

# RUNDA

## UNIT HISTORY

### 36 IRISH BATTALION ONUC

#### FORMATION AND MOVEMENT

		<u>Page</u>
Advance Party	18 Nov. to 7 Dec. 1961	1
Assembly of Battalion	20 Nov. to 4 Dec.	1 - 2
Move to E'Ville	5 Dec. to 24 Dec.	2

#### OPERATIONS

Arrival and Build up	3 Dec. to 15 Dec.	3 - 6
UN Offensive - Op "Sarsfield"	15 Dec. to 18 Dec.	7 - 9
Situation Report to 27 December 1961		10 - 12
Aftermath to Operations	19 Dec. to 31 Dec.	12 - 17
Situation Report to 3 January 1962		18 - 20

#### KEEPING THE PEACE 1962

Towards Peace	1 Jan to 31 Jan	21 - 27
Situation Report to 15 January		27
Routine Activity	1 Feb to 29 Mar	28 - 38
Situation Report to 31 March		39
Period of Tension	30 Mar to 9 May	40 - 46
Moving Home	10 May to 29 May	46 - 52

#### OPERATIONAL DOCUMENTS

Operation Instruction No. 7 (for 7 Dec. '61)	54 - 55
Operation Instruction No.10 (for 8 Dec. '61)	56 - 57
Operation Instruction No.11 (for 10 Dec. '61)	58 - 59
Operation Instruction No.14 (for 16 Dec. '61) (Destr of Gend Resistance in E'Ville)	60 - 63
Operation Order 36 Bn . . OP "Sarsfield".	64 - 70
Guards and Patrols, from Jan to May 62	71 - 73

#### SPECIAL REPORTS

CC 'A' Coy re Op "Sarsfield"	75 - 77
Medical	78 - 82
Quartermaster	83 - 88
Ordnance	89 - 90
Transport	91 - 95
Training	96
Association with other Contingents	96 - 97
Welfare	98
Visits and Guards of Honour	99
Public Relations	100

#### NOMINAL ROLLS

Casualties	102
Advance Party	103 - 104
Trials and Punishments	105
Battalion	106 - 124

#### MAPS

	<u>Facing Page</u>
General Map E'Ville area	3
Op 'Sarsfield'	64

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FORMATION AND MOVEMENT.

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FORMATION AND MOVEMENT

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The Advance Party

The Advance Party consisting of 19 Officers, 24 NCO's and 7 Ptes departed Dublin at 16.30hrs (local time) 18 Nov'61 and arrived Elizabethville 16.30hrs 22 Nov'61 (local time). On route it reached WHEELUS 19 Nov'61, LEOPOLDVILLE 20 Nov'61 and KAMINA 21 Nov'61. A small party of Officers and NCO's from the Advance Party remained at Kamina to take over stores.

On 25 Nov'61 the OIC Advance Party, O/4989 Comdt. T.Ryan, was informed by OC KAT COMD that the 36 Bn would be stationed at NYUNZU - NIEMBA. Two Companies of the 35 Inf Bn were then in that area. He proceeded with portion of the party to ALBERTVILLE on 27 Nov'61 having instructed the QM to arrange to move Bn stores to ALBERTVILLE by air and from there by rail to NYUNZU - NIEMBA. During the period 27 Nov'61 to 5 Dec'61 the move of Bn stores got under way.

During the period 27 Nov'61 to 6 Dec'61 the 36 Inf Bn Advance Party was in the NIEMBA - NYUNZU area arranging the take-over from the Companies of 35 Inf Bn in that area. On 6 Dec'61 the OIC Advance Party received a telex message from OC Katanga Command to the effect that the plans for 36 Inf Bn had been changed and it would now be stationed at ELIZABETHVILLE. On 7 Dec'61 the Advance Party began the return to ELIZABETHVILLE as best it could. First to leave were Comdts Ryan and Harrison. On arrival at LUENA the "war" was already in progress and Battalion elements were at the Airport in slit trenches waiting to be convoyed to LEOPOLD FARM.

Nominal Roll of Advance Party is attached (see Contents page).

Pending build up of Staff Comdt Ryan acted as OC, Capt Crawford as Adjutant, Comdt Harrison as Operations Officer.

Assembly of Battalion

Advance Bn HQ opened at McKee Barracks, Dublin, as per OO 13/1961 Director Plans and Operations, at 16.00hrs on 20 Nov'61. The following Officers of the Unit were present at the opening

O/4939	Comdt. J.Beary	-	Adjutant
O/5152	Comdt. J.J.Griffin		Ops Officer
O/4562	Comdt. J.Foran	-	OC HQ Coy
O/7143	Capt G.D.Leech	-	Asst QM

O/4484 Lt Col. M.F.Hogan reported on 21 Nov'61. 36 Inf Bn was activated on 29 Nov'61 and Lt Col. M.F.Hogan assumed Command.

On 24 Nov'61 a special Advance Party of 1 Officer, 2 NCO's and 6 Ptes was detailed to move to LEOPOLDVILLE to arrange reception and transit of 36 Inf Bn through to KATANGA. The following party was detailed:

Capt C.Kelleher	Pte Buckley
Sgt Wilson	" Fitzpatrick
Cpl McCormack	" Kelly
Pte Shaw	" Hunt
" Clancy	

Orders were issued by CCA for the conc. of E Comd Coy and S Comd Coy in DUBLIN and for the conc of the W Comd Contingent in the Sarraghon the 27 Nov'61.

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Four A Cars were left at Dublin Airport for lifting to the CONGO by Globemaster with the Unit. They never left DUBLIN during the tour of duty of the 36 Inf Bn.

On 1 Dec'61 all officers were received by the President of Ireland at Áras an Uachtarán. An tAire Cosanta, CF., A Adn, A Crn were also present.

On 4 Dec'61 the Unit was reviewed by An Taoiseach at McKee Barracks in the presence of Civil, Religious and Military representatives.

The Move to ELIZABETHVILLE

The move of the Main Body commenced on 5 Dec'61 and ended on 24 Dec'61. Personnel were transported in 20 Globemasters. Schedule of departure and arrival of the 20 Aircraft is set out hereunder:

<u>Chalk No</u>	<u>Departure DUBLIN</u>	<u>arrived LEOPOLDVILLE</u>	<u>arrived ELIZABETHVILLE</u>
1.	5 Dec'61	6 Dec'61	7 Dec'61
2.	5 Dec'61	6 Dec'61	7 Dec'61
3.	5 Dec'61	6 Dec'61	7 Dec'61
4.	5 Dec'61	6 Dec'61	8 Dec'61
5.	5 Dec'61	6 Dec'61	8 Dec'61
6.	5 Dec'61	6 Dec'61	8 Dec'61
7.	5 Dec'61	6 Dec'61	8 Dec'61
8.	6 Dec'61	9 Dec'61	9 Dec'61
9.	6 Dec'61	9 Dec'61	9 Dec'61
10.	6 Dec'61	9 Dec'61	10 Dec'61
11.	6 Dec'61	7 Dec'61	8 Dec'61
12.	9 Dec'61	11 Dec'61	11 Dec'61
13.	11 Dec'61	12 Dec'61	13 Dec'61
14.	10 Dec'61	11 Dec'61	12 Dec'61
15.	13 Dec'61	14 Dec'61	15 Dec'61
16.	18 Dec'61	23 Dec'61	24 Dec'61
(Held up at MILDENHALL Aerodrome England due to engine trouble)			
17.	16 Dec'61	18 Dec'61	19 Dec'61
18.	18 Dec'61	19 Dec'61	20 Dec'61
19.	18 Dec'61	20 Dec'61	23 Dec'61
20.	20 Dec'61	22 Dec'61	24 Dec'61

It is noteworthy to remember that the Unit flew to its operational area in the full knowledge that hostilities were inevitable. It was the first Battalion to have on AA complement included and to carry steel helmets.



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OPERATIONSArrival and Build Up3-8 Dec'61

First report of new developments came on the 3 Dec'61 when Gendarmerie became very active in Eville and on roads leading into City. All troops were confined to Camp. At this stage the 36 Inf Bn was to concentrate in ALBERTVILLE and NYUNZU/NIEMBA, but it became necessary to consider a change of plans and to have 36 Inf Bn take over from 35 Inf Bn in Eville due to deterioration in the situation. On the 4 Dec'61 the Gendarmerie placed a road block at BADOUIN BOULEVARD. This was to be removed later after negotiation. It was not removed and firing commenced in the City at 14.00hrs on the 5 Dec'61, in that area. Troops in Leopold Farm had to withdraw into close proximity to the camp due to having been fired on by Gendarmerie. A firm decision was taken to replace 35 Inf Bn by 36 Inf Bn and the first three USAF planes landed with 36 Inf Bn personnel at Eville Airport on the 7 Dec'61. Gendarmerie fired on the planes and one was damaged as follows:

40 hits, two outboard fuel tanks punctured; oil system of starboard inner engine damaged. The plane took off again during the day on three engines. There were two officers and 44 men of A Coy aboard the plane. It landed with a trail of petrol vapour behind it. The crew stated that it was miraculous that the aircraft did not take fire in the air, considering the heat of the engines and the inflammability of the high octane vapour. Indeed, the crew were reported to have said that landing in Eville Airport "wasn't just war but suicide". There were no casualties.

The main route to the Airport was considered insecure due to Gen activity and all 1 Bde movement to and from the Airport was via Route Charlie (AVENUE DE ARUCARIAS).

Sniping continued around LEOPOLD FARM during the 7 Dec. The night was comparatively quiet. Gendarmerie commenced mortaring LEOPOLD FARM on the 8 Dec'61. Cpl Fallon, A Coy, was killed and the following were wounded:

Sgt Mulcahy, Tpr Kenny, Pte March, Tpr McMullan (repatriated) and Pte Gilrain.

On the afternoon of the 8 Dec'61 'A' Coy 36 Inf Bn was ordered to clear SAVONNIERS as far as the LIEGE crossing.

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The operation was carried out in conjunction with a Swedish Company operating along RUE DE KASENGA - 'A' Coy 36 Inf Bn came under very heavy mortar fire at Point 'E' (LIEGE - SAVONNIERS). For six hours approx one hundred mortar bombs fell on the area and the Coy was ordered to withdraw after last light to within the perimeter of Bn HQ at LEOPOLD FARM.

'B' Coy 36 Inf Bn arrived at the Airport at 19.00hrs on 8 Dec'61.

9 Dec'61

On the morning of the 9 Dec'61 after a quiet night, 'A' and 'B' Coys 36 Inf Bn were deployed on the eastern perimeter of the Irish Camp. There was some sniping and mortar fire on forward positions in the forenoon.

The Force Commander held a conference of Commanders and Staff Officers at DOGRA CASTLE. First Brigade Officers all travelled in one Swedish A.P.C. which was ambushed and hit by Atk fire on STANLEY AVE. The driver was seriously wounded and died later. In the A.P.C. were Bde O/C, O/C 35 and 36 Inf Bns, 2 i/c 36 Inf Bn and 10s of 35 and 36 Inf Bns. At 15.00hrs DOGRA CASTLE, Command HQ, came under heavy mortar fire. Approx 106 rounds fell on the area. The conference continued in the cellar. Four APCs were provided for 1 Bde Officers on the return journey and the convoy was ambushed by approx one Company of Gendarmerie. There were no casualties.

'A' Coy set up a platoon post at the junction of AVE DE GREVILLEAS and AVE SCERIERS in order to secure the GREVILLEAS ROUTE to Eville Airport (ROUTE CHARLIE). After last light and throughout the night heavy small arms fire came into the Irish Camp. A Gend Armd Car from positions on AVE TULIPIERES and AVE KASENGA placed harrassing fire on IR Bn HQ. The Armoured Car fired all through the night.

Between fifteen and twenty rounds of mortar shells fell on the Irish Camp during the hours of darkness. Defensive fires were kept up all night. There was a serious shortage of mor and Atk weapons and ammunition at this stage, as 36 Inf Bn supplies had been flown to ALBERTVILLE.

Elements of HQ Coy 36 Inf Bn arrived at LEOPOLD FARM.

10 Dec'61

The 35 Inf Bn evacuated LEOPOLD FARM area and moved back to ROUSSEAU FARM located between LEOPOLD FARM and the Airport. In order to enlarge the 36 Inf Bn perimeter a combined operation was planned and carried out towards the City. 'A' Coy, with a section of Armd Cars cleared SAVONNIERS to Point 'E' (LIEGE SAVONNIERS). 'B' Coy cleared the Police Camp to RUE DE KASENGA.

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The Swedish Battalion cleared KASENGA to LIEGE CROSS. This operation was preceded by an airstrike on CAMP MASSARD. The operation was carried out successfully. Lt Kiely, 'B' Coy 36 Inf Bn, was wounded by mortar fire. The Battalion perimeter was now secured along KASENGA and SAVONNIERS as far as LIEGE. The enemy who were accustomed to occupying certain houses from which they opened fire on the Irish Camp got a hot reception when they found the houses occupied by the Irish at last light. The enemy fled under a hail of fire. A very severe mortar barrage was placed on the Irish Camp during the night. Irish mortars replied. Approx 105 mortar bombs fell on the Bn area during the hours of darkness. Cpl Sheridan, 'A' Coy, and Pte Ferguson, 'A' Coy, received shrapnel wounds and Cpl Gorman, 'A' Coy, received a bullet wound.

11 Dec'61

'A' Coy 36 Inf Bn position at Point 'E' came under heavy mortar fire. 36 Inf Bn mortars replied. 'A' Coy platoon position on GREVILLEAS and AVE SCERIERS was relieved by a platoon from 35 IR Bn. Capt McIntyre, 'B' Coy received a bullet wound. Six mortar bombs fell on area of Point 'E'. Enemy small arms fire came from BCK CAMP at the TUNNEL, and SOUTH of AVE KASENGA.

12 Dec'61

Comdr 'A' Coy called for mortar fire four times during the night to break up enemy concentrations in forward positions. Sergt Mulcahy 'A' Coy 36 Inf Bn, was wounded a second time by mortar fire and later died.

Enemy vehicles approaching junction of LIEGE - SCERIERS were driven off by fire from 'A' Coy positions. In the early afternoon 'A' Coy came under mortar fire. It was confirmed that Gendarmerie moved up to the Irish lines in civilian clothes during daylight and having changed into Gend uniform after darkness sniped on various positions in the Irish Camp.

Pte Desmond, Pte Woodcock, Pte Confrey, all of 'A' Coy 36 Inf Bn, received shrapnel wounds from mortar fire. Irish Battalion put a heavy mortar barrage on enemy positions after last light to neutralise enemy mortar fire. Intermittant mortar fire fell on all Irish positions during hours of darkness. Enemy mortar positions were located and fired on by Irish Bn.

13 Dec 61

It was requested by the American Embassy that mortar fire from Irish lines should stop to allow the evacuation of 500 women and children from the ATHENE SCHOOLS. This was agreed to.

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Heavy mortar fire came from the area of SIMBA factory and AVE INDUSTRIALLE. 'A' Coy suffered mortaring all day. Some of this was CB fire from enemy positions due to Swedish mortars firing from 'A' Coy locality. Vigorous patrolling was carried out by all Companies. Capt Agnew of A Coy wounded by mortar fire.

Learned that a replacement of Armd Cars due from IRELAND could NOT be loaded on US aircraft due to lack of space caused by the airlift of personnel and war-like stores.

Towards midnight Bn HQ came under mortar fire from the INDUSTRIALLE area. This continued until first light.

14 Dec'61.

Mortaring of all Irish positions continued. This was located as coming from CAMP MASSARD and the BCK area.

A Gendarmerie Armd Car was located in a firing position behind a house in the BEL AIR area SOUTH of AVE DE KASENGA. Enemy mortar positions were also located in this area. (BEL AIR is a residential area for white settlers in ELIZABETHVILLE).

All Congolese were evacuated from Irish Camp for security reasons. Plans were made on the order of the Force Commander for the encirclement of the City of ELIZABETHVILLE and the blocking of routes of access to the City. The Irish Bn was to be responsible for the capture of the TUNNEL area and the Swedish Bn was to be responsible for RUE DON BOSCO and KATUBA ROAD.

Over a dozen enemy mortar bombs fell on Bn positions during the night.

15 Dec'61.

Targets in ETOILE area (ELIZABETHVILLE) were engaged by mortar fire after midnight. Mortar fire was continued on targets in the City. United Nations offensive in ELIZABETHVILLE which was due to take place at first light was postponed to the 16 Dec'61.

A platoon from 'A' Coy 36 Inf Bn relieved a Swedish platoon at ELACAT (junc of SCERIEERS and LIEGE). (ELACAT is a cold storage depot).

The UN Offensive - Operation 'Sarsfield'15 Dec'61

In the afternoon O/C 36 Inf Bn received orders for the offensive on the morning of the 16 Dec'61. He issued orders at 21.00hrs. H-hour for attack by 36 Inf Bn on the TUNNEL area was fixed for 04.00hrs.

Brigade plan for the operation, 36 Battalion Operation Order and reports from Commanders of A and B Coy are attached (see contents page).

16 Dec'61;

The mission of 1st Brigade was to attack and capture CAMP MASSARD, block the routes AVE KATUBA and DON BOSCO in order to assist in sealing off ELIZABETHVILLE City preparatory to the destruction of enemy resistance in Eville area. One half troop of Indian 120mm Hy Mors was in direct support of 1 Bde attack in loc Irish Battalion.

The mission of the 36 Inf Bn was initially to capture the triangle GFD with 'B' Coy and thereafter to capture the TUNNEL area with 'A' Coy, 'C' Coy in Bn Reserve.

Mortar fire commenced from Irish lines at 04.00hrs

02.00hrs Solid downpour of tropical rain.

04.00hrs 'B' Coy crossed start line.

04.35hrs 'B' Coy pinned down by enemy mortar fire. Own mortars put down CB fire.

05.00hrs All 'B' Coy objectives captured

05.25hrs 'A' Coy attack on TUNNEL commenced on code word from Bn O/C.

Tac HQ operated from H-hour until 19.00hrs on D-day in conjunction with main HQ as rear link to 1 Bde. At Tac HQ were O/C, 10, Asst Ops Offr and MP Offr. At main HQ were 2 i/c, Ops Offr and LOs Swedish Bn and 35 Inf Bn.

05.45hrs 'A' Coy pinned down before TUNNEL by mortar fire from area INDUSTRIALLE. This was neutralised by our own CB fire and 120 Hy Mor (Indian) from area 36 Bn HQ.

06.00hrs Swedish attack on CAMP MASSARD commenced.

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- 06.20hrs 'A' Coy destroyed by 84mm RCL fire two strong points which held up its advance on the TUNNEL.
- 06.30hrs 'A' Coy captured TUNNEL and O/C 1 Bde conveyed his congratulations to O/C 36 Inf Bn. Two were killed in the attack, Lieut A.O'Riordan and his orderly Pte Wickham.
- 07.05hrs Enemy mortar fire was falling on junc of LUX - KASENGA.
- 07.45hrs Heavy enemy mortar fire fell on the TUNNEL causing 'A' Coy personnel to redeploy.
- 08.20hrs Water supplies cut off from 36 Inf Bn area, light and power also cut off.
- 08.30hrs Pte O'Flynn, 'B' Coy, was wounded by a ricochet-bullet in Ops room. He recovered after treatment.
- 08.35hrs Swedish Bn moving towards CAMP MASSARD.
- 09.00hrs TUNNEL reported to be firmly held by 'A' Coy after mopping up operations.
- 10.30hrs Swedish Bn breached the defences at CAMP MASSARD. A large number of prisoners were captured. The Gurkha Bn having moved along AVE CHURCHILL reached ATHENE SCHOOL. The Ethiopian Bn having cleared the LIDO and ZOO area moved towards CAMP MASSARD to close the ring around the City.
- 11.00hrs Bn O/C requested that a platoon from 'C' Coy be sent to relieve a platoon of 'A' Coy on the TUNNEL. This was carried out after last light - Lt Young i/c.
- 12.45hrs Gendermerie Officer was captured in 'B' Coy lines. Prisoners captured were escorted back to the Brigade cage in Swedish Camp.
- 14.30hrs Bde O/C visited Bn O/C at Tac HQ in order to co-ordinate the attack on BCK Camp.
- 15.30hrs More mortar fire fell on TUNNEL area having been fired from UNION MINIERE. 36 Inf Bn mortars took on UNION MINIERE.
- 18.00hrs Bde O/C gave permission for Tac HQ to join Main HQ after last light.
- 20.00hrs Congolese prisoners captured by 36 Inf Bn were released when it was established that their release was NO threat to the security of the Bn.
- 21.25hrs Swedish Camp came under mortar fire from area KILOBELOBE and O/C Swedish Bn requested heavy mortars in Irish Camp to engage them. Target was out of range.

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## RÚNDA

17 Dec'61.

07.45hrs The section of Indian Hy Mors moved into 'B' Coy area to bring enemy mortars **within range**.

10.00hrs It was reported after the battle of the TUNNEL that the enemy strengths in the area were as follows:-

TUNNEL - 3 Coys (-) of Gendarmerie.

BCK Camp - 1 Coy (-) of Gendarmerie.

ATHENE SCHOOL - Mobile reserve of Gendarmerie under command of white mercenaries.

Some prisoners of Belgian nationality taken in Irish lines were escorted to the Brigade cage in the Swedish lines.

The Indian Hy Mor detachment vacated the Irish lines and moved to CAMP MASSARD to organise fire to counter enemy mortar fire falling on CAMP MASSARD.

Prisoners and refugees in Irish battle area were evacuated.

Due to dispositions of 1 Bde and 2 Bde around the City of ELIZABETHVILLE orders were issued for the strict control of mortar fire.

18 Dec'61.

The Bn Ordnance Officer commenced the disposal of unexploded mortar bombs in the Company lines. The Force Commander and Brigadier Raja visited the Irish lines. Mopping up operations by Ethiopians and Gurkhas continued in ELIZABETHVILLE. Looting by refugees was widespread. Loot was confiscated and stored.

There was a Baluba threat to move into the City from the Refugee Camp. Those who succeeded in reaching the City were engaged in looting. Brigade Headquarters set up a depot for the storage of confiscated loot.

An unexploded 4.2 inch mortar bomb of British manufacture was found in the Bn HQ area. It was disposed of by the Battalion Ordnance Officer.

Snipers fired into the area of 36 Inf Bn all day. Many mortar shells fell on the TUNNEL area.

The 36 Inf Bn was informed after last light that the water system was poisoned. Rain water had been used for all purposes since the mains were turned off on the morning of the 16 Dec'61.

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Situation Report  
to  
27 Dec'61

Ref Map 1: 20,000 Eville

Own

During night 16/17 and 17 th Ghurka Bn consolidated in STADIUM area and dominated AVE CHURCHILL by aggressive pats. This Bn also opened up AVE STANLEY to UN HQ and beyond leaving strong parties at MUSEUM. 8 Eth Bn moving NORTH of and parallel with AVE STANLEY secured LES ROCHES and pushed on to LIDO area. 35 Eth Bn clearing BOULEVARD ELIZABETH occupied UNION MINIERE on 19th. 14 SW Bn based in str on CAMP MASSARD pushed out WEST on 19th to dominate remaining routes from the City. (This op was not completely successful and enemy continued to have routes to and from the City until 27th). The same Bn, also on 19th sent dets NORTH from CAMP MASSARD to hold BCK CAMP and RLY STN.

36 Inf Bn held ground taken on 16th with two Coys. 'A' Coy conc on TUNNEL and 'B' Coy linking with Swedes in area G - C. While most other UN Units are spread thin on the ground the Irish, who hold the most important ground have the task of dominating their immediate area.

Enemy

Of an est seven mors deployed in the City only one op against the Ir attack and that gave up after six rds approx. As to Inf it was est that some 2,500 incl mercenaries were available for def. The TUNNEL area which in addition to its tactical importance has great psychological value was defended heavily by three enemy Coys. Two factors assisted us in our attack, namely, that the enemy did not stand and fight to the last round and that, although he could have dug in extensively with great facility he did not do so as a matter of course. It would appear also that the whites who manned the sp wpns made pte ests and took off with their wpns for the communes (native villages) WEST and SOUTH of the City before they could be encircled. A further interesting tactical factor is that the Gends while they may be org to attack have never yet pushed an attack to the aslt stage.

It should be noted however that until this op the enemy had been going from str to str. When 34 Inf Bn took the airport at ELIZABETHVILLE all that was needed was a show of str. During 35 Inf Bn ops the enemy had grown more determined with results which are known. In the period immediately before 35 Inf Bn phased out it was considered that the enemy could deploy only one mor of 3" cal approx and one modern armd C. 36 Inf Bn experience did not confirm this and sitreps as got from Bde painted a very different picture. In fact the enemy was very well equipped and lacked only determination to use his weapons. We ourselves have captured some dozen FN rifles, a Bren gun (probably from 'A' Coy 35 Inf Bn at JATOVILLE), an FN LMG, grenades and a rocket launcher of approx 84mm calibre. In CAMP MASSARD the Swedes have taken four 81mm mors, twelve 60mm mors and one mor of very large calibre.

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From docs captured it is apparent that the enemy planned this campaign well but did not have the capability to implement his policy. The cease fire notwithstanding he planned to (1) begin harrassing tactics with close in fire on UN Camps at the time when Ir and Sw Bns would be rotating. His object here was to confine the raw new Bns in their camps. (2) to isolate Ir and Sw and Indians in their camps from their lines of sup. This phase was almost successful for routes ALFA and BRAVO were in fact denied to us. (3) to seize the airport thus denying us our base.

This enemy plan failed because (1) the new Sw and Ir Bns did NOT hole up in their camps but moved out towards the enemy and by aggressive defence protected their camps successfully. (2) he did not bargain on UN RFTS coming in such str to ELIZABETHVILLE area. The arrival of two Eth Bns which were not needed to hold ground for defence swing the balance in UN favour. (3) he did not bargain that his RFTS from KIPUSHI and JADOTVILLE would be denied him by our air and gd ops.

Policy since the UN op has been to dominate the City with pats of Armd Cs and, where possible, of soft skinned vehicles. Owing to hy commitments for convoy duty to and from the airport where our stores and pers continue to arrive daily the Irish were not, at first, required to carry out pats. Now however we are beginning to share the task. Today (26 Dec) we are org pats to clear the area EAST of AVE CHURCHILL to and incl RUE LIEGE. The opening of this area will give access to ROUTE ALFA, the best route to the airport, to the proposed new UN HQ at SABENA GUEST HO and to the UN HOSPITAL.

Best info on the enemy is that he is still present in the area of Presidential Residence, AVE ETOILE and AVE MOERO. Here he continues to hold his peace. Certainly TSHOMBE, MUNONGO and lesser fry are there also. The three COMMUNES SOUTH of line UNION MINIERE - CAMP MASSARD namely ALBERT, KENYA and KATUBA (not shown on map) contain upwards of five Gend Coys. The enemy has access to his part of the City from the COMMUNES. At KIPUSHI the mercenaries are thought to be reorganising. Best info that some 48 jeeps with Hy MGs have been delivered to KIPUSHI. It is thought that with this eqpt the tribes may be encouraged to engage in harrassing tactics against UN tps. These tactics while they may result in UN cas cannot have positive results. The fact that the mercenaries have retired to KIPUSHI (on the borders of RHODESIA) is a strong indication of enemy lack of confidence in his ability to carry another campaign.

UN plans for the future (assuming that the cease fire breaks down) are to move in on KIPUSHI, JADOTVILLE and KASENGA in order to break all org resistance.

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## Police

In pursuit of policy of keeping initiative Ir and Sw reps, with min armed party, went by appt to Police HQ for conf with Chief of Police. Made arrangements for reactivation of police in Ir/Sw area. White advisers of Police Chief ignored by UN reps. Meeting cordial, coop promised.

First result of meeting was posting of Police to TUNNEL area but Police reluctant to carry out patrols unless accompanied by Ir and Sw in sec str. Chief promised to base a large number of Police at police camp but only after it had been cleared up. Clearing going on intermittently.

Police are in a difficult posn. They must provide hy escorts for Katangese Ministers, consulates etc. If they coop with UN they run danger of being accused by Gends of traitorous conduct. The fact of Chief of Police met UN deputation in his HQ is, at once, a dem that UN dominate the area and an indication that the Police Chief is not particularly afraid of incurring wrath of Gends. If Police Chief at any time withdraws sp of UN this will indicate that Gends are preparing for war.

## Aftermath to Operations

19 Dec'61

All firing was suspended at 07.15hrs while Katanga Government, Central Government and United Nations were engaged in peace talks.

Meeting was arranged with Red Cross personnel in order to facilitate the distribution of food in the 36 Inf Bn area. The opportunity was availed of at this meeting to -

- (a) Demonstrate that Irish troops did not loot private property but had sealed up to the best of their ability such houses as had to be searched.
- (b) To assure Red Cross that Balubas were NOT allowed to loot or kill in any area controlled by the 36 Irish Bn.
- (c) To satisfy the Red Cross that white refugess who were old and infirm had been housed and fed.

The Red Cross personnel were fed, and food was given to them for the Swiss Consul and his family.

Present at the meeting were -

### For 36 Inf Bn

Comdt Ryan 2 i/c.  
Comdt Griffin, Ops Offr.  
Comdt Harrison, Int Offr.  
Comdt McSullivan, M.O.  
Comdt Delaney, M.O.

### For Red Cross

Mr. SENN, International Red Cross Geneva.  
Mr. TOM BRIGHT, Red Cross Katanga.  
Mr. J.SMEETS, Health Service Sec.  
Mr. B.HAZAN, Red Cross Driver.  
Mr. JEAN CLERC, Belgian (Searching for relatives).  
Mr. GUY DEWELF, Red Cross Belgian.



# RUNDA

The Post Office was still occupied in the morning by Gendarmerie. They withdrew later. The Ethiopian Bn captured UNION MINIERE after first light. Opposition was NOT strong.

The control of refugees and the apprehension of suspects was continued.

The following instructions were issued in regard to the suspension of fire:

- a. NO firing by UN troops except
  - (i) when fired upon, and
  - (ii) if lives were endangered.
- b. Freedom of movement of UN troops to continue.

Civilians began moving freely in and out of the City of ELIZABETHVILLE. The following message was passed in writing to all Sub-Unit Commanders in the 36 Inf Bn by the O/C 36 Inf Bn.

"UN troops will NOT break into houses without sufficient reason, e.g. firing on UN troops. If there is any case of house breaking, disciplinary action will be taken against offenders".

The Platoon of 'C' Coy which was sent to reinforce 'A' Coy on the 17 Dec'61 returned to 'C' Coy at ROUSSEAU FARM.

20 Dec'61

Three dead Gendarmerie were buried in the BCK Hosp garden beside the TUNNEL. Fr.Crean officiated.

Unexploded bombs were disposed of in different Coys localities.

The following message was received from HQ KATANGA Comd:

"UN troops holding fire for duration of TSHOMBE-ADOULA talks. ONUC will, of course, scrupulously observe the instruction and will NOT, repeat NOT, initiate fire from ground or air. To do so would constitute breach of Secretary General's word and UN good faith. If ONUC is fired upon by Gendarmerie or civilian snipers, our troops should return fire without hesitation and if it is repeated should take any necessary steps to ensure security of ONUC troops. This applies particularly to UNION MINIERE compound. Withholding fire does not involve restriction of movement of ONUC troops, aircraft or vehicles.... This may be brought to the notice of all ranks."

All Companies 36 Inf Bn were ordered to organise patrols to control refugees who were looting. The food in ELACAT stores had become unusable due to the failing of electricity supply to the refrigeration plant from the 16 Dec'61. This store was entered by the refugees and large quantities of stale meat were taken away by them.

