer	-	1 FN Rifle
1 Private - Storeman	-	1 FN Rifle (Energa)

b. RIFLE PLATOON

Platoon Headquarters

1 Lieutenant	-	1 Gustaf Sub-Machine Gun
1 Sergeant	-	1 Gustaf Sub-Machine Gun
1 Private - Orderly/Runner	-	1 Gustaf Sub-Machine Gun
1 Private - Signaller	-	1 Gustaf Sub-Machine Gun.

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4.

PROVISIONAL BATTALION ARMAMENT TABLE

2. COMPANY GROUP

b. RIFLE PLATOON

Rifle Section

1 Corporal - Section Commander	-	1 Gustaf Sub-Machine Gun
1 Private - No. 1 Rifleman	-	1 FN Rifle (Energa)
1 Private - No. 2 Rifleman	-	1 FN Rifle
1 Private - No. 3 Rifleman	-	1 FN Rifle
1 Private - No. 4 Rifleman	-	1 FN Rifle
1 Corporal - 2 I/C	-	1 Gustaf Sub-Machine Gun
1 Private - No. 1 Light Machine Gun	-	1 Bren Light-Machine Gun
1 Private - No. 2 Light-Machine Gun	-	1 Gustaf Sub-Machine Gun

c. SUPPORT PLATOON

Platoon Headquarters

1 Captain	-	1 Gustaf Sub-Machine Gun
1 Sergeant	-	1 Gustaf Sub-Machine Gun
1 Private - Orderly & Runner	-	1 Gustaf Sub-Machine Gun
1 Private - Signaller	-	1 Gustaf Sub-Machine Gun

60 mm Mortar Section

Three Sub-Sections (each)

1 Corporal	-	1 Gustaf Sub-Machine Gun
1 Private - No.1 Mortarman	-	1 60 mm Mortar & 1 Gustaf Sub-Machine Gun
1 Private - No.2 Mortarman	-	1 FN Rifle
1 Private - No.3 Mortarman	-	1 FN Rifle (Energa).

Medium-Machine Gun Section

Section Headquarters

1 Sergeant - I/C Section	-	1 Gustaf Sub-Machine Gun
1 Private - Rangetaker	-	1 FN Rifle

Two Sub-Sections (each)

1 Corporal - I/C and No.1 Gunner	-	1 Gustaf Sub-Machine Gun
1 Private - No. 2 Gunner	-	1 Medium-Machine Gun & 1 Gustaf Sub-Machine Gun
1 Private - No. 3 Gunner	-	1 FN Rifle
1 Private - No. 4 Gunner	-	1 FN Rifle (Energa)

Anti-Tank Section

3 Sub-Sections (each)

1 Corporal - I/C	-	1 Gustaf Sub-Machine Gun
1 Private - No. 1 Gunner	-	1 x 84 mm Atk Rifle & 1 Gustaf Sub-Machine Gun
1 Private - No. 2 Gunner	-	1 FN Rifle
1 Private - No. 3 Gunner	-	1 FN Rifle.

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5.

PROVISION BATTALION ARMAMENT TABLE

2. COMPANY GROUP

SUMMARY - COY GP

Sub-Unit	Bren LMGs	Gustaf SMGs	FN Rifles	Medium Machine Guns	60 mm Mortars	84 mm Atk Rifle
Rifle Platoon HQ	-	4	-	-	-	-
One Rifle Section	(1)	(3)	(4)	-	-	-
Three Rifle Sections	3	9	12	-	-	-
Total Rifle Platoon	3	13	12	-	-	-
Support Platoon HQ	-	4	-	-	-	-
60 mm Mortar Section	-	6	6	-	3	-
Medium Machine Gun Section	-	5	5	2	-	-
84 mm Anti-Tank Section	-	6	6	-	-	3
Total Support Platoon	-	21	17	2	3	3
Three Rifle Platoons	9	39	36	-	-	-
Support Platoon	-	21	17	2	3	3
Company HQ	3	18	11	-	-	-
Total Company Group	12	78	64	2	3	3

3. ARMoured CAR GROUP

a. Group Headquarters

1 Commandant	-	1 Gustaf Sub-Machine Gun
2 Lieutenants	-	2 Gustaf Sub-Machine Guns
1 Company Sergeant	-	1 FN Rifle
1 Company Quartermaster Sergeant	-	1 FN Rifle
2 Sergeants - Fitters	-	2 FN Rifles
2 Corporals - Fitters	-	2 FN Rifles (Energa)
4 Corporals - Section (Relief)	-	1 Bren Light-Machine Gun and
		3 Gustaf Sub-Machine Guns
4 Troopers - Gunner Drivers	-	4 Gustaf Sub-Machine Guns
4 Troopers - Gunner Operators	-	4 Gustaf Sub-Machine Guns
1 Trooper - Storeman Driver	-	1 FN Rifle

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6.

PROVISIONAL BATTALION ARMAMENT TABLE

b. Armoured Car Section

Four Armoured Car Sections (each)

1 Captain - Section Comd	-	1 Gustaf Sub-Machine Gun
1 Sergeant - Section Sergeant	-	1 Gustaf Sub-Machine Gun
1 Corporal - Operator	-	1 Gustaf Sub-Machine Gun
2 Troopers - Drivers Armd Car	-	2 Gustaf Sub-Machine Guns
2 Troopers - Gunner Drivers	-	2 Gustaf Sub-Machine Guns
1 Trooper - Gunner Operator	-	1 Gustaf Sub-Machine Gun

NOTE: Two 84 mm Atk Recoilless Rifles are allotted to the Armoured Car Group Headquarters. Personnel to form two Atk Sub-Sections will be nominated by OC, Group.

SUMMARY - Armoured Car Group

Sub Unit	Bren LMG	Gustaf SMG	FN Rifles	84 mm Atk Rifles	MMG (Cav) on Armd Cars
Section	-	(8)	-	-	(2)
Four Sections	-	32	-	-	8
Group HQ	1	14	7	2	-
TOTAL GROUP	1	46	7	2	8

SUMMARY - 35 INFANTRY BATTALION

Sub Unit	Bren LMGs	Gustaf SMG	FN Rifles	84 mm Atk Rifles	MMGs	60 mm Mors
One Coy Gp	(12)	(78)	(64)	(3)	(2)	(3)
Three Coy Gps	36	234	192	9	6	9
Bn HQ and HQ Coy	7	56	73	2	-	-
Armd Car Gp	1	46	7	2	8(Cav)	-
TOTAL	44	336	272	13	6(Inf) 8(Cav)	9

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35 INFANTRY BATTALION

AMMUNITION ALLOTMENT

NOTE: The allotment given below is only a guide. Different situations may call for a re-distribution of amm. e.g., a sub-unit on an independent mission may carry some or all of its res which is normally held at Coy HQ.

WEAPON	.303 Ball	.303 Tracer	Ballistite	9mm SMG	7.62 mm
1. <u>Per Energa Man</u>					
a. On the man	-	-	10	-	-
b. In Coy Res	-	-	10	-	-
TOTAL	-	-	20	-	-
2. <u>Per LMG (a)</u>					
1st (a. With gun	750	75	-	-	-
Line (b. In Coy Res	450	45	-	-	-
One Second Line	1000	100	-	-	-
TOTAL	2,000	220	-	-	-
3. <u>Per MMG</u>		<u>Inf</u>	<u>Cav</u>		
1st (a. With gun	3,500	350	700	-	-
Line (b. In Coy Res	6,500	650	1300	-	-
2nd Line	3,000	300	600	-	-
TOTAL	13,000	1,300	2,600	-	-
4. <u>Per Gustaf SMG (b)</u>					
1st (a. On the man	-	-	-	216	-
Line (b. In Coy Res	-	-	-	216	-
One Second Line	-	-	-	432	-
TOTAL	-	-	-	864	-
5. <u>Per F.N. Auto-Rifle</u>					
1st (a. On the man	-	-	-	-	100
Line (b. In Coy Res	-	-	-	-	200
One Second Line	-	-	-	-	200
TOTAL	-	-	-	-	500

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ARMY ALLOTMENT

	60 mm Mor		Energa Grenades	No. 36 Grenades HE	Smoke Grenades	Cartridges			84 mm Atk Heat
	HE	Smoke				Red	Green	Illum	
6. <u>Per 60 mm Mor</u>									
1st (a. With Gun	64	16	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Line (b. With Coy	64	16	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Res									
One Second Line	60	12	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	188	44	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
7. <u>Energa Grenades</u> (Per Energa Man)									
1st (a. On the man	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-
Line (b. In Coy Res	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
One Second Line	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	-	-
8. <u>No. 36 Grenades HE</u> (Per Rifle Gp)									
a. With Rifle Gp	-	-	-	12	-	-	-	-	-
b. In Coy Res	-	-	-	12	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	-	-	-	24	-	-	-	-	-
9. Bn (Smoke Grenades Res (Grenades (Lachrymatory	-	-	-	-	600	-	-	-	-
	-	-	-	-	400	-	-	-	-
10. <u>Per Verrey Light Pistol</u>									
a. With Gun	-	-	-	-	-	4	4	6	-
b. In Coy Res	-	-	-	-	-	4	4	6	-
TOTAL	-	-	-	-	-	8	8	12	-
11. <u>84 mm Atk Heat</u>									
1st Line With Gun	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10
Coy Res	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10
One Second Line	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10
									<u>30</u>

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35 INFANTRY BATTALION

ARMoured CAR GROUP

EQUIPMENT TABLE - ARMoured CAR SECTION

ANNEX E

ESTABS 35 INF BN

	No. 1 Armoured Car					No. 2 Armoured Car					TOTAL Armoured Car Section (12)
	Troop Commander (2)	Operator (3)	Driver (4)	Gunner (5)	On the Armoured Car (6)	Section Sergeant (7)	Operator (8)	Driver (9)	Gunner (10)	On the Armoured Car (11)	
Vickers .303 MMGs	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	2
Vickers .303 MMGs Spare Barrels	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	2
Gustaf Sub-Machine Guns	1	1	1	1	-	1	1	1	1	-	8
Wireless Sets No. C.12	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
Wireless Sets No. 31	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	2
Batteries Lead Acid 6 Volt	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2
Binoculars	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	2
Compasses Prismatic	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	2
Map Cases	1	1	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	4
Protractors	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	2
Romers	1	1	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	4
Torches Complete	1	1	1	1	-	1	1	1	1	-	8
Watches	-	1	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	3
Whistles	1	1	1	1	-	1	1	1	1	-	8
Verey Light Pistols	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	2
Cutters Wire	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	2
.303 MMG Amn in Belts	-	-	-	-	3,300	-	-	-	-	3,300	6,600
9 mm Gustaf SMG Amn	216	216	216	-	-	216	216	216	216	-	1,728
Verey Light Pistol Cartridges -- Red	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	4	8

