

UNIT HISTORY

40 IRISH BATTALION

UNITED NATIONS FORCE IN CYPRUS

9 APRIL - 16 OCTOBER 1964

INIT HISTORY - 40 BATTALION

CONTENTS

<u>PARAGRAPH</u>	<u>HEADING</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
	<u>BACKGROUND - HISTORICAL AND IMMEDIATE - TO THE CYPRUS PROBLEM</u>	
1	Occupation	1
2.	Ethnarchy	2
3.	British Control	2
4.	The Struggle for Independence	3
5.	New Constitution	5
6.	Violence	6
	<u>UNITED NATIONS</u>	
7.	Introduction of United Nations Force in Cyprus	7
	<u>40 IRISH BATTALION</u>	
8.	Formation of battalion is authorised	9
9.	Recce Party to Cyprus	9
10.	Battalion Mobilises and Trains	10.
11.	Visit to President	12
12.	Battalion Advance Party Moves to Cyprus	12
13.	Battalion Prepares at Curragh Camp	14
14.	Airlift	14
	<u>IN CYPRUS</u>	
15.	Temper of Affairs in Famagusta District	15
16.	The Bigger Picture	18
17.	The Approach of Both Sides to the Irish	19
18.	Disposition of Battalion	20
19.	The Battalion becomes Operational	20
20.	The Karolos Incident	21
21.	Arrival of Panhard Armoured Cars	23
22.	Arrival of New Irish Contingent Commander	23
23.	Missing British Salesman - Operation "Blackcat".	24

The English had little interest in Cyprus which had little economic or strategic value in those days but the outbreak of the 1914-18 War, with Turkey on the side of the Central Powers, caused Britain to assume complete title to the island and this was ultimately recognised by both Greece and Turkey in the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. Cyprus then became a Crown Colony - all Cypriots, both Greek and Turk, becoming British subjects. (After the Treaty of Lausanne Turk Cypriots were given the choice of opting for Turkish nationality and living in Turkey. 9,000 went to Turkey on this arrangement, but 6,000 of them returned again to Cyprus.)

4. THE STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE.

a. Enosis.

The origin of "Enosis" or the desire for Union with Greece is a much argued point. During the Greek War of Independence in the early part of the 19th Century numbers of Cypriots fought and died but the numbers could not be regarded as representing a full commitment to the cause of Greek resurgence. However, the establishment of an independent Greece in 1830 undoubtedly aroused national aspiration among the Greek Cypriots. Certainly reports of the preaching of Enosis throughout the island's Greek schools can be found in British official papers from 1879 onwards. What is not quite so certain is whether the Union to which Greek Cypriots aspired was a total political integration in the kingdom of the Hellenes or an association of brothers without the political domination by Athens. But, it is clear that the British later recognised the growing feeling for what most of the Greek Cypriots now claimed to be the Mother Country and in 1915 the British Government offered the island to Greece if the latter country would enter the war against Serbia. Greece declined and the offer was withdrawn. At the end of the war the Cypriot leadership tried to induce Venizelos, the Greek prime minister, to demand the union of Cyprus. However, Venizelos' eyes were turned to the East to the old lands of Byzantium and, when Ataturk threw out the Greek invading Army, the question of Enosis was shelved again. Political feeling in Cyprus continued to grow and in 1931 a revolt was suppressed by British Arms and the leaders, including Archbishop Makarios II, the predecessor of the present Primate, were exiled. While there were no more revolts, the political unrest and demands for Enosis grew until, in 1954 the Government of Greece took the question of self-determination for Cyprus to the United Nations. "The principle of self-determination should be applied in the case of the population of Cyprus" Britain succeeded in having the matter shelved for the time being. As time passed, the British attitude towards Cyprus changed materially. Initially Britain had little interest in the island which was considered to be of no great economic or strategic value. The die-hard imperialists would not yield up control but only because they would yield up no part of the Empire.

The rise of Nasser in Egypt changed the situation entirely and the Suez debacle pointed to the strategic worth of the island. Indeed, from being of no consequence it now assumed an exaggerated importance in the eyes of Imperial strategy planners and it came to be held that possession of Cyprus was vital to British interests in the Middle East.

53.	Anti-British Feeling	49
54.	Extension of Mandate	50
55.	Protection and Evacuation of British Families in Famagusta (Planning)	50
56.	Major Macey	50
57.	Serious Shooting Incidents	51
58.	New Arrivals	53
59.	Visit of Adjutant General	53
60.	Social Functions	53
61.	Visit to Lebanon and Holy Land	54

PERIOD 9TH AUGUST - 16TH OCTOBER
(Date of return home).

62.	Turkish Air Force drops bombs in NORTH WEST CYPRUS	56
63.	Attempted Economic Blockade of Turk Cypriots	56
64.	Anti-British Feeling Tension Continues	57
65.	Training of Greek Cypriot Forces	58
66.	Protection and evacuation of Proposed Observer Group (Planning)	58
67.	Presentation of UN Cyprus Medals	59
68.	Homeward Bound	59
69.	Serious Shooting Incidents	51

INFANTRY COMPANIES AND ARMoured CAR GROUP

69.	A Company Adjutant General	60
70.	B Company Functions	68
71.	C Company Lebanon and Holy Land	73
72.	Armoured Car Group	79

BRANCHES AND SECTIONS

73.	"A" Branch	81
74.	"Q" Branch	111
75.	OPS Branch	122
76.	Intelligence Section	125
77.	Engineer Section	127
78.	Signal Communication	131
79.	M.T. Platoon	136
80.	Welfare	144
81.	Medical	146

BACKGROUND, HISTORICAL AND IMMEDIATE, TO THE
CYPRUS PROBLEM.

(Given is some detail as 40th Battalion was in
Cyprus during initiation of the peace keeping
mission on the island.)

1. OCCUPATION.

- a. Cyprus, the third largest island in the Mediterranean, in area, equal to half Munster, is 40 miles south of Turkey and 200 miles east of the nearest Greek island, Rhodes. It is 400 miles from the Greek mainland. It has a population of about 580,000 divided according to the last British census, as follows:

Greek Cypriot	442,500
Turkish "	104,300
Armenian	3,600
Maronite	2,700
Others (mainly British)	24,400

- b. The occupation history of this island is too involved and long to be dealt with here but it may be summarised as follows:

First Greek settlements	-	before 1,000 B.C
A Roman Colony	-	58 B.C to 330 A.D
Part of Byzantine Empire	-	330 A.D to 1191 A.D
Occupied by Richard the Lion Heart (Crusade period)	-	1192
Lusignan Kingdom	-	1192 - 1489
Venetian Colony	-	1489 - 1571
Turkish Occupation	-	1571 - 1878
British Control	-	1878 - 1960

As far as is known, during all this period the island was governed as a single unitary state or province - this is important from the Greek viewpoint - never partitioned

Anthony Eden memoirs state - " In geographical and tactical considerations the Turks have the strongest claims in Cyprus, in race and language the Greeks, in strategy the British, so long as their industrial life depends on oil supplies from the Persian Gulf"

Oxford writer, Casson in 1942 in book "Greece" states "Cyprus is still occupied by Greek stock which can claim a more direct descent from the old Greek strain than most parts of the mainland of Greece".

Storrs, British Governor of Cyprus 1926-32 in a book "Orientation" writes " The Greekness of Cypriots is, in my opinion indisputable. No sensible person will deny that the Cypriot is Greek speaking Greek thinking, Greek".

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It is undoubtedly a valuable staging area and storage base and is useful, though not at all indispensable, as an acclimatisation centre for troops from Britain going to serve in the hot climate of the oilfields. In the Cold War it also became important as a communications monitoring centre directed towards the Soviet Union. So now the old Imperial intransigence was backed up by the cry of "vital interests".

In 1950 Makarios III succeeded to the office of Primate, Archbishop of Nicosia and Ethnarch. As head of the Ethnarchy Council, composed of church leaders and laymen, he assumed the political leadership of the Greek Cypriot people. The raising by Greece of the question of Cyprus at the United Nations in 1954 was backed by violent demonstrations on the island and the "Cyprus question" began to raise faint echoes around the world. In November 1954 a retired Greek Army officer landed secretly in Cyprus with a boat-load of arms. This event, the turning point of the Cypriot campaign for self-determination, went unnoticed by the British authorities. The new arrival who operated under the nom de guerre "Dighenis", a fabled hero of Greece, was Colonel George Grivas. Grivas, an ex Greek Army officer, was a most convinced anti-communist and a determined proponent of the union of his native island with Greece. Now retired, he had, for some time, been in communication with Archbishop Makarios, offering his services in Cyprus but claims that Makarios continued to fob him off with vague "don't call me, I'll call you" promises. Eventually he decided to wait no longer and, from Rhodes sailed in a 30 foot caique to Khlorakas, near Paphos, the legendary birthplace of Aphrodite where he landed on the night of 10 November 1954.

b. EOKA.

Grivas immediately set about the organisation and training of a guerrilla force which he named EOKA after the Greek initials of the name "National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters". From very small beginnings the organisation spread until the Greek Cypriot Mayor of Nicosia could defiantly tell the British authorities in 1958 "we are all EOKA". However, the active fighting strength of EOKA was never large. Grivas claims that, in 1956, his total front line strength was only 273 men sharing 100 guns between them and backed by 750 villagers armed with shot-guns. While the stocks of arms increased substantially as the struggle continued, the numbers on active service probably did not exceed 500 at any one time. As in the case of the I.R.A during the Irish struggle for independence there were small active service units with a great reserve available if required and serving as messengers, spies, saboteurs, propagandists and supporters. British troops on the island were increased to 20,000. On the night 31 March/1 April 1955 explosions all over the island declared the start of the EOKA campaign which was to continue until March 9 1959. The British position was extremely vulnerable. All the public services, including the police, were riddled with EOKA members or sympathisers. The great military bases employed large numbers of Cypriot civilian who committed sabotage, stole weapons and ammunition and kept the Organisation informed of troop movements and plans.

In an attempt to counter the widespread disloyalty among the police, the eyes and ears of the Authorities, the British recruited large numbers of "Auxiliary Police" from the Turkish Cypriot community. There was already in existence a Turkish secret organisation called "Volkan", the aim of which was to prevent Enosis or the granting of control of the island to the Greek majority. Large numbers of this organisation became auxiliary policeman so that the first elements of civil war were created. While the relationship between Greek and Turk heretofore was not all sweetness, the two peoples did live together in peace and reasonable harmony despite their religious and cultural differences. Now, racial bitterness grew and came into the open, the seeds of the later trouble were sown.

c. Independence.

In March 1956 Archbishop Makarios was exiled to the Seychelle Islands. Several offers of settlement were made by the British including the "Mac Millan Plan" under which the administration of the island would be shared by Greece and Turkey, in effect, a plan for partition, based in the findings of the "Radcliffe" commission. Grivas refused to negotiate in the absence of Makarios who eventually was released from the Seychelles in March 1957 but was initially denied return to Cyprus. The question of Cyprus kept on appearing before the United Nations until eventually the London and Zurich Agreements were signed in February 1959, following which a cease-fire was ordered by Grivas. In the negotiation by the British, a demand for a type of partition of the island was always being made. Mr Lennox Boyd the Colonial Secretary states "Had partition not been mentioned we should never have had the settlement which we have reached" Mr Bevan, a prominent member of the opposition said of Lennox Boyd - "the right honourable gentleman was engaging at that time in a shabby trick". The British maintain that President Makarios accepted the Constitution as an alternative to invasion by Turkey and partition of the island. As an alternative to outright partition, the British and Turks were pressing for a Cantonal Federalisation, quoting the USA, Federal Germany and Switzerland as successes in this type of rule. Greeks maintained, with some truth, that the cantons were all independent provinces before coming together as a group under federal control. The Greeks also countered that the federalisation introduced by Britain in India and Palestine was a failure.

5. NEW CONSTITUTION.

a. In Granting Independence to Cyprus, Britain's main concern was to preserve her own special interests on the island and to ensure the privileges of the Turkish minority. British interests were secured by declaring the main military bases to be sovereign British territory and by acquiring leases on many other installations. (Total rent to Cyprus Government, approx £11,000,000 per year). The new constitution provided for a President to be elected by the Greek Cypriot community and a Vice-President to be elected by the Turk Cypriot community. The Vice-President had the right of final veto on matters concerning foreign affairs, defence and security. The Constitution provided for a House of Representatives of 50 members, 35 Greek Cypriot and 15 Turk Cypriot. Any law imposing taxation, relating to Municipalities or to the Electoral Law must be approved

by separate majorities of the Greek and Turkish members taking part in the vote. This double structure was repeated in the system of Justice where Turkish cases must be heard before Turkish judges and Greek cases before Greek judges. The Supreme Court consisted of a Greek Judge, a Turkish judge and a neutral (non-Cypriot) President. Matters of education, sport, religion, social welfare and personal status etc would be dealt with not by the Legislature but by "Communal Chambers" elected separately by the two communities. Positions in the public service were allotted on a basis of race - 30% to the Turk Cypriots and 70% to the Greek. (In the case of the Army, 40% to the Turk Cypriots). In addition, the Constitution provided for the keeping in Cyprus by Greece and Turkey of separate military forces - 950 Greek and 650 Turkish troops. In the Constitution, ministries were as follows: Greek Cypriot - Interior, foreign affairs, finance, justice, commerce and industry, communications and works, labour, social insurance. Turk Cypriot - Health, agricultural and natural resources, defence

The disproportionate powers conferred on the Turkish minority rankled with the Greek majority and the "Enosis" supporters saw that the Turkish veto made their aim of union with Greece constitutionally impossible. However, the Constitution was accepted and independence was declared on 16 August 1960. Archbishop Makarios was the new President and Dr Fazil Kutchuk was Vice-President.

b. Proposed Amendment of Constitution.

In November 1963 President Makarios who stated "The agreements are not the goal; they are the present, not the future", issued proposals for changes in the Constitution. Reading over those 13 proposals now one finds that some of them are reasonable and unexceptionable. Some, such as the automatic assumption of the duties of President by the Vice-President in the absence of the former in fact increased the prestige and authority of the Turk/Cypriot. However, the proposed termination of the Vice-President's right of veto, the unification of municipalities and the ending of the provisions regarding separate majorities for the enactment of separate laws were not acceptable to the Turkish Cypriots. Indeed, it is doubtful if any alteration of the Constitution would be permitted by the minority. For a while it appeared that the proposed amendments might be negotiated and Dr. Kuchuk, in an interview in London announced that this was his intention. Suddenly there was a complete volte face and he declared that his people would not tolerate any meddling with the Constitution.

6. VIOLENCE

a. The President's proposals were the culmination of various moves and counter-moves over the administration of the separate municipalities and there had been a series of bomb outrages from March 1962 right through 1963. The Turkish Government, one of the guarantor powers under the Treaty, rejected the Makarios proposals and there was an immediate outbreak of communal rioting throughout Cyprus. The fighting gave rise to a serious threat of military intervention by Turkey.

Indeed, on 25 December 1963 part of the Turkish National Contingent left its barracks and took up positions astride the Nicosia - Kyrenia road while Turkish jet aircraft flew over Nicosia on 25 and 26 December - Britain and USA having been informed in advance of these flights. On 27 December the commander of 2nd Turkish Army declared that Turkish units were ready to embark for Cyprus. The Cyprus representative at U.N., Mr Rossides requested a meeting of the Security Council to hear a complaint of Turkish "intervention in the internal affairs of Cyprus"

- b. On December 28 Mr Duncan Sandys of the British Colonial Office flew to Cyprus to negotiate a cease-fire and a settlement. Both sides released hostages, most road blocks were removed and an uneasy calm was established.

7. INTRODUCTION OF UNITED NATIONS FORCE TO CYPRUS.

- a. In January a proposal was put forward by Britain that an arrangement be instituted whereby British, Greek and Turkish troops on the island - a Tripartite Force - would be utilised to help eliminate strife and maintain stability. This proposed force assumed the mantle of a "NATO" force and President Makarios stated that he would accept a force only through the U.N. In fact a NATO force proposal gave rise to strong anti american feeling among the Greek Cypriots who held that the US would favour its ally, Turkey, in a settlement and two bombs exploded outside the US Embassy in Nicosia on February 4th. In the meantime on January 16th, General Gyani of India had been appointed a UN Observer in Cyprus. In February the British security Force was increased to 7,000 and Major General Michael Carver was appointed to its command. At the same time Britain, with the acquiescence of President Makarios asked the United Nations to intervene and send in a peace-keeping force.
- b. Substantive discussion on the problem of a peace-keeping force began in the Security Council on 19 February. On 4th March a resolution recommended, with the consent of the Government of Cyprus, the creation of a United Nations peace keeping force and specified that

" The composition and size of the force shall be established by the Secretary General in consultation with the Government of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom. The Commander of the force shall be appointed by the Secretary General and report to him. The Secretary General, who shall keep the Governments providing the force fully informed, shall report periodically to the Security Council on its operation. The function of the force should be, in the interests of preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions. The stationing of the force shall be for a period of three months, all costs pertaining to it being met, in a manner to be agreed upon by them, by the Governments providing the contingents and by the Government of Cyprus. The Secretary General may also accept voluntary contributions for that purpose!"

c. Mediator.

The resolution further empowered the Secretary General to designate, in agreement with the Government of Cyprus and the Governments of Great Britain, Greece and Turkey, " A mediator who shall use his best endeavours with the representatives of the communities and also with the aforesaid four governments, for the purpose of promoting a peaceful solution and an agreed settlement of the problem confronting Cyprus, in accordance with the charter of the United Nations, having in mind the well-being of the people of Cyprus as a whole and the preservation of international peace and security. The mediator shall report periodically to the Secretary General on his efforts" (The first mediator appointed was Mr Sakari Thomioja of Finland)

d. Ireland was one of the countries from which the Secretary General requested troops to form the Cyprus peace-keeping force- the request reached the Irish Government on 5 March. After due debate in Dail Eireann and after a full explanation of what was involved the Government offered to provide a battalion of 500 men (later raised to 600) on certain conditions -

"(1) That the functions of the force would be to maintain peace while the process of mediation, to achieve an agreed solution of the problem confronting Cyprus, was in progress and that the force would have no function in influencing the character of the settlement to be made or its subsequent enforcement.

(2) That an assurance would be forthcoming from the Governments of Great Britain, Greece and Turkey that during the presence of the force in Cyprus, they would not intervene or attempt to impose by force, or by threat of force, a solution of the problem - and particularly a solution by partition.

(3) That every effort would be made by the Secretary General to ensure that the Greek and Turkish Governments would place under the command of the United Nations their troops now stationed in Cyprus.

(4) That if it should be agreed to be necessary to keep a United Nations Force in Cyprus after the expiration of three months

(a) Other member countries of the United Nations would be asked to provide contingents and

(b) The Government would be free to withdraw the Irish Contingent, irrespective of the progress of the mediation and the state of affairs in Cyprus at that time".

This decision was conveyed to the Secretary General on 13 March, and after agreement in principle to the conditions, the Secretary General was informed on 24 March that Ireland would provide a contingent.

- e. On March the 14th the advance party of the Canadian UN contingent arrived in Cyprus and the British troops commanded by Major General Carver came under UN control. Throughout March and April the other contingents from Ireland, Sweden, Finland, Denmark and Austria (Field Hospital) arrived on the island and Headquarters United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was established in Nicosia under the command of General Gyani, now appointed Force Commander, with Major General Carver as Deputy Force Commander. The staff at H.Q. UNFICYP was predominantly British. The force was operational on the island as from 27th March, 1964.

8. 40 IRISH BATTALION.

8. Formation of Battalion is Authorised.

- a. On 24th March 1964 Army Headquarters announced that a force of battalion strength, designated "40 Battalion" would be organised to form part of a peace-keeping force in Cyprus.

Lieutenant Colonel P.P. Barry, then Officer Commanding 12 Infantry Battalion, was appointed to command the battalion. A new mission for our army was now born - peace-keeping in Western Asia between Moslems and Christians in the sunny levant island of Cyprus.

b. Organisation of the Battalion.

Unit officers and men, drawn from all commands of the Army, were named in mid March and a battalion of 600 all ranks, broadly organised as follows, was established.

- (1). Bn Hqrs.
- (2). Headquarters Coy, including elements of
Infantry Corps ("A" and "Q")
Engineer Corps
Signal Corps
Supply and Transport Corps
Ordnance Corps
Military Police Corps
Medical Corps
- (3). Three rifle companies, each of three rifle platoons and a support platoons.,
- (4). Armoured Car Group, comprised of four sections, each of two Panhard Armoured Cars.

9. RESCUE PARTY TO CYPRUS.

On 28th March a reconnaissance party as hereunder went to Cyprus with the task of putting in motion arrangements for reception and accommodation of the battalion and making a brief survey of the supply system being planned.

Lieut Colonel J. Adams - Army H.Q.
Comdt J. Stewart - 2 i/c 40 Bn.
~~Comdt G. Leach~~ - 40 Bn.
Capt W. Rafferty - Senior M.O. 40 Bn.
Mr. G Crean - 4th Pa Coy Engrs.
- Dept of Defence.

On return from Cyprus, Lt. Colonel Adams briefed personnel of the General Staff and O.C. 40 Bn on the situation in Cyprus -

- a. The dispute between the communities,
- b. The U.N Staff set up,
- c. The supply system envisaged,
- d. Proposed installations for 40 Bn.

10. BATTALION MOBILES AND TRAINS.

During March 1964, training, medical processing and screening of battalion personnel was got underway. In the selection of personnel, strict account was taken of previous conduct record and of training standard already achieved.

a. Training: In training, emphasis was on the following,

- (1). Weapon Training - having men competent in the use of weapons.
- (2). Fire Control Orders.
- (3). Brush-up on all aspects of foot drill and arms drill.
- (4). Guard duties - smartness of outward appearance combined with vigilance and alertness.
- (5). Initiative development exercises.
- (6). Physical fitness and endurance; first aid, hygiene and sanitation.
- (7). Patrols, urban and country, preparation and execution.
- (8). Co-operation between infantry - armoured teams.
- (9). Precautions against ambush.
- (10). Immediate action drills.
- (11). Method of searching houses, vehicles.
- (12). Guarding and escorting.
- (13). Technique of road blocks, control points.
- (14). Domination of area - occupation and strong points, roof tops.
- (15). Suppression of unlawful assembly and riots: crowd dispersal.
- (16). Observing and reporting.
- (17). Communications, voice procedure, message writing.
- (18). Security of posts; digging; air attack shelters.
- (19). Deployment drills.
- (20). Sealing off an area.
- (21). Section, platoon and company exercises, including battle practices.
- (22). Specialist training, in particular with new equipment - signal section and armoured car group.
- (23). Development of team spirit and harmony within the unit.
- (24). Briefing and discussions on the Cyprus Peace-keeping problem.
- (25). External specialist training -
 - (a). Capt T. Kelly, Capt M. Carroll and 12 NCOs of the armoured car group completed an intensive course in France on the Panhard armoured cars.

- (b). Capt S. Flynn, Bn signals officer, Lt Evans and two NCOs of the Signal Corps completed a course in France on the Panhard wireless sets - VRC 10 and ANGR09.

(Note - Chief-of-staff, Lt General S. McKeown and Quartermaster General, Colonel P Curran visited United Nations Headquarters in New York where, among other matters, was discussed the problem of equipment for a peace-keeping force in Cyprus.)

b. Assembly of Battalion.

- (1). On 1 April, Battalion Hqrs and elements from each sub-unit assembled at PLUNKETT BARRACKS, Curragh Camp.
- (2). On 3 April a conference of battalion staff and sub-unit commanders was held, chiefly with the object of having personnel put in the picture and having a working plan laid on for the days ahead.
- (3). On 6 April the battalion was activated and all unit personnel reported to Curragh Camp. On that evening a conference of all unit officers was held, with the object of officers getting to know one another, having all working in the one direction and getting a broad outline of the task of the unit in Cyprus. It was emphasised that at this stage, 2,500 miles distant, the officers were dealing with an abstract problem - it was only when the battalion got to Cyprus, they could really see the problem, properly assess it and take steps, mainly through experience, to deal with it. It was also emphasised that the peace-keeping problem confronting the battalion should be well within the capability of the battalion officer group. On that evening also Lieutenant Colonels Foley and Adams of Army Hqrs briefed the battalion officers on the history of the island and on some aspects of the dispute between the communities.
- (4). On 7 April the unit was reviewed by the Battalion O.C in Connolly Barracks in the presence of good press and television coverage. The troops looked well and drilled well. In an address to the men, the Commanding Officer, after complimenting them on being selected for this new and important peace-keeping mission, emphasised the absolute importance of the following in the mission they were about to undertake
 - (a). Good conduct and sobriety - ambassadors of our country and our army - one of the main factors in successful peace-keeping is a high personal conduct standard by troops.
 - (b). Good bearing and dress - on and off duty
 - (c). Need for keeping all ranks happy - good food and well organised recreation.
 - (d). Personal security and security of weapons.
 - (e). Impartiality.
 - (f). Sympathetic approach to needs of parties in dispute
 - (g). Sincerity, truthfulness and uprightness.



Officers of the 40th infantry battálion met President de Valera yesterday at Arus an Uachtaráin. The President is speaking with the battálion commander, Lieut.-Colonel Patrick Pearse Barry.



Comdt. T. Treacy



Comdt. Tony MacSullivan, stationed in Cork, will be senior medical officer to the Cyprus force. A native of Drumcollogher, he served in the Congo.



Lieut-General Sean McKeown (left), Chief-of-Staff, accompanied by Col. Patrick Curran, Quarter-Master General, boarding an Aer Lingus Boeing jet at Dublin Airport yesterday, on their way to New York for talks at U.N. Headquarters in connection with the sending of an Irish battálion to Cyprus.



Capt. J. Phelan

- (h). Team work - all ranks of battalion work as one team; also, proper merging of personnel of all home commands into one unit - 40 Bn UNFICYP.

c. Address by Chief-of-Staff.

On the evening of 7 April, the Chief-of-Staff, Lieutenant General Sean McKeown addressed the battalion in the Curragh Gymnasium. The main points

- (a). His confidence in officers and men of the battalion to give a good account of themselves in their respective roles.
- (b). The importance of good behaviour.
- (c). The importance of good dress.
- (d). The vital importance of security.
- (e). The need for honesty in approach and in dealing with all problems.
- (f). The need for good military intelligence - we should have learned our lesson in this matter from the Congo operation.
- (g). His satisfaction and that of Army Hqrs at being capable of putting such good troops at the disposal of UNITED NATIONS for a peace-keeping mission.



11. VISIT TO PRESIDENT.

On the night of 7 April the President of Ireland, An tUasal Eamon De Valera received the battalion officers at Arus An Uachtardain. In the course of the reception, the President addressed the officer group, stressing the importance of the mission and how glad he was that our country was in a position to answer the call of the United Nations. Also present were the Minister for External Affairs, Mr Aiken, The Minister for Defence, Mr Bartley, Secretary, Dept of Defence, Mr Brady, Chief-of-Staff - Lt General S McKeown, Adjutant General, Major General S. Collins Powell, Quartermaster General, Colonel P. Curran, Assistant Chief-of-Staff, Colonel J. Emphy.


12. BATTALION ADVANCE PARTY MOVES TO CYPRUS.

The advance party of the battalion in a Hercules aircraft provided by U.S.A.F left Dublin Airport at 08.00 hours on 9 April, '64, touched down at 11.45 hours in Naples United States Naval Air Station for re-fuelling, after a fine flight in brilliant sunshine over the snow-covered Alps. The party took off from Naples at 15.00 hours and reached Nicosia at 19.40 hours. Included in the party were,

Battalion O.C, Bn Adjutant, Quartermaster, Intelligence Officer, Operations Officer, Legal Officer, Officer i/c various sections H.Q Coy and Armoured Car Group.
2 i/c Rifle Companies, Chaplain, Press Officer.
The party consisted of 17 Officers, 26 NCOs, 16 Privates. In addition, Lieutenant Colonel Moylett of the Army C nteen Board went to Cyprus with the advance party.



Comdt. J. M. Stewart (left) presents the flag of the 40th Infantry Battalion to Lieut. Carl Dodd at the Curragh Camp yesterday.



Colonel W. Donagh, O.C. Southern Command, handing over the Company pennant to Comdt. W. Callaghan, who commanded the 150 men who left Kicham barracks, Clonmel, for service in Cyprus.

as did Newspaper Staff - Irish Times: Mr Tom McCaughran, Irish Press: Mr Terry O'Sullivan, Irish Independent: Mr Michael Ryan and Telefis Eireann Staff - Mr Kevin O'Kelly, (This Press and T.V team which remained in Cyprus for about a month hit up a happy association with the battalion and gave the unit due publicity in the home press.) On arrival at Nicosia Airport, the party was greeted by British Major General Mike Carver, Deputy Force Commander and other officers from H.Q UNFICYP. The Major General said that he was deputising for the Force Commander, Lieutenant General P.S Gyani O.B.E, who was engaged at that time with President Makarios. The arrival of the party was well covered by Press and Television. The advance party was transported to ANZIO CAMP in the British Sovereign Base of DHEKELIA in South East Cyprus. Officer Commanding (Lieutenant Colonel Percy Blake from Galway), officers and men of the 1st Battalion, Inniskilling Fusiliers were hosts to the advance party at ANZIO for the next five days. At the time the Inniskillings were part of the British Contingent of UNFICYP - they were all Irishmen, fifty per cent of them approx, from Southern Ireland. This close association of the two units was an interesting one - in one of Major General Carver's jocose moments he said that he was apprehensive lest a second "Green Line" be established in ANZIO! There was no need for worry - the units hit up a happy liaison which lasted during the full tour of Cyprus duty. The Inniskillings did everything possible for the 40th Bn during those early days in Cyprus, for which the 40th is most appreciative. Not alone that, but word of this happy merging must have quickly got to all the British installations in the base, as from the outset, the co-operation given by these installations and services to 40th battalion was outstanding. The advance party immediately set to solve the problems of being put in the picture, of reconnaissance and inspection of battalion installations, of preparation of these installations, of familiarisation with the leaders of the parties in conflict, of contact with H.Q UNFICYP and other contingents, of deciding on tasks for sub-units of the battalion. Staffs worked on the procurement of tentage, transport, cookers, fridges, building equipment; operational equipment, mail and pay arrangements (Barclays Bank) were laid on. An excellent association with the British Military Hospital in Dhekelia was established. On April 14th, five days after arrival and well ahead of schedule, the advance party moved into the main battalion camp - named "WOOL TONE CAMP". The chief and immediate work on the camp - the engineer problem, is covered in the engineer section report. As work was so quickly and enthusiastically tackled the battalion was in a position, on arrival in Cyprus, to forego a short period in a transit camp in Dhekelia - this was a happy decision and eliminated duplication of work.



Some of the troops aboard a Globemaster just before leaving.



Members of the Armoured Car group preparing defensive positions near the perimeter of Walsh Tone Camp. In the trench is Trooper M. Collins, Co. Cork; others (from left) Trooper J. Shannon, Curragh Camp; Trooper E. O'Sullivan, Fermoy and Trooper T. Carey. (Pictures by Irish Times photographer, Gordon Standing.)

13. BATTALION PREPARES AT CURRAGH CAMP.

In the meantime back in Ireland, the battalion, under control of the battalion 2 i/c, Comdt Jack Stewart, continued its training and its preparations for departure to Cyprus.

- a. On 14 April there was a briefing for battalion officers by Lieutenant Colonel Caseley and Commandant McManara of Army Mgrs, on unit and sub-unit administration.
- b. On 17 April, the Taoiseach, Mr Sean Lemass T.D. inspected the battalion and took the salute at a march-past at the Curragh Training Camp. Prior to the parade, the battalion colours were presented by the battalion 2 i/c to Lieutenant Carl Dodd and were blessed by Very Rev. Fr. Duffy H.C.F. There was a general blessing of the assembled battalion and an t-Aire Cosanta, Mr G Bartley, addressed the troops. Present at these ceremonies were Mr F. Aiken, Minister for External Affairs, the Chief-of-Staff, Lieutenant General S. McKeown, members of the Defence Council and Command Officers Commanding. The cadet class in training was also present.

14. AIRLIFT.

The airlift of the main body took place 19-21 April - from Dublin Airport to Nicosia. Details of chucks are as follows:-

Chuck No.	Date of Departure.	No. of troops.	Baggage.	Stop.	Date of arrival.
1.	19.4.'64	68	Personnel	Rome	19.4.'64
2.	+do-	68	-do-	Rome	-do-
3	-do-	68	-do-	Rome	-do-
4	-do-	68	-do-	Rome	20.4.'64
5	-do-	3	Stores	Chatreaux	-do-
6	-do-	3	-do-	-do-	-do-
7	-do-	3	-do-	-do-	-do-
8	-do-	3	-do-	-do-	-do-
9	20.4.'64	68	Personnel	-do-	-do-
10	-do-	68	-do-	-do-	-do-
11	-do-	68	-do-	Pisa	-do-
12	-do-	64	-do-	Chatreaux	-do-
13	-do-	3	Stores	-do-	21.4.'64
14	-do-	3	-do-	-do-	-do-
15	-do-	8	-do-	-do-	-do-
16	-do-	3	-do-	Chatreaux - Pisa.	-do-

On arrival at Nicosia Airport troops were ferried by M.T to "WOLFE TONE" Camp, Famagusta. The first chunk of the main body, was met at the airport by General Gyani, Force Commander and Major General Carver. After due token presentation to both these officers, General Gyani inspected a Guard of Honour of the battalion drawn from 'A' Coy and under command of Lieutenant Jim Harold, while the first class battalion pipe band, resplendant in kilts, played Irish airs.

The performance of this Guard of Honour and band was striking and evoked comment as follows from Major General Carver - "it is amazing to see that men could look so well and drill so well after such a long, tiring journey".

15. IN CYPRUS.

Temper of Affairs in Famagusta District.

- a. 40 battalion was given the task of peace-keeping in FAMAGUSTA district - an area 45 x 15 miles approx in the Eastern Side of the island. The district had one large town, FAMAGUSTA, with 34,000 people - 25,000 Greek Cypriots, 6,000 Turk Cypriot and 3,000 others, mainly British, separated by huge walls from the Greek Cypriot population and a number of villages -

59 Greek Cypriot

26 Turk Cypriot

14 mixed.

The district had a population of 91,370 Greek Cypriots and 18,870 Turk Cypriots.

When the battalion arrived on the island the Turk Cypriot Vice-President, Dr. Kutchuk, and the Turk Cypriot Ministers had withdrawn from participation in the Government. The Greek Cypriots referred to the Turk Cypriot population as "rebels", but the Turk Cypriots held that the real "rebels" were the Greek Cypriot authorities who, the Turks said, had abrogated the constitution without authority. The Turk Cypriot attitude was that the constitutional Government of Cyprus no longer existed, but there were two "de facto" Governments - one headed by Dr. Kutchuk controlling Turk Cypriot affairs and the other under Archbishop Makarios controlling Greek Cypriot matters. Flags were flown in every conceivable place, as a show of strength; and also a show of "division" - the Cyprus flag at administration and police headquarters, the Greek flag (Enosis) on Greek Cypriot private and public buildings, the Turkish flag on Turk Cypriot buildings and police stations. The Greek Cypriot cabinet under the Archbishop was officially referred to by U.N. as "the Government of Cyprus".

- b. The police force had split - Greek Cypriot police operating in numerous Greek Cypriot towns and villages and Turk Cypriot police, armed of course, occupying the occasional police station previously occupied by them - walled city FAMAGUSTA, CHATOS and GALATIA. Turk Cypriot police, who wear red badges in their caps, against green ones by Greek Cypriots, were, of course, not paid by the Cyprus Government - They were paid, as were other public servants for the Turk Cypriot community such as teachers, by the Turk Cypriot communal chamber in NICOSIA. As far as could be ascertained, funds of the Turk Cypriot communal chamber were augmented by donations from the Turkish mainland authorities and from collections, or demands, from the Turk Cypriot population.

- c. No Turk Cypriots joined the Cyprus Government force - The National Guard.
- d. In the mixed villages the trend was for the Turk Cypriots to move out and place themselves in areas which were under Turk Cypriot control. This was, at least, in part, a political expedient - to prove the Turk Cypriot theory that the two communities could not live together. In the odd mixed village they did manage to live together - though, with scarcely any social or business contact with one another.
- e. Armed civilians (Cypriot)-armed police and civilians were to be seen everywhere. The Government legalised the carrying of arms by civilians by a simple device - civilians wishing so, were given papers indentifying them as auxiliary policemen. Others were called "special constables" - practically everyone who could lay hands on a gun was a "policeman" of some kind.

f. Ahmed Sami

During the year just prior to 1964, FAMAGUSTA district had a Turk Cypriot Administrator, Mr. Ahmed Sami, a volatile man of 46 years, who did not show unreasonable anti-Greek feeling.

It is to his credit that he lasted for so long as District Administrative Officer in this predominantly Greek Cypriot area. Particularly in view of the importance of FAMAGUSTA town and port, the Cyprus Government had, of course, to oust Mr. Sami - they offered him the appointment of District Officer PAPHOS District. This, of course, he declined, claiming the transfer was illegal.