# RUNDA

Due to the fact that the water supplies were still cut off, rain water was conserved for cooking and water was drawn by a pump from an old well for washing. A free issue of minerals was made for drinking purposes.

International Red Cross began organising the distribution of foodstuffs to the Civilian population and the Baluba refugees.

The 8th and 35th Ethiopian Bns were machine gunned and mortared during most of the day.

A large group of refugees estimated at 500 or 600 approached the perimeter of the IR Camp and were driven back by Smoke Bombs.

Orders were issued by Katanga Command that only boiled and chlorinated water would be used.

Refugees rioted at ELACAT food store and an Irish patrol went out and dispersed them. A patrol from 'B' Coy to ELACAT was hit up by the Gendarmerie. The patrol was reinforced by a section of Armd Cars. The Gend withdrew. Requests were made continually for the services of French speaking Officers from the 36 Ir Bn. There were NO qualified Officers with the Unit.

21 Dec '61

White residents of the Irish Bn area who fled to the City during the fighting were encouraged to visit their homes and remain.

Brigadier Raja and General Rikkye visited the Irish lines. A representative body of Irish troops attended the funeral of six Ethiopians who were killed in action.

Cooperation was given to International Red Cross for the evacuation of white refugees by train to NDOLA, RHODESIA.

Great difficulty was encountered with refugees.

Armed patrols were sent to prevent them moving into ELIZABETHVILLE. It was necessary to fire over them in order to drive them back to the Refugee Camp.

Telephones had to be disconnected in occupied private houses for the security of the Battalion.

Lack of food and water in the Refugee Camp caused serious concern. Provision for food was made and refugees were allowed to go to a lake near the Camp for water.

The Bde O/C ordered free movement through the TUNNEL of all civilian personnel NOT bearing arms. TUNNEL to be closed during the hours of darkness.

/OVER.

22 Dec'61

Orders issued by O/C 1 Bde that the BCK workers to be allowed to move freely around the TUNNEL area by day in order to get trains going again. No BCK workers were to be allowed move in the TUNNEL area between last light and first light. The TUNNEL Company ('A' Coy) adjusted its defences accordingly. This meant that 50% of 'A' Company was on duty.

International Red Cross reps requested that the Chaplain would accompany them to search for the bodies of three Red Cross officials who were killed in the fighting. The Chaplain was not permitted to go. The Red Cross later found the graves of the three Red Cross officials.

23 Dec'61

It was reported that the weapons of 'A' Coy 35 Inf Bn were located at UNION MINIERE. After investigation nothing was found.

Orders were issued by KAT Comd as follows:-

- a. UN Units NOT to be provoked into firing by extreme enemy elements.
- b. UN Units to assist Red Cross where possible.
- c. UN Units to assist Police.
- d. UN Units to assist local authorities in restoring order.

Northern Ireland Command wished the Bn "A Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year".

The non-availability of sandbags caused great concern in the Unit.

A war party of about two hundred Jeunesse from the Refugee Camp armed with bows and arrows, knives and bicycle chains tried to move to the attack on the BCK Camp on AVE SCERIERS where they alleged two of their numbers had been murdered. The break-out was stopped ONLY at bayonet point by a platoon of 'C' Coy under Capt Keyes.

A conference was held at Bde HQ to arrange the running of trains for refugees, the delivery of food, and the resumption of normal duties by the Katanga Police.

The Chief of Civil Ops, MR.URQUART, thanked all military units for a great effort during the days of battle.

The Gendarmerie started the murder of Balubas in the Communes. Guerilla warfare was also organised among tribes in KATANGA against ONUC.

/OVER.

## RÚNDA

24 Dec'61

It was arranged that Katanga Police would be permitted to patrol at the TUNNEL. NO Gendarmerie would be allowed into the Irish lines in uniform armed or unarmed. Some difficulty was experienced in investigating reports made by Congolese that certain whites were mercenaries. These whites had been living in the area of the Irish Camp for many years. On investigation many of the reports were proved false. It seems the reports were made by the Congolese because of personal grievances against whites.

Pte Geoghegan, 'B' Coy, accidentally received a gunshot wound. He died later.

25 Dec'61

Refugees were on the warpath. It was reported that the Indian driver of a jeep was killed by the Balubas on ROUTE CHARLIE. It transpired later that he had escaped into the bush and had survived.

MR. SENN of the International Red Cross Society requested the names of Gendarmerie killed on the Irish front during the battle. Three were buried in the Irish lines and the identity of one only was available.

The religious significance of Christmas Day was kept sight of and all troops heard Mass. Christmas Dinner was enjoyed by all, and those on duty celebrated on the 26th.

26 Dec'61

Spare parts for Tpt, Sigs, Ord and Atk were available at CAMP MASSARD. Officers from units concerned inspected the parts and took their requirements.

War parties of Baluba refugees were disarmed by the Irish Bn.

Irish patrols opened Routes ALPHA, BRAVO and CHARLIE. A party of about 500 refugees which concentrated at the ROUNDABOUT were driven back to Camp by an Irish patrol.

Conferences were held daily between reps of Irish Bn and Police to arrange mixed ONUC/Police patrols. A similar series of conferences took place with Police reps in RUASHI COMMUNE for the mixed patrol of ROUTE CHARLIE and AVE SCERIERS.

Refugees were restive and the patrols were to be alert. NO movement outside Bn area was permitted without an escort.

27 Dec'61

Lt Col Larkin and Capt Casey were appointed to 1 Bde Staff.

Ptes Moffatt and Robinson of 'A' Coy reported missing. They were taken prisoners by the Gendarmerie to KIPUSHI.

RÚNDA

/OVER.

'A' Coy sent a patrol to the ROUNDABOUT to control a large concentration of refugees.

The Minister for Justice of the Katanga Government was arrested by the Swedish Battalion. The O/C of the 36 Inf Bn made a request to 1 Bde that the Ministers release should be conditional on the release of ONUC prisoners held by the Kat Govt.

It was reported that some Gendarmerie were moving around in police uniforms. This could NOT be confirmed.

28 Dec'61

Patrolling and control of refugees continue. 'C' Coy relieved 'A' Coy in the TUNNEL. 'A' Coy had been in position since the capture of the TUNNEL on the 16th.

It was decided to locate a Company of Tunisians on ROUSSEAU FARM on the arrival of the Tunisian Bn.

29 Dec'61

The advance party of the Tunisian Bn arrived at ELIZABETHVILLE AIRPORT. Irish and Swedish Bns provided transport. The Battalion Ordnance Officer destroyed approximately twenty grenades of Belgian and British design which were found in the Company lines.

Irish escort for workers moving from RUASHI to EVILLE was arranged due to interference by refugees.

Katanga Police were permitted to carry rifles ONLY. NO automatic weapons would be allowed to Police. NO firing of weapons by UN troops was permitted during the so called "cease fire" except in exceptional circumstances.

Gendarmerie were active in the City. They endeavoured to take over some positions in the City. They also tried to capture ONUC personnel.

Plans were finalised for the departure of the Katanga Government to KIPUSHI, according to reliable civilian sources. The Tunisian Bn would NOT be operational for some time after arrival in the ELIZABETHVILLE area.

30 Dec'61

Great difficulty was experienced in controlling refugees; particularly in the "SHOPS" area and AVE SCERIEERS. All movement outside the Bn area continued to be heavily escorted.

31 Dec'61

Refugees were looting BCK property. An Irish patrol drove them back to the Camp. Battalion escorts and patrols continued to keep routes of supply open.

Situation Report to 3 Jan'62Ref Map 1: 20,000 EVILLEPolitical Situation

The political situation resumed its dominance over the military at a time when:-

- a. the military had reopened the routes to the airport.
- b. the access routes to the SOUTH CITY area had not been completely cut owing to shortage of troops.
- c. fourteen UN prisoners (10 Sw, 2 Norw, 2 Ir) were still in enemy hands.
- d. UN troops had capability of employing battle patrols to dominate City but NOT of occupying it.

The KITONA agreement made, it is conceded, under pressure is the dominant political factor. If it can be implemented it will be the beginning of a basis for a solution to the Katanga problem. By sending a deputation to LEO the Katanga Government has honoured its promise to negotiate. UN, in spite of the history of broken promises, accepts that Tshombe is acting in good faith and will lean over backwards to show this.

The main victory for UN has been the capture, in great part, of world opinion as expressed in the world press. People of influence are now coming to realise Katangese irresponsibility and to accept that UN is the only stable element here. In order to continue to convince world opinion that UN is still operating to prevent civil war and to assist the legal civil administration all military operations must be subord to political factors. Troops must now revert to original protective role, liaise with police for restoration of public order and try to protect our erstwhile white enemies in the pursuit of their legal occupations.

As has been proved from the various types of prisoner captured not all our white opponents are mercenaries. Some whites fought because they had no option but others (and they still exist) are convinced by their own propaganda that UN is evil and that troops are communists (a ragbag term for all who oppose Katanga) Even among the mercenaries there are dedicated groups who have vowed never to desist from military action until UN is eradicated.

UN prisoners held by the Gends are a factor of the political no less than of the military situation since they give concrete bargaining power to Katanga. Their release is being negotiated at political level but what concession, if any, the political side is prepared to make is not known. Prisoners held by UN (who are far more numerous than our prisoners held by the Gends) do not constitute a counter-factor since the Katangese have no particular value on their own nationals

Katangese Situation

As of this date information as to strength, location and activity is:-

Str and loc (some of these locs are on maps supplied. Most SOUTH of CITY)

- |     |  |   |  |
|-----|--|---|--|
| (1) | KATUBA COMMUNE                               | - | Gend BN<br>Para commando Bn<br>Bn HQ<br>Bde HQ (Gen Noke)                  |
| (2) | KENYA COMMUNE<br>(South of City)             | - | Two MP Coys<br>Two Gend Coys   |
| (3) | ALBERT COMMUNE<br>(South of City)            | - | Para commando<br>elements  |
| (4) | RUE <del>DE</del> MIT SUD                    | - | One Gend Coy   |
| (5) | KIPUSHI RD<br>(SW of City)                   | - | One Gend Coy   |
| (6) | MISSION AREA<br>(SE of City,<br>four miles)  | - | One Gend Coy   |
| (7) | MUNAMA CAMP<br>(South of City,<br>six miles) | - | Armd Coy (14 Armd.<br>Cs?) Mob Bn (40<br>jeeps with cannon<br>or Bazookas) |
| (8) | KIPUSHI<br>(18 miles SW)                     | - | 200 mercenaries<br>Bank of Katanga<br>Elements of Govt                     |

Company strengths are not known, assumed to be 100. Armament of Battalions mainly FN rifles. Distribution of heavy weapons not known, assumed to be distributed on ad hoc basis as needed. Heavy weapons include rocket launchers, mortar up to 4.5 cal, FN MMGs.

Activity confined to movement in communes and within own area of City. Gends out of hand last week and threatening householders and shopkeepers. This now ceased and are under control. Reports of large scale assassination of Commune residents by Gends NOT confirmed.

Own Situation

UN operational area is divided into zones in which each battalion is responsible for patrols to ensure dominance of area and security of life and property.

Irish responsibility is extensive, NOT alone do we patrol within our own area, we also have responsibility in Ethiopian and DOGRA Zones.

Daily duties include:-

- (1) Two infantry sections and one section Armd Cars from 0700 to 1200. Police type patrols in industrial district (see map). Object to reassure traders through manifestation of UN presence that they may open for business and trade in peace. Irish boys are particularly successful at this.

- (2) One infantry platoon and one section Armcd cars  
Any series of routes within battalion zone at  
various times during day as per daily requirement.  
Object to ensure that routes BRAVO & CHARLIE  
remain in UN hands, to assist pat No 1 if needed,  
and to keep UN presence manifested in entire zone.
- (3) One infantry platoon and one section Armcd Cars.  
Daily to Airport (usually via ROUTE ALFA) and  
return. Object, Collection of rations, stores  
and mail, manifestation of UN presence.

Routine duties involve

Maint of positions and local defence of HQ area.



RÚNDA

KEEPING THE PEACE.

RÚNDA

KEEPING THE PEACETowards Peace

During the remaining months of its service the unit remained in its original positions while negotiations were in progress among the politicians. The Battalion carried out its training programme. It manned barriers and posts, carried out active patrolling, controlled refugees and was frequently called upon to provide Guards of Honour for visiting VIPs. A vigorous programme of sports and games was carried out.

1 Jan'62

A message was received from the Secretary General in New York thanking all ranks for their excellent performance.

Residents of houses in our area set booby traps in their homes to prevent looting by refugees. At the request of the International Red Cross they were removed on humanitarian grounds.

2 Jan'62

Two patrols were organised, one for the forenoon and one for the afternoon.

A conference was held at 1 Bde HQ with reps of Katanga Police to organise police duties in the City and outskirts.

Great difficulty was experienced in maintaining patrols due to unserviceable transport.

The Chief Medical Officer pointed out the serious situation arising in the battalion, due to lack of fresh food. The unit had been on peck rations for twenty-one days.

It was arranged that two Swedish instructors would give a short course on 20mm Atk Gun to NCOs of Atk platoon.

3 Jan'62

Irish patrols escorted workers from RUASHI commune to ELIZABETHVILLE at first light. Two serious matters concerning the security of the unit arose. The supply of petrol was cut. This was later increased. The staff at the airport threatened to leave due to inadequate air traffic control equipment and shortage of staff. This was remedied.

/OVER.

## RÚNDA

The necessity for reporting incidents fully, was stressed, due to adverse publicity by local and international newspapers.

4 Jan'62

Katanga Police were permitted to move in Irish lines during daylight hours ONLY.

The battalion was connected by telephone with the City exchange.

5 Jan'62

Refugees who have succeeded in getting work in town were allowed to travel via AVE SCERIEERS ONLY. Factories and commercial concerns in area INDUSTRIALLE were getting business back to normal.

With the help of Commander Katanga Police it was possible to recover 500 bed sheets belonging to the battalion which were in a laundry in the City.

Irish patrol evacuated refugee squatters from houses in INDUSTRIALLE area, and impounded stolen property.

6 Jan'62

An order was issued by the O/C Bn that a strict check would be kept on the acquisition of abandoned vehicles.

A bulldozer was requisitioned and sent to the airport to be available in case of a crash on a runway.

A driver was provided full-time by O/C 36 Inf Bn for the UN Civil Rep MR.URQUART. MR.TSHOMBE's car which was taken from the refugees (who stole it) was returned through MR.URQUART.

Swedish Battalion issued 14,000 litres of petrol to Irish Bn as a temporary relief.

7 Jan'62

Sport field in Police Camp was taken over by the 36 Inf Bn. Irish Officers Club and Swimming pool was opened.

Irish Bn was allotted 500 litres petrol per day.

8 Jan'62

Reserve petrol issued: All patrols resumed. Refugees active in the vicinity of the "SHOPS" and stoned the people from RUASHI COMMUNE and the police escort. Armoured cars were sent to drive them back.

ROUSEAU FARM evacuated by 'C' Coy. Irish Battalion provided a Signal Despatch Service for 1 Brigade. This duty was shared monthly between the Brigades.

/OVER.

RÚNDA

9 Jan'62

Civil Police were unsatisfactory due to the withdrawal of white officers. Range Practices were not permitted due to the political situation.

A Gendarmerie Armoured Car captured by the 35 IR Bn was handed back to the 36 Inf Bn by the Swedes.

The sanitary situation in the Battalion caused concern because of the difficulty of clearing septic tanks. Latrines were dug as an alternative.

10 Jan'62

British and United States Consuls visited 1 Bde HQ.

Forty women and children from LUENA Commune near the Airport were captured by refugees and taken to the refugee camp.

11 Jan'62

A report of a mass break-out from the refugee camp was proved false.

Multi-vitamin tablets were issued to make up the deficiency in fresh fruit and vegetables.

Approaches to Bn HQ were blocked to increase 36 Inf Bn security.

12 Jan'62

The TUNNEL was opened for the free flow of traffic during daylight hours.

In order to ensure officers security in villas patrols were placed around the villas during the hours of darkness.

13 Jan'62

Film shows were organised in all companies.

A uniform drill was fixed for FN and Gustafs.

Pamphlets were distributed by Katanga authorities exhorting Baluba refugees to return to their homes. This was the first friendly act towards the refugees.

MR.DUMONTET A/UN Civil rep in KATANGA visited the Refugee Camp.

14 Jan'62

Plans were made with the UN Refugee Officer, KATANGA Comd, for the evacuation of refugees to their homes. Some of them refused to leave.

A round of 84mm RCL discharged accidentally in 'B' Coy lines. Six men were injured. All recovered.

/OVER.

15 Jan'62

Refugees looted in large numbers in TULIPIERS area within Irish lines. A patrol from 'A' Coy drove them back to Camp and confiscated the stolen property.

The ELIZABETHVILLE Commend was reorganised as follows:

- a. 1 Bde - Swedes and Irish.
- b. 2 Bde - Dogras and Ghurkas.
- c. 3 Bde - 8th and 35 Ethiopians.

It was complained that the Irish Battalion arrested two Gendarmerie Officers. Ptes Moffat and Robinson were released from prison in KIPUSHI with other UN prisoners after a day of negotiations. They were later courtmartialled, awarded detention and repatriated.

16 Jan'62

The report on the performance of weapons during the December battle was very satisfactory. Only six blinds from mortar bombs were reported. There were NO reports of unsatisfactory performance of Gustafs, FN Rifles, etc.

A months mind Mass was held at the TUNNEL in memory of members of the 36 Inf Bn who died in December. A review and March Past was held. MR.URQUART, Civil Rep ONUC, Brigadier Raja and Colonel Waern, O/C 1 Bde, attended.

17 Jan'62

There was a disturbance at ELACAT between refugees and Civil Police. An Irish patrol went to investigate. The refugees were sent back to camp. Methods of control of refugees were tightened up due to the activity of the Jeunesse - a "Teddy-boy" element in the Refugee Camp.

Special arrangements were made to keep the TUNNEL barrier open to allow MR.TSHOMBE, his Ministers and his military escort to move through the Irish lines to a party at the Swedish Officer's Mess.

18 Jan'62

Instructions were issued that all civilian vehicles were to be returned to the owners, when proof of ownership was produced.

A Baluba-Kasai with his wife and family were evacuated from ELIZABETHVILLE to the refugee camp because of intimidation by Civil Police.

19 Jan'62

Some owners of houses in Company lines requested that Irish troops evacuate the houses. This was not possible as the security of the battalion was involved. The houses were rented by ONUC.

Lt Col Larkin left for IRELAND,

RÚNDA

/OVER

A Company of Gendarmerie was located in the ETOILE area in rear of our lines. A Swedish patrol approached them but they moved back into the bush.

20 Jan'62

Members of the battalion were permitted to move under escort to the LIDO Swimming Pool. It was in the possession of the Ethiopians, who welcomed them.

A joint Irish-Civil Police post was established at ELACAT to prevent looting by refugees, and to prevent interference with the Civil Police by the refugees.

21 Jan'62

ROUTE CHARLIE, the alternative route to the Airport was almost impassible due to the surface having been washed away by rains. RCUSEAU FARM was found stripped of furniture, roofing and windows by refugees.

22 Jan'62

Brigadier Raja, O/C Katanga Command, made an official visit to the Irish Battalion. A Guard of Honour was provided with Lt J.Young i/c and colours by Lt P.Feely.

Baluba-Kasai and Baluba-Katanga fought in refugee camp and seven were killed.

Freedom of movement was granted through the TUNNEL during hours of daylight. Gendarmerie, armed or un-armed, were NOT allowed through.

23 Jan'62

The Swedes raided the refugee camp for arms and arrested five Jeunesse leaders and released some prisoners held by the Jeunesse. Four stolen cars were found with the Jeunesse.

24 Jan'62

The three Gendarmerie buried on the 17th Dec in Irish lines beside the TUNNEL were exhumed by the International Red Cross for re-burial.

A curfew was imposed on the refugee camp during the 11 hours of darkness to stop exit of Jeunesse. A runaway railway engine at the TUNNEL knocked the front of an Irish MMG post. There were no casualties.

A helicopter patrol of ELIZABETHVILLE was carried out daily.

The Jeunesse group in the refugee camp burned two Africans to death with petrol.

25 Jan'62

Irish Officers and NCOs visited the Ghurka Bn to inspect trenches and dug-outs. All were very impressed. They live in them, sleep in them and fight from them.

/OVER.

The refugee "Sheebeens" on AVE ARUCARIAS were closed.

O/C 36 Inf Bn had a conference with DR.LINNER, ONUC Chief in CONGO, at the residence of MR.URQUART, ONUC Chief in KATANGA.

26 Jan'62

Lt General McKeown arrived for farewell visit prior to his departure from the CONGO. He attended a party given by the Irish Officers and accepted a presentation. MR TSHOMBE and his Ministers were present, as also were the Chief ONUC Civil and Military Reps in KATANGA. MR. TSHOMBE made a conciliatory speech at the Irish party which got wide publicity in the world press.

Black Magic rituals were practiced in the refugee camp.

Four railway wagons on the TUNNEL, which were found to contain aircraft parts, were confiscated. The material was originally consigned to the Belgian Airbase at KAMINA.

27 Jan'62

The Force Commander (Lt Gen McKeown) gave a farewell address at HQ Katanga Comd and paid tribute to the Indians. The Force Commander later visited all Companies in the Irish Battalion and spoke informally to the officers and men. The usual security arrangements and escorts were provided for the Force Commander.

28 Jan'62

A wide-spread search was made for a refugee who had murdered a white man some days previously.

29 Jan'62

Irish troops moved freely in ELIZABETHVILLE and no hostility was shown them.

ROUTE CHARLIE was declared impassible due to rains.

The Force Commander requested that Irish troops evacuate the BCK hospital at the TUNNEL. Apparently the continued occupation was given unfavourable publicity. This was arranged after the reorganisation of the TUNNEL defences. The nuns who ran the hospital requested protection from Irish troops against the Refugees. This was granted despite their attitude of hostility.

30 Jan'62

Bn O/C was appointed Acting O/C 1 Bde during absence of Bde O/C at LEOPOLDVILLE.

31 Jan'62

The Civil Rep in KATANGA discussed ways and means of solving the refugee problem. Very little progress was made.

/OVER.

# RUNDA

27.

'C' Coy, which was in occupation of the BCK hospital, started preparing villas at LEIGE in anticipation of occupation.

## Situation Report to 15 Jan'62

### Political Situation

This, according to the politicians, continues to improve; the return of our prisoners can be taken as a sign of peaceful intention. It is expected that the talks will last for some weeks yet as MR. MONUNGO is determined NOT to concede a great deal to the Central Government.

UN troops will remain in locations in order to continue to impress the local population but, for time being, no mercenaries are to be arrested. Action against Gends is to be limited to keeping them away from UN area.

### Katangese Situation

Recent contacts with Gends in ELIZABETHVILLE as well as their check points and road blocks have NOT led to shooting. This indicates that a general cease fire policy has been promulgated. Private contacts with them, especially their officers, lead to the conclusion that they have no wish to fight again. A few inflammatory speeches could, however, change their attitude but NOT necessarily increase their courage.

There are continuing signs that the mercenaries are breaking up and it is known that the French Ultras are at loggerheads with their Belgian counterparts. The Chief of mercenaries, and TSHOMBE's Chief Military Adviser, Col Foulque with his Chief of Staff have left KIPUSHI and it is an outside chance that they may have left the CONGO altogether. Supporting this conclusion is the fact that BANQUE DU KATANGA is supposed to have spent large sums in paying off mercenaries during recent weeks.

### Own Situation

No significant change in dispositions, no change in patrol policy. Organisational changes made last week grouped the two Ethiopian Battalions in a further Bde-3 Bde. As a consequence of move of 8 Ethiopian Bn to STANLEYVILLE this org was cancelled almost immediately. A battalion from GHANA, (advance party of which has arrived) will replace 8 Ethiopian Battalion. Projected move of 14 Swedish Battalion has been deferred indefinitely.

### Future Operations

The concept of future operations as got from Brigade HQ visualises the speedy round-up of mercenaries. To this end familiarisation tours of the City and surrounding areas are in progress.

RUNDA

/OVER.



## 28. RÚNDA

### Routine Activity

1 Feb'62

Lt Col Ryan was appointed a member of mixed Military Commission ONUC and Katanga Forces to study ways and means of getting white mercenaries out of KATANGA. The Commission visited JADOTVILLE, KOLWESI and KIPUSHI.

2 Feb'62

Katanga authorities cut off public phones. A wireless net and a field telephone system were adequate.

The engine of an ONUC truck took fire on the airport road. No one was injured. Helicopter recce flights were availed of by Officers of the Battalion.

3 Feb'62

The manager of ELACAT refrigeration plant requested a guard of Irish troops to prevent looting by refugees. The guard was provided.

There was a small-pox scare at KAMINA.

A lorry of armed Gendarmerie came to the Irish lines with a funeral for the local cemetery. They were escorted back to the City by an Irish patrol.

A request for permission to fire 20mm Atk range practices was refused due to cease fire.

4 Feb'62

The Civil Police returned to the Police Camp in the Irish lines. They left before darkness because of the fear of refugees.

5 Feb'62

Bn O/C and O/C 'B' Coy spent a weeks holiday in ALBERTVILLE.

Special arrangements were made for the disposal of unexploded bombs in the City of ELIZABETHVILLE.

The daily patrol to the INDUSTRIALLE area was withdrawn due to the improvement of the situation there.

6 Feb'62

A platoon each from 'B' and 'C' Coys cleared squatters from the BCK Camp at the TUNNEL at 04.30hrs.

Father Crean went to LEOPOLDVILLE for conference on refugee problem.

7 Feb'62

The refugees and BCK workers from RUASHI fought on AVE SCERIERS. An Irish patrol dispersed them.

/OVER.

RÚNDA

## RÚNDA

8 Feb'62

The Tunisian Battalion moved into CAMP MASSARD.

9 Feb'62

'C' Coy evacuated the BCK Hospital at the TUNNEL and withdrew to LIEGE/ELACAT. A bungalow was retained for the defence of the TUNNEL and the protection of the BCK Hospital.

Lt Col Ryan went to KIPUSHI with the mixed Commission.

A Congolese, released from prison in JADOTVILLE was given refuge in the Irish Refugee Camp.

10 Feb'62

Irish Police and Civil Police co-operated in the search for stolen cars in the Refugee Camp.

11 Feb'62

The petrol ration was reduced to 600 litres per day.

12 Feb'62

Unexploded bombs were removed from the Swiss Consulate and UNION MINIERE at LUMUMBASHI.

Some Jeunesse leaders were arrested for fomenting disturbances in the refugee camp.

A' Coy provided standing patrols to prevent looting of food from railway wagons at the TUNNEL.

13 Feb'62

Traffic going through the Irish lines was to be checked during the hours of darkness only.

14 Feb'62

Enquiry into losses of arms, equipment and vehicles during the operations in December was begun.

15 Feb'62

Irish patrols were to avoid AVE CHURCHILL and ASTRID due to the meeting of the KATANGA PARLIAMENT.

An African reported the location of an ammunition dump to 'C' Coy. 791 rounds of FN ammunition was found.

16 Feb'62

The Katangese distributed pamphlets in town urging refugees to return to the Communes and live in peace with their brother Africans.

17 Feb'62

The Civil Police handed in a list of stolen vehicles. A check of vehicles was made in the refugee camp.

/OVER.

RÚNDA

## RÚNDA

18 Feb'62

Gelignite was found in railway carriages at the TUNNEL. The cargo was released on production of authority from the ONUC Rep. It was for use in KIPUSHI copper mines.

19 Feb'62

Katanga Command requested the return of shops occupied by 'B' Coy to the owners. NO shops were occupied by 'B' Coy.

20 Feb'62

A strike in the Post Office in LEOPOLDVILLE caused a delay in Irish mail.

One platoon of infantry and a section of Armoured Cars co-operated with the Civil Police in a search for arms without incident at RUASHI Commune at 04.30hrs.

The Refugee Camp was searched for stolen aviation spirit. Twenty-three barrels were found and confiscated.

21 Feb'62

Normal patrols and escorts were carried out.

22 Feb'62

Officers went on familiarisation flights over the area by helicopter.

Lt Col Ryan went to KOLWESI on Mixed Military Commission.

23 Feb'62

A bullock ran amok on AVE SCERIERS. The refugees tried to drive it into their camp. The Civil Police shot at it. It attacked the Police. The Police retreated at the double. The animal was cornered by the Irish patrol and destroyed by the owners.

MR.URQUART called on a farewell visit to the Irish Bn. Comdt D.Hurley was acting O/C during the absence of Lt Col Ryan with the Mixed Commission.

24 Feb'62

Young refugees were on looting expeditions. Steps were taken to stop them.

An explosion which took place on the KASENGA ROAD was caused by a Swedish soldier destroying a car with grenades.

25 Feb'62

Shots were fired into the Swedish Camp, it was NOT established by whom. A refugee was beaten up by the Katanga Police because he was found in possession of a gun.

/OVER.

RÚNDA

26 Feb'62

New postal arrangements were made between IRELAND and the CONGO.

An African was found shot dead at PROCONGO - AVE SCERLERS. Irish and Swedish patrols, Civil Police and Gendarmerie M.Ps were on the scene. The matter was dealt with by the Civil authorities.

27 Feb'62

Lt Col Hogan returned to duty.

Shots were heard in the City. Reasons for shooting were NOT established. Shots were fired in the vicinity of the Swedish Camp and the Refugee Camp.

28 Feb'62

Unarmed Gendarmerie were reported in the Irish Battelion. lines. They were escorted quietly out of the area.

An 81mm Mortar of 35 Inf Bn was found with Royal Malays in ALBERTVILLE.

1 Mar'62

Lt Col Hogan moved to hospital in LEOPOLDVILLE.

Small parties of Gendarmerie continued to move around Irish lines.

2 Mar'62

To 'C' Coy was added a further patrol duty of guarding a UN refugee food store on AVE LIEGE.

The Golf Clubhouse was handed back to the Golf Committee by the DOGRA Battalion (Indian). However, Irish Officers continued to play golf on the course. The DOGRA Bn occupied the Golf Ridge and lived under canves.

3 Mar'62

Two platoons of Armed Gendarmerie moved into Irish lines with a funeral to the City cemetery which was within Irish area. 36 Inf Bn patrol was alerted and escorted the Gendarmerie out of the Irish area. There were NO incidents. A complaint was lodged with UN and orders were issued by Military Commander that armed Gendarmerie would be disarmed in future.

4 Mar'62

The Irish defence post at the 'SHOPS' on the NORTH side of the refugee camp was busy with:

- a. The recovery of a stolen car.
- b. The care of an African who was beaten up by the Jeunesse.
- c. The investigation of the shooting of an African by the Katanga Police.

Orders were issued by the Bn O/C that all movement to City would be escorted, due to the unrest and tension there, caused by the defection of a member of the Katanga Government to the Congolese.

5 Mar'62

Orders issued by O/C IR Bn to disarm any armed members of Gendarmerie found in Irish lines.

6 Mar'62

A search was made by an Irish patrol in the "Irish" section of the refugee camp to trace a stolen car, reported by Katanga Police to have been stolen by refugees. No car found.

The order to disarm the Gendarmerie was cancelled for political reasons, but they are to be kept outside Irish lines.

7 Mar'62

Bn 10 interviewed Capt MWAPE MUMFUNTE of the Gend Para Commandos at the TUNNEL.

Cpl Power of 'A' Coy died at the U.N Hospital ELIZABETHVILLE from natural causes.

A message was received from UN HQ KATANGA that NO UN personnel would be permitted to drive captured civilian cars.

UN Security Police were to set up check points on main routes to prevent such driving, and disciplinary action was to be taken where necessary.

The following message was received from 'A' Coy at "THE SHOPS".