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RESTRICTED35 INFANTRY BATTALIONARMoured CAR GROUPEQUIPMENT TABLE - ARMoured CAR SECTION

(1)	No. 1 Armoured Car					No. 2 Armoured Car					TOTAL Armoured Car Section (12)
	Troop Commander (2)	Operator (3)	Driver (4)	Gunner (5)	On the Armoured Car (6)	Section Sergeant (7)	Operator (8)	Driver (9)	Gunner (10)	On the Armoured Car (11)	
Verey Light Pistol Cartridges - Green	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	4	8
Verey Light Pistol Cartridges - Illuminating	-	-	-	-	6	-	-	-	-	6	12


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35 INF BN

SUPPORT PLATOON ORG AND EQPT TABLES

Pl HQ

1 Capt	-	Pl Comdr
1 Sgt	-	Pl Sgt
1 Pte	-	Orderly and Runner
1 Pte		Signaller




SUMMARY

Sub-Unit	Offr	Sgts	Cpls	Ptes	TOTAL
Pl HQ	1	1	-	2	4
60 mm Mor Sec	-	-	3	9	12
MMG Sec	-	1	2	7	10
Atk Sec	-	-	3	9	12
TOTALS	1	2	8	27	38

INFANTRY PLATOON ORGANISATION

Platoon HQ

1 Lieut	:	Pl Comdr
1 Sgt	:	Pl Sgt
1 Pte	:	Runner
1 Pte	:	Signaller



Sub-Unit	Offr	Sgts	Cpls	Ptes	Total
Pl HQ	1	1	-	2	4
No. 1 Section	-	-	2	6	8
No. 2 Section	-	-	2	6	8
No. 3 Section	-	-	2	6	8
TOTAL PL	1	1	6	20	28

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
2.

MMG SEC - EQPT TABLE

ITEM	Sec HQ	Two MMG Sub Secs	Total MMG Sec	REMARKS
<u>Misc MMG eqpt</u>				
Aiming posts	-	2	2	Carried in gun carts Carried in Sec Cart Contents detailed Overleaf.
Boxes spare parts, complete				
Batteries Y Mk II (night lamps)	2	-	2	For use with night lamps
Batteries Y Mk II, spare	2	-	2	do.
Bulbs 3.5 volt, spare	2	-	2	do.
Barrels VMG - spare	-	2	2	One spare barrel per VMG Carried in gun cart.
Cases B and S Rangefinder	1	-	1	Carried in sec truck
Cases spare parts VMG	-	2	2	Carried in gun cart. Contents detailed Overleaf.
Cases oil can complete	1	-	1	
Cleaning rods	-	2	2	One per VMG in gun cart
Condenser can	-	2	2	do.
Condenser can - filler	-	2	2	do.
Condenser tube	-	2	2	do.
Gun chests VMG	2	-	2	
Gun flags	-	2	2	
Funnels water	1	-	1	One per sec for boiling out guns.
Measures water	1	-	1	do.
Lamps aiming - night firing box complete.	2	-	2	Carried in sec cart when required. Otherwise in sec truck.
Plugs belt	1	-	1	
Posts - Zero	-	2	2	Carried in gun carts.
Sights - bar foresight	-	2	2	do.
Sights - night - fore	2	-	2	In night firing box.
Sights - night - back	2	-	2	do.
Gloves VMG	-	2	2	Carried in gun carts.

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Gendarmerie Disposition
in Ketanga 3/9/1961



LEGEND
 TC = TRAINING CAMP
 LP = MILITARY POLICE
 Kcb = GROUP MOBILE
 Ma = NAVAL FLOTILLA

NOTE: net 1500 combat troops incl Group Mobile, 1st and 2nd Gend Bn. Incl other services TOTAL MILITARY STRENGTH = 2000/2200 Military personnel.

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3.

ANNEX G (Cont)

MMG SEC EQPT

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>Sec HQ</u>	<u>Two MMG Sub-Secs</u>	<u>Total M G Sec</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
<u>Instruments:</u>				
Binoculars	1	2	3	
Clinometers	-	2	2	One per gun in gun Handcarts.
Compass prismatic	1	2	3	One for Sec and Sub- Sec Comds.
Protractors	1	2	3	One for Sec and Sub- Sec Comds.
Rangefinders	1	-	1	
Slide rules Mk III 1937	1	-	1	For sec comd.
Watches GS	1	-	1	One for sec comd.
Map Cases	1	2	3	
<u>Engr Tools</u>				
Axes pick	-	2	2	One carried in each gun cart.
Axes felling	1	-	1	One carried in sec cart.
Cutters wire	1	-	1	One carried by sec comd.
Hooks bill or slashing	-	2	2	
Mallets	1	-	1	
Spades or shovels	-	2	2	One in each gun cart.
Saws Hand or saws folding	1	-	1	One in sec cart.
Ropes - 50 ft Lengths	1	2	3	
<u>Tot:</u>				
Handcarts	1	2	3	One for each gun (gun-carts) and one per sec for res misc eqpt.

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SCHEDULE OF MMG SPARE PARTS

The following are the contents of the spare parts case, wallet and spare parts box for MMG secs.

Spare parts case		Wallet	
(One per gun - total of 2 per MMG Sec)		(One per gun - total of 2 per MMG Sec)	
Balance spring	- 1	Bottles, Oil Mark 4 or 5	- 1
Can, oil	- 1	Cork for plug	- 1
Extractors	- 2	Cup, muzzle attachment	- 1
Lock breech	- 1	Disc muzzle attachment	- 1
Plug clearing	- 1	Fuzee with chain	- 1
Spring fuze	- 1	Levers, bottom	- 1
Wallet	- 1	Levers, top	- 1
Tool combination	- 1	Gib	- 1
Flannelette for binding lutin pads	- 6	Packing asbestos 5-yard pieces	- 1
Lutin, czs.	- 6	Pins, split, lever feed-block	- 1
		Pins, trigger lock	- 1
		Pins, tumbler	- 1
		Pins, firing	- 2
		Pins, keeper, split, $\frac{1}{8}$ x $2\frac{1}{8}$ ins (for Mk IV tripod Mounting)	- 3
		Fliers sidecutting pairs	- 1
		Protector muzzle	- 1
		Full-through double	- 1
		Punches No.3	- 1
		Punches No.5	- 1
		Reflector mirror	- 1
		Screwdrivers, small	- 1
		Sear, with spring	- 1
		Springs lock	- 2
		Trigger	- 1
		Tumbler	- 1
		Washers, adjusting No.1 .003-in	- 3
		Washers, adjusting No.2 .005-in	- 3
		Wire gauze (pieces)	- 2
		Washers, leather	- 1

Spare parts box

(One per MG sec)

Blocks, feed	- 2	Plugs, cork complete	- 1
Boxes, patch first aid complete	- 1	Plugs, belt	- 1
Boxes, small parts	- 3	Plugs, front cover catch	- 1
Brushes, oil MG	- 1	Plugs, screwed	-
Bush axis side levers	- 1	Plungers, front cover catch	- 2
Chains crosshead joint	- 1	Screw drivers large	- 1
Collars, roller	- 1	Roller	- 1
Cork for plug	- 2	Screws, clamp checking traverse	- 1
Eyelets, long, oz.	- 1/2	Sights, fore	- 1
Cups muzzle attachment	- 1	Sights, Tangent	- 1
Discs muzzle attachment	- 4	Spanner, adjustable	- 1
Fuzee with chain	- 1	Springs, bottom pawl	- 1
Gib	- 1	Springs, rear cover lock	- 2
Hammer	- 1	Springs, front cover catch	- 2
Lever, extractor left	- 1	Springs, gib	- 2
Lever, extractor right	- 1	Springs, lock	- 8
Packing asbestos (5-yd pieces)	- 8	Springs, safety catch with piston	- 4
Pins, crosshead joint	- 1	Springs, sear	- 2
Pins, elevating joint	- 1	Springs, shutter catch	- 2
Pins, split, keeper 1/18 x 1 in	- 3	Springs, tangent, sight	- 1
Pins, trigger lock	- 1	Springs, top pawl feed block	- 4
Pins, tumbler	- 1	Springs, trigger bar	- 2
Pins, firing	- 4	Washers, adjusting No.1	- 4
Pins, Spring, collar, roller	- 2	Washers, adjusting No.2	- 4
Pins, split, keeper 1/8 x 2 1/2 ins (for Mk IV tripod mounting)	- 6	Washers, elevating nut (tripod Mk IV)	- 6
Pins, fixing crank handle	- 1	Wire gauze (pieces)	- 8
Pins, gland packing	- 1	Strips, long	- 25
Pins, split sheek nut long	- 3	Strips, short	- 25
Pins, split bush, axis sidelever	- 1	Tools repairing belt	- 1
Pins, muzzle attachment	- 1		
Pins, T fixing rear crosspiece	- 2		

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EQPT TABLE - INF PL

ANNEX H TO
ESTABD 35 INF BN

	PL HQ				RIFLE GP							LMG GP			Total Section	Total Platoon	
	Platoon Commander	Platoon Sgt.	No.1 Runner	Signaller	Total Pl HQ	Sec Cpl	No. 1 Riflemen	No. 2 Riflemen	No. 3 Riflemen	No. 4 Riflemen	With Rifle Gp	LMG Cpl - 2 IC	No.1 Bren	No.2 Bren			Total LMG Gp
F.N. Rifle	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	1	4	-	-	-	-	4	12
Sub Machine Gun	1	1	1	1	4	1	-	-	-	1	1	-	1	2	3	13	13
Light Machine Gun Bren	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	1	1	3
Light Machine Gun Spare Barrell	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	1	3
1 MG Spare Parts Wallet	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	1	3
Energa Grenades	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	6
Grenades IS No.36	-	-	-	-	-	3	2	2	2	3	12	-	-	-	-	12	36
Grenades Smoke	-	-	-	-	-	Coy HQ - Allotted as required.										12	36
Ballistite Energa	-	-	-	-	-	-	10	-	-	-	10	-	-	-	-	10	30
Binoculars	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Compass	1	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	4
Map Case	1	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	4
Verey Light Pistol	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Verey Lt Cartridges Red	-	4	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4
Verey Lt Cartridges Green	-	4	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4
Verey Lt Cartridges Illuminating	-	6	-	-	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6
Whistles	1	1	1	1	4	1	1	1	1	5	1	1	1	3	8	28	
Wireless Sets No.31	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Watches	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Rope, 50 ft length	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
.303 Bren mags	-	-	-	-	30	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
7.62 mm F.N. Mags	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	5	5	20	4	5	4	13	15	75	
.303 Bren Amn - Rds	-	-	-	-	900	-	60	-	5	60	120	150	120	390	20	60	
7.62 mm F.N. Amn Rds	-	-	-	-	-	-	100	100	100	400	-	-	-	-	400	1,200	
SMG Amn on map (6 mags)	216	216	216	216	864	216	-	-	-	216	216	-	216	432	48	2,808	

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2.
EQPT TABLE - INF PL

ANNEX H TO
ESTARS 35 INF BN

	Pl HQ				RIFLE GP							LMC GP			Total Section	Total Platoon	
	Pl Comd	Pl Sgt	No.1 Runner	Signaller	Total Pl HQ	Sec Cpl	No.1 Rifleman	No.2 Rifleman	No.3 Rifleman	No.4 Rifleman	With Rifle Gp	LMC Cpl - 2IC	No.1 Bren	No.2 Bren			Total with LMC Gp
Picks	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	6
Shovels	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	6
Hooks Slashing	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	6
Saws Hand or folding	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2
Sledges	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	6
Wedges Steel	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	6
Axes	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	6
Crowbars	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	6
Wire Cutters	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	6
Torches Complete	1	1	1	1	4	1	1	1	1	1	5	1	1	1	3	8	28

NOTE: Engineer tools are normally carried in the coy truck for the pl. If they must be issued a suggested distribution is shown for the most important items.