He was then dismissed from office and in the week prior to arrival of 40 battalion a new Greek Cypriot District Officer was appointed - Mr. Paralikis.

Mr Sami then withdrew to the walled city and continued as District Officer for the Turk Cypriot community.

Mr. Paralikis.

A man of 45 years, an able and sincere administrator, very much pro the Greek Cypriot cause in his outlook and always prepared to go to extremes to point out why the Turk Cypriot leadership should fall in line with the proposed changes in the constitution. After Sami's replacement by Paralikis there was no negotiation or meeting between the rival leaders in FAMAGUSTA district, though there was some limited liaison, at lower level, in the matters of medical treatment and local employment.

g. Famagusta Port.

This is the main port in the island and the only one at which large ships can move "alongside".

Consequently the economy of the island depends, to some considerable degree, on the smooth operation of this port. Most ships calling to the port come in near empty and leave fully laden - chiefly, with new potatoes, fruit and vegetables - it is a common scene during June and July to see up to ten large cargo ships lying high in the water, anchored outside the harbour awaiting their turn to dock and take away cargo that keeps the island's economy booming.

This port had to be kept running smoothly and this consideration weighed largely in the "thinking" and planning of the operations of 40 battalion.

Outside of the various administrative jobs in the port a working party of 500 approx was employed - 300 Turk and 200 Greek Cypriots. The docks are very much dominated by the huge walls of the old city, which, of course, is completely Turk Cypriot.

Shipping company representatives, port and custom officials and harbour police were all Greek Cypriot.

Though the dockers were mainly Turk Cypriot, the chief beneficiary from their work was the Greek Cypriot population of the island - consequently, the Cyprus Government had to handle the affairs of the port with the utmost tact and understanding for the local Turk Cypriot community. Army contingents from Greece and Turkey were replaced on the island through the port, never without incidents; the Turkish red crescent relief shipments came through the port; Britain had dock installations in the port as well as an evacuation ship for army families always at the ready - a delicate balance always existed here.

The port became the main subject in negotiations with both communities in the battalion's attempt to relieve tension and restore some approach to normal living in the district.

- h. Among the people bearing arms, discipline on the Turk Cypriot side was very effective. On the Greek Cypriot side, however, owing to the abundance of "policemen" and the various factions to which they owed allegiance, proper discipline was difficult and these armed Greek Cypriots were not effectively under the control of the Government or its agents. Consequently, the development of the NATIONAL GUARD or Cyprus army, was welcomed as a safeguard against anarchy. The number of incidents in the FAMAGUSTA district diminished as the National Guard officers began to establish their authority.

There were incidents involving the National Guard, sometimes to their discredit, but there was some semblance of responsibility where before, there had been none. When the National Guard came under the control of General George Grivas in June '64, they smartened up quickly and improved considerably in discipline and efficiency.

- i. The excitable temperament of the Cypriot people, inflamed by its press and radio, helped to keep the two communities apart and in deep distrust of each other. It was virtually impossible to speak for a few minutes to a Cypriot without being pressed to agree with the political sentiments of one side or the other. It was a very rare and a pleasant experience to meet a Cypriot who could speak of the problems with good sense and calm reason. A reasonable approach was regarded by a man's colleagues as a lack of fervour to the cause and "reasonable" people were inclined to find themselves under suspicion.
- j. Political criticism of the UNFICYP mission was freely offered by both sides. The criticism was usually of partiality to the other side or else was based on a misinterpretation of the U.N. Mandate. The Greek Cypriots professed to believe that the function of UNFICYP was to assist the Government in restoring order, which, of course, meant, to them, the quelling of the Turk Cypriot opposition.

The Turk Cypriots seemed to feel that it was the duty of UNFICYP to protect their people and property, by force, if necessary. The fact that UN recognised the Makarios Administration as the legal Government was always an irritant with the Turk Cypriot community.

- k. Greek Involvement: A small issue of the massive Greek involvement in the political situation in Cyprus was the relationship that existed between Cyprus and the Greek Government - the Greek Government had failed to find stability and was only just "hanging on" in the homeland. The catastrophic consequences inevitable in a war between Greece and Turkey were fully realised by Greek premier Papandreu and while his Government was inevitably committed to all-out support to Cyprus in the event of invasion by Turkey, it was plain that the Greek dog did not like being wagged by the Cyprus tail.

The displeasure of Greece at having, in effect, its foreign and military policy decided by Makarios and Grivas was made obvious on many occasions, but Greek displeasure never succeeded in restricting the Greek Cypriot initiative. The most striking example of the brinkmanship so adroitly played by Archbishop Makarios was in September '64, when the rotation of the Turkish National Contingent was due to take place.

Makarios stated flatly that he would not permit the rotation and left immediately for Alexandria for talks with President Nasser of Egypt. A postponement of the problem was achieved by the diplomacy of Greece, U.S.A. and the U.N. to which the Cyprus Government contributed nothing. (Rotation, with strings attached, took place in October.)

16. THE BIGGER PICTURE.

To the 40th Battalion, the bigger political picture which the contingent officers in their thinking, could not ignore was as follows:-

- a. In the cold war, U.S.A. versus Soviet Union, the U.S.A. is flanking Russia's South-west region with N.A.T.O. bases in Turkey. Greece, as well as a satellite, is in N.A.T.O. The Americans split between Greece and Turkey - this, one might think, is the main consideration in the whole problem. The Americans sixth fleet is in the eastern Mediterranean.
- b. Greece and Turkey, while adversaries already in war in this century, must think twice before destroying one another over Cyprus - then the Cyprus Government, pressing for abrogation of the constitution, must be held in restraint.
- c. Russia, antagonistic rather than friendly towards Turkey, has an interest in creating good-will with the Cyprus Government and people, thus advancing the cause of world communism - the communist party on the island is by no means negligible.
- d. Britain is deeply involved over the presence on the island of her two Sovereign Bases.
- e. President Nasser of Egypt quite close geographically, whose antagonism towards Britain is evident, is supporting Makarios.

- f. One might be justified then, in assessing the immediate inter-communal conflict in Cyprus, in assuming that there is something bigger looking over Cyprus' shoulder.

177. THE APPROACH OF BOTH SIDES TO THE IRISH.

- a. By and large, the Greek Cypriot authorities were glad to see Irish troops coming along. Our fight at home over the years against the British had not gone unknown to the Cypriots. Cypriots have had quite a lot of association with Irishmen in Britain and they felt that the Irish and themselves were on common anti-British ground. At this time, 40th Battalion sensed that anti-British feeling was as rife as anti-Turkish feeling on the part of the Greek Cypriots. While the battalion advance party was in Cyprus, just before the arrival of the main body, the Greek Cypriot authorities laid on a wonderful social party in "Gregoris Axfendiou" Camp south of FAMAGUSTA for the officers of the battalion. This party, lavish in its food and perfumed ladies was really a brain-washing effort. The battalion officers that day met some very hospitable and helpful Cypriots who afterwards were found to be the head men in the district and tough and relentless negotiators.
- b. The Turk Cypriot leaders and population seemed to be a little apprehensive of Irish troops. They had been very friendly with the British troops who patrolled the district before the arrival of 40th Battalion. Some not too well-wishers had given a bad picture of Irish troops to the Turkish leadership before the arrival of these troops on the island. The sincerity and excellent conduct of the Irish troops quickly exposed the malice of this misrepresentation and the impartiality of the unit in early incidents made it clear that the battalion was going to be equally fair to both sides. The bulk of assistance given by the unit, went to the Turk Cypriot population, simply because they were the people in need of help - and always with the acquiescence and good will, within reason, of the Greek Cypriot leadership. A good bond of friendship was built up between the battalion officers and the leadership on both sides and, though, in the early days before the National Guard was brought under proper discipline, unit personnel had many a confrontation with the Government forces. Yet there was never a charge of partiality brought against the battalion - it was accepted that the unit's efforts were always designed to prevent escalation and secure and maintain peace.

18. DISPOSITION OF BATTALION.

The initial plan for the disposition of the battalion was:-

a. WOLFE TONE CAMP, Salamis Road, FAMAGUSTA.

Battalion Headquarters.

H.Q. Coy.

'C' Coy.

b. TWO-MILE POINT CAMP, FAMAGUSTA.

'A' Coy.

On 23 April a historic take-over took place with good T.V. coverage. 'A' Coy, 40th Bn took over Two-mile Point Camp now called "Pearse Camp", from 'A' Squadron, Life Guards. After exchange of presents between both commanders, the hand-over, with full muster of both units present, was effected with full ceremonial worthy of this very important occasion.

c. BOGHAZ-TRIKONO area.

'B' Coy.

Difficulties arose with property-owners in the BOGHAZ-TRIKONO area and with the Department of Public Works re the acquisition of ground and property in the area scheduled for 'B' Coy.

The plan to station the company in that area was dropped and with the procurement of extra tentage, 'B' Coy were also accommodated in Wolfe Tone Camp.

19. THE BATTALION BECOMES OPERATIONAL.

a. The company areas of operations were arranged as follows:-

'A' Company.

Southern and south western area of FAMAGUSTA district. Southern boundary - LARNACA district. DHRUKELIA sBa and sea by CAPE GRECO. Northern boundary - VAROSHA - KOUKLIA - SINDA - CHATOS - AYIOS KHARITON (all inclusive.)

'B' Company.

KARPAS (panhandle) area to, on western flank, ARNADEI - SYNGRASI - AYIOS JAKOVOS - MANDRES (all inclusive.)

'C' Company.

Central area of FAMAGUSTA district, between 'A' and 'B' Company areas; centred on FAMAGUSTA and LEFKONIRO.

Armoured car group, after arrival on 2nd May, was held initially under central control at WOLFE TONE CAMP. Elements of that group later were attached to companies or stationed in outposts, with Infantry, as the situation demanded.

- b. Irrespective of the changing around of companies from post to post, the patrolling area of each company remained as initially planned, with the exception that all companies later had static patrol commitments in the more sensitive areas of FAMAGUSTA town and immediate vicinity.
- c. On April 21st Platoon Commanders and Platoon Sergeants went on familiarisation patrols of the battalion area with officers and NCOs of 'A' Squadron, Life Guards from whom the battalion was taking over the district.

20. THE KARAOLOS INCIDENT.

- a. The battalion was due to take over operational responsibility of the district at 23.59 hours on 22 April '64, but due to a shooting incident within a mile of Wolfe Tone Camp, the time of actual take-over of duty was brought forward to 16.00 hours on 22nd. At 10.15 hours, Capt Flynn, battalion signal officer, reported that a shot had been fired into the signal battery charging area (this happened to be a stray bullet fired from some distance.) A telephone message from the school for British children in KARAOLOS then reported a shooting incident in the village - a Turk Cypriot one. Although the battalion was not yet operational, No 6 platoon 'B' Coy, under command of Lieutenant R Keane was immediately sent to the scene. Bn 2 i/c also reported there. A section of Life Guards arrived. Shooting was in progress and as it continued so, more Irish troops were despatched there as also was a platoon of 1st Inniskilling Battalion.
- b. KARAOLOS is a large Turk Cypriot village with four or five families separated from the remainder by about 500 yards of open waste-land. These families lived in make-shift huts, near which was the school for British children. Defensive trenches were dug extensively in the village and were occupied by armed men. On this day, 22 April, a Greek Cypriot police sergeant, decided to patrol the road beside the Turk Cypriot village in his jeep. As far as could be ascertained he stopped by a trench and questioned the position of the trench - a Turk Cypriot opened fire on the jeep, the fire was returned by the policeman and the stage was set for the first shooting incident the battalion was called in to handle.
- c. Greek Cypriots quickly rallied to the scene of the shooting and in a short time their force consisted of:-

A section - mobile police reserve.
Elements of National Guard - untrained.
2 armoured land rovers with six policemen.

The Turk Cypriot force consisted of:-

5 armed men with sterling S.M.38 and 25 others, including women and boys, some of whom were armed - The Turk Cypriots were in trenches. When Lieutenant Keane's platoon arrived near the scene, they found shooting in progress between the Turk Cypriots in the hutments and the Greek Cypriots who had surrounded the village.



At the Irish base (Wolfe Tone Camp) in Famagusta, East Cyprus (right to left):
Comdt. Jim Seward (with sun glasses); Gen. Mike Carver (British U.N. Force); and
Lt.-Col. P. P. Barry.



After consultation between the U.N. elements on the spot, under direction of 2 i/c 40th battalion it was arranged that the British troops would get the Turk Cypriots to stop firing and would also see to the security of the British children and teachers at the school nearby. Irish troops, now reinforced by No 5 platoon under Lieutenant Martin O'Donnell, to liaise with and get the Greek Cypriot forces to stop firing and disperse. No 5 platoon blocked the road from FAMAGUSTA and prevented the armoured land rovers escalating the situation.

The section of police reserve, which was well disciplined and well lead, readily agreed to withdraw, but there was difficulty in getting the then undisciplined elements of the National Guard to withdraw and unload their weapons - one Captain Constantinou, their fiery leader, wanted to take the law into his own hands and it was only after confrontation with the U.N. troops, who had to resort to a threat of opening fire in self defence in the maintenance of law and order, that the National Guard elements eventually agreed to leave the scene. The tension of KARAOLOS quickly spread to the other outline Turk Cypriot villages of FAMAGUSTA - SAKHARIE - and this was a day of armed confrontation between the two parties in conflict in the area. By 13.00 hours, quiet had been restored to KARACLOS and the school children were escorted out of the school area.

- d. British troops under command to Irish - at 15.00 hours, Deputy Force Commander, Major General Carver arrived by helicopter and was put in the picture. 40 Battalion yet had no armoured cars operational, so after consultation and agreement with O.C 40th Battalion and O.C 'A' Squadron, Life Guards, the Major General directed that 'A' Squadron, Life Guards, would come under command of 40th Battalion until this KARAOLOS incident was disposed of. Copy of later official message from H.Q. U.N.F.I.C.Y.P, authorising this historic command set-up is given hereunder,

FM HQ UNFICYP
TO RBQAAA/HQ NICOSIA ZONE
HQ PAPHOS ZONE
ZEN/HQ DIMASSOL DISTRICT
HQ FAMAGUSTA DISTRICT
INFO RBQPSD/TPS CYPRUS MAIN
RBQAXB/TPS CYPRUS REAR
RBQPSD/HQ BFC

BT

RESTRICTED OPS(A)38 RELIEF PROGRAMME PD REFERENCE PARA
TWO OPS(A)28 OF 171145Z PD ONE PD COMMAND FAMAGUSTA
DISTRICT PASSED TO IRISH BATTALION 221600B DUE TO
DEVELOPMENTS IN AREA PD TWO PD A SON IG UNDER COMMAND
IRISH BATTALION FROM 221600B UNTIL RELEASED
ON 23 APRIL AT TIME DECIDED BY COMMANDER FAMAGUSTA
DISTRICT
PD THREE PD 1 INNISEILLINGS ASSUMED COMMAND FARNICA
DISTRICT ONLY
221600B

BT

C WA COMMANDER FAMAGUSTA"

40 Battalion now officially assumed responsibility for FAMAGUSTA district at 16.00 hours 22 April '64.

- e. During the evening of 22nd and morning 23rd the Greek Cypriot authorities were making threats re disarming the Turk Cypriots in the hutments.

The Turk Cypriots felt insecure and eventually decided to abandon the huts and moved to the main village of KARAOLOS. After much local negotiation, chiefly on the part of Captains Kelly and Cantrell, late on the evening 23rd April, the Turk Cypriots, with their families and belongings, were moved with unloaded arms under Irish escort to KARAOLOS main village the incident, as such, was closed.

f. Lessons:

The Irish troops, in this early incident, acquitted themselves well - they won the good-will of both sides by their sincerity in handling the problem and by their impartiality. The incident was a valuable experience and pinpointed:-

- (1). The need for good communications.
- (2). The need for promptness in moving to the scene of an incident.
- (3). The need to seal off an area and prevent rival reinforcements moving in.
- (4). The value of impartiality - in negotiation and execution.

21. ARRIVAL OF PANHARD ARMoured CARS.

- a. Two cars, without ammunition which had been used for training in the Curragh, arrived in Cyprus on 21 April - by air, with the main body of the battalion.

The remaining six cars, crated, arrived by sea, from France, at FAMAGUSTA docks at 08.00 hours 2 May.

They were unloaded by 13.00 and were conveyed to Wolfe Tone Camp by low-loader borrowed from the British. The armoured car group personnel immediately set about assembling the cars and road tests were carried out on 6 May. Training, including signal training, was immediately got under way and the cars were operational from 11 May. Range practices M.G. were fired at PALAMEIDA near LIMASSOL on June 4th and Mortars were fired north of LEFKONKA on June 10th. All participants were struck by the accuracy of both weapons.

- b. The arrival of the panhards was a great boost to battalion morale - their presence gave to the battalion a much needed mobile fire-power; they were a deterrent to would-be gun users in both communities; they gave troops that confidence which might be lacking when soft-skinned vehicles had to enter areas in which firing is taking place.

22. ARRIVAL OF THE NEW IRISH CONTINGENT COMMANDER.

Colonel J Quinn, Army Headquarters, paid his first visit to the 40th Battalion on April 29 - he had just been appointed Military Adviser to the Force Commander and was now the senior Irish officer on the island. His good counsel and co-operation were always much appreciated by 40th Battalion.

23. MISSING BRITISH SALESMAN - OPERATION "BLACKCAT"

Early 22 April, an Englishman, Mr Gibbins, a tobacco salesman, left NICOSIA, by car, ostensibly for LARNACA. He was seen later that day at 12.30 hours in the Turk Cypriot village of KNODHARA near CHATOS by a familiarisation patrol of 40 Battalion - before battalion was operational. He was due back in NICOSIA at 17.00 hours and when he did not return, he was reported missing or possibly missing at 19.30 hours. On 23 April the British sent troops to the area to search for him. Greek Cypriot police also took part in the search. His car was found in the bed of the dried up river TOUFOUIS. The area was patrolled extensively for the next few days by Irish and British troops, but no information on Mr Gibbins was forthcoming.

The British H.Q at HQUNFICYP decided to lay on an elaborate search operation and after postponements it was eventually carried out on 14 May. U.N. civil police, aided by helicopters, carried out the search - operation "Blackcat". 40 Battalion, 'A' and 'C' Coys, sealed off the area while the search was in progress and established 17 observation and reporting posts, all with wireless communications. Area searched - large Turkish area, CHATOS - KNODHARA - GOUPHES - ARTEMIPLATANI - PSILATOS.

Mr Gibbins was not found, neither was any worthwhile information, regarding his whereabouts, forthcoming. It has been accepted that he was murdered, with robbery the motive.

24. SHOOTING INCIDENT AT SALAMIS ROAD POLICE STATION.

Most FAMAGUSTA Turk Cypriots, not working in FAMAGUSTA were employed in the British Sovereign Base area or in other British institutions.

Travelling to such places was a hazard for such workers. At 07.30 hours on 6 May a Turk Cypriot travelling home by car from the SBA was shot by a Greek Cypriot policeman at Salamis Road Police Station. The policeman claimed that the Turk Cypriot failed to stop when called on to do so.

Captain Dobey and Lt Colclough of 'C' Company escorted the dying man to the Turk Cypriot hospital in the walled city in a U.N. jeep. He died in hospital. All trenches again were occupied by Turk Cypriots in KARAOLOS and SANHARIA villages and terror mounted, only to ease off again with the passing of a couple of days - still a fatal shooting leaves a bad taste and tends to widen the inter-communal rift.

25. ROUTINE WORK OF BATTALION.

During the period late April - early May, while the two most important incidents were those related in paragraphs 23 and 24, there was quite an amount of routine peace-keeping work being done by the battalion. This consisted mainly of :-

- a. Extensive patrolling - all villages visited twice weekly.
- b. Escorting of Turk Cypriot workers, officials, sick persons.
- c. escorting of Turk Cypriot market convoys to FAMAGUSTA, Red Crescent supplies to NICOSIA, food and equipment from NICOSIA to FAMAGUSTA.

- d. Searches for missing persons, Turk and Greek Cypriots - chiefly persons missing since the taking of hostages at Christmas 1963.
- e. Searches for missing cars, lorries and farmstock.
- f. Standing patrols to protect farm workers on their land - the areas of TRIPIMENI (GREEK) and PERGAMOS (mixed) were the most explosive places in this respect.
- g. Frequent meetings with leaders of both communities and constant negotiations.
- h. Investigating damage to abandoned houses.
- i. Prevention and reduction of fortifications.
- j. Good-will matters - band recitals, soccer matches with both communities and attending social functions put on by both communities.
- k. Improving post and outposts; opening further outposts - CHATOS ('A' Coy) and KOMI KEBIR ('B' Coy)
- l. Daily dealings and the odd confrontation with the Cyprus army, The **National Guard**. The National Guard was in its infancy; young, undisciplined men were delighted to have a gun in their hands, they were generally "cocky" and some of the more volatile elements in them considered U.N. presence a hindrance in their efforts to subdue the Turk Cypriot minority. (National Guard improved considerably later.)
- m. Constant negotiation with Cyprus Police (city) and gendarmarie (country police) as they were then called - the police and gendarmarie were well disciplined, courteous and always helpful, but, of course, not inclined to yield to any pressure that would improve the lot of the Turk Cypriot population.

26. DIRECTIVES AND INSTRUCTIONS FROM HIGHER AUTHORITY.

A series of directives and instructions governing the peace-keeping operation were issued, from time to time, by the Secretary General and by the Force Commander. The chief ones were those hereunder:-

- a. "General Directive No 1" dated 26 March '64 from Secretary General, giving details of command, composition and status of the force and the method of operation.
- b. "Regulations for United Nations Force in Cyprus", dated 25 April from Secretary General.
- c. "UNFICYP Operational Directive No 1, first revise" dated 30 April, from Force Commander. Among other matters this covered:-
 - (1). Mission of Force: "In the interest of preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions."
 - (2). Peace-keeping duties.

(3). Use of force: (Extract given for information and reference.)

(a). Circumstances in which fire may be opened are:-

- (i) In self-defence, but only as a last resort.
- (ii) In defence of UNFICYP posts and vehicles under armed attack.
- (iii) In support of other troops of UNFICYP under armed attack.

(b). The principle of minimum force will always be applied and fire will be opened only when all peaceful means of persuasion have failed. Troops will not take the initiative in the use of force. The decision as to when force may be used rests with the commander on the spot whose main concern will be to distinguish between an incident which does not require fire to be opened, and those situations in which troops may be authorised to use force. Examples in which troops may be so authorised are

- (i) Attempts by armed forces to compel them to withdraw from position which they occupy under orders from their commanders, or to infiltrate and envelop such positions as are deemed necessary by their commanders for them to hold, thus jeopardising their safety.
- (ii) Attempts by force to disarm them.
- (iii) Attempts by force to prevent them from carrying out their responsibilities as ordered by their commanders.
- (iv) Violation by force of United Nations premises and attempts to arrest or abduct United Nations personnel, civil or military.

(c). Should it be necessary to open fire, advance warning will be given whenever possible. Automatic fire is not to be used except in extreme emergency and fire will continue only as long as is necessary to achieve its immediate aim. Aimed fire only will be used.

(d). High explosive weapons i.e. mortars, rocket-launchers or grenades will only be used if U.N. positions are unmistakably, deliberately attacked. They will not be used for any other purpose without the personnel authority of the Force Commander".

(4). Search and arrest.

(5). Patrols.

(6). Attitude to the population.

(7). Public relations.

d. "Status of Force agreement".

e. "U.N. recognition of Cypriot organisations" dated 30 April, from Force Commander.

f. Numerous reports by Secretary General to Security Council - mainly "Summing-up and observations".



Comdt. Gartyby kisses Archbishop Makarios's ring after the latter's arrival in Famagusta to open a charity bazaar. Right foreground is Lieut.-Col. Barry, the Irish commander and beside him is Father P. Condon, the chaplain.



Gen. Gyanl of India



Lt.-Col. Pearse Barry, O.C. of the Irish contingent in Cyprus, greets General Mike Carver, second-in-command of the United Nations peace force when he arrived (at left) at Wolfe Tone Camp, near Famagusta.



General Grivas



Major-General Sean Collins-Powell, Adjutant-General



Col. James J. Quinn



U Thant, the U.N. Secretary General



Premier Meneu

- g. Press releases of press conferences given by the mediator.
 - h. Secretary General's appeal of 17 July to Governments of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey to end arms build up in Cyprus.
 - i. Various "notes on incidents" from HQUNFICYP.
 - j. U.N. Policy on escorts.
 - k. "UNFICYP freedom of movement", dated 8 October from Force Commander.
27. HIS BEATITUDE ARCHBISHOP MAKARIOS III, PRIMATE AND ETHNARCH AND PRESIDENT OF CYPRUS.

The President of Cyprus was born the son of a shepherd in the mountains of south west Cyprus in 1913. His family name is MOUSKOS. He entered the great monastery of KYKKO in the Troodos mountains at an early age to study for the priesthood. Here he soon acquired a reputation as a fine student and became a protégé of the Abbot, a man of immense prestige in the Church of Cyprus.

After receiving Minor Orders he went on scholarships to study Theology in Athens and the U.S.A. By this time his name was well-known in the Orthodox Church as a scholar. Before his studies at Boston University were finished he was chosen to be Bishop of Kitron in 1948. In 1950 at the age of 37 - the youngest ever elected - he became Archbishop of Nicosia.

The Archbishop of Nicosia is Primate of the Autocephalous Church of Cyprus which, because of its earlier establishment, ranks in seniority over the Orthodox Churches of Greece and Russia. The Archbishop is also traditionally "ETHNARCH" or national head of his people. This title derives from the Turkish occupation when the Primate was responsible for the behaviour of his people and the collection of taxes for the Turkish overlords.

Archbishop Makarios did not become "ex officio" President when Cyprus became independent. When the Presidential elections were held on 13 December '59 Dr Kuchuk was returned unopposed as Vice-President, but Makarios' candidacy was opposed by John Clerides Q.C. a former Mayor of Nicosia. The results gave Makarios a 2 to 1 majority (144,501 against 74,753) but Clerides polled a majority in FAMAGUSTA, was only a 1000 votes behind in LIMASSOL and was well supported in NICOSIA.

The circumstances of Makarios' rise in the Church and as a civil leader and the aura which he generates have made him a figure of considerable controversy. His enemies see him as a power hungry unconscionable bloody-handed clerical despot. His admirers see a saintly scholarly man whom circumstances and his sense of duty have forced into a position he does not want.

He has, on many occasions, declared the hope that circumstances may permit him to return full-time to his ecclesiastical duties. He has indeed brought about several reforms in the Church field. The level of Church rents and the amount of land owned by the Church in a land-hungry island is an old and growing source of friction.

Makarous set up a public committee to control the lands of the Archbishopric, but the other bishops and abbots have refused to follow his lead.

He has initiated many improvements in the seminary training of the clergy and has encouraged study and research in the Bible. He has not been overtly active in the ecumenical initiative of Patriarch Athenagoras; It may well be that Archbishop Makarous longs to lay down the heavy burden of the Presidency, but the voluntary abdication of power is not too often resorted to.

28. DR FAZIL KUTCHUK, CYPRUS VICE-PRESIDENT.

He was born in 1906 and educated at the universities of ISTANBUL and LAUSANNE and took the degree of M.D. He practised in NICOSIA and there became owner and editor of the Turkish language daily newspaper "HALKIN SESI" in 1941. (In 1960 after his election to the Vice-Presidency of Cyprus, he relinquished the editorship.) From 1943 he was leader of the Cyprus Turkish National Union Party. At what the Turk Cypriots considered the dissolution of the Government of Cyprus in December 1963, Dr Kutchuk became "de facto" leader of the Turk Cypriot people on the island.

On visits of officers of 40 Battalion to his headquarters in NICOSIA he was always courteous and showed appreciation of the work of the United Nations on the island.

PERIOD 11 MAY - 9 AUGUST. (Serious incidents on both those dates changed the pattern of things.)

29. SHOOTING OF GREEK OFFICERS.

a. At 14.30 hours on 11 May Mr Sami, Turk Cypriot leader, telephoned OC 40 Battalion and asked him to come to the old city immediately as "the Greek Cypriots are shooting all over the place" as Mr Sami put it. OC 40 Battalion, after having stand-to platoon alerted and reported to the old city, entered the old city by the land gate within five minutes and saw four people, dressed in civilian attire, lying on the ground beside a motor car either dead or dying - this incident completely changed the whole atmosphere of things in PAMAGUSTA district for the months to come. Lt Hoskin of 'C' Company with a section of his stand-to platoon was already on the job at the scene inside the gate, as was Miss Joan Smith of the Red Cross, who had been in Mr Sami's office when the shooting took place. Balance of stand-to platoon with OC 'C' Company, reported within minutes.

b. Turk Cypriots stated that at approximately 14.25 hours, a civilian car, with four passengers, entered the JAMBULAT gate of the old city. After refusing to stop when challenged, it drove around the old city just inside the walls and attempted to leave by the land gate - word having got to the Turk Cypriot policemen at all the gates that this strange car was in circuit. It was held up as it approached the exit gate (all entrance gates to the old city were guarded by armed Turk Cypriot policemen.)

Occupants were ordered out and as they got out, shooting started. The Turk Cypriots said that when the Greeks got out of the car, they opened fire - this was never definitely confirmed. The surviving Greek officer stated that the party drove in through the land gate and were turning to drive out again when they were stopped and shot. Killed immediately were:-

Constable Kostakes Pantellides, a Greek Cypriot, and son of Cyprus Chief of Police.

Captain Vasilios Kopotas, Greek Army.

Mustafa Arrap, a Turk Cypriot bystander.

Seriously injured were:-

Major Demetrios Poullos, Greek Army, died later that day in hospital.

Captain Panayiadis Tarsoulis, Greek Army, recovered in hospital. The wounded were removed by U.N. ambulance and St John's Ambulance Brigade to the up-to-date Greek Cypriot hospital in VAROSHA; the dead, excluding Turk Cypriots, were also taken there after being first taken to the Turk Cypriot hospital in the old city. The party, which picked up Pantellides by chance at a petrol filling station, had just come from NICOSIA and it looks as if they foolishly entered the old city through bravado, rather than on an intelligence mission of testing the resolve of the Turk Cypriots.



Lt. Col. Pearse Barry, Commander of the 40th Irish U.N. Battalion in Cyprus, inspects new promoted personnel at Wolfe Tone Camp, Famagusta


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General Gyani, inspecting the Guard of Honour drawn from B. Coy 40th Batt., accompanied by Capt. Terry Higgins, Cork, Officer-in-Command of guard of honour, when the Irish battalion took over command at Famagusta.

- c. The following weapons, which the Turk Cypriots say belong to the party in the car, were produced:-

1 38 Webley - 3 rounds fired.
1 Luger Parabellum - one round fired.
1 Sterling SMG - unfired.

There was no injury to the Turk Cypriot policemen.

- d. The Greek officers had been on duty in Cyprus with the Greek National Contingent and should normally have returned to Greece some weeks prior to this fatal shooting. The dead were given a state funeral in NICOSIA.

30. DEPLOYMENT OF TROOPS.

- a. At 14.40 hours approx., OC Battalion was back at Battalion Headquarters and instructed the Adjutant to alert the Battalion - This was done verbally in the case of Wolfe Tone Camp, by phone in the case of Pearse Camp and by radio in the case of outposts, CHATOS and KOMI KEBIR.
- b. HQ UNMICYP were put in the picture regarding developments.
- c. Verbal Orders. - verbal orders were issued at 14.50 hours to Bn Staff, Company Commanders and Armoured car group Commanders.
- (1) 'C' Company to seal off, immediately, all entrances to old Turk Cypriot walled city - no Greek Cypriots whether civilian, police or National Guard to be allowed in - Lt Heskins' platoon of 'C' Company, though thin on the ground, already all entrances as per verbal instruction given to Lt Heskin at the scene of the shooting. In this task 'C' Company to have the support of two armoured car sections, under Lieutenants Stapleton and O'Connor, who are already patrolling in support of Lt Heskin's platoon.
 - (2) 'A' Company stand-to in Pearse Camp and send a platoon to base medical camp, between Turk Cypriot school (outside walls) and Greek Cypriot police station.
 - (3) 'B' Company, less platoon in KOMI KEBIR, stand-to in Wolfe Tone Camp and be prepared in particular to intervene in SAKHARI - KARAOLIOS area, if required
 - (4) Armoured car group - two sections to support 'C' Company in sealing off old city. One section, Capt Kelly ~~to~~ KARAOLIOS to prevent National Guard attacking Turk Cypriot village or coming towards old city.

31. SITUATION DEVELOPS.

- a. As word of the killing of the Greek officers got around, Greek Cypriots - civilians, police and National Guard - seethed with anger and immediate reaction was to avenge this unfortunate incident.

- b. National Guard assembled on the barrack square at Karolos National Guard Camp - section of armoured cars, Capt Kelly i/c, was sent to vicinity to prevent National Guard from attacking Turk Cypriot village of KARAOLOS and to keep National Guard from moving towards old city entrances.
- c. At 15.05 all Turk Cypriot dockers left dock area for security of walled city. Greek Cypriot workers also later left the dock area.
- d. 15.30 - there were indications that National Guard had received orders and were about to move from camp - chief of police informed that U.N. troops would not allow National Guard to come towards Turk Cypriot positions. The National Guard did leave camp for a short while and returned again. They did not try and force the issue - they did not attempt to attack Turk Cypriot areas.
- e. 15.40 - Police and Auxiliary Police left Police Barracks area and assembled on NICOSIA road - their senior officer stated that he could not restrain them from attacking the land gate entrance to the old city - a platoon of Company, Lieutenant i/c intervened and advised them, and prevented them from escalating the situation.
- f. 15.45 - Turk Cypriot shot dead, from his scooter by Greek Cypriot Police from moving land-rover at T junction, beside walled city.
- g. 16.00 - British NAAMI (Canteen) in FAMAGUSTA reported through duty officer DHEKELIA that armed Greek Cypriots had entered the canteen enclosure in cars and had abducted six Turk Cypriot employees at the canteen. 'C' Company sent a patrol and remained there until arrival of British troops from DHEKELIA at 17.10 hours. Another Turk Cypriot, assistant manager, Barclays Bank was also abducted - this taking of HOSTAGES introduced a new and sinister factor to the whole incident.
- h. 19.50 - a message from HQ UNFICYP - conversation among Greek Cypriots in NICOSIA " Nicos Samson's (head of extremist Greek Cypriot Group) boys are going to FAMAGUSTA to make trouble". There was also a report of collection of arms in NICOSIA and movement of armed men by bus from NICOSIA to FAMAGUSTA.
- i. 20.00 - Duty officer HQ UNFICYP to OC 40 Battalion. President Makarios to General Gyani.
() " Request that U.N. troops occupy space in old walled city commanding port of FAMAGUSTA. If this is not done the space will be occupied by security forces of the Republic"

- (2) President Makarios requests General Gyani to advise the Turk Cypriots not to leave the walled city for V.ROSHA (i.e FAMAGUSTA, outside of walled city) for two or three days and not to go to the port for work. Leaders of both sides advised of wishes of Cyprus President - Turk Cypriots peculiarly enough did not express any serious wish that U.N. troops should not go on the walls - the Turk Cypriots were now in the defensive and were glad to have U.N. troops in the old city.
- j. Message at 21.00 from Major General Carver to 2 i/c of 40 Battalion.
- (1) 40 Battalion to occupy walls overlooking harbour, morning of 12 May.
 - (2) OC 40 Battalion, in consultation with leaders of both sides, to use his discretion as to whether or not Turk Cypriots should work in docks on 12 May. Battalion 2 i/c requested Major General Carver to ask the Cyprus Government to control the police and National Guard as they had been giving trouble all day.
- k. 11 May was a day of intense activity by the whole battalion - conferring with rival parties, escorting personnel in danger, patrolling mobile and static - in Turk Cypriot areas, rendering medical aid, searching for abducted personnel, liaising and arguing with police and National Guard, obstructing movement of police, National Guard and armed civilians, endeavouring to curtail fortification - in general trying to prevent escalation of this very serious incident of the shooting of Greek Army officers.
- l. Turk Cypriots, of course, were digging-in in the local villages. A patrol to the village of SAKHARIA Capt Leyne i/c reported Turk Cypriot strength as follows approx.
- 100 men, all armed.
 - 2 Bren guns.
 - 30 Sten guns.
 - Numerous rifles and grenades.
 - 7 Revolvers.

32. WEEK FOLLOWING SHOOTING.

This was a worrying week, with the battalion objective being, prevention of escalation and getting the Turk Cypriot workers back into the docks. Orders for battalion, issued on evening of 11 May were as follows:-

- a. 'C' Company - (1) Hold north gate, land gate, Djanbolet gate, Medical depot.
- (2) Patrol KARAOLOS - SAKHARIA road junction - Salamis road police station - T junction; observe movements of both sides and prevent conflict.
- b. 'B' Company - (1) Occupy and hold walls dominating the harbour - MMG posts to be used where feasible in order to conserve personnel.
- (2) Police the harbour.

c. 'A' Company in battalion reserve - be prepared in particular to,

- (1) Intervene in SAKHARIA village if Turk Cypriots are attacked.
- (2) Intervene in KARAOLOS village if Turk Cypriots are attacked.
- (3) Support 'C' Company in medical depot.
- (4) Support 'B' Company in harbour area.

d. Armoured car group.