"Three large cars followed by a jeep, with two Gends on board, kept moving at a fast speed past the SHOPS at 12.00hrs today towards RUASHI. Although a signal was given to slow down it was ignored. It was suspected that MR.MUNONGO was travelling in one of the cars. NO confirmation that the cars were state cars".

8 Mar'62

Gendarmerie found on perimeter of Irish defence position by Irish patrol were removing furniture from store. After investigation it was established that the material was Gend property.

9 Mar'62

GURKHA soldiers who were drawing food from ELACAT molested the Katanga Police. These Police were a joint standing patrol with Irish. MR.SAPWE, the Police Chief, made an official complaint and after a conference with Bn 10 peace was restored.

10 Mar'62

Memorial Service and formal parade ordered by Force Commander (Lt Gen McKEOWN) for thirteen ITALIAN airmen killed in KINDU by Congolese on the 11/11/61. UN flags were to be lowered between 10.00hrs and 12.00hrs, and the following elegy was to be read by O/C Parade.

"For us they live 'til life shall end  
The frailties and the follies of those years  
Their strength which only pride of loss could  
lend  
Their vanished hopes, their sorrows and their  
tears  
But slowly towards the verge the dim sky clears  
For nobler men may yet redeem our clay  
When we and war together one wise day,  
Have passed away".

Katanga Civil Police, having been enticed by offers of Irish protection, agreed to set up a Refugee Control Point on the KASENGA ROAD. They occupied the old Police Camp and would only operate during hours of daylight due to fear of refugees.

An Indian soldier who wandered out of bounds in ELIZABETHVILLE was taken prisoner by the Gendarmerie near the KENYA native commune. All UN units were alerted in case of reprisals.

An attempted robbery by a refugee at Irish Bn HQ was foiled by a Sentry.

Two shillelaghs were received from IRELAND for Brigadier Raja and Colonel Waern.

11 Mar'62

Movement of UN troops in ELIZABETHVILLE was restricted due to Gendarmerie parade.

A Sentry from 36 IR Bn fired over natives who were attempting to steal tentage from Irish lines.

12 Mar'62

Orders were issued for the evacuation of refugees from houses beside Irish lines where they had squatted. This was done for reasons of health and for better control.

13 Mar'62

Refugee clearance operation completed by 08.00hrs.

There were two Indian rocket projectiles removed from the house of a Director of UNION MINIERE in EVILLE.

The Bn 10 investigated a report (false) that Gendarmerie had mounted guns in BCK Camp near TUNNEL.

A message was received that Brigadiers Raja and Noronha would visit Irish Bn on 19 Mar.

# RUNDA

14 Mar'62

A Gendarmerie Para-Commando was found in the Irish lines by Refugee Police. He was taken over by an Irish MP and sent back to the City - very much the worse for wear.

The 10-in-Chief UN Leo visited Bn HQ. Had long conference with Unit Intelligence Officer re: possible operations towards JADOTVILLE.

15 Mar'62

General RIKRYE (Indian), military adviser to Secretary General visited the Irish Battalion accompanied by Colonel AERN, O/C 1 Bde.

A carload of Gendarmerie came through the TUNNEL into 'C' Coy lines. They were escorted back to the City via LIEGE/SAVONNIERS barrier.

Bde OIC and O/C Irish Bn to meet Brigadiers at UNION MINIERE on 19 Mar.

16 Mar'62

Nine unarmed Gendarmerie called to ELACAT for meat supplies. They were allowed to draw their requirements and use the LIEGE route ONLY.

An Ordnance inspection team from LEOPOLDVILLE (PAKISTANIS) found the weapons of the Irish Battalion in good condition. (see Ordnance report)

Four parties of Gendarmerie tried to move through the TUNNEL into Irish lines. The MP on duty succeeded in persuading them to turn back. They hurled abusive language at him and threw SIMBA bottles on the road. O/C issued orders to halt such parties beyond barrier in future in order that they could be turned back before coming to grips with them.

St. Patrick's Day greetings were received from UN Force Commander (Lt Gen McKeown) and the Irish Ambassador in Nigeria. Irish artists arrived to entertain UN troops in KATANGA.

Harry Bailey	-	Comedian and Violinist
Ed Browne	-	Tenor
Dolly McMahan	-	Ballad Singer
Monica Bonnie	-	Xylophone and Singer
Jackie Farne	-	Accordion and Pianist

17 Mar'62

St. Patrick's Day was celebrated by a ceremonial parade to Mass at 08.00hrs and the blessing and distribution of shamrock by Rev. Fr. Crean, C.F., followed by an address of good wishes in Irish and English from An tAire Cosanta - amplified by public address over the parade ground.

Hurling and Football matches were organised and members of other UN contingents attended.

/OVER.

19 Mar'62

General NORONHA, incoming Commander of UN Forces Katanga Command, (accompanied by Brigadier RAJA), arrived at HQ 36 Inf Bn on an official visit. He was received by a Guard of Honour under Lt G.Murphy, Lt A.Carr i/c Colour Party. He was briefed by the Operations Officer on the role of battalion in ELIZABETHVILLE.

He inspected the HQ and Company locations. Great satisfaction was expressed by Brigadier NORONHA on the organisation and efficiency of the unit.

20 Mar'62

Two African girls were abducted by Jeunesse. Swedish UN personnel searched the camp and found the girls. The Jeunesse were arrested.

21 Mar'62

It was reported that unexploded mortar bombs and grenades were located in various parts of the City of EVILLE. These were disposed of by the Ordnance Officer and his Staff.

Two jeep-loads of Gendarmerie attempted to pass through the Bn barrier at the TUNNEL. They were turned back by the Sentry at the barrier without incident.

22 Mar'62

Brigadier General K.A.S.RAJA left ELIZABETHVILLE on route to INDIA, having completed his tour of duty.

Rep of the 36 Irish Bn and Band were among the party at Elizabethville Airport to see him off.

Four Indian soldiers went outside UN bounds and were taken prisoners by the Gendarmerie. After negotiations they were released.

There were reports that Gendarmerie in ELIZABETHVILLE had mutinied. As a result UN units were placed on the alert. The Tunisian Battalion was detailed as 'Stand to' for the City. Slight panic prevailed in ELIZABETHVILLE. Gendarmerie were alerted by TSHOMBE. Schools were evacuated and closed. There were no incidents.

Brigadier NORONHA assumed command of all UN troops in KATANGA.

Brigadier NORONHA, O/C KAT Comd sent the following message to Lt Col T.Ryan, O/C 36 Inf Bn.

/OVER.



"Assuming command of Katanga Command, I wish to say that I deem it a great honour and privilege to be associated with such gallant leaders and veteran soldiers in the task of restoring normality to this strife-torn country. You have on many occasions, even at the cost of supreme sacrifice, upheld the great traditions of your army and the ideals of the UN organisation. I have no doubt whatever of the odds, and with the grace of God we will continue to strive, as in the past, to bring to a successful conclusion our mission here. In accomplishing this I look to you for your willing co-operation which, I am confident, will always be forthcoming, and from my side you can always count on my unstinted support in all your endeavours."

S.C.SUNDERJI, MAJOR COS.

23 Mar'62

The question of a bar to the Congo Medal was discussed at Kat Comd. The question of the issue of a special medal for those engaged in the fighting in ELIZABETHVILLE during December 1961 was also discussed.

24 Mar'62

Evacuation of refugees to communes in ELIZABETHVILLE was organised by UN.

Powers of arrest of civilian lawbreakers were given to Military Police.

The situation in NORTH KATANGA was reported as quiet, but that ANC were commandeering trucks in the ALBERTVILLE area. A small detachment of the 36 Bn was in ALBERTVILLE in charge of Irish Stores

25 Mar'62

Two new Gendarmerie posts were set up - one at the rear of Ecole St Boniface Stade Ave Prince Leopold. It was manned by five Gends by day and twenty Gends by night. The post held three MGs. The second post was on the circuit DE LA KASAPA about two kilometres from the Golf Course. This position was well dug-in and had one LMG. All units were informed of these posts and no action would be taken pending UN-TSHOMBE talks.

Shots were heard in the direction of the Swedish Camp. On investigation by 10 it was found that dogs were being exterminated by the Swedes.

26 Mar'62

A farewell message was sent to Lt Col Hogan on the occasion of his departure to IRELAND.

/OVER.

# RUNDA

37.

The following reports were received from UN Civil Rep (Mr. J. Rolz-Bennett).

On Mar 6 Mr. TSHOMBE, together with his ministers, met UN officials in the presence of Consular Reps. On behalf of UN, full assurances were given to Mr. TSHOMBE concerning his visit to Leopoldville to begin discussions on the KITONA agreement (which brought about the Cease Fire in Dec. '61). When the UN agreement had been stated, the British Consul then suggested that, since the assurance was comprehensive now, Mr. TSHOMBE should go to Leo soon. Mr. TSHOMBE stated that it was his intention to go on Mar 15 (the last date set by UN).

It was essential now for UN to preserve the attitude of caution, discretion and vigilance until the meeting would get started in Leo. The fact that the meeting would take place was merely the first step; the second would be discussion, and the third agreement. UN diplomatic policy would be to go step by step.

27/3/'62.

A message was received from Capt. HANSEN, Assistant Comd IO, that four Tunisian soldiers were captured by Kat Police at AVE MUNAMA.

A report came from Capt. KEYS 'C' Coy that he was told by a refugee of six Indian soldiers having been captured by Gendarmerie. This report was confused with the capture of four Tunisians reported earlier. Both reports were not confirmed.

28/3/'62.

A message was received that COLONEL GONARD, Vice President of the International Red Cross Committee Geneva would visit units of 1 Bde on the 28th and would arrive with the 36 IR Bn at 10.15 hrs.

1 Bde, (36 IR Bn and 14 Swedish Bn) was disestablished as Swedish Bn moved to KAMINA Air Base. Documents were taken over by Bn Ops Offr. A rear-party of the 14 Swedish Bn remained behind to hand over duties of Refugee Camp to Tunisian Battalion. The duties of 14 Swedish Bn at CAMP MASSARD were taken over by the 4 RAJ RIF Indian Bn.

Tunisians were introduced to the system of refugee food supply.

Lt/Col Ryan and Comdt Beary travelled to Leopoldville for the departure to Ireland of the Force Commander - Lt/Gen McKeown.

There was a complaint from the Swedish-Tunisian Group that too many visitors were going through the Refugee Camp. This put a strain on security and interfered with the adm of the camp and the discipline of the refugees.

Irish Bn had Refugee Camp out of bounds to all except those on duty so we were not affected.

RUNDA

29/3/'62.

14 Swedish Bn continued move to KAMINA. The RUASHI Commune mobile patrol and the standing patrol at "THE SHOPS" were taken over by the 36 IR Bn from the Swedish Bn until the Tunisian Bn was reinforced. This put a considerable strain on the 36 IR Bn and Comd was pressed for a relief as soon as possible.

At the KASENGA barrier refugee youths stoned Irish sentries. As a result all Africans were prohibited from using the SAVONNIERS and KASENGA routes to EVILLE without a written pass issued from 36 IR Bn HQ.

Two whites were attacked and injured on the KASENGA road by Africans bent on looting. One African was apprehended by a member of the Bn and handed over to the Civil Police.

RÚNDA

C O N F I D E N T I A L.

39

HQ.,  
36 Bn ONUC.REPORT ON OPS NO 6.Sit to 28 Feb  
Diary to 28 Feb.Political Situation.

The political situation has stabilised almost to the point of stalemate but since Tshombe has agreed, in principle, to unite with the Congo and to pay off the mercenaries the UN, having achieved its object, has no function in the matter except to ensure that the Katanga Government will continue to act in good faith.

In order to ensure that there will NOT be a reversion to the situation which obtained in December UN contingents are being kept in the Eville area at full strength.

Katanga Situation.

The Joint Commission has now completed its first series of inspections and found no evidence that mercenaries are still employed in any capacity by the Katangese Forces. This is NOT to say that they have all gone, in EVILLE alone there are upwards of one hundred who appear to be unemployed at present but who could become a source of conflict.

The Gendarmerie situation continues as previously reported with this difference that small unarmed parties pop up on our perimeter and move within our area. It is NOT considered that this has any particular significance but the situation is being watched carefully.

To summarise, it can be said that the enemy in the EVILLE area has no capability other than to harass our forces; the implementation of such a course is very unlikely. For the future it is expected that every change will, from our point of view, be for the better.

Katangese military effort now seems to be directed against the ANC and it is apparent that Tshombe has tapped off his available forces from SOUTH KATANGA in an effort to secure his northern frontiers. With all Katanga secured by the Gendarmerie, his hand for future negotiations would be so much stronger.

Own Forces.

No significant change in dispositions of either 1 or 2 Bde. Covert intelligence effort being directed towards elucidating the true situation at JADOTVILLE. It must be stressed, however, that while the present political situation continues, military operations of any kind are NOT in prospect.

Home Front.

Irish newspapers continue to give scare headline coverage to events in the Congo. It must be stressed that the situation here could NOT be more normal.

## RÚNDA

Period of Tension.30/3/'62.

The Courtmartial of ten members of Bn commenced. Some of these trials were outstanding since the fighting in December, 1961.

President:	Comdt. J.J. Griffen.
Prosecuting Officer:	Comdt. J. Heron.
Legal Officer:	Capt. J. Sweeney.

Fifteen civilian reporters arrived to hear the proceedings of the Courtmartial because of rumours that pers were being charged for looting. The Court ordered that under the Defence Act, 1954 (in the interests of security) they would not be admitted. They complained directly to the Force Commander who ordered the matter to be investigated by Brigadier NORONHA, O/C Kat Comd, directly with Lt. Col. Ryan, O/C 36 IR Bn. O/C Kat Comd and O/C 36 Bn instructed the President of the Court (Comdt. J.J. Griffen) to submit an explanation for transmission by telex to the Force Commander. The Section of the Defence Act, 1954, was quoted and nothing further was heard concerning the complaint.

UN HQ issued orders that NO UN pers would enter native communes.

IR Bn requested to take over from the 14 Swedish Bn the duties of protecting Belgian families in the Bel-Air area EVILLE. An additional barrier had to be set up by the Bn at the junction of SAVONNIERS and KASENGA roads.

31/3/'62.

As a result of anti-UN demonstrations in EVILLE, particularly at UN barriers all unescorted movement to the city was prohibited. The platoon at the TUNNEL was alerted for trouble.

Press LO Kat Comd, Mr. BACK, conferred with Bn IO (Comdt. Harrison) concerning the release of information to the Press. It was decided that a black-out of news would be detrimental to UN as Irish publicity had been an advantage to UN.

Lt. Col. Ryan was appointed as A/OC 1 Bde w.e.f. 31 Mar in addition to his duties as O/C 36 IR Bn. The Brigade now was composed of the 36 Bn and the 14 Tunisian Bn. Orders issued by Kat Comd for implementation by the Irish and Tunisian Bn were referred to the Staffs of the two Bns who put their heads together and in English and French very successfully carried out their mission.

The Purafina Garage on the KASENGA ROAD, evacuated by the Swedish Bn, was taken over by EME Indian technicians to maintain and service Irish, Tunisian and Ethiopian vehicles.

1/4/'62.

Ops Offr and IO held a conference with offr of 14 Swedish Bn pending the arrival of the 14 Tunisian Bn.

All IR Bn barriers reported hearing firing of shots after hours of darkness. This was eventually traced to the Swedish section of the Refugee Camp.

2/4/'62.

The RUASHI Police Chief called to Bn HQ for discussions with IO concerning protection of RUASHI people (who were pro-Tshombe), This Commune was isolated from the other Communes of EVILLE and close to the Refugee Camp (anti-Tshombe). It was agreed that joint RUASHI Police/IRISH patrols would continue.

3/4/'62.

The Tunisians complained that their African employees from the Refugee Camp were prevented from passing through Irish barriers to CAMP MASSARD for work. This was due to Africans having been diverted to one route only into city. A roll was issued by the Tunisians and the Bn IO issued the passes.

An African who was wanted by the UN security police was apprehended at "THE SHOPS". He was placed in jail in the Swedish camp pending collection.

A sentry in 'C' Coy area fired over African youths who were stoning him.

4/4/'62.

A goods train passing by the TUNNEL from JADOTVILLE to KOLWEZI was held up by 'C' Coy and examined. It was found that some aircraft parts were aboard. Comd was informed and the cargo was impounded. Tshombe's foreign Minister KIMBA threatened violence against UN for holding up the train. All UN pers were alerted and barriers were reinforced.

5/4/'62.

A lorry load of unarmed Guards were turned back at the TUNNEL. The Gends. threw bottles on the road as a protest. The sentries took no action. O/C IR Bn requested Kat Comd to make protest to Katangese.

6/4/'62.

It was arranged by MR. TSHOMBE that the Provincial Assembly would meet on the 9th April. The 36 IR Bn was detailed to provide security for members of Assembly at the MUSEUM.

Balubakat deputies arriving for the meeting of the Assembly were to be accommodated in SABENA Guest House and a guard was to be provided by the Indian Raj Rif Bn. Their escorts to and from Parliament would be provided by the Malayan Squadron and the 63 Cav Sqn (5 Indep Armd Indian Sqn). The 1 DOGRA Bn would assist the 36 IR Bn in security during the assembly of Parliament of 9th April. IR Bn was to provide one pl of infantry and one section of Armd Cars.

7/4/'62.

The meeting of the Provincial Assembly was cancelled due to the absence of Mr. TSHOMBE in Leopoldville.

The husband of a refugee reported that his wife was abducted while washing clothes at a pool adjacent to route CHARLIE. A search was organised by IO without result.

It was reported from the IR patrol at "THE SHOPS" that there was shooting inside the Refugee Camp.

8/4/'62.

Lt. Col. Ryan, A/OC 36 IR Bn was appointed Bn O/C, w.e.f. 4 April, 1962.

Ptes. Moffat and Robinson (who had been captured by Gendarmerie after Christmas, '61 and whose release was arranged by UN together with a Swedish Major), were sent back to IRELAND with an escort, after having been courtmartialled.

9/4/'62.

Routine only.

10/4/'62.

A schedule of flights to and from EVILLE to LEO, A'VILLE, MANONA, LULUABURG and KAMINA, was issued by Kat Comd.

A request was received from Lt. Gen. McKeown for a report on the December '61 fighting in EVILLE by Irish troops.

There was an influx of refugees to houses in 'A' Coy area on AVE TULIPIERS. This was investigated by the Bn IO who arranged their accommodation in the Refugee Camp.

A Swedish truck crashed through 'A' Coy barrier on KASENGA. There were NO casualties.

11/4/'62.

UN Security Police and Civil Police arrived at Bn HQ to interrogate a Belgian living nearby. Bn IO was a member of the Group.

Shots were heard in the direction of CAMP MASSARD.

12/4/'62.

Routine only.

13/4/'62.

Shots after last light were reported as coming from the direction of AREA INDUSTRIALLE.

14/4/'62.

Rev. Fr. Crean and the Bn IO went with Refugee representatives to a meeting with delegates from the Central Congolese Government at Tunisian Bn HQ.

'A' Coy reported that shots were coming from the direction of the city. Later established that Police were inspecting vehicles in town and establishing their authority by firing rifles.

15/4/'62.

Routine only.

16/4/'62.

A circular was issued by Kat Comd HQ stressing the dangers involved in UN personnel approaching Gend road blocks. This was issued to all sub-units.

## RÚNDA

17/4/'62.

It was announced that a 37th Bn was being formed and that the Adv Party would arrive on the 12th May. The 36th Bn Adv Party would depart on or before 15th May.

18/4/'62.

Mr. TSHOMBE was prevented from leaving LEO for EVILLE. Considerable tension existed in LEO and EVILLE. EVILLE was placed out of bounds until further notice to all UN troops because of tension.

Reported by Africans that Swedish or Irish Troops involved in a fight with Gends in EVILLE. A check was made throughout the Irish Bn and no one was missing, nor had anyone been involved.

Shots being fired in various parts of EVILLE.

It was learned that the ANC prevented Mr. TSHOMBE'S plane from leaving LEOPOLDVILLE Airport for EVILLE. Mr. KIMBA, of TSHOMBE'S Cabinet, issued a statement that if TSHOMBE'S plane had not arrived in EVILLE on the morning of the 19th there would be "trouble".

It was reported by an African that war material was being transported by rail through EVILLE to JADOTVILLE. The report was investigated and no war material was found.

O/C Bn ordered that all off-duty pers of the Bn would only travel to EVILLE under escort and i/c an officer. This officer would be in possession of a nominal roll of pers from various sub-units travelling on the UN bus.

The O/C Bn forwarded the following letter to the Chief of Staff, Kat Comd.

"The sit in regard to transport in the Bn has become a cause for concern. It was anticipated that the Bn would receive some surplus troop carrying vehicles from the IV Swedish Bn on its departure to KAMINA. None were handed over. The standard of the vehicles on charge has deteriorated and many of them are breaking down continually. The minimum additional requirement of vehicles as follows is urgent:

- a. Two trucks suitable for troop carrying.
- b. Two land rovers/pick-ups for patrol.

19/4/'62.

Information was received that Mr. TSHOMBE would arrive in EVILLE at 10.00 hrs. No UN troops were to move near EVILLE Airport or on the route to the Airport or in the city of EVILLE. The daily Irish Patrol covering the route to the Airport was ordered off the route during the trip of Mr. TSHOMBE and his Party from the Airport to the city.

A number of single shots and some automatic fire was heard in the area of CAMP MASSARD.

20/4/'62.

Provisional order for the arrival of the 37th Bn was issued.

RÚNDA



## RÚNDA

21/4/'62.

A car stolen by Refugees was located by Irish MP and returned to its lawful owner. The car had two sporting rifles and two revolvers concealed in the body of the car. These weapons were confiscated.

The A Car patrol in the INDUSTRIALLE AREA was ordered to investigate a report that Gends were moving material from the old Gend Depot in the area.

22/4/'62.

There was a clash between the Ruashi Civil Police and Refugees. IO to scene at once. O/C Bn Ops Offr and Patrol moved to the north of the Refugee Camp to investigate and separate the Police and the Refugees. Tunisian Patrol got the Refugees under control. Some Refugees had come by weapons to attack the Police. The Irish and Tunisian Patrols eventually succeeded in pushing both the Ruashi Police and the Refugees apart. The Irish Patrol remained in the area on patrol. The Chief of Police, Ruashi, was instructed by IO to keep the Police out of sight until tension eased. Some refugees were wounded in this incident but it was reported in EVILLE that 15 persons were killed. A reporter, JOHN LATTS, from an English daily newspaper arrived at Bn HQ to get details. He was surprised to hear the facts..

23/4/'62.

Telephone line to the "SHOPS" was cut. Congolese often took the wire for their various needs. Radio comn was substituted.

24/4/'62.

A burst of automatic fire was heard in the area of CAMP MASSARD. No reason was found for the shooting.

25/4/'62.

A Director of the Civil Police in EVILLE, Mr. de Fruit, (a Belgian) arrived at Bn HQ to confer with the IO and discussed the patrolling of the BEL AIR area for the prevention of looting. It was arranged that only mixed Irish-Civil Police patrols would be agreed to as the Irish patrols had been accused of looting.

The Bn Swimming Gala was held at the STADE Swimming Pool. It was a great success.

26/4/'62.

The schedule of load tables for the airlift of personnel and stores was issued by Kat Comd.

O/C Bn received a farewell message from Lt. Col. HAZARI of DOGRA (Indian) who was returning to INDIA.

Orders were issued to the Bn IO to arrange that Ruashi Police would not move outside the Commune nor would they be reinforced from EVILLE.

RÚNDA

27/4/'62.

There was some shooting heard in the Refugee Camp. No Irish troops were involved.

An evening social was held at Bn HQ Mess for all Bn Officers.

28/4/'62

Captured bicycles were collected for disposal.

It was arranged with the Civil Police for the collection of a criminal in the Irish section of the Refugee Camp.

29/4/'62.

Routine only.

30/4/'62.

Arrangements were made for the relief of the Irish Post at "THE SHOPS" by the 14 Tunisian Bn.

With onset of dry season water patrols had to be organised to prevent a shortage. The Refugees were running taps all over the place. Sentries had to be posted at watering points. Fixed times were arranged for drawing water.

A Congolese was severely injured after having been attacked by Jeunesse. He was taken to the "SHOPS" initially and afterwards to the Refugee Hospital.

A message was received that Maj Gen KEBEDE GABRE, Force Comdr, accompanied by Maj Gen G.L. YACOB, Deputy Force Comdr., Maj Gen DEWAN, PREM CHAND, New Gen Offr Comd Kat Area, and Brig R.S. N OROHNA, M.C. would be arriving at EVILLE on 1 May.

All Offrs Commanding Units of Kat Comd were to be present at the Airport to receive the Party. A Guard of Honour for the Force Comd would be supplied by the 2/5 GURKHA Bn. The escort of Force Comd from Airport to residence and during stay would be provided by the Malayan Armd Squadron.

The Guard of Honour for the Force Comd departure would be provided by the 14 Tunisian Bn.

1/5/'62.

A military funeral with Escrts (horse, motor cycle and foot) and attended by top Katnagese Brass was allowed to pass to the cemetery in Irish lines. There was no incident. A 36 Bn patrol stood by to "see" the Gonds out of the Irish area. The funeral was that of an Officer of Mr. TSHOMBE's Gendarmerie who had been killed in a motor cycle accident.

2/5/'62.

A warning was issued to all sub-units of the Irish Bn concerning the movements and timings of the Force Comd through Irish lines. The Force Commander and Party were briefed on the dispositions and activities of the Irish Bn by the Bn Ops Offr. Afterwards the Party was entertained to lunch at the Officers' Club by the Bn OC and Staff.

A UN bus carrying Irish troops on local leave in EVILLE hit a lamp-post when reversing outside the Post Office. The Offr i/c bus contacted the Civil Police and reported the

# RUNDA

46.

incident. The bus was sent back to the Irish lines and the Offr was driven back to his unit by the Police. Some civilians tried to agitate the Gends to attack the Irish troops. This was averted by the intervention of the Civil Police.

3/5/'62.

A message of greeting was received from the new Comdr of Kat Comd, Gen PREM CHAND.

Two land mines were examined by the Bn Ord Offr and disposed of.

Detachment of 14 Swedish Bn moved to KAMINA.

4/5/'62.

Two unexploded mortar bombs found in the Tunisian Bn area near CAMP MASSARD were disposed of by the Bn Ord Offr. These bombs were the first of this type encountered (diameter 4", length 2'). They were thought to be of EAST EUROPEAN origin. A remarkable fact was that the HE contained an alloy of copper. It was thought that they would be used as Atk mines. The exterior was prepared for the insertion of fuzes. The nearest projectile used by the Irish Army to resemble them would be the 3.7" AA Shell fitted with fins.

5/5/'62. to 9/5/'62.

Plans were announced for the evacuation of Refugees to KASAI.

MOVING HOME.

10/5/'62.

64 pers and 1,000 lbs stores dep from EVILLE on one aircraft containing Bn Adv Party.

Tunisian Bn was informed that trip-flares were placed by 36 Bn on footpaths leading to Refugee Camp for the purpose of preventing Africans from entering the Refugee Camp after darkness.

Major FURSTLUNG (Swedish), Offr i/c Refugee Camp and LO with Tunisians requested the provision of a bulldozer and driver to level ground along railway line at Refugee Camp for the entrainment of Refugees and their belongings. This was agreed to.

11/5/'62.

Remains of the late Capt Dick McCann, who was killed near the port of MATADI travelled with the Adv Party bound for Ireland.

The Adv Party of the 37th Bn, consisting of 18 Offrs and 31 O/Rs, arrived in EVILLE on the 19th May with Comdt. B. McGurk i/c.

Three Irish TV personnel to arrive 12th May and be briefed by Mr. BACK, UN Press Offr Kat Comd.

# RUNDA

12/5/'62.

A message was received from KAMINA that Irish ammo in store there would have to be moved or handed over to the PAKISTANI Ord Unit in KAMINA as the store was urgently required by the Swedish Bn.

It was reported from 'C' Coy Post that there was an explosion at the "SHOPS". The telephone line (as usual) was cut and communication was by radio.

First trainload of Refugees left EVILLE.

The Irish TV Crew carried out a camera survey of the activities of the 36 Bn during the six months in EVILLE. By means of interviews and commentaries they covered the life of the Bn and visited each Coy locality. They did a camera tour of EVILLE and the Refugee Camp. They also travelled with patrols and contacted Congolese personnel. (The film was shown on their return on Telefís Éireann during June, 1962).

13/5/'62.

Evacuation of Refugees was in progress. Indian units supplied the train Guard and food. A number of Africans (not Refugees) in the EVILLE area and in the Communes, hearing of a free train trip to KASAI, commenced moving into the Refugee Camp. This caused chaos in evacuation plans. Orders were issued by Kat Comd to the IR and Tunisian Bns to seal off the Refugee Camp, both night and day, to prevent mass movement into the Camp. New Irish Posts were set up on the roads, the railway line and on the approaches to the Refugee Camp to prevent mass movement into the Camp.

The following actions were taken to control movement of Refugees.

'A' Coy at the "SHOPS" established a 24 hr post (1 NCO, 5 Men) at the junc of AVE SCERIERES and AVE TULIPIERS to prevent entry of Africans from EVILLE and the Communes.

Foot patrols along AVE SCERIERES were extended to the junction of AVE SCERIERES/AVE TULIPIERS by day (as supplied by Company at SHOPS).

One A Car would patrol from the SCERIERES-TULIPIERS junc to RUASHI by day.

By night the foot patrol was carried out by a vehicle patrol from "THE SHOPS", and all foot posts were withdrawn.

HQ Coy established a 24 hr post at the junc of the RLY-TULIPIERS, manned by 1 NCO and 3 Men.

Africans found trying to enter the Refugee Camp at the HQ Coy barrier were pushed back beyond the perimeter posts by Bn Orderly Officer and 20 O/Ranks. Baggage was taken away by UN transport.

All new Posts were supplied with verey light pistols and amn, and the new post at SCERIERES-TULIPIERS junc in telephone contact with the "SHOPS". This Post was to be augmented by RUASHI Police.

# RUNDA

48.

There were 1,456 Refugees evacuated by train from EVILLE on the 12th May, escorted by one Coy Group Indian Bn.

The MADRAS Patrol (Indian) encountered two armed Gends in the city. They were disarmed and the weapons were given over to the Civil Police.

TV equipment for the Irish TV Team was offloading in LEO. Orders were issued to have the eqpt in EVILLE immediately.

A further Refugee problem was created in EVILLE because Balubas already living in EVILLE and the Communes were told by CONAKAT tribesmen to clear out to SOUTH KASAI or else.

There was a complaint made that members of Tunisian Post near the "SHOPS" were illtreating Refugees. This matter was brought to the notice of the Tunisian Bn Comd.

COS Kat Comd and Ops Offr 36 Bn inspected all Posts around the Refugee Camp perimeter to ensure that adequate precautions were taken for Refugee control. (It was estimated that there were over 75,000 Refugees in the Camp.)

A message was received that 37 Bn would start move to Congo from Baldonnel on the 18th May.

14/5/'62.

The Tunisian Brass Band gave a recital on the lawn at Bn HQ and were treated to refreshments afterwards. A special salute was played at the end to honour the BN OC.

15/5/'62.

Lt. Carr i/c Armd Car Section on patrol in the RUASHI Commune area reported as follows:-

"I received a complaint that an Irish soldier at the "SHOPS" pointed a rifle at Mr. SINUSA LUMENGO of RUASHI and took the watch he was wearing from his wrist. He was then let go."

The matter was investigated without result.

A message was received concerning loading and allocation of aircraft for the transport of 36 Bn to LEO. Airlift to be co-ord from LEO by dropping 37 Bn partly in LEO and partly in EVILLE.