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ANNEX J TO
ESTABS 35 INF BN35 INFANTRY BATTALIONROPA TABLE AND ENGR TOOLS - COY C2

Item	Coy HQ			Three Rifle Pls.	Sp Pl	Total
	Coy Res	Coy HQ	TOTAL			
<u>EGFT</u>						
Binoculars	-	(5)	5	3	10	18
Compass, Prismatic	-	(5)	5	12	8	25
Handcart - Mortar 60 mm	-	-	-	-	3	3
Handcart - MMG	-	-	-	-	3	3
Handcart - 84 mm Atk	-	-	-	-	3	3
Map Cases	-	(5)	(5)	12	8	25
Torches *	-	(32)	32	84	30	154
Watches	-	(4)	4	3	3	10
Whistles	-	(32)	32	84	38	154
Wrls Sets No.88	-	-	-	-	4	4
Wrls Sets No.31	-	(1)	1	3	1	5
Wrls Sets No.C.12	-	(1)	1	-	-	1
Telephones	(1)	(5)	6	-	-	6
Cable D.10 Twin - Miles	(2)	-	2	-	-	2
Apparatus Cable Laying	(1)	-	1	-	-	1
Battery Charging Plant	(1)	-	1	-	-	1
Protractors	-	(5)	5	12	8	25
Romers	-	(5)	5	12	8	25
Bicycles	-	(5)	5	-	-	5
<u>ENGR TOOLS</u>						
Axes Felling	-	(4)	4	3	3	10
Axes Pick	-	(6)	6	18	6	30
Crow Bars	-	(1)	1	3	1	5
Cutters Wire	-	(2)	2	9	5	16
Hooks Slashing	-	(6)	6	18	9	33
Saws Cross Cut	-	(2)	2	-	-	2
Saws Hand or Folding	-	(1)	1	3	1	5
Shovels or Spades	-	(6)	6	18	6	30
Sledges	-	-	-	3	1	4
Wedges Steel (assorted)	-	(4)	4	12	4	20
Ropes, 50 ft Lengths	-	-	-	3	9	12

* Spare batteries will be carried.

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ANNEX "K" TO
 TABS 35 INF BN

CONSOLIDATED BN HQ AND HQ COY EQPT TABLE

ITEM	Bn HQ	Coy HQ	"A" Pl	"Q" Pl	Int Pl	Sigs Pl	Tpt Pl	Med Pl	TOTAL BN HQ & HQ COY	REMARKS
<u>ENGR TOOLS & EQPT</u>										
Axes Felling or hand	-	-	-	8	-	-	-	-	8	
Axes Pick	-	-	-	20	-	-	-	-	20	
Crowbars	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	5	
Cutters Wire	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	5	
Hooks Slashing	-	-	-	11	-	-	-	-	11	
Saws Cross cut	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	5	
Saws Hand or folding	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	5	
Shovels or spades	-	-	-	20	-	-	-	-	20	
Sledges Steel	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	4	
Wedges steel astd	-	-	-	24	-	-	-	-	24	
Sandbags	-	-	-	8000	-	-	-	-	8000	Bn Stock
Ropes 50 ft lengths	-	-	-	9	-	-	-	-	9	
<u>INSTRUMENTS & ED EQPT</u>										
Binoculars	8	1	2	4	4	2	2	2	25	
Compasses	8	1	2	4	4	2	2	2	25	
Map Cases	8	1	2	4	4	2	2	2	25	
Protractors	8	1	2	4	4	2	2	2	25	
Romers	8	1	2	4	4	2	2	2	25	
Torches - complete	11	12	40	36	4	11	15	9	138	
Watches	1	1	6	4	1	1	2	1	17	For NCOs
Whistles	11	12	40	36	4	11	15	9	138	
Vervey Light Pistols	1	1	1	2	-	1	1	1	8	4-Red, 4-Green 6-Illuminating Ctges each
<u>WIRELESS & LINE EQPT</u>										
Wrls Sets No. C.12	1	-	-	-	-	8	-	-	9	
Wrls Sets No. 31	-	-	-	-	-	5	-	-	5	
Wrls Sets No. 38	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	2	
H.R.O. Receiver	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	
Telephones	-	-	-	-	-	10	-	-	10	
Switchboards WD 10 Line	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	
Cable D.10 Twin-Miles	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	
Cable Laying Apparatus	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	3	
Battery Charging Plant	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	2	

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ANNEX L
ESTABS 35 INF BN

35 INF BN

ARMoured CAR GROUP

CONSOLIDATED EQUIPMENT TABLE

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>Group HQ</u>	<u>Armoured Car Section</u>	<u>Four Armoured Car Sections.</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
<u>Armament</u>				
Gustaf SMG	14	(8)	32	46
FN Rifles	7	-	-	7
Bren LMG	1	-	-	1
.303 MEG	-	(2)	8	8
84 mm Atk Rifles	2	-	-	2
<u>Comms Equipment</u>				
Wireless Sets No.C 12	-	(1)	4	4
Wireless Sets No. 31	-	(2)	8	8
Batteries Acid Lead 6 Volt	-	(2)	8	8
<u>Instruments and Pd Equipment</u>				
Binoculars	3	(2)	8	11
Compasses	3	(2)	8	11
Map Cases	3	(4)	16	19
Protractors	3	(2)	8	11
Romers	3	(4)	16	19
Torches Complete	22	(8)	32	54
Watches	2	(3)	12	14
Whistles	22	(8)	32	54
Verrey Light Pistols	1	(2)	8	9
Verrey Light Cartridges - Red	4	(8)	32	36
Verrey Light Cartridges - Green	4	(8)	32	36
Verrey Light Cartridges - Illuminating	6	(12)	48	54

NOTE: S. Mar will issue the following Tables:-

Tools, Equipment and Spares.

Fitters Kits.

Field Kits.

Maintenance Spares and Materials.

RESTRICTED

35 INF BN

CONSOLIDATED EQPT TABLE

ITEM	Bn HQ		Armd Car Gp	One Coy Gp		Three Coy Gps		TOTAL ALLOT-MENT		GRAND TOTAL
	Combat	Res	Combat	Combat	Res	Combat	Res	Combat	Res	
FN Rifles	73	-	7	(64)	-	192	-	272	-	272
Gustaf Sub-Machine Guns	56	38	46	(78)	-	234	-	336	38	374
Revolvers .38	-	56	-	-	-	-	-	-	56	56
Bren LMG Mk. III	7	3	1	(12)	-	36	-	44	3	47
60 mm Mortar	-	5	-	(3)	-	9	-	9	5	14
81 mm Mortar	-	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	7	7
.303 MMG (Inf)	-	1	-	(2)	-	6	-	6	1	7
" " (Cav)	-	-	8	-	-	-	-	8	-	8
84 mm Atk Rifles	2	-	2	(3)	-	9	-	13	-	13
<u>Comms Eqpt</u>										
HRO Receiver	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1
Wrls Set No. C.12	1	8	4	(1)	-	3	-	8	8	16
Wrls Set No. 31	-	5	8	(5)	-	15	-	23	5	28
Wrls Set No. 88	-	2	-	(4)	-	12	-	12	2	14
Telephones	-	10	-	(6)	-	18	-	28	-	28
Switchboards WD 10 line	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1
Cable D 10 Twin - miles	1	-	-	(2)	-	6	-	7	-	7
Apparatus Cable laying	3	-	-	(1)	-	3	-	6	-	6
Battery Charging Plant	2	-	-	(1)	-	3	-	5	-	5
<u>Instruments & Fd Eqpt</u>										
Binoculars	25	-	11	(18)	-	54	-	90	-	90
Bicycles	5	-	-	(5)	-	15	-	20	-	20
Compasses	25	-	11	(25)	-	75	-	111	-	111
Map Cases	25	-	19	(25)	-	75	-	119	-	119
Protractors	25	-	11	(25)	-	75	-	111	-	111
Romers	25	-	19	(25)	-	75	-	119	-	119
Torches Complete	138	-	54	(154)	-	462	-	654	-	654
Watches	17	-	14	(10)	-	30	-	61	-	61
Whistles	138	-	54	(154)	-	462	-	654	-	654
Veray Light Pistols	8	-	9	(5)	-	15	-	32	-	32
Veray Lt Ctges - Red	32	32	36	(20)	(20)	60	60	128	128	256
Veray Lt Ctges - Green	32	32	36	(20)	(20)	60	60	128	128	256
Veray Lt Ctges - Illuminating	48	48	54	(30)	(30)	90	90	192	192	384