- (1) One section near exit from KARAOLOS National Guard Camp area.
- (2) One section to NICOSIA road.
- (3) One section Dock area to T junction.
- (4) One section Sakharioroad junction - Salanis police station - T junction.

All sections to keep a sharp look-out, show U.N. strength and prevent conflict.

e. Headquarters Company.

- (1) One section Military Police under command to 'B' Company in dock area.
- (2) Prepare two combat platoons as reserve in Wolfe Tone Camp.

(Note: Standing patrols of course were in position overnight between the two sides - as they were for the coming five months.)

Troops were in position 04.00 hours 12 May. Both Greek and Turk Cypriots now seemed to acquiesce in the arrangement whereby U.N. troops controlled the gates and the walls and police the harbour - no side was now losing face. The Turk Cypriots were glad that there was no large scale offensive against any of their villages, though a sinister method of revenge crept in without warning - taking of hostages. The Greek Cypriots were glad to get breathing space, to plan their next actions - their dislike of too much U.N. intervention became very pronounced as the days passed on.

f. Major General Carver visited the battalion, in position, at 06.00 hours, 12 May and approved of conduct of operations.

33. HOSTAGES.

The taking of hostages is the one aftermath to the shooting incident for which the battalion was not prepared. Strangely enough, HQ UNFICYP had issued no instruction on ways and means to guard against such a contingency. Hostages had been taken by both sides in the December 1963 fighting, yet the possibility or probability of this happening again, and ways and means of combating it, had not been discussed by U.N. authorities. And again, very strangely, the Turk Cypriot leadership did not remind or ask U.N. to guard against the possibility, following the shooting. Neither did the Turk Cypriot leadership send word immediately to their outlying workers, i.e. personnel working in or near Greek Cypriot areas and without the shelter of the old city's walls, to come in immediately to the old city for their own safety. Turk Cypriot dock workers were the only group that sought the shelter of its walls; small isolated groups such as NAAFI and bank officials, much to their misfortune, did not seek shelter. The odd traveller in country areas, such as farm workers, shepherds shoppers etc, who in any case only seldom moved very far from the Turk Cypriot villages, were also easy prey to evil-doers. In the days immediately after the shooting, 32 Turk Cypriots were taken hostage in the FAMAGUSTA district. They never returned home and it is accepted that they were killed. This caused serious embarrassment to the Cyprus Government - no doubt the Government authorities were not in favour of this hostage-taking - there was some evidence in FAMAGUSTA on 12 May that when a member of the Government spoke against the taking of hostages, he was threatened by extremist Micos Sanson's men and told mind his own business. The taking of the hostages did considerable damage to the Greek Cypriot cause - world opinion favoured the Greek Cypriots immediately after the shooting but the hostage-taking lost all this advantage to the Cyprus Government. There is evidence that the Turk Cypriots in due course got instructions to accept the "hostage" position as it was and not to retaliate as this would again alienate world opinion.

34. SAKHARIA INCIDENT.

- a. At 05.30 12 May a Greek Cypriot bakery overlooking the Turk Cypriot village of SAKHARIA was occupied by armed Greek Cypriots. They fortified the house - about fifteen men. They were agitated and were bent on striking a blow for the cause. Despite urgings and warnings they eventually opened fire on SAKHARIA village at 13.45 hours. Turk Cypriots returned the fire and in the next 40 minutes about 1000 rounds were fired with M.A.s and rifles. Once firing commenced there was an effort by National Guard and armed civilians to infiltrate the area and occupy commanding buildings.
- b. Armoured Personnel Carriers : The battalion had nine APCs - cumbersome but useful vehicles, hired to U.N. by British Base authorities. They gave good personal security to troops on static patrol duties, interposed between the conflicting parties in the more sensitive spots. Lieutenant Travers had his 'C' Company patrol in SAKHARIA when shooting broke out.

His men in A.P.Cs were in the actual fire area - he withdrew them to a flank, as was the general order in such contingencies. Shortly afterwards this platoon assisted in entering Greek Cypriot strong points and getting armed men to unload weapons.

c. Troops were immediately sent into the area as follows.

- (1) 'A' Company moved from Pearse Camp to position on high ground 300 yards west of SAMHARIA. The Company deployed and sealed off the firing area from the Tower House to Salamis Road. This action threatened the National Guard position from the rear - 'A' Company was in a position to prevent reinforcements moving in. Armoured car section, Lieutenant Stapleton i/c, moved from Wolfe Tone Camp to support 'A' Company and patrolled the road from Salamis road police station to Nicosia road.
- (2) 'B' Company - Commandant O'Callaghan with his available platoon, Lieutenant O'Donnell and elements of Company HQs under control of Captain F. Higgins moved from north west corner of Wolfe Tone Camp to north side of SAMHARIA - en route they came upon a platoon of National Guard in area of ELECTRA II house and prevented them from taking part in the fighting.
- (3) 'C' Company and Armoured Car Group.
 - (a) Section armoured car group, Captain Kelly i/c, and platoon 'C' Company, Lt Warren i/c, succeeded in confining the two companies of National Guard to KARAOLOS camp by interposing between the camp and the fortified Turk Cypriot village of KARAOLOS. National Guard personnel were informed that if they left camp and attacked the Turk Cypriot village, they would have to pass through a belt of defensive fixed line fire laid down by U.N.

(Note: Regarding this fixed line of fire, it was planned in very serious situations to curb Greek Cypriot movement towards Turk Cypriot villages by bringing about a situation where U.N. troops would be entitled to open this fire for their own protection and at the same time imposing a emphatic deterrent on Greek Cypriot forces. The same would apply to Turk Cypriot forces also of course if offensive action on their part became so serious as to warrant it.) Troops went into the Turk Cypriot trenches and persuaded the men to unload their weapons.
 - (b) Captain Carroll, with a section of armoured car group was the first of battalion elements to intervene in support of 'C' Company in SAMHARIA, arriving there within five minutes of the outbreak of firing - they assisted in the withdrawal of 'C' Company platoon to the flanks. This was followed by OC 'C' Company with a platoon which joined Lieutenant Travers, entered the bakery and persuaded the armed Greeks to stop firing and unload weapons.

- (c) 'B' Company - Within fifteen minutes of the commencement of firing, Headquarters Company had mobilised three platoons. Two platoons under Captains Barrett and McIlvoy took over the defence of Wolfe Tone Camp and Captain Leyne with the other platoon took over the high ground at Oasis House, west of the camp.
- d. By prompt and energetic intervention by the battalion, escalation was prevented and shooting stopped after 40 minutes. There were no casualties. SAKHARIA and KAROALOS had as from that date, 12 May, on, become two fortified villages and also two besieged villages. Greek Cypriot forces infiltrated the area and occupied all commanding buildings dominating the Turk Cypriot positions. 40 Battalion kept static patrols for the months ahead in positions held by both sides and this constant interposition of troops, day and night, was a serious strain on the battalion. The safety of Turk Cypriot personnel in these two villages became secondary in importance only to security and stability in the dock area. Prevention of a massacre, especially of women and children, in these two villages became one of the main tasks of the battalion - such a massacre would of course incur the serious wrath of Turkey with attendant consequences. The presence of U.N. troops in the area now also gave each side a sense of security and allowed the desirable state of affairs to develop where no side loses face. While there was constant tension in this area in the coming month - hold ups, isolated shots, fortification, defortification, house breaking, all sorts of tricks to let the world see that reconciliation was impossible - yet there was no serious outbreak of shooting while 40 Battalion stayed on the ground and patrolled the area, showing sympathy and understanding to both sides.
- e. The battalion was fully deployed under stress for the first time - troops were also committed at Docks, walls and gates to old city. All ranks reacted well to pressure and no one could afford more than a few hours continuous rest. All service of the battalion were fully tested and operated efficiently.

35. ATMOSPHERE IN RURAL AREAS.

The old city shooting and subsequent taking of hostages left a deep rift between the communities. Messages were coming into battalion hqrs on 12th and 13th May of assembly of armed Greek civilians in various villages, of mustering of cars, lorries etc. Turk Cypriots now began to confine themselves closely to their villages and "partition" of the two parties was becoming more pronounced. With this build-up in country villages and the impetuosity of the National Guard, which were yet pretty undisciplined, a big problem for 40 Battalion was to prevent an all out attack in all Turk Cypriot positions in FAMAGUSTA. Assurances were sought constantly at conferences from civil and political leaders on the Greek Cypriot side that there would be no large scale attack. The proximity of "Mother Turkey", as some Turk Cypriots called it, kept Turk Cypriot morale up.

In any case, through many trying days for the battalion, a serious confrontation was averted. Anti-U.N. feeling was building up in Greek Cypriot quarters - they felt that U.N.'s presence prevented their avenging the deaths of the Greek officers. A patrol of 'A' Company was fired on by Greek Cypriots at TRIPINENT and a Swedish police patrol was fired on at ANGASTINA - both incidents being explained by Greek Cypriots as "fired on by mistake". Police patrols, especially new untrained police, who set up road check points only reluctantly allowed U.N. vehicles to pass through unquestioned.

36. FAMAGUSTA DOCK AREA.

- a. Lieutenant General Gyani, Force Commander, arrived in FAMAGUSTA on 11 May to get a first-hand report on matters and assess the situation. He spoke separately to the leaders of both sides and asked for tolerance and understanding and exhorted them to do their utmost to ensure that the old city shooting does not escalate. He asked in particular that the Greek Cypriot authorities take every step for the safety and return of hostages. On his return to NICOSIA he asked the Cyprus Government to condemn publicly the taking of hostages - this was done in due course in an address over the Radio by the President, and in the Cyprus Press.
- b. National Guard occupied some buildings in the docks and immediately set about taking provocative steps against the Turk Cypriot community. On May 13 and 14 they bored holes, for guns, in walls facing the old city. They tried to dominate the old city by building gun emplacements on top of the highest buildings in the dock area. There now was constant friction between U.N. and National Guard in the dock area - Greek Cypriots now wanted to cash-in on the fact that the whole dock area was no longer dominated by Turk Cypriot guns from the walls overlooking the docks. On May 14 cement and sand were drawn to the docks, to seal off the sea gate from the old city. This gate, which was the normal Turk Cypriot route to the docks, had been in operation for 266 years and the Turk Cypriots now objected vehemently to its closing. The Turk Cypriots said that if the Greek Cypriots persist and get their way, then the Turk Cypriots will, by means at its disposal, destroy the docks. This was a very serious situation and a clash had to be averted at all costs - in any case the Greek Cypriots by sealing off the gate would only be encouraging "partition" of the two communities and ultimate reconciliation and communication would be more difficult. There was quite a lot of abuse and counter abuse between U.N. and National Guard in the docks during those days. Lt O'Donnell 'B' Company was jostled by an over enthusiastic National Guard officer - Lt O'Donnell felt obliged to site all his platoon weapons and show his full strength. On instructions, 'B' Company placed U.N. Bedford lorries in the gateway and on the approach there to - the vehicles not to be removed by anybody. This obstruction temporarily checked the closing of the gate.

Greek Cypriot leadership was informed that if this gateway were to be sealed off, such instruction would have to come from Cyprus Government level. This gate incident ~~now~~ ^{now} ~~must~~ ^{must} assumed the proportions of a show-down between elements of 40 Battalion and the National Guard.

37. ARCHBISHOP MAKARIOS GIVES INSTRUCTIONS.

- a. The situation in FAMAGUSTA remained tense and no doubt the Cyprus Government must have been concerned about the future of the docks and harbour - the the only proper port in Cyprus. From the viewpoint of the island's economy, FAMAGUSTA port must be got back to normal.
- b. The President decided to visit FAMAGUSTA on 15 May and see things for himself. At a conference in the office of the District Officer were:- Archbishop Makarios, General Gyani, Mr Paralakis the District officer, Mr Pavlakis local N.P., OC and IO, 40 Battalion. The recent incidents and their possible consequences were discussed. Also discussed in detail were measures to be taken by both sides and by 40 Battalion - request to Turk Cypriot leader in this matter to be conveyed by General Gyani and OC 40 Battalion and good will of Turk Cypriot community sought. OC 40 Battalion made a strong complaint to the Archbishop regarding the lack of co-operation being extended to the Irish Contingent by the Greek Cypriot forces, especially the National Guard, in the battalion efforts to secure and maintain peaceful conditions. The Archbishop accompanied by security men and entourage toured the dock area and saw for himself Greek Cypriot attempts at fortification and sealing off of sea gate. After a further conference in the District Officer's office, the following instructions were issued - official U.N. release as follows:-

"Notes on action expected to result from the visit of General Gyani and President Makarios to FAMAGUSTA on 15th May, 1964.

- A. The Greek Cypriots will:
 1. Do everything to reduce tension and produce free movement and will co-operate with United Nations forces to this end.
 2. Not block the entrances to the old city by OTILIO tower i.e the sea gate. The material deposited for that purpose will be moved after an interval of a few days.
 3. Remove the Police Station above the baker's shop on the Salamis Road, provided that the Turkish Cypriot fortifications in the area are removed.
 4. Remove all fortifications erected since 11th May.
 5. Retain the post in the harbour tower, but will not position weapons in it.

6. Do their best to get hostages released.
7. Co-operation in getting the port working as normal with Turkish as well as Greek Cypriot labour from 18th May.

B. The Turkish Cypriots will:

1. Remove extra defences and armed men overlooking the area of the port extension.
2. Use the JAMBULAT Gate for movement of labour to and from the docks and keep the other gates shut.
3. Return the port operating machinery to the docks and leave it there at night in UN Force custody.
4. Remove all fortifications put up since 11th May.
5. Co-operate in getting the port working as normal from 18th May.
6. Not have anybody on the walls overlooking the dock area.

C. United Nations Forces will:

1. Continue to occupy the walls overlooking the dock area.
2. Patrol the dock area.
3. By their presence and occasional checks see that persons using the JAMBULAT Gate do not carry arms.
4. Maintain an observer in the post in the port tower".

c. The visit of the Archbishop and General Gyani introduced stability to the area and it was felt after the visit that there was a general interest and desire on both sides to get the port working normally again - this was the big problem immediately to hand. The Turk Cypriot leader, at urging of OC 40 Battalion, agreed that Turk Cypriot Dockers would go back to work on 16 May. Greek Cypriot leaders advised a couple of more days inactivity so that tempers might be eased. Colonel Quinn, military adviser to the Force Commander visited FARMAGUSTA on 17 May and conferred with both sides - he played his part in advising tolerance and good-will. The 18 May was eventually agreed on both sides as the date on which Turk and Greek Cypriots would commence working again in FARMAGUSTA port.

38. MARRYING-UP OF GREEK CYPRIOT AND TURK CYPRIOT WORKERS IN DOCKS.

40 Battalion kept its fingers crossed as the morning of 18 May approached - this was the big test - would the two groups of workers merge again in the docks after the serious rift of the previous week? The leadership on both sides was advised that the U.N. Force had sufficient fire power to take complete control of the situation and that this fire power would be used, if needs be, in defence of U.N. personnel and installations in the dock area - what was intended here was a psychological deterrent to the use of weapons by either side. The armoured car sections were the only troops authorised to fire and only of course as a last resort and only on order of OC 40 Battalion, whose Tac HQ would be near the main dock entrance. What was envisaged here, was that if shooting broke out between the rival communities they would quickly segregate, and U.N. fire on fixed lines between the communities would have a sobering effect and would eliminate or restrict movement while also safeguarding U.N. personnel - needless to say U.N. fire would not be directed towards personnel of any community - this was an occasion on which the U.N. instruction that the use of force must be sensibly interpreted, keeping in mind the need for the fulfilment of the U.N. mission in the overall scheme of things. In any case this day, May 18th proved to be a happy day for the battalion - Turk Cypriot workers began to trickle into the docks, through the Djambolet gate (see gate now locked) at 07.30 hours and by 10.00 hours there were approx. 200 Greek Cypriot and 200 Turk Cypriot workers working in the docks. There was some slight trouble regarding the ownership of dock equipment such as tractors and fork-lifters, but this resolved itself. Work continued in the docks for months ahead and workers from both communities got on reasonably well with one another.

39. UNEASY PEACE.

During these days of uncertainty both sides found it difficult to establish a pattern or a standard - the conflict was still in its infancy and neither side knew exactly how far it may go without causing serious escalation. The Turk Cypriots, one would think, were seeking an enlargement of the conflict; yet their wishes were tempered with concern lest Turkey would not stand by them. Later, when it became obvious that Turkey would support them, Turk Cypriot morale soared. This summer period was one of uneasy peace in the district with a whole series of incidents, some of them important and serious in the local context but none of them a major problem in the larger picture.

40. FORTIFICATION AND DEFORTIFICATION.

Sandbagging and digging of slit trenches became a symbol of resolve to keep the pot boiling. Sensitive areas in FAMAGUSTA were fortified and refortified only to be partly defortified again after temporary easing of tension and after urgent negotiation - in which the intelligence officer, Comdt Garvey took an outstanding part. In addition to constant urgings to defortify at conferences with leaders of both communities, officer groups headed by Captains Kelly Cantrell and O'Leary were set up to liaise with both sides and to draw up and implement a phased defortification programme.

some progress was made but then another serious local incident would give both sides the excuse to fortify again, and so the game went on. Greek Cypriots would say that they would take down sandbags if Turk Cypriots at a certain place would fill in slit trenches. When Turk Cypriots would say that they would defortify if the others commence - but no side would "lose face" by starting and so U.N. negotiating teams had a difficult and frustrating job. (Incidentally the Turk Cypriots favoured going underground, in trenches while the bulk of Greek Cypriot fortification was built upwards - sandbagging.) Efforts at defortification had assumed such proportions that the Force Commander and his deputy and President Makarios were all drawn into the web - On 23 May, the President sent the chief of police an instruction in writing to remove provocative fortifications - only scant attention was paid to this, some or other new incident being used as an excuse to discontinue. It was found, in the atmosphere prevailing, that once a new post was erected or a trench dug, it was extremely difficult to have it removed afterwards. But positive action by standing patrols in the first instance often prevented fortification. From a military view point most of the fortifications were useless but they were a serious provocation and a menace to freedom of movement. It was also found that days or weeks of good work, negotiation or persuasion could be nullified by some new instruction from extremist politicians. Sometimes it appeared that both sides welcomed bargaining and expected to be forced to compromise. U.N. pressure had to be kept up with both sides - once inspection, observation and negotiation stop, all good work can quickly be brought to naught by refortification.

41. THE DOCK AREA - CONTINUING INVOLVEMENT.

The dock area was a constant thorn in the side of the battalion - there were various incidents some of them serious to a degree but all of which were solved by local U.N. intervention. The fact that this was the island's main installation directly involving the economy and that also the old city's Turk Cypriots depended on it for livelihood - these factors tended to have an overall sobering effect on the various incidents that arose. These incidents chiefly concerned sandbagging, gun emplacements, presence of National Guard, replacement of Turkish National Contingent through the port, red crescent supplies from Turkey, custom duties, equipment and weapons from abroad for National Guard etc. 40 Battalion and the Australian Police Contingent were pretty heavily involved in the dock area - consequently there was no killing or shooting. One trump card held by the Greek Cypriots in justifying their provocative actions in the dock area was the fact that invasion by Turkey was far from out of the question and that steps taken in the docks were anti-invasion preparations.

42. NIGHT TURKEY INTERVIEW.

The taking and likely killing of the large number of hostages was not, for Turk Cypriots or Turkey, an easy matter to accept. Large demonstrations in Turkey for intervention in Cyprus became common. Diplomatic activity by Greece, Turkey, Britain and the United States was indulged in - becoming more intense as time went on. It was later generally implied in press articles that on 6 June 1964, the American Sixth Fleet stood between Turkish forces and invasion of Cyprus. In the tense atmosphere prevailing on the island the Irish Contingent, unlike the other contingents did not have "on the spot" liaison with a representative of foreign affairs department of the home country. At this early stage of the U.N. mission in Cyprus S.O.P's or plans for U.N. troops in the event of invasion had not been drawn up. In assessing the situation it was felt that FALGUSTA must be one of the points of landing - this, the only good port on the island must be taken or at least an attempt made to take it. Officer Commanding 40 Battalion proposed to Major General Carver that in the event of hostilities on a large scale, i.e. invasion, consideration should be given to getting United Nations troops to some neutral territory in preparation for being repatriated - British Sovereign Base area being the place in mind. No action was taken by HQ UNFICYP in the matter - for the time being, especially with the gradual easing of tension.

43. LETTER TO CEANN FOIRNE.

In the context of the possibility of invasion and the hardening of Greek Cypriot opinion against United Nations, OC 40 Battalion wrote as follows to Ceann Forine, home army on June 6th.

"A Dhuine Uasail,

a.1. Se mo thuairm gur sinne an taon aonad ainseo nach bhfuil ionadaí de ghnothaí eachtracha acu.

b.2. Mar a fheiceann tú ós na páipéirí nuachta le déanaí tá difir anois idir staid rudaí ainseo scacas cúpla mí é choin.

3. Bhí me ag caint in aonar leis an Ard Easbog ar feadh dachad noiméad de haoine seo chaithte. Do thugas cúntas ar mo lenistóir dó agus annsin do labhair sé ar feadh tamaill mhaith. Dubhairt sé nach bfeiceann sé aon seans ar shocrú poiliticiúil gan ro-mhoill agus nach féidir leis an Mediator socrú, go mbeadh an dá thaobh sísta leis, a fháil. Tá imshníomh air mar gheall ar ról na Naisúin aontaigthe ainseo. Dar leis, bhí sé ceart go léor dos na naisiún aontaigthe seasamh idir an dá dream ar feadh tamaill, ach anois toisg nach bhfuill aon réidtrach ag teacht, cé fada leanfaidh na naisiún aontaigthe ag déanamh an saghas sin oibre? Comh fada agus a leanfaidh siad leis, tá siad ag cur isteach ar obair an rialtais. Mar a bhí rudaí ag tarlachtaint san oileán, ní raibh aon rogha ag na naisiún aontaigthe i dtosach, ach seasamh idir an dá dhream - dubhairt an tArd easbog gur saghas deigi (Partition) é sin agus gach áit san domhan in a raibh na naisiún aontaigthe, taobh amuigh den Congo, gurbé deigilt an socrú.

4. Dé réir na páipéirí insan comhaháil i Nua Eabhrach an tseachtmhain seo chugainn tá an tAire ghnóthaí eachtracha Cipireach chun coingiallacha áirithe a leaga síos dos na naisiún aontaigthe san oileán - coingiallacha gur súil leis, a thabairfaidh "lanh saor" don rialtas ainseo, mar a dearfá. Comh fada agus a bheidh sin amhlaidh is deacair a fheisgint conas a fheadach na naisiún aontaigthe obair mhaith a dheanamh ainseo. Is cosúil gur sé atá uatha ainseo ná go mbeadh na naisiún aontaigthe san oileán chun cosg a chur le ionnsaí an Tuirc ach nach mbeadh aon mandate acu chun na Cipirí Turcaig a shabáil i rudaí mar obair, eonomiocht etc, le linn an treimhse go bfuil an mediator ag iarraidh socrú a fháil. Sé ár dtuairin ainseo go bfuill "hardening" maith ag na Cipirí greigeach i gcoinne na naisiún aontaigthe toisg nach bfuil siad, na Cipirí greigeach, saor chun a rogha rud a dheanamh chun friotáiocht na Cipirí Turcaig a bhriseadh - ní cheadíonn na naisiún aontaigthe é sin. Má gheibheann an tAire gothaí Eachtracha Cipireach a shlighe féin sa comhaháil i Nua Eabhrach, beidh saothar ana ait agus saothar neamhdheanta ag na naisiún aontaigthe ainseo.

Agus nuna bhfaigheann siad a slighe féin beidh sé deacair deileáil leis an bpoball Cipiríeach greigeach ainneco le linn na míosa atá romhainn - níl mórán foirdine orthu ag feitheamh le socrú.

5. Ar bharr sin tá na cádta Cipirí greigeach ar an áitirig ainneco in eice linn ag cur suas mairí gainithe agus concrete 7lc i gcoinne ionsaí- agus na Cipirí Turcaig ag feitheamh go docasach leis an iolnsaí.
6. Tá aspadh mór coth-oibriú os na Cipirí greigeach i lorg na n-geallaithe agus anois i lorg duine ós na naisúin contaigthe atá ar iarraidh. Is léir go bfuil ar intinn acu gan co-oibriú leis na naisúin contaigthe i rudaí poiliticúil nuna noireann sé len na gcás féin.
7. Caithfidh sé a radh nach bfuil na Cipirí Turcaig puinn níos fearr na an dream eile.
8. Rud anhain, pé rud a tharlaoidh, cuirfidh an dá theobh an milleán ar na naisúin contaigthe.
9. Tá súil again nach mbeidh aon bhreitheamhantas tógthe i Gua Labhrach a dheanadh obair na naisúin contaigthe ainneco neamh-eifeachtúil agus neamh-dhéanta.

P.P. De BARRA IT CHOR. "

44. PATTERN OF WORK

The general pattern of the battalion work during the mid-summer period was as follows:-

- a. Having troops interposed between the conflicting parties on a 24 hour a day basis - ie. in the more sensitive spots where opposing fortifications were only 80-150 yards apart.
- b. Extensive mobile patrolling- twice weekly to each village, except the more prosperous Greek villages, where problems were few.
- c. Providing escorts for farm-workers grain convoys, food convoys, red crescent supplies, veterinary surgeons, collection of money for electricity supplies, telephone linesmen, sheep dippers etc.
- d. Providing medical service to Turk Cypriot population.
- e. Investigation of damage to houses and other property.
- f. Trying to locate missing persons.
- g. Investigation of various shooting incidents, some of them fatal.
- h. Constant negotiation, chiefly with a view to defortification and elimination of provocative gestures.
- i. Troop recreation - chiefly swimming, excursions, soccer, basket ball; assisting in the opening of a rest-centre in FAMAGUSTA for other contingents.
- j. Engineer work in posts and outposts - improving billets, cook-houses, dining facilities and having large "U.N." notices painted on buildings and squares. (An Irishman, Mr Paddy Byrne, chief finance officer was of considerable help in the allotment of money for engineer works.)
- k. Digging trenches to get the battalion underground if ~~needs be~~.
- l. Range practices for armoured car group - M.G. at PALOMEIDA, mortar at DEPKANIKO; helicopter training.
- m. Providing security parties for HQ UNFICYP.

45. PARALIMNI SEARCH.

UNFICYP HQ received information that some or all of the Turk Cypriots kidnapped at FAMAGUSTA on 11 May had been murdered and buried in the vicinity of PARALIMNI, south of FAMAGUSTA. It was stated that a bull-dozer and disc-harrow had been used in disposing of the bodies. 40 Irish Bn was ordered to investigate.

On 18 May the search was carried out. The object of the search was to examine all earth - moving equipment and disc-harrows in the PARALIMNI area and obtain scarpings which could be examined in a forensic science laboratory. In addition, the area was to be reconnoitred to find any likely burial place. The battalion I.O. went to the area with 4 patrols commanded by Captains Williams, Barrett, Cantrell and McEvoy and supported by a section of armoured cars commanded by Captain Carroll.

The patrols established observation on all roads leading into PARALIMNI and a U.N. helicopter joined in the search. All bull-dozers, tractors with power shovels and disc harrows in the area were checked, and scrapings were taken from four bull-dozers, a tractor with power shovel and three disc harrows. Examination of the scrapings proved negative. The PARALIMNI area is an early potatoe region and that fact and the recent rain made it extremely difficult to pick out any likely burial place. However, a high level air recon was carried out and a number of places selected for digging. When the purpose of the search became apparent to the local people they protested to the authorities that U.N. activities were pointing the finger of guilt at the people of PARALIMNI and as a number of them worked in the PAMAGUSTA docks with Turkish workers, they were worried. The Greek Cypriot top level authorities refused to permit U.N. to continue the search. They said that if we had any information the police would investigate it. They refused to allow any U.N. participation in such a search but after protracted negotiation a very intensive search was carried out by the police at which Capt Carroll was present. The results were again negative. We found no evidence whatever to support the information given by HQ UNICYP.

46. DENIAL OF STRATEGIC MATERIAL TO TURK CYPRIOTS.

As time went on and as the "squeeze" on Turk Cypriots became more pronounced, the Cyprus Government issued a list of "strategic" materials which were not to be channelled to Turk Cypriot quarters. These included cement, wireless sets, car tyres and parts, petrol, gas, tractors, concrete mixers sulphur and a host of other things. Endeavouring to get supplies, not for war purposes but for the sustenance of the community, through to the Turk Cypriots was very difficult and always was the subject of negotiation. The Greek Cypriots of course always made it clear that they wanted no help - their economy was as they used say "booming". Towards the end of the tour of duty of 40 Bn an officer, Captain H Fitzgerald was set aside to a new group that was being formed in NICOSIA - such officers eventually were termed "economics officers".

47. NATIONAL GUARD.

In the early days, the fact that the National Guard was not yet properly trained or disciplined often made U.N. contact with it quite unpleasant. As time went on, and especially after being taken over by General Grivas, the National Guard improved out of all recognition in discipline and apparent performance and friction between it and U.N. troops was considerably reduced. Especially later again, with the arrival of Greek Army officers, with whom U.N. negotiated, relations with the Cyprus force were good.

48. GENERAL GEORGE GRIVAS.

In view of his impact on the island's affairs, it is worth while giving some details of the man. He was born in TRIKOMO, East Cyprus in 1898, the son of a merchant - 1916 joined the military academy, Athens 1919 - commissioned and sent to SYMRNA front and in 1926, as a Captain was sent to a military school in France. Served in various units in Greek army until 1940 and when Germany invaded Greece, he was appointed 2 i/c of a Division. He escaped capture after the defeat of the Greek army in 1941. In 1943 he commanded a group 300 Greek officers - freedom fighters. In 1951 he arrived in Cyprus to examine the possibility of a military rebellion and for the next three years he was organising the rising and collecting arms for the job. The first boat-load of arms was sent to Cyprus (PAPHOS) in March 1954 and in November of that year he landed at the same place and then commenced his EOKA fight against the British. He was called "Dighenis" - a mythical Greek warrior. After his successful campaign he left Cyprus in March 1959 not to return again until June 1964. His arrival in Cyprus gave rise to great speculation. His early speeches were moderate, avoiding all reference to ENOSIS (Union of Cyprus with Greece) and offering the hand of friendship to the Turk Cypriots. His public appearances, rare as they were, were deliberately played down with the intention, no doubt, of quelling any suggestion that he intended to oust Makarios or force his own policy of ENOSIS on the Government. However his influence could be seen in the conduct of military affairs. He was at first described as "adviser to the Government on Military Affairs" and later after the MANSOURA - KOMMUNA fighting as Commander-in-Chief of the National Guard. Despite strong rumour, much of which was no more than wishful thinking, there was at no time any real evidence of disagreement on policy or operations between Makarios and Grivas.

49. INTERVIEW, OC 40 BATTALION WITH ARCHBISHOP MAKARIOS.

On 2nd June the Archbishop interviewed, individually, all the District Commanders of the U.N. peace-keeping force, the British excepted, in the Archbishop's Palace. Interview of OC 40 Battalion lasted approximately forty minutes. After an account of affairs of PAMAGUSTA District being given to him, the Archbishop then spoke at some length. The chief points he made were as follows - considered by OC 40 Battalion, in the main, as Greek Cypriot propaganda.

- a. The good work being done by Irish troops on the island.
- b. It is impossible for the mediator to get a solution acceptable to both sides.
- c. The U.N. has now taken the role of defending the Turk Cypriot population, therefore thwarting the efforts of the Government to rule the island. In all places where the U.N. intervened, the solution was "partition", the Congo excepted.
- d. The potential danger spots on the island are, in order of priority NICOSIA, KYRENIA ROAD, MANSOURA, PAMAGUSTA, LIMASSOL.

e. The constitution was not accepted voluntarily by him, but was imposed on him. He stated, inter alia, that he was called to LONDON in 1959 "to discuss the Cyprus Constitution". In a lengthy meeting, he objected to the provisions of the constitution, stated that the people of Cyprus must be given an opportunity to study it and vote on it. He stated that eventually Mr Selwyn Lloyd, Britain's Foreign Secretary, pushed a document across the table towards him and said in effect "sign that; it is the Cyprus Constitution. It must be signed to-night. I am going to Russia in the morning with the Prime Minister and if this is not signed before we leave, violence will continue in Cyprus". He stated that he signed it under protest, but felt that he had to do so as Cyprus was a small, weak, emerging nation without an army and experienced state services.

50. AUSTRALIAN POLICE CONTINGENT:

It was evident early on in the Cyprus U.N. mission that quite an amount of U.N. work was in fact police work. It was hoped that if police were sent in, a group from Ireland might arrive - as was stated in a report from Army Hqrs. Police were eventually assigned to the force and on 25th of May '64 forty Australian Police arrived for U.N. police work in FAMAGUSTA district. Twenty of those were later sent to LARNACA district with 3rd Infantry Group. The arrival of the Australian police was a great boon to the battalion. They undertook the supervision of Greek Cypriot police checkpoints thereby releasing troops for other duties. Their high standard of training had a marked effect on the local police who tried to emulate them so that the behaviour at check points improved enormously. They carried out investigations into shootings, abductions and thefts and participated in joint patrols with the Greek Cypriot police in sensitive areas. They set up a liaison office in the FAMAGUSTA police HQ which gave UNFICYP continuous contact with that important centre. The co-operative spirit shown by the Australian police was one of the battalions very pleasant experiences in Cyprus. They were commanded by Superintendent Frank Holland an officer of Irish extraction.

51. THE JUDICIARY.

Efforts were made to get Courts, for trial of Turk Cypriots, going as to procedure outlined in the constitution. Battalion legal officer, Commandant Heron, had his share of liaison with the Turk Cypriot judge Mr Orhan in the old city. Eventually Mr Orhan decided to do his part to heal the break as did those concerned on the Greek Cypriot side. Hereunder report of Captain O'Leary, who accompanied Mr Orhan to court on the first day, 4th July.

Mr Orhan met the President of the Court, Mr Michaelides, and they discussed his (Orhan's) duties as the Turk Cypriot's judge. The President wanted him to prepare cases and arrange for Mr Constanides, (local chief of Greek Cypriot police) to issue warrants. Mr Constanides, who was present, pointed out the danger of entering Turk C...

The police chief agreed with him but stated that he would have to receive direct orders from his superiors in the matter. The President of the court agreed to get the matter cleared at the top. It was then agreed that Mr Orhan would resume his duties at the court on 6 July. We then left for the walled city and reported to Mr Sami. Mr Sami will not agree to the Greek Cypriot police issuing warrants to Turk Cypriot villagers. He then stated that they would decide over the weekend whether or not Mr Orhan would report to the court for duty again - I am of opinion that Mr Sami is checking with Nicolas before a decision on this is given. Mr Orhan was very well received by the Greek Cypriots in the court-house. The court President informed the police chief that UN would help him to issue warrants. He stated that General Gyani's legal adviser had agreed to this !

The mixed court did not function again - it was envisaged by the Turk Cypriots that it entailed Greek Cypriot police arresting Turk Cypriots. On no account would the Turk Cypriots agree to allowing Greek Cypriot police into their villages (not alone that, but in the matter of ordinary police patrolling, the Turk Cypriot leader advised very strongly against mixed Greek Cypriot police and UN patrols entering any Turk Cypriot village. These mixed patrols were never indulged in as they would constitute a scheme whereby the Greek Cypriot authorities would be patrolling Turk Cypriot villages, with the connivance of UN, and against the expressed wish of the Turk Cypriots. It would also, very likely, lead to violence).

52. CYPRUS PRESS

As Greek Cypriot morale went up so did the general tone of the Greek Cypriot press become anti UN. Any UN indiscretion got full press publicity. A certain indifference towards the affairs of UN was becoming apparent among quite a lot of the Greek Cypriot public - some would be quick to say that the UN presence was an impediment to Greek Cypriot aspirations. The English language "Cyprus Mail" endeavoured to give a fair account of things not political by the more extremist Greek Cypriot papers.

53. ANTI-BRITISH FEELINGS

As time went on the Greek Cypriots saw that there was no easy solution and that the Turk Cypriots were not going to be easily subdued. The Greek Cypriots looked for somebody to blame for their predicament. In unofficial circles, Britain was blamed for creating the crux and was now being castigated for helping the Turk Cypriots perpetuate the trouble. Greek Cypriot police were only too eager to charge any Britisher found stepping out of line. Even escorts from British UN units were not welcome. Ill-feeling built up to the stage where water pipe lines and installations at ATHNA and MAKRASZYKA, taking water to the British Sovereign Base, were repeatedly blown up (patrolling to counter this was done by UN and British troops) British land rovers and station wagons were stolen and even two British ferret scout cars were stolen from the British compound beside FAMAGUSTA docks - none of these vehicles were returned to British authorities.