Bn Ops Offr attended a conference at Tunisian Bn HQ with COS Kat Comd, a French Interpreter from Kat Comd, O/C Tunisian Bn and the Adjutant of the Tunisian Bn (who spoke French and English). At this conference it was arranged that the 36 Bn would be relieved from defence and patrol Posts around the Refugee Camp by the Tunisian Bn on the 16th May. The SCERIERS-RUASHI Patrol would be taken over immediately. Armd Cars would withdraw at first light and be relieved at 08.00 hrs, and also 'A', 'B' and 'C' Coys. This sit would exist for ten days until the arrival in strength of the 37 Bn.

The Refugee evacuation by train continued. This plan was NOT too successful and consideration was given to the airlifting of Refugees to SOUTH KASAI (later implemented).

RUNDA

16/5/'62.

The following letter was received from the leaders of the Political Refugees in the Irish Section of the Refugee Camp.

"Déténus Politiques Rescapés,  
Camp Irlandais de l'ONUC,  
Elizabethville.

EVILL 16 Mai 1962.

Au Colonel des Troupes  
Irlandaises de l'ONUC,  
S/C de Monsieur l'Aumonier,  
en Chef Crean Fr.,  
Elizabethville.

Mon Colonel,

Les membres et le Comité des D.P.R. vivant sous votre protection, se montrent fort sensibles au resultat obtenu par vous, pour parvenir a nous faire a l'honneur de l'admission de notre delégation a l'Audience des Hautes Autorites de Leopoldville.

A vous-meme, a votre Etat Major et specialment a notre tres devoué et char Père, l'Aumonier en Chef CREAN, nous temoignons sincerement toute notre gratitude.

Nous nous prions par meme occasion de daigner transmettre nos remerciements et notre adination a tous les Soldats Irlandais, pour leur sympathie a notre egard et pour leur conduite exemplaire.

Nous vous promettons, Mon Colonel, que nous ferons rapport a notre Gouvernement de l'efficacite de notre collaboration avec nous, et le prions d'en tenir compte dans cadre des futures relations diplomatiques avec des pays amis.

Vive les Troupes Irlandaises au Congo.  
Vive le Congo Uni.

Pour le President du Comité des P.D.R.,

Les Délégués,

(Signé) Poyo Sebastien.

TSHIBANDA Th F.

These Reps of the Political Refugees held Court each day with their subjects in the Refugee Camp and heard complaints made against one another, complaints made against outsiders, etc. These matters were also taken up the following morning at a fixed time with the Bn IO at Bn HQ. The letter demonstrates the amount of patience and consideration displayed by the Chaplain and IO, who represented the Refugees at UN Civil level.

The following message was received concerning org of Kat Comd.

"Comd and control of all Units in EVILLE area come under HQ Sector B (HQ Indian Independent Brigade Group). All signals and correspondence, including sitreps, would now be addressed to HQ Sector B. This procedure would be effective from 21st May, '62."

HQ Sector sent a message to O/C 36 Bn to the effect that Bn O/C would be required for a conference on the 17th May.

17/5/'62.

Despatch Escort from 36 Bn, operating with Indian Army Post Office relieved. This party of 1 NCO and 2 Men acted as escort of mail from Kat Comd Post Office to units of Kat Comd. The period of duty was one month. It was rotated between units. There were a number of Despatch Escorts required. Only one, however, was required from the 36 Bn at any one time.

The Guard Commander at the Baluba barrier reported that the Tunisians were obstructing the IR sentries in the execution of their duties. This matter arose through a misunderstanding. The Tunisians moved on patrol into the sector allocated to the 36 Bn. The language problem was mainly the difficulty - French on the one hand and English on the other.

It was found difficult to get the number of aircraft being made available for repatriation of 36 Bn and details of load capacity from HQ ONUC Leo. Consequently, provisional plans were made. The plan was to work initially on nine aircraft, each to take 19,000 lbs.

Chalks 1, 2, 3	to Southern Command.
" 4, 5	to 'A' Coy.
" 6, 7	to HQ Coy and A Cars.
" 8, 9	to 'C' Coy and HQ pers.

Pl Comd at the TUNNEL received a message that a complaint had been made by a Bar owner in EVILLE to the effect that Irish soldiers were creating a disturbance there. The Military Police investigated and it was found that the Irish soldiers did not belong to the 36 Bn.

18/5/'62.

HQ ONUC Leo was informed by HQ 36 Bn that a tenth ac would be required with a capacity of 19,000 lbs., in accordance with manifests of personnel made out and load tables.

The TUNNEL duty was changed to a 24 hr duty as follows:-

'A' Coy	-	19th May, '62.
'B' Coy	-	20th May, '62.
'C' Coy	-	21st May, '62,

to facilitate evacuation of troops to airport.

Capt. Brewer, 'C' Coy, reported that an unarmed Gend taken into custody in a house in 'C' Coy area. He was taken from the house and deposited outside the Irish lines.

19/5/'62.

A tele message was received by the O/C Bn from Chief Logistics Offr LEO that claims for ancillary allowances had been settled.

Bn Advance Party in Leopoldville (Capt Kelleher i/c) was having a very busy time organising the arrival of the 37 Bn and the departure of the 36 Bn.

Maj Gen Dewan Prem Chand, Gen Offr Commanding Kat Area, accompanied by Brig Norohna and Staff, visited the Bn.

20/5/'62.

Airlift of Bn commenced from Leo to Dublin as follows:-

Sunday, 20th May, 1962.

Chalk 1	C	118	ETD	08.45 hrs	-	66 pers.
Chalk 2	"	"	"	10.45 hrs	-	66 pers.

Monday, 21st May, 1962.

Chalk 3	C	118	ETD	08.45	-	66 pers.
"	4	"	"	10.45	-	66 pers.
"	Cargo	C 124		09.00	-	22,000 lbs.

Tuesday, 22nd May, 1962.

Chalk 5	C	118		08.45	-	66 Tps.
"	6	C 118		10.45	-	do.
"	Cargo	C 124		10.45	-	Remaining Stores.

Wednesday, 23rd May, 1962.

NIL.

Thursday, 24th May, 1962.

Chalk 7	C	118		03.45	-	66 Tps.
"	8	C 118		05.45	-	64 "

Friday, 25th May, 1962.

Chalk 9	C	118		03.45	-	66 Tps.
"	10	C 118		05.45	-	64 Tps.

Due to engine trouble the last aircraft did not leave LEO until the 29th May and arrived in Dublin on the 30th May at 08.30 hrs.

21/5/'62.

The following message was received by O/C 36 Bn from Civilian UN Chief LEO:- (quote)

"In the name of the Secretary General and all the Colleagues you are leaving behind in the Congo, I wish you a pleasant and safe journey home. We are proud of your creditable contribution and the comradeship which you have forged with us in our collective endeavour to uphold the charter of UN and defend the peace of the world." (unquote).

Signed: R. K. GARDINER (GHAN.),

22/5/'62.

Instruction issued by Bn Ops Offr to O/C 'C' Coy that 2 NCOs and 3 Men would be required for HQ duties as 37 Bn pers were fully committed.

Bn O/C informed Comd HQ that 'C' Coy duties had to be taken over by Indian Units as follows:-

- ELACAT protection post at first light on Wed. 23rd May.
- 'C' Coy area to be taken over at 08.00 hrs. Thurs. 24th May, to allow 'C' Coy rear to evacuate.

RÜNDA



23/5/'62.

Rear parties of 36 Bn preparing for departure.

37 Bn detachment in control of area and 36 Bn Journal closed.

24/5/'62.

Rear parties of 36 Bn moved to EVILLE Airport in preparation for departure. High ranking offrs of Kat Comd and a Gurkha Pipe Band were drawn up on the tarmac to wish bon voyage to the Bn O/C and his Staff.

O/C Bn and Staff, accompanied by Fr. Crean, Chaplain, departed for LEO on Thu evening and arrived before midnight. The party was accommodated at CAMP MARTINI with HQ 37 Bn until aircraft was available on the morning of Tue. 29th May.

25/5/'62. (Fri. 26th; 27th; 28th.

CAMP MARTINI, Leopoldville.

29/5/'62.

Bn HQ pers left Camp Martini Leo at 06.30 hrs for Leo Airport. The DC 6 left at 08.30 hrs and arrived at KANO Airport, Nigeria at 14.00 hrs. The plane took off for Wheelus Airforce Base at 14.30 hrs and landed at 22.00 hrs. The final take-off was at 23.30 hrs and the party arrived at BALDONNEL at 08.30 hrs on the 30th May, 1962.

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RÚNDA

RÚNDA

53.

OPERATIONAL DOCUMENTS

RÚNDA

54.

COPY No. 5HQ SECTION B  
E'VILLE

6 DEC 1961.

OPERATION INSTRUCTION NO. 7PLAN FOR CONTINUATION OF OFFENSIVE ON GEND FOR 7 DEC 1961SITUATION

1. GEND FORCES. As per oral briefing.
2. OWN FORCES. As per latest location statements.
3. ATTACHMENTS AND DETACHMENTS. Possibility that remnants of either XII SWED or 35 IRISH may be repatriated.

MISSION

4. UN forces in Sec B will continue offensive action to destroy Gend resistance in E'VILLE area.

EXECUTION5. XII SWED BN

- (a) Will attack enemy in TUNNEL area destroy his resistance and withdraw when ordered.
- (b) General outline.
  - (1) SWED BN will advance along AVE SAVONNIER and KASENGA ROAD to line of AVE TULIPIERS.
  - (2) AVE TULIPIERS is the first bound. From AVE TULIPIERS the battalion will continue attack to TUNNEL area.
  - (3) Mortars will initially support from area SWED lines prepared to leapfrog forward to positions already selected to support continuation of attack to TUNNEL.

6. GORKHA BN

- (a) Will at Hhr put mortar fire on area ATHENIER SCHOOL and SOUTH end of STADIUM.
- (b) Prepared at discretion of OC GORKHAS to follow up own mortar fires to seize area mortared and clean up.
- (c) Hhr for attack. At discretion of OC GORKHAS.

7. 35 IRISH BN

- (a) In absence of SWED troops be prepared to reinforce or support SWED ops in Refugee Camp Area.

(b) Provide one platoon as reserve to support XII SWED BN attack. Locate Reserve in IRISH FARM.

8. DOGRA BN.

As per OPERATION INSTRUCTION NO. 3.

(Signed)

Jonas Waern

COL.

JONAS WAERN

OC SECTOR B

HQ SEC B  
E'VILLE  
8 Dec 61

OPERATION INSTRUCTION NO. 10

PLAN FOR CONTINUATION OF ATTACKS ON GEND ON 8 DEC 61

SITUATION

1. Gend Forces
  - (a) As per oral briefing.
2. Our Forces
  - (a) ETHIOPIAN BN moving in to SABENA GUEST HO area - one coy at airport since night 7 DEC.
  - (b) Approx 170 all ranks 36 IRISH BN moved into 35 IRISH BN location at FARM 7 DEC.
  - (c) GORKHA is making limited attacks on objectives WEST of RAILWAY LINE.
3. Sec B units will clear area POLICE CAMP and continue attack to seize line of AVE LUXEMBOURG in order to restrict Gend manoeuvres and form firm base for future def and offensive ops.

EXECUTION

4. XII SWED BN will destroy all Gend resistance in the area POLICE CAMP, prepared to continue attack to line of AVE LUXEMBOURG.
  - (a) Objective. POLICE CAMP prepared to continue attack to seize line of AVE LUXEMBOURG.
  - (b) Attack will be supported by 35 IRISH BN on RIGHT.
  - (c) Zone of Action. Inclusive AVE SAVOINNIERS and inclusive KASENGA ROAD.
  - (d) Hhr. Not later than 1300 hrs. Coordinate with 35 IRISH BN.
  - (e) Advance. Coordinate advance with 35 IRISH BN.
  - (f) Fire Support. SWEDISH 81 mm mortars 4,2 in mortars and SWEDISH APCs. OC SWEDISH BN will prepare FIRE PLAN.

COMMS and LIAISON. SWEDISH BN arrange.

5. 35 IRISH BN (+) with newly arrived elements 36 IRISH under comd
  - (a) Will support SWEDISH BN by making a secondary holding attack on the right of SWEDISH BN to seize line of AVE TULIPIERS and support the advance of SWEDISH BN to AVE LIEGE.
  - (b) Pay particular attention to containment of enemy in ELAKAT area.

# RUNDA

57.

## FIRE SUPPORT

- (c) Hhr. Coordinated by SWEDISH BN.
- (d) Advance " " " "
- (e) Provide own fire support
- (f) START LINE. Arrangement between both bn commanders

## ADM AND LOG

- 6. Bn Commanders arrange.

## COMMAND AND SIGNALS

- 7. OC SWED BN arrange.

(Signed) Jonas Waern COL  
JONAS WAERN  
OC SECTOR B

## DISTRIBUTION

## COPY NOS

XII SWED BN	1
35 IRISH BN	2
DOGRA BN	3
GORKHA BN	4
ETH BN	5
HQ SECTOR B	6
HQ KAT COMD	7
SPARE	8

RUNDA

COPY NO. 2

HQ SECTOR B

E'VILLE

10 DEC 1961

OPERATION INSTRUCTION NO. 11GENERAL PLAN FOR EMPLOYMENT OF UNITS IN SEC B (1) ON 10 DEC 611. XIV SWED BN.

- (a) Will seize and hold general line of road AVE TULIPIERS from KASENGA ROAD inclusive to a point about half-way between KASENGA ROAD and AVE SAVONNIER.
- (b) When objective is captured digging will commence at once and the position will be fortified and defended.
- (c) Axis of attack. KASENGA ROAD
- (d) Fire Support. Own mortars.
- (e) Start Line. SWED CAMP

2. 36 IRISH BN

- (a) Initially secure POLICE CAMP area.
- (b) Will seize and hold general line of road AVE TULIPIERS from point indicated at 1a) above and to astride AVE SAVONNIER.
- (c) When objective is captured digging will commence at once and the position will be fortified and defended.
- (d) Axis of attack. AVE SAVONNIER.
- (e) Fire Support. Own mortars.

3. XII SWED BN with APC's under command.

- (a) Will follow XIV SWED BN and advance through BEL AIR area to general area Xrds AVE DES PLAINES/AVE SAPINIERS.
- (b) The general area BEL AIR and SOUTH of KASENGA ROAD will be cleaned up.
- (c) If feasible fire will be put on CAMP MASSART.
- (d) Mines will be placed at suitable places to restrict Gendarmerie armoured car movement.
- (e) Withdrawal at discretion of Major Mide.

FIRE PLAN. Own mortars support battalions. In addition an air strike will be made on CAMP MASSART at 1630 hrs.

4. Coordinating Instructions

- (a) In order to secure the line of AVE TULIPIERS it will be necessary to secure forward of this line to protect consolidation of TULIPIERS.

59. RÚNDA

- (b) XIV SWED BN and 36 IRISH BN will coordinate advance by liaison.
- (c) Hhr for 36 IRISH attack on POLICE CAMP - 1500 hrs.
- (d) Hhr main attack. 1530 hrs.

(Signed) Jonas Waern COL.  
JONAS WAERN  
OC SECTOR B

DISTRIBUTION

COPY NOS

XII SWED BN	1
XIV SWED BN	2
35 IRISH BN	3
36 IRISH BN	4
HQ SEC B (1)	5
HQ SEC B (2)	6
HQ KAT COMD	7
SPARE	8

RÚNDA



# RUNDA

60.

HQ 1 Bde Sec B,  
E'Ville.

15 Dec, 1961.

## OPERATION INSTRUCTION NO. 14

Ref E'VILLE - 1.20.000  
E'VILLE - coloured

### 1 BDE PLAN TO IMPLEMENT OVERALL KAT COMD PLAN FOR DESTRUCTION OF GENDARMERIE RESISTANCE IN EVILLE AREA.

#### SITUATION

1. Katangese Forces. As per oral briefing.
2. Own Forces.
  - a. AIR. Enemy Fugas and most of their aircraft based at Kolwezi and Jadotville have been destroyed by own air action. Enemy Dornier are still operating during the night from some small airfields presumably near Kipushi. Information obtained from a reliable source that by day these aircraft are based at N'dola from where they replenish bombs and ammunition. Our air strikes in E'ville area have had an adverse effect on Gend morale.
  - b. Morale. Enemy intercepts indicate that morale of Gend has suffered a set back.
  - c. 2 Bde has been reinforced as follows:-
    - (1) 35th ETH Bn less one coy group.
    - (2) 8 ETH Bn less rear party.
    - (3) Coy 3/1 GR from Manono less one platoon.
    - (4) MSF Recce Regt - Two troops.
    - (5) 120 Hy Mor Bty and one and half troops - one troop is allotted in direct support 1 Bde from 150800 B.
    - (6) Squadron 63 Cav - two troops expected to complete move by 15 Dec '61.
  - d. 2 Bde tasks are as follows:-
    - (1) Phase 1 3/1 GR will clear AVE STANLEY and secure complete route including domination of area STADIUM and also capture area RIDGE 2 km West of HQ KAT COMD.
    - (2) Phase 2 Occupy Lido and cut off Kipushi Road.
3. Attachments and Detachments

In direct support - Half troops 120 Hy Mor Bty from 150800 B.
4. Mission

1 Bde Sec B will attack and capture Camp Massart and block the routes Ave Katuba and Don Bosco in order to assist in sealing off Eville City preparatory to the destruction of enemy resistance in Eville area.

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## EXECUTION

5. Gen Outline. The operation will be carried out in two phases.

- a. Phase 1 Contain and keep pressure on enemy in area TUNNEL particularly with mortar fire on 15 DEC.
- b. Phase 2 Capture of CAMP MASSART and cutting off of approaches to KENYA and KATUBA on D + 1 (16 DEC).

## 6 36 IRISH BN

- a. Relieve XII and XIV Swede Bn throughout the length of AVE LIEGE before 16.00 hrs 15 Dec in case of points O and P and 04.00 hrs in case of point B.
- b. On 15 Dec (Phase 1) maintain pressure on enemy in TUNNEL area particularly with mortar fire.
- c. Attack to seize area X-Rds Kasenga/Luxembourg (preferably via point F.) at H Hr 16 Dec.
- d. Secure Right flank of main attack (Swede) by holding enemy in that area (c. above) from H hr 16 Dec.
- e. Fire support for Phase 1. - See fire plan.  
 In direct support - Own mortars.  
 In support - Half troop 120 Hy Mor Bty and Swede med mors.
- f. Be prepared to seize and hold TUNNEL on capture of X-Rds Kasenga/Luxembourg.
- g. Fire support for Phase 2 - See fire plan.

## 7. COMPOSITE SWEDE BNS

- a. Attack capture and hold Camp Massart.
- b. Assembly Area. General area Beavsejour.
- c. General axis. AVE DES PLAINES or any other axis as selected from reconnaissance - axis via Beausejour - Aves de Gand/Namur might also be investigated.
- d. On capture of Camp Masart continue attack to seize and block road and railway junction Munama/Don Bosco prepared to continue attack to seize area of junction Katuba/Tombeur and block that approach from the South.
- e. Particular attention to Southern approaches to Camp Massart.
- f. Provide 1 Brigade Reserve in SWEDE Camp area - Nucleus based upon APCs of OC XIV SWEDE Bn will organise the two Swede HQ Coys and one platoon XIV SWEDE Bn for defence of Refugee Camps.

## 8. 35 IRISH BN

Secure CHARLIE Route between shops inclusive, and WHITE PIERS CROSS ROADS exclusive.

9. FIRE PLAN

Separate - ANNEX A.

10. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

- a. Assembly area Swede Bns - General area Beausejour.
- b. Assembly area 35 Irish Bn - Rear of FDI's.
- c. No movement into assembly areas before 03.15 hrs.
- d. Hhrs
  - (1) 36 IRISH BN - 04.00 hrs (Cross startline).
  - (2) Composite Swede Bn - 04.00 hrs (do).
- e. Forming up Places and Startlines. Bns select own - Startline Swede Bn in general area line of road Ave des Sapinieres.

ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

11. Chief Logistics Officers 1 Bde will coordinate and arrange for the following:
  - a. Ammunition supply Swede Bns.
  - b. Rations Swede Bns.
  - c. Transport forward of entrenching tools, barrier material.
12. Logistics officers 35 and 36 Irish Bns will arrange for each of the items mentioned under paras 11a, b and c above in respect of their own battalions.
13. MEDICAL
  - a. Normal RAP with each battalion.
  - b. SMO 35 Irish Bn will establish a casualty collection post in Swedish Camp for evacuation to Italian Hospital by CHARLIE Route.
  - c. SMO and battalion MO's prepare Medical Plan (Annex B)(not att)

14. TRANSPORT

Unit arrangement. Demands if necessary to Chief Logistics 1 Bde.

COMMAND AND SIGS

15. Chief Signals Officer each battalion will report to this HQ to coordinate and arrange a Signal Plan on D-day (15 Dec.) - ANNEX C.
16. Liaison. Composite SWEDE Bn and 36 Irish Bn will exchange liaison officers. 35 IRISH Bn will send a Liaison Officer to 36 IRISH Bn.
17. HQ. This HQ.

# RUNDA

63.

## 18. Light Signals

<u>Signal</u>	<u>Meaning</u>	<u>By Whom</u>
3 GREEN	Success 36 IRISH Bn.	-36 IRISH Bn.
3 RED	Success Composite Swede Bn.	OC SWEDE Bns.

(Signed) Jonas Waern COLONEL  
(Jonas Waern)

OC, 1 Bde Sec B.

## ACK.

<u>DISTRIBUTION</u>	<u>COPY NOS</u>
XII Swede Bn	1 - 3
XIV Swede Bn	4 - 6
35 Irish Bn	7 - 9
36 Irish Bn	10 - 12
HQ Kat Comd	19
HQ 1 Bde Sec B	14 - 17
HQ 2 Bde Sec B	18
TP Comd 120 Hy Mor Bty	13
Spare	20 - 30

# RUNDA

RUNDA

64.

SECRET

COPY NUMBER \_\_\_\_\_

OPERATION - SANSFIELD

HEADQUARTERS 36 IRISH BATTALION - E/VILLE.

36 IRISH BN OPERATION ORDER NO. 2

REF MAPS: E/VILLE - 1:20000.  
E/VILLE - COLOURED.  
SPECIAL OPERATIONS SKETCH.

GENERAL

1 Bde plan to implement overall Kat Comd Plan for destruction of Gendarmerie resistance in E/Ville Area.

SITUATION:

1. Enemy Forces.

(a) Air. Cannot op except after darkness due to Air superiority of friendly forces in daylight.

(b) Ground

TUNNEL area three Coys plus.  
CAMP MASSART two MP Coys.  
NE END CAMP MASSART a strong point.  
BCK - Camp Enemy recce Sqn.  
ATHENE School has a large number of Europeans.  
GEN SUPPLY DEPOT is MAG location.  
RLY YARD - Enemy OP.  
Gen at Presidential Palace: One Para Coy at LIDO: One MOR Unit at UNIONMINIERE.  
Reserve Coy in Town on AVE DROOGMANS.  
Reserve Coy in AVE LOUVAIN.  
Reserve Coy in ETOILE.  
One Coy (-) two mortars and two Armd Cars at RLY ROUNDABOUT.  
Sixty men 600 yards EAST OF TRANSMISSION STN.  
MORS on ridge of GOLF Course.

2. Friendly Forces. 12/14 Swedish Bn on left to take Camp MASSART.  
35 Bn in rear.  
One Sec Indian Hy MORS under Comd.  
3 Gurkha Bn cleared STANLEY AVE, and THEATRE AREA.

3. Mission

36 Irish Bn will:-

- a. Seize and hold area of rd junc KASENGA - LUXEMBOURG rd (Point C) to secure RIGHT flank of Swedish attack.
- b. Be prepared to seize and hold the TUNNEL.

4. Execution

General Outline.

Attack will be in two phases.

Phase 1 - Capture of area rd junc - Point C.

Phase 2 - Seize and hold TUNNEL area.

RUNDA

5. Grouping

B Coy with under Comd One Sec Armd Car and one Sec of Engrs followed by A Coy.

Bn MOR Sec in SP of attacks. Indian Hy MORS in general support.

6. Tasks

(a) B Coy with under Comd One Sec Armd Cars and One Sec Engrs will advance through Point F, seize KASENGA - LUXEMBOURG x rds (Point ) and will exploit forward to point G thereby protecting the RIGHT flank of 12/14 Swedish Bn attacking CAMP MASSART.

(b) A Coy will relieve 12/14 Swedish Bn at E L A C A T as from 10.00 hours to-day with one Pl.

A Coy from its position in front of E L A C A T will be prepared to seize and hold the TUNNEL.

(c) (i) MOR SEC

H - 20 to H - Area F C G and TUNNEL. Thereafter on call.

(ii) Indian Hy MORS

H - 20 to H - 15 on C G F fwd of TUNNEL lift for five mins.  
Stonk in rear of TUNNEL H - 10.  
H to H + 15 CAMP MASSART to SOUTH part of BCK Camp.  
Thereafter on call.

(iii) Gurkha MORS

H - 20 to H - 10 on - BCK Camp.  
In direct SP to Swedish Bn from H - 10.

(d) Reserve

C Coy ( - )  
LOC - Bn HQ.

7. Co-Ord in Hrs.

(a) H - hr ... 04.00.  
TC of moves of pers and Tpt under Coy ctl.

(b) Ass Area - Area FARM.

(c) FUP.

(i) A Coy - REAR of E L A C A T  
B Coy - EAST of Point E on Sketch.

(d) SL Fwd line of FUP.

(e) Axis of Adv. A Coy - Rly line  
B Coy on line E F C

ADM

8. AMN (a) (i) LOC Bn HQ

(ii) Allotment as follows:-

# RUNDA

66.

<u>Type</u>	<u>1st Line</u>	<u>2nd Line</u>
FN	300	200
Gustaf	432	432
LMG	1200	2000
84 mm Heat	20	10
60 mm	32	12
MMG Cav	4000	1200
MMG Tracer	2000	600
.303 Ball	10000	3000
36 Grenade	12	12

- (b) RAP - Point between E and O on Sketch.
- (c) PW - Evac thro Tac HQ, Bn HQ to Swedish Camp under MP Escort.
- (d) MP - (i) Three MP each Coy.  
(ii) Protection of Tac HQ
- (e) LO - 35 Bn and Swedish Bn Present LOs
- (f) Comms
- (i) Loc and Mov HQ - Axis E F G
- (ii) Wrls silence ONLY if ordered.
- (iii) Lt. Sigs
- Capture of area Point C by B Coy  
Three Green.
  - Capture Camp MASSART by Swedish Bn.  
Three Red.
  - Caputre of TOMBUER by Swedes  
Three Green.
- (iv) Password \_\_\_\_\_ CLONGEL.
- (v) CODEWORD attack on TUNNEL - SANSFIELD.
- (vi) Recognition Signs.
- A to G and O - No change.  
Others as per sketch.
- (vii) Signal Plan - as per ANNEX A.
- (viii) MOR Fire Plan. As per ANNEX B.
- (viii) Special OPS Sketch - As per Annex C.

ACK

COMMANDANT

(J.J. Griffin)

OPERATIONS OFFICER: 36 IRISH BATTALION ONUC.

RUNDA

RÚNDA

AUTH:

LT. COLONEL

---

(M.F. HOGAN)

OFFICER COMMANDING : 36 IRISH BATTALION ONUC.

DISTR:-

- 1 OC 36 Bn
- 2 OC 1 BDE
- 3 OC A Coy
- 4 OC B Coy
- 5 OC MOR SEC
- 6 ADJ 36 BN
- 7 OPS 36 BN
- 8 INT 36 BN
- 9 QM 36 BN
- 10 OC 35 BN
- 11 FILE (2)
- 12 WAR DIARY (2)
- 13 SPARE (10)

RÚNDA



# RUNDA

68.

## 81 mm MOR TASKS. 16/12/61

1. Sec of 3 81 mm Mors loc NORTH of Point D. Ctl by line from Bn CP (Mortar Officer) and linked to static OP loc near Point E.

Post H. hour on call tgts to be called for by MFC (Capt. G. Keyes) by C. 12, "A" Coy set, to BN CP. All orders to fire, elevations and switches to be relayed by line to guns by Capt. J. Matthews from BN CP.

2. Pre H. hour tgts.

TIME	TGT	NO. OF RDS.	FIRE UNIT
03.40	POINT C	10	1 Gun
03.40	POINT R	20	2 Guns
03.45	POINT G NE BCK CAMP	30	3 Guns
03.50 to 04.00	TUNNEL AND 300 NORTH	40	2 Guns
04.00 to 04.10	ROUNDAABOUT - WEST OF TUNNEL	30	2 Guns

  

TIME	TGT	UNIT	REMARKS
03.40 to 03.50	BCK Camp	Swedish 6 Gun Platoon.	On timed programme.
04.20 to 04.30	WEST Side of Tunnel	$\frac{1}{2}$ TP. Indian HY MORS	Called for by Mortar Officer.

# RUNDA

Originator 41

# RUNDA

IAFB - 930

H hr - 0400

## TASK TABLE

Task in sp of - BDE I (SWEDE + IRISH BMS)

S.No.	Time From	Mins To	Tgt No	Grid Ref and Height and/or description	Units to Engage	Amn	Rate	Remarks (Registration to on)	Amn Expenditure (Not to be transmitted.)		
									Fd	Med	Hy MOR
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(k)	(l)	(m)
1	- 20	-15	D-2523	6950 2312 NEAR SIDE TUNNEL	"D" TP	HE	(2' N (3' S	Reg hy 55			
2	- 15	-10	D-2523 ALFA	6990 2308 FAR SIDE TUNNEL	"	"	(2' N (3' S	"			
3	H	+10	D-2524	EAST END CAMP MASSART 7046 2152	"	"	5' S 3' N 2' R	"	SWEEP "	3d 1d	
4	+10	+15	D-2524 BRAVO	6970 2014 WEST END CAMP MASSART	"	"	3' S 2' N	"	SWEEP "	2d 1d	

AUTHORITY TO MODIFY

55 (FOC)

INDIAN 4. 2. MORS.

Signed \_\_\_\_\_ CAPT.

15 Dec '61.

GUARDS AND PATROLS

It will be appreciated that until the end of December 1961 the Battalion was fully deployed for operations and the question of patrols and sentry posts did not arise.

FROM JANUARY 1962

DETAIL	STRENGTH	TIME	REMARKS
Foot Patrol SHOPS to AVE JUNGERS.	1 NCO, 3 Men (A Coy).	06.00 - 18.00	1. One Arm Car to report to SHOPS from 06.00 - 12.00 daily. 2. Pat will be briefed and posted by order of OC SHOPS.
Standing Patrol INDUSTRIALLE - SOCO PETROL AREA.	Two Sec Inf. (A Coy) One Sec Arm Cars.	07.00 - 12.00	Also assist Police pat at SOCO PETROL
Patrol of Bn Sector, ROUTES ALPHA, BRAVO and CHARLIE.	Two Secs Inf (B Coy) One Sec A/Cars.	Between 08.30 - 12.00	1. Ensure vehs can pass road block at WHITE PIERS CROSS. 2. Pay particular attention to ROUTE CHARLIE.
Escort of convoy to Airport via ROUTE ALPHA.	Two Secs Inf (B Coy) One Sec A/Cars.	14.00	Escort of vehs for Sups and Pol.
Guard Duties and Sentry Posts.	KASENGA Barrier. 1 NCO, 3 Men (A Coy).	08.00 - 08.00	1. Prevent unauthorised entry. 2. Report unusual incidents.
	"A" Coy. SHERIDAN - AVE JACARANDAS. 1 NCO, 3 Men (A Coy)	18.00 - 06.00	do.
	SAVONNIERS - TULIPIERS X RDS. 1 NCO, 3 Men (A COY)	08.00 - 08.00	1. Prevent unauthorised entry. 2. Report unusual incidents.