RESTRICTED

2

35 INF BN

ANNX "M" TO
ESTABS 35 INF BN

CONSOLIDATED EQPT TABLE

Item	Bn HQ		Armd Car Gp		One Coy Gp		Three-Coy Gp		TOTAL ALLOTMENT		GRAND TOTAL
	Combat	Res	Combat	Res	Combat	Res	Combat	Res	Combat	Res	
Engr Tools & Eqpt	8	-	Per Annxs		(10)	-	30	-	38	-	38
Axes Pick	20	-	"E" & "L"		(30)	-	90	-	110	-	110
Crowbars	5	-			(5)	-	15	-	20	-	20
Cutters Wire	5	-			(16)	-	48	-	53	-	53
Hooks Slashing	11	-			(33)	-	99	-	110	-	110
Saws Cross Cut.	5	-			(2)	-	6	-	11	-	11
Saws Hand or Folding	5	-			(5)	-	15	-	20	-	20
Shovels or Spades	20	-			(20)	-	90	-	110	-	110
Sledges Steel	4	-			(4)	-	12	-	16	-	16
Wedges Steel Astd	24	-			(20)	-	60	-	84	-	84
Sandbags	-	8000			-	-	-	-	8000	-	8000
Rope 50 ft lengths	9	-			(12)	-	36	-	45	-	45
<u>Allistite Energa</u>											
On Man	-	-	20	-	(170)	-	510	-	530	-	-
Coy Reserve	-	-	-	20	-	(170)	-	510	-	530	1,060
<u>.303 IMG Ball</u>											
With Gun	5250	-	750	-	(9000)	-	27,000	-	33,000	-	-
Coy Reserve	-	3150	-	450	-	(5400)	-	16,200	-	19,800	-
One 2nd Line	-	7000	-	1000	-	(12000)	-	36,000	-	44,000	-
										63,800	96,800
<u>.303 IMG Tracer</u>											
With Gun	525	-	75	-	(900)	-	2,700	-	3,300	-	-
Coy Reserve	-	315	-	45	-	(540)	-	1620	-	1980	-
One 2nd Line	-	700	-	100	-	(1200)	-	3600	-	4400	-
										6380	9,680
<u>.303 M1G Ball</u>											
With Gun	-	-	28000	-	(7000)	-	21000	-	49000	-	-
Coy Reserve	-	-	-	52000	-	(13000)	-	39000	-	91000	-
One 2nd Line	-	-	-	24000	-	(6000)	-	18000	-	42000	-
										133,000	182,000
<u>.303 M1G Tracer</u>											
With Gun	-	-	5600	-	(700)	-	2100	-	7700	-	-
Coy Reserve	-	-	-	10400	-	(1300)	-	3900	-	14300	-
One 2nd Line	-	-	-	4800	-	(600)	-	1800	-	6600	-
										20900	28600
<u>7.62 mm FN Rifle</u>											
On Man	7300	-	700	-	(6400)	-	19200	-	27200	-	-
Coy Reserve	-	14600	-	1400	-	(12800)	-	38400	-	54400	-
One 2nd Line	-	14600	-	1400	-	(12800)	-	38400	-	54400	-
										108800	136000

RESTRICTED

3.

ANNEX "M" TO
ESTABS 35 INF BN

35 INF BN

CONSOLIDATED EQPT TABLE

○ Item	Bn HQ		Armd Car Gp		One Coy Gp		Three Coy Gps		TOTAL ALLOTMENT		GRAND TOTAL
	Combat	Res	Combat	Res	Combat	Res	Combat	Res	Combat	Res	
<u>9 mm Amn Gustaf SMG</u>											
On Man	12096	-	9936	-	(16848)	-	50544	-	72576	-	290304
Coy Reserve	-	12096	-	9936	-	(16848)	-	50544	-	72576	
One 2nd Line	-	24192	-	19872	-	(33696)	-	101088	-	145152	
										217728	
<u>60 mm Mortar</u>											
<u>HE Amn</u>											
With Gun	-	-	-	-	(192)	-	576	-	576	-	1692
Coy Res	-	-	-	-	-	(192)	-	576	-	576	
One 2nd Line	-	-	-	-	-	(180)	-	540	-	540	
										1116	
<u>Smoke Amn</u>											
With Gun	-	-	-	-	(48)	-	144	-	144	-	396
Coy Reserve	-	-	-	-	-	(48)	-	144	-	144	
One 2nd Line	-	-	-	-	-	(36)	-	108	-	108	
										252	
<u>84 mm Atk Rifle</u>											
<u>HEAT</u>											
With Gun	20	-	20	-	(30)	-	90	-	130	-	390
Coy Res	-	20	-	20	-	(30)	-	90	-	130	
One 2nd Line	-	20	-	20	-	(30)	-	90	-	130	
										260	
<u>Energz Atk Grenades</u>											
On Man	-	-	4	-	(34)	-	102	-	106	-	265
Coy Reserve	-	-	-	2	-	(17)	-	51	-	53	
One 2nd Line	-	-	-	4	-	(34)	-	102	-	106	
										159	
<u>No. 36 Grenades</u>											
With Rifle Group	-	-	-	-	(108)	-	324	-	324	-	684
Coy Reserve	-	36	-	-	-	(108)	-	324	-	360	
<u>Smoke Grenades</u>											
Grenade Lachrymatory	-	600	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	600	600
	-	400	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	400	400
<u>Verey Light Pistol</u>											
<u>Cartridges</u>											
<u>Red & Green (each)</u>											
With Man	32	-	36	-	(20)	-	60	-	128	-	256
Coy Reserve	-	32	-	-	-	(20)	-	60	-	128	
<u>Illuminating</u>											
With Man	48	-	54	-	(30)	-	90	-	192	-	384
Coy Reserve	-	48	-	-	-	(30)	-	90	-	192	

REPORTS OF "A" AND "B" COY COMDRS
EVILLE AIRPORT ACTION 26/27 AUGUST 1961

1. "A" COYCAPTURE OF GENDE AT EVILLE AIRPORT 27 AUG.

At approx midnight on Sat 26 Aug I received info that a group of Gend had moved into the Airport. This group did not pass by "A" Coy position and must have moved around by White Piers Cross.

I went to the Airport to investigate and contacted Comdt McMahan OC B Coy who was in command at the Airport. He confirmed that a group estimated at Platoon strength had taken up position on the edge of the runway between the Airport buildings and the Sabena Villas (A Coy) and appeared to be digging in.

This was disquieting news as aircraft with Indian troops were due to commence landing at the Airport very early the next morning. I asked Comdt McMahan to get his Armoured Cars to do a recce and I returned to my HQs and set up Listening Posts around the area suspected to contain this Gend group. I had a tele conversation with Lt. Col McNamee informing him of the situation. B Coy armoured cars reported "all quiet" but my Listening Posts confirmed that digging in was in progress. The digging stopped each time the armoured cars approached and re-commenced again as soon as they had passed.

I recommended to the Bn OC that we should move in and dislodge this group at first light. At approximately 0230 hrs I received orders from Bn OC (Lt Col McNamee) that I was to take command of A and B Coys and move in and capture the Gend positions at first light.

At about 0300 hours I again went to the Airport and discussed plans with Comdt McMahan. Plan was as follows:-

- (a) No 1 Platoon of A Coy to set up road block on main road from Eville to prevent reinforcement from City.
- (b) No 2 Platoon A Coy with MMG section to surround Gen Position from rear in order to prevent escape and also to prevent reinforcements from direction White Pier Cross.
- (c) A Coy HQs personnel to hold Sabena villas and the cross-roads leading from Gend range to Airport to prevent reinforcements or escape in that direction.
- (d) B Coy with 2 Platoons supported by Armoured Cars to move from Airport and take Gend position.
- (e) Only minimum force to be used. Fire not to be opened unless necessary in self-defence.
- (f) Mike Nolan, Interpreter, to go with B Coy and call on the Gend to surrender.

I again went to the Airport at 0540 hours to ensure final co-ordination of A and B Coy Plan. Operation was executed exactly as planned and at 0600 hrs the position was taken.

Gend strength 40. The two white officers surrendered and were disarmed by B Coy. We found two Mortars mounted with shells fused and laid out beside the Mortars, ready to fire. Two MGs were loaded and trained on the Runways. All Gend personnel were captured with rifles, which were loaded. Their Wireless set was in contact with the Gend HQs in Eville.

We later got instructions to release the Gend but the two white officers were held prisoners and sent by plane to Kamina later that day.

Major Mathys, Belgian Intelligence Officer, and No 1 on our list to be captured in Operation "Rum Punch" was arrested by Lt. Leech at the road block on this morning while attempting to reach the Gend at the Airport. We got orders to release him later as his arrest at this stage might jeopardise Operation "Rum Punch". As far as I am aware he was not found again and evaded arrest in Operation "Rum Punch".

2. "B" COY.

24.8.61

Hostility against UN was building up - leaflets were being dropped in Coy area. The situation at the airport was

UN: B Coy 35 Inf Irish Bn. with 1 Sec Armd Car.

Katanganese: Approx 24 Police on duty, more or less duplicating our sentries. These police carried Lee Enfield Rifles but were NOT very well trained. By persuasion tact and firmness we kept them on our side and we frequently inspected their rifles to ensure they were unloaded.

Air Katanga: Guarded by approx one pl of Gendarmerie armed with F.N. Rifles, well trained and disciplined. We found it impossible to exercise any control or influence over them. In Air Katanga there were two jet planes, crews and maintenance staff.

24.8.61 (contd).

UN Aircraft were now ferrying in Indian troops and mov of Katanganese soldiers was also taking place. B Coy exercised general control over the mov of civilian aircraft through the good offices of the Airport Manager, Mr. DeDeacon whose courtesy, efficiency and gentlemanly behaviour will long be remembered by our officers. He was reported killed in subsequent fighting.

26.8.61

Obvious hostility was now evident against UN. Movement of Gendarmerie intensified during the day leaflets denouncing UN were dropped by cars through the Coy area.

2100 HRS 26.8.61

Sentries reported that Gendarmerie in 3 trucks were moving into area already held by their guard in Air Katanga area. Company stood to, it was obvious the Gendarmerie were establishing new posts. Recce discovered a gendarmerie position in the vicinity of the main runway. They were approx 50 strong and digging in.

0130 hrs 27.8.61

Messages received from OC A Coy 35 Bn.

Orders from OC 35 Bn. B Coy will attack Gendarmerie position at first light.

A Coy will co-ordinate by establishing road blocks on the approaches to the Airport.

0500 hrs

I made a detailed recce, made a plan and issued orders.

0630 hrs

B Coy attacked as ordered capturing, 2 white officers, 42 o/ranks Congolese.

Wpn SMG, FN Rifle, Mortars.

There were NO troops other than pers of B Coy and armd car section present during the operation. The Congolese were released and the white officers flown out. The company was congratulated on its action by:-

OIC Sect B	- Col Waern
OIC Katanga Command	- Gen Raja.
UN Civilian Representative	- Dr.Cruise O'Brien
OIC 35 Irish Bn	- Lt.Col. McNamee.