Irish troops attached to the United Nations truce force in Cyprus are pictured in Famagusta during a briefing session before setting out on the daily search for missing U.N. officer, Major Edward Macey and his driver. They are (l to r.)—Cpl. Joseph Hunt, of Bruff, Co. Limerick; Cpl. John Phelan, of Drangan, Co. Tipperary; Signalman James MacCarthy, of Cork; Sgt. Daniel Goggin, of Cork city; Cpl. Bernard Griffin, of Kildysart, Co. Clare; Lt. James Connolly, of Thurles, Co. Tipperary, and Cpl. William John Lacey of Waterford city.



Studying a map of the Famagusta area (from left): Lieutenant Frank Cokolugh, Lieutenant Des Treavers, Commandant T. O'Neill and Lieutenant Sean Warren.



Pictured in Cyprus together for the first time, members of the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers and members of the 40th Irish Battalion

54. EXTENSION OF MANDATE.

The U.N. mandate to station troops in Cyprus was extended for a further three months from June 26th and was again later further extended - at the time there was speculation on the island that perhaps the Greek Cypriot Government would ask that the mandate not be extended.

55. PROTECTION AND EVACUATION OF BRITISH FAMILIES IN FAMAGUSTA (Planning).

There were over 2,000 British civilians living in FAMAGUSTA, chiefly the families of British Army personnel or base personnel. The British authorities at Base Headquarters naturally were concerned about the safety of these people in the event of a general conflict. A series of conferences were held between U.N. commanders in the south east of the island and the Base Commander, Brigadier Merchant, and his staff. 40 Battalion was pleased to give all the help requested, in so far as immediate U.N. duties would allow. Plans were drawn up for alerting, assembling, protecting, and transporting the families from FAMAGUSTA to the SBA at DHEKEMIA. The British also had a ship standing by in the harbour for evacuation. Officers and other ranks 40 Battalion were invited to frequent social evenings in the British installations.

56. MAJOR MACEY.

Major Macey, a British officer, was employed at HQ UNMICYP as liaison officer to the Vice-President, Dr Kutchuk. On 6th June at 10.05 hours he and his driver, Private Platt, were reported missing by U.N. H.Q. In the hope of their turning up, instructions were issued that a search was not to be organised but in the afternoon, 40 Battalion was instructed to help locate the missing man. The only information that was given to the battalion was that Macey and his driver on the previous day, Sunday 7 June, had been travelling in a land-rover, were dressed in U.N. uniform and intended going to GALATIA, a large Turk Cypriot village in the northern region of FAMAGUSTA district - 40 Battalion had not been informed in advance that Macey had intended visiting this Turk Cypriot village - this village was the hub of Turk Cypriot resistance in the northern rural area. A search HQ was set up at 15.00 hours on the 8th June under battalion 2 i/c at GALATIA - two helicopters were put at the disposal of this HQRS. 'A' Company provided a party to search the area MONARGA - PATRIKI - LAVIDHIA, GYAL FOREST and GALATIA. 'B' Company provided search parties converging on GALATIA from AYIOS ANDRONIOS, MONARGA and YERANI. 'C' Company provided a search party for the area TRIFONIKO and AYIOS THEODORES to GALATIA. Australian U.N. civil police covered the area TRIKOMO to GALATIA. Helicopters and the joint patrol were also used in liaison with the company parties. Turk Cypriot police reported that Macey had been in Galatia from 12.00 to 15.00 on 7 June and had left in the land-rover at about 15.00 hours, travelling from whence he came in NICOSIA direction. He said in effect to the Turk Cypriot police that he was going to NICOSIA, "that is if I ever get there" - he explained to the police that he had been attacked in the Greek Cypriot press for his activities among the Turk Cypriots - his reports of these attacks was true.

The search continued on the 9th June but sealed Greek Cypriot lips did not help the search parties much. The intensive search, as such, was called off on the evening of 9th June, but routine patrols for the weeks ahead endeavoured to discover Major Macey's fate. On 16 July a report was made to U.N. H.Q. in NICOSIA, likely as a result of a reward offered, that Macey's land rover was in the vicinity of GASTRIA. Two days of intensive digging of deep disused wells and subterranean channels by 40 Battalion and U.N. civil police unearthed small fragments of metal and glass, mixed with soil and rubble - it was impossible to say whether or not the fragments had come from a land rover or from a particular land rover. Top level conferences between Greek Cypriot police officers and staff at H.Q. UNFICYP came to nothing. The Greek Cypriot police put on a show of assistance to U.N. - but only a show - in the effort to trace Macey. It was finally presumed that both Macey and Platt were shot on afternoon of 7th June somewhere north of BOGHIAZ, after leaving GASTRIA.

57. SERIOUS SHOOTING INCIDENTS.

A number of shooting incidents took place in rural villages - those mentioned hereunder were the more serious ones (there were also two instances, one at LAVIDHIA and one at CATOS, where Turk Cypriots shot and killed their own men - paying off old scores.)

a. Vatili shooting - 23 Jan.

VATILI is a mixed village, of approximately 1500 Greek Cypriots and 500 Turk Cypriots, in a predominantly Greek Cypriot area. The Muktar (leader) of the Turk Cypriot community had not left the village for three months. He ventured out on the morning of June 23rd and went to SINDA, a Turk Cypriot village, with a car and a lorry, to collect animal food. As they approached VATILI on the way back, Greek Cypriot police fired on them, wounding the mukhtar and the lorry driver. Both vehicles made their way to the Turk Cypriot quarter. At 09.20 Panagusta police HQ reported the shooting to 40 Battalion HQ. Battalion 2 i/c, M.O. with ambulance, platoon of 'A' Coy under Lt Howard and section armoured car were immediately sent to the village. They arrived there at 10.15 and found about 100 National Guard surrounding the Turk Cypriots who had about 30 men in firing positions. National Guard had quickly assembled from nearby villages of AYSI and LONDIA. M.O. 40 Battalion attended to the wounded, arranged an escort and had the two men - the mukhtar seriously wounded - evacuated to the Base Military Hospital at DHEKELIA. The troops were depolyed quickly, persuading both sides to enter houses in which their weapons were unloaded. by 12.00 hours, when OC 40 Battalion arrived, through energetic urging of the 40 Battalion officers on the spot, Commandants Treacy and Stewart and Lieutenant Howard, the National Guard had dispersed and escalation was prevented. It was decided there and then that 'A' Company would keep a permanent post in the village - with Greek Cypriot acquiescence the local school was occupied by 40 Battalion for the months ahead.

Not alone did the U.N. presence there keep Vatiili- quite but it also was convenient for patrolling Turk Cypriot villages in that part of the battalion district (Incidentally NCOs periodically commanded the smaller battalion outposts and responded well to the challenge.) It transpired that this village muktar was a wanted man, so it was decided, as a means of eradicating the cause of trouble, to transfer him eventually from the Base Hospital to the old city at FAMAGUSTA and keep him away from VATILI.

b/. AYIOS KHARITON Shooting 28 June.

At 10.05 hours on 28 June (Sunday) a message was received from the Canadian Sector that heavy shooting was going on at the borders of NICOSIA and FAMAGUSTA districts in the CHATOS-AYIOS KHARITON area.

(1) Joint Patrol, Captain Cantrell i/c, which was in the general area was directed to AYIOS KHARITON, in which area Captain Cantrell clearly located the shooting.

(2) Patrols from all companies and armoured car group were alerted and at 10.10 hours orders were given to put the following into effect.

Platoon 'C' Company to move to CHATOS.

Platoon 'A' Company to RV at RJ south of CHATOS.

Platoon 'B' Coy and section armoured cars to MAIOUNDA.

Detachment Australian Police and sec armoured cars to RV at TRIPIZENI.

HQ NICOSIA zone was asked to patrol road leading into FAMAGUSTA district and prevent movement in of reinforcements.

(3) After movement across country by troops of 'C' Company under Comdt O'Neill and Lt Travers, they came on two platoons of National Guard in well concealed positions only 500 yards from ground features held by 12 armed Turk Cypriots. Commandant Treacy with a patrol from 'A' Company had by now arrived in AYIOS KHARITON and had the Turk Cypriots withdraw to their village. Both sides unloaded weapons and broke off the engagement. 'A' and 'C' Company now took over security of the Turk Cypriot area CHATOS - AYIOS KHARITON and an overnight static patrol remained in AYIOS KHARITON. Troops of 'B' Company and armoured car group patrolled the area ARTEMI, MAIOUNDA and AYIOS MIKAULOS and acted as a deterrent to Turk Cypriots who had occupied fire positions in their villages and to the National Guard at their Mersiniki training camp. Australian police investigating the incident got conflicting reports from both sides. Greek Cypriots stated that two Turk Cypriots from AYIOS KHARITON assaulted an old Greek Cypriot woman from TRIPIZENI, that Greek Cypriots then came towards AYIOS KHARITON in a car and tried to abduct two Turk Cypriots. These ran and were fired on, one, Osman Ismail Kocina, being killed, the other wounded. In the intercommunal shooting that followed, until 11.10 hours, there were no further casualties.

58. NEW ARRIVALS.

- a. New Force Commander - General Kodendera Subayya Thimayya, an Indian was appointed to replace General Gyani as Force Commander. He arrived on the island on 6 July. Born in 1906, he was commissioned in 1928 and became Chief-of-staff Indian Army in 1957. He commanded Indian troops in Japan and Kashmir. He had previous staff experience with United Nations commissions sitting in Paris and Korea. He was awarded the DSC in 1944.
- b. Major General Rilye, military adviser to the Secretary General arrived in Cyprus and visited 40 Battalion on 7 July for an on-the-spot look and report on matters. He interviewed the leaders of both communities.
- c. On the death of the previous mediator, Mr Gale Plaza, ex President of Columbia was appointed Mediator in June, 1964. He visited the MAGUSTA district on 16th June where he was accorded due courtesy with a Guard of Honour drawn from 'B' Company under Lt Keane. After being duly put in the picture, he toured part of the district and expressed appreciation of the close liaison between the troops and the rural community of both sides. He also conferred with leaders of both communities.

59. VISIT OF ADJUTANT GENERAL.

Adjutant General, home army, Major General Collins Powell arrived in Cyprus on 7 July on a visit to Irish Troops in Cyprus and the Middle East. He was accompanied by Captain J. Kelly, Army Hqrs. Major General Powell's visit was good for battalion morale - he visited men at all posts and spoke appreciatively to them of the good work they were doing. He was given an interview by Archbishop Makarios and attended a dinner given in his honour by the Greek Cypriot communal chamber. His visit to the island added prestige to the already high standing of the Irish Troops.

60. SOCIAL FUNCTIONS.

Numerous social functions - most of them of the small cocktail party variety - were put on by the various contingents and by the force commander. 40 Battalion troops also attended a series of parties in the British installations in the MAGUSTA district. Greek Cypriot and Turk Cypriot communities also put on parties for officer group of the battalion and on the unit leaving the island, made due presentations signifying their appreciation of the work of the battalion. On July 31st officers of the 40 Battalion, at a cost of approximately 3200, put on a function - buffet, drinks, dance - Commandant O'Callaghan was i/c organisation. Some Greek leaders and dancing troupe, National Guard and police officers, oficers of HQ UNFICYP and from other contingents and from British Sovereign Base with their partners attended. This was a good night, the chief purpose was "to show the Irish flag". It was endeavoured to get the Greek Cypriot and Turk Cypriot leaders to attend this function together. Finally the Greek Cypriots stated that they would be obliged to decline if the Turk Cypriots attended. It was then decided, with Turk Cypriot agreement, to have a further function for the Turk Cypriots - which was held on 5 August.

64. VISIT TO THE LEBANON AND THE HOLY LAND.

The visit of 262 members of the 40 Battalion to Jordan and the Lebanon can be regarded as one of the major highlights and achievements of the Battalion's social and recreational activities whilst serving in the Middle East.

This major break from the rigours of patrols, escorts, guards and other duties came as a result of the mandate being extended from 3 months duty to 6 months. During this first period it was generally felt that the mandate would be extended and time off allowed to Contingents. On this assumption, the Adjutant, Comdt T. V. Furlong, who had previously served in the Middle East, had worked on plans for personnel to visit the Lebanon and the Holy Land.

Messers Thornton and Pengalley, Tourist Agents, Nicosia were engaged to organise 6 tours. The itinerary selected was accepted as a result of an advance visit by two members of the Bn, Comdt T.V. Furlong and Lieut H O'Conno. to Jordan and Beirut, in the 3rd week of July, 1964. A very interesting and varied itinerary was drawn up.

The first tour commenced on 3rd August, 1964 and five other tours, each carrying approx. 45 members of the Bn, continued until the last tour on the 7th September, 1964. Each tour took 7 days and was a wonderful break for the troops who had worked non-stop since leaving Ireland. The cost of the tour was £27.10.0. for officers and £26.10.0. for other ranks.

The following are the details of the itinerary.

1st Day.

Departure Nicosia Airport for Jordan.

Afternoon.

Visit to Holy Sepulchre.

Evening.

Free Time.

2nd Day.

Morning

Coash tour to Mount of Olives, visiting the place of the Ascension, Church of Pater Noster, Garden of Gethsemane. Church of All Nations, Tomb of the B.V.M and the Grotto of Gethsemane.

Aftrenoon.

Tour of the old city, visit to Church of Flagellation, Pilate's Palace, Judgment Hall, Via Dolorosa, David's Tomb.

3rd DayMorning.

Visit to Temple area, Mosque of Omar (Dome of the Rock), Solomon's Stables, Wailing Walls.

Afternoon.

To Bethlehem by coach, passing Mt. Herodium on the way. In Bethlehem the tour included the Grotto where Christ was born and which is marked by a star (here also our chaplain celebrated Mass), the manger, and the Church of St. Catherine, where Mass is heard each Christmas over the Radio throughout the World.

4th Day.

The first part of the tour was to Bethany, visiting the tomb of Lazarus. From here to Jericho passing on the way the Apostles' Fountain, and the Good Samaritan Inn, Elisha's Fountain, viewing the Mount of Temptation and eventually reaching Umayyad Palace where mosaics of the era are still well preserved. From here the tour proceeded to the River Jordan and finally arriving at the Dead Sea. Troops had a swim - or more appropriate "float" - in the Dead Sea.

5th Day.Morning.

Departure Jordan Airport for Beirut.

Afternoon.

Tour of the Market, Bazaar and shopping centre.

6th Day.

Tour of the Cedars of Lebanon and Betteidine, making short stops on the way to Jeidda Grotto, Biblos. This was a fantastic tour covering approx. 100 miles along the Mediterranean, and rising from sea level to 9,000 ft through most picturesque country.

7th Day. (Final day of Tour)

Visit to Baalbek, the fantastic Temple City of the Sun, passing on the way the Summer resorts of Bhamdoun and Alley, through the fertile lands of the North Bekka Valley, Cheatura, and eventually reaching Baalbek, returning to Beirut International Airport where we departed for Nicosia and Home Stations.

General.

This trip will live forever in the memory of those members of the Bn who were privileged to undertake it. The pilgrimage - cum - holiday was a welcome break for the troops and was one of those episodes that makes an Irish UN soldier proud of his status.

PERIOD: 2 AUGUST - 16 OCTOBER 1964 (Date of Return Home)

62. TURKISH AIRFORCE DROPS BOMBS IN NORTH WEST CYPRUS.

After a large build-up of National Guard strength and equipment during the summer months, the Turk Cypriot controlled area of coast line at MANSOURA in north west Cyprus, to which a large number of Turkish or Turk Cypriot freedom fighters had mysteriously infiltrated, became the main target for Greek Cypriot pressure - even to the point of encirclement by National Guard. On August 7th and 8th matters came to a head with National Guard opening fire on the Turk Cypriot village of KOKKINA and retaliation by the Turkish Airforce on 9th August with bombing of National Guard positions with heavy Greek Cypriot casualties. On August 10th Archbishop Makarios threatened that if the bombing did not cease he would attack all Turk Cypriot villages on the island. (The Battalion's isolated outpost at AYIOS ANDRONIKOS was now withdrawn to Wolfe Tone Camp and later, as tension eased, KOMI KEBIR was occupied again - accommodation at AYIOS ANDRONIKOS had in the meantime been requisitioned by the National Guard.) Large scale intervention by Turkey was now again to be considered and a plan was authorised by HQ UNFICYP, after liaison with British Base authorities, for moving UN troops to SBA in the event of large scale hostilities. Plans were made for utilising 40 Battalion in the DHEKELIA SBA area to set up regimental aid posts and to administer and protect refugee camps - in liaison with Base authorities. In assessing the possible hostilities situation it was considered that FAMAGUSTA must be a likely point of landing for Turkish troops and that the ground occupied by 40 Battalion in Wolfe Tone Camp would likely become a fighting area - this was commanding ground and dominated the two main roads leading out from FAMAGUSTA. This area could come in for air bombing or sea bombardment and consequently elaborate underground shelters were made for protection of the battalion while engaged in operations or while awaiting evacuation. Plans for movement of the battalion to DHEKELIA were made and were rehearsed with officers and senior NCOs. In due course the prospect of a big confrontation receded and tension eased. A new atmosphere now prevailed - Turk Cypriot morale soared to a corresponding deflation of the Greek Cypriots. It was much easier, during the coming weeks, to confer and negotiate with the Greek Cypriot leaders - they knew now that Turkey was not going to stand for the subjection of the Turk Cypriot minority.

63. ATTEMPTED ECONOMIC BLOCKADE OF TURK CYPRIOTS.

After the fright given to the Greek Cypriots in north west Cyprus, military means of a solution appeared to be put into the background by the Cyprus Government and resort was made to economic pressure. A number of strong Turk Cypriot areas in the island, including the walled city of FAMAGUSTA were declared "restricted" areas into which goods would not be allowed to move freely. After top level negotiation between the Force Commander and the Cyprus President, the "blockade" was officially lifted, but still remained to a degree, unofficially. U.N., for the months ahead, were in constant negotiation with Greek Cypriot authorities to get certain goods through to the areas that were considered Turk Cypriot strongholds, high on the list being FAMAGUSTA old city.

Strategic goods, such as petrol, cement, oil, radio sets, explosives, (for crops), tyres, tractor parts etc were almost completely barred from entry to these areas, while essentials such as food and clothing were difficult to get through. A new appointment was set up in each district - economics officer. He was directly responsible to a new economics branch at HQ UNMICYP and his work covered, mainly the alleviation of conditions under which the Turk minority now found themselves living. It had in due course been discovered through the personal intervention of the Force Commander that the Turk Cypriots in KOKKINA - in the Swedish U.N. sector were living in wretched conditions and had their food value cut well below the calorific quota needed - this incident reached Nicosia - New York level. An all-out effort was made, and with the good-will of the Cyprus Government, to relieve this situation in KOKKINA and this entailed for 40 Battalion loading and escorting grain, sugar, cigarettes, red crescent supplies from FAMAGUSTA to KOKKINA. In addition numerous escorts and standing patrols were required for harvesters, shoppers sack persons etc. As time went on there was a tendency on the part of U.N. to cut down on escorts and eventually discontinue them altogether in an effort to get the Turk Cypriots moving freely on the roads.

64. TENSION CONTINUES.

- a. Fortification in sensitive areas and efforts by U.N. at persuading both sides to defortify continued to take quite a lot of time. Standing 24 hour patrols continued to operate in these areas, thus making duties very heavy for the men. A new problem arose in the large Turk Cypriot school overlooking the Greek Cypriot police station in FAMAGUSTA. Armed Turk Cypriots and sandbagging there were considered a severe provocation to the Greek Cypriots - they threatened to attack and take the school. After due negotiation the solution was to open a new U.N. post in an old building between the conflicting parties - both sides were happy now and neither side lost face. Greek Cypriots continued to work feverishly in building fortifications and gun emplacements on the beaches, giving access to the lowlying areas north of FAMAGUSTA. These fortifications were purely anti-invasion and were not objected to by U.N.
- b. In the harbour area a large new scheme for extending the harbour brought numerous points of friction between the two communities - the extension scheme provided for the demolition of some walls which the Turk Cypriots considered "old city" property for hundreds of years. After frequent heated negotiation and arguments the scheme went ahead just prior to the battalion departure from the island.
- c. Firing of shots in the district continued, though to a diminishing degree, but with no fatal shooting, though the odd persons, chiefly Turk Cypriot, were wounded.
- d. Medical: As time went on the plight of the Turk Cypriots was slowly getting worse and hence there was all the more need for medical attention. The Medical staff of the battalion was kept busy. After the discovery at KOKKINA of how bad things really could be, OC 40 Battalion and Chief MO, Commandant McSullivan visited the poorer Turk Cypriot villages in FAMAGUSTA district with a view to having a case made for the replenishment of supplies before things got too bad.

While in some villages things were not good, yet there was no real hardship which would entail invoking the help of HQ UNFICYP or the Cyprus Government. Daily patrols, joint patrol and the Economics Officer paid attention to this aspect of matters in their reports.

65. TRAINING OF GREEK CYPRIOT FORCES.

During this period the National Guard engaged in intensive field training. Areas of the island were set aside for their training and exercises and UN Units were asked not to enter. Oddly enough HQ UNFICYP indulged in a game of watching and reporting on all activities of the National Guard. Whatever good could come of this was certainly more than offset by the annoyance being caused to the National Guard and by their consequent objection to UN prying into their affairs. On one occasion 40 Battalion was asked by HQ UNFICYP for a report as to what was happening at BOGHAZ. that the British High Commissioner was interested in what equipment was being unloaded at the pier there. The selling of United Nations arms and ammunition to the Turk Cypriots in the north west of the island by the contingent from another country left a bad feeling against UN in all the Greek Cypriot areas of the island. In different places on the island UN freedom of movement was being questioned by Greek Cypriot officials or National Guard Officers. On 31 August a patrol of 'B' Company, Cpl Lacey i/c, going from FAMAGUSTA to KOMI KEBIR was not allowed through a detour on the main road by National Guard on exercises. The incident escalated to Company, Battalion and UNFICYP HQ level. In ensuring UN freedom of movement, the Deputy Force Commander, Brigadier Yeo, got an assurance from the Minister of the Interior that UN freedom of movement would not in future be obstructed in areas not specifically set aside for National Guard concentration and training. Officers of the Greek Army took over command of National Guard Units and made the task of liaison easier. There was also now a gradual unofficial build-up of Greek Forces on the island but not through FAMAGUSTA port.

66. PROPOSED OBSERVER GROUP.

Without much discussion on the matter, in September the Force Commander told all district commanders that the replacement of the contingents by observers was being contemplated. What the reaction of both communities to the evacuation of UN from sensitive areas of confrontation, would be, was not easy to determine. In any case it was not put to the test as this idea of the Observer Group was dropped in the course of a few days. The mandate was again extended and a new Irish Contingent, the 41st Irish Battalion arrived in Cyprus in mid October.

67. PRESENTATION OF UN MEDALS.

Colonel Quinn with full ceremonial parade, presented the UN Medals to the Battalion Officer Group on 1st October, 1964, after which Unit Officers presented the medals to NCOs and Men.

68. HOMELWARD BOUND.

During the early days of October preparations for hand over to 41st Battalion were completed. Operations and Intelligence documents, accounts etc were duly handed over to the incoming staff. OC 41st Battalion and available members of his staff were introduced to leaders of both communities.

40th Battalion was air-transported to Dublin. 13-16 October, 1964.

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INFANTRY COMPANIES & ARMoured CAR GROUP

97. 'A' COMPANY

a. Formation

Personnel of 'A' Company, 40th Battalion were drawn from both Ceann O and Ceann I. Ceann O supplied personnel for Coy Hqrs and Nos 1 and 2 pls. Ceann I were responsible for supplying personnel for No 3 Pl and Sp Pl. The integration of Officers, NCOs and Men drawn from many different units normally presents a problem on the formation of a unit for overseas service. At the early stages of the formation of such a unit the men were inclined to remain in isolated groups. This problem of developing a Company and Battalion esprit-de-corps was more acute because the troops were drawn not only from different units but also different Commands. By careful indoctrination and by constant awareness of the needs to develop a bond of unity amongst all ranks, the Coy became a well disciplined, close knit organisation with a strong sense of pride in itself and in the Battalion as a whole. Credit for this achievement must be given to the privates, who adapted themselves so readily to their new circumstances and to the Company Officers and NCOs who gave the necessary leadership and example.

b. Training.

Each Command concentrated their own elements prior to the concentration of the Battalion in the Curragh. Training was carried out in accordance with Imilitir Treineala issued by An Str Trn. Training continued on the concentration of the Battalion. In addition to weapon training and range practices, troops were instructed in various peace-keeping duties. This training served our troops well during their mission in Cyprus. At no stage were they faced with problems which their training had not prepared them for. All troops in the Coy were given helicopter training while in Cyprus.

c. Arrival in Cyprus.

'A' Coy was the first Company of the Battalion to be airlifted to Cyprus. With a refuelling stop in NAPLES the first air craft touched down in NICOSIA some hours after taking off from DUBLIN. At the Airport to greet the Irish troops were the Force Commander, General Syani and his Chief-of-Staff, Major General M. Carver, OC 40th Battalion, Lieut.Col P. Barry and many Cypriot officials. Stepping out smartly from the plane Lieut.J.Harold quickly mounted a Guard of Honour for the Force Commander. The Guard was accompanied by the Pipe Band of the 40th Battalion in their full ceremonial dress. Cypriots heard for the first time the skirl of the pipes of Irish Army pipers, and saw this band which later played such a vital part in establishing good relationships all over the FAMAGUSTA district.

Under the full glare of television newsreel cameras the Guard of Honour paid compliments and was inspected by the Force Commander. The dress, drill and bearing of the Guard of Honour received very favourable comment especially the fact that the members had completed a 15 hour plane journey. The Company was quickly transported to FALAGUSTA and were soon settled in at Wolfe Tone Camp.

d. Area of Responsibility

'A' Company was assigned the western sector of the FALAGUSTA District. Within the Coy section were Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot villages. There were some mixed communities also within the sector. Although the Coy was assigned other tasks by the Bn O/C from time to time it remained responsible for this sector throughout the mission period. The company got its first operational task the day after arrival in Cyprus when a patrol was sent out to search for a British cigarette salesman. The patrol led by Lieut. H. Smith succeeded in locating his van but the salesman was never located. During this search operation the patrol was briefed by Major Wacey, then at UN HQ in NICOSIA and who subsequently disappeared without trace.

e. Take over of Two Mile Point.

Shortly after arrival in Cyprus 'A' Coy was moved to Two Mile Point camp. This camp was occupied by 'A' Squadron, The Life Guards, (B.A) commanded by Major R. Ferguson. It was a proud company with heads held high which marched into Two Mile Point camp behind the Battalion Pipe Band. The Squadron was drawn up inside the camp gate and rendered honours as the company marched in. After the formal hand over the Squadron drove out of camp while a special guard presented arms. This was the first occasion since 1938 that an Irish unit took over from a British Army unit and 'A' Coy were particularly proud to have participated in this historic event. The camp was re-named "Padraig Pearse Camp".

f. Harvest Patrols.

(4). An incident which happened in the PERGAMOS area typifies the kind of protection tasks which the company had to perform. PERGAMOS is a Turk Cypriot village. Their lands were bounded by the Greek Cypriots from neighbouring villages. During harvesting operations an exchange of fire took place between the Greek Cypriot and Turk Cypriots (from neighbouring villages) farmers. 'A' Coy was notified of this firing and sent a patrol to the area. The Inniskillings who, up to this, were responsible for PERGAMOS brought about a cease fire but from then until the end of the harvesting operations a patrol visited the area each day and remained there while work was in progress in the fields.

These patrols became known as "Harvest" patrols and became a feature of the Battalion peace keeping role through the FAMAGUSTA District.

(2). Survey of Turk Cypriot Property.

A survey was carried out in the Coy area of all vacated and abandoned Turk Cypriot property and lands. This survey was very extensive and covered damage to property, damage to crops and estimated losses to crops which could not be harvested. The properties effected were generally located near Greek Cypriot lands and in mixed communities. The information supplied from this survey was passed on to UN HQ through the Battalion.

g. Escorts.

- (1). The Coy provided many escorts of different sizes and for different purposes. Turk Cypriot workers from FAMAGUSTA travelled each day by bus to two mile point and IHEKALI. These buses were given an armed escort by 'A' Coy after Turk Cypriot workers were abducted. No trace of these workers was ever found, and it was believed that they were massacred. These escorts operated four times each day.
- (2). Escorts were provided for Turk Cypriot workers going from the village of SINDA to PERGAMOS.
- (3). Escorts were provided for Turk Cypriot villages on shopping trips to FAMAGUSTA.
- (4). The Coy provided an escort for milk supplies from PERGAMOS and other Turk Cypriot villages to NICOSIA.
- (5). An escort was provided by Lt.C. Patten for a very seriously ill woman in CHATOS whose removal to hospital was a matter of urgency. This escort was undertaken at night when there was grave danger of being stopped by armed bands of Greek Cypriots who patrolled the roads at night. However, because of the serious condition of the woman the patrol was allowed to proceed unmolested.
- (6). Most of these escorts were supplied throughout the mission period. They extended over the full day, and some necessitated a 04.00 hours reveille. In addition to the normal routine escorts, it was necessary sometimes to provide escorts for the Turk Cypriot Doctor, for seriously ill patients needing hospitalisation and for veterinarians visiting farms. 'A' Coy together with other coys of the battalion provided escorts for grain trucks bringing grain to the shores in FAMAGUSTA.

j. Famagusta Docks.

The docks in FAMAGUSTA are located just outside the walls of the old city (A Turk Cypriot township). Both Greek Cypriot and Turk Cypriot dockers worked in the port. The majority of the stevedores were Turk Cypriots. After a shooting incident in the old city the port was closed because the Turk Cypriot workers withdrew to the old city and were afraid to leave it while the Greek Cypriot workers were afraid to go on to the docks because of the presence of Turk Cypriots on the battlements overlooking the docks. Through the efforts of the OC 40th Bn an agreement was reached to re-open the docks.

'A' Coy was given the task of organising and maintaining a U.N presence in the docks thereby preventing any incidents between Greek and Turk Cypriots. This task was not made any easier by the presence of armed members of the National Guard. The constant active patrolling by the Irish troops helped to get this operation over without incident although a few near misses were recorded. The swift action by Sgt N Carroll in disarming a docker who produced a knife during an argument with a fellow worker is an example of the prompt action taken by our troops when ever there were signs of trouble.

During the period the docks were visited by the President of Cyprus - Archbishop Makarios. The danger of an incident during this visit placed all UN forces under a great strain but again by constant vigilance the visit passed by happily. Time - the great healer - saw work return to normal and eventually the UN troops were withdrawn.

During this period of duty on the docks 'A' Coy helped the Red Cross to supervise the unloading of medical and food supplies from a Turkish Red Cross ship. These supplies were landed in the British Forces section of the docks and taken by trucks to the old city. As Greek Cypriot Customs officials and Greek Cypriot police were present during this operation which involved Turk Cypriot workers, there was always a danger of some incident upsetting the smooth running of the operation. Fortunately all supplies were landed and dispatched without incident.

k. Other duties - SAKHARIA - KARAOLOUS Area.

- (1). When 'A' Coy was withdrawn to Wolfe Tone Camp it was given responsibility for this area in addition to the Coy Sector already mentioned. A Platoon post was established at KARAOLOUS. This post was located between the Greek Cypriot National Guard Camp and the Turk Cypriot village of KARAOLOUS. It provided a standing patrol to the camp, a foot patrol to the village, and a standing patrol in the new harbour. Standing Patrols were provided in SAKHARIA - at the approaches to the village and in the nearby National Guard posts. 'A' Coy was responsible for this area when General Grivas visited the National Guard camp at KARAOLOUS. A guard was also supplied at the workhouse daily. During this period an outbreak of fire threatened the inmates at the workhouse. Cpl Finnegan and his guard by their prompt action saved the lives of the many old, and infirm patients there.

(2). Old City

'B' Coy provided guards on the walls of the old city as part of the rotation of duties between the coys. Three posts were occupied on the walls. In addition another post was occupied in the AYIOS LUCAS area.

(3). Patrols.

In addition to the tasks already listed patrols were sent out daily to visit the various villages in the Coy section. The aim was to visit each village at least once a week. These patrols helped to maintain contact with the people and in addition kept the Battalion informed on the problems of the area.

(4). Searches.

The Coy helped in carrying out searches organised by the Battalion at different times. One of these searches was for Major Macey.

1. Padraig Pearse Camp.

This camp was an ideal location for the Company. The accommodation was hatted. The cooking facilities were very good. The cookers were oil-fired. There was a large refrigerator in the building. The water cooler was a great blessing during the heat of Summer. Fans in the dining rooms and canteen gave pleasant cool conditions in these establishments. The canteen facilities were excellent. A cooker in the canteen enabled the Coy to provide hot meals during the period when local leave was restricted and the men were unable to use the local Cafés. Ice coolers ensured a constant supply of cool drinks.

'B' Coy initiated a policy of supplying recreational facilities in the canteen at Padraig Pearse Camp. These included a juke-box, television, radio, and various games of the amusement arcade variety. These facilities were extensively used by the troops and helped to fill their off duty hours in a pleasant manner. 'B' Coy was fortunate to have such good facilities at the beginning because these helped to raise morale and cement a bond of comradeship which the Coy worked hard to develop.

m. Discipline.

The discipline of the Coy was excellent throughout the entire period. There were comparatively few offences and all these were of a minor nature. This record of good discipline can be attributed to a high standard of the soldiers selected for this unit and the high quality of leadership displayed by all the NCOs of the Coy. The high standard of dress both on and off duty mirrored the self discipline which was the hall mark of every soldier in the Coy.

n. Morale and Welfare.

Despite the problem posed by the formation of the Coy from two different Commands the morale of 'A' Coy was extremely high and continued to grow and improve as the troops became more integrated. This high morale was the product of many factors but primarily it came from excellent Platoon Commanders and junior leaders who constantly strove to look after and improve the welfare of those under their command. The satisfactory living conditions and canteen facilities already mentioned together with well cooked and varied meals helped in maintaining a high standard of morale. Recreational facilities were well provided. Films were shown on three nights per week. In this connection a warm tribute must be paid to the NCCs (British) from the Four Mile Point camp who came to 'A' Coy one night each week to show films to the troops. Even when duties prevented them coming to the camp, they arranged for delivery of the projector and the films to the camp. A member of 'A' Coy acted as projectionist. These NCCs became firm friends of 'A' Coy. The welfare officer from Four Mile Camp was very helpful too and invited troops of 'A' Coy to many social functions in their camp. There was always a plentiful supply of books and magazines thanks to many English friends who kept the Coy well supplied throughout. Outdoor games were all well catered for. Gaelic Football, hurling, soccer, basketball and volleyball games were organised. The Coy hurling team won the inter Coy hurling competition. The Coy Officers won the Bn Officers basketball competition. All ranks took a keen interest in these games and this more than anything else united the Coy. They did not shout for "Eastern Command" or "Western Command" but for "A" Coy. There were ample facilities for swimming when the pressures of duty allowed. KARAOLOUS post was very popular because of the swimming. When the situation allowed, men were permitted to go to F.M. GUST on local leave. The town provided the usual facilities for troops on local leave.

o. Incidence of Duty.

Incidence of duties varied, depending on the situation. At times troops were required to work on a 24 hour on, and 24 hour off basis. On occasions it was necessary to turn out troops who should be resting off duty. Patrols in many instances meant Reveille at 04.00 hours. Heavy duties never lasted too long. Because duties were assigned on an equitable basis there were never complaints. The same high standards in performance of duties prevailed, no matter how heavy the duties were.

p. Transport.

The Coy was provided with a variety of vehicles including landrovers, trucks and APCs. In all there were 18 vehicles on charge to the Coy. The standard of maintenance was excellent. The drivers showed a very standard of driving. Although the Coy vehicles covered an average of 25,000 miles per month, only three minor accidents occurred and in each case the army driver was not to blame. The Coy was never without transport to carry out its patrols and other tasks. This satisfactory position can be attributed primarily to Cpl P. Mooney who was NCO I/C of Transport in the Coy.

q. Communications.

Throughout the mission, communications were excellent thanks to a dedicated and hardworking signal detachment led by Sgt N. Keyes. C.12s and 41 sets provided communication to outposts and patrols. The fact that the Coy was never out of radio contact with its outposts or patrols is an indication of the efficiency of the signals detachment. Line NCOs and Ptes were utilised as 41 set operators on many occasions when signal corps operators were not available.

r. Administration.

A high standard of administration was maintained both in 'A' and 'Q' matters. Equipment was well maintained, and a high standard of weapon maintenance was achieved. There were no losses of stores or equipment. Credit for the high standard of weapon maintenance is due primarily to the work of Sgt Cleary, the Coy armourer who carried out frequent inspections of all arms and equipment and executed all necessary repairs. In addition to his armourer duties, Sgt Cleary maintained the oil-fired burners of cookers and water heating furnaces in a first class condition. To ensure that the burners were working properly and to avoid any danger of injury to Personnel, Sgt Cleary rose each morning, at least one hour before the cooks came on duty and had the cookers fired and in operation.

s. Ceremonials.

Besides the Guard of Honour provided on arrival in Cyprus 'A' Coy also provided in turn Guards of Honour for visiting dignitaries.

t. Conclusion.


'A' Coy returned to IRELAND in October, '64, proud of its record of achievements. The Coy had discharged the many and varied tasks assigned to it efficiently and well. Each man was proud of the part he had played in helping to bring peace to this troubled island. A group of individuals had become 'A' Coy. Each man carried a profound pride in that Coy and in the Battalion in which he was honoured to serve.