DETAIL	STRENGTH	TIME	REMARKS
			<p>3. Personnel to man road blocks at SAVONNIERS and on both TULIPIERS Roads leading to SAVONNIERS. A four man patrol will link road blocks.</p> <p>4. Three men acting as Coy Police will control Road Blocks from 08.00 - 18.00</p>
	BACK GATE. 1 NCO, 2 Men (HQ Coy)	18.00 - 06.00	<p>1. One MP from 06.00 - 18.00.</p> <p>2. Prevent unauthorised entry.</p> <p>3. Report unusual incidents.</p>
	AVE de GREVILLEAS. 1 NCO, 2 Men (HQ Coy)	08.00 - 08.00	<p>1. Prevent unauthorised entry.</p> <p>2. Report unusual incidents.</p> <p>3. Refuge patrol to Railway Line from 06.00 - 18.00</p>
	Bn HQ - Ops Room. 1 NCO, 2 Men (HQ Coy)	18.00 - 06.00	<p>1. Prevent unauthorised entry.</p> <p>2. Report unusual incidents.</p> <p>3. Patrol front Avenue and Mess Block.</p> <p>4. Close barrier front gate from 23.59 to 06.00.</p> <p>5. One MP front gate 06.00 - 18.00.</p> <p>6. One MP Bn HQ 06.00 - 18.00</p>

# RUNDA

73.

DETAIL	STRENGTH	TIME	REMARKS
	Arm Car Gp	08.00 - 08.00	1. Prevent unauthorised entry. 2. Report unusual incidents.
	"C" Coy TUNNEL AREA (C Coy)	08.00 - 08.00	1. Org own defence. 2. TUNNEL open except to Armed Gens from 06.00 - 19.00

## FROM 1 April 1962 - ADDITIONAL DUTIES

Barrier at Junc KASENGA - SAVONNIERS Road by HQ Coy.

Junction KASENGA - GREVILLEAS Road by A Car Gp.

Patrol of Northern perimeter of Refugee Camp as far as Rd junc in RUASHI - Rotated daily between Coys of 36 Bn.

Patrol of BEL AIR (Belgian Residential Area ) to prevent looting - Armd Car Gp.

NOTE: Unit also supplied a Despatch Escort for Kat Comd.

## FROM END APRIL 1962 - FURTHER DUTIES

24 Hr Def Post at Junc of AVE TULIPIERS and AVE SCERIERS.

- 1 NCO and 5 Men from "A" Coy.

Foot Patrol from "SHOPS" to connect with Post at (1) by day ONLY.

- "A" Coy. (Later included some Tunisian and Ruashi Police).

One Armd Car to Patrol from SHOPS to RUASHI by day.

- Armd Car Gp.

By night Armd Car at (3) would be withdrawn and a vehicle patrol would carry out the detail by night from SHOPS.

- "A" Coy.

24 Hour Post at Junction of RAILWAY - TULIPIERS.

- HQ Coy - 1 NCO, 3 Men.

### NOTE:

THESE POSTS AND PATROLS WERE ORDERED BECAUSE OF EVACUATION OF REFUGEE CAMP.

# RUNDA

SPECIAL REPORTS

RÜNDA

A Coy, 36 IRISH Bn,  
 ONUC,  
 The TUNNEL,  
 ELIZABETHVILLE.

23.12.61.

REPORT ON THE ACTION AT THE TUNNEL

1. MISSION OF 36 BN. 36 Irish Bn will seize and hold RJ KASENGA/LOUXEMBOURG (Pt C) through Pt F on SAVONNIER and exploit fwd to Pt G, in order to secure the rt flank of the Swedish attack, prepared to seize and hold the Tunnel.
2. TASK OF A COY.
  - a. A Coy will relieve 12/14 SWEDISH Bn at ELAKAT (Pt B) as from 10.00 hrs 15-12-61 with one pl.
  - b. A Coy from its posn in front of ELAKAT will be prepared to move fwd and seize and hold the TUNNEL.
3. COMMS. The Coy axis was along a rly line and tpt could only be brought up to the Tunnel by AVE DES SAVONNIERS when it would be cleared.
 

The initial allotment of radios was four 88 sets, with a guaranteed range of 200 yds, and one C 12 which would have to be on tpt. A re-allotment gave the Coy Comd a 31 set and a 31 set to accompany the C 12 rear link.
4. ARMAMENT. The Coy had only one 60 mm Mor and one MMG, but had six 84 mm RCL rifles which were issued to the Pls.
5. PERSONNEL. One Pl spent the day and night leading up to the attack in fwd trenches at ELAKAT and joined the Coy at the SL there. One Pl had two nights at Pt E and was relieved for the attack during the afternoon of 15-12-61. There had already been some casualties during the week, the men were tired but in good spirits.
6. MOVE TO SL. A Coy less No 2 Pl already in posn at ELAKAT left LEOPOLD FARM on foot at 03.00 hrs. The mov was carried out in rear of B Coy, and A Coy reached its FUP at approx 04.10 hrs and picked up no 2 Pl. The line of road at the level crossing was selected as the SL.
7. ATTACK. At approx 05.10 hrs the Codeword SANSFIELD, for the attack to commence, was received and A Coy moved up the rly line in the following formation:

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      ← No 1 Pl          ← No 3 Pl
      ← No 2 Pl          ← Coy HQ
                    Coy Comd
  
```

On passing Pt D the formations remained the same except that No 2 Pl moved on left of the HOSP and Pt. G. Heavy automatic and rifle fire was received. There were at least three LMG type guns and one MMG probably a Vickers and an undetermined number of riflemen. The Coy took cover on the rly tracks and among the small bldgs in the open fd. When fire was opened No 2 Pl had reached the area of Pt K, No 1 Pl the area of Pt J, No 3 Pl was in rear of No 1 Pl and Coy HQ around Pt H. No 1 Pl returned the fire on the

RÜNDA

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BUNDA

bridge area with four rds of 84 mm ATK. Owing to the fact that the Pl Comd had been killed the Pl was somewhat disorganised and remained in posn on the tracks. No 2 Pl was under fire from pts SOUTH of the HOSP. They used small arms fire, and cleared these posns and adv to the line of the rd fwd of Pt G. No 3 Pl engaged the enemy left with SA fire.

8. FURTHER ACTION. No 2 Pl closed up to the line of the road. Under cover of about seven 84 mm rds the Pl moved up to the front of the Hosp and made contact with the Coy Comd and elements of No 1 Pl which had adv with him. At the same time elements of No. 1 Pl joined No 2 Pl on the East side of the Hosp. On the direction of the Coy Comd No 2 Pl crossed the road and cleared the area of the big rly sheds. They continued the adv and changed direction to the right with the object of attacking the rly stn. Very heavy SA Fire was being received from PARC V T area. At Pt L they engaged a jeep carrying a heavy weapon probably a .5 MG. The driver was hit and the vehicle roared out of sight behind the bldg. Comd No 2 Pl left one sec in posn and made a left flanking attack South of the rly stn. The fire from this area dwindled as the attack progressed. By the time the jeep posn was reached the jeep had been driven away. The Pl was ordered to reorg on the ground held and the ATK team was returned to the bridge area to deal with firing from the coaches on the bridge. Two rds of ATK silenced the fire. Two men left the carriages and made off up the road towards the roundabout. Before they reached it they were killed by fire from No 3 Pl who were moving fwd to the yard to reorg.

No 3 Pl which was following No 1 Pl veered left off the rly into the Hosp area. The Pl Comd came fwd to meet the Coy Comd at the SW corner of the Hosp and received orders to clear the area NW of the Tunnel. This was done and the section which took the yard area was able to finish off the two men retreating up the rd after abandoning the rly carriage.

No 1 Pl during the foregoing actions was divided between No 2 and 3 Pls and took part in all these actions.

9. Reorg. No. 2 Pl + was ordered to consolidate and reorg on the SOUTH of the Tunnel Rd. The Pl was ordered to withdraw from the Station Buildings and org a close-in def about the area of the SOUTH end of the Rly sheds.

No 3 Pl + was ordered to reorg and consolidate on the NORTH side of the Tunnel in the area of the Yards and the Hosp.

10. Losses.     Killed:           Lieut P. Riordan  
  Pte A. Wickam
- Wounded:           Cpl P. Gregan            Bullet wound in chin.  
  " J. Callan             Fractured ankle.  
  " G. Francis            Bullet wound in ear lobe.  
  Pte G. Kelly            Two bullet wounds in  
  thigh and fracture.  
  " J. Walsh             Sprained knee.

11. LESSONS.

- a. 84 mm RCL Rifle. This weapon must be well fwd and used aggressively, at the side of the Pl Comd. It has taken over the role of the 60 mm Mors in attack, it is lighter and more portable and quicker into action.

- b. Comms.                    Ctl was rendered difficult by complete failure of local comms. Quality of wrls supplied was poor.



# RUNDA

77.

The attack was carried out in torrential rain which may have militated against efficiency.

- c. Momentum. It was found difficult to get the men moving after they had been fired on at close range. The inclination was to remain in cover and return the fire. No. 2 Pl Comd had to push his men hard at one stage. The Coy Comd had to work hard to get the pers of No 1 Pl moving after the initial check and after the death of the Pl Comd. The Pl Comd must push his men as well as lead them.
- d. Dispersion. Despite trg and instr on the necessity for dispersion, the tendency of the men to bunch had to be fought throughout the action.
- e. Maps. The map provided gave no indication of the nature of the ground or Bldgs on the obj. Air photos were NOT provided. This resulted in the Coy Comd and Pl Comds being completely in the dark re the surroundings of the obj area.
- f. Junior Leaders. The success of the op largely depended on the initiative, energy and determination of junior leaders in applying the Coy Comd's plan.

RUNDA

MEDICALArrival:

I arrived at H.Qr. 35 Bn on 23 November, 1961. I was accompanied by C/S J. Broderick, AMC. The hand-over of Medical supplies and equipment was carried out and general orientation on the medical situation was effected.

Standard of Fitness:

On Dec. 5th, active operations commenced and continued up to 18th December. First operational units of the battalion arrived on 7th December and the Medical Platoon became operational from that date. Three Companies, H.Q., A. & B. came under fire immediately on arrival, and had to be deployed directly into battle positions; this coming directly as the troops disembarked after upwards of 22 hours continuous flying was a severe test of stamina & morale. I consider the overall reaction by the Officers, NCOs, and Men was excellent. Should it be argued that such a precipitous induction was a blessing in disguise as personnel had no time to think, it nevertheless (from a physical standpoint) imposed a very severe strain on stamina, and the successful execution of the military operation over the following 11 to 12 days without adequate reliefs bears high testimony to the physical standards and morale of all ranks.

Particular attention was paid to the behaviour of troops under fire, and details of cases of battle neurosis and hysteria are supplied. The incidence of such was remarkably low and the wastage to the unit was negligible.

Casualties:

Died from wounds sustained by direct enemy action	.. .. .	4
Died from wounds sustained in the course of duty	.. .. .	1
Died from causes other than wounds (Natural causes)	.. .. .	2
<b>Casualties wounded by enemy action &amp; repatriated</b>	<b>.. .. .</b>	<b>5</b>
Psychiatric cases repatriated	.. .. .	3
Casualties wounded during enemy action & returned to duty	.. .. .	10
Casualties occurring in the course of military duty	.. .. .	6
Acute surgical emergencies (natural causes) Appendicitis	.. .. .	3
Games injuries (ineffective longer than 48 hours)	.. .. .	12
Repatriated due to medical conditions	.. .. .	2
Total No. of patients treated in U.N.O. Hospitals	.. .. .	42
Total No. of troops treated in Unit Camp Hospital	.. .. .	64

The general standard of fitness was high, and the daily incidence of sick was in the region of 1%. This reveals a high standard of morale as well as physical fitness.

Sickness:

Quite a few people found their way out who would be better off at home and should not have been accepted. I have had to afford treatment over a period of weeks to three cases of Suppurative Otitis

Sickness (contd).

Media. One case of Bronchial asthma flared up in this climate. Two cases of already established Peptic Ulceration found their way here and would have been repatriated only that they responded to hormone treatment without any dietary regime, viz., Sgt. Power, of "C" Coy, & Sgt. Watson, of "H.Q." Coy.

Random blood slides for Malarial parasites have been examined, where indicated, and no positive results obtained. One case who was treated for Malaria with the 34th Inf Batt, had a recurring attack with this unit but responded to treatment. His blood slide was negative as it was apparent the parasites had not invaded the peripheral blood stream.

Two cases of Lues Minor were confirmed by urethral smear examination, and responded to treatment. The numbers reporting for prophylactic treatment is low, and does not truly represent the numbers submitting to exposure and possible infection. There existed a concept among some sections of the troops that anti-malarial therapy had a suppressing action on sexual virility. This was made the subject of an advisory talk to the unit by the Senior Medical Officer. The numbers requiring Dental treatment did not warrant the services of a Dental Officer with the Unit. Some five patients required repairs to dentures.

There are a number of people of 50 years and over serving, principally with H. Qrs. Coy. While these are employed on special duties & have stood up well to the conditions it is doubtful if they would have been of value to the unit if the active hostilities had continued longer than the stated period. I think the policy should be to reduce the age limit to below 50 years.

A case of Epilepsy was diagnosed, precipitated by the strain of enemy attack. This man has not had a recurrence.

During the enemy offensive from period 8th December to 18th December, I treated eight cases of battle hysteria & neurosis. Only one of these failed to respond and had to be repatriated.

Gastroenteritis, seems to be the main medical problem. For instance the incidence of such cases for three months is: December, 13., January, 13, February, 19. These figures are based on cases ineffective for periods of 48 hours and upwards, and do not include minor degrees of enteritis which responded to treatment while ambulant. Only one of these cases required treatment at UNO hospital, Stool examinations carried out on the more resistant cases were negative for Bacillary Dysentery and Salmonella strains.

Camp Sanitation and Hygiene Control:

The standard of Camp Sanitation eventually reached was very satisfactory. An excellent supply of disinfectants & larvicidal solutions and preparations was made available. Spray pumps worked efficiently in all companys, and were excellently maintained by the Ordnance Pn.

A Swingfog Pressure Gun was on charge to the unit, and was operated by a medical orderly.

Flush toilets & baths in occupied houses were all kept in working order, & additional 'Drum type' latrines installed where necessary. Septic tanks were emptied by the B.C.K. Hospital mobile pump. Drains around the lines were cleaned and stagnant water eliminated. Routine garbage and swill collections were carried out by the unit on a daily basis. All personnel were in possession of mosquito netting, and a plentiful supply of insect repellent was available. These measures were of the utmost importance in view of the proximity of two large

African Refugee Camps to our lines.

Climate:

The climate here had no direct adverse effect on the health of the troops. In fact, the majority have maintained good health, if not gaining some all round improvement. In some cases a loss of appetite was not so much due to the climate change, as to the change in food. People who have any marked dietary idiosyncrasies should not be taken on these operations. The effects of heat & fluid loss gave no cause for concern, - salt replacement was adhered to unnecessarily by some people.

Incidence of Disease:

In this connection routine feverish chills were encountered and responded readily to treatment. No acute respiratory diseases were seen.

A few Follicular Tonsillitis cases occurred.

Three cases of Renal Colic were investigated. No radiological obstruction was seen, & these cleared up with increased fluid intake.

One case of essential Hypertension is on duty while under medical supervision.

Three cases of Herpes Zoster were treated.

Some cases of Furunculosis cleared up readily, while in other patients minor wounds became readily infected.

The tendency was to lose surplus weight, and this in a number of instances was an advantage.

A few cases of persistent insomnia were treated satisfactorily.

Hospitalisation:

The unit was readily served by UN Hospital, EVILLE, administered by the Italian Red Cross unit, under the command of CAPT. CIPOLAT.

The period of retention in hospital of some cases had to be reduced to a minimum, due to bed shortage; for instance appendicectomies were sent back to unit after 7 days. Because of this I opened a Camp Hospital Centre with a bed capacity of 6 to 7 beds to provide for such patients. I also admitted febrile patients & others for observation from the lines prior to transferring them to UN Hospital. AFs 177 were completed in all cases, & when transferred to UN Hospital, daily visits were made by M.Os. and entries of progress made from day to day to maintain medical records.

Radiological & Pathological facilities were provided through the Extern Dept. of ~~the~~ Hospital.

Evacuation of Cases:

During hostilities, this was a major problem. There was only one route available, and this sector was not safe for about three miles, the road surface was very bad, and the danger of attack from out of the bush was ever present.

All the urgent cases were removed expeditiously from the Battalion CCS by Swedish Armoured Personnel Carriers. I think we owe a lot to the Swedish Command, which made their vehicles available to us for evacuation at a time when their combat vehicles were in full demand. Our own Armoured vehicles, if available, would not have suited this purpose. The Swedish APC type vehicle was ideal for the job. Ambulances were not

safe as they were likely to draw fire, and would require an escort of other vehicles.

An example on a time basis may give some idea, and I cite two urgent casualties in which speed of evacuation was imperative. A badly mutilated thigh and a case of perforation of the thorax, both due to mortar fire, were injured at 19.45 hours. Evacuation was made by truck to CCS, a distance of about 1 mile. At CCS resuscitation and intra-venous fluid was administered, dressings re-adjusted and sedatives also administered. Evacuation from CCS to UNO Hospital was by A.P.C. arriving at 21.30 hours in good condition with drips running satisfactorily. On this occasion, other less seriously wounded were kept in the CCS overnight and evacuated the next morning.

In this operation, the base hospital unit was not within our lines, and the route to it was partly through the enemy controlled area. This was a major problem, but it was successfully overcome by the use of the armoured carriers.

#### Medical Plan for Op 'Sarsfield':

The medical plan during the offensive was as follows:-

Comdts J.J. Sheehan & D.J. Delaney established a joint RAP for Coys A & B. One ambulance as on duty at this location. Casualties were evacuated to the CCS in the Swedish lines. At this station, one Swedish M.O. and two Irish M.Os. dealt with cases from both Swedish and Irish units. Comdt. L.P. O'Toole & myself were on duty here. Both Chaplains made their headquarters at the CCS and visited the company positions during the action.

Treatment & evacuation went without a hitch, and the operation gave no cause for comment. Unit Coy. Sergt. was on duty at the CCS, and kept casualty records up to date.

The working of AMC personnel in the forward positions was very satisfactory, and the general plan was adequate for the requirements. One Medical Corporal, No. 81244 Cpl. Connolly, C, distinguished himself during these operations and has been recommended recognition through his disregard for his personal safety.

Comdt. E. Daly, whose coy was in reserve, was detached to the Swedish unit for the operation. He remained (along with one Swedish M.O.) in the forward positions, & returned to his own unit on the 19 December.

#### Medical Supplies and Equipment:

The supply position has been excellent. Both the quantity & variety of drugs give a high measure of confidence in dealing with medical problems.

#### Assistance to other Contingents and to Congolese:

Comdt. E. Daly, as already mentioned, was detached to the Swedish Bn during the operation from 15th to 19th December. Subsequently he was detached to the Indian Unit at Elisabethville Airport, & rejoined his Coy early in February, '62. Since rejoining his Coy, he attends to the Ethiopian Bn, operating on call from his own Company HQ.

Comdt. J.J. Delaney, took medical charge of "C" Coy, as well as "B" Coy while Comdt. Daly was detached.

Comdt. J.J. Sheehan, M.O. 'A' Coy, has worked daily at the Refugee Hospital in the Swedish lines. He was appointed M.O. i/c of the

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82.

Refugee Hospital by the A.S.M.S.O., H.Qr. Kat Command. Evacuation of patients to UNO Hospital was carried out jointly by Swedish & Irish transport.

I, as Senior Medical Officer, visited the Refugee Camp Hospital daily for about 14 days after the fighting period. The number of casualties at this time was very high & presented a major problem. Only the most urgently in need of surgical treatment could be received at the UN Hospital, and many badly wounded had to be treated under bad conditions. Supplies of dressings etc, were made available from our Battalion supplies. Comdt. Sheehan took over this work from myself, and has continued in this capacity.

Medical attention has also been given to the personnel of a second refugee camp, which is under the protection of the Irish Bn. This body comprises about 1500 men, women, and children. They are located up against our lines, and a daily clinic of some 20 to 25 patients are attended to. Medical supplies had to be given from our own stocks.

As Senior Medical Officer, I have carried out the duties of ASMSO, Katanga Command, during various periods of absence on duty, of SMSO in other Command Sectors.

Finally, I consider the personnel of this unit, from my viewpoint behaved & acquitted themselves very creditably. There was no problem with men reporting sick without reasonable cause. The main cause for any concern arose through the effects of a local beer on individuals who apparently lose their sense of proportion when intoxicated. The number of such individuals in the Unit I have estimated at about 35 to 40, which is a very small percentage.

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Advance Party

The personnel of the Q Pl in the Advance Party proceeded to KAMINA where the take-over of stores commenced. 35 Bn stores were loc at

E/VILLE - HQ Coy, Bn HQ & A Coy.  
 NYUNZU - B & C Coys.  
 KAMINA - Bn Reserve Stocks together with stores of 1 Inf Gp.  
 which were also handed over to 36 Bn.

The intention at the time of our arrival in the Congo and indeed for some time after, was that the 36 Bn would be located in the NYUNZU/NIEMBA area and, accordingly, our plan of take-over was based on the assumption that all stores taken over would perforce have to be transferred as soon as possible to ALBERTVILLE and thence to the new Bn area. Representatives of the 35 Bn met us on arrival at KAMINA and the hand-over was quickly completed. The stores at KAMINA were generally reserve stocks of previous units which had accumulated for various reasons:- i.e., Tentage, Engineer Stores, Cooking Apparatus, Bicycles, MG Handcarts, together with a large stock of captured ammo of various calibres. On completion of the take-over the party moved to E/VILLE.

Stores Take-Over - E/VILLE.

On arrival in E/VILLE a discussion took place between OC 35 Bn, QM 35 Bn and 36 Bn representatives ref hand-over. It was decided to -

Take over all stores not immediately required by 35 Bn.  
 Remaining stores in 35 Bn use to be taken over but to remain in use by 35 Bn, i.e., wps, bedding, rations etc.  
 Stores taken over to be airlifted with utmost dispatch to ALBERTVILLE.

To give effect to the above plan, it was decided that elements of the Adv Party should go to ALBERTVILLE to take-over from B & C Coys of 35 Bn in NYUNZU and NIEMBA and to open a Receiving Depot at ALBERTVILLE for receipt and distribution of stores airlifted from E/VILLE.

During the period 27th Nov to 5th Dec this was put in hand - our main objective being to have enough stores airlifted to A/VILLE Area in sufficient time for elements of 36 Bn which were due to arrive early in Dec.

The hand-over proceeded with the utmost dispatch but on 5 Dec fighting broke out in E/VILLE and it was decided that 36 Bn would conc at E/VILLE and not in the NYUNZU/NIEMBA Area. On 7/12/61 Bn 2 i/c and Pty returned.

Period 5th Dec to 16th Dec.

During the above period the Bn HQ Area - Leopold Farm - was under SA and Mor fire almost continuously. The work of taking over stores was not yet completed and was constantly disrupted for various reasons, viz.:-

Personnel had to evacuate houses, offices, etc., and find shelter in slit trenches.

The constant patrols, guards, etc., constituted a drain on the Q personnel of both 35 and 36 Bns.

Normal communications were non-existent.

Movement on roads unless under heavily armed escort was out

OVER/.

BUNDA

of the question.

The task of accommodating and feeding the incoming elements of the 36 Bn had to receive priority.

The segregation and custody of incoming stores had to be carried out under cover of darkness and under continuous sniping and increasing SA and Mor fire.

Stores which had been taken over and airlifted to A/VILLE incl amm, wpns, etc., were now a vital necessity and their re-routing to E/VILLE became more urgent daily.

The ELIKAT Supply Depot from which our first food supply was drawn, went out of commission and vast quantities of foodstuffs perished. We were now compelled to fall back on 21 Days Irish Congo Rations. This was to be our sole source of supply during above period.

At one stage our water supply was cut off but, providentially, heavy rains which occurred at the time averted what might have been a serious problem.

During the above period the Q Branch were on a 24 hr duty basis. Normal accountancy and administration were impossible. The essentials were the supply of amm, wpns, food and blankets on request and with the utmost dispatch. Atrocious weather conditions during this period made our task still more difficult, but despite all it could be truly said that no man had to forego a meal or lacked a bed when allowed to rest. A large amount of Bn stores which arrived with the Bn from Ireland had perforce to remain at E/VILLE due to shortage of planes as well as the priority which combat stores were given over luggage and non-essential during the period. In addition, the stores taken over at A/VILLE from B & C Coys of the 35 Bn could not be air-lifted for the same reason.

The conditions as outlined improved on the capture of the Tunnel on Dec 16, 1961.

Period 17th Dec 61 to 1 Jan 62.

The main tasks confronting Q Branch during this period were -

Restoration of normal supply lines for supply of rations, POL and other stores.

Restoration of power which had seriously affected our ability to keep foodstuffs fresh and fit for consumption. Fridges, lighting, cooking, etc., were all affected by power failures. It was essential that a food depot on lines of ELIKAT should be established at earliest opportunity and representations were made to KAT. Comd. to this effect.

The requisitioning and, in some cases, purchase of spares, commodities, etc., essential for our purposes.

Billeting arrangements in conjunction with the Accommodation Officer, KAT. Comd.

The stores at E/VILLE and A/VILLE had to be airlifted - this task alone lasted to mid-February.

Replacement and re-allocation of amm and wpns.

Repair and maintenance of wpns; hydra cookers, clothing, Bn Services, etc.

Survey of stores, write-offs, condemnations, etc., had to be undertaken.

Transport requirements, repair and maintenance was a full time task for the MT Section.

A major task during the period was the interviewing and investigation of complaints by civilians re looting of property, requisitioned transport, housing, and damages of one kind or another. Since the official policy was to fully co-operate, all facilities requested were granted. Furniture, etc., was restored, when identified, and in many cases it was discovered in Refugee Camp or in unlawful possession of military or civilian personnel and restored to owners. All houses occupied by troops (100 approx) had to be inventoried, often after repair by Engrs, the owner notified if available, and any goods or valuables discovered therein handed over on demand. Many owners were only too glad to have their homes occupied by U.N. They

OVER/.



were guaranteed rent and protection by U.N. In many cases owners approached us to take over their houses. In other cases the owners could not be traced as they had gone back to Europe. It was also evident that when a house was left vacant it was quickly occupied by refugees who refused to budge when approached by the owner. The clearing of such houses and transferring the occupants to the Refugee Camps was delegated to us by KAT Comd. Subsequently, the owners when seeking compensation for occupation of or damage to houses inferred that Irish troops were in occupation of such houses. Eventually we assumed control of practically all unoccupied houses in the Bn Area.

Period January - February, 1962.

Gradually, normal conditions returned and during this period every effort was made to put the Q affairs in order. KAT Comd instructed that a "War Losses Board" should be convened to inquire into and report on losses of stores, etc., sustained during recent hostilities. Losses incurred were mainly due to:-

Actual material losses sustained during the fighting.  
Losses due to pilfering while awaiting airlifts from L/VILLE and A/VILLE to E/VILLE - December 1st to 16th.  
Deterioration due to lack of proper storage facilities at Bn HQ.

Rough handling at Airports when offloading.

The practice of offloading supplies at E/VILLE Airport in tropical rain-storms and allowing stores to remain in the open until segregated and collected.

The Inspection Team who checked the findings of the Board were reasonable men and no great difficulty was experienced in having the Board's recommendations accepted.

Early in January a new Supply Depot was opened at E/VILLE Airport. Supplies were flown in from L/VILLE daily and gradually, as conditions became normal, supplies were contracted for locally and items such as fresh vegetables, fruit, etc., became available. Initially there were draw-backs. Bread was a constant headache. When supplies reached E/VILLE by air from L/VILLE it was found on occasions that loaves were very often musty and unfit for consumption. While we refused to accept supplies, this did not solve our problem as men still had to be fed. Flour was accepted in lieu and thanks to the initiative of "C" Coy. a bread bakery was established which tided us over our worst days. Local purchase was resorted to on a few occasions but the machinery for re-imbusement for purchases was so cumbersome that the system was unsatisfactory. Eventually, bread was purchased locally by the Food Depot and this solved the problem. When the ELIKAT Meat Depot resumed production our supply of meat was quite good, very palatable and generally proved popular with the men. Prior to the organisation of the ELIKAT Supply Depot an inordinate amount of tinned meat and fish only was provided from the Airport Supply Depot. The lack of fresh meat was quickly felt and the Bn M.O. protested on our behalf to KAT Comd. The position was speedily remedied on the reopening of ELIKAT.

March - May, 1962.

This period was mostly uneventful and our main task was the Boarding, Surveying, etc., of Unit Stores and the preparation for out-survey and hand-over. The out-survey Board was completed in time before the Adv Party returned to Ireland.

Clothing

The supply of UN uniform from ONUC Stores was very unsatisfactory. The allocation of green uniforms was, one before leaving Ireland and a replacement issue after 3 months. The issue of one uniform initially meant that the men had to go through torrential rain during the fighting without a change of uniform. The weather conditions

prevailing in Dec quickly reduced uniforms to sodden, torn rags. Despite representations in writing and personal visits to LEO, the Logs Officer there was adamant that we were not entitled to a second uniform until three months had elapsed. Were it not for the fact that our troops had brought out Irish uniforms, which were used while UN uniforms were being dried and laundered, the position would have been catastrophic. A replacement uniform was not received until mid-February. The quality of the uniform was quite good and it proved satisfactory generally.

The Walking-Out Uniform was generally satisfactory and compared favourably with the W/O Uniforms of other Contingents. A lighter quality cloth would be appreciated as the garments feel rather heavy during the Summer season. The issue is adequate for 6 months.

A leather upper and rubber or composition sole is necessary. The Swedish issue boot was ideal and very popular when obtainable by various means by the Irish troops. The issue of jungle boots was not popular and they were rarely worn by our men. Our own army boots are much too heavy, are not waterproof and the leather tends to disintegrate under tropical conditions.

The UN issue is a W/Proof Cape (Poncho style), with hood. However, supplies were not available to our unit. The Groundsheet as issued to Irish troops is inadequate and far too heavy for Congo wear.

#### Bedding, Blankets, etc.

We had no bedding suitable for active service. The best equipped unit in this respect was the Swedish Bn. Each Swedish soldier was equipped with an easily transportable inflatable mattress. It was ideal for semi-permanent conditions, guards, patrols, etc. Had our troops been obliged to move on extended operations, we would have had to fall back on the issue of 1 or 2 blankets per man with all the attendant difficulties of transportation, issue and collection of same. It was a source of complaint by KAT Comd. Officials that the Irish troops tended to become house-bound more so than other units and lacked mobility in the event of a sudden operational move. The requirement was for a light sleeping bag or rubber mattress to meet the conditions in the Congo.

#### Cooking Facilities.

Cooking was done by Hydra Cookers. They were very satisfactory and compared more than favourably with the equipment of other Contingents. Servicing was all-important and the Ord Sec of the Bn rendered excellent service towards the care and maintenance of Cookers. The overall picture was that no meal was lost or even unduly delayed consequent on failure by the Hydras. Cooks should be highly trained in the manipulation and care of Cookers, but it is regarded as essential that servicing be carried out by trained personnel, i.e., armourers or technicians. In the matter of field cooking, using natural resources, our cooks were not as adaptable as the Indians, for example, but happily, the occasions when we had to cook under these conditions were non-existent.

A supply of Picnic Cookers was received from McMullan Bros. for use by the Unit. Sufficient gas was also given for our six months stay in the Congo. These cookers were ideal for cooking by patrols, guards, etc., and also for such tasks as heating of water and sterilization of instruments. Each cooker contained an 8-hour gas supply, and a sufficient supply of gas was held in reserve for replenishment purposes.

#### System of Supply

The system of supply was far from satisfactory. All our requirements of clothing, Bk. Services Eqpt., etc., were supplied from L/VILLE Ordnance Base Depot. The time lag between the

requisitioning of supplies and receipt of goods, if available, was ridiculous. To cite two examples:-

Uniforms requisitioned in Nov '61	received Feb '62.
Camp beds                   "                   "                   "                   "	May '62.

In some cases items requisitioned were not available and a comparable length of time elapsed before we were notified that they were unavailable. Local purchase could not be resorted to officially until we were informed that goods were not available at LEO. Before stores could be purchased locally we just had to submit a case to Katanga Comd outlining the necessity for local purchase, and pointing out that items were not available at Base Depot, LEO. Before granting us permission to purchase, KATANGA Comd in turn checked with LEO and so more time was lost. By the time permission did come through the necessity for purchase had ceased to exist, or we had improvised from our own resources. In extreme cases, i.e., Engineer Stores bulbs, fuses, flex, etc., sanitation requirements, or other such high priority items, we purchased first and argued with the authorities later.

The general impression was that the system of supply was far too cumbersome, entailing too much documentation, and was incapable of moving faster than a set routine. Paper work was all important and a requisition for stationery was treated with the same respect as one for more important items on which the well-being and health of a Unit might depend. It was very evident that a Sub-Depot should have been established in the E/VILLE Area, but, despite our recommendation to this effect, nothing was done.

The system of food supply, on the other hand, was quite good. A Food Depot was established at E/VILLE Airport for the supply of vegetables, tinned foodstuffs, bread, etc., and ELIKAT Depot catered for our requirements of fresh meat, poultry and fish. I have nothing but praise for the system of supply, requisitioning and issue of foodstuffs. The staffs employed - Indian - were considerate, very reasonable to our demands, and on many occasions gave us choice of meat - whether mutton, bacon or beef. Many times, when feast or fast days intervened and items such as fish or eggs were required, we were accommodated.

The choice of vegetables, many of which were completely foreign to our tastes, was almost unlimited. They were not appreciated by the men when cooked, so we had to fall back on the old reliables, cabbage, peas, beans, carrots, etc. I made it my business to go to the Food Depot each day for the drawing of rations as the strict control and supervision of rations was all-important. The procurement and cooking of a properly balanced diet had a great influence on the maintenance of morale and any deterioration in the quality or quantity of supplies was speedily reflected in the conduct of the men. The food question in the Congo assumes an importance out of all proportion to home conditions and must receive the personal attention of the Q staff.

#### Irish Pack Rations:

Irish Pack Rations for twenty-one days were taken to the Congo with the Bn. They were very popular with the troops and more so with other Contingents on the few occasions when attached to us for rations. They were far superior to the American Dry Ration which was generally unpalatable. The Irish Pack Rations were a god-send during the period of hostilities. They were also very popular on guards, patrols, etc. The one item lacking was butter in lieu of the margarine issue, margarine was never popular.