NOMINAL ROLL - 35 IRISH BN

<u>Regt. No.</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Coy</u>	<u>Parent Unit</u>
0.4487	Lt Col	MacNeill, O.J.	Bn HQ	AHQ
0.5162	Lt Col	McNamee, H.	Bn HQ	Mil Col
0.45266	Comdt	Barry, P.J.	HQ	10 Bn
0.5131	Comdt	Barrett, J.J.	Bn HQ	D/Cav attd Mil Col
0.4773	Comdt	Cahalane, P.	AC Gp	AHQ
0.7529	A/Comdt	Clune, J.P.M.	A	2 H ^o Coy AMC
0.5135	Comdt	Condon, E.	Bn HQ	Mil Col
0.7693	Comdt	Conroy, A.F.	HQ	4 H/Coy AMC
0.4933	Comdt	Kane, J.P.	Bn HQ	5 F/R
0.5037	Comdt	Moynihan, T.	HQ	D/AOC
0.5383	Comdt	McGoldrick, J.C.	C	1 H/Coy AMC
0.4972	Comdt	McMahon, J.A.	B	11. Bn
0.6183	A/Comdt	O'Shea, T.	Bn HQ	AHQ
0.6745	Comdt	O'Shea, H.P.J.	B	D/AMC
0.4979	Comdt	O'Neill, T.	C	D/MPC
0.5311	Comdt	O'Toole, L.	HQ	1 H/Coy AMC
0.5176	Comdt	Quinlan, P.S.	A	HQ W/Comd
0.4991	Comdt	Wheatley, J.P.	Bn HQ	1 Bde HQ
	Rev,Fr.	Clarke, T.J.	Bn HQ	Air Corps
	Rev.Fr.	Fagan, J.	Bn HQ	Air Corps
0.7102	Capt	Byrne, D.	A	1 Bn
0.7371	Capt	Carroll, M.A.M.	AC Gp	D/Cav
0.7466	Capt	Condon, S.B.	B	1 FAR
0.7440	Capt	Donnolly, W.G.	A	5 FAR
0.7346	Capt	Doolan, S.	A	AHQ
0.7272	Capt	Gregan, R.L.	C	HQ CTC
0.6397	Comdt	Heffernan, M.	B	Civ Def HQ S/Comd
0.7295	Capt	Hennesy, J.	AC Gp	1 M/Sqn
0.6857	Capt	Kavanagh, P.D.	C	D/Arty
0.7477	Capt	Keegan, R.J.	C	GTD CTC
0.7360	Capt	Lawless, F.A.	AC Gp	D/Cav
0.7273	Capt	Malinn, M.G.	HQ	2 F/Sig Coy
0.6719	Capt	McCartney, K.	A	4 FAR
0.7422	Capt	McCorley, R.	C	1 A/Sqn
0.6510	Capt	Magennis, A.J.	AC Gp	1 A/Sqn
0.4874	Capt	McGuinn, T.E.	A	1 Bn
0.6787	Capt	McKeever, T.	HQ	AHQ
0.7516	Capt	McQuillan, C.J.	B	CTD S/Comd
0.7048	Capt	O'Halloran, K.	HQ	1 A. Regt
0.5951	Capt	O'Connell, J.F.	B	HQ S/Comd
0.7406	Capt	Parker, J.	HQ	Mil Coll /over...

<u>Regt.No.</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Coy</u>	<u>Parent Unit</u>
0.7280	Capt	Purfield, M.	HQ	2 G/Coy S&T
0.6867	Capt	Stewart, P.J.	Bn HQ	AHQ
0.7410	Capt	Walsh, P.L.	Bn HQ	AHQ
0.7444	Capt	Hyte, E.F.	HQ	AHQ
0.7767	Lt	Carey, W.N.	A	17 Bn
0.7584	Lt	Considine, M.M.G.	AC Gp	Gen List Cav
0.7759	Lt	Farrell, J.J.	B	attd. 1 A/Sqn 4 Bn
0.7645	Lt	Knightley, K.P.	AC Gp	2 M/Sqn
0.7639	Lt	Leech, J.A.C.	A	6 Bn
0.7849	Lt	Madigan, C.	C	3 Bn
0.7551	Lt	Maguire, C.B.	B	HQ S/Comd FCA
0.7523	Lt	McPeake, J.P.	HQ	1 F/Coy S&T
0.7625	Lt	Purcell, J.P.	HQ	1 F/Sigs
0.7668	Lt	Quinlan, T.	A	18 Bn
0.7553	Lt	Ryan, T.F.	C	D/AMC
0.7719	Lt	Shannon, M.D.	B	1 FAR
0.7667	Lt	O'Shea, M.T.	C	Mil Col
61444	BSM	Harlin, J.	Bn HQ	2 Bn
77627	BQMS	Linnane, F.	HQ	Mil Col
204521	A/BQMS	Harrington, J.C.	HQ	23 Bn
415646	C/S	Carroll, D.	AC Gp	1 M/Sqn
82108	A/C/S	Condon, D.	B	4 Bn
89937	C/S	Gallagher, J.	HQ	2 F/Sigs
74028	C/S	McGlynn, P.	C	3 Bn
83810	C/S	O'Hanlon, P.	HQ	4 H/Coy AMC
91189	C/S	O'Sullivan, M.	HQ	D/Cav
73505	C/S	Prendergast, J.	A	6 Bn
425405	CQMS	Coyle, C.	HQ	14 Bn
82454	CQMS	Dempsey, D.	HQ	GT Depot
99093	A/CQMS	Hamill, J.	AC Gp	4 M/Sqn
87688	A/CQMS	Dignam, P.	HQ	1 Tk Sqn
77482	CQMS	Finnegan, J.	HQ	D/COE
80585	CQMS	Murphy, T.	C	3 Bn
113181	CQMS	Neville, P.	A	6 Bn
46176	A/CQMS	Walsh, J.	B	4 Bn
200920	Sgt	Ambrose, M.		GT Depot
92597	Sgt	Reehan, J.	C	
99696	Sgt	Canavan, F.	C	1 AA Regt
96798	Sgt	Carey, T.	AC Gp	1 M/Sqn
88438	Sgt	Collopy, J.	HQ	3 F/Coy S&T
806778	Sgt	Cuffe, G.	A	CTD W/Comd
95829	A/Sgt	Curran, M.	HQ	2 M/Sqn

/over....

<u>Unit No.</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Parent Unit</u>
81366	Sgt	Dillon, T.	HQ	McKee Bks Coy
408327	Sgt	Dixon, H.	A	11 F/Amb Coy AMC
83290	Sgt	Feehan, M.	B	CTD S/Comd
80808	Sgt	Flynn, J.	AC Gp	1 M/Sqn
75881	Sgt	Gallagher, J.	B	D/AMC
95750	Sgt	Gaynor, W.	HQ	4 G/Coy AOC
96145	Sgt	Gearey, C.	AC Gp	4 M/Sqn
87211	Sgt	Gilsenan, F.	A	4 G/Coy AOC
804513	A/Sgt	Guckian, P.	HQ	D/Sigs
92195	Sgt	Hamill, M.	HQ	D/Sigs
75746	Sgt	Hartley, W.	AC Gp	D/Cav
801545	Sgt	Hegarty, N.	A	1 Bn
88021	Sgt	Hughes, T.	HQ	Mil Col
74018	Sgt	Johnstone, P.	HQ	4 G/Coy MPC
74802	Sgt	Joyce, P.	A	6 Bn
422939	Sgt	Judge, M.	HQ	6 Bn
425316	Sgt	Kelly, B.	HQ	HQ W/Comd
425402	Sgt	Kelly, T.	A	6 Bn
802841	A/Sgt	Kent, G.	B	4 Bn
96267	Sgt	Keogh, E.	AC Gp	4 M/Sqn
84466	Sgt	Kiernan, P.	HQ	4 G/Coy S&T
90859	Sgt	Leahy, M.	B	4 Bn
415593	Sgt	Lucey, J.	B	1 FAR
87770	Sgt	Macauley, W.J.	HQ	D/MPC
81799	A/Sgt	Mulryan, E.	HQ	3 G/Coy S&T
86755	Sgt	Maher, M.	B	CTD S/Comd
94808	Sgt	Monaghan, J.	A	6 Bn
91764	A/Sgt	Monaghan, P.	HQ	2 G/Coy AOC
435980	Sgt	Morris, D.	AC Gp	1 M/Sqn
200386	Sgt	McCabe, M.	A	6 Bn
80804	Sgt	McDermott, C.	HQ	D/MPC
86758	Sgt	McDonald, M.	HQ	McKee Bks Coy
87230	Sgt	McLoughlin, K.	A	4 F/Coy COE
417157	Sgt	McMahon, J.	B	4 Bn
87182	Sgt	Norris, P.	HQ	2 Bn
94169	Sgt	O'Byrne, S.	HQ	D/COE
89436	Sgt	O'Driscoll, J.	C	3 Bn
88525	Sgt	O'Neill, S.	C	3 Bn
86682	A/Sgt	O'Reilly, J.	HQ	4 F/Coy COE
94557	Sgt	O'Sullivan, W.	H	4 Bn
802913	Sgt.	O'Sullivan, J.	B	1 F/Sigs
89948	Sgt	Palmer, J.	HQ	Air Corps
805649	Sgt	Rea, J.	A	1 Bn
810232	A/Sgt	Rowland, M.	AC Gp	1 M/Sqn /over...

<u>Regt.No.</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Coy</u>	<u>Parent Unit</u>
407788	Sgt	Sheridan, T.	HQ	D/Cav
88010	Sgt	Shannon, S.	C	GT Depot
92754	Sgt	Shaughnessy, G.	C	4 M/Sqn
88069	Sgt	Smart, P.	HQ	D/AOC
86861	Sgt	Smith, M.	C	GT Depot
90244	Sgt	Tiernan, G.	A	19 Bn
83217	Sgt	Tobin, P.	HQ	3 Bn
90326	Sgt	Walsh, M.	HQ	1 G/Coy AOC
99377	Sgt	Woods, P.	B	CTD S/Comd
810497	Cpl	Aldridge, W.	C	3 Bn
81154	Cpl	Allen, W.	A	4 F&R
803966	Cpl.	Barnby, G.	C	D/MPC
91695	A/Cpl	Bowe, M.	B	3 G/Coy S&T
806567	Cpl	Bolger, T.	C	GT Depot
804636	Cpl	Bradley, V.	C	D/Cav
805626	Cpl	Broderick, J.	C	GT Depot
807525	Cpl	Brannigan, B.	C	16 Bn
810589	Cpl	Burke, P.		1 Bn
98164	Cpl	Brennan, J.P.	HQ	D/MPC
807825	Cpl	Carey, J.	B	1 M/Sqn
800382	Cpl	Cotter, G.J.	B	23 Bn
93442	Cpl	Cahill, S.	AC Gp	Depot Cav
808659	Cpl	Cahill, P.	B	4 Bn
809707	Cpl	Crowley, B.	HQ	4 Bn
95153	Cpl	Coughlan, J.	HQ	Depot S&T
805847	Cpl	Coughlan, J.	HQ	4 F/Sigs
88965	Cpl	Cronin, W.	HQ	20 Bn
92547	Cpl	Carrick, N.	HQ	1 H/Coy AMC
89932	Cpl	Carroll, W.	C	GT Depot
407112	Cpl	Casserly, J.	C	Mil Col
807672	Cpl	Conroy, P.	C	D/COE
808385	Cpl	Conway, M.	C	3 Bn
809184	Cpl	Cullinane, J.	B	4 Bn
806850	Cpl	Colclough, L.	C	3 Bn
807244	Cpl	Daly, M.	HQ	4 G/Coy MPC
91387	Cpl	Digan, T.	HQ	4 G/Coy MPC
804685	A/Cpl	Dunne, M.	HQ	2 G/Coy AOC
97855	Cpl	Dempsey, J.	A	19 Bn
804192	Cpl	Devine, J.	A	6 Bn
805100	Cpl	Donnolly, J.	A	17 Bn
810024	Cpl	Dowling, M.	C	3 Bn
808593	Cpl	Doyle, J.	C	1 M/Sqn
206726	Cpl	Duffy, P.	A	2 H/Coy AMC