Gen. Prem Singh Gyani,

Dr. Ralph Bunche

General Gyani speaks to Cpl. J. Hunt of Limerick (●) at a Famagusta observation post. The Irish Commander, Lt.-Col. Pearse Barry, is on the right.



Lieut. J. Howard issuing instructions to an Irish patrol on the Salamis road, near some Turkish positions in Cyprus. (Report, Page 15).



Sgt. Michael Butler, Rathdrum, Co. Wicklow (Platoon Sgt. No. 1 Platoon A. Coy.) inspecting members of an Irish patrol before going out on a patrol from the Patrick Pearse Camp, Famagusta.

70. 'B' COMPANY.

a. Organisation.

'B' Coy 40th Battalion was raised in the Southern Command and consisted of Coy HQ and 4 Plns (No 4, 5, 6 and SP Plns.)

Coy Comdr	:	Comdt W. Callaghan	22u Cn FCA
2 I/C & Adm Offr	:	Capt T. M. Higgins	4u Cn
No 4 Pl Comdr	:	Lt M. O'Donnell	11u Cn FCA
No 5 Pl Comdr	:	Lt J. Connolly	14u Cn FCA
No 6 Pl Comdr	:	2/Lt Rusty Keane	12u Cn
SP Pl Comdr	:	2/Lt C. Dodd	12u Cn
C/S	:	C/S Woods, A	4u Cn
CQMS	:	CQMS O'Brien, N	4u Cn

Coy HQ and 4 and 5 Plns were supplied by Comd Units & 1st Bde. No 6 and SP Pls were supplied by 2nd Brigade.

b. Preparatory Training.

Preparatory training was carried out in home stations and consisted of Drill, Weapon Trg, Range Practices, Signal Trg and Patrolling. All Adm was also completed in these stations. This Coy was then concentrated in Kilworth and field exercises and combined exercises in patrolling and communications were undertaken. Battle practices up to and including Coy level were also successfully undertaken. Coy concentration took approximately one month.

The Bn concentration took place at the Curragh where Trg at Bn level was undertaken. A feature of this training was the inclusion of Riot Drill, Road check drill etc. By the date of embarkation the standard of training was high. The Coy Advance Party lead by the 2 I/C left in Mid April and the area allotted to the 40th Battalion was the FAMAGUSTA ZONE.


c. Initial Location and Tasks.

'B' Coy was located with the BN HQ at Wolfe Tone Camp at FAMAGUSTA. This was an old British Engr Camp which in the main had been stripped down.

Accommodation was found in the main storage sheds for men and officer accommodation had to be built. The area of the "Pan Handle" was allotted to 'B' Coy who were tasked with maintaining law and order there and to reduce incidents to the minimum and to make an effort to get matters back to normal.

d. Area Physical Features Economy.

The area was roughly from TRIKOMO (the birth place of General Grivas) to DHAVLOS on the North Coast and included all that area North East to APOSTOLOS ANDREAS MON (a cistercian like establishment as Roscrea and Melleray). Its main towns were TRIKOMO, KONI KEBIR, G.LATIA, YIALCUSA and RINOKARPASSO. The area was also referred to as the KARELS. There were many smaller towns and villages. Some of these were Greek, some mixed of Greek and Turks and some Turkish only as G.LATIA, AYIOS SIMEON and GALINOPORNI.



Pte. Thomas Galbraith (left) of Newtown Hamilton, Co. Armagh, and Signalman Leo Brown, of Donegal, make friends with camels during a patrol of Famagusta, Cyprus. In the back of the land-rover is Pte. William McCormack, Curragh Camp.



Troops of B Company, 46th Irish U.N. Battalion, in a Bren gun pit at Koni Kehir Camp in Cyprus. Included are Sgt. Edward Shaw, Cork; Pte. W. Birmingham, Cork; Pte. D. O'Mahony,

The Northern part of the area was of high ground which ran to the extension of the KYRENIA Mountain Range. In the N/E in the area of RIZOKARPASSO there was rolling country with many pine woods. In the remaining area the land was flat unfenced and fertile. All over it were growing the big C rob trees and the glistening olive trees. Many orange groves where fresh water was found and pumped with their flocks of sheep and big goats roamed the area. There were no rivers. Many strands were to be found on the coasts and BOGHAZ was at one time a bidding resort and from YIALOUSA a small fleet did off shore fishing. The main road was good but the bye roads were no more than paths. The main crops were Potatoes, Grain for sheep feeding and malting, olives, Carobs, tomatoes bananas, oranges, artichokes from AYIOS ANDRONIKOS. A tobacco drying plant was situated at YIALOUSA. All in all the area was prosperous but this was not reflected in the dress or dwellings of the people. A public transport service was available - K.E.M. Most travelling was done in the village buses which are a feature of the area and Cyprus transport set-up. These buses accommodate anything from 30 to 60 people and as well are used for the carrying of every kind of merchandise. In the area was the famous Monastery KANTER. which is hewn from the rock in the mountain range. The distance from F.MAGUSTA to the furthestest point of the area was approximately 56 miles.

e. Situation.

The situation throughout 'B' Coy area was tense and rather mixed up. Guns were everywhere evident and in use. The communities had separated and there was no movement between the Turk and Greek sectors. In most cases the roads and areas were controlled by the Greek Cypriot Police but in strong Turkish areas control was held by the Turk Cypriots. Freedom of movement did not obtain. Markets ceased to operate and the economic system had broken down. The main market area for the Pan Handle was F.MAGUSTA. No Army or local defence force existed at this time. As the agricultural system which obtained was one in which all the people lived in villages and commuted to their farms, lands were not separated and fields of both Greek and Turk Cypriots were "Tri na Céile"

. Duties.

In order to achieve the objectives of the mission i.e

- (1) to reduce tension,
- (2) To stop bloodshed,
- (3) To normalize the situation,

many and varied chores fell to the lot of 'B' Coy, these included:-

- (a) Patrolling areas of confrontation and tension,
- (b) Escorting workers to the fields and protecting them during their working days.

- (c) Medical aid to those in need.
- (d) Protection of harvesters of all crops.
- (e) Observation at all times in tense situations and at road checks and blocked areas.
- (f) Protection of shoppers in their visits to P.M.GUST to purchase necessities.
- (g) Even the escorting of sheep to be dipped.

g. Methods and Responsibilities.

In order to establish UN omnipresence in the area the 8 sub police districts were divided among the four platoons who were made responsible for all aspects of UN responsibility in these areas. This method worked well in the initial stages but as other chores demanded and due to the distance from HQ it was found necessary to establish a 2 Pl outpost in the area. The recce for this purpose left the selection between a beach site at P.N.C.S BEACH, TRIFOMO, an old British Camp at BOGHUZ and an empty old school at KCMK KEBIR. The latter was selected and a 2 platoon camp was established there with 2 I/C Capt T. Higgins and No 4 and 5 Pl. At once they accepted responsibility for all the workings in the area and the scheme was very successful. With difficulty some freedom of movement was established for the Turk Cypriots who were the main sufferers in the circumstances. This system operated until more demanding situations forced changes.

h. Incidents and Involvement.

The first shooting incident took place adjacent to Wolfe Tone Camp when a Turk Cypriot in KAROLOUS fired on a police Sgt and Constable in a vehicle. Lt Keane and two sections of his platoon were committed to this, which was of a short duration and was resolved by the transfer of the Turk Cypriot and his family to another area. At this time the National Guard a semi military LDF under police control, began to show itself. It was armed with a variety of weapons. It was commanded in the main by ex BOEM men. Shortly after this incident intense firing between the Greek Cypriot Police and the fighters in the Turkish village of SAKHARIA took place. This was a protracted skirmish and necessitated the committing of Lt O'Donnell and his men. They were instrumental in cutting off a large Greek Cypriot reinforcing party from the direction of the laundry. The biggest and most serious outbreak was still to come and arrived in the killing of two Greek officers and a Greek Cypriot Policeman in the Turkish Walled City. This was the signal for an all out effort at slaughter. In a reprisal the Greek Cypriots snatched 32 Turk Cypriots and they were not returned. 'B' Coy were asked to occupy the walled city and to ensure that law and order prevailed. This occupation was effected at night with reluctant acquiescence of the Turk Cypriot leaders and was indeed a ticklish operation. Sandbags etc., were filled in the Camp and all preparations were made for the occupation.

It was effected by No 5 and 6 Pls and then No 4 and SP Pls were recalled from KOMI KERIR in support. The mission was accomplished and many long nights of tense observation followed, no shooting took place. It took five weeks before efforts could again be seriously made towards normalization. It was found that patrolling, limited though it was, from the Walled City to the Pan Handle did help but that a continuous UN presence was again needed there. As the camp at KOMI KERIR was closed another camp was selected this time at AYIOS ANDRONILOS, south of YIALOUSA, and occupied at Pl strength by No 6 Pl. A section of Panhard Armoured Cars were also attached here, The remainder of the Coy was based at Wolfe Tone Camp. Later all platoons did periods in the new Camp and helped extensively to normalize the situation in the area. The chores of the Coy were then alternated between SAKHARIA, PARACLOS, the Docks etc. At all times a certain was to be felt with minor incidents to be solved locally every day.

The disappearance of Major Macey and his driver Platt near BOGHIAZ was the next major incident. It appeared that they were shot and their bodies and the Jeep in which they were travelling were disposed of. With Supt Holland and a detachment of his Australian Police the Coy was assigned the task to empty a deep 60ft well where it was hoped traces of the two men would be found. The joint effort at GASTRIA provided little convincing evidence.

For its final two months tour the Coy moved to the independent camp at Two Mile Point and as before operated the P.M. GUSTIA details in addition to the normalization programme in the Pan Handle. This period was uneventful but was a very satisfactory one from the Coy point of view - it enabled all ranks to be prepared for home under direct Coy control and as well to show its efforts at Camp presentation in Cyprus. 'B' Coy was frequently complimented on the condition of its Camp.

i. Health

Though the tour of duty covered the warmest periods of climate in the island, the standard of health was exceptionally high. At no time during the assignments was any member of 'B' Coy on the seriously ill list. This state of affairs was no doubt due in no small way to the excellent standard of cooking and food presentation carried out under the control and careful eye of Cpl Kiniry.

j. V.I.Ps.

During the tour the Coy had the honour of playing host to many important people. It was always a pleasure to do this and the high standard of catering was indeed a credit to Capt Higgins and his staff. The undermentioned were some of guests.

- (1). Maj Gen Collins-Powell A.G.
- (2). Mr Galo-Plaza UN Rep in Cyprus,
- (3). Maj Gen M. Carver COS UNFICYP.
- (4). Gen Giani FC UNFICYP,
- (5). Col Amy CANCON COMDR,
- (6). Col Quinn Deputy COS UNFICYP.

k. Guards of Honour.

It fell to the lot of the Coy to provide ceremonial honours for many VIP's on their formal visits to H. IRCON. Such presentations always drew the comment of "excellent" from the visitors and gave all concerned a great sense of satisfaction.

l. Sport.

'B' Coy was at all times and in all sports represented by excellent performers who always gave of their best. The Coy on the Battalion Soccer Competition and the Bn Volleyball. They were runners up in Basketball, Hurling and Football Competitions. In the indoor section they proved themselves to be Champs at Darts. Outstanding performers were Lt O'Donnell, Wall, Mickie Ryan, John Joe Laster, Walsh, Sheehan, Gardiner, Big Fitz, Cpl Power (Basketball) etc..

m. Communications.

As communications were vital in the situation it must be recorded that at all times "contacts" gave us excellent service. Cpl Lacey, Cpl McCarthy, Sgm Gilmartin to mention but a few did trojan work.

n. Transport.

The performance of Cpl O'Neill, R assisted by Cpl Morrissey in keeping the 26 vehicles in P.M.O during our tour was an outstanding achievement. To add to this that no accident was recorded in this period in the books of the Coy, completes a great picture.

o. Coy Personalities.

In addition to these already mentioned the Coy was lucky to have such as the u/m in its membership:-

Cpl Roche & O'Hara - Canteen

Murphy)
Guerin)
Ryan) COOKS.
Downey)
Rochford)

Sgts Leigh (Rock), Higgins, Goggins, Shaw
Sgt Keely of the APC & Cpl Power of AMC
with Cpl Parker and Gardiner of the O/Mess.

p. Summing Up.

'B' Coy was an excellent one and can indeed be proud of a job "well done".

71. 'C' COMPANY.

a. Location.

During its tour of duty in Cyprus, the Coy was located at the main Bn Camp i.e. Wolfe Tone Camp, PAMAGUSTA, except for a period of six weeks (June/July) when it was located at Two-Mile Point Camp. During the whole period it had a detachment, generally one pl, at the Medical Depot.

b. Duties.

(1). SAMARIA - KARACLOS - BAIKAL area.

The incidence of duties varied from time to time in accordance with the state of unrest and tension in the operational area. For the first six weeks (May/June) tension was very high in PAMAGUSTA, particularly in the SAMARIA - KARACLOS - BAIKAL area, due to a number of shooting incidents and the abduction of a number of Turk Cypriots. Duties were particularly heavy during this period, the incidence being 24 hours on 24 hours off for approx a fortnight. The Coy was deployed as follows:-

- (a). One pl stationed at KARACLOS, between KARACLOS village (Turkish) and the Greek National Guard Camp - providing one standing and one foot patrol and a mobile patrol on the Dock Road. It also provided a patrol in the New Harbour.
- (b). One pl at SAMARIA - providing standing patrols in , and at the approaching to the village and in the surrounding National Guard Posts.
- (c). One pl at the Medical Depot; providing mobile patrols in the Salamis Rd - BAIKAL area, and a standing patrol in the WORMHOUSES.
- (d). One pl, in Wolfe Tone Camp - Resting and providing Stand-To Party, patrols and escorts as required.

Later when tension eased duties were reduced and men had two nights' rest (full) in every three. Patrols and escorts were introduced.

Two patrols each consisting of one Officer and a section were provided daily to visit the villages in the Coy area. All villages were visited twice each week.

escorts were also provided daily in connection with the harvesting of cereal crops. Two escorts each of 1 NCO and 4 Ptes were provided daily.

An escort of 1 Officer and one section was provided twice each week for a period of approx one month to escort Turk Cypriot villagers on shopping trips to FLEMINGUSTA. Occasionally a small escort was provided to escort a Turk Cypriot doctor on his visits to Turk Cypriot villages in the Coy area.

(2). Two Mile Point Camp.

While stationed at Two Mile Point Camp for a period of six weeks in June/July, the Coy was relieved of patrols in the SAKHARIA - KARAOLOS area and instead provided:-

- (a). Guards and patrols in the Docks, FLEMINGUSTA.
- (b). Escorts for workers (Turks) of the Old City to and from DHEKELIA Base (Twice in AM and one in PM).
- (c). An escort for a consignment of milk daily to NICOSIA.
- (d). A standing patrol in the old Turkish school which was adjacent to the Greek Police Hqrs.

During this period the Coy continued to provide a platoon for the Medical Depot from which a mobile patrol was provided for the BUKKAL area. (It also provided the patrol mentioned at (d) above.

Escorts and patrols for the Coy area

At the end of June the Coy (Sp Pl) took over CHITOS Post from 'A' Coy., who were obliged to station a platoon in VATILI as a result of a shooting incident there. The platoon which was stationed in CHITOS for approx six weeks, patrolled the North-East part of 'A' Coy's area.

A major task for the Coy while stationed at Two-Mile Point was the digging of anti-aircraft shelters and defence positions, as a result of the threat of a Turkish invasion. Digging in the area of the post was very difficult due to the rocky nature of the ground.

(3). Defence of Old City.

The Coy returned to Wolfe Tone Camp early in July. It was relieved of its duty in the Docks, Old Turkish School and instead provided a platoon for the Old City. (24 hour duty). Escorts for harvesting were no longer required as all cereal crops had been harvested by the end of June. Shopping escorts had also ceased - Turkish villagers were now prepared to travel unescorted. Patrols to villages in the Coy area continued. The Coy assisted in providing guards and fatigues for Wolfe Tone Camp. It also had a platoon on Stand-to daily.

The platoon stationed at the Medical Depot had to provide an additional patrol - a standing patrol plus an APC in VIOS LUBUS where armed Greeks had occupied houses in very close proximity to houses occupied by Turkish fighters.

(4). SAKHARTI - KAROLICE - BIKEL area.

During the last five or six weeks of its tour the Coy was again responsible for this area. Tasks and duties were similar to those which the Coy performed when previously it had responsibility for the same area. However, the area was comparatively quiet at this time and duties were considerably reduced.

c. Morale and Discipline.

Morale and discipline of the Coy were very good throughout the entire period. In regard to discipline, there were comparatively few offences, approx twelve in all, and except for one, these were of a minor nature - conduct to the prejudice, etc. - and were all dealt with by the Coy Comdr. The one serious offence was committed by a private, who broke into a British Service School and improperly possessed a few articles of educational equipment. He was awarded 7 days' detention by the CO. The conduct of NCOs was particularly good. No NCO of the Coy was convicted of any offence.

The good morale was reflected in the efficient, willing manner which men performed their various tasks and duties, the high standard of dress and bearing on and off duty and the esprit-de-corps of the platoons. Factors which helped to maintain good morale were:-

- (1). The keen interest taken by pl comdrs and NCOs in the welfare of their men.
- (2). Satisfactory living conditions - the sleeping accommodation was adequate and the food was good.
- (3). Good bathing and swimming facilities - very much appreciated in July/August.
- (4). Good recreational facilities, mainly films and concerts, and canteens had TV, Radio and interesting games.
- (5). Field games - soccer, Gaelic football, hurling, basketball and volley ball. These were well organised to cater for large numbers. Inter-Coy competitions were very keenly contested and succeeded in promoting a keen interest and a strong Coy spirit among the men.
- (6). Satisfactory mail - generally letters and newspapers arrived regularly.

The chief adverse factor was the humid heat during July and August. This was offset to a large extent by the good sea swimming facilities and ample shower baths, and by the provision of overhead shelters for men on duty. Heavy duties during the month of May did not have any serious effect, as the necessity for them was apparent to all ranks from the tenseness of the situation, and the novelty of the island had not yet worn off.

d. Training.

(1). Pre Cyprus Training.

(a). The Coy had been concentrated in Connolly Bks; CTC for a fortnight prior to the concentration of the Bn. During this period the following training was carried out:-

(i) Range Practices.

Each member of the Coy was exercised in the Range Practices applicable to the weapon with which he had been issued for Cyprus.

(ii) Tactics.

These consisted in the main of the subjects included in the Manual - "Keeping the Peace" Part 11, Lectures, Demonstrations and Practice on the ground were given in -

Taking over and controlling an area, including Control Points, Domination of Roof Tops, Road Blocks, Searching Vehicles and Persons, Anti Ambush Drills and Patrols.

Anti Riot Drill was practised on a platoon basis. Two exercises involving the use of tear gas were carried out.

A Coy exercise was carried out in the Ammunition Depot, CTC - on guarding vulnerable points.

Foot patrol - reconnaissance and fighting.

(iii) Mobile Patrols.

An exercise was carried out by each platoon to which a section of Armoured Cars was attached - provided by Depot Cavalry. Opposition (in an ambush position) was also provided so that Inf/Cav co-operation was practised in addition to mobile patrolling procedure.

(iv) Communications.

Some instructions in the use of the 41 set and Voice Procedure was given by the Signal Personnel of the Coy and a number of these sets were used on exercises, whenever possible.

(v). Films.

Training films were shown after normal duty hours, and included "Keeping the Peace", drills and other tactical subjects.

(vi). Drill.

A short period of COFD and Arms Drill was carried out each morning - at section, platoon and Coy level.

(vii). General.

Medical processing, particularly during the first week, took up a considerable amount of time. Despite this, however, reasonably good progress was achieved, particularly in developing team-work and a Coy spirit.

(b). Bn Concentration Period.

Training was as per Bn Programme.

(2). Further Training Required.

No further training of a really military nature was required by the Coy to enable it to perform its various tasks as part of the Bn, in accordance with the UN Mission in Cyprus.

The Peace Keeping Mission was very different from that of the Congo. Our troops were presented with a series of problems of which they had very little previous experience. The use of force, and generally, even a display of force was out. Instead our troops were called upon to stop fighting wherever it reduce tension and help to restore normal conditions by negotiating with both communities. This involved acting as a communication medium between the two communities; reassuring them and dispelling undue fears, helping them by getting to know all their local problems and attempting to solve them; dealing with incidents between the two communities promptly with the aim of preventing more serious trouble arising; and reporting all relevant happenings.

Our men adapted themselves to this type of work very quickly and very successfully. It is unlikely that they could have got any training at home extra to what they did get, i.e. talks and briefing, to make them more proficient for their duties in Cyprus. Practical experience was what they required.

J. Equipment

(1). Effect of Weather Conditions.

Weather conditions had very little adverse effect on weapons, ammo, personal equipment, etc. Due to the proximity of the sea and the dusty atmosphere, there was a danger of rust effecting weapons and ammo, but daily cleaning and frequent inspections by Coy officers and Ordnance Section prevented any deterioration.

(2). Losses.

The only losses were of some small items of equipment on personal issue to NCOs and Privates. These losses were comparatively very little and were made good by the men concerned.

f. Transport.

The Coy had on charge Landrovers, 3-ton Trucks, 1-ton Trucks and APCs.

The Landrovers and 3-ton Trucks were in very good condition and very suitable for the task.

The 1-ton Trucks were old and in a poor state of repair. However they were useful, particularly for the movement of small patrols. The APCs were old and not very reliable. They were unsuitable for long mobile patrols, being cumbersome to drive on narrow roads and uncomfortable for passengers due to unsteadiness and lack of ventilation. They were very suitable as a base for Standing Patrols, as they were capable of affording protection against small arms fire in the event of an outbreak of shooting.

g. Standard of Living.

In the Coy area, both communities appeared to have a reasonably good standard of living. Although most villages looked dilapidated, the houses were adequate for the climate. Internally they were generally clean, well decorated and adequately furnished.

As regards food and clothing, there appeared to be very few people in need. The people eat well and for most of the period there was no shortage anywhere of foodstuffs such as bread, meat, (mainly mutton), fowl, eggs, vegetables and fruit. Because of the warm climate, clothing was never a major problem. The people generally were well dressed and there were ample supplies in the shops.

During the period of greatest tension (May/June) some Turkish villages notably MALOUNDA, PLATANI, ARTEMI and KNODHARA experienced some difficulties in getting food. There were restrictions on their freedom of movement and many were afraid to travel. They were also subject to economic restrictions. However, the provision of "shopping" escorts by UN and of relief supplies by other nearby Turkish Villagers, e.g. CHATOS ensured that there was never any serious shortage of basic foodstuffs.

72. ARMoured CAR GROUP.

a. Purchase of Panhard Armoured Cars.

- (1). The replacement of the Ford Armoured Cars sent to the Congo had been under consideration in the Cavalry Corps for some years when in 1962 it was decided that the Panhard, from the the limited selection available, was likely to be most suited to our needs.
- (2). Colonel Stapleton, Lt.Col McKenna, and Capt. A.J Magennis visited the Panhard factory in France from 19.11.'62 to 26.11.'62 and as a result of this visit the purchase of the Panhard Armoured Car for adoption as standard equipment for Motor Sqns, was recommended.
- (3). Colonel Stapleton recommended the 90mm Gun as the required but this weapon for technical reasons was not considered suitable by G.H.Q. and the weapon finally selected as the main armament was the 60mm Mortar with two 7.62mm ~~amm~~ M.Gs.
- (4). The original equipment tables issued on the 19.3.'64 for 40th Battalion show the Armoured Car Groups equipped with 8 Landsverck Armoured Cars so it would appear that the decision to purchase Panhards was not made until after that date.

b. Delivery of Panhards.

- (1). Two cars were delivered to Dublin by ship on 13.4.'64 in crates and were assembled on the Curragh. These two cars were air lifted to Cyprus by USAF (type of A/C c 124) on 19.4.'64.
- (2). Six cars were delivered to FAMAGUSTA by ships on the 2.5.'64 in crates and those were assembled in Wolfe Tone Camp by personnel of the Armoured Car Group and participated in active patrols some ten days later.

c. Armoured Car Group, 3 Infantry Group.

- (1). Armoured Car Group, 3rd Inf Group, arrived in Cyprus on 22.7.'64 and reported to 40th Bn for training. a three weeks period of intensive training was carried out.
- (2). The Armoured Cars of the 3 Inf Group arrived (assembled) in FAMAGUSTA on 16.8.'64 and these were immediately put into service.
- (3). The Armoured Car Group after training rejoined the 3rd Inf Group in LARNACA on 21.8.'64.

d. Maintenance.

Prior to the departure of 40th Bn for Cyprus a group of 2 officers, 10 NCOs and two Tprs underwent a short course in driving and maintenance and gunnery at ORLEANS from 1.4.'64 to 16.4.'64. This group was drawn from Armoured Car Group, 40th Bn and travelled from Ireland to Cyprus with them.

Due to the brevity of the course in France it was not possible to get full instruction in maintenance and therefore great credit is due to the technical staff that they were able to maintain and service these strange and complicated cars, during our period in Cyprus. In this connection it is also worthy of mention that they also maintained the 3rd Inf Group Cars until the return of their technical staff from France on 20.9.'64.

e. Main Characteristics of the Panhard Armoured Car.

(1). Technical.

The car which is rear engined, weighs about four tons. The engine is of much the same design as that of the Volkswagen. The clutch is electrically operated by pressing the knob on the gear lever. Top speed is about 60 mph.

(2). Armament.

(a). One 60mm Mortar which is capable of direct fire up to 300 yards as a flat trajectory weapon and semi-indirect fire up to 1400 yards. This weapon is capable of extreme accuracy.

(b). Two 7.62 M.Gs co-axially mounted which may be fired singly or together, again with great accuracy. Rate of fire approx 1000 rounds per minute.

(3). Radio.

Each car is equipped with one C.10 radio for inter-car communication and each member of the crew is on inter-com. The Troop Comd's car is, in addition, equipped with a C.9 radio for rear communication.

(4). Crew.

The crew consists of a driver, gunner and Car Commander.

BRANCHES AND SECTIONS.

73. 'A' BRANCH.

a. Activation, Command, Roll of Battalion.

Hereunder copy of Routine Order No 1/1964.

SREATH UIMH 1/1964

DÉ CÉLDAOIN 8 AIBREAN, 1964

ORDUITHE GAAT LIMH
LE
LEFT-CHORNAL P.P. DE BARRA
OIFIGEALCH I gCEANNAS: 40 CN COIS.

Cuid a h-éan

1. Activation of Unit.

40 Cn Cois is activated on 8 Aibreán, 1964

2. Command.

O.4938 Lt-Chornal P.P. De Barra assumes Command of the 40 Cn Cois on 8 Aibreán, 1964.

Tomás Furlong CE. NNFCORT AGUS
(Tomás Furlong) OIFIGEALCH

A/S OIFIGEALCH I gCEANNAS: 40 CATHLAIN COISITHE.

SREATH UIMH 1/1964

DÉ CÉLDAOIN 8 AIBREAN, 1964

ORDUITHE GAAT LIMH
LE
LEFT-CHORNAL P.P. DE BARRA
OIFIGEALCH I gCEANNAS: 40 CN COIS.

Cuid a d'.

Alt "A"

1. Postings/Transfers in - Officers.

The following Officers are posted/transferred to the 40 Cn Cois on 8 Aibreán, 1964 to fill appointments shown opposite their names.

Authority: Defence Force Gazette Amendt No 4/1964.

Battalion HQ.

Officer Commanding	O.4938	Lt. Col.	BARRY Patrick, P-	12u Cn.
2IC	O.5181	Comdt.	John M -	7u Cn.
Operations Offr.	O.6198	Comdt.	C'BRIEN, Edward, T-Mil Col.	
Adjutant.	O.6111	Comdt.	FURLONG, Thomas U-C.D.A.	
Quartermaster.	O.5158	Comdt.	LEECH, Stephen	- .H.C.
Legal Officer.	O.7269	Comdt.	HERON, Séamus	- .H.Q.
Intelligence Offr.	O.4951	Comdt.	GARVEY, John, J	-19u Cn.

SREATH UIMH 1/1964. ORDUIT LAGNAIT UIMH:40 CN COIS D/8 AIBREAN, 1964

Cuid a do Alt "A" (Contd)

1. Postings/Transfers In - Officers (Contd)

Bn. HQ

Welfare Officer	0.6997	Capt.	WILLIAMS, James J	- H.Q.
Press Officer	0.6313	Comdt.	NASTOR, Ambrose	- H.Q.
Asst Int Officer	0.	Comdt.	BURGIN, Noel	- Mil Col.

HQ Company.

Coy Comdr.	0.6032	2/Comdt.	SHANNON, Patrick	- 3u Cn.
Asst Adj & Pl Comdr (A Pln)	0.7522	Capt.	O'LEARY, Cathal, D	- CHQ E/Comd.
MP Officer	0.6689	Capt.	FITZGERALD, Michael, J	- 4 Fd MPC.
Asst QM & Pl Comdr (Q Pl)	0.7370	Capt.	McEVOY, Joseph, V, N	- Dep Arty.
Ord Officer (OME)	0.7831	Capt.	BARRETT, James, A.	- 1 Garr AOC.
Enrg Officer	0.6472	Comdt.	SLWARD, James.	- 1 Fd COE.
Pl Comdr (Sig Pl)	0.7718	2/Capt.	FLYNN, John.	- 1 Fd Sigs.
Pl Comdr (Tpt Pl)	0.7461	Capt.	LEYTE, Timothy N.	- Det STC.
Pl Comdr (Med Pl)	0.6291	Comdt.	SULLIVAN, Anthony M	- 3 Hos Coy.

A. Company.

Coy Comdr.	0.6375	Comdt.	FRLOBY, Thomas.	- 2u Cn Cois.
2IC & Adm Offr.	0.7327	Comdt.	PHILLAN, John.	- 2u Cn Cois.
Pl Comdr (Sp Pl)	0.7541	Lt.	SMITH, Henry.	- 6u Cn Cois.
Pl Comdr (Rifle Pl)	0.7728	Lt.	HAROLD, James.	- 7u Cn Cois.
Pl Comdr (Rifle Pl)	0.7536	Lt.	WATSON, John, C.	- 2u Cn Cois.
Pl Comdr (Rifle Pl)	0.7905	Lt.	HOWARD, Bernard, J, A.	- 6u Cn Cois.

B Company.

Coy Comdr.	0.5167	Comdt.	MULLIGAN, William.	- 22u Cn Cois.
2IC & Adm Cffr.	0.7386	Dept.	HIGGINS, Michael, T	- 4u Cn Cois.
Pl Comdr (Sp Pl)	0.7578	2/Lt.	DODD, Carl A.	- 12u Cn Cois.
Pl Comdr (Rifle Pl)	0.7726	Lt.	CONNOLLY, James.	- 14u Cn Cois.
Pl Comdr (Rifle Pl)	0.7730	Lt.	O'DONNELL, Martin, B.	- 11u Cn Cois.
Pl Comdr (Rifle Pl)	0.7970	2/Lt.	KEANE, Joseph, M, R.	- 12u Cn Cois.

C Company.

Coy Comdr.	0.4979	Comdt.	O'NEILL, Thomas	- Dep MPC.
2 IC & Adm Offr.	0.7579	Capt.	DOBEY, Bernard	- 3u Cn Cois.
Pl Comdr (Sp Pl)	0.7875	Lt.	McCLOUGH, Francis J	- Mil Col.
Pl Comdr (Rifle Pl)	0.7877	Lt.	WARREN, John, J	- G.T.D.
Pl Comdr (Rifle Pl)	0.7959	2/Lt.	TRAVERS, Desmond, A.	- 3u Cn Cois.
Pl Comdr (Rifle Pl)	0.7966	2/Lt.	HESKIN, Edmond.	- G.T.D.

Arm'd Car Group.

Group Comdr.	0.6877	Comdt.	DELANEY, Jeremiah, R	- 1u Mot Scn.
"IC	0.6313	Capt.	KELLY, Thomas, B.	- 1u Mot Scn.
Tech Officer.	0.7371	Capt.	CARROLL, Mark, A, M.	- Dep Cav.
Arm'd Car Coas Comds.	0.7731	Lt.	O'CONNOR, Hugh.	- Dep Cav.
" " " "	0.8045	2/Lt.	STAPLETON, Thomas.	- 1u Mot Scn.

Attached.

Chaplain:	Rev. Father Sean Condon C.P.	-	S/Comd.
	Rev. Father Ronnie Neville C.P.	-	

ATH UIMH 1/1964 ORDUITHE GNATAIMH 40 CN COIS D/8 AIBREAN, 1964

Cuid a d6 Alt "B"

Postings/Transfers In - Other Ranks.

The following are posted/transferred to 40 Cn Cois, from the Units shown opposite their names, on 8 Aibreán, 1964. (Authority an tArd Aidiunach).

BATTALION HEADQUARTERS.

97043	Sgt. Mullins, J	1 Bn.
909915	Lt/Man Totten, P, V	HQ Air Corps.
907555	Sgt. Griffin, J	Depot Sigs (Directorate of Sigs)

HEADQUARTERS COMPANY.

COMPANY HQ

1283	CS	Lee, J	GTD.
75915	COMS	Dillon, P	GTD.
314176	Cpl	Flynn, A	Dept Arty.
12573	Pte	Moylan, L	4 Bn.
38152	Pte	McInerney, J, T	12 Bn.
11333	Pte	Kelly, B	Depot East Comd.
2713	Pte	Ryan, L	12 Bn.
03841	Pte	Duffy, J	12 Bn.
1269	Pte	Colsh, T	6 Bn.

GUID A DO ALT "B" (AR LE N)HQ COY"A" PL. TOON.

No.	Rank.	Name.	Unit.
80804	CS	McDermott, C	4 G/Coy A/Dep MPC.
804237	Sgt	Murray, P	1 Bd Hqrs.
803336	Sgt	Ryan, J	5 Bde Hqrs.
7,188	Sgt	Hayes, P	HQ CTC.
435871	Sgt	Barron, J	2 G/Coy MPC.
90451	Sgt	Callinan, J	4 G/Coy MPC.
88230	Sgt	Byrne, S	Depot MPC.
803975	Sgt	Flanagan, L	4 G/Coy S& T.
94557	Sgt	O'Sullivan, W	4 Bn.
94144	Sgt	Murray, P	12 Bn.
807250	Cpl.	Sharpe, E, D	4 Bn.
804780	Cpl	Timoney, J	4 Bn.
814121	Pte	O'Sullivan, D	4 Bn.
808494	Cpl	Byrne, M	19 Bn.
436588	Cpl	McEvoy, J	2 G/Coy MPC.
86891	Cpl	Clancy, E	2 G/Coy MPC.
97332	Cpl	Henderson, G	3 G/Coy MPC.
803614	Cpl	Devany, P	3 G/Coy MPC.
807735	Cpl	Aherne, J	3 G/Coy MPC.
812865	Cpl	McNamara, E	4 G/Coy MPC.
96739	Cpl	McManus, J	4 G/Coy MPC.
40975	Cpl	Kavanagh, P	Depot MPC.
810384	Pte	Roche, J	4 Bn.
808816	Pte	Behan, M	12 Bn.
804128	Pte	Murphy, J	4 Bn.
813294	Pte	Collins, J	4 Bn.
809535	Pte	Foley, D	4 Bn.
814645	Pte	Raymond, R	4 Bn.
86796	Pte	Leahy, D	4 Bn.
808946	Pte	McLoughlin, M	4 Bn.

HQ COY

"A" PLATOON.

No.	Rank	Name	Unit.
812589	Pte	Cullinane, M	4 Bn.
804904	Pte	Hussey, A	12 Bn.
<u>"Q" PLATOON.</u>			
71851	BCMS	C'Connell, J	6 Bn.
83628	CCMS	Mahoney, J	13 Bn.
83714	CCMS	O'Sullivan, R	Mil Coll.
93695	Cpl	Hanley, W	1 G/Coy AOC.
417528	C/S	Bray, H	3 G/Coy AOC.
207932	Sgt	Walsh, M	2 H/Coy AMC.
804721	Sgt	Kilgallon, P	4 G/Coy AOC.
82684	C/S	McLoughlin, W	1 Fd COE.
802236	Sgt	Cotten, J	1 Fd COE.
95595	Sgt	Burke, J	5 Fd COE.
802062	Sgt	Pierce, D	CHQ E/Commd.
808879	Cpl	Perry, J	2 G/Coy AOC.
91722	Cpl	Cleary, M	2 G/Coy AOC.
805918	Cpl	Byrne, L	4 G/Coy AOC.
814172	Cpl	Keohane, M	CTD S/Comd.
804717	Cpl	Heffernan, T	1 Fd COE.
805966	Pte	Kiernan, J	1 Fd COE.
804727	Cpl	Murphy, S	Depot COE.
99659	Cpl	O'Brien, M	Depot COE.
810638	Cpl	Murray, T	1 G/Coy AOC.
808264	Cpl	Fogarty, P	6 Bn.
810666	Pte	O'Donovan, D	3 H/Coy AMC.
812557	Pte	Keenan, J	6 Bn.
91647	Pte	Scally, T	4 FAR.
804705	Pte	Devine, D	4 Fd COE.
809603	Pte	Veale, J	4 Fd COE.
805956	Pte	Sheedy, T	4 Fd COE.