#### Effect of Weather on Eqpt.

Small Arms Amm sealed presented no difficulty but loose amm tended to oxydise and required constant cleaning. Items such as Verey Light Cartridges handed over to us had often to be condemned as the cardboard containers absorbed moisture, and cartridges would not fit the Pistols.

RÜNDA

Unsealed Mortar Amm was somewhat of a problem due to condensation on the casing of the projectiles. Unsealed primary and secondary charges taken over from previous formations were often U/S and had to be W/O.

Barrels of FN Rifles had to receive constant cleaning to prevent rusting. The same remarks apply to gas vent, plugs, etc. The weekly check of Ordnance for care and cleaning was carried out and the results were very satisfactory. An Ordnance Inspection Team from ONUC carried out an inspection of our wpns with very satisfactory results, see O/O Report.

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ORDNANCE.Ammunition Performance

During the December operations, our ammunition gave a most satisfactory performance, e.g., out of approximately 1000 81 mm mortar bombs fired, the percentage failure is less than 5%. A point worthy of note is that our mortars gave pin-point accuracy on their different objectives. This is borne out by the fact, that the few blinds discovered were dead-on target.

Disposal of U x Bs

This was a commitment, which previous ordnance personnel had not to deal with and can be assessed as a major operation for a city the size of ELIZABETHVILLE. Resulting from the fact that none of the other formations had a bomb disposal officer on their strength, OC, KATANGA COMMAND, entrusted the work to the 36th Irish Bn. This entailed liaison with the Civil Police, the different Consuls, the Security Forces, etc. Every portion of the city was catered for. The following work was executed:-

Mortar Bombs disposed of	- 40,	nearly all were Gendarmarie of the 3" British Bomb design.
Grenades, anti-personnel	- 50,	Design - some similar to the No 36 Mills Gde, some of continental design and some of local pattern, all were Gendarmarie stock.
Grenades, anti-tank	- 18,	all of Belgian design, the majority of them, Strem type and a few Energas similar to our own, all of Gendarmarie stock.

Ordnance Inspection by OIYUC LEO

During the course of this inspection, all heavy weapons were examined and a fairly high percentage of Gustaf Sub Machine Guns and FN Rifles were also given a detailed inspection. The Support Platoon of "C" Coy 36 Irish Bn were given special mention by the Inspecting Staff, for the excellent condition of their weapons. A 100% inspection carried out periodically by the Ordnance Inspection Staff of the unit, has insured that unit maintenance is of a high order.

Report of the Inspection Team reads as follows:-

".....visited all Companies of the 36th Irish Bn and found the condition of all stores (including weapons and ammunition) to be highly satisfactory.

Sgd. M.I. Khan. Major.

NEK Amal. Major.

No 3 Log Inspection Team,  
16th March, 1962....."

Small Arms Ammunition.

There is quite an adequate stock of all S.A. Components for the various weapons. The capture of Camp Massard provided us with fairly large stocks of FN Rifle Components, while all the components do NOT fit our particular rifle, the majority of components are identical and in sufficient quantity to meet the largest possible commitment. I would point out that a major commitment was the actual segregation of those S.A. Components into their different categories and the position now stands, that components for the different weapons are packed in separate boxes, complete with a packing note, giving their contents, a copy of the packing note

RÜNDA

OVER/.

is also held in the appropriate file held by the Unit QM.

Tool Kits.

The tool kits as issued to the Bn, namely -

Armourers' Kits - 3  
Artificers' Kits - 1

are 100% in respect of quantity and condition. Skeleton kits from previous formations exist, but those kits are in no manner complete.

Workshops.

Workshops facilities are adequate to meet current needs.

TRANSPORT

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21 NOV 61 to 26 NOV 61:

In this period there was NO decision as to where the 36th Bn would be stationed. Consequently, I only took over from Capt McPeake the National and UN Stores on Ledger Charge. The vehs had already been allotted to various unit in EVILLE. On 26.11.'61, the Advance Party were ordered to ALBERTVILLE where arrangements were to be made for the reception of the 36th Bn, now scheduled for NYUNZO and NIEMBA.

27 NOV 61 to 8 DEC 61:

On arrival in ALBERTVILLE the OC of the Advance Party found that practically all the Bn would be living under canvas in NYUNZO and NIEMBA, two villages approx 80 miles apart. Pats would have to be operated between both places. To service the Bn there was only 1 Jeep, 1 Bedford truck and 1 Water Trailer available. Together, with the Bn 2IC, I went to Brigade HQ to enquire about tpt, and if we could get some from them. This Brigade is made up of 3 Indian Bns and with the exception of a Canadian Wksps Sec, all the supporting units were Indian. The three Bns were located as follows:-

One Battalion in KAMINA and two Bns in ELIZABETHVILLE.

Due to lack of facilities to bring heavy tpt with them from A/VILLE to these stations, all their vehs were loc at A/VILLE. There was a minimum of 80 Bedfords (3-Ton Trucks) alone in a car park in A/VILLE and all the remaining tpt was scaled accordingly. The bulk of this tpt was un-used as there were insufficient troops available. When we made out demand for tpt from the INDIAN BDE HQ we were literally laughed out of the place. They explained that when they came from INDIA, they always brought with them, by sea, every item that was required by a unit. They would NOT rely on the UN to supply them with any eqpt. All their tpt requirements were bought (new) in INDIA, shipped to AFRICA and brought to the CONGO by air. They then presented the bill to UN. In this way they did NOT have to beg for any eqpt and were completely self sufficient from the day they arrived. There were at least two meetings daily at BDE HQ plus innumerable wireless msges to HQ, LEO, in the period we spent in A/VILLE. The Indians refused point blank to give us even one veh for use in A/VILLE while we were there. On 7th Dec an order was made by HQ, LEO that the Indians would hand over to us whatever surplus tpt they had available. This amounted to four Jeeps and four trailers, and it appeared that we would have to operate in NYUNZO and NIEMBA with that amount. At this stage we were ordered back to E/VILLE, where fighting had already broken out.

9 DEC to 19 DEC 1961:

I arrived in E/VILLE on 8th Dec. Capt. McPeake, was running the transport section, still operating in LEOPOLD FARM HQ of 35 Bn. The bulk of the 36th Bn tpt sec arrived that night and the following day. The 35 Bn were ordered out to a loc near the airport. It was impossible to effect a proper handover of vehs and this can very readily be understood as the HQ at LEOPOLD FARM was coming under heavy fire day and night at this period. Some of the available tpt was taken by the 35 Bn to their new loc. From 9th to 15 Dec the four fitters in the sec worked without ceasing during daylight hrs to get some vehs on the road.

RÜNDA

## 92. RÜNDA

The biggest operation of the fighting was due to commence at 0400 hrs on the morning of the 16th Dec. This was the attack on the Tunnel. We had two Coys, "A" and "B" engaged in this attack, plus a tactical HQ. I would say that never in modern times has an attack been mounted with so little transport. The total amount of transport available on the morning of the 16th Dec was eleven vehs. Broken down this was allotted as follows:-

"A" Coy	-	Three Pick-ups
"B" Coy	-	Three Pick-ups
TAC HQ	-	One Landrover, one VW Saloon and one Pontiac Saloon.
MED POSTS	-	Two VW Ambulances.

Six of these vehs were so unroadworthy that if a Transport Offr allowed them on the road in IRELAND he would be charged on the spot. Elements of "C" Coy were acting as a reserve and if we were unfortunate enough to be held up in the attack there would have been no way to bring them up to the front quickly. They would have had to march the two miles. There were NO reserve vehs to bring up sups of food, amm or anything required immediately for the furtherance of the action. Fortunately, for all concerned, none of these things were required urgently and the available tpt was able to perform all the routine tasks.

About midday of the 16th Dec when all objectives were secured in the IRISH AREA I formed the tpt sec into two squads under myself and Lt Bennet. Our objective was to seize any tpt and spares that could be of any use to us. In this we met with reasonable success. The following is a list of tpt seized between 16th and 19th Dec 61:-

Misc Saloons	-	17
Pick-ups asst	-	10
VW mini-buses	-	3
Trucks, 3-ton	-	4
50-Seater buses	-	3
Tractor & Trailer	-	2
Bulldozer & Low-Loader	-	1
Grader	-	1
TOTAL:	-	41 Vehs.

Some of these were in very poor condition, but were taken in and stripped of all working parts. There were NO spare parts available except Jeep and Landrover. Quantities of tyres, tubes, batteries, Jacks garage and various other items of stores were taken during these dates.

### 20 DEC to 12 JAN 62:

During this period the Bn was very heavily committed to pats and convoy work to and from airport. We still had NO spare parts and it was a constant effort to try and keep the vehs on the road. The civ garage that the 35 Bn had at their disposal was NOT available to us. Leopold Farm had NO bldgs that could be converted into a wksps and consequently all repair work had to be done in the open. This was a serious discomfort to the wksps staff because the rainy season lasts from Nov to Apr. Six out of seven days we had hy tropical rains that lasted sometimes for three or four hours. The yard in which the fitters were working was constantly flooded and very mucky. We had NO wksps eqpt as such and all hy repair work had to be done by improvising eqpt. Despite their handicap the fitters were very successful in keeping a maximum number of vehs on the road at all times.

The transport generally was in an appalling condition. With the exception of three vehs which came from Ireland and four UN Pick-ups which were nearly new, all other vehs were giving constant trouble. The Bn had a total of 3 three ton trucks. Only one of these, a Chev 3 Ton Truck was on the road when I took over.

RÜNDA



It was engaged whole time on ration duties and was never available for troop carrying. We managed to get the Bedford Truck on the road but it was anything but roadworthy and had to be used for local details around the farm only. It eventually burned out. After overheating it caused a pouch of Gustaf ammo to discharge a round which severed a petrol pipe and set the veh on fire. The third truck, a Chev 3 Ton, had not been on the road for four months due to lack of spare parts which were unavailable both in E/VILLE and LEO. There were no trucks available for patrol work. These patrols had to be carried out in pick-ups without seating, protection or freedom of movement in the event of an attack. Consequently, the troops in them were in unnecessary danger, which could have been minimised if proper steel bodied trucks were available. From 12th Jan onwards the situation became more settled. Further activities are dealt with under different headings.

#### Suitability of Vehs:

The type of vehs on charge, UN and Nat, were as follows:- Willy's, Landrover, Chev, Bedford, Ford & V/W. The V/W vehs were by far the most satisfactory of all vehs on charge but this was accounted for by the fact that the best vehs mechanically were V/Ws. The Ford vehs and the Landrovers received from Ireland are most suitable for small patrols and give very little trouble mechanically. However, from Nov the climate was little different from conditions experienced in Ireland during summer. The roads were also good, and in many cases excellent. The overall conditions, therefore, were the same as in Ireland and any transport would be suitable while stationed in E/VILLE.

#### Maintenance and Repair:

Although I have already dealt with the repair situation up to 12 Jan, 62, I would like to point out that despite repeated appeals to Kat Comd to make a civilian garage available to us they had done nothing. To the best of my knowledge the 35th Bn had the use of a section of a big garage in E/VILLE.

This concession was not renewed. The reason was that there was a total of 22 vehs asst in this garage at the beginning of Dec when the fighting broke out. During Dec an Italian mercenary marched a platoon of Gends to this garage, took over the 22 vehs and loaded them up with other UN equipment located there, and drove the whole issue over the border into RHODESIA. He sold the lot for £8,000 and kept the money himself. At the moment, the KATANGA Govt. refuse to recognise he was working for them so the UN civilian branch are chary of allowing vehs to be repaired or located in civilian garages. Permission was consistently refused to do any repair work in any but a UN wksp. There were two wksp for military vehs in operation. Both were located at the Airport. The biggest one was run by an Indian Staff and there was at least a three months waiting list. As they always repaired Indian vehs as first priority, it is doubtful if vehs would be repaired even in three months. The other wksp was run by Danes and although they did their best they were swamped with work and being a small establishment could make very little impression on repair work. An arrangement was put into operation whereby we sent three of our fitters up to the Swedish wksp and worked in conjunction with their fitter staff. The Swedes had a system that allowed them to purchase spare parts when they wanted them and they agreed to purchase for us in their own name, an arrangement that speeded up our repair work. (I will deal with their system under the section "Spares"). The wksp situation I considered to be the greatest drawback to a satisfactory transport set up in the CONGO.

Spares:

Apart from Landrover and Jeep spares, of which we had more than we could possibly require with the small number of those vehs on charge, there was great difficulty in getting any other type of part. We had to requisition all spares from Ord Depot, LEO. It took at least three to four weeks to get a reply and it was usually in the negative. Every obstacle was apparently put in our way to delay any delivery. An example of this is that if one small error was made in making out the requisition, which could be easily rectified in LEO, instead of doing so they would send it back to be corrected and the same procedure had to be adopted again. When it was established that the spares were not available in LEO the list was then sent to Kat Cmd Logs Offr, who gave us permission to price the item locally. The list with prices was again sent to LEO and after another delay it was sent back with permission to buy. I can say with certainty that we would be lucky to get a spare part within two months of original date of requisitioning. Some stores requisitioned in Dec were still unavailable either in LEO or locally in April. There does not appear to be any chance of getting acid for batteries to quote an example. We did get permission to purchase locally, without reference to anyone, parts to the value of 200 francs, this order came in March. When one realises that 200 francs would not purchase a set of four spark plugs it can be understood what a concession this was. I referred to the Swedish system in the previous paragraph. When they realised what difficulties existed in getting spares their Govt. sent money direct to the Logs Officer who in turn gave it to the Transport Officer. He then bought any parts required, for cash. He included, with the receipt from the trader, a certificate that the price was reasonable and it was necessary. This was sent through the C.O. to Sweden and from there the UN were billed with the cost. The system allows the Transport Offr to effect immediate repairs without any hold-up. It would give any Irish Transport Offr an excellent chance to keep abreast of repair work if this system could be adopted by us.

POL Consumption:

Up to the end of Dec there was a grave shortage of Petrol. All supplies had to be flown in, in barrels. Our allocation for cooking, lighting sets, charging plants, MT Vehs and Armd Car Gp was set at 500 litres a day - approx 112 gallons. Cooking alone consumed 50 gals per day. All MT work was carried out at lower gears and heavy patrol duties for Armd Cars etc. put us in a critical position. On the 6 Jan we had just sufficient petrol for one day's cooking after draining all vehs. We had at this date drawn our quota of petrol up to and including the last day of Jan. The Bn O/C then wrote to Bde cancelling all activities and stated unless the position was rectified within 24 hrs the Bn would do nothing except cooking. In less than 2 hrs we had 2,800 litres delivered and a further 1,400 litres within 24 hrs. The ration was also doubled and we had no further trouble with supplies. Consumption was heavy because all of work comprised of short patrols and local details. Cooking was by far the heaviest consumer. The Armd Car Gp was next and then MT Vehs. The MT Section had, however, only one heavy petrol truck on the road and all our vehs were pick-ups or saloons. If we had twenty trucks as we should have our quota would have to be raised. We had no difficulty in getting adequate supplies of diesel fuel oils of all descriptions or grease.

Driving Standards:

Officially the Bn strength of drivers as per establishment is twelve. This is totally inadequate even for Bn HQ alone. We had to test a panel of drivers for each Coy to ensure sufficient drivers would be available at all times, irrespective of duties, guards and drivers resting/off duty. Fortunately, the Bn had a

good number of regular S.&T. drivers as riflemen and all these were put on the panel. Altogether, apart from officers, there were 105 licences issued. This number included all the Armd Car Gp (43) and as duties of various kinds were heavy it was barely adequate. The position in Bn HQ would have been critical were it not for all the officers driving themselves when required. The standard of driving was generally satisfactory. Only in two cases were licences withdrawn and in each case it was a matter of discipline rather than bad driving. We had no difficulties under this heading.

Accidents:

The position was very satisfactory. We had one accident which was not due to any fault on the part of the Irish driver.

Conclusion:

It would appear that in this matter of tpt we, as a contingent, do NOT get what we should because we make do with what we have in any location. To quote an instance of what other contingents feel about tpt and the lack of it, the following is an example. The Tunisian Bn transferred to E/VILLE early this year found themselves, like us, with inadequate tpt. They went through the normal channels when applying for vehs but got nowhere. Eventually the Bn Comd got in touch with his Government, who notified UN HQ in NEW YORK that they would withdraw the Bn from the CONGO unless they were sup with adequate vehs. Within 48 hours nearly all their requirements were sup. Whereas I am quoting hearsay with regard to that story, my own experience would lend credence to the indident. I feel I should repeat that men's lives could have been lost due to the lack, and the unroadworthy condition of the tpt available to us.

Representation should be made to the UN auths to meet any reasonable demand from an Irish Bn Comd for tpt. NO tpt offr should be in the posn, when serving with UN, that his conscience is uneasy when sending troops on a mission in tpt he feels is NOT 100% fit for the job. Were I to ground all vehs in that category, NO patrol would have been undertaken by the 36 Irish Bn. Fortunately, we were NOT committed to long patrols over bad roads in areas remote from all other UN troops.

TRAINING

The standard of training on assuming duty was generally satisfactory. Unfortunately for the battalion it was engaged in hostilities immediately on arrival in Elizabethville. No chance was given for bedding-down, becoming accustomed to food or climate. Training had been carried out in Riot Drill, Defence of Road Blocks and the handling of all weapons on issue to the Unit. Six 20 MM Bofors AA Guns were taken over from the Swedish Bn to be used in an Anti-tank role, and training was given to the Anti-tank Pl HQ Coy in the use of the guns. Permission was repeatedly sought but refused by Kat Comd to fire weapons for training purposes. The refusal was for security reasons due to the state of tension existing throughout the period of duty of the battalion. Each Coy in the battalion organised a limited training programme, but due to heavy guard duties on barriers and duties on patrols, training was negligible.

It must be pointed out here that NO problems were experienced in the performance of weapons due to daily care and cleaning by men and supervision by unit officers. The greatest credit in this connection is due to the members of the Ordnance Platoon who continually moved from Coy to Coy servicing weapons.

It must also be pointed out that the employment of 20 MM AA Bofors for use as an anti-tank gun was limited. It was necessary to site it in an elevated position due to the type of ground encountered. The 84 MM RCL was sufficient for all anti-tank requirements and proved a valuable weapon in the hands of trained crews during the hostilities in December, 1961.

ASSOCIATION WITH OTHER CONTINGENTS -LANGUAGE PROBLEMS

As stated in the Journal report, the 36 Bn was associated with the following UN Contingents:

Swedish, Indian, Ethiopian, Tunisian,  
Malayan (in Operations), Canadian (Signal),  
Italian (Medical), Norwegian (Movement Control Air),  
Pakistani (Ordnance Repair Unit).

The only association the Unit had with Belgians was among civilians. Belgian civilians requested protection for themselves and their property, and requested assistance in the recovery of their (Belgian) property stolen by Africans. Belgian civilians requested assistance during the hostilities in 1961 in locating relatives and friends, and asked for protection which was given.

The Bn had NO direct association with the Congolese Army as Katanga was occupied by the Gendarmerie Army of Mr. Tshombe.

The Unit had NO direct association with neighbouring countries.

The languages used were English, French and Swahili. Interpreters were available for Swahili. Mr. Charlie Kearney (a native of County Wexford) joined the 35th Bn as an interpreter in Swahili during the hostilities in Jadotville in September, 1961, and was taken prisoner with members of 'C' Coy 35th on the departure of the 35th Bn to Ireland, Mr. Kearney joined the 36th Bn as an interpreter. Great difficulty existed in regard to interpreters in French. Some officers and one NCO of the 36th Bn

# RUNDA

97.

had a slight knowledge of French. The Bn Chaplain, Fr. Crean, was also on call as an interpreter in French and gave wonderful help in this field during the period of service of the Bn, in dealing with UN officials and Refugees. Fr. Crean also organised French classes for officers which was continued for a period of about three months.

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WELFAREWelfare Equipment:

Generally speaking ONUC supplies were adequate to meet our requirements. However it was necessary to order a supply of Hurleys from home and our appreciation must be recorded for the prompt manner in which An tArd Ceathrúnach met our demand and forwarded the Hurleys by Airmail. In February, 1962, O.N.U.C. issued an instruction to the effect that all Sports and Welfare Equipment must be taken on official Ledger Charge and accounted for in the same manner as items of Ordnance. This necessitated the opening of two separate Ledgers for National and UNO Equipment. Such Equipment was out-surveyed in exactly the same manner as items of Ordnance. The operation of the Ledgers and location records to ensure the proper implementation of this instruction involved a considerable amount of extra clerical work.

The provision of prizes for inter-Platoon and Company Competitions presented a problem due to the limited supplies in the local shops. An tArd Cheathrúnach was informed of this problem during our tour of duty and it was recommended that provision should be made to send out with the 37th Bn a supply of Medals and Plaques to cover prizes in various competitions and furthermore it was felt that Medals and Plaques could be inscribed "CONGO 1962". In this way they would have an added souvenir value.

Canteen Trading.

Due to the absence of goods from the shops as a result of the December fighting practically NO local purchases for re-sale were made and all goods were received through the PX. Supplies generally were good and adequate to meet demands. However Air Transport was NOT always available to convey our stocks from Leopoldville and in this connection we must acknowledge with deep appreciation the wonderful co-operation received from the Swedish Battalion in E/Ville as on numerous occasions they loaned goods to our Canteen pending receipt of supplies from the PX.

Gifts Received by 36th Bn:

60,000 Players Cigarettes  
 60,000 Gold Flake "  
 72,000 Sween Afton  
     4 Cases Baby Bottles J. Power Whiskey  
     3 " Whiskey & Wines - Daly of Cork  
 120 Dozen Guinness Stout  
 135 Lbs Tea  
     8 Cwt Sugar  
 112 Lbs Ruddells Tobacco  
 200 Tins Butterscotch Sweets - Williams and Woods  
 155 Records - Miscellaneous  
     20 Electric Irons  
     28 Razor Blade Sherpens  
 332 Books Miscellaneous  
     96 Valves Radio Assorted  
     36 Batteries Radio - Bl03  
     5 Transistor Radio - Phillips  
     20 Gross Christmas Cards  
     20 Kosangas Picnic Sets.

INCIDENCE OF VISITS OF UN OFFICERS AND GUARDS OF HONOURVisits:

Details are given in the Journal report.

Frequent visits by Co. Whern (Swedish O/C 1 Bde) during the service of the Bn.

Visits of the Force Commander, Lt/Gen. McKeown, during hostilities in December, 1961, and prior to the termination of his tour of duty as Force Commander.

Visit of the President of Katanga, Mr. Tshombe, and his Ministers on the occasion of the farewell visit of Lt/Gen McKeown. Lt/Gen McKeown received a presentation at a party at the "Irish Officers' Club" at which Mr. Tshombe made a conciliatory speech to the UN military and civilians group gathered there.

Frequent visits by Dr. Senn, International Red Cross Geneva, investigating the whereabouts of missing persons, and a visit by Acting Sec Gen of International Red Cross Geneva.

Visits of General Rikkye (India) Chief Military Adviser on the Congo to the Secretary General of UNO, Mr. U. Thant.

Visits of Civil Reps of UNO for Katanga - Mr. Urquart (British); Mr. Rolz-Bennett (South America); Mr. Dumontet (French); Mr. Back (French) PRO; Mr. Gussing (Swedish).

Visits of Brigadier Raja (India), O/C Katanga Command, Brig Noronha (India) later O/C Kat Comd, and Brig Prem Chand (India) later O/C Kat Comd.

Visits of Force Commander, General Gerede Gebre (Ethiopia) and his Deputy Maj-Gen Jacob (Ethiopia).

Frequent visits by Mr. Sapwe, Civil Police Chief Elizabethville (African) for the purpose of co-operation between Civil Police and 36th Bn on patrols. He also assisted Irish personnel who had been apprehended by Gendarmerie.

Guards of Honour:

- 4 Dec 61. Review of Unit by Taoiseach, McKee Barracks.
- 16 Jan 62. Commemorative Mass and March Past Tunnel E/ville.
- 22 Jan 62. Visit of Brigadier K.A.S. Raja OC Katanga Command to Irish Camp.
- 27 Jan 62. Visit of Lieut. General S. McKeown Force Commander to Irish Camp.
- 19 Mar 62. Visit of Brigadier R. Noronha, OC Katanga Command to Irish Camp.

RUNDA

100.

PUBLIC RELATIONS

The Battalion arrived in Elizabethville at a time when the area was extremely newsworthy. Publicity was not so much sought as thrust upon the United Nations during this period of defensive and offensive operations. Within the Battalion the question of press relations did not arise then but Press reports of the period were moderate in tone if somewhat garbled in context and Irish newspapers, by cultivating restraint maintained a creditably balanced outlook. These reports were, in all cases, supplied by United Nations Headquarters and the Battalion had no idea of the type of material being supplied.

First visit by pressmen to Irish lines were made about Christmas, 1961, mainly for pictures. These pictures as published, while they did not reflect a parade ground standard, did portray our troops as they were and so could not be regarded as objectionable. They served as a warning however, as to what could happen if newsmen were allowed indiscriminate access to our area. The second warning came via a report which appeared in Irish newspapers on the Battalion's New Year's Day parade through the Tunnel. This report, filed by John Bullock (Special Representative of the Daily Telegraph) was written at second hand and its general tone was grossly flamboyant. About this time too it was discovered that the British press corps and representatives of the British based wire services were concentrating on the Irish since our newspapers were prepared to publish everything sent home concerning us.

In the light of these circumstances Cft Harrison was appointed Press Officer and construed his duties as having more to do with control of publicity than its development.

First contact was made with the Press on 16th January, the occasion of a memorial service in A Company area. Present to cover the function were representatives of all newspapers, wire services and news services in Elizabethville namely Reuter, AP, UPI and AFP, special correspondents from Daily Telegraph and Daily Mail and cameraman from V.I.S. views. Present also was the UM Public Information Officer newly arrived from Leopoldville. In the presence and with the approval of this latter, press policy was given out verbally to all reporters as follows:

The Irish will facilitate all press agencies whose coverage is fair whether favourable or not. We will resent untrue interpretation of our role.

All our releases will be through the Information Officer <sup>UN IQ</sup>  
No direct quotes whatever except by Battalion Commander.  
Although willing to cooperate fully the Battalion reserves the right to privacy.

After this meeting relations with news agencies were most cordial and the only objectionable features of our publicity emanated from home particularly from the Evening Mail. All in all however, the publicity received was, although very extensive, quite well balanced.

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NOMINAL ROLLS.

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CASUALTY ROLLDEAD:

<u>NO.</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
0.7776	Lieut.	RIORDAN, P.A.	Killed in action while leading his platoon on the <b>assault</b> of the Tunnel at Elizabethville, on 16th Dec, 1961.
87410	Sgt.	MULCAHY, P.	Died from wounds received in action on 12th Dec. 1961, at Luigie.
810568	Cpl.	FALLON, M.	Died from wounds received when a mortar bomb hit Bn HQ.
87602	Cpl.	GEOGHEGAN, J.	Accidentally shot by Gustaf at Luxembourg, Elizabethville and died on 28 Dec. 61.
811849	Cpl.	POWER, J.	Died of natural causes in hospital in Elizabethville on 7 Mar 62.
812054	Pte.	WICKHAM, A.	Radio Operator with Lt. Riordan - Killed in action on the assault of the Tunnel at Elizabethville on 16th Dec. 1961.

WOUNDED:

0.6626	Capt.	AGNEW, H.	Shrapnel wound - ring finger - right hand.
0.6322	Capt.	McINTYRE, R.K.	Bullet wound - throat.
0.7679	Lt.	KIELY, W.G.	Bullet wound - throat.
94029	Cpl.	GORMAN, T.	Bullet wound - right foot.
804788	Cpl.	SHERIDAN, A.	Shrapnel wound - chest.
808720	Cpl.	GREGAN, P.	Bullet wound - right jaw.
810957	Cpl.	FRANCIS, G.	Bullet wound - left ear.
810490	Pte.	DESMOND, J.	Shrapnel wounds - chest & back.
200608	Pte.	DUNNE, J.	Shrapnel wound - back.
807241	Tpr.	KENNY, M.	Shrapnel wound - right ear and neck.
806181	Pte.	FERGUS, O.	Shrapnel wound - throat.
806540	Pte.	WOODCOCK, A.	Shrapnel wound in back.
811429	Pte.	CONFREY, A.	Shrapnel wound in right thigh.
811308	Pte.	KELLY, G.	Wound - left thigh.
811406	Pte.	O'FLYNN, R.	Bullet wound - abdomen.
808811	Pte.	GILRAIN, P.	Cont used wound - face.
808571	Pte.	McMULLEN, M.	Wound - right hand.

INJURED:

96438	Pte.	LIDDY, T.	Injuries - head & face and right eye - accidental discharge of 84 mm Rec. Rifle.
811129	Pte.	FITZGERALD, S.	Blast injury - same incident.
808241	Pte.	KELLY, N.	Contusion - right elbow - same incident.
808245	Pte.	HAYES D.	Wound - right shoulder - same incident.
811439	Pte.	GRIFFIN, J.	Wounds - abdomen - right foot - left arm - same incident.
811238	Pte.	LOWRY, J.	Scalp wound and shock - same incident.

# RÚNDA

103.

## ADVANCE PARTY ROLL

### BN HQ:

2 i/c 0/4989 Comdt Ryan, T.  
10 0/5238 Comdt Harrison M.  
Asst Ops Offr 0/7108 Capt Fagan, J.  
Air L.O. 0/4624 Comdt Johnston, D.

### "A" PL:

Asst Adjnt 0/6852 Capt Crawford V.  
1 C/S - MP 76492 C/S Fitzpatrick, P.  
1 Sgt - MP 71689 Sgt Mee H.  
1 Sgt - Clerk 98361 Sgt. Carroll, T.  
1 Cpl - MP 86891 Cpl Clancy E.

### "Q" PL:

QM 0/4947 Comdt Donovan, C.  
Ord Offr 0/5048 Comdt O'Donnell, T.  
Welfare Offr. 0/6997 Capt Williams, J.  
Engr Offr 0/7589 Capt Hallahan, M.  
BQMS 16488 BQMS O'Regan, J.  
CQMS 78335 CQMS Doyle, J.  
Sgt - Engs 86727 Sgt Barron  
Sgt - Stores 423313 Sgt O'Sullivan, J.  
Sgt - Cook 78890 Sgt McKenzie, P.  
Cpl - Stores 90827 Sgt Lamb, W.  
Pte - Cook 97085 Pte Larkin, J.  
Pte - Cook 86770 Pte O'Rathallaigh, S.

### INT PL:

Int Sgt. 91638 Sgt Kirwan, L.

### SIGS PL:

Pl Comd 0/7314 Capt Maguire, P.  
Sgt - Op Wrls & Ln 434634 Sgt Torpey, T.  
Sgt - Op Wrls & Ln 88486 Sgt Power, J.  
Pte - Op Wrls & Ln 809743 Pte Ford, P.

RÚNDA

RÚNDA

104.  
COM

TPT PL:

P O	0/7446	Capt Cotter, P.
C/S	431092	Sgt Clegg, J.
Sgt - Fitter	81651	Sgt Delaney, W.
Pte - Dvrs MT	95153	Pte Kearns, J.
Pte - " "	810555	Pte Power, J.

MED PL

M O	0/6291	Comdt Sullivan, A.
Cpl - Med Ord	79526	C/S Proderick, J.

A COY GP:

2 i/c	0/6766	Capt Page, K.
S O	0/6626	Capt Agnew, H.
Sgt	87410	Sgt Mulcahy, P.
Cpl - Stores	89205	Cpl Callan, J.

B COY GP:

2 i/c	0/5225	Capt J. Long
S O	0/7157	Capt Minihane, J.
Sgt.	95333	Sgt Enright, J.
Cpl - stores	80468	Cpl Kelly, A.

C COY GP:

2 i/c	0/7107	Capt Flynn, J.
S O	0/7501	Capt Keyes, G.
Sgt.	93494	Sgt Conneely, P.
Cpl - Stores	71005	Cpl White, L.

ARND C GP:

Capt	0/6877	Capt Delaney J.R.
COMS	425362	COMS Carroll, J.
Sgt - fitter	424442	Sgt McGuire, T.
Tpr - dvr	805678	Tpr Murphy, L.