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<u>Regt.No.</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Coy</u>	<u>Parent Unit</u>
809454	Cpl	Deegan, R.	C	1 Tk Sqn
97518	Cpl	Donnolly, P.	C	3 Bn
806157	Cpl	Fogarty, F.	HQ	Depot S&T
81399	Cpl	Fleming, J.	HQ	D/MPC
803386	Cpl	Fleming, T.J.	HQ	4 F/Sigs
810428	Cpl	Foley, J.	A	1 Bn
92122	Cpl	Foster, J.	A	4 G/Coy MPC
96723	Cpl	Flynn, S.	C	1 H/Coy AMC
806303	Cpl	Geary, M.	B	4 Bn
91803	Cpl	Gibney, E.	HQ	4 G/Coy MPC
809449	Cpl	Ginty, J.	AC Gp	6 Bn
436149	Cpl	Ging, J.	C	3 Bn
415841	A/Cpl	Guerin, J.	B	4 Bn
809628	A/Cpl	Hall, J.	HQ	D/AOC
74801	Cpl	Hanley, E.	HQ	D/Sigs
96966	Cpl	Hegarty, J.	HQ	5 Bn
69438	Cpl	Higgins, J.	B	1 F/Sigs
91183	Cpl	Holbrook, P.	AC Gp	D/Cav
85331	Cpl	Ivers, R.	HQ	11 Col
805208	Cpl	Joyce, J.	C	Depot Cav
99003	Cpl	Kerr, J.	A	19 Bn
809356	Cpl	Kent, P.	B	4 Bn
805189	Cpl	Kenneally, T.	B	4 Bn
409975	Cpl	Kavanagh, P.	HQ	D/MPC
805463	Cpl	Kavanagh, J.	B	1 F/Coy COE
810617	Cpl	Keane, J.	HQ	4 G/Coy MPC
78732	Cpl	Kelly, P.	C	1 F/Coy Sigs
806088	Cpl	Kilty, M.	C	3 Bn
805589	Cpl	Laffere, B.	A	16 Bn
92587	Cpl	Lawlor, J.	HQ	3 Bn
425332	Cpl	Lynch, M.	A	6 Bn
810033	Cpl	Lyons, P.	C	3 Bn
808502	Cpl	Loughman, J.	C	3 Bn
809447	Cpl	Lysaght, M.	C	1 Tk Sqn
804723	A/Cpl	Lucey, J.	AC Gp	D/Cav
78605	Cpl	Myler, T.	B	3 G/Coy S&T
202577	Cpl	Murphy, S.	B	13 Bn
809333	Cpl	Murphy, W.	C	GTD
809281	Cpl	Moss, P.J.	C	XXSXXX 11 Bn
808727	Cpl	Mason, J.	C	1 A/Sqn
82357	Cpl	Mockler, T.	B	1 M/Sqn
79257	Cpl	Mulryan, J.	HQ	4 G/Coy MPC
805223	Cpl	Moore, T.	C	3 Bn

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<u>Regt.No.</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Com</u>	<u>Parent Unit</u>
802951	Cpl	Allen, M.	A	18 Bn
84197	Cpl	McAnaney, J.	A	4 F/Coy S&T
90926	Cpl	McArdle, J.	A	16 Bn
88618	Cpl	McEntee, J.	A	4 F/Coy S&T
803670	Cpl	McDonnell, P.	HQ	HQ B/Comd
805846	Cpl	McDermott, J.	HQ	4 F/Coy COE
94809	Cpl	McDonnell, T.	A	6 Bn
98807	Cpl	McDonagh, S.	A	1 Bn
98955	Cpl	McNamee, G.	A	4 F/Coy S&T
96739	Cpl	McManus, J.	A	4 G/Coy MPC
804396	Cpl	Nolan, E.	AC Gp	1 A/Sqn
806566	Cpl	Nolan, M.	AC Gp	1 Tk Sqn (Deceased)
808384	Cpl	O'Hara, J.	C	3 Bn
808505	Cpl	O'Rourke, D.	C	3 Bn
89748	Cpl	O'Brien, J.	A	4 G/Coy S&T
94823	Cpl	O'Callaghan, P.	A	McKee Bks Coy
91440	Cpl	O'Connor, M.	A	4 F/Coy Sigs
807146	Cpl	O'Connor, T.	AC Gp	1 A/Sqn
805191	Cpl	O'Sullivan, E.J.	B	4 Bn
807233	A/Cpl	O'Sullivan, D.	HQ	4 Bn
808332	Cpl	O'Regan, P.	B	4 Bn
808159	Cpl	O'Connor, J.	B	Depot S&T
99139	A/Cpl	O'Neill, R.	B	1 F/Coy S&T
805950	A/Cpl	O'Carroll, J.	HQ	2 F/Coy COE
805716	Cpl	O'Brien, T.	AC Gp	4 F/Sqn
805148	A/Cpl	O'Connor, J.J.	AC Gp	1 F/Sqn
809311	Cpl	Power, P.	B	1 F/Sqn
800840	A/Cpl	Power, M.	B	4 Bn
809355	Cpl	Parker, M.	B	4 Bn
810264	Cpl	Quinn, T.	A	1 Bn
808262	Cpl	Rhatigan, P.	A	4 G/Coy AOC
804139	A/Cpl	Rowe, A.	HQ	4 G/Coy AOC
94780	Cpl	Roche, P.	B	4 Bn
88569	Cpl	Rothe, C.	A	CTD W/Comd
87715	Cpl	Relihan, J.	A	4 G/Coy MPC
810244	Cpl	Smith, M.	A	4 G/Coy S&T
807250	Cpl	Sharpe, E.	B	4 Bn
810740	Cpl	Shinkwin, J.	B	CTD S/Comd
802515	Cpl	Sisk, W.	B	CTD S/Comd
804927	Cpl	Sheridan, T.	HQ	4 H/Coy AMC
91467	Cpl	Shine, D.	C	D/Sigs
810383	Cpl	Tiernan, S.	A	1 Bn
97457	Cpl	Wall, J.	B	1 F/Coy COE
806871	Cpl	Weston, M.	B	12 Bn

<u>Regt.No.</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Coy</u>	<u>Parent Unit</u>
805446	Cpl	Whelan, W.	B	CTD S/Comd
96639	Cpl	Williams, B.	HQ	3 Bn
77210	Cpl	Williams, F.	A	2 F/Coy Sigs
417782	Cpl	White, P.	AC Gp	1 M/Sqn
809021	Pte	Aherne, N.	B	4 Bn
811245	Pte	Aherne, M.	B	1 FAR
809724	Pte	Bergin, P.	C	Depot COE
804697	Pte	Brennan, J.	HQ	4 F/Coy COE
804696	Pte	Boland, P.F.	HQ	Depot COE
802907	Pte	Barry, D.	HQ	1 M/Sqn
805919	Pte	Byrne, P.	HQ	2 F/Coy COE
811080	Pte	Byrne, G.	HQ	2 Inf Bn
800000	Pte	Byrne, J.	A	2 H/Coy AMC
808925	Pte	Byrne, J.	AC Gp	4 M/Sqn
809947	Pte	Bradley, R.	A	6 Bn
810792	Pte	Bracken, J.	A	6 Bn
809683	Pte	Brennan, M.G.	A	6 Bn
807964	Pte	Broderick, J.	A	HQ W/Comd
809853	Pte	Battles, G.	A	4 F/Coy COE
808554	Pte	Boland, F.L.	A	6 Bn
810944	Pte	Broderick, M.	A	4 F/Coy S&T
94334	Pte	Browne, E.	B	3 G/Coy S&T
808309	Pte	Bowler, M.	B	3 G/Coy S&T
806825	Pte	Boland, D.	B	4 Inf Bn
809495	Pte	Boland, J.J.	B	4 Inf Bn
93924	Pte	Bennett, T.	B	3 G/Coy AOC
803355	Pte	Brennan, M.	B	4 Inf Bn
808061	Pte	Buckley, T.	B	4 Inf Bn
804535	Pte	Byrne, T.	C	Depot COE
808921	Pte	Browne, W.	C	3 Bn
810601	Pte	Brennan, J.	C	Depot Sigs
807154	Pte	Baird, J.	C	4 M/Sqn
809536	Pte	Bolger, T.	C	1 Tk Sqn
810128	Pte	Burke, J.	C	Depot COE
811224	Pte	Bennett, K.	C	3 Bn
810297	Pte	Barry, W.	C	3 Bn
810298	Pte	Breen, J.	C	3 Bn
810322	Pte	Byrne, P.	C	3 Bn
810111	Pte	Byrne, M.	C	3 Bn
808774	Pte	Bolger, P.	AC Gp	1 A/Sqn
93482	Pte	Boyce M.	AC Gp	1 M/Sqn
810374	Pte	Cush, J.	HQ	HQ, E/Comd
806341	Pte	Cusack, T.	HQ	3 G/Coy S&T
807391	Pte	Cronin, O.	HQ	Depot S&T /over...