40 CN COIS

1/1964 D/ 8 AIBREAN, '64

HQ COY"Q" PLATOON

<u>No.</u>	<u>Rank.</u>	<u>Name.</u>	<u>Unit.</u>
805937	Pte	Johnston, J	2 Fd Coy ACE
811715	Pte	McNamara, J	4 G/Coy AOC
Storeman/Driver	Sgt 87688	Sgt Dignam, P	1 Tank Scn
Storeman/Driver	Cpl 88965	Cpl Cronin, W	McKee Bks Coy.

TRANSPORT PLATOON.

71074	Sgt	Madigan, J	Depot S & T.
96855	Sgt	Cannon, A	2 G/Coy S&T.
408203	Sgt	Ferris, W	2 Fd Coy S & T. TECH
98955	Cpl	McNamee, G	4 Fd Coy S & T.
805435	Cpl	Butler, J	3 G/Coy S & T.
805939	Pte	Lynch, J	2 G/Coy S & T. TECH
805944	Pte	McCarthy, A	1 Fd Coy S & T.
813567	Cpl	O'Halloran, T	Depot S & T.
812827	Pte	Crowther, S	2 Fd Coy S & T.
813260	Pte	Cleere, S	2 Fd Coy S & T.
810412	Pte	Kelly, A	4 Fd Coy S & T.
93346	Pte	Fitzgerald, A	4 G/Coy S & T.
812552	Pte	Prendergast, J	1 Fd Coy S & T.
812479	Pte	Barrett, J	3 G/Coy S & T.
807849	Pte	Hughes, J	Depot S & T.
807330	Pte	Boland, P	2 Fd Coy S & T.
812469	Pte	O'Keefe, R	1 Fd Coy S & T.
807433	Pte	Fitzgerald, P	4 Fd Coy S & T.
809573	Pte	McHugh, M	Depot S & T.

SIGNAL PLATOON

91674	Sgt	Crocock, J	4 Fd Coy Sigs.
90148	CCMS	Mullins, F	Depot Sigs.
802409	Sgt	Fogarty, A	1 Fd Coy Sigs.
91116	Sgt	Sullivan, M	Depot Sigs.
811296	Cpl	O'Mahoney, C	1 Fd Coy Sigs.

HQ COYSIGNAL PLATOON.

No.	Rank.	Name.	Unit.
805254	Cpl	Hurley, T	4 Fd Coy Sigs.
809917	Pte	Maher, J	1 Fd Coy Sigs.
812436	Pte	Deasy, D	1 Fd Coy Sigs.
812257	Pte	Healy, C	1 Fd Coy Sigs.
811258	Pte	Quigley, J	4 Fd Coy Sigs.
812398	Pte	Browne, J	2 Fd Coy Sigs.
813450	Pte	Struther, R	1 Fd Coy Sigs.
81258	Sgt	Sherdian, H	2 Fd Coy Sigs.
800782	Sgt	Keyes, T	2 Fd Coy Sigs.
415520	Sgt	O'Callaghan, E	4 Sqn Sigs.
805794	Cpl	Phelan, J	Depot Sigs.
800247	Sgt	Byrne, P	2 Fd Coy S & T.

MEDICAL PLATOON.

201969	CS	Tisdall, T	3 Hos Coy.
408827	Sgt	Dixon, H	11 Fd Coy.
93959	Cpl	Power, P	3 Hos Coy.
806699	Cpl	Murphy, T	Depot AMC.
80585	Cpl	Larkin, B	2 Hos Coy.
802559	Pte	Conlon, J	3 Hos Coy.
810758	Pte	Purcell, M	3 Hos Coy.
809363	Pte	Harman, T	3 Hos Coy.
813466	Pte	Delaney, J	3 Hos Coy.
810801	Pte	Lackey, M	1 Hos Coy.
810816	Pte	Caffrey, P	1 Hos Coy.

40 CN COIS

1/1964 D/ 8 AIBREAN '64

"A" COY

COMPANY "HC"

No.	Rank.	Name.	Unit.
87182	CS	Norris, P	2 Bn.
85432	CCMS	McCarthy, F	20 Bn.
801568	Cpl	Kealy, T	CTD B/Comd.
95716	Cpl	Kavanagh, P	2 Fd Coy AIBR.
803899	Cpl	Mooney, P	2 Bn.
809629	Cpl	Fields, P	2 Fd Coy Sigs.
806394	Cpl	Larrigan, F	2 Fd Coy Sigs.
92157	Cpl	Rogers, G	21 Bn.
959118	Pte	Martin, T	2 Bn.
811778	Pte	Leonard, W	5 Bn.
806198	Pte	Slater, J	2 Bn.
92627	Pte	Kealy, H	2 G/Coy S & T.
806929	Pte	Leech, G	2 Bn.
801533	Pte	Quarney, W	11 Fd S & T.
812305	Sgm	Jolley, F	2 Fd Coy Sigs.
811779	Sgm	Walsh, E	2 Fd Coy Sigs.
810398	Pte	Byrne, J	21 Bn.

"A" COMPANY.

NO 1 PLATOON

94700	Sgt	Butler, M	21 Bn.
812150	Sgm	Rooney, J	2 Fd Coy Sigs. TECH.

NO 1 Rifle Section.

800846	Sgt	Foran, J	CTD E/Comd.
801988	Cpl	Monaghan, M	20 Bn.
801692	Pte	McGrath, J	2 Bn.
813208	Pte	Kelly, P	CTD E/Comd.
85450	Pte	Ward, P	2 Hos Coy.
812581	Pte	O'Neill, P	2 Bn.
810085	Pte	Casey, D	2 Bn.
804693	Pte	Murray, P	2 Bn.
803533	Pte	Barnes, P	2 Bn.
814128	Pte	Crosby, P	5 Bn.

40 CN COIS.

1/1964 D/ 8 AIBREAN '64

"A" COMPANY

No 1 PLATOON

NO 2 Rifle Section.

No.	Rank.	Name.	Unit.
812457	Cpl	Raleigh, J	2 Bn.
808194	Cpl	Carroll, J	2 Bn.
813209	Pte	Floyd, P	2 Fd Coy S & T.
812857	Pte	Shannon, T	2 Bn.
812580	Pte	Gettings, P	2 Bn.
810600	Pte	Redmond, C	10 Bn.
434720	Pte	Grincell, T	6 Bde Hq.
808274	Pte	Valentine, J	2 Bn.
812058	Pte	Morgan, A	2 Bn.
813498	Pte	Treacy, S	2 Fd Coy S & T.
812012	Cpl	Ryan, M	2 Bn.
94685	Cpl	Egerton, A	9 Bn.
806479	Pte	Butler, M	2 Fd Coy ACE.
811856	Pte	Carthy, W	6 Bde Hq.
78854	Pte	Madigan, P	CTD E/Comd.
811988	Pte	Butler, P	East Comd HQ.
811131	Pte	Loughran, P	East Comd HQ.
814011	Pte	Sunderland, M	2 Bn.
806588	Pte	Mernagh, P	2 Bn.
813362	Pte	Kielt, M	2 Fd Coy Sigs.

No 2 PLATOON.

803674	Sgt	Crosbie, T	5 Bn.
812068	Pte	Smith, P	2 Fd Sigs Coy.

No 1 Rifle Section.

91470	Sgt	Keevey, P	5 Bn.
803670	Cpl	McDonnell, P	HQ E/Comd.
812962	Pte	Brennan, J	5 Bn.
812792	Pte	Burns, M	5 Bn.
810869	Pte	Delaney, T	5 Bn.

40 CN COIS

1/1964 D/ 8 AIBREAN '64

"A" COMPANY.

No 2 PLATOON

No 1 Rifle Section.

No.	Rank.	Name.	Unit.
813871	Pte	McGleenan,C	2 Fd Sigs Coy.
805416	Pte	Mooney,D	McKee Bks Coy.
807941	Pte	Doherty,P	5 Bn.
800252	Pte	Hore, M	5 Bn.
812950	Pte	Keating,G	5 Bn.

No 2 Rifle Section.

809694	Cpl	Finnegan,S	CTD E/Comd.
808427	Cpl	Fallon,J	11 Fd ACE.
811519	Pte	Davies,A	6 Fd Coy MPC.
813971	Pte	Cudden,J	CTD E/Comd.
812489	Pte	Mullen,J	5 Bn.
812729	Pte	Barcoe,A	20 Bn.
302061	Pte	Maher,D	5 Bn.
811739	Pte	Rehill,M	5 Bn.
812074	Pte	Foran,C	5 Bn.
812945	Pte	Jackson,F	2 Fd Coy Sigs.
812953	Cpl	O'Sullivan,J	5 Bn.
808720	Cpl	Gregan,P	5 Bn.
812391	Pte	Garland,J	2 FAR.
812406	Pte	Keenan,G	2 FAR.
812165	Pte	Reilly,A	2 FAR.
814492	Pte	Coakley,P	2 FAR.
812409	Pte	Igoe,J	2 FAR.
801577	Pte	Norris,A	5 Bn.
812461	Pte	Sinnott,J	5 Bn.
809244	Pte	Rafferty,r	5 Bn.

No 3 PLATOON

805888	Sgt.	McGowan,M	1 Bn.
812771	Pte	Barr,P	6 Bn.

40 CN COIS

1/1964 D" 8 AIBREAN '64

"A" COMPANY

No 3 PLATOON.

No 1 Rifle Section.

No.	Rank.	Name.	Unit.
94809	Cpl	McDonnell, T	6 Bn
810264	Cpl	Quinn, T	1 Bn.
814079	Pte	McDonagh, J	1 Bn.
803227	Pte	Kennedy, P	6 Bn.
810493	Pte	Donlon, T	6 Bn.
811135	Pte	Fogarty, C	1 Bn.
811130	Pte	Clarke, A	6 Bn.
808114	Pte	Gormley, J	6 Bn.
808261	Pte	McManus, F	4 G/AOC.
806057	Pte	Glennon, J	1 Bn.
<u>No 2 Rifle Section.</u>			
810216	Cpl	Clancy, A	1 Bn.
807828	Cpl	Curtin, M	6 Bn.
814061	Pte	O'Donovan, E	6 Bn.
814062	Pte	Cogan, J	6 Bn.
814297	Pte	Porter, B	6 Bn.
814307	Pte	Smollen, D	6 Bn.
810966	Pte	Corrigan, J	W/Comd HQ.
810145	Pte	O'Mahoney, J	1 Bn.
811396	Pte	Guidon, G	6 Bn.
813018	Pte	Geoghegan, J	4 FAR.
804139	Cpl	Rowe, A	4 G/AOC TECH.
806951	Cpl	Geraghty, D	5 Fd Coy Sigs.
813282	Pte	Higgins, G	1 Bn.
813257	Pte	Donoghue, J	6 Bn.
813039	Pte	Connolly, M	1 Bn.
813183	Pte	Mahon, M	4 FAR.
805535	Pte	Quirke, J	1 Bn.
809853	Pte	Battles, G	4 Fd Coy COE.

40 CN COIS:

1/1964 D/ 8 AIBREAN '64

"A" COMPANY

No 3 PLATOON

No 2 Rifle Section.

No.	Rank.	Name.	Unit.
813844	Pte	Robinson, E	4 FAR.
813915	Pte	Yorke, J	4 FAR.
<u>SUPPORT PLATOON.</u>			
87393	Sgt	Wykes, G	6 Bn.
812515	Pte	Carthy, C	4 FAR.
<u>84mm Anti-Tank Section.</u>			
814135	Cpl	Donnolly, J	6 Bn
91460	Cpl	McDonagh, M	6 Bn.
206620	Pte	McKevitt, L	4 FAR.
810866	Pte	Galvin, W	6 Bn.
809977	Pte	Flynn, J	4 FAR.
91391	Pte	McCormack, J	4 FAR.
94318	Sgt	McManus, R	CTD W/Comd.
808013	Cpl	Poynton, L	4 FAR.
807753	Cpl	Gavin, T	5 FAR.
811528	Pte	Flanagan, T	6 Bn.
812378	Pte	Hewitt, R	6 Bn.
808743	Pte	Monaghan, P	6 Bn.
812612	Pte	McLoughlin, P	6 Bn.
99830	Pte	Nicell, P	6 Bn.
813186	Pte	McEntee, P	4 FAR.
812413	Pte	Watters, H	4 FAR.
812735	Pte	Prendergast, K	4 FAR.
812482	Pte	O'Keefe, L	4 FAR.

"B" COMPANY

COMPANY HEADQUARTERS.

No.	Rank.	Name.	Unit.
99377	CS	Woods, P	4 Bn.
81911	COMS	O'Brien, N	4 Bn.
808332	Cpl	O'Regan, P	15 Bn.
94885	Cpl	Kiniry, J	1 Fd Coy COE.
99139	Pte	O'Neill, R	1 Fd Coy S&TC.
99158	Pte	O'Shea, W	1 Fd Coy Sigs.
91711	Cpl	Lacey, J, W	1 Fd Coy Sigs.
804143	Cpl	Kelleher, J	1 Fd Coy Sigs.
415841	Pte	Guerin, J	4 Bn.
417132	Pte	Murphy, E	1 Fd Coy S&TC.
93185	Pte	Ryan, P	1 Fd Coy S&TC.
812508	Pte	Ryan, J	1 Fd Coy S&TC.
93234	Pte	Kelleher, L	1 Fd Coy S&TC.
801376	Pte	O'Shea, J	4 Bn.
813603	Pte	Kilmartin, B	1 Fd Coy Sigs.
811471	Pte	McCarthy, J	1 Fd Coy Sigs.
802819	Pte	Clarke, J	4 Bn.

NO 4 PLATOON.

94764	Sgt	Goggins, D	4 Bn.
812877	Pte	Britton, M	1 Fd Coy Sigs.

NO 1 RIFLE SECTION.

802646	Sgt	Higgins, M	4 Bn.
808706	Cpl	Phelan, J	S/Comd HQ Coy.
810409	Pte	O'Gorman, W	4 Bn.
812662	Pte	Dunlea, P	4 Bn.
812908	Pte	Mockler, P	1 Fd Coy COE.
87262	Pte	Downey, R	CTD. S/Comd.
810840	Pte	Falvey, J	S/Comd HQ Coy.
813164	Pte	O'Hara, T	1 Mot Sen.
803967	Pte	Grace, P	4 Bn.
813350	Pte	Gamble, J	4 Bn.

40 CN COIS.

1/1964 D/8 AIBREAN '64

"B" COMPANY

NO 2 RIFLE SECTION.

No.	Rank.	Name.	Unit,
808993	Cpl	Hunt, J	4 Bn.
805510	Cpl	Roche, M	13 Bn.
814491	Pte	Keogh, J	4 Bn.
812690	Pte	Gubbins, J	4 Bn.
814247	Pte	Morey, T	4 Bn.
812871	Pte	Burke, D	4 Bn.
812476	Pte	O'Donnell, J	McKee Bks Coy.
812758	Pte	Foley, B	4 Bn.
800840	Pte	Power, M	4 Bn.
808804	Tpr	Mulhern, A	1 Mot Scn.
804374	Cpl	O'Brien, D	4 Bn.
802295	Cpl	Griffin, B	CDA S/Comd.
806388	Pte	Sheedy, F	1 Mot Scn.
812270	Pte	Heaney, J	1 Fd Coy COE.
813163	Pte	Burke, T	1 Mot Scn.
813075	Pte	Hanley, C	1 Mot Scn.
805738	Pte	Tobin, J	CTD S/Comd.
813043	Pte	Butler, J	1 Fd Coy COE.
812465	Pte	Homan, T	4 Bn.
813843	Pte	Byrne, T	1 Mot Scn.

NO 5 PLATOON.

86755	Sgt	Maher, M	CTD S/Comd.
812466	Pte	O'Sullivan, M	1 Fd Coy Sigs.

NO 1 RIFLE SECTION.

99626	Sgt	Shaw, E	4 Bn.
813595	Cpl	Doyle, J	4 Bn.
812445	Pte	Deegan, R	4 Bn.
813865	Pte	O'Mahoney, D	1 Mot Scn.
813613	Pte	Barrett, W	4 Bn.
812817	Pte	McKenna, J	4 Bn.
804027	Pte	McManus, D	1 Mot Scn.

40 CN COIS

1/1964 D/8 BAIBREAN '68

"B" COMPANY

NO 1 RIFLE SECTION (ar lean)

No.	Rank.	Name.	Unit.
812504	Pte	Birmingham, W	4 Bn.
803760	Pte	Daly, M	4 Bn.

NO 2 RIFLE SECTION.

809356	Cpl	Kent, F	McKee Bks. Coy.
811837	Cpl	Clune, E	CTD S/Comd.
811899	Pte	Donoghue, J	4 Bn.
812499	Pte	Collins, E	4 Bn.
811695	Pte	Malone, N	4 Bn.
813467	Pte	McCarthy, C	4 Bn.
98426	Pte	Enright, A	1 Mot Scn.
812467	Pte	O'Sullivan, T	4 Bn.
809515	Pte	Foley, J	4 Bn.
811696	Pte	O'Sullivan, F	4 Bn.
810740	Cpl	Shinkwin, J	CTD S/Comd.
813384	Cpl	Radford, J	4 Bn.
812376	Pte	Thompson, J	4 Bn.
813870	Pte	Cannon, T	1 Mot Scn.
810621	Pte	Cremin, M	4 Bn.
814007	Pte	Hanrahan, J	4 Mot Scn.
812484	Pte	Culhane, M	1 Fd Coy S&Tc.
813074	Pte	Cody, W	1 Mot Scn.
812065	Pte	Sheehan, L	4 Bn.
801389	Pte	Hayes, F	4 Bn.

NO 6 PLATOON.

75388	Sgt	Leigh, M	22 Bn.
813283	Pte	O'Donovan, M	1 Fd Coy Sigs.

NO 1 RIFLE SECTION.

95600	Sgt	Dollon, J	12 Bn.
71515	Cpl	Kirwan, J	12 Bn.
812897	Pte	Conaghan, J	12 Bn.
813287	Pte	Kelleher, A	12 Bn.

40 CN COIS:

1/1964 D/8 AIBREAN '64

"B" COMPANY

NO 1 RIFLE SECTION (ar lean)

No.	Rank.	Name.	Unit.
813021	Pte	Maher, J	12 Bn.
814041	Pte	Keating, W	12 Bn.
809205	Pte	Bourke, W	12 Bn.
814711	Pte	O'Connor, F	12 Bn.
812850	Pte	Meehan, D	12 Bn.
814488	Pte	Nash, J	12 Bn.

NO 2 RIFLE SECTION.

810645	Cpl	Morrissey, J	3 FAR.
98320	Cpl	Power, J	12 Bn.
808612	Pte	Kealy, J	1 Mot Sen.
813550	Pte	Constable, O	12 Bn.
809201	Pte	Fitzgerald, M	12 Bn.
814117	Pte	Wall, J	12 Bn.
808991	Pte	O'Malley, J	12 Bn.
82071	Pte	Connolly, W	12 Bn.
813577	Pte	Ryan, R	12 Bn.
812831	Pte	Ryan, C	12 Bn.
78605	Cpl	Myler, T	3 G/Coy STC.
809958	Cpl	O'Regan, T	McKee Bks Coy.
811795	Pte	Carmody, W	1 Fd Coy COE.
813982	Pte	Corbett, M	12 Bn.
814118	Pte	Walsh, D	12 Bn.
813822	Pte	Nagle, G	12 Bn.
804087	Pte	Roche, D	1 Mot Sen.
808995	Pte	Thompson, G	12 Bn.
814075	Pte	Ryan, C	15 Bn.
810157	Pte	Ryan, M	12 Bn.

40 CN COIS.

1/1964 D/8 AIBREAN '64

"B" COMPANY

SUPPORT PLATOON

No.	Rank.	Name.	Unit.
91433	Sgt	Hackett, T	3 Mot Sqn.
813505	Pte	O'Flynn, D	1 Fd Coy Sigs.
<u>80 mm ANTI-TANK SECTION.</u>			
804926	Cpl	Parker, A	12 Bn.
87305	Cpl	Lynch, E	12 Bn.
806149	Pte	Holden, J	12 Bn.
96964	Pte	Tier, J	14 Bn.
813248	Pte	O'Mahoney, T	12 Bn.
807652	Pte	Naughton, H	12 Bn.
<u>81 mm MORTAR SECTION.</u>			
94546	Sgt	McDonald, R	4 Bn.
805189	Cpl	Kenneally, T	4 Bn.
99205	Cpl	Moloney, J	14 Bn.
91451	Pte	Hawkins, L	12 Bn.
91960	Pte	Wynne, D	12 Bn.
808872	Pte	Laste, J	12 Bn.
801419	Pte	Kennedy, N	12 Bn.
812455	Pte	Gardiner, M	12 Bn.
807894	Pte	Morgan, P	12 Bn.
804078	Pte	Coote, P	22 Bn.
813374	Pte	Blake, T	12 Bn.
811291	Pte	Madden, J	1 Fd Coy Sigs.

40 CN COIS

1/1964 D/8. AIBREAN '64

"C" COMPANY

COMPANY HEADQUARTERS.

No.	Rank.	Name.	Unit.
200290	CS	Ambrose, M	GTD.
93288	CCMS	Freeman, E	3 Bn.
806088	Cpl	Kilty, M	3 Bn.
801835	Cpl	Confrey, P	Depot MPC.
802919	Cpl	Harmon, J	Depot STC.
92195	Sgt	Hamill, M	Depot Sugs.
810599	Cpl	Buckley, M	Depot Sigs.
93164	Cpl	Fowley, T	Depot STC.
88095	Cpl	Hannigan, P	Mil Col.
98583	Pte	Maguire, J	4 Mot Sen.
803695	Pte	Kearney, J	Depot STC.
801827	Pte	McCormack, W	Depot STC.
808086	Pte	Hayes, E	Depot STC.
803983	Pte	Murphy, F	Depot STC.
811635	Pte	Doran, J	4 Fd Sigs Coy.
813189	Sgm	Regan, M	4 Fd Sigs Coy.
809615	Pte	Fahy, A	Depot STC.
<u>No 7 PLATOON</u>			
86861	Sgt	Smith, M	GTD.
812523	Sgm	Brophy, M	Depot Sigs.
<u>No 1 RIFLE SECTION.</u>			
407112	Sgt	Casserly, J	Mil Col.
806567	Cpl	Bolger, T	GTD.
811886	Pte	Battle, B	GTD.
806166	Pte	Goff, W	GTD.
800768	Pte	Goff, E	GTD.
88488	Pte	O'Conner, E	Depot STC TECH BAKER.
97542	Pte	Hipwell, A	Mil Col.
435357	Pte	Rowe, P	Mil Col.
810604	Pte	Lee, J	Mil Col.
813402	Pte	Byrne, M	Depot COE.

40 CN COIS.

1/1964 D/8 AIBREAN '64

"C" COMPANY

No 2 RIFLE SECTION

No.	Rank.	Name.	Unit:
811219	Cpl	Carton, J	GTD.
90597	Cpl	Caffrey, S	GTD.
813144	Pte	Faughran, F	Depot COE.
813150	Pte	Browne, W	Depot STC.
809535	Pte	Grant, P	Depot COE.
807352	Pte	Keogh, J	Depot COE.
813631	Pte	Davis, J	Depot COE.
813494	Pte	Roche, W	Depot COE.
801136	Pte	Bohan, W	Depot COE.
811885	Pte	Ward, C	Depot COE.
809064	Cpl	O'Halloran, R	GTD.
807013	Cpl	Glasheen, S	GTD.
81438	Pte	Cullinane, T	CHQ Coy CTC.
96103	Pte	Hayes, P	CHQ Coy CTC.
436293	Pte	Salmon, J	CHQ Coy CTC.
806852	Pte	O'Brien, E	CHQ Coy CTC.
806972	Pte	Galbraith, T	1 Garr Coy AOC: Tech Ammo Examiner.
813147	Pte	Havern, C	1 Garr Coy AOC.
814030	Pte	Shelly, M	Army App School.
810564	Pte	Doran, M	Army App School.

No 8 PLATOON.

96676	Sgt	Rochford, R	3 Bn.
812292	Sgm	Harrington, A	Depot Sigs.

No 1 RIFLE SECTION.

93422	Sgt	Ronayne, W	Mil Col.
808393	Cpl	Lambert, M	3 Bn.
813012	Pte	O'Brien, F	3 Bn.
801104	Pte	Radford, M	3 Bn.
813004	Pte	Sherdian, J	3 Bn.
810103	Pte	Flynn, C	3 Bn.
813934	Pte	France, E	3 Bn.

40 CN COIS.

1/1964 D/ 8 AIBREAN '64

"C" COMPANY.

No 1 RIFLE SECTION (ar lean)

No.	Rank.	Name.	Unit.
814112	Pte	Stokes, T	Depot STC.
813487	Pte	McHugh, J	Depot Arty.
813619	Pte.	Timmins, M	3 Bn.

No 2 RIFLE SECTION.

811336	Cpl	Murphy, J, P	3 Bn.
810734	Cpl	render, J	3 Bn.
813003	Pte	Murphy, T	3 Bn.
813092	Pte	Murphy, .	3 Bn.
813002	Pte	Halligan, M	3 Bn.
814009	Pte	Sweeney, M	3 Bn.
812745	Pte	Coady, .	Depot Cav.
812181	Pte	render, M	3 Bn.
800019	Pte	Sherdian, A	3 Bn.
813616	Pte	helan, T	3 Bn.
805223	Cpl	Moore, T	3 Bn.
98731	Cpl	Casey, .	Mil Col.
813087	Pte	McHugh, N	Depot STC.
806854	Pte	Connolly, J	3 Bn.
814101	Pte	Byrne, M	3 Bn.
813009	Pte	Ellatd, D	3 Bn.
811339	Pte	Moran, J	3 Bn.
813001	Pte	Sherdian, T	3 Bn.
813077	Pte	Quigley, J	3 Bn.
809217	Pte	Duffin, .	1 AA Regt.

No 9 PLATOON.

801905	Sgt	Lakes, T	GTD.
811512	Sgm	Kavanagh, B	Depot Sigs.

40 CN COIS.

1/1964 D/ 8 AIBREAN '64

"C" COMPANY

No 1 RIFLE SECTION.

No.	Rank.	Name.	Unit.
434187	Sgt	Stafford, J	Depot Arty.
808412	Cpl	Nolan, J	Depot Arty.
812811	Pte	Daly, L	1 AA Trng Regt.
814096	Pte	Carr, F	1 AA Trng Regt.
814111	Pte	Donohoe, T	1 AA Trng Regt.
814033	Pte	Power, J	1 AA Trng Regt.
813488	Pte	Hyland, N	Depot Arty.
813481	Pte	Fortune, S	Depot Arty.
811884	Pte	Fogarty, G	Depot Arty.
810097	Pte	Dempsey, P	Depot Arty.

No 2 RIFLE SECTION

811486	Cpl	Connolly, T	3 Bn.
99151	Cpl	McNamara, P	Army App. School.
812753	Pte	Walsh, J, J	Depot Cav.
812754	Pte	Finn, N	Depot Cav.
812650	Pte	Whyte, J	Depot Cav.
812652	Pte	Nolan, E	Depot Cav.
811974	Pte	Gaffney, P	Depot Cav.
812889	Pte	Browne, R	1 Tank Scn.
812741	Pte	Dowling, P	Depot Cav.
813797	Pte	Wall, T	GTD.
800703	Cpl	Belger, P	1 AA Trg Regt.
800705	Cpl	Fortune, J	1 AA Trg Regt.
809662	Pte	Touhy, E	Mil Col.
88713	Pte	Gaynor, J	Mil Col.
814563	Pte	Duffy, L	Depot Arty.
812755	Pte	Thomas, A	Depot Cav.
814102	Pte	Sweeney, P	1 AA Trg Regt.
812746	Pte	Daly, E	Depot Cav.
813798	Pte	Walsh, J	Mil Col.
813626	Pte	Ennis, C	Depot STC.

40 CN COIS.

1/1964 D/ 8 AIBREAN '64

"C" COMPANY

SUPPORT PLATOON

No.	Rank.	Name.	Unit.
205628	Sgt	Reidy, C	3 Bn.
813401	Sgm	Talbot, N	Depot Sigs.
<u>84 mm ANTI-TANK SECTION.</u>			
807672	Cpl	Conroy, P	Depot COE.
810033	Cpl	Lycns, P	3 Bn.
810027	Pte	Hynes, E	3 Bn.
803541	Pte	Dingley, M	3 Bn.
805632	Pte	Herron, K	Depot Arty.
808395	Pte	Curran, C	3 Bn.
<u>81 mm MORTAR SECTION.</u>			
92680	Sgt	Connolly, R	Depot Arty.
812079	Cpl	Smith, W	3 Bn.
811593	Cpl	McHugh, P, A	3 Bn.
813005	Pte	O'Connor, R	3 Bn.
812525	Pte	Flanagan, S	3 Bn.
812637	Pte	Stynes, M	3 Bn.
812925	Pte	Whelan, J	3 Bn.
812808	Pte	Garrett, D	3 Bn.
812532	Pte	Moriarty, B	3 Bn.
801821	Pte	Canning, M	3 Bn.
812643	Pte	Houlihan, W	3 Bn.
813493	Sgm	O'Donnell, P	Depot Sigs.

40 CN COIS.

1/1964 D/ 8 AIBREAN '64

ARMOURED CAR GROUP
GROUP HQ

No.	Rank.	Name.	Unit.
86525	CS	Nolan, D	1 Arm'd Car Sqn.
437729	COMS	Cooley, M	2 Mot Sen.
803542	Sgt	Shaw, J, V	Cav Depot.
88071	Sgt	Sweeney, P	1 Tank Sqn.
804643	Sgt	McCafferty, J	2 Mot Sqn.
805124	Cpl	Nolan, W	1 Mot Sen.
809311	Cpl	Power, P	1 Mot Sen.
802158	Cpl	Hayes, G	2 Mot Sen.
808765	Cpl	Landy, J	1 Arm'd Car Sqn.
804762	Tpr	McGoldrick, P	Cav Depot.
807449	Tpr	Mason, J, N	3 Mot Sen FCA.
810336	Cpl	Lynch, D	1 Arm'd Car Sqn.
803335	Tpr	Coughlan, J	4 Mot Sen.
812289	Tpr	Sahughnessy, F	1 Arm'd Car Sqn.
810241	Tpr	Corbett, P	1 Mot Sen.
94554	Tpr	O'Sullivan, E	1 Mot Sen.
819081	Tpr	Hayes, J	4 Mot Sen.
424456	Tpr	Kilkelly, M	5 Mot Sen FCA.
90089	Tpr	Shanahan, J	Cav Depot.

No 1 SECTION

0.7731	Lieut	O'Connor, H	Cav Depot.
87631	Sgt	Duffy, P	2 Mot Sen.
809454	Cpl	Deegan, R	1 Tank Sqn.
807577	Tpr	Dolan, J	1 Arm'd Car Sqn.
814106	Tpr	Dover, J	1 Arm'd Car Sqn.
812210	Tpr	O'Brien, P	1 Mot Sen.

40 CN COIS.

1/1964 D/ 8 AIBREAN '64

ARMOURED CAR GROUP (ar lean)

<u>No.</u>	<u>Rank.</u>	<u>Name.</u>	<u>Unit.</u>
<u>No 2 Section</u>			
97060	Sgt	Byrne, J	Cav Depot.
807102	Cpl	Irwin, E	1 Tank Sqn.
809057	Cpl	Phillips, M	4 Mot Scn
813928	Tpr	Heffernan, J	1 Tank Sqn.
94209	Tpr	Caughlan, A	1 Mot Scn.
813751	Tpr	Groark, T	2 Mot Scn.
<u>No 3 Section.</u>			
0.8045	Lieut	Stapleton, T	1 Mot Scn.
801232	Sgt	Rowland, M	1 Mot Scn.
808217	Cpl	McGarr, W	4 Mot Scn.
812076	Tpr	Kelly, H	1 Armd Car Sqn.
811894	Tpr	Smith, J	1 Armd Car Sqn.
812600	Tpr	Camhrell, B	2 Mot Scn.
<u>No 4 Section.</u>			
92754	Sgt	Shaughnessy, G	4 Mot Scn.
99194	Cpl	Crawley, J	1 Tank Scn.
94759	Cpl	Barry, R	1 Mot Scn.
811687	Tpr	Griffin, J	2 Mot Scn.
813001	Tpr	Carey, T	1 Mot Scn.
810786	Tpr	Collins, M	1 Mot Scn.

T. FURLONG
T. FURLONG

CEANNFORT.

AIDIUNACH: 40 CN COIS.

BRANCHES AND SECTIONS.

b. CRIME RECORD.

Sec 137	AWOL (Less than 6 hours)	43
Sec 137	AWOL (More than 6 hours)	3
Sec 142		10
Sec 133	Insubordination	3
Sec 168	Disobedience to Orders	7
Sec 168	Other Offences	41
Sec 168	Losing by Neglect	3
Sec 134	Breaking out of Camp	8
Sec 169		1
LCM (MPC Cpl. striking a superior officer)		1.

In general, the conduct of battalion personnel was excellent.

BRANCHES AND SECTIONS

c. GUARDS OF HONOUR - 40 IRISH BN UNFICYP

DATE	FOR WHOM SUPPLIED		APPOINTMENT
	RANK	NAME	
8.7.'64	Maj, Gen	S Collins-Powell,	Adjutant General.
13.7.'64	Brigadier General.	K.S Thimayya,	CSR, YEO Force Commander. CBE, MC
15.7.'64	Maj. Gen.	R.M.P. Carver,	CB, CBE, Deputy Force DSO, MC Commander.
18.7.'64	Maj. Gen	Rikhe	Military Adviser to The Secretary-Gen.
11.9.'64	General	K.S Thimayyi,	CSR, YEO Force Commander CBE, MC

d. VISITS BY BN MEMBERS TO OTHER CONTINGENTS

DATE.	DETAILS OF INVITATION	PERSONNEL INVITED.
7.7.'64	Dinner & Drinks, Inniskillings, on occasion of Hurling match against Bn at Dhekelia.	12 Offrs 28 O/Ranks.
8.7.'64	Dinner by Australian Police Contingent.	5 Offrs 3 NCOs.
10.7.'64	Dinner by Adj-Gen to Bn OIF	17.
18.8.'64	Cocktails, Dinner/Dance, Deputy Cdr Cyp Dist.	7 Officers.
31.8.'64	Refreshments to 3 Inf Gp at Larnaca.	10 Officers.
11.9.'64	Social & Dancing, Signals Rect, 4 Mile Point.	8 NCOs.
12.9.'64	Buffet & Dancing, RAF Pergamos	12 NCOs.
12.9.'64	Buffet & Dancing, Nicosia	6 NCOs.
18.9.'64	Buffet & Dancing, HQ UNFICYP	7 Officers.
18.9.'64	Annual Dinner Dance, OC Pergamos	5 Officers.
19.9.'64	Dinner, Dance, Ordnance Depot, 4 Mile Point	4 NCOs.
19.9.'64	Dance, Pergamos RAF	2 NCOs.
22.9.'64	Luncheon, RASC, Dhekelia	7 Officers.
24.9.'64	Cocktails, Danish Contingent Nicosia.	5 Officers.
24.9.'64	Luncheon, Life Guards Zyyi.	4 Officers.
25.9.'64	Cocktails, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers.	10 Officers.
30.9.'64	Cocktails, HQ Cyprus District	1 Offr CO
2.10.'64	Dinner - Force Comdr	1 Offr CO
2.10.'64	Dinner - Cdr Finnish Contingent	1 Offr CO

e. VISITS BY BATTALION PERSONNEL TO OUTSIDE FUNCTIONS

<u>DATE</u>	<u>DETAILS OF INVITATIONS</u>	<u>PERSONNEL INVITED</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
5.7.64.	Famagusta Clay Pigeon Shooting Ass. Contest v B Soft Drinks supplied	1 Offr. 2 O/Ranks	Won 3 Medals
5.7.64	The Deputies, Organisers, Fighters of Famagusta To Meeting of General, Grivas	1 Offr.	Commanding Offr.
9.7.64	Legal Adviser to Force Comdr.	OIC	Farewell Cocktail Party.
9.7.64	Special Rep to Sec. Gen Meeting Force Comdr.	OIC	With Gk Cyp Leader.
11.7.64	- do -	OIC	With Tk Cyp Leader.
11.7.64	Boat trip and picnic by Brittish serving Families	4 Offrs. 14 ONC	To Cape Greco
14.7.64	French Ambassador to reception	OIC	French Nat. Holiday.
14.7.64	Maj. Gen. R.M.P. Carver - to Cocktails	OIC	With GK Cyp Leader.
15.7.64	Lt. Col. D.D. Fairman, 9 Sigs Regt. Sheakespeare Twelfth Night	OIC	At Dhékelia.
16.7.64	Maj. Gen. R.M.P. Carver, - to Cocktails	OIC	With TK Cyp Leader.
17.7.64	Reception of A.G. by Archbishop Makarios	3 Offrs	A.G. Capt Kelly, OIC Bn.
17.7.64	Reception of A.G. by Dr Butchuk	3 Offrs	- do -

e.