Tpr - gnr/dvr	807098	Tpr Leonard, J.
Tpr - gnr/dvr	808173	Tpr Roche, J.

RÚNDA

## TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS

RÜNDA

Courtmartials

LCsM. There were nine Limited Courtmartials as outlined hereunder:-

<u>NO.</u>	<u>RANK.</u>	<u>NAME.</u>	<u>CHARGE.</u>	<u>RESULT.</u>
810379	Cpl.	P. Ferguson	Abandoning ATK Rifle	Acquitted.
99659	Cpl.	M. O'Brien	Leaving his Patrol	Acquitted
811215	Pte.	F. McBrearty	Asleep on Post	Reprimand
801466	Cpl.	P. Lucey	Asleep on Guard	Reprimand and Fined £10
805265	Cpl.	M. Thompson	Leaving his Guard Room	Reprimand and Fined £10
811248	Pte.	J. Robinson)	By want of due	56 Days
811761	Pte.	J. Moffatt )	precaution being taken prisoner	Detention
811359	Pte.	A Russell	(1) Entering private house. (2) Assaulting Civilians. (3) Resisting an Escort. (4) Attempting to strike an Officer. (5) Using threatening language. (6) Being Drunk.	56 Days Detention.
809974	Pte.	J. Buckley	(1) Entering private house. (2) Assaulting a civilian. (3) Assisting a prisoner to escape.	14 Days Detention.
801787	Cpl.	T. McCarthy (elected for LCM)	(1) Insubordinate language to superior officer. (2) Absent whilst Transport Orderly Sergeant.	Fined £1 and severe reprimanded.

Summary Trials:

Section under which Offences committed.	No of cases Tried.	No found Guilty.	No found NOT Guilty.
Sec. 131. Disobeying a lawful Command of a S.O.	29	29	-
Sec. 133. Behaving in an insubordinate manner to a S.O.	11	11	-
Sec. 134. Leaving Camp without permission.	14	14	-
Sec. 137. A. W. O. L.	95	94	1
Sec. 141. Making a false statement	2	2	2
Sec. 142. Drunk when NOT on duty	12	12	-
Sec. 156. Stealing	2	-	2
Sec. 157. Improper selling of property.	3	3	-
Sec. 168. To the Prej. of Order and Discipline.	153	150	3
TOTAL	321	315	6

- Note: (1) In the cases of absence without leave, charges as shown under Sec. 137, these are of a minor nature.
- (2) Charges under Sec. 168 were mostly of minor nature, with 56 cases of being in places Out of Bounds and 14 cases of improper possession.

RÜNDA

RÜNDA

BATTALION  
NOMINAL ROLL.

UN No.	Regt. No.	Rank	Name.	Coy.	PX Card No.	Parent Unit.
53627	0.4484	Lt Col	Hogan, M.F.	HQ	00754	S Comd HQ.
53051	0.4911	Lt Col	Larkin, J.	A Car Gp	27913	11 Mot Sqn
53635	0.4989	Lt Col	Ryan, T.	HQ	00755	Dep Cav
53628	0.4939	Comdt	Beary, J.	HQ	00756	AHQ
53139	0.5167	Comdt	Callaghan, W.	B	27751	22 Bn
53645	0.6852	Comdt	Crawford, V.	HQ	00763	E Comd HQ.
53469	0.7829	Comdt	Daly, E.D.	C	28794	3 Hosp Coy
53140	0.7344	Comdt	Delaney, D.J.	B	27752	3 Hosp Coy
53052	0.6877	Comdt	Delaney, J.R.	A Car Gp	27914	1 Mot Sqn
53629	0.4947	Comdt	Donovan, C.	HQ	00757	HAQ
53305	0.6378	Comdt	Fitzpatrick, J.M.	A	27967	E Comd HQ.
53631	0.4562	Comdt	Foran, J.	HQ	00765	CDA.
53630	0.5152	Comdt	Griffin, J.J.	HQ	00758	5 Bde HQ.
53632	0.5238	Comdt	Harrison, M.	HQ	00759	AHQ
53633	0.7269	Comdt	Heron, S.C.	HQ	00760	AHQ
53468	0.4959	Comdt	Hurley, D.	C	28793	GTD.
53634	0.4624	Comdt	Johnston, D.K.	HQ	00761	Air Corps
53544	0.5048	Comdt	O'Donnell, T.J.	HQ	00762	Ord CTC
53310	0.6766	Comdt	Page, K.	A	27973	6 Bde HQ
53306	0.7075	Comdt	Sheehan, J.J.	A	27968	3 Hosp Coy
53589	0.6291	Comdt	Sullivan, A. Mc A.	HQ	00764	3 Hosp Coy
53636	Chaplain	Rev.Fr	Crean, C.	HQ	00766	AHQ
53307	Chaplain	Rev.Fr	Matthews, C.	A	27969	5 Bn
53460	0.6626	Capt	Agnew, H.	A		CT Dep.
53577	0.6188	Capt	Auliffe, D.	C	28919	HQ CTC
53053	0.5755	Capt	Bergin, J.L.	A Car Gp	27915	1 Tank Sqn
53472	0.6325	Capt	Brewer, W.J.	C	28797	Area Rec CTC
53054	0.7169	Capt	Casey, J.	A Car Gp	27916	Dep Cav
53637	0.7446	Capt	Cotter, P.J.	HQ	00768	4 Fld S&T
53308	0.7103	Capt	Crowley, J.J.P.	A	27970	Mil Col
60063	0.7418	Capt	Dawson, Leo M.	AC	5159	Mil Col
53638	0.7366	Capt	Duff, T.F.	HQ	00769	6 FAR
53639	0.7108	Capt	Fagan, J.J.	HQ	00767	W.Comd. HQ
53470	0.7107	Capt	Flynn, J.	C	28795	HQ CTC
53640	0.7589	Capt	Hallahan, M.F.	HQ	00773	4 Fd Engr
54768	0.5170	Capt	Kelleher, C.T.	HQ	00770	Mil Coll
53471	0.7501	Capt	Keyes, G.M.	C	28796	24 Bn
53643	0.7143	Capt	Leech, G.D.	HQ	00771	4 Maint Engr
53141	0.5225	Capt	Long, J.	B	27753	4 Bn
53641	0.7314	Capt	Maguire, P.A.J.	HQ	00772	AHQ

RÜNDA

107  
RÜNDA

UN No.	Regt.No.	Rank	Name.	Coy.	PX Card No.	Parent Unit.
53309	0.7385	Capt	Matthews, J.G.	A	27972	5 Bn
53143	0.7157	Capt	Minihane, J.O.	B	27755	3 Grn AOC
53142	0.6322	Capt	McIntyre, R.K.	B	27754	HQS Com
53055	0.7159	Capt	O'Leary, T.	A Car Gp	27917	3 Mot Sqn
53144	0.7502	Capt	Riordan, A.A.	B	27756	12 Bn
53644	0.6032	Capt	Sheehan, P.K.	HQ	00774	1 Hosp Coy
53642	0.6997	Capt	Williams, J.J.	HQ	00775	AHQ
53647	0.7766	Lieut	Bennett, M.A.	HQ	00776	Dep S&T
53057	0.7734	Lieut	Carr, A.J.	A Car Gp	27919	4 Mot Sqn
53145	0.7628	Lieut	Dunne, T.	B	27757	15 Bn
53648	0.7661	Lieut	Ghent, P.J.	HQ	00777	2 AA Bty 1AA Regt
53525	0.7844	Lieut	Hearns, P.J.D.	C	28849	3 Bn
53646	0.7724	Lieut	Kavanagh, B.J.	HQ	00778	Dep Sigs
53146	0.7679	Lieut	Kiely, W.G.	B	27758	14 Bn
53147	0.7642	Lieut	Murphy, G.C.	B	27759	3 FAR
53649	0.7716	Lieut	Murphy, J.H.J.	HQ	00779	Dep Arty
53312	0.7806	Lieut	Norton, J.J.	A	27974	2 Bn
53056	0.7851	Lieut	O'Byrne, M.J.	A Car Gp	27918	Dep Cav
53461	0.7776	Lieut	Riordan, P.A.	A		5 Bn
53555	0.7842	Lieut	Wright, G.A.	C	28950	3 Bn
53495	0.7669	Lieut	Young, J.	C	28819	1 Bn
53311	0.7887	Lieut	Feeley, P.J.	A	27971	2 Bn
53650	75275	BSM	Byrne, R.	HQ	00781	CT Dep W
53657	79526	CS	Broderick, J.	HQ	00782	2 Fd Coy AMC
53656	431092	CS	Clegg, J.	HQ	00783	2 Grn S&T
53148	75014	CS	Deveney, J.	B	27760	12 Bn
53658	91848	CS	Flavin, T.	HQ	00784	1 AA Regt
53653	76492	CS	Fitzpatrick, P.	HQ	00785	4 Grn MPC
53313	87404	CS	Harte, M.	A	27975	5 Bn
53655	71298	CS	Kearney, A.	HQ	00786	Dep Sigs
53652	424266	CS	Kiernan, M.	HQ	00787	6 Bn
53473	73361	CS	Lynch, M.	C	28798	ML Coll
53619	76589	CS	Maher, M.	HQ	00788	1 Grn AOC
53149	201969	CS	Tisdall, T.	B	27761	3 Hosp Coy
53058	76700	CS	Tuohy, J.	A Car Gp	27920	2 Mot Sqn
53059	425362	CQMS	Carroll, J.	A Car Gp	27921	11 Mot Sqn
53569	78335	CQMS	Doyle, J.	HQ	00789	1 Mot Sqn
53651	16488	BQMS	O'Regan, J.	HQ	00781	CT Dep W

# RUNDIA

UN No.	Regt. No.	Rank	Name	Coy	PX Card No.	Parent Unit.
53474	75088	CQMS	Gorman, L.	C	28799	CHQ CTC
53150	415366	CQMS	Grace, T.	B	27762	22 Bn
53660	420167	CQMS	McMonagle, J.T.	HQ	00797	17 Bn
53314	88836	CQMS	O'Brien, J.	A	27976	E Comd HQ
53661	86649	Sgt	Ahern, D.	HQ	00791	Dep S & T
53664	86727	Sgt	Barron, R.	HQ	00792	4 Fd Engr
53315	94700	Sgt	Butler, M.	A	27977	21 Bn
53665	74851	Sgt	Browning, W.	HQ	00793	W Comd HQ
53663	92590	Sgt	Byrne, J.	HQ	00794	Dep. Cav
53662	800247	Sgt	Byrne, P.	HQ	00795	2 Fd S & T
53666	98361	Sgt	Carroll, T.	HQ	00796	Dep Engrs
53316	81243	Sgt	Clarke, T.	A	27978	EC Dep
53317	85773	Sgt	Clohesy, J.	A	27979	2 Bn
53526	93494	Sgt	Conneely, P.	C	28850	GT Dep
53151	87612	Sgt	Conran, J.	B	27763	12 Bn
53325	103617	Sgt	Cooney, P.	A	27987	2 Hosp AMC
53667	203605	Sgt	Daly, P.	HQ	00798	15 Bn
53668	81651	Sgt	Delaney, W.	HQ	00797	1 Fd S&T
53318	88110	Sgt	Donagan, T.	A	27980	
53152	81427	Sgt	Doyle, J.	B	27764	12 Bn
53060	87631	Sgt	Duffy, P.	A Car Gp	27922	2 Mot Sqn
53153	95333	Sgt	Enright, J.	B	27765	3 Fd Sigs
53154	88084	Sgt	Fitzgerald, T.	B	27766	12 Bn
53061	807229	Sgt	Fitzpatrick, J.	A Car Gp	27923	4 Mot Sqn
53155	88096	Sgt	Fogarty, G.	B	27767	12 Bn
53530	94185	Sgt	Fogarty, J.	C	28854	GT Dep
53669	88325	Sgt	Foley, T.	HQ	00799	1 AA Regt
53062	82445	Sgt	Fraher, P.	A Car Gp	27924	1 Mot S
53156	88939	CQMS	Hayes, P.	B	27768	4 Bn
53672	415968	Sgt	Hayes, P.	HQ	00800	S Comd HQ
53670	417518	Sgt	Hough, F.	HQ	00801	3 Gm AOC
53671	805790	Sgt	Houlihan, C.	HQ	00802	Dep S & T
53157	88468	Sgt	Howard, T.	B	27769	12 Bn
53158	91296	Sgt	Hunt, I.	B	27770	4 Bn
53590	803571	Sgt	Kearney, C.	C	28916	3 Bn
53319	91470	Sgt	Keevey, P.	A	27981	5 Bn
53159	806634	Sgt	Kelleher, T.	B	27771	S Comd HQ
53673	91638	Sgt	Kerwan, L.	HQ	00803	Base Workshops S & T

RUNDIA



109  
RÜNDA

UN NO.	Regt No.	Rank	Name	Coy.	PX Card No.	Parent Unit
53560	801905	Sgt	Lakes, T.	C	28945	GT Dep
53674	90827	Sgt	Lambe, W.J.	HQ	00804	5 Bde HQ
53498	420650	Sgt	Langdon, M.	C	28823	6 Bn
53063	424442	Sgt	Maguire, T.	A Car Gp	27925	4 Mot Sqn
53160	87508	Sgt	Mahon, D.	B	27772	3 Bde HQ
53677	420775	Sgt	Mahon, J.	HQ	00808	4 Hosp Coy AMC
53321	92951	Sgt	Martin, T.	A	27983	5 Bn
53320	73958	Sgt	Martin, J.	A	27982	5 Bn
53675	404411	CQMS	Matthews, J.	HQ	00807	2 Grn MPC
53678	71689	Sgt	Mee, H.	HQ	00806	2 Grn MPC
53463	87410	Sgt	Mulcahy, P.	A		2 FA Regt
54765	404653	Sgt	Murphy, J.	HQ	01920	ASM
53512	805430	Sgt	Mac Gabhann, P.	C	28836	1 Bn
53679	78890	Sgt	McKenzie, P.	HQ	00809	CT Dep W
53680	74057	Sgt	Nolan, M.	HQ	00810	2 Bn
53682	88329	Sgt	O'Callaghan, P.	HQ	00811	1 AA Regt
53064	85447	Sgt	O'Connell, M.	A Car Gp	27926	2 Mot Sqn
53066	94542	Sgt	O'Keefe, J.	A Car Gp	27928	1 Mot
53681	78597	Sgt	O'Neill, J.	HQ	00812	4 Fd Sigs
53322	91405	Sgt	O'Shaughnessy, C.	A	27984	CT Dep E
53685	423313	Sgt	O'Sullivan, J.	HQ	00813	4 Gm S & T
53065	74870	Sgt	O'Sullivan, S.	A Car Gp	27927	1 Mot Sqn
53682	88486	Sgt	Power, J.F.	HQ	00814	Dep Sigs
53556	88803	Sgt	Power, J.	C	28949	3 Bn
53067	88343	Sgt	Power, T.	A Car Gp	27929	1 Tank Sqn
53587	205628	Sgt	Reidy, C.	C	28918	3 Bn
53161	86750	Sgt	Ryan, M.	B	27773	12 Bn
53323	97666	Sgt	Scott, W.	A	27985	CT Dep E
53324	88533	Sgt	Sexton, J.	A	27986	10 Bn
53068	96124	Sgt	Sexton, J.	A Car Gp	27930	Dep Cav
53496	90259	Sgt	Shanahan, P.	C	28820	5 FAR
53162	203746	Sgt	Shortt, J.	B	27774	3 FAR
53685	434634	Sgt	Torpey, T.	HQ	00815	1 Fd Sigs
53687	771003	Sgt	Walsh, W.	HQ	00817	1 Fa Regt
53686	76150	Sgt	Walsh, W.	HQ	00818	3 Gm AOC
53620	89954	Sgt	Watson, W.	HQ	00816	Dep Arty
54769	79185	Sgt	Wilson, T.	C	28884	3 Bn
53689	60837	Cpl	Adamson, V.	HQ	00819	2 Hosp AMC
53327	806511	Cpl	Anderson, L.	A	27988	1 AA Regt
53688	99393	Cpl	Armstrong, T.	HQ	00820	2 Fd S&T

RÜNDA

UN NO.	Regt No.	Rank	Name	Coy	PX CARD No.	Parent Unit
56163	99378	Cpl	Ashman, P.	B	27775	COA
53691	87373	Cpl	Baldwin, G.	HQ	00821	Dep Arty
53568	803862	Cpl	Bentley, W.	C	28937	1 Garr AOC
53164	802344	Cpl	Brennan, B.	B	27776	3 FAR
53543	807842	Cpl	Brennan, E.	C	28867	Dep S & T
53328	809621	Cpl	Brennan, E.	A	27989	2 FAR
53690	800703	Cpl	Bolger, P.	HQ	00822	1 AA Regt
53165	87716	Cpl	Bridgeman, W.	B	27777	15 Bn
53479	803157	Cpl	Browne, J.	C	28804	Dep MPC
53598	810333	Cpl	Byrne, M.	C	28908	3 Bn
53692	802632	Cpl	Byrne, W.X.	HQ	00823	2 Fd Engrs
53329	89205	Cpl	Callan, J.	A	27990	5 Bn
53330	809951	Cpl	Carey, S.	A	27992	5 Bn
53326	88923	Cpl	Cantwell, W.	A	27991	3 Hosp Coy
53694	93425	Cpl	Carroll, J.	HQ	00825	Dep MPC
53477	90399	Cpl	Carroll, J.	C	28802	2 Hosp AMC
53529	806544	Cpl	Carter, T.	C	28853	1 Tank Sqn
53583	811219	Cpl	Carton, J.	C	28923	GT Dep
53693	804973	Cpl	Casey, M.	HQ	00824	1 Bn
53697	86891	Cpl	Clancy, E.J.	HQ	00826	2 Grn MPC
53166	801763	Cpl	Connolly, A.	B	27778	1 Fd Sigs
53331	81244	Cpl	Connolly, C.	A	27993	2 Hosp Coy
53698	807558	Cpl	Connolly, E.	HQ	00827	Dep Sigs
53476	96627	Cpl	Connolly, M.	C	28801	1 AA Regt
53700	92680	Sgt	Connolly, R.	HQ	00828	Dep Arty
53600	811486	Cpl	Connolly, T.	C	28906	3 Bn
53567	806174	Cpl	Cooke, J.	C	28938	6 Bn
53695	804393	Cpl	Corbally, B.	HQ	00829	2 Bn
53521	809182	Cpl	Craigh, A.	C	28845	4 FAR
53625	423815	Cpl	Creegan, L.	HQ	00832	2 Hosp AMC
53696	802924	Cpl	Crocock, E.	HQ	00831	4 Fd Sigs
53699	805188	Cpl	Curling, C.	HQ	00830	1 FAR
53499	807828	Cpl	Curtin, M.	C	28824	6 Bn
53167	810133	Cpl	Daly, A.	B	27779	13 Bn
53566	808506	Cpl	Daly, M.	C	28939	3 Bn
53703	804620	Sgt	Darcey, R.	HQ	00833	Dep Sigs
53701	95759	Cpl	Dennehy, J.	HQ	00834	3 Grn MPC
53332	810239	Cpl	Dobbin, F.	A	27994	5 Bn
53168	81281	Cpl	Donovan, K.	B	27780	4 Bn
53702	99729	Cpl	Doyle, P.	HQ	00835	1 AA Regt

# 131 RÜNDA

UN NO.	Regt No.	Rank	Name	Coy,	PX CARD No.	Parent Unit
53333	94390	Cpl	Dyer, A.	A	27995	5 Bn
53334	808427	Cpl	Fallon, J.	A	279966	2 Fd Engrs
53464	810568	Cpl	Fallon, M.	A		5 Bn
53335	810379	Cpl	Ferguson, P.	A	27997	5 Bn
53705	408203	Cpl	Ferris, W.	HQ	00836	2 Fd S&T
53559	809541	Cpl	Fitzpatrick, W.	C	28946	GT Dep
53169	88404	Cpl	Fogarty, P.J.	B	27781	13 Bn
53475	97961	Cpl	Foran, J.	C	28800	Mil Coll
53704	800705	Cpl	Fortune, J.	HQ	00837	1 AA Regt
53599	93164	Cpl	Fowley, T.	C	28907	Dep S & T
53481	94173	Cpl	Foyle, G.	C	28806	2 Hosp Coy
53170	87249	Cpl	Fox, E.	B	27782	12 Bn
53336	810957	Cpl	Francis, G.	A	27998	5 Bn
53171	89002	Cpl	Freaney, M.	B	27783	12 Bn
53609	810132	Cpl	Gannon, P.	C	28897	3 Bn
53706	90068	Cpl	Gartland, P.	HQ	00838	3 Grn MPC
53172	87602	Cpl	Geoghegan, J.	B	27784	15 Bn
53478	800455	Cpl	Gorman, J.	C	28803	1 Fld Sigs
53337	94029	Cpl	Gorman, T.	A	28751	Air Corps
53462	808720	Cpl	Gregan, P.	A		5 Bn
53338	807333	Cpl	Guerin, P.	A	04854	5 Bn
53173	93796	Cpl	Hannon, T.	B	27785	12 Bn
53174	804680	Cpl	Hanley, J.	B	27786	3 Grn MPC
53175	92491	Cpl	Harney, J.	B	27787	15 Bn
53176	99311	Cpl	Hayde, A.	B	57788	3 Grn MPC
53177	802646	Cpl	Higgins, M.	B	27789	4 Bn
53178	95345	Cpl	Horgan, J.	B	27790	12 Bn
53179	808993	Cpl	Hunt, J.	B	27791	4 Bn
53506	93484	Cpl	Hyland, M.	C	28831	6 Bn
53621	811146	Cpl	Keenan, M.J.	HQ	00839	1 Grn AOC
53707	200072	Cpl	Keeley, G.	HQ	00840	3 Grn MPC
53180	88186	Cpl	Kelly, A.	B	27792	12 Bn
53339	81838	Cpl	Kelly, S.	A	04855	McKee Bks Coy
53181	95924	Cpl	Kenefick, M.	B	27793	3 Mot Sqn
53536	807546	Cpl	Leigh, W.	C	28860	GT Dep
53340	801466	Cpl	Lucy, P.	A	04856	2 Bn
53550	805494	Cpl	Lynam, K.	C	28873	4 FAR
53070	810336	Cpl	Lynch, J.	A Car Gp	27932	1 Armd Sqn
53069	95997	Cpl	Lynch, N.	A Car Gp	27931	1 Armd Sqn

RÜNDA

UN NO.	Regt No.	Rank	Name	Coy	PX CARD No.	Parent Unit.
53507	807328	Cpl	Malone, G.	C	28830	6 Bn
53342	809418	Cpl	Mannix, D.	A	04858	2 Bn
53709	804514	Cpl	Meehan, C.	HQ	00842	Dep Sigs
53709	02121	Cpl	Minagh, E.	HQ	00841	4 Fld Engr
53182	89619	Cpl	Moloney, J.	B	27794	14 Bn
53343	809645	Cpl	Mooney, J.	A	04895	5 Bn
53344	809965	Cpl	Murphy, J.	A	04860	5 Bn
53345	95156	Cpl	Murphy, N.	A	04861	5 Bn
53346	97063	Cpl	McAney, T.	A	04862	2 FAR
53077	804643	Cpl	McCafferty, J.	A Car Gp	27939	2 Mot Sqn
53071	94523	Cpl	McCarthy, J.	A Car Gp	27933	11 Mot Sqn
53710	801787	Cpl	McCarthy, T.	HQ	00843	1 Fd S & T
53712	97139	Cpl	McCormack, J.	HQ	00844	4 Grn MPC
54770	87334	Cpl	McCormack, M.	C	28883	Mil Coll
53714	807890	Sgt	McCormack, R.	HQ	00845	3 Grn AOC
53072	805316	Cpl	McElroy, E.	A Car Gp	27934	2 Mot Sqn
53347	811061	Cpl	McGivern, N.	A	04863	5 Bn
53183	93538	Cpl	McGivney, F.	B	27795	12 Bn
53711	91144	Cpl	McGivney, T.	HQ	00846	4 Grn MPC
53341	810389	Cpl	McGuire, F.	A	04857	2 FAR
53592	806674	Cpl	McLoughlin, M.	C	28914	3 Bn
53713	94318	Cpl	McManus, R.	HQ	00847	6 Bn
53073	806132	Cpl	McQuillan, S.	A Car Gp	27935	2 Mot Sqn
53184	802882	Cpl	McSweeney, C.	B	27796	12 Bn
53610	808412	Cpl	Nolan, J.	C	28896	Dep Arty
53591	808226	Cpl	Nolan, W.	C	28915	3 Bn
53535	809216	Cpl	Noonan, D.	C	28859	GT Dep
53717	99659	Cpl	O'Brien, M.	HQ	00848	Dep Engrs
53542	806681	Cpl	O'Callaghan, C.	C	28866	1 Tank Sqn
53715	437919	Cpl	O'Hara, P.	HQ	00849	2 Bn
53513	429646	Cpl	O'Laighin, M.	C	28837	1 Bn
53185	808937	Cpl	O'Shaughnessy, M.	B	27797	3 Grn MPC
53716	803969	Cpl	O'Shea, A.	HQ	00850	1 Grn AOC
53718	79520	Cpl	O'Toole, E.	HQ	00851	1 Fd S & T
53349	811849	Cpl	Power, J.	A	04865	2 Bn
53575	93949	Cpl	Prendergast, M.	C	28930	GT Dep
53074	809323	Cpl	Price, B.	A Car Gp	27936	6 Bn
53186	93633	Cpl	Quaid, J.	B	27798	23 Bn
53187	809612	Cpl	Quinlan, P.	B	27799	1 FAR

UN No.	Regt No	Rank	Name	Coy	PX CARD No.	Parent Unit.
53719	76595	Cpl	Quirke, J.	HQ	00852	4 FAR
53351	77696	Cpl	Reidy, W.	A	04867	2 Bn
53348	810544	Cpl	Reilly, V.	A	04864	5 Bn
53350	92157	Cpl	Rogers, G.	A	04866	21 Bn
53075	802655	Cpl	Ryan, D.	A Car Gp	27937	11 Mot Sqn
53353	809456	Cpl	Ryan, J.	A	04869	2 Fld Sigs
53352	812012	Cpl	Ryan, M.	A	04868	2 Bn
53720	811229	Cpl	Ryan, P.J.	HQ	00853	Dep MPC
53188	800648	Cpl	Ryan, P.J.	B	27800	14 Bn
53076	804788	Cpl	Sheridan, A.	A Car Gp	27938	4 Mot Sqn
53721	406292	Cpl	Smyth, M.	HQ	00854	2 Grn MPC
53354	76956	Cpl	Taafe, L.	A	04870	Air Corps
53189	805265	Cpl	Thompson, M.	B	27801	CT Dep S
53722	97778	Cpl	Tobin, J.	HQ	00855	Dep MPC
53355	806698	Cpl	Walsh, J.	A	04871	6 Bde HQ
53356	810342	Cpl	Watters, P.	A	04872	5 Bn
53480	71005	Cpl	White, L.	C	28805	Dep MPC
53723	92659	Cpl	Woods, J.	HQ	00856	W Comd HQ
53724	402157	Pte	Ambler, W.	HQ	00857	CT Dep E
53357	811357	Pte	Archibold, J.	A	04873	5 Bn
53358	807552	Pte	Armstrong, J.	A	04874	Dep Sigs
53190	811558	Pte	Attridge, J.	B	27802	4 Bn
53726	803533	Pte	Barnes, P.J.	HQ	00858	2 Bn
53191	810688	Pte	Barnes, F.J.	B	27803	12 Bn
53551	801359	Pte	Bennett, P.	C	28874	4 FAR
53574	811225	Pte	Bennett, V.	C	28931	3 Bn
53192	811172	Pte	Bergin, M.	B	27804	12 Bn
53581	809308	Pte	Boland, J.	C	28925	Dep Engrs
53364	93004	Pte	Bolger, M.	A	04880	2 Bn
53193	530415	Pte	Bolger, T.	B	27805	CT Dep S
53365	811758	Pte	Bollard, J.	A	04881	2 Bn
53184	810042	Pte	Bourke, W.	B	27806	12 Bn
53559	809257	Pte	Bradley, D.	A	04875	2 Fld Engrs
53487	811726	Pte	Bradley, M.	C	28811	Dep S & T
53612	803040	Pte	Bradley, N.	C	28894	3 Bn
53360	810691	Pte	Bradshaw, N.	A	04876	2 Bn
53725	811257	Pte	Brady, D.	HQ	00859	6 Bn
53366	811370	Pte	Brady, J.D.	A	04882	2 Mot Sqn
53518	810433	Pte	Breathnach, M.	C	28842	1 Bn
53078	807150	Pte	Brown, P.	A Car Gp	27940	Dep Cav

# RÚNDA

UN No.	Regt No.	Rank	Name	Coy.	PX CARD No.	Parent Unit
53361	809974	Pte	Buckley, J.	A	04877	5 Bn
54771	803465	Pte	Buckley, W.	C	28879	Mil Coll
53362	809520	Pte	Buggy, G.	A	04878	5 Bn
53541	803163	Pte	Burke, P.	C	28865	Dep S & T
53196	89387	Pte	Butler, W.	B	27807	12 Bn
53363	811522	Pte	Byrne, J.	A	04879	5 Bn
53522	804016	Pte	Byrne, J.	C	28846	4 FAR
53196	811306	Pte	Byrnes, A.	B	27808	12 Bn
53613	98448	Pte	Canavan, J.	C	28893	3 Bn
53611	801821	Pte	Canning, M.	C	28895	3 Bn
53197	811012	Pte	Carey, O.	B	27809	4 Bn
53198	805023	Pte	Carmody, P.	B	27810	12 Bn
53199	810057	Pte	Carroll, J.	B	27811	3 Grn S & T
53596	808303	Pte	Carroll, S.	C	28910	3 Bn
53368	811856	Pte	Carthy, W.	A	04884	2 Grn S & T
53367	810085	Pte	Casey, D.	D	04883	2 Bn
53200	805812	Pte	Cassidy, P.	B	27812	12 Bn
53079	415909	Pte	Chambers, W.	A Car Gp	27941	1 Mot Sqn
54776	811492	Pte	Clancy, P.	C	28868	Gt Dep
53727	811130	Pte	Clarke, A.	HQ	00863	6 Bn
53369	808725	Pte	Clarke, J.	A	04885	2 Grn S & T
53540	90811	Pte	Clarke, J.	C	28864	Dep S & T
53733	807985	Pte	Clerkin, R.	HQ	00865	S Ccmd HQ
53732	805334	Pte	Clery, J.	HQ	00864	22 Bn
53520	811603	Pte	Clyne, M.J.	C	28844	6 Bn
53730	99653	Pte	Coady, J.	HQ	00862	CDA
53545	809552	Pte	Coffey, J.	C	28869	Dep Engrs
53201	805737	Pte	Coffey, R.	B	27813	11 Bn
53370	810768	Pte	Cole, J.	A	04886	1 Fd Sigs
53504	810995	Pte	Coleman, J.	C	28828	6 Bn
53202	811458	Pte	Collins, J.	B	27814	4 Bn
53204	811335	Pte	Gondon, J.	B	27816	4 Bn
53203	810983	Pte	Gondon, W.	B	27815	12 Bn
53584	99965	Pte	Comiskey, B.	C	28922	Mil Coll
53371	811249	Pte	Confrey, A.	A	04887	5 Bn
53372	811325	Pte	Connolly, E.	A	04888	2 Bn
53080	800236	Pte	Cooke, R.	A Car Gp	27942	2 Mct Sqn
53373	807720	Pte	Corbally, P.	A	04889	2 Bn
53377	811302	Pte	Corcoran, W.	A	04893	CT Dep E
53205	811531	Pte	Corcoran, W.	B	27817	4 Bn

RÚNDA

# 115. RÚNDA

UN NO.	Regt No.	Rank	Name	Coy.	PX CARD No.	PARENT UNIT
53206	87229	Pte	Cosgrove, J.	B	27818	S Comd HQ
53578	810134	Pte	Costello, G.	C	28928	Dep Engrs
53729	811318	Pte	Coughlin, M.	HQ	00860	1 FAR
53631	811476	Pte	Coughlan, T.	HQ	00961	Dep Arty
53374	811537	Pte	Cremers, R.	A	04890	CT Dep E
53485	93848	Pte	Croke, J.	C	28951	GT Dep
53210	87155	Pte	Cronin, W.	B	27822	CT Dep S
53375	805831	Pte	Crosbie, P.	A	04891	5 Bn
53208	809200	Pte	Culhane, J.	B	27820	4 Bn
53528	807585	Pte	Cullen, D.	C	28852	
53207	804090	Pte	Cullen, M.	B	27819	12 Bn
53376	811312	Pte	Cullen, R.	A	04892	5 Bn
53209	810557	Pte	Cunningham, W.	B	27821	3 Hosp AMC
53588	808395	Pte	Curran, C.	C	28917	3 Bn
53597	811233	Pte	Curran, E.	C	28909	3 Bn
53505	810489	Pte	Curry, B.	C	28829	6 Bn
53728	800841	Pte	Curry, J.	HQ	00966	1 FAR
53739	811410	Pte	Daly, B.	HQ	28953	1 FAR
53385	802772	Pte	Daly, L.	A	04901	2 Hosp Coy.
53211	803760	Pte	Daly M.	B	27823	4 Bn
53212	90921	Pte	Dalton, M.	B	27824	12 Bn
53378	806223	Pte	Deady, W.	A	04894	2 FAR
53213	90862	Pte	Dee, M.	B	27825	12 Bn
53214	812147	Cpl	Deedigan, E.	B	27826	12 Bn
53215	807987	Pte	De Lacey, P.	B	27827	12 Bn
53603	806424	Pte	Delaney, W.	C	28903	3 Bn
53564	95631	Pte	Dempsey, P.	C	28941	Dep Engrs.
53379	809994	Pte	Denton, J.	A	04895	2 Bn
53380	810490	Pte	Desmond, J.	A	04896	5 Bn
53735	804705	Pte	Devine, D.	HQ	28952	4 Fd Engrs
53381	807941	Pte	Doherty, P.	A	04897	4 Bn
53081	807043	Pte	Doody, P.	A Car Gp	27943	1 Mot Sqn
53615	810099	Pte	Dooley, P.	C	28891	3 Bn
53737	76659	Pte	Donegan, J.	HQ	28955	1 FAR
53523	811622	Pte	Doran, C.	C	28848	4 Fld Engrs
53741	809074	Pte	Doran, J.	HQ	28954	1 AA Regt
53382	811448	Pte	Doran, R.	A	04898	2 Bn
53216	811331	Pte	Dorney, T.	B	27828	12 Bn
53217	87262	Pte	Downey, R.	B	27829	CT Dep S
53539	810017	Pte	Doyle, J.	C	28863	Dep S & T.

RÚNDA

UN NO.	Regt no.	Rank	Name	Coy.	PX CARD No.	Parent Unit.
53562	810125	Pte	Doyle, J.	C	28943	3 Bn
53593	810112	Pte	Doyle, J.	C	28913	3 Bn
53218	809518	Pte	Drake, J.	B	27830	4 Bn
53736	80752	Pte	Drury, T.J.	HQ	28956	Mil Coll Coy
53572	808763	Pte	Duffin, T	C	28933	CHQ CTC
53503	86906	Pte	Duffy, D.	C	28827	6 Bn
53383	810851	Pte	Duffy, J.	A	04899	2 Mot Sqn
53519	806792	Pte	Duffy, J.	C	28843	4 Grn AOC
53734	804302	Pte	Duffy, L.	HQ	28957	6 Bn
53740	95337	Pte	Duggan, J.	HQ	28959	1 FAR
53082	93981	Pte	Duggan, W.	A Car Gp	27944	1 Mot Sqn
53738	811619	Cpl	Dunne, J.	HQ	28959	2 Grn AOC
53384	200608	Pte	Dunne, J.	A	04900	Air Corps
53219	809673	Pte	Egan, T.	B	27831	4 Bn
53585	805186	Pte	Enright, P.	C	28921	Mil Coll
53573	809615	Pte	Fahy, A.	C	28932	Dep S & T
53220	806799	Pte	Fahy, P.	B	27832	4 Bn
53387	804930	Pte	Farrell, J.	A	04903	2 FAR
53602	809373	Pte	Farrell, M.	C	28904	3 Bn
53386	806181	Pte	Fergus, O.	A	04902	2 Mot Sqn
53221	810682	Pte	Ferncombe, T.	B	27833	12 Bn
53389	809629	Pte	Fields, P	A	04905	2 Fd Sigs
53083	809442	Pte	Finn, A.	A Car Gp	27945	1 Tank Sqn
53388	807719	Pte	Finn, P.	A	04904	Air Corps
53226	809006	Pte	Finnan, J.	B	27838	12 Bn
53224	805151	Pte	Fitzgerald, E.	B	27836	12 Bn
53223	811129	Pte	Fitzgerald, S.	B	27835	12 Bn
53222	808242	Pte	Fitzgerald, W.	B	27834	22 Bn
53622	92893	Pte	Fitzmaurice, T.	HQ	28963	6 Bn
53225	93795	Pte	Fitzpatrick, M.	B	27837	12 Bn
54772	87855	Pte	Fitzpatrick, P.	C	28878	Dep S & T
53742	91058	Pte	Flanagan, T.	HQ	28960	2 Hosp AMC
53538	806535	Pte	Flynn, D.	C	28862	1 Grn AOC
53502	811454	Pte	Flynn, P.	C	28826	6 Bn
53580	807389	Pte	Flynn, J.	C.	28926	Dep Engres
53227	811203	Pte	Foran, A.	B	27839	12 Bn
53743	809873	Pte	Forde, P.	HQ	28961	Dep Sigs
53744	804383	Pte	Fortune, M.	HQ	28962	1 Bn
53390	85481	Pte	Foster, T.	A	04906	CT Dep E



RÜNDA

UN NO.	Regt. No.	Rank	Name	Coy.	PX CARD No.	Parent Unit.
53084	809542	Pte	Durlong, P.	A Car Gp	27946	1 Tank Sqn.
53601	808378	Pte	Gannon, M.	C	28905	3 Bn
53746	804572	Pte	Geary, S.	HQ	28964	1 FAR
53391	91178	Pte	Geraghty, M.	A	04907	8 Bn
53394	808811	Pte	Gilrain, P.	A	04910	5 Bn
53570	810327	Pte	Gough, D.	C	28935	CHQCTC
53392	811687	Pte	Griffin, J.	A	04908	2 Mot Sqn
53228	811439	Pte	Griffin, J.	B	27840	12 Bn
53229	809240	Pte	Grimes, J.	B	27841	12 Bn
53745	206702	Pte	Guest, G.	HQ	28965	4 Hosp AMC
53747	811223	Pte	Guidera, J.	HQ	28966	Dep Arty
53393	810474	Pte	Guidon, E.	A	04909	2 FAR
53230	92979	Pte	Hally, W.	B	27842	22 Bn
53231	807283	Pte	Hanlon, P.	B	27843	12 Bn
53085	79511	Pte	Hanna, R.	A Car Gp	27947	1 Mot Sqn
53486	802919	Pte	Harmon, J.	C	28810	Dep S & T
53232	811237	Pte	Harte, J.	B	27844	12 Bn
53616	808410	Pte	Harris, T.	C	28890	3 Bn
53233	811532	Pte	Hayes, D.	B	27845	4 Bn
53234	808245	Pte	Hayes, D.	B	27846	12 Bn
53579	96103	Pte	Hayes, P.	C	28927	CHQCTC
53395	806326	Pte	Healy, D.	A	04911	2 Fd Sigs
53396	98290	Pte	Heavey, R.	A	04912	CT Dep E
53523	84471	Pte	Hegarty, H.	C	28847	4 FAR
53753	803427	Pte	Hegarty, E.	HQ	28972	1 FAR
53748	91218	Pte	Hennessy, P.	HQ	28967	1 FAR
53752	805632	Pte	Herron, K.	HQ	28970	Dep Arty
53751	811273	Pte	Hession, K.	HQ	28968	6 Bn
53614	807067	Pte	Hickey, A.	C	28892	3 Bn
53565	806671	Pte	Higgins, G.	C	28940	Dep Engrs
53533	810037	Pte	Higgins, T.	B	28857	4 Bn
53400	800252	Pte	Hoare, M.	A	04916	5 Bn
53233	98543	Pte	Hoare, W.	B	27847	12 Bn
53238	807177	Pte	Hoey, J.	B	27850	3 Hosp AMC.
53397	811246	Pte	Hogan, J.	A	04913	2 Bn
53256	806149	Pte	Holden, J.	B	27848	12 Bn
53237	811851	Pte	Holland, J.P.	B	27849	4 Bn
53398	810255	Pte	Holohan, W.	A	04914	5 Bn
53399	809256	Pte	Hopkins, B.	A	04915	2 Grn AOC
53750	811465	Pte	Horgan, M.	HQ	28969	1 FAR.

RÜNDA

UN No.	Regt No.	Rank	Name	Coy.	PX Card No.	Parent Unit
53239	807300	Pte	Houlihan, B.	B	27851	12 Bn
53594	810114	Pte	Houlihan, M.	C	28912	3 Bn
53537	807849	Pte	Hughes, J.	C	28861	Dep S & T
54775	97291	Pte	Hunt, J.	C	28885	3 Bn
53749	811216	Pte	Hunt, L.	HQ	28970	Dep Arty
53240	810543	Pte	Hurley, P.	B	27852	4 Bn
53511	809680	Pte	Hussey, T.	C	28835	4 Fld Engrs
53241	811214	Pte	Jackson, A.	B	27853	12 Bn
53754	806250	Pte	Jeanes, H.	HQ	28973	Dep Arty
53617	811969	Pte	Jenkins, D.	C	28889	3 Bn
53086	808612	Pte	Kealy, J.	A Car Gp	27948	1 Mot Sqn
53243	811295	Pte	Keane, F.	B	27855	12 Bn
53242	88471	Pte	Keane, J.	B	27854	12 Bn
53755	811373	Pte	Kearney, J.	HQ	28975	1 FAR
53756	811319	Pte	Kearney, P.	HQ	28974	1 FAR
53759	71483	Pte	Kearns, A.	HQ	28977	4 Fd Engrs
53757	95153	Pte	Kearns, J.	HQ	28976	2 Grn S & T
53087	805677	Pte	Kearns, J.	A Car Gp	27949	2 Mot Sqn
53401	810446	Pte	Keating, T.	A	04917	2 FAR
53244	805421	Pte	Kelleher, H.	B	27856	12 Bn
53246	805116	Pte	Kelly, F.	B	27958	12 Bn
53758	811550	Pte	Kelly, F.	HQ	28978	4 Fd Engrs
53466	811308	Pte	Kelly, G.	A	5 Bn	5 Bn
53608	810123	Pte	Kelly, J.	C	28898	3 Bn
54773	803544	Pte	Kelly, M.	C	28880	Dep S & T
53245	808241	Pte	Kelly, J.	B	27857	12 Bn
53402	811367	Pte	Kelly, P.	A	04918	HQE Comd
53561	804275	Pte	Kelly, T.	C	28944	Dep. Engrs
53247	801419	Pte	Kennedy, N.	B	27859	12 Bn
53248	811198	Pte	Kenny, J.	B	27860	12 Bn
53089	807241	Pte	Kenny, M.	A Car Gp	27951	2 Mot Sqn
53088	806867	Pte	Kenny, T.	A Car Gp	27950	2 Mot Sqn
53493	807352	Pte	Keogh, J.	C	28817	Dep Engrs
53576	805384	Pte	Keogh, W.	C	28929	CHQCTC
53618	803168	Pte	Kersting, E.	C	28888	3 Bn
53403	811363	Pte	Kielt, P.	A	04919	CT Dep E
53250	93498	Pte	Kiely, C.	B	27862	3 Hosp AMC
53249	811375	Pte	Kiely, D.	B	27861	12 Bn
53090	424456	Pte	Kilkelly, M.	A Car Gp	27952	5 Mot Sqn
53251	811552	Pte	Kirwan, A.	B	27863	12 Bn

UN No.	Regt. No.	Rank	Name	Coy.	PX CARD No.	Parent Unit
53488	810801	Pte	Lackey, M	C	28812	1 Hosp AMC
53405	812000	Pte	Lally, P.	A	04921	2 Bn
53091	808765	Pte	Landy, J.	A Car Gp	27953	1 Amd Sqn
53626	97085	Pte	Larkin, J.	HQ	28979	6 Bn
53252	811617	Pte	Leahy, K.	B	27864	4 Bn
53492	807964	Pte	Lee, S.	C	28816	1 Fd Sigs
53531	809443	Pte	Leigh, J.	C	28855	Gt Dep
53092	807098	Pte	Leonard, J.	A Car Gp	27954	1 Amd Sqn
53253	96438	Pte	Liddy, T.	B	27865	12 Bn
53404	89142	Pte	Logan, S.	A	04920	2 Fd Sigs
53254	808896	Pte	Longan, P.J.	B	27866	4 Bn
53255	811238	Pte	Lowry, J.	B	27867	12 Bn
53406	811573	Pte	Lynch, C.	A	04922	2 Bn
53415	810550	Pte	Madden, M.	A	04931	5 Bn
53569	87677	Pte	Madden, P.	C	28936	Mil Coll
53408	78856	Pte	Madigan, P.	A	04924	CT Dep F
53257	811057	Pte	Maher, E.	B	27869	12 Bn
53256	804575	Pte	Maher, P.	B	27868	12 Bn
53258	810021	Pte	Maher, J.	B	27870	Dep Sigs
53259	808709	Pte	Mahony, P.	B	27871	4 Bn
53260	807343	Pte	Mangan, T.	B	27872	12 Bn
53423	003032	Pte	Marsh, W.	A	04911	Ord Svy Coy Coe
53261	810231	Pte	Marshall, A.	B	27873	12 Bn
53571	95910	Pte	Martin, J.	C	28934	Dep S & T
53563	807017	Pte	Meehan, J.	C	28942	3 Bn
53558	806430	Pte	Mernagh, L.	C	28947	Dep S & T
53762	811046	Pte	Merrigan, J.	HQ	28982	1 Fd Sigs
53410	811761	Pte	Moffatt, J.	A	04926	5 Bn
53262	88214	Pte	Molloy, J.	B	27874	CT Dep S
53409	812056	Pte	Molloy, N.	A	04925	2 FAR
53761	804567	Pte	Monaghan, W.	HQ	28981	CT Dep S
53412	88134	Pte	Monks, A.	A	04928	2 Bn
53413	803899	Cpl	Mooney, P.	A	04929	2 Bn
53489	807661	Pte	Mooney, T.	C	28813	1 Hosp AMC
53765	810763	Pte	Moore, A.	HQ	28980	6 Bn
53760	806442	Pte	Moore, G.	HQ	28985	1 FAR
53414	809482	Pte	Moore, J.	A	04930	2 FAR
53532	809726	Pte	Moore, L.	C	28856	Dep S & T
53606	811339	Pte	Moran, J.	C	28900	3 Bn

UN NO.	Regt No.	Rank	Name	Coy.	PX CARD NO.	PARENT UNIT
53411	808422	Pte	Morrison, J.	A	04927	McKee Bks Coy.
53263	811543	Pte	Mulcahy, E.	B	27875	12 Bn
53093	808804	Pte	Mulhearn, A.	A Car Gp	27955	1 Mot Sqn
53416	811326	Pte	Mulready, A.	A	04932	5 Bn
53763	811294	Pte	Mulryan, F.	HQ	28983	1 FAR
53764	810316	Pte	Murphy, A.	HQ	28984	Dep Arty
53264	810578	Pte	Murphy, D.	B	27876	4 Bn
53419	94449	Pte	Murphy, J.	A	04935	5 Bn
53094	810753	Pte	Murphy, J.	A Car Gp	27956	1 Mot Sqn
53095	805678	Pte	Murphy, L.	A Car Gp	27957	2 Mot Sqn
53418	810886	Pte	Murphy, M.	A	04934	CT Dep E
53417	811442	Pte	Murphy, P.	A	04933	5 Bn
53582	809009	Pte	Murphy, P.	C	28924	Dep Engrs
53595	811337	Pte	Murphy, V.	C	28911	3 Bn
54420	808516	Pte	Murray, P.	A	04936	2 Mot Sqn
53421	806014	Pte	Murray, J.	A	04937	2 Bn
53781	70302	Pte	Mac an Iomara, J.	HQ	04938	1 Bn
53769	811215	Pte	McBrearty, F.	HQ	28988	4 Grn S & T
53096	811876	Pte	McCabe, J.	A Car Gp	27958	Dep Cav
53265	811072	Pte	McCabe, J.	B	27877	12 Bn
53766	811309	Pte	McCarthy, P.	HQ	28987	1 FAR
53266	805286	Pte	McCormack, J.	B	27878	12 Bn
53604	801827	Pte	McCormack, W.	C	28902	Dep S & T
53267	811330	Pte	McCoy, M.	B	27879	12 Bn
53097	808513	Pte	McEvoy, J.	A Car Gp	27959	1 Armd Sqn
53517	811193	Pte	McGiollarnat, L.	C	28841	1 Bn
53424	92447	Cpl	McGivern, D.	A	04940	2 Bn S & T
52422	809970	Pte	McGinley, J.	A	04939	2 Bn
53768	811274	Pte	McGoran, R.	HQ	28990	
53767	804677	Pte	McGrath, J.	HQ	28989	4 Hosp AMC
53407	810736	Pte	McGuire, P.	A	04923	2 Bn
53770	804223	Pte	McHugh, J.	HQ	28986	McKee Bks Coy.
53268	809779	Pte	McKenna, M.	B	27880	12 Bn
53552	206620	Pte	McKevitt, L.	C	28875	4 FAR
53269	811755	Pte	McMahon, C.	B	27881	12 Bn
53270	808478	Pte	McMahon, J.	B	27882	12 Bn
53484	79268	Pte	McMahon, P.	C	28809	Mil Coll
53427	808571	Pte	McMullen, M.	A	04915	2 Mot Sqn

JUN NO.	Regt No.	Rank	Name	Coy.	PX CARD No.	Parent Unit
53425	811647	Pte	McPhillips, S.	A	28752	2 Bn
53497	99830	Pte	Nicell, P.	C	28821	6 Bn
53271	805549	Pte	Noonan, W.	B	27883	12 Bn
53431	810377	Pte	O'Beirne, P.	A	28757	2 FAR
53546	811495	Pte	O'Brien, E.	C	28870	GTD
53272	811075	Pte	O'Brien, E.J.	B	27884	12 Bn
53274	811544	Pte	O'Brien, P.	B	27886	12 Bn
53548	810102	Pte	O'Brien, J.	C	28871	3 Bn
53273	810340	Pte	O'Brien, J.	B	27885	4 Bn
53772	812035	Pte	O'Brien, P.	HQ	28991	CT Dep E
53549	806631	Pte	O'Brien, P.	C	28872	Dep S & T
53554	803890	Pte	O'Brien, P.	C	28877	6 Bn
53429	803658	Pte	O'Brien, W.	A	28755	5 Bn
53557	88488	Pte	O'Connor, E.	C	28948	Dep S & T
53428	811424	Pte	O'Connor, M.	A	28754	2 Bn
53099	810803	Pte	O'Donohue, P.	A Car Gp	27961	4 Mot Sqdn
53775	808549	Pte	O'Farrell, O.	HQ	28992	2 Fd Engrs
53515	811135	Pte	O'Fogartaigh, C.	C	28839	1 Bn
53275	810417	Pte	O'Flaherty, W.	B	27887	12 Bn
53516	810216	Pte	O'Flannchada, A.	C	28840	1 Bn
53276	811406	Pte	O'Flynn, R.	B	27888	4 Bn
53277	803814	Pte	O'Gorman, J.J.	HQ	28993	1 Fd S & T
53277	810843	Pte	O'Halloran, J.	B	27889	12 Bn
53771	92660	Pte	O'Hanlon, H.	HQ	28995	6 Bn
53278	811404	Pte	O'Loughlin, T.	B	27890	4 Bn
53279	809336	Pte	O'Meara, T.	B	27891	1 Bde HQ
53776	807703	Pte	O'Neill, D.	HQ	28994	4 Fd Engrs
53605	810605	Pte	O'Neill, E.	C	28901	3 Bn
53098	808787	Pte	O'Neill, J.	A Car Gp	27960	Dep Cav
53434	810828	Pte	O'Neill, M.	A	38760	1 Hosp Coy
53527	77597	Pte	O'Regan, J.	C	28851	3 Bn
53773	90393	Pte	O'Reilly, D.	HQ	28996	Dep S & T
53774	89547	Pte	O'Reilly, M.	HQ	28997	6 Bn
53430	811277	Pte	O'Rourke, J.	A	28756	5 Bn
53280	811780	Pte	O'Rourke, T.	B	27892	12 Bn
53514	809399	Pte	O'Scanlainn, P.	C	28838	1 Bn
53282	810414	Pte	O'Shea, M.	B	27894	S Comd HQ
53281	99158	Pte	O'Shea, W.	B	27893	1 Fd Sigs
53426	811551	Pte	O'Shea, W.	A	28753	2 Bn
53283	801630	Pte	O'Sullivan, C.	B	27895	3 Grn S & T

# RUNDA

1224

UN No.	Regt No.	Rank	Name	Coy.	PX CARD No.	Parent Unit
53433	81221	Pte	O'Sullivan, G.	A	28759	2 Hosp AMC
53447	809937	Pte	O'Sullivan, J.	A	28773	2 FAR
53482	806172	Pte	O'Sullivan, M.	C	28807	1 Hosp AMC
53778	808158	Pte	O'Sullivan, P.	HQ	28998	1 FAR
53432	802950	Pte	O'Toole, P.	A	28758	Clancy Bks. Coy.
53284	804926	Cpl	Parker, A.	B	27896	12 Bn
53490	805794	Pte	Phelan, J.	C	28814	Dep Sigs
53780	811145	Pte	Phelan, M.	HQ	28999	Dep Arty
53435	811524	Pte	Power, F.	A	28761	5 Bn
53779	810555	Pte	Power, J.	HQ	29000	3 Grn S & T
53500	810657	Pte	Power, R.	C	28822	6 Bn
53285	810758	Pte	Purcell, M.	B	27896	3 Hosp AMC
53286	810453	Pte	Quane, F.M.	B	27898	12 Bn
53437	801533	Pte	Quearney, W.	A	28763	2 Bn
53436	810170	Pte	Quinn, J.	A	28762	5 Bn
53445	810992	Pte	Raftery, M.	A	28771	20 Bn
53440	811523	Pte	Raleigh, C.	A	28766	5 Bn
53510	810943	Pte	Rattigan, G.	C	28834	6 Bn
53442	810563	Pte	Redmond, A.	A	28768	5 Bn
53491	808039	Pte	Redmond, W.	C	28815	Dep Sigs
53534	810830	Pte	Reilly, J.	C	28858	3 Bn
53444	811126	Pte	Reilly, K.	A	28770	2 Mot Sqn
53100	808791	Pte	Rellis, R.	A Car Gp	27962	Dep Cav
53439	811248	Pte	Robinson, J.	A	28765	5 Bn
53676	809401	Pte	Robinson, P.	HQ	00805	2 Bn
53623	811157	Pte	Roche, B.	HQ	28886	Dep Arty
53301	804087	Pte	Roche, D.	A Car Gp	27963	1 Mot Sqn
53302	808773	Pte	Roche, J.	A Car Gp	27964	1 Armd Sqn
53287	99238	Pte	Rochford, R.	B	27899	CT Dep S
53443	811673	Pte	Roddy, S.	A	28769	E Comd HQ
53438	811445	Pte	Rooney, J.	A	28764	2 Bn
53509	811253	Pte	Roulston, J.	C	288333	6 Bn
53441	811359	Pte	Russell, A.	A	28767	5 Bn
53607	810306	Pte	Russell, B.	C	28899	3 Bn
53289	810985	Pte	Ryan, D.	B	27901	12 Bn
53624	811347	Pte	Ryan, J.	HQ	28887	Dep Arty
53290	811328	Pte	Ryan, J.	B	27902	12 Bn
53288	804676	Pte	Ryan, P.J.	B	27900	S Comd HQ.

RUNDA

UN NO.	Regt No.	Rank	Name	Coy	PX CARD NO.	PARENT UNIT
53494	436293	Pte	Salmon, J.	C	28818	CHQ CTC
53783	81903	Pte	Scully, E.	HQ	28787	CDA
53448	810437	Pte	Searson, M.J.	A	28774	2 FAR
54774	804140	Pte	Shaw, F.	C	28881	4 Fd Sigs
53782	805956	Pte	Sheedy, T.	HQ	28786	4 Fd Engrs
53450	811365	Pte	Sheeran, P.	A	28776	2 Bn
53449	811620	Pte	Sheridan, C.	A	28775	2 Mot Sqn
53291	808360	Pte	Sheridan, J.	B	27903	12 Bn
53483	801123	Pte	Sherry, C.	C	28808	3 Bn
53446	811369	Pte	Smith, J.	A	28772	5 Bn
53303	807406	Pte	Smith, J.	A Car Gp	27965	2 Mot Sqn
53292	810642	Pte	Sorensen, E.	B	27904	4 Bn
53501	808575	Pte	Stephens, E.	C	28825	6 Bn
53586	806866	Pte	Stokes, B.	C	28920	1 Grn AOC
53451	811250	Pte	Tapley, R.	A	28777	2 Bn
53784	806471	Pte	Taylor, R.	HQ	28788	CDA
53452	811266	Pte	Tighe, G.E.	A	28778	5 Bn
53293	810785	Pte	Twoomey, T.	B	27905	4 Bn
53453	808274	Pte	Valentine, J.	A	28779	2 Bn
53787	810988	Pte	Wade, H.	HQ	28791	1 Fld Sigs
53785	809296	Pte	Wade, T.	HQ	28789	1 FA Regt
53294	811183	Pte	Wall, J.	B	27906	12 Bn
53786	809228	Pte	Wall, R.	HQ	28790	1 AA Regt
53788	806469	Pte	Walsh, D.	HQ	28792	1 FAR
53458	80683	Pte	Walsh, J.	A	28784	2 Fd Engrs
53508	811255	Pte	Walsh, J.	C	28832	6 Bn
53295	810218	Pte	Walsh, J.	B	27907	4 Fd Sigs
53296	811213	Pte	Walsh, J.	B	27908	12 Bn
53297	806148	Pte	Walsh, M.	B	27909	12 Bn
53298	807012	Pte	Walsh, P.	B	27910	12 Bn
53304	805410	Pte	Walsh, W.	A Car Gp	27966	1 Mot Sqn
53455	811208	Pte	Ward, T.	A	28781	5 Bn
53299	811810	Pte	Whelan, R.	B	27911	12 Bn
53457	807800	Pte	White, P.	A	28783	11 Fd S & T
53300	811457	Pte	Whooley, J.	B	27912	4 Bn
53465	812054	Pte	Wickham, A.	A		2 Grn S & T Coy
53547	810509	Pte	Widdess, M.	C	28882	GTD
53456	811282	Pte	Wilgar, D.	A	28782	5 Bn
53459	806540	Cpl	Woodcock, A.	A	28785	2 Fd Sigs

UN No.	Regt No.	Rank	Name	Coy	PX Card No.	Parent Unit
53454	810043	Pte	Wooley, J.	A	28780	2 Bn
53553	99848	Pte	Yeats, W.	C	28876	4 FAR

M A P S.

General Map E'ville area

Special Map on "SARFIELD"

Facing page.

3.

64.

E N D

Edited by

COMDT. M. HARRISON.