<u>Regt.No.</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Coy</u>	<u>Parent Unit</u>
809376	Pte	Crowley, T.	HQ	2 M/Sqn
808432	Pte	Collins, J.	HQ	4 Bn
807986	Pte	Connor, J.	HQ	4 Bn
810219	Pte	Cooley, G.	A	1 Bn
808073	Pte	Cunningham, T.	A	4 FAR
803881	Pte	Conlon, P.	A	4 F/Coy COE
94301	Pte	Connolly, D.	A	4 F/Coy COE
810003	Pte	Cleary, J.	A	4 G/Coy S&T
808910	Pte	Conway, J.	A	4 F/Coy COE
81335	Pte	Corbett, J.	B	3 H/Coy AMC
808620	Pte	Chambers, M.	B	4 Inf Bn
93238	Pte	Corbett, A.	B	CTD S/Comd
810238	Pte	Clery, G.	B	1 F/Coy Sigs
805260	Pte	Cronin, F.	B	4 Inf Bn
810783	Pte	Caball, J.A.	B	4 Inf Bn
811317	Pte	Cassidy, H.	B	1 FAR
809472	Pte	Casey, W.	B	1 FAR
807759	Pte	Connolly, J.	B	4 Inf Bn
810621	Pte	Cremin, M.	B	4 Inf Bn
806211	Pte	Cambridge, J.	B	3 G/Coy S&T
811011	Pte	Cassidy, C.	B	4 Inf Bn
806854	Pte	Connolly, J.	C	3 Bn
88044	Pte	Cuddy, M.	C	GT Depot
809230	Pte	Costello, A.	C	1 AA Regt
810169	Pte	Cosgrove, P.	C	1 F/Sigs
808377	Pte	Cooney, D.	C	3 Bn
808228	Pte	Coogan, S.	C	3 Bn
810330	Pte	Casey, P.	C	GT D
803530	Pte	Clancy, D.	AC Gp	1 M/Sqn
810786	Pte	Collins, M.	AC Gp	1 M/Sqn
802670	Pte	Doyle, R.	HQ	2 G/Coy S&T
810800	Pte	Dreelan, J.	A	1 H/Coy AMC
85058	Pte	Duff, J.	A	4 FAR
435951	Pte	Dell, A.	A	4 G/Coy S&T
808510	Pte	Doyle, M.	A	Depot AMC
809805	Pte	Delaney, P.	A	4 F/Coy Sigs
809015	Pte	Dykes, A.	A	6 Bn
810006	Pte	Donnolly, P.	A	4 F/Coy S&T
806875	Pte	Deegan, W.	A	4 F/Coy S&T
807893	Pte	Duffey, W.	A	4 G/Coy AOC
811090	Pte	Dunleavy, P.	A	4 F/Coy S&T
808174	Pte	Dowler, J.	A	4 G/Coy AOC
810594	Pte	Delaney, J.	B	3 H/Coy AMC

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<u>Regt.No.</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Coy</u>	<u>Parent Unit</u>
804624	Pte	Dwyer, K.	B	Depot Sigs
809780	Pte	Dineen, J.	B	CTD S/Comd
810956	Pte	Drought, R.	B	4 Bn
803589	Pte	Doyle, J.	C	3 Bn
808504	Pte	Donohue, E.	C	3 Bn
808031	Pte	Doyle, J.	C	Depot Sigs
805165	Pte	Duffy, E.	C	Depot Arty
809071	Pte	Deveraux, P.	C	1 AA Regt
807548	Pte	Donohue, P.	C	1 AA Regt
807577	Pte	Dolan, J.	C	1 A/Sqn
810097	Pte	Dempsey, P.	C	3 Bn
810307	Pte	Davis, T.	C	3 Bn
810806	Pte	Dowling, J.	C	1 H/Coy AMC
809827	Pte	Darby, M.	C	Depot Sigs
78361	Pte	Doolan, C.	C	3 Bn
808403	Pte	Dreeling, P.	C	3 Bn
803541	Pte	Dingley, M.	C	3 Bn
808220	Pte	Daly, T.	C	3 Bn
808227	Pte	Deegan, B.	C	3 Bn
810504	Pte	Dunne, M.	C	Depot Sigs
810894	Pte	Earle, A.	B	4 Bn
805715	Pte	Ellard, L.	C	4 M/Sqn
809553	Pte	Egan, P.	C	1 T/Sqn
805929	Pte	Farry, P.	HQ	4 F/Coy COE
310103	Pte	Flynn, C.	HQ	3 Bn
809535	Pte	Foley, D.	HQ	4 Bn
810761	Pte	Fitzsimons, S.	H.	2 F/Coy Sigs.
810805	Pte	Fitzpatrick, W.	HQ	1 H/Coy AMC
804799	Pte	Flanagan, P.	HQ	2 G/Coy S&T
810143	Pte	Flynn, T.	A	1 Bn
809084	Pte	Feery, J.	A	6 Bn
807245	Pte	Flynn, J.	A	4 G/Coy AOC
810794	Pte	Finlass, S.	A	6 Bn
809977	Pte	Flynn, J.	A	4 FAR
210199	Pte	Flaherty, D.	A	17 Bn
810656	Pte	Farrell, M.	A	6 Bn
807905	Pte	Freyne, D.T.	B	4 Bn
809394	Pte	Fitzgerald, W.	B	4 Bn
98634	Pte	France, A.	C	3 Bn
808757	Pte	Fitzpatrick, J.	C	HQ CTC
809219	Pte	Fortune, D.	C	1 AA Regt
810812	Pte	French, P.	C	GTD CTC
804644	Pte	Furlong, J.	C	4 M/Sqn
808152	Pte	Foley, P.	C	D/Cavalry /over...

<u>Regt No.</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Coy</u>	<u>Parent Unit</u>
810098	Pte	Furlong, A.	C	3 Bn
807160	Pte	Featherston, S.	AC Gp	4 H/Sqn
811355	Pte	Griffen, A.	C	Dep S&T
810809	Pte	Gaffney, P.	C	1 H/Coy AOC
800068	Pte	Gunn, T.	A	4 F/Coy S&T
809687	Pte	Galvin, G.	A	4 F/Coy COE
810576	Pte	Graham, N.	A	4 F/Coy S&T
808114	Pte	Gorale, B.	A	6 Bn
809362	Pte	Gorman, J.	A	6 Bn
206011	Pte	Guldea, P.	A	6 Bn
809385	Pte	Greene, M.	A	4 G/Coy AOC
810841	Pte	Gavin, P.	A	1 Bn
806057	Pte	Glennon, S.	A	1 Bn
811097	Pte	Graham, J.	B	4 Bn
803967	Pte	Grace, P.	B	4 Bn
809435	Pte	Gleeson, T.	B	12 Bn
807615	Pte	Grace, J.	C	3 Bn
807013	Pte	Glasheen, S.	C	GTD CTC
809735	Pte	Grant, P.	C	Dep COE
88713	Pte	Gaynor, J.	C	Mil College
808594	Pte	Gaffney, E.	C	1 A/Sqn (Deceased)
804714	Pte	Gaffney, L.	HQ	Dep COE
807675	Pte	Hackett, B.	C	Dep COE
805936	Pte	Higgins, J.	HQ	4 F/Sigs
809692	Pte	Hegarty, J.	A	4 G/Coy S&T
809337	Pte	Hannigan, W.	A	1 F/Sigs
808424	Pte	Harber, J.	A	4 F/Coy S&T
810793	Pte	Harkin, D.	A	6 Bn
810140	Pte	Hogan, T.	A	4 F/Coy Sigs
95011	Pte	Heffernan, .	A	4 FA leg
809650	Pte	Hennelly, G.	A	4 F/Coy COE
809388	Pte	Hegarty, D.	A	4 F/Coy S&T
810213	Pte	Hegarty, H.	A	4 F/Coy Sigs
807860	Pte	Hogan, P.	A	6 Bn
808556	Pte	Hughes, W.	A	6 Bn
810742	Pte	Hynes, .	B	3 H/Coy AMC
810292	Pte	Hannigan, R.	B	4 Bn
803123	Pt	Horgan, D.	B	4 Bn
809292	Pte	Hoare, J.	B	4 Bn
803627	Pte	Hogan, J.	B	4 Bn
9229	Pte	Hayes, P.	B	4 Bn
890	Pte	Hickey, J.	B	1 F/Coy COE
5	Pte	Hoare, B.	B	4 Bn

<u>Regt.No.</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Coy</u>	<u>Part. Unit</u>
809493	Pte	Hurley, T.	B	4 Bn
809930	Pte	Hurley, J.	C	1 F/Coy Sigs
810027	Pte	Hynes, J.	C	3 Bn
810129	Pte	Hurley, W.	C	GTD CTC
810121	Pte	Houlinan, J.	C	3 Bn
811232	Pte	Hackett, T.	C	3 Bn
808239	Pte	Harris, J.	AC Gp	1 M/Sqn
808232	Pte	Jordan, G.	C	3 Bn
810626	Pte	Keegan, J.	HQ	4 F/Coy COE
808532	Pte	Keane, J.	A	6 Bn
807961	Pte	Levanagh, S.	A	1 F/Coy Sigs
810416	Pte	Kelly, J.	B	CD Arty
809379	Pte	Kelly, M.A.	B	4 Bn
808225	Pte	King, P.	C	3 Bn
807173	Pte	Kenny, A.	C	4 M/Sqn
807143	Pte	Lally, T.	C	1 M/Sqn
806672	Pte	Kenny, C.	C	HQ CTC
806038	Pte	Lally, J.	C	Mil College
805587	Pte	Kenny, J.	C	3 Bn
808602	Pte	Keegan, D.	AC Gp	1 M/Sqn
801691	Pte	Lynch, G.	H.	2 M/Sqn
808009	Pte	Lynch, J.	H	4 Bn
809016	Pte	Larkin, R.	A	6 Bn
808976	Pte	Larkin, T.	A	4 F/Coy S&T
808049	Pte	Lynch, K.	A	4 G/Coy ACC
808983	Pte	Lowe, T.	B	4 Bn
811440	Pte	Lawlor, J.	B	CTD B/Comd
808686	Pte	Leahy, J.G.	B	1 F/Coy Sigs
801189	Pte	Leacy, T.	C	1 H/Coy AFC
810335	Pte	Lawlor, P.	C	GTD CTC
810126	Pte	Lennon, J.	C	GTD CTC
810807	Pte	Leahy, P.	C	GTD CTC
809332	Pte	Larkin, T.	C	1 Tank Sqn
811231	Pte	Lynch, P.	C	3 Bn
803156	Pte	Lynch, P.	AC Gp	4 M/Sqn
96797	Pte	Llewellyn, J.	AC Gp	1 M/Sqn
94217	Pte	Llewellyn, J.	H.	1 M/Sqn
810537	Pte	Leahy, J.P.	B	3 G/Coy S&T
810895	Pte	Linehan, M.	B	4 Bn
805416	Pte	Mooney, D.	H.	McKee Bks Coy
807728	Pte	Martin, J.A.	H.	2 Bn
804128	Pte	Murphy, J.	H.	4 Bn
803983	Pte	Murphy, P.	H.	Dep S&T