VISITS BY BATTALION PERSONNEL TO OUTSIDE FUNCTIONS (Contd)

<u>DATE</u>	<u>DETAILS OF INVITATIONS</u>	<u>PERSONNEL INVITED</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
14.7.64	Reception of Mr Paralakis, District Officer, Famagusta.	3	
14.7.64	Reception of Mr Sami, Tk Cypriot Leader.	3	
17.7.64	Supper and Social, 9 Sigs, 4 Mile Point.	4 NCOs	This is the 7th such invitation since our arrival.
18.7.64	Supper and Social Austrian Hospital, Nicosia.	7 NCOs	
28.7.64	Cocktails - Dr Kutshuk.	8 Offrs.	
31.7.64	Cocktails - 1st Bn Royal Inniskillings Fusilliers.	6 Offrs.	
1.8.64	Reception Military Attache - Syrian Arab Republic.	1 Offr.	CIC
3.8.64	Cocktails - Turkish Communal Chamber.	9 Offrs.	
10.8.64	Meal and Social - UN Group in Famagusta.	40 O/Ranks.	8 Per Sub Unit.
26.8.64	Cocktails - American Military Attache.	1 Offr.	CIC
2.9.64	Cocktails - UN Association in Cyprus.	10 Offrs.	

108

11

f. BATTALION FUNCTIONS

<u>DATE</u>	<u>DETAIL OF VISITORS</u>	<u>PERSONNEL INVITED</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
22.5.64	Mr paralikis, Dist Offr, Mr Constartinides, Chief of Gendarmerie, Supt Georghiades, Chief of Police.	3	Social Visit
25.5.64	Mr Sami, Tk Cyp Leader, 3 Other Tk Cyp Officials.	4	Social Visit
27.5.64	Bn Party for HQ UNFICYP and Iniskillings.	42 Officers	Dinner
26.5.64	NCOs Mess Buffet.	46 NCOs and Police	Opening of Mess
26.5.64	Mr Paralikis, Mr Constantinides, Supt Georghiades.	3	Presentation to Supt Georghiades.
12.7.64	2 I/C and 6 Officers from Iniskillings.	7 Offrs.	Refreshments
18.7.64	Adj. Gen., Capt Kelly, Australian Police Officers, 6 Irish Officers from HQ UNFICYP.	10	
30.7.64	Local M.P Greek -- Leaders, Police Chiefs, Nat Gd Officers, Pers of HQ UNFICYP, all Contingent Cdrs, and 4 Officers, Civilian Staffs, All British Army Contingents, and local civilian personnel.	250	Social Function Dance & Refreshments
5.8.64	Tk Cyp Leaders, Pers of HQ UNFICYP. Contingent Cdrs	50	Social Function Refreshments
15 9.64	Tk/Cypriot Leaders, from Walled City, Famagusta.	12	Buffet & Supper also 12 40 Bn Pers
1.10.64	HQ UNFICYP, 3 Inf Gp, Life Guards	12 Officers	Farewell Dinner Officers Mess
1.10.64	HQ UNFICYP, 3 Inf Gp.	20 NCOs	Farewell Dinner NCOs Mess.

g. CHAPLAINS REPORT

Originally only one Chaplain, Fr. John Condon C.F. Sarsfield Bks, Limerick, was appointed with the 40th Battalion and he accompanied the advance party.

Within a few days of reaching the island he was admitted to hospital. Fr. R. Neville C.F. Collins Bks, Dublin, was sent to take his place temporarily. It emerged quickly that two Chaplains would be needed if all sub units were to get Mass on Sundays. So, Fr. Neville was detailed to stay on after Fr. Condon's recovery.

The two Chaplains shared the Battalion between them for their work. One worked on two Companies with Wolfe Tone Camp as base, while the other worked on the two other Companies using Two Mile Point as HQ. Both exchanged places every couple of months. The local Parish Priest provided Confession facilities occasionally. (Fr. Sabiñ Flechta C.F.M.

Each Chaplain offered three Masses each Sunday and one on week days, usually at both Wolfe Tone Camp and 2 Mile Point. The Rosary was recited each evening in both places. Mass was offered at the main outposts on Sundays and occasionally on week days.

Practically every NCO and Man was interviewed personally by one of the Chaplains and a reassuring letter was sent to the next-of-kin of each.

The Chaplains assisted at the organising of tours of the Holy Land (Jordan side Only), and both accompanied one of the groups going there. These tours lasted seven days, the last few being spent in the Lebanon on the way back. The Chaplains gave talks on the Holy Places to all groups before their departure. Altogether about half of the Battalion strength went on these tours.

At the suggestion of Fr. Condon, a meeting was arranged between all the UN Chaplains on the Island and Archbishop Makarios.

The Chaplains were very pleased with the general behaviour of the Battalion and were very appreciative of the good example shown by the Officers. These encyclical meetings, as they soon became known, have been kept alive since.

BRANCHES AND SECTIONS - 40 BN

74. "Q" BRANCH

a. Consolidated Equipment Table - 40 Bn

ITEM	BN HQ & HQ Coy		Armd Car Gp		Three Coy Gps		Total	
	Combat	Res	Combat	Res	Combat	Res	Combat	Res
9 MM Browning Rifles	24	-	1	-	3	-	28	-
Gustaf Sub-Machine Guns	73	17	8	-	318	-	399	17
Bren LMG Mk III	19	17	37	-	66	-	123	17
81 mm Mortar	8	3	-	-	30	-	38	3
81 mm Mortar	-	1	-	-	6	-	6	1
81 mm Mortar	-	1	-	-	6	-	6	1
62 MG	-	-	16	-	-	-	16	1
75 mm Atk Rifles	2	2	-	-	6	-	8	2
75 mm Mortars	-	-	8	-	-	-	8	-
<u>Comms Eqp.</u>								
Wrls sets No.C.11	2	2	-	-	-	-	2	2
WFO Receiver	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
Wrls Set No.C.12	1	8	8	-	3	-	12	8
Wrls Set No.41	-	5	4	-	15	-	19	5
Wrls Set No.88	-	2	-	-	12	-	12	2
Telephones	-	10	-	-	18	-	28	-
Switchboards WD	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
10 Line	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
Table D 10 Twin	1	-	-	-	6	-	7	-
Files	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
Apparatus Cable Laying	3	-	-	-	3	-	6	-
Battery Charging Plant	2	-	-	-	3	-	5	-
<u>Instruments & Eqp.</u>								
Dinoculars	22	-	11	-	51	-	84	-
Compasses	22	-	11	-	72	-	105	-
Map Cases	22	-	11	-	60	-	93	-
Protractors	22	-	11	-	72	-	105	-
Comers	22	-	11	-	72	-	105	-
Torches Complete	92	10	27	-	156	15	275	25
atches	16	-	22	-	30	-	68	-
Clasp Knives	138	-	46	-	417	-	601	-
Verrey Light	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Pistols	8	-	9	-	15	-	32	-
Line Detectors	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<u>Other</u>								
Hot Shields	40	40	-	-	120	-	160	40
Batons	40	40	-	-	120	-	160	40
Cameras & Films	1	1	-	-	3	-	4	1
Loud Hailers (powered)	1	1	-	-	3	-	4	1
Loud Speaker	1	1	-	-	3	-	4	1
Hydro Cookers Complete	4	3	-	-	12	-	16	3
Volcano Kettles	-	40	-	-	-	-	-	40
Rivouacs	97	20	31	-	234	-	362	20
Stencil sets	2	4	2	-	6	-	14	-
Slidex Folders Complete	12	-	-	-	-	-	12	-

ARMED CAR GROUP

ITEM	Bn HQ	Armd Car Gp	Three Car Gp	TOTAL ALLOTMENT
<u>Engr Tools and Eqpt:</u>				
Axes Felling or Hand	8	6	39	53
AXES PICK	20	6	120	146
Crowbars	5	6	15	26
Cutters Wire	5	6	48	59
Hooks Slashing	11	-	99	110
Saws Cross Cut	5	6	6	17
Saws Hand or Folding	5	-	-	35
Shovels or Spades	20	6	120	146
Sledges Steel	4	-	12	16
Wedges Steel Astd	24	-	60	84
Sandbags	8,000	-	-	8,000 Bn Res.
Rope 50 Ft. Lengths	9	3	39	51

AMMUNITION TABLE

Amn	Bn HQ & HQ Coy	Armd C. Gp.	Three Coy Gps	Total
1. <u>Ballistite Energa</u>				
a. First Line		8	288	296
b. Second Line	-	16	576	592
2. <u>.303 LMG Ball</u>				
a. First Line	12,000		45,000	57,000
b. Second Line	24,000		90,000	114,000
3. <u>.303 LMG Tracer</u>				
a. First Line	2,400		9,000	11,400
b. Second Line	4,800		18,000	22,800
4. <u>7.62 MG</u>				
a. First Line (Belted)		36,000		36,000
b. Second Line (Mired)		72,000		72,000
5. <u>7.62 MG AP.</u>				
a. First Line Ball &		7,200		7,200
b. Second Line Tracer		14,400		14,400
6. <u>.303MMG Ball</u>				
a. First Line			13,500	13,500
b. Second Line			27,000	27,000
7. <u>.303 MMG Tracer</u>				
a. First Line			1,350	1,350
b. Second Line			2,700	2,700
8. <u>7.62 mm FN</u>				
a. First Line	7,300	800	31,800	39,900
b. Second Line (collected in Cyprus)	14,600	1,600	63,600	79,800
9. <u>9 mm Gustaf SMG</u>				
a. First Line	4,104	8,208	14,256	26,568
b. Second Line (collected in Cyprus)	8,550	17,100	29,700	55,350
10. <u>60 MM Mortar :HE</u>				
a. First Line		800		800
b. Second Line		1,600		1,600
11. <u>60 MM Mortar :Smoke</u>				
a. First Line		200		200
b. Second Line		400		400
12. <u>81 mm Mor 14 lb HE</u>				
a. First Line			180	180
b. Second Line			360	360

AMMUNITION TABLE (Contd)

Amm	Bn HQ & HQ Coy	Armd C Gp	Three Coy Gps	Total
13. <u>81 mm Mor 7 lb HE</u> a. First Line b. Second Line			480 960	480 960
14. <u>81 mm Mor Smoke</u> a. First Line b. Second Line			180 360	180 360
15. <u>84 mm Atk Rifle HEAT</u> a. First Line b. Second Line	30 60		90 180	120 240
16. <u>84 mm Atk Rifle HE</u> a. First Line b. Second Line	30 60		90 180	120 240
17. <u>No.36 HE Grenade</u> (Rifle Group) a. First Line b. Second Line	120 240	36 72	270 540	426 852
18. <u>Smoke Grenades</u> (Second Line) Grenades Lachrymatory (Second Line)	600 400			600 400
19. <u>Verex Lt Ctdgs</u> <u>Illuminating</u> <u>Red/Green (each)</u> (First Line) (Second Line)	64 128	72 144	120 240	256 512
20. <u>Energa Atk Heat</u> a. First Line b. Second Line		6 12	216 432	222 444
21. <u>FN 9 MM Browning</u> a. First Line b. Second Line	1,248 2,496		156 312	1,404 2,808
22.				

Barbed wire and explosives available in Cyprus.

b. Rations

(1) Rations were provided on the scale at present on issue to British Troops as shown below. Demands were made on No 4 Supply Depot, RASC DHEMELIA. Rations were supplied in two parts.

(a) FRESH RATIONS: Vegetables, Fruit, Bread and Meat which were supplied daily.

(b) DRY RATIONS: The remainder of the items on the Ration scale. These were supplied once weekly.

To assist in the turnover of stocks composite rations in 10-man Packs were issued on 1 Day weekly during the first three months and once per fortnight during a second three month period.

(2) It was found during the operations in May that the Daily Ration Scale was inadequate to cater for personnel who were required to perform duties away from Camp during the hours of darkness. A case was made for the provision of a Patrol Ration at UN expense on the scale provided in R.O.E R/7 Para 47. HQ UNFICYP authorised the issue of a single Patrol Ration at a cost of 10.891 d to all UN Units serving in CYPRUS.

(3) As a result of a request to UNFICYP Authority was granted for the issue of a $\frac{1}{2}$ Litre of Fresh Milk daily in lieu of 3 ozs tinned milk. Due to the dispersion of the Battalion and the difficulty of distribution the issue was drawn on an average for 50% of the Battalion daily.

(4) General Overseas Ration Scale

Serial	Basic Item	Basic Scale oz.	Alternative	Eqpt Scale Oz.
1	Meat Frozen bone-in Beef	8	Meat frozen bone-in Mutton or Meat frozen bone-in Lamb or Meat frozen bone-in Fork or Meat fresh bone-in or Offal or Corned Beef or Stewed Steak or Steak & Kidney Pudding or Meat and Vegetables or Chicken, oven-ready roasting or Rabbit	8 8 8 At local equivalence 8 8 8 10.2/3 18 8 8
2	Bacon mild cured	1.3/7	Bacon Canned or Eggs shell large or Eggs shell small	2 1 (no) 2 (no)
3	Sausages fresh Beef.	1.5/7	Sausages fresh Pork or Sausages canned or Luncheon Meat or Eggs shell large or Eggs shell small	1.5/7 1.5/7 1.1/2 1 (No) 2 (No)

74. b. (4) General Overseas Ration Scale (contd)

Serial	Basic Item	Basic Scale Oz.	Alternative	Eqpt Scale Oz.
3	Sausages fresh Beef	1.5/7	or Fish whole or Fish headed and gutted or Fish fillets or Kippers boned or Smoked Haddock fillets or Beans canned	6.6/7 5.1/7 3.3/7 3.3/7 3.3/7 5.5/7
4	Fish fillets	1.1/2	Fish whole or Fish headed and gutted or Kippers boned or Smoked Haddock fillets. or Sardines canned or Salmon canned MR or Herrings canned or Beans canned or Potatoes fresh	3 2.1/4 1.1/2 1.1/2 1/2 3/4 1 2.1/2 21
5	Eggs shell large	4/7 (No.)	Eggs shell small (under 1 1/2 oz)	1.1/7 (No)
6	Milk canned	5	Milk fresh or Milk Powder SSU	12.1/2(f1) 1.2/3
7	Cheese cheddar type	1/2	Cheese processed blocks or Cheese canned or Chocolate eating	1/2 1/2 1
8	Butter fresh	1/2	Butter concentrate or Margarine table	3/7 1/2
9	Margarine table	1.1/2		
10	Compound Cooking Fat	1/2	Margarine table or Cooking Oil local	1/2 1/2
11	Bread	12	Flour Culinary or Biscuits Service or Potatoes fresh in lieu of each oz. of Bread or Vegetables fresh in lieu of each oz of Bread	9 9 3 4/5
12	Flour Culinary	2.1/2	Bread or Rice or Potatoes fresh in lieu of each oz of Flour or Vegetables fresh in lieu of each oz of Flour	3.1/3 2.1/2 4 1
13	Rice	2/7	Macaroni or Semolina or Cornflour or Spaghetti or Ice Cream	2/7 2/7 2/7 2/7 1.1/4(f1)

74. b. (4) General Overseas Ration Scale (contd)

Serial	Basic Item	Basic Scale Oz.	Alternative	Eqpt Scale Oz.
14	Breakfast Cereals	5/6	Rolled Oats or Rolled Oats <u>and</u> Sugar or Breakfast Cereals <u>and</u> Milk canned	1 1/2 1 3/7 3/5
15	Sugar	3	Jam	1.5/7
16	Jam	1.1/4	Marmalade or Syrup or Sugar	1.1/4 1.1/4 2.1/8
17	Tea	5/14	Coffee or Instant Coffee Powder	1.1/14 5/28
18	Fruit Dried Vine	3/7	Fruit Dried Tree or Jam or Marmalade or Syrup or Fresh Fruit (average or varieties or Apple solid pack	3/7 3/7 3/7 3/7 3.3/4 1.1/2
19	Fruit Fresh (Average of varieties)	5	Melons, Mangoes, Pappas, Pineapples or Bananas. or Lemons and Oranges or other fresh fruit or Fruit canned or Fruit Dried Tree	6 5 4 2 4/7
20	Vegetables Fresh	8	Vegetables Canned or Beans canned or Pulses dired or Vegetables dehydrated or Vegetables quick- frozen	4 4 2 2/3 4
21	Onions fresh	1	Onions dehydrated or Vegetables Fresh	1/12 1
22	Potatoes fresh	20	Potatoes canned or Potatoes canned <u>and</u> Flour or Bread or Mashed Potato Powder or Potatoes dehydrated	13.1/3 10 2.1/2 3.1/3 4 2.6/7
23	Orange/Lemonade Powder	3/4	Tea <u>and</u> Sugar <u>and</u> Milk canned or Cocoa <u>and</u> Sugar <u>and</u> Milk Canned or Jelly Powder or Sugar	1/12 1/4 2/5 1/8 1/4 2/5 3/4 3/4

74. b. (4). General Overseas Ration Scale (contd)

Serial	Basic Item	Basic Scale Oz.	Alternative	Equivalent Scale Oz.
24	Salt Culinary	3/8		
25	Salt Table	1/8		
26	Pepper	1/100)	Any scale of any culinary item of UK or local provision within a monetary ceiling assessed on the basic scale and periodically notified.	
27	Mustard	1/100)		
28	Vinegar	1/4(f1))		
29	Custard Powder	1/12)		
30	Baking Powder	1/20)		
31	Tomato Puree	1/6)		
32	Pickles	1/12)		
33	Colourings	1/300)		
34	Essences	1/200)		
35	Herbs	1/200)		
36	Spices	1/30)		

NOTES:

- (a) In addition to the above scale, personnel under 18 years of age will receive the equivalent of an extra 1/2 pint of fresh milk daily.
- (b) When 18 oz Meat and Vegetables are issued in lieu of 8 oz Meat, 8 oz potatoes and 5 oz Vegetables will be underdrawn.
- (c) An additional issue of 1/4 oz of Salt in the form of table salt or salt tablets may be made daily on medical recommendation.

BARRACK SERVICES:

- (1) Initially Barrack Services were provided in accordance with British Army Part V Scale. This scale is a field scale and provides a minimum of Barrack Services for Units in the Field. As the scale was totally inadequate for a permanent post UNFICYP HQS was requested to make Barrack Services available in accordance with Part VI Scale. As this equipment could not be provided from British Army sources in DHEKELIA UNFICYP HQ authorised the hiring of Furniture and Refrigerators at a Hire Charge of £140 per month from a **Civilian Contractor**.

The Equipment hired provided for

- (a) Single Accommodation - Officers.
 - (b) Mess Accommodation - Officers.
 - (c) Mess Accommodation - NCOs.
 - (d) General Accommodation - Rank and File.
 - (e) Canteen Accommodation.
- (2) Miscellaneous Chemicals and Disinfectants, Fuel Wood, electric Bulbs etc were provided on demand by Barrack Services RASC DHEKELIA.

74. c. (3) RE-FILLS of Bottled Gas were provided by contract arranged by UNFICYP with MOBIL LP GAZ CYPRUS LTD.
- (4) CONSERVANCY AND SCAVENGING: Existing British Army Contracts were availed of to provide these services in the Irish Camps by arrangements of UNFICYP.
- (5) CLEANING MATERIALS: The Cleaning Materials carried by the Battalion from IRELAND was sufficient for 3 months. For the second three months UNFICYP authorised the Battalion QM to expend up to a maximum of £30 per month on the purchase of these items, accounts being paid by Chief Finance Officer UNFICYP.
- (6) FIRE FIGHTING EQUIPMENT: The District Fire Adviser HQ CYPRUS DISTRICT inspected the Irish Camps and arranged for Fire Fighting Equipment on a suitable scale to be provided from Ordnance Stores, DHEKELIA.

d. CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES:

UNFICYP authorised the employment of One Foreman, 14 labourers in the Irish Camps. Arrangements for the procurement of this labour from the Labour Exchange FAMAGUSTA was made by the Civilian Establishment and Pay Officer, CYPRUS. Time Sheets were submitted weekly by the Battalion QM to CEPO who arranged for the payment of the personnel. This money being subsequently claimed from UNFICYP by the Finance Officer, BYPRUS DISTRICT.

e. GENERAL:

All the Stores, Services and Contracts supplied and arranged by HQ CYPRUS DISTRICT were most satisfactory and all ranks of the British Army both UN and NON-UN gave every assistance and co-operation in the logistical support of this Unit throughout its tour of duty in CYPRUS. A special word of praise is due to 1 Battalion Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers for the provision of Transport and Fatigue parties to assist in the drawing of Stores to set up Wolfe Tone Camp before the arrival of the Main Body.

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BRANCHES AND SECTIONS

"Q" BRANCH

f. CLOTHING :

(1). Issues from Ireland

Tropical Walking Out Trousers Prs	2
" " " Shirts	2
Vests	6
Underpants	6
Sweater	1
$\frac{3}{4}$ Length Hose Prs	3
Brassards	2

(2). UN Issue

Scarves	2
Berets	2
Badges Cap	1
Caps Field Service	1
Badges UN	3
Shirts Olive Green	2
Trousers Olive Green Prs	2

- (3). The above items of clothing were the normal issue for overseas service with the exception of the Sweater which was introduced for service in CYPRUS. All carried a life of 6 months. Frequent laundering of UN Green Uniforms due to warm climate and dusty conditions reduced the life of these uniforms. Shortly after half way through the tour of duty 50% of the Bn got a replacement issue.

g. EQUIPMENT

(1). Web Equipment

Each Officer and Man One set of Web, water bottle, ground sheet, respirator, mess tin, helmet and whistle.

(2). Bn Equipment

(a). See consolidated equipment table.

(b). 8 Panhard Armoured Cars complete with Spares and Wireless equipment. Ammunition was expended on exercising the crews of the Armoured Cars.

(c). Ordnance Section The Ordnance Section, Capt Barrett IC gave careful attention to weapons and ammunition. The dusty conditions, as well as proximity to sea and the difficulty of storing ammunition and explosives in the very hot climate caused many problems for the Section but they overcame them and succeeded in maintaining weapons and ammunition in very good condition.

h. THE SYSTEM OF SUPPLY:

- (1). HQ UNFICYP exercised overall logistic control of the UN Force and HQ CYPRUS DISTRICT DHEKELIA (NOT Part of the UN Force) was responsible for the direct provision of the logistic support of the UN Force in CYPRUS. In the case of 40 Bn this support consisted of:-
 - (a) Rations
 - (b) Tpt, Spares, Repair and Maintenance.
 - (c) POL
 - (d) UN Clothing
 - (e) Tentage
 - (f) Bk. Services
 - (g) Contracts for Laundry, Dry Cleaning and Boot Repairs.
 - (h) Civilian Labour
 - (i) 2nd Line Amn
 - (j) Misc Chemicals for water purification, insect and rodent control and disinfectants.
 - (k) Signal equipment, Spares, Repair and **Maintenance**.
 - (l) Camp maintenance and repair.
- (2). Accountancy for above was carried out as laid down in UNFICYP SOPs which were based on the British Army System of Accountancy.
- (3). Imprests were NOT given to QM. Local purchases were permitted for cleaning materials - soap, washing powders etc.
- (4). (a). Ration Scale - See Ration Scale (page 115).
 - (b). The quality of the rations was excellent at all times.
 - (c). The standard of cooking was high. Cooking was carried out in all permanent camps by means of oil fired ranges and ludgate boilers (oil fired and solid fuel). Hydra Cookers were used on all other occasions. With the Bn engaged in heavy operations for the first three months, the Cooks of the Bn went through a very difficult time. For long periods meals were being served from 03.30 hours to 23.59 hours. In the hot summer weather and working in a kitchen designed to cater for 100 men the cooks were severely tested and acquitted themselves reasonably well. Their good work certainly must get its share of credit for the good health and general happiness enjoyed by the Bn in Cyprus.
1. Liaison with the British Supply Bases was excellent at all times during the tour of duty of 40 Bn in Cyprus and every assistance and co-operation was given by all ranks at these Establishments

BRANCHES AND SECTIONS

OPS BRANCH

75. OPS BRANCH:

a. Organisation

The Ops Branch staff consisted of one Comdt and one Sgt. Due to the multiplicity of problems dealt with it became evident at an early stage that this staff was inadequate. Three Capts (asst adjt, asst IO and Ord Offr) were seconded to the branch and contributed in no small way to the efficient running of the branch from then onwards.

b. Duties

One member of the Ops Staff was on duty at all times between 08.00 hours and 20.00 hours. A Unit duty Officer was appointed daily for the period 20.00 hours to 08.00 hours.

c. System of Reporting

The Ops Room had direct contact with HQ UNFICYP by radio, telephone and teleprinter. All serious incidents were reported to HQ UNFICYP as they occurred and, depending on the gravity of the incident, HQ was kept informed of the progress made by the Unit in dealing with it. Apart from this incident report all activities of the Unit were reported twice daily to HQ UNFICYP by a routine Situation Report (SITREP). As all communications were unclassified this was normally sent by teleprinter at 05.00 hours and 17.00 hours daily.

Reports from routine patrols and escorts were sent by wireless if the situation warranted. On the return of the patrol or escort the Comd submitted a patrol report and was debriefed by the Ops Offr on duty.

Reports of a classified or confidential nature were picked up daily at 07.00 hours by an Air Dispatch Service organised by HQ UNFICYP.

d. Tasks

Due to the fact that there was a complete breakdown in communications between the Greek and Turkish communities the Ops Branch had to deal with many problems not normally associated with this branch. Apart from dealing with outbreaks of hostilities and routine patrols most of the following problems became normal to the day to day operation of the branch.

(1). Missing Persons.

This was unrewarding in that very few of those reported missing were ever traced. 32 disappeared in one 14 day period in the FAMAGUSTA District.

(2). Damage to Property.

This was continuous during the period, effecting property vacated by both sides as a result of local hostilities. Reports were investigated.

(3). Distribution of harvest monies to Turkish Co-operatives.

Monies remaining unpaid by the Greek Community for the 1963 harvest on the outbreak of hostilities were distributed to the Turkish Co-operatives concerned.

(4). Red Crescent Supplies.

Arrangements were made for the release and distribution of Red Crescent Supplies from FAMAGUSTA to Turkish villages all over the island.

(5). Straying animals.

Animals straying from the property of one community to the other was continuous and arrangements had to be made for the return of these animals.

(6). Liaison.

There was continuous need for liaison between the two communities. For part of the period the Ops Officer also acted as Liaison Offr with the leader of the Turkish Community in the district. This involved the resolution of all types of problems in the daily life of the community.

(7). Escorts.

As life began to return to normal there was a continuous requirement for the following escorts:-

(a). Harvesting operations.

(b). Shopping convoys from Turkish villages to FAMAGUSTA and NICOSIA.

(c). Milk Convoys to NICOSIA.

(d). Turkish employees to British SBA at DHEKELIA.

(e). Individuals visiting their property on both sides.

e. Airlift on rotation of 40 Inf Bn

The Ops Offr assisted by the QM and Transport Offr was responsible for arranging the airlift of the 40 Bn from CYPRUS and it is to the credit of these Officers that the rotation was completed without a single hitch.

f. Joint Patrol

A Joint Patrol led by Capt N. Cantrell operated in FAMAGUSTA District throughout the tour of duty of 40 Bn. In addition to the Officer, two interpreters - Mr G. Tinati (Turkish) and Mr A. Martinano (Greek), a Signaler and two Dvrs made up the team. They travelled in two landrovers, one fitted with a C42 Wrsls.

g. Purpose of the Patrol.

(1). To collect information on the state of Health, Economic Situation and Particularly on any causes of hardship in the District.

(2). To restore confidence and goodwill between Greek and Turk Cypriot Communities and UNFICYP.

OVER/

By using patience and a sympathetic approach, the Patrol gradually gained the confidence of the villagers who then were induced to discuss freely their problems. A feature of the work of the Patrol was that every problem, however small, was noted and followed up and the result reported back to the village. For months the villages were out of contact with neighbouring villages, their relatives in other parts of the island, and the Authorities. The UN Patrol having free access to all areas solved many problems, inspired confidence and goodwill for UN and particularly for the Irish Contingent, and were a big factor in restoring and maintaining peace in the FAMAGUSTA District.

The Patrol moved out every morning and visited a group of villages calling on the MUEHTAR or President and leading Citizens of Communities. They made on the spot inspections of complaints and problems and set about their solution. They explained the mission of UNFICYP and the point of view and conflicting claims of the other side. By taking in about 10 villages daily, they were able to visit each village about once in 10 days and report progress made in the interval.

The daily report was discussed each evening with Bn HQ who decided on action to be taken. Sometimes the Coy operating in the particular area were given the tasks, such as provision of escorts and local protection, or adjudicating in disputes over Livestock or Crops. Other problems would be taken up with the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriot authorities and Police. Other problems were passed on to the various Relief Organisations such as Red Cross, Red Crescent etc. Such problems were also passed on to the Medical Officer 40 Irish Bn. The Turkish community were in a far more difficult situation and it was unavoidable that a good deal of the time was given to them. Nevertheless the Greek Cypriot population were not neglected. Irish Contingent, and were a big factor in restoring and maintaining peace in the FAMAGUSTA District.

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BRANCHES AND SECTIONS

76. INTELLIGENCE SECTION

The first task of the Battalion on the island was to establish relationship with the leaders of the two rival communities. By April 1964 the Turkish Cypriots had withdrawn from all participation in the Government of Makarios and had a parallel administration of their own which recognised Dr Kuchuk as its head. In the Famagusta District, with a very few exceptions, the villages and towns had become entirely Greek. In the city of Famagusta the walled city was completely Turkish and no Greeks were admitted. The Turkish element of the Cyprus Police force had taken their arms and moved to Turkish areas where they continued to carry out police duties.

The Turkish Cypriots in the Famagusta District recognised Mr Ahmet Sami as their leader. Mr Sami was formerly the District Commissioner but was deposed by the Makarios Government. While Sami was the recognised Turkish spokesman it was apparent that his power was restricted by the shadowy figures in the background, the leaders of TMT, the Turkish Cypriot secret army which succeeded Volkan already referred to. Rauf Denktaş, a Nicosia lawyer and head of the Turkish Communal Chamber, was the reputed head of TMT in Cyprus. The identity of the Famagusta TMT leader was never revealed to 40 B although we had information that he was a Turkish (National) Army Officer who went under the nom de guerre of "PASHA".

The Greek Cypriot authority was shared between the District Commissioner, Mr Paralakis and a local M.P. Mr Pavlakis who was a former EOKA leader and was designated as Makarios's local representative.

Whereas the Turkish control was monolithic there were many separate factions among the Greeks who were agreed only in their opposition to the Turks. The Greek Cypriot political spectrum ranged from the "Enosis or nothing" element through the many who were unenthusiastic about complete union with Greece - among them, it was claimed, Makarios himself - to the Communists and near communists who were a substantial part of the population.

At the start of the mission there were hundreds of Armed Greek Cypriots throughout Famagusta and District who enjoyed the special status of auxiliary policemen. This status was acquired by the simple procedure of registering at the nearest police station and any violence thereafter could be described as in the line of duty. The coffee shops were full throughout the days with those swaggering gun men who were guilty of many outrages. Even when the authorities disapproved of their activities they did little to curb them and nothing to bring them to justice. There were also considerable numbers of uniformed auxiliary policemen who manned a great number of strong points and carried out patrols in cars and land rovers.

Many of the old EOKA leaders emerged from retirement and formed their own bands of armed followers. A number of those leaders had doubts about the sincerity of Makarios's desire for Enosis and were prepared to act independently whenever they so chose. It was essential to the success of our mission that we should get to know who those leaders were.

From the very beginning of the Battalion tour of duty great emphasis was laid on the visits to the villages. Patrols quickly established friendly relationships throughout the District and lists of the civic and military leadership were compiled. Very close liaison with the Turkish leadership and with the Greek authorities, police and administrative, was established.

OVER.....

Ireland's long struggle against Britain was a factor which predisposed the Greek Community in favour of the Irish. Against that, the battalion's very first intervention in Karaolos to save Turk Cypriot families and several other incidents during the first weeks in Famagusta proved to the Turk Cypriots the impartiality of the battalion. After their close association with British troops, the Turk Cypriot community was initially apprehensive as to the attitude and thinking of the Irish battalion but any fears they had in this regard were quickly dispelled in the early days of the battalion's mission.

The fact that the battalion reported to HQ UNFICYP, where British Officers predominated, was a disadvantage as the Greek Cypriot authorities felt that to some degree UN was serving as a British intelligence source. This attitude was aggravated by the tactless, and indeed pointless reconnaissance flights carried out by UN aircraft over sensitive Greek Cypriot installations.

The battalion was required to submit a daily INTSUM to UNFICYP HQ. This obviously contained information which by any standards was highly confidential. Notwithstanding this, instructions to the battalion were to send the INTSUM by telex which was routed through the Government post office. This would place a copy of the INTSUMS in the hands of the Greek Cypriot authorities. The intelligence UNFICYP staff refused to see anything wrong in this system and only after considerable argument and discussion on the point was a change of procedure brought about.

A task which fell to the lot of the intelligence staff was the investigation of killings and shootings. These investigations were necessarily time consuming and the staff had no special training in this type of work. The need for the services of people trained in criminal investigation was keenly felt and the services of some of the Swedish civil police were entirely unsatisfactory because of the language difficulty. As a result a request was made to have a detachment of Irish civil police attached to the battalion. The Irish Government did not accede to the UN request (from New York) for Gardai but early in June a section of Australian civil police was posted to the Famagusta District.

BRANCHES AND SECTIONS

77. ENGINEER SECTION

With the arrival of Comdt J. Seward and Coy Sgt W. McLoughlin at the old R.E. Camp at Salamis Road early on the morning of 10th April 1964 the task of the Engineer Section began. It was not to stop until the last "dingy" box was nailed up on the morning of departure. In fact, in common with the remainder of the Bn they worked the first five weeks from dawn to dusk, Sundays included.

The take over of the Camp was the first of many surprises that the section was to experience. They were met at the gate by a number of uniformed Cypriots, War Department Policeman. Comdt Seward stated that he had come to prepare the Camp for the arrival of the Irish UN Bn. To his amazement he was handed over the keys by a most friendly bunch of men. It was in strange contrast to the previous take over of a R.E. British installation by the Corps of Engineers, that was at Fort Camden, Crosshaven in 1938 when it was carried out with full ceremonial.

There was never a further attempt at a hand-over and no documents were ever produced. In this simple informal but friendly manner an entire camp and its fittings passed from British to Irish hands.

The Salamis Road camp is located a few miles North of Famagusta and it had housed No 3 Cyprus Royal Engineers (RE) Supply Depot. It was said to have held the Engineer equipment of three British Divisions. The camp had been vacated in Dec 1963 and could best be described as a derelict site in April 1964. All lighting, plumbing and other attractive fittings had been removed and the interior sheeting had even been torn from the Nissan Huts. It had been severely damaged by a storm in Dec, 1963. It was a British retained site and all the buildings erected on it were due to be auctioned on 25 May 1964 and the site handed back to the Cyprus Government. Being within one mile of the sea on the main road it is a most valuable bit of property. The Camp had never been designed to accommodate troops other than a small number of Royal Engineer NCOs. It was purely a large stores depot staffed by over one hundred Cypriot workers. It covered an area of about five acres and was completely surrounded by an eight foot high single strand barbed wire fence with two coils of dannert wire at the base. The perimeter fence was completely illuminated and it had all the appearance of a concentration camp. The camp contained 19 Nissan huts, 22 corrugated iron sheds and 9 mason sheds, each shed 60 ft long X 33 ft wide X 20 ft high. These sheds were subsequently to house a Platoon each. The camp also contained a small canteen and kitchen. These were to serve as the base for the cooking for an entire Bn.

This camp had been selected to accommodate the main body of the Bn by the Recce Party who visited Cyprus at the end of March, 1964. The Engineer Section of one Officer, six NCOs and five Ptes faced a major problem in fitting it out to accommodate 40 Officers and over 400 other ranks. Valuable preparatory work had been carried out by Capt W. Raftery who was the Engineer member of the Recce Party. In order to rehabilitate the camp to the minimum UN acceptable standard for housing troops an estimate was passed to the Chief Finance Officer, UNFICYP, Mr Paddy Beirne of Dublin on 11 April 1964 for the following works

/OVER.....

a. Lighting of buildings	- £570
b. Two new cooking ranges	- £330
c. Re-lining Messon huts	- £600
d. Laying concrete floors and providing ends to OM Stores and NCOs Mess	- £600
e. Provision of deep trench latrine	- £650
f. Provision of ten cold water showers and ablution trenches	- £400
Add 10% contingency	- £315
Add 20% British Departmental Charge	- £700 approx
Grand Total	- £4,200

The Work was to be carried out in three weeks by contract and British Ministry of Public Works and Buildings (MPBW) using Cypriot labour under the direct supervision of Comdt Seward, who incidentally made history by being the first Irish Engineer Officer to have female labourers, on his staff. These Ladies of intermediate age, dressed, in long black dresses and shawls, who fed the concrete mixers, were in direct contact to the young Cypriot white-shirted glamour-boy electricians. A labour force of about sixty Cypriots was employed at the peak of work.

The Engineer section was employed on Camp maintenance and minor repair works. A job priority list was drawn up on the initial inspection of the camp when the NCOs were assisted by the Greek Clerk of Works, Mr Andreas Nicholas, from the nearby British Royal Signals Camp at Four Mile Point. He made materials readily available from his stores on the instructions of the Garrison Works Officer, Mr R.V. Wright and the Area Engineer at Dhekelia, Mr Roons, A.M.I.C.E. These gentlemen proved most helpful during the entire tour and due credit must be given to their ready assistance.

The works sanctioned above were completed in mid May and the contractors withdrew. All works from that on were carried out by the Engineer Section with ever ready assistance from Bn personnel of all Corps and ranks. Following discussions with Mr Beirne at HQ UNFICYP and MPWB it was agreed that stores to the value of £300 could be drawn each month from Dhekelia. C/S McLoughlin was appointed foreman of works. This speeded up the work programme and gave Comdt Seward complete freedom of job selection; and some of the jobs were somewhat peculiar.

On the 18th April Lt Col M. Andrews, Commanding Royal Engineers, Cyprus, invited Comdt Seward to his HQ at Slim Eks., Dhekelia and briefed him of the full Royal Engineer set up on the island. He also promised full co-operation and use of all engineer plant and equipment as required. This promise was kept to the full and subsequently concrete mixers, cranes, storage tanks, water towers etc were loaned without charge. Comdt Seward was lucky in that he had completed an Engineer Course with Lt Col Andrews O.B.E. at Chatham and that Lt Col E.C. O'Callaghan O.B.E. Chief Engineer Officer, UNFICYP was a fellow corkman.

At the end of April Comdt Tony MacSullivan, A.M.S. decided that the area in rear of the cookhouse was a health hazard as it was unpaved. Sanction was granted in the sum of £450 to carry out this work, provide sinks, construct overhead cover from the sun and timber presses for delph. As the British Army School at near-by KARAOLOS had been vacated following the outbreak of fighting, the water heating plant was transferred to provide hot water for this system. Due to the installation of

extra signal equipment the Signal centre proved too small. As a result of the urgent requests of Capt. Sean Flynn an addition was constructed at a cost of £360. With the advent of hot weather in June it was found that the tents were most uncomfortable for housing troops as floors were of six inches of fine dust. Sanction was granted on 3 July for £500 to purchase materials to lay concrete floors, to paint, to provide ends and install lighting in six open Nissan huts. This work was carried out by the Engr Section ably assisted by Sgt O'Sullivan 4 Bn and his pipe band. The Adjutant General complimented them on this work. Sanction was received in July for £155 to install socket outlets and a power supply to the Mens Dining Hall and for £300 to cover a 70 ft x 30 ft corrugated iron shed into a Corporals Mess. These works were carried out in addition to the normal maintenance requirements of the Engineer Section.

In addition to the above works a light aircraft runway was developed at Salamis Road on the partly developed site of a holiday village. During this work the Section had an armed confrontation with car loads of armed irregulars who did not like planes landing near their camp. A water shortage also developed in the camp, due partly to the fact that it was situated at the end of the main from Panagusta and also to the fact that the local shepherds watered their flocks by cutting the pipes, which were overground, with picks. This was overcome by erecting two 1600 gall braithwarte tanks on prefabricated towers which were supplied from R.E. stores.

Pearse Camp at Two Mile Point also created some problems for the Section but as it had been handed over in good condition these were quickly overcome. The Section also erected camp structures, engineer fittings and supplied light and water at Platoon camps at KOMI KEBIR, CATOS, VATILI, AXIOS ANDRONIKOS, and the Medical Depot. But these jobs were much welcomed as they enabled the tradesmen to get away from HQ and work in other spheres - and the Platoon Commanders gave them much appreciated holiday facilities.

A solution to the sheltering of entries or observers on exposed positions on the walls of the old city, from the hot sun was found by erecting shelters of cane matting over each position. This type of shelter was rapidly copied by the entire force.

Engineer inspections were also carried out to property damaged by both Greek and Turk Cypriots and estimates prepared and costed.

General Gyani on his farewell visit on 24 June spoke to members of the Section and complimented them on their works. He stated that "a derelict site had been made a comfortable camp". The UN Financial Controller, New York visited the camp on 27 July and stated that it was the best UN Camp in Cyprus and that the money sanctioned had been well spent and accounted for in excellent fashion. The tribute must be paid to Mr P. Beirne for meeting the many requests in such a generous way. Comdt J. Seward was appointed Chief Engineer UNFICYP and reluctantly left to take up his new appointment on 29 June. Supervision of the remaining works fell on the capable shoulders of C/S McLoughlin and his excellent Senior NCOs Sgts Cotter and Burke.

Sgt Cotter and tradesmen of the Section also helped the 3rd Infantry Group in setting up their Camps at Larnaca.

The works were much appreciated by the men of 40 Bn who were under strain for long periods and it is believed to have been a big factor in the higher morale which the 40 Bn undoubtedly had.

But the works could not have been carried out without the wonderful co-operation and good-will that was so readily available from the Officers and men of the Battalion. They quickly realised that the Engineer Section was too small and overworked, and readily helped in every job. The results of this were only too evident when the Camp was handed over to the 41 Bn. An Officers Mess with bar, lounge and anti-rooms stood where the ruins of a Nissen Hut lay 1st April. A very large high hut had mysteriously moved across the Camp and was a most comfortable Sergeants Mess. The large Manson Huts were good billets, canteens and recreation halls. It was a complete change from the night of 14th April when the advance party moved in and all ranks slept in huts without doors, windows, light or even chairs, and one sink and one range were the complete working facilities and the future looked bleak.

The Engineer Section was glad of the experiences gained both as soldiers and tradesmen and proud to wear the 40 Bn badge. They were C/S McLoughlin (Carpenter), Sgts Cotter and Burke (Painters) Cpls O'Brien (Mason), Heffernan and Murphy (Carpenters) Ptes Devine (Electrician) Johnston (Fitter/Driver) Sheehan, Vale and Kiernan (Carpenters).

BRANCHES AND SECTIONS

SIGNAL COMMUNICATION

78. FORMING UP

a. The Signal Pl of the battalion was representative of all parts of Ireland being composed of men from all three Commands and Curragh Training Camp and made up mostly of technicians in the following categories:

- (1) Wireless operators
- (2) Line men
- (3) Radio mechanics
- (4) Cipher operators, with a sprinkling of switchboard operators, teleprinter operators, battery charging and stores personnel.

On 1st April, prior to the departure of the battalion overseas the Officer i/c Signal Platoon Capt. S. Flynn, and 2 Senior NCOs proceeded to Orleans, France for a short course in the installation, operation and maintenance of the communication equipment supplied with the new Panhard Armoured Cars with which the battalion was to be equipped. The course was conducted by the 2nd Hussars, a Cavalry Regiment of the French Army with HQ in Orleans. This party returned to Ireland on 15th April and rejoined the already formed battalion at the Curragh. In the meantime on the 9th April the Pl Sergeant COMS F. Mullins and 2 NCOs of the Pl flew out with the advance party to Cyprus. On arrival in Cyprus one of the NCOs in question Sgt Callaghan of Air Corps Signals, Gormanstown, remained in Nicosia to be briefed and practised on the operation of the teleprinter system which was used by U.N. on the Island. Sgt Callaghan had previous experience of teleprinter working with the Dept of P&T and this fact plus the training he received at UN HQ was a valuable asset to the battalion in first few settling down weeks of the mission.

b. REAR LINKS

- (1) Radio and Line. The arrival of the main body of the battalion at Wolfe Toke Camp, Famagusta saw established rear links in operation between the B. and HQ UNFICYP composed of, direct teleprinter link, direct tie line, phone link and one operational radio link as well as a telephone line connected into the local Famagusta Exchange for telephonic communication throughout the island. Much of the credit for procuring this excellent established set up must go to the Signals Advance Party, and Capt B. Deegan an Irish Signal Officer on the communications staff at HQ UNFICYP. The telephone and teleprinter facilities were provided by the local Dept of P&T (CYTA) and proved very efficient, though undoubtedly insecure, throughout the duration of the mission.

The operational radio link was supplied by the British Forces on the Island and was designed for passing messages of a purely operational or emergency nature. This radio link up ensured a continuous radio link between all UN Contingents on the Island and HQ UNFICYP. This was accomplished in the following manner:

The British established a receiving and re-broadcast station on Mount Olympus in the Troodos mountain range manned by the British forces. All UN Contingent HQ were supplied with transmitters and receivers suitable for working to this station and provided that one's aerial was suitably sited and sufficient power available, radio-communications were possible throughout the island. It was possible to trigger this receiving and re-broadcast station with either of two frequencies 53 Mc/s and 235 Mc/s and this was suitable for us as the 53 Mc/s frequency was within the frequency range of both the infantry manpack set A 41 and the Panhard Armoured Car VHF/FM set VRC 10 as well as the one C 42 set which we had on loan from UN and supplied by HQ UNFICYP for the joint Patrol Commander.

Shortly after the battalion became operational a further stand-by radio link using WS C 11s on the HF band was set up to link all Contingents on the island with UNFICYP and though little used it had the advantage of not being dependent on local electricity which was controlled by the Cyprus Government. The Australian Civilian Police attached to the battalion had motorola radio sets installed in their cars and their base station was installed in the battalion Signal centre and was operated by Bn Signal personnel. This station had also contact with UN Civilian Police HQ stationed in Nicosia.

(2) Signal Dispatch Service.

This was catered for from April to August by a daily aircraft dispatch service from HQ UNFICYP, the aircraft using a landing strip close to the Irish Bn camp. This ended however when the runway was made unusable so the dispatch service was carried on by sending a landrover to HQ UNFICYP each day at 0530 hrs carrying classified documents to and from the HQ.

(3) Fwd Links: Radio, - this fell into 4 categories

- (a) Linking the Coy and Pl outposts with Bn HQ.
- (b) Mobile patrols.
- (c) Standing patrols in sensitive areas
- (d) Cavalry communications.

For (a) and (b) above the WS C. 12 was generally used supplemented with spare A NGRC 9 and C. 11s as available. When possible the local telephone service was utilised and this proved satisfactory.

Very heavy patrolling of the battalion area was undertaken early on and signals were heavily committed during this period with anything up to 18 or 19 of the C 12 sets in use daily. Thus a continuous stream of information was being fed back daily during patrol missions from all patrols into the Bn operations room to be utilised as required. This heavy commitment on equipment and operating personnel continued throughout most of the mission and worked very satisfactorily.

Standing Patrols. For the standing patrols in the sensitive areas such as the docks, Sakharis, Karaolos and the walled city the lately purchased A 41 infantry manpack sets were used but where possible, line was substituted and good results from both was experienced.

20VER.....

A feature of using the WS A 41 set was that all infantrymen engaged in patrol work became quite proficient in its use and with the Voice Procedure used for radio communications.

Cavalry Coats: Of the eight Armoured Cars with the Battalion two cars were equipped with both a HF set ANCRC 9 similar to C 12 and a VHF/FM set ANVRC 10 similar but more powerful than infantry manpack set A 41. All other cars were equipped with VRC 10s, satisfactory results were obtained with both sets the ANCRC 9 working on the Bn C 12 net and the VRC 10 working either into an A 41 set in Bn HQ or utilising the operational rear link set on 53 Mc/s.

c. Line

As the operation advanced and permanent posts were established, telephone lines were run out between posts generally in omnibus circuits and they worked satisfactorily.

d. Comcen

This was located beside the Bn ops room and within it were

- (1) The bns forward and rear radio base stns.
- (2) Teleprinter.
- (3) Telephone SB which controlled the tie line to HQ UNFICYP, the local post office exchange lines and the internal extensions for the Bn HQ. Senior NCOs of the Signal Platoon acted as supervisors in the Comcen with the responsibility of ensuring that all the circuits were kept in operation and working efficiently and that all traffic incoming and outgoing was cleared without delay. The NCOs chosen for this task were Sgt A. Fogarty, Sgt O'Callaghan and Sgt H. Sheridan and much credit is due to these men for the continued efficient smooth running of the COMCEN which was the subject of favourable comment on more than one occasion.

e. Maintenance

- (1) Workshops
- (2) A reasonably well equipped workshop provided us with a very satisfactory maintenance service and the unit had two excellent radio mechanics in Sgt M. Sullivan of Signal Base Workshops and Cpl J. Maher of 1 Fd Sigs Coy. HQ UNFICYP had made prior arrangements with the British Forces in the SBA for maintenance help and use was made of this facility when required.

The incidence of faults on all equipment was fairly low with the exception of the A 41 set which tended early on to be quite high. However after a request to each of the Coys that the sets should be more carefully handled this reduced the fault incidence to a reasonable level.

/OVER.....

- (3) Spare Parts - Adequate spares were carried generally except for A 41 set which had only been recently issued to the Army and little or no spares were available. However the British Forces on the Island carried adequate stocks and they generously provided us with our requirements.

One of the spare ANGRC 9 for the Armoured Cars developed a transmit relay fault and as the British did not have this set on issue, one of our ANGRC 9s was out of commission for about 3 months until a suitable spare could be sent out from Ireland.

Another part of the Armoured car communication equipment which gave a lot of trouble was the microphone capsule for the operators headset and soon they were in short supply. Excessive blowing into the microphone resulted in the tiny grains of carbon being displaced thus damaging the sensitivity of the mic beyond repair. Polythene covers were made for the capsules and this helped until more spares became available.

f. Accountancy and Stores

The Signal Platoon was responsible for keeping its own accounts and this work was carried out in a most efficient manner by COMS F. Mullins who also carried out the duties of Pl Sgt. In both of these capacities this man acted in an exemplary manner and proved to be an outstanding NCO.

g. Battery Charging Equipment

Field Wireless sets without batteries are as useful as rifles without bullets so this end of the stick was a very important one. The responsibility for this task fell to Sgt J. Crocock of the line section. The battery charging equipment carried proved unsatisfactory but fortunately the Cavalry contingent had a large Auto Diesel charging plant and this got over the difficulties. It was run continuously on an average of 16 hours per day, sometimes 24 hrs a day and to Sgt Crococks credit no failure of communications was ever attributed to lack of batteries.

It was fortunate also that most of the wireless cars supplied by HQ UNFICYP to the Bn were fitted for radio (FFR) and thus incorporated a charging unit for its wireless batteries and this relieved the strain somewhat on the battery charging section and ensured that patrols had fully charged batteries for their wireless set at all times.

h. Codes and Cipher

- (1) Cipher. Prior to the formation of the Bn all the Senior NCOs and the Signal Officer of the Pl went on a crash refresher course on the Army No 1 Cipher system as this was stated to be one of the requirements and would be used between Bn HQ and HQ UNFICYP. As it turned out this did not arise; however the equipment was carried and was given a working test during the period and performed satisfactorily.

h. Codes and Cipher (COMED)

(2) Codes: Slidex equipment was also carried. UN HQ issued the relevant keys periodically to each contingent and the Bn Signal Officer compiled unit cards locally to suit the famagusta area. These were distributed to each Coy for use in emergency. A mapcode to cover the Bn area was also made out by the Bn Signal Officer and distributed to the Coys for patrol work.

i. Personnel

All personnel performed excellently. Early on there was a dire shortage of Radio operators and switch-board operators but this was somewhat relieved by utilising signal corps personnel who had travelled out with the Coys as infantrymen.

From time to time some of the HQ operating personnel had to be seconded to the Coys to help them out in their patrolling commitments. Specially commended for excellence in this field were Sgm B. Kilmartin and Sgm D. Deasy.

The Signal section of A Coy was ably commanded by Sgt N. Keys and B Coy by Cpl W. O'Shea and Cpl C. O'Mahoney, and C Coy by Sgt M. Hamill.

j. General

The standard of radio operating and communications generally was excellent throughout the tour and it can be said that the Signal platoon played a major part in the success of the operations in the 40 Bn. Immediate info was available at Bn HQ and Officer Commanding 40 Bn was at all times fully informed of all happenings in his district. All patrols were in constant contact with base and an up to the minute of the location of each patrol was at all times available. in the Ops Room

BRANCHES AND SECTIONS

79. M.T. PLATOON - 40th Bn

a. Training

There were two distinct phases of training particular to the M.T. Platoon and outside of scope of organised HQ Coy or Bn training. The phases were pre-embarkation training and during tour training.

(1). Pre-embarkation.

Since the Platoon was organised of men from numerous transport Units, of varied ages and experience a few subjects were tackled to give a standard basis for operation. In the pre-embarkation phase the following subjects were covered:-

(a). Drill.

This included footdrill on square as well as other drills for loading and unloading troops and stores. Rules of the road and Convoy driving drill were also included.

(b). Vehicle and Workshop Accountancy;

Every member was put through the standard method of "Marking out" and recording vehicle details as well as "Use of Petrol and Oil". In addition every member was made familiar with the procedure of sending a vehicle to workshop for repair.

(c). Accident Procedure.

The Platoon Commander satisfied himself that every member was familiar with accident procedure.

(d). Drivers Standing Orders.

All drivers were tested to ensure that they were familiar with the contents of Drivers Standing Orders.

(2). During Tour Training.

Every opportunity was availed of to improve procedures and educate clerical and fitter members of platoon especially. The following was accomplished:-

(a). Conducted visit of workshop and technical stores of ENNISKILLING FUSILLERS, conducted by the M.T. Officer of that Unit, Lieut Anderson. Those who took part were:- Capt Leyne, Sgts Madigan and Ferris, Cpls McNamee and Fowley.

(b). Cpls O'Halloran and Butler were given ten hours accountancy instruction at Ordnance Stores, 4 Mile Point. This proved useful and ensured efficiency in working with a new system of accountancy.

- (c). A conducted tour of 48 Command workshops by Major Taylor (B.A) for the fitters followed by a period of four hours instruction ensured that there was efficient co-operation throughout the tour.
- (d). Capt Leyne, with the Bn QM attended a two day course in "Methods of Accountancy" at the Ordnance Stores 4 Mile Point.

b. NCO Tasks.

A concept of tasks was given to the NCOs before embarkation. This enabled them to familiarise themselves and ensured smooth operation throughout the tour. The concept was changed very little and the allotment of tasks was as follows:-

(1). Sgt James Madigan.

Platoon Sgt, responsible for overall supervision discipline and administration. Assistant to Platoon Officer in operation of M.T Platoon. Accident Investigation NCO.

(2). Sgt William Ferris.

Fitter Sgt, responsible for supervision, administration and work-flow through workshops. Vehicle and equipment inspection and Maintenance; recovery NCO.

(3). Sgt Anthony Cannon.

Detail NCO, responsible for driver duty allotment of tasks, custody and compilation of all vehicle records and supporting documents: Security NCO.

(4). Cpl Jeremiah McNamee.

POL NCO, responsible for procurement custody and records of all POL supplies; all necessary documentation. Fire Prevention NCO.

(5). Cpl John Butler.

Servicing NCO, responsible for vehicle work forecasting and execution. All necessary documentation: Interior economy NCO.

(6). Cpl Thomas O'Halloran.

Spare parts NCO, responsible for procurement, custody and accountancy of all necessary stores and spare parts, exclusive of POL requirements.

c. Platoon HQ

This was initially at DHEKELIA and moved on 14 April to Wolfe Tone Camp which was equipped with adequate workshop space, stores, indoor pit and pit and ramp in the open.

d. Vehicle Establishment

(1). Growth

Vehicles were taken on charge from Ordnance Depot, DHEKELIA, at various dates from 11.4.64 to 27.6.64. Vehicle strength of Unit at different dates was:-

Type of Vehicle	30.4.1964	30.6.64 (When fully equipped)
Vanguard Saloon	1	
Ambulance Fordson	1	2
Austin 1 ton Cargo Truck	5	20
Austin Water - 200 gls	4	4
Bedford 3 ton 4x4 Cargo	15	15
Bedford 3 ton - 4x4		
Recovery	1	1
Humber APC	4	8
Landrover FFR Mk 8	7	14
Landrover Cargo Mk	8	8
Landrover FFS Mk 6	1	2
Trailers ½ ton Cargo	5	10
Motor Cycles BSA M20	5	10
Total	57	95

(2). On receipt at Unit all vehicles were inspected before allocation to Companies. Two vehicles were found defective and returned for repairs immediately. The mileage performed by the vehicles when taken on charge was approximately as shown below. Minimum and maximum to nearest thousand.

- (a). Vanguard Saloon - 114,000 miles.
- (b). Bedford Trucks - 40,000 to 60,000 miles.
- (c). Austin Trucks - 65,000 to 80,000 miles.
- (d). Landrover Cargo - 40,000 to 50,000 miles.
- (e). Landrover FFR - Not run in - 5,000 miles.
- (f). Landrover FFS - 45,000 to 55,000 miles.
- (g). Humber APC - 20,000 to 40,000 miles.
- (h). Fordson Ambls - 40,000 to 60,000 miles.

(3). Additional Vehicles

Five additional Landrovers FFR vehicles were on loan to the Bn during June and July for special search duties undertaken of missing British Army personnel with UN.

(4). Company Allotment.

Early in April the Commanding Officer approved of a desirable Company allocation to the **three** operational Companies. By the 7.6.64 this had been met in vehicle numbers if not in type.

The Company target and the final allotment is shown as follows:-

	Target	Final Allot
(a). Bedford Trucks Cargo 4x4	4.	3.
(b). Austin Truck 1 ton Cargo	2.	6.
(c). Austin Water - 200 gls	1.	1.
(d). Humber APC	2.	2.
(e). Landrover Cargo	5.	2.
(f). Landrover FFR	3.	2.
TOTAL	17.	16.

(5). Vehicle Tool Kits

On receipt by Bn each vehicle had a comprehensive tool kit. It consisted of Jack complete, wheel brace, six assorted spanners, screwdriver, pliers, spare bulbs and a foot pump where the air line did not operate. These kits were packed in a timber container and sealed. The Jack complete and wheel brace were the only items located to the drivers. This was done because of the lack technical knowledge of the drivers. This proved a success and became standard issue for duration of the tour of duty of the Bn. This system depends entirely on an efficient servicing system at the Unit Workshop. It was a complete success. Vehicle kits were handed over in 100% condition to the 41st Bn.

e. POL.

The accountancy of the POL supplies for the 40 Irish Bn and Australian Civil Police was co-ordinated at Platoon HQ. Sub-accounts were operated by the sub-units and for cooking, by the Bn QM. This method proved accurate and simple. A daily "Petroleum State" was given by all sub-units at 09.00 hours. This was necessary as supplies were delivered in bulk to the sub-units - a vehicle load of 702 gallons each delivery.

(1). Petroleum.

A Petroleum target useage figure of 10 MPG was struck for the Bn by No 2 Petroleum Depot, DHEKELIA. It was exclusive of the Panhard Cars. This figure was useful for stock control and a guard against pilferage. The Bn consumption inclusive of the Panhard Cars was 9.02 MPG and was considered satisfactory. The target figures for vehicles was given as follows:-

- (a). Saloon - 20 MPG
- (b). Landrovers - 20 MPG
- (c). Austin Trucks- 10 MPG
- (d). Ambulance - 8 MPG
- (e). Bedford Trucks- 8 MPG
- (f). Humber APC - 4 MPG

Petroleum was issued to other UN Contingents as required on demand. The following consumption figures are interesting. The figure is inclusive of the Armoured Cars.

April	<u>1964</u>	-	3,346	gls
May		-	9,958	gls
June		-	9,295	gls
July		-	11,403	gls
August		-	8,315	gls
September		-	8,595	gls
October		-	3,988	gls
All other Contingents for Period		-	3,848	gls
				58,748
				gls

(2). Reserve Stock

In accordance with UNFICYP Adm Inst. No 1 a reserve stock of 100 miles per vehicle was built up and located at PL HQ early in the operation. It was packed in accordance with local climatic practice as laid down by No 2 Petroleum Depot, DHEKELIA.

(3). Diesel Oil.

Large quantities of this type of fuel were used for cooking purposes. The same methods of accountancy as for petroleum was operated. The quantities of this fuel issued were:

April	-	1,023	gls
May	-	3,789	gls
June	-	3,363	gls
July	-	2,668	gls
August	-	2,669	gls
September	-	2,473	gls
October	-	1,944	gls

Total	-	17,933	gls
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Capacity tanks at Cookhouses were replenished twice daily by members of the Platoon.

f. POL Methods of Supply.

Supply was by standard load. This was a Bedford Truck with one hundred and fifty six gerry cans containing 702 gls. Loose petroleum in 800 gls tankers was also availed of. Initially a hand pump tank of 1,000 gls was located at Pl HQ. This was replaced in September by an electric pump tank of similiar capacity.

g. Vehicle Speeds

Early in the operation the Commanding Officer directed that the following speeds operated.:-

Saloon	-	40	miles per hour
All other Vehicles	-	30	miles per hour

All vehicles to conform to local speeds in restricted areas.

h. Unit mileage performed.

The recorded mileage of all vehicles was taken when vehicles were on charge. On completion of detail on the last day of each month and on completion of duty on the 14.10.'64, mileages were recorded. The following table gives a picture of Unit Performance:-

April	-	33,465	miles
May	-	85,064	miles
June	-	79,675	miles
July	-	96,192	miles
August	-	66,520	miles
September	-	68,098	miles
October	-	38,052	miles

467,066 miles

Armd Car Gp Tot 36,365 miles

Grand Total 503,431 miles

i. Garage and Workshop Equipment.

A quantity of essential workshop equipment was forwarded to Cyprus. Sufficient items to ensure that all Unit 1st Line repairs could be tackled were not included. It can be stated that the deficiencies did not much hinder 1st Line repairs owing to good will and co-operation of British MT Personnel.

The deficiencies noted in equipment were:-

- (1). Welding equipment (less cylinders available locally).
- (2). Panel beating set.
- (3). $\frac{1}{2}$ " electric drill and attachments.
- (4). Compression guage.
- (5). Mobile plug tester.
- (6). Block, tackle and shear legs.
- (7). Robot type tyre changer.
- (8). Vulcanising Unit.
- (9). Torque wrench for engine repairs.
- (10). Plug spanners.
- (11). Sets of stocks and dies - BSF and white.

The break down of jobs completed was Unit was:-

Unit workshops	-	744
Light aid Det (4 mile Pt)	-	312
48 Command Workshop		
- DHEKELIA	-	17
		<hr/>
Grand Total		1,073

The number of jobs by LAD - 312 - could have been very much reduced but for the deficiencies in equipment noted and maintained above.

j. Vehicle Inspection

All vehicles were given a technical inspection on receipt from Ordnance Depot and thereafter once per month. The vehicles were inspected regularly by Company Commanders for cleanliness. The Commanding Officer and a technical team carried out a full scale inspection of all vehicles between the 22.9.'64 and 28.9.'64. The Commanding Officer expressed his pleasure at the high standard displayed.

k. Vehicle Servicing

The "Forecast Method" was operated for vehicle servicing. Company Commanders received the forecast schedule before the 1st of each month. This enabled them to arrange the domestic employment and ensure that vehicles were serviced as forecast by M.T. Officer. Vehicles were inspected, serviced and returned to locations on the same day. This method due to all round co-operation proved effective and successful.

l. Accidents:

The accident record of the platoon is excellent - 9 accidents, most of them of a minor nature; in 503,000 miles, or an average of one accident per 56,000 miles. In all cases, drivers were suspended during investigation and all were honourably reinstated. Action in the Civil Courts was taken against no M.T driver, but six of the civilian drivers involved in the accidents were charged in Court. Total damage to vehicles in the nine accidents was £130.10.0d.

m. Platoon Daily Routine

The first detail each day was at 05.00 hours. It was the S.D.S (Special Dispatch Service) detail. POL was available from 05.00 hours to 09.00 hours and from 17.00 hours to 23.30 hours. The "Detail Office" was manned from 05.00 hours to 23.30 hours daily by a party of three. They were one NCO, one fitter and one driver. Parties changed duties at 14.00 hours daily. All weapons were checked daily for serial numbers by the "Security NCO" before drivers proceeded on detail. The Platoon Officer inspected all weapons for serial numbers and cleanliness once per week.

n. Promotion

One member of the Platoon (SS Fitzgerald) was promoted to fill a vacancy in Bn HQ Coy. This promotion to Acting Corporal was granted to the M.T. Platoon in recognition of the service provided. This recognition was appreciated by all members of the platoon and encouraged greater efforts from all.

o. Discipline

The standard of discipline of the platoon was high. The great supports in the maintenance of that discipline were equity in duties and rotation of tasks. Communication of information available to all members was utilized fully and appreciated. Each member of the platoon felt that he was playing an important function. Responsibility was delegated at every opportunity. The high standard of discipline coupled with good NCO leadership helped the individual morale of the members. The Esprit de Corps was recognised in the Bn as a very high standard.

p. Australian Police

This sub-unit depended on the M.T. Platoon for facilities in vehicle maintenance. It was a source of great pride to the platoon that these vehicles were treated in the same way as those of the Bn, for over a month before a formal request was made by UNFICYP HQ to grant facilities.

q. Unusual Tasks.

Three tasks were performed that could be described as unusual. They were:-

- (1). The recovery and repair of a Tractor on the NICOSIA road. This tractor was the cause of some dispute between factions and led to incidents.

- 143 -
q. Unusual Tasks (Contd)

- (2). A survey of requirements of oxygen and acetylene in garages in TURKISH Wallaed City was carried out. The report submitted to UN HQ made a recommendation of requirements which differed by only two cylinders from the estimate of another independent authority.
- (3). A cement mixer was successfully recovered without special equipment, transported and delivered from AYIOS JAKOVOS to the Turkish owners in the walled city.

r. Morale:

The recreational activities availed of by members of platoon - daily swim, basketball, volleyball etc - combined with a sense of team-work and achievement helped to maintain the morale of the platoon at a high state. The commanding officer paraded the drivers of the platoon every six weeks approx and expressed the appreciation of the battalion of the wonderful work they were doing, in particular, the absence of any serious accident in their abnormally large mileage.

80. WELFARE REPORT

a. Preliminary Arrangements

On arrival in Cyprus with the advance party it was found that UN HQ had thoroughly discussed with the Cypriot Government the question of PX supplies to UN troops and had arrived at the following procedure.

- (1) The Cypriot Government specifically prohibited any trading whatsoever with NAAFI (The British Army equivalent to ACB).
- (2) UN Units not to employ or enter into contracts with Pakistani or Armenian personnel as regards the provision of such services in Camps as Laundries, Barber Shops, Tea Shops or Gift Shops. There are two small communities of Pakistanis and Armenians on the Island which concentrate on trading and provision of services to the various British Camps on the Island. The system followed by the British is to enter into a contract for some or all of the above services (shops to be open only during the hours NAAFI are closed). The amount payable by such contractors varies with the size of the unit but for a unit of approximately battalion strength £100 to £170 per month is normal - this money is used for the provision of unit welfare facilities and amenities.
- (3) The Cypriot Government agreed to establish a supply depot in Nicosia under auspices of the Ministry of Finance and cater for goods on duty free basis to United Nations Troops.

b. Goods were purchased in bulk weekly from the Depot mentioned above by the Unit Welfare Officer who in turn issued them on invoice to Company Canteens on a weekly credit system. Beer and spirits were supplied direct to the Welfare Officer by authorized traders on credit and all payments had to be made through the Ministry for Finance. Ample supplies of essential commodities e.g. cigarettes, tobacco, beer, spirits, minerals, soap, polish, note paper etc., were available and quality generally was reasonably high. Minerals could be purchased direct from firms and as a result of representations the Ministry for Finance agreed to the Welfare Officer paying firms direct, this facility avoided payment of a small overhead percentage charged by Ministry for Finance as a handling charge and thus permitted the sale of minerals at a reduced price to troops. The sale of souvenir type goods was limited as the Unit was stationed in Famagusta, a Tourist Centre with an abundance of souvenir shops which amply catered for the troops requirements at reasonable cost.

c. Attractive Items

Items such as watches, radios, cameras etc., were available through the Supply Depot on a duty free basis. However, whilst the goods were actually duty free the agents or distributors were not prepared to forego their profit. In the circumstances such items could be, in the majority of cases, purchased cheaper at home through Command Welfare Officers at wholesale rates. As the majority of personnel had previous service in the Congo where attractive

items were made available on a duty free basis prices ex-factory plus a small 2% cover charge made by UN to cover the cost of providing the service. This was a special concession provided by UN as a result of negotiations with the Congolese Government. The Cypriot Government was not prepared to interfere with normal commercial practice whereby goods are supplied through local agents. This was understandable since the trouble on the island did NOT disrupt commerce to any great degree especially in the field of watches, radios, cameras.

d. Films

The only method of obtaining a regular supply of films was through the British Army agency - A.K.C. (Army Kinema Corporation) - which had a Depot on the island at Larnaca for the distribution of film throughout the Middle East. The A.K.C. had a system of charging based on Unit strength and the duration of use of films; this worked out roughly at £11 per film for three nights. The battalion obtained films through this Agency during its stay in Cyprus. As troops were familiar with the practice of having films provided free in the Congo it was decided not to charge admission fees (the British charge 1/- per head to shows) and to pay the cost from Welfare Funds. It was subsequently found that if Companies collected films direct from A.K.C. Depot on a Coy strength basis the charge was approximately £3.10. This system proved cheaper and was employed after the first few weeks for the remainder of our tour of duty.

Representations were made to HQ UNFICYP requesting UN to provide and pay for weekly films as they had provided in the Congo. The Chief UN Finance Officer cabled New York supporting our case and requesting the necessary authority. The request was refused.

Mr P. Beirne from Dublin UN Chief Finance Officer of Cyprus was always sympathetic to any cases made to him and both from the Welfare and "Q" points of view he merits the expression of earnest appreciation.

e. Recreational Facilities

- (1) Outdoor - very successful inter Company and inter Platoon competitions in Hurling, Football, Soccer, Basketball and volleyball were held and Trophies provided by Unit Welfare Funds. The Unit competed in a number of Inter Contingent matches and also against local Soccer teams - such did a lot to project a favourable image of Irish Troops. Sea trips and excursions to different parts of the island were organised on a sub unit basis.
- (2) Indoor - Bingo, Cards, Darts, Rings, etc., were available. Very keen inter Coy and inter Platoon question time and miming competitions were held. A number of Camp Fire Parties were held and proved very popular and entertaining.

40 BATTALION

81. MEDICAL REPORT.

a. Medical Processing and Inoculations:

These were carried out in Ireland at short notice in a good many cases. The protective medical processing was satisfactory and troops were prepared to meet the endemic situations in Cyprus, the area of operation. Later it was decided to administer a booster dose of Anti-Poliomyelitis oral vaccine to all ranks to conform to the measures adopted by British Forces in the area.

b. The Medical Platoon:

The medical officer was concerned mainly with:-

- (1) The establishment of Med Aid Posts and Sick Bay at Bn HQ.
- (2) Hygiene measures applied to Camp Installations and sub-units.
- (3) Medical Assistance to civilians.

c. Medical Aid Posts and Sick Bay:

Each sub-unit position had a medical aid post and medical personnel on duty. Troops on continuous duty at fixed positions were visited by a M.O. regularly in order to ascertain conditions and requirements. The Sick Bay at Bn Hqrs had accommodation for six patients on spring beds.

d. Repatriation on Medical Grounds:

A total of four were repatriated on medical grounds as follows:-

86891	Cpl	Clancy	-	HQ Coy	Psychotic disorder
811779	SS	Walsh	-	A Coy	Fracture Tibia & Fibula
804516	SS	Mooney	-	A Coy	Active Doudenal Ulcer.
91391	SS	McCormack	-	A Coy	Radial Nerve Paralysis - Obesity.

e. Infectious Diseases:

There were 2 cases - Rev. Fr. Condon (Morbelli) incubated prior to departure from Ireland.

800703 Cpl Bolger (Bacillary Dysentery) isolated outbreak, confined to one case.

f. Medical Statistics:

Total number reported sick was 372 and were disposed of as follows:-

	ExD	-	133
	LxD	-	51
	MxD	-	96
Admitted Sick Bay	-		74
" BMH Dhekelia	-		14
" Austrian F/Hosp	-		4

Appended hereunder is extract from the Monthly Health Report for the month of June as issued by the Chief, M.O. UNFICYP which is indicative of the state of the health of 40 Bn troops as compared with other national contingents.

Extract given on page 153.

Over....

f. (contd)

The troops in general became readily acclimatised and adjusted to conditions of food and climate. Regimental duties, particularly since 11.5.'64, were prolonged and strenuous and the men stood up well both physically and psychologically to the strain.

A total number of 3 patients reported with symptoms of psychotic disorder. One was repatriated. The other cases were suitably assisted and returned to duty with their sub-units. Medical supplies were adequate, any items not carried were obtained at B.M.H., Dhekelia. Hospital services afforded the unit at Austrian Field Hospital and B.M.H., Dhekelia, were first class. Medical staff was received with extreme courtesy and friendliness and the patients were treated on the same lines and were afforded excellent treatment. Special mention was made of patients of 40 Bn by the hospital staff at B.M.H Dhekelia. The conduct, behaviour and good manners were favourably commented upon.

g. Ambulance Transport:

2 Ambulance cars (3 ton vehicles) and one Land