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<u>Regt. No.</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Coy</u>	<u>Parent Unit</u>
810127	Pte	Maner, .	A	Dep A/C
421445	Pte	Murray, J.	A	4 FA Regt
84030	Pte	Waller, J.	A	6 Bn
809349	Pte	Manley, D.	A	6 Bn
810946	Pte	Maloney, J.	A	6 Bn
808092	Pte	Meyley, J.	A	4 F/Coy Sigs
810865	Pte	Malone, F.	A	4 F/Coy COE
811272	Pte	Manning, J.	A	6 Bn
809854	Pte	Molloy, D.	A	6 Bn
808743	Pte	Donaghan, P.	A	6 Bn
810291	Pte	Maher, E.	A	4 Bn
810867	Pte	Moloney, M.	B	1 F/Coy COE
809415	Pte	Milner, C.	B	4 Bn
810697	Pte	Mangan, P.	B	HQ S/Comd
811285	Pte	Murphy, P.	B	1 FA Regt
809421	Pte	Murphy, P.	B	1 FA Regt
806862	Pte	Murphy, J.J.	B	4 Bn
810838	Pte	Maguire, J.	B	12 Bn
810813	Pte	Moran, M.	C	1 H/Coy AMB
811195	Pte	Murphy, F.	C	2 F/Coy Sigs
808030	Pte	Murphy, T.	C	GTD CTC
811336	Pte	Murphy, J.	C	3 Bn
811230	Pte	Murphy, T.	C	3 Bn
808404	Pte	Mulpeter, W.	C	3 Bn
809329	Pte	Moriarty, P.	C	HQ CTC
808394	Pte	Molloy, P.	C	3 Bn
805399	Pte	Moules, H.	C	Mil College
809444	Pte	Mahon, K.	C	GTD CTC
808511	Pte	Maher, W.	AC Gp	1 A/sqn
810552	Pte	Mullins, P.	AC Gp	1 A/sqn (Deceased)
806884	Pte	Murphy, P.	AC Gp	1 Tank sqn
87185	Pte	Mallon, C.	AC Gp	1 A/sqn
98083	Pte	McEvelly, J.	HQ	4 F/Coy COE
808946	Pte	McLoughlin, M.	HQ	4 Bn
805948	Pte	McMahon, J.	HQ	4 F/Coy S&T
810000	Pte	McDermott, W.	A	4 G/Coy S&T
88511	Pte	McCormick, .	A	5 Bn
87480	Pte	McErney, A.	A	6 Bn
808201	Pte	McManus, F.	A	4 G/Coy AOC
806370	Pte	McGrath, W.	A	6 Bn
803923	Pte	McCourt, J.	A	4 F/Coy S&T
809893	Pte	McGuinness, J.	A	4 F/Coy COE
810559	Pte	McDonagh, T.	A	1 Bn

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<u>Regt.No.</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Coy</u>	<u>Parent Unit</u>
810332	Pte	McMahon, T.	A	1 Bn
208903	Pte	McGovern, T.	B	CD Arty
810154	Pte	McCrumm, R.A.	B	3 G/Coy S&T
809183	Pte	McGrath, C.	B	4 Bn
808986	Pte	McCarthy, D.	B	4 Bn
811155	Pte	McGurgan, K.	C	Dep S&T
806095	Pte	McCaul, J.	C	3 Bn
807159	Pte	McCarton, P.	AC Gp	4 M/Sqn
95420	Pte	McAuliffe, J.	AC Gp	1 F/Sqn
804027	Pte	McManus, D.	AC Gp	1 M/Sqn
803751	Pte	Nolan, J.	Hq	Dep S&T
808893	Pte	Nugent, C.	B	4 Bn
811058	Pte	Noonan, R.	B	4 Bn
810325	Pte	Naughten, R.	C	GTD CTC
809505	Pte	Nally, M.	C	Mil College
808772	Pte	Nolan, M.	AC Gp	1 A/Sqn
809642	Pte	Nolan, W.	B	1 F/Coy Sigs
810990	Pte	Noonan, D.	B	4 Bn
810214	Pte	Nicell, J.	A	6 Bn
811054	Pte	Owens, J.	Hq	2 Bn
810884	Pte	O'Toole, N.J.	HQ	2 F/Coy Sigs
810511	Pte	Orr, R.	A	1 Bn
806704	Pte	O'Sullivan, M.	A	6 Bn
808749	Pte	O'Kane, J.	A	6 Bn
808117	Pte	O'Kane, J.	A	4 G/Coy S&T
810666	Pte	O'Donovan, D.	B	4 Bn
207463	Pte	O'Brien, J.	B	1 F/Coy S&T
804688	Pte	O'Mahoney, D.	B	3 H/Coy AMC
810977	Pte	O'Neill, E.T.	B	1 F/Coy Sigs
804374	Pte	O'Brien, D.	B	4 Bn
807906	Pte	O'Sullivan, F.	B	4 Bn
802765	Pte	O'Connor, F.	B	4 Bn
810655	Pte	O'Donovan, J.	B	4 Bn
809210	Pte	O'Neill, P.	B	4 Bn
809784	Pte	O'Brien, S.	B	4 Bn
311210	Pte	O'Brien, T.K.	B	1 FA Regt
808962	Pte	O'Meara, P.	B	4 Bn
808289	Pte	O'Donovan, P.	B	4 Bn
806826	Pte	O'Brien, D.	B	4 Bn
805059	Pte	O'Sahilly, T.	B	4 Bn
808071	Pte	O'Callaghan, T.	B	4 Bn
808771	Pte	O'Donnell, W.	C	Dep Sigs
808386	Pte	O'Brien, J.	C	3 Bn

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<u>Regt.No.</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>14.</u> <u>Coy</u>	<u>Parent Unit</u>
808501	Pte	O'Rourke, C.	C	3 Bn
809719	Pte	O'Neill, J.	C	Dep Sigs
804411	Pte	O'Sullivan, A.	C	3 Bn
808148	Pte	O'Regan, E.	AC Gp	1 M/Sqn
810339	Pte	O'Callaghan, B.	AC Gp	1 M/Sqn
809395	Pte	O'Keefe, T.	AC Gp	1 M/Sqn
803902	Pte	O'Leary, C.	AC Gp	1 M/Sqn
810547	Pte	O'Mahony, J.	AC Gp	1 M/Sqn
808435	Pte	O'Mahoney, T.	B	1 M/Sqn
811283	Pte	O'Callaghan, J.M.	B	1 FA Regt
808012	Pte	Peppard, J.	A	4 FA Regt
809976	Pte	Purtill, J.	A	6 Bn
810163	Pte	Powell, C.	A	6 Bn
810978	Pte	Purcell, R.	B	1 F/Coy COE
810997	Pte	Quinlan, M.	A	1 Bn
810699	Pte	Quilty, P.	B	3 H/Coy AMC
810055	Pte	Quinn, G.	B	3 G/Coy AOC
810935	Pte	Quinn, P.	AC Gp.	1 M/Sqn
77139	Pte	Riordan, M.	HQ	Mil Coll
810384	Pte	Roche, J.	HQ	4 Bn
808761	Pte	Raymond, R.	HQ	4 Bn
805954	Pte	Ready, W.	HQ	4 F/Coy S&T
809777	Pte	Redmond, J.	A	6 Bn
810945	Pte	Regan, D.	A	6 Bn
803473	Pte	Riggs, W.	A	6 Bn
809530	Pte	Roper, A.	A	4 F/Coy COE
93185	Pte	Ryan, P.	B	1 F/Coy S&T
811073	Pte	Ryan, M.	B	1 F/Coy Sigs
809511	Pte	Ryan, T.	B	1 FA Regt
811286	Pte	Ryan, J.	B	1 FA Regt
809178	Pte	Ryan, M.	B	4 Bn
809116	Pte	Roberts, P.	B	3 Bn
435357	Pte	Rowe, P.	C	Mil College
808515	Pte	Rooney, P.	C	1 AA Regt
811513	Pte	Reilly, B.	C	GTD CTC
809436	Pte	Ryan, M.	C	1 Tank Sqn
99070	Pte	Rafter, H.	C	3 Bn
810600	Pte	Redmond, C.	C	3 Bn
808930	Pte	Ryan, J.	C	4 M/Sqn
810070	Pte	Rockett, K.	B	1 M/Sqn
809922	Pte	Reilly, S.	HQ	Dep Sigs
810627	Pte	Smullen, B.	HQ	4 F/Coy COE
90925	Pte	Seery, M.	A	4 F/Coy S&T
809693	Pte	Stanley, N.	A	6 Bn /over....

<u>Regt.No.</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Coy</u>	<u>Parent Unit</u>
808563	Pte	Stanford, J.	A	4 G/Coy I&T
92710	Pte	Sweeney, B.	A	4 H/Coy AMC
809174	Pte	Shanagher, J.	A	6 Bn
809771	Pte	Scally, J.	A	4 FA Regt
807892	Pte	Sweeney, P.	A	4 G/Coy AOC
809260	Pte	Spillane, J.	B	4 Bn
808657	Pte	Sunderland, J.	B	Hq S/Comd
804925	Pte	Sheehan, J.	B	Hq S/Comd
807790	Pte	Sullivan, T.	A	1 H/Coy Sigs
811280	Pte	Steele, W.	B	4 Bn
99689	Pte	Shea, P.	C	Dep COE
800019	Pte	Sheridan, A.	C	3 Bn
311227	Pte	Shorthall, P.	C	3 Bn
90089	Pte	Shanahan, J.	AC Gp	D/Cavalry
806388	Pte	Sheedy, F.	AC Gp	1 M/Sqn
810083	Pte	Sheehan, P.	B	CD Arty
810802	Pte	Tucker, E.	Hq	1 H/Coy AMC
810811	Pte	Tuite, J.	Hq	1 H/Coy AMC
70696	Pte	Tomkins, C.	A	4 FA Regt
809014	Pte	Tighe, M.	A	6 Bn
810567	Pte	Tahaney, J.	A	6 Bn
810423	Pte	Twohig, D.	B	Hq S/Comd
811056	Pte	Tusky, W.	B	4 Bn
805872	Pte	Thompson, W.	B	Hq S/Comd
811342	Pte	Treacy, M.	C	3 Bn
808767	Pte	Tucker, P.	AC Gp	1 A/Sqn
95241	Pte	Williams, P.	A	OTD W/Comd
811197	Pte	Watters, P.	Hq	5 Bn
810300	Pte	White, P.	Hq	Hq CTC
96057	Pte	Wall, P.	Hq	12 Bn
85450	Pte	Ward, P.	Hq	2 H/Coy AMC
809506	Pte	Ward, N.	Hq	Adm Corps
810299	Pte	White, L.	C	Dep AMC
806798	Pte	Wright, J.	B	4 Bn
802479	Pte	Woods, J.	B	4 Bn
91960	Pte	Wynne, D.J.	B	12 Bn
805219	Pte	Walsh, N.	C	Hq CTC
806435	Pte	Walsh, K.	C	D/Cavalry
88416	Pte	Walsh, J.	AC Gp	1 M/Sqn
809390	Pte	Young, M.	B	1 FA Regt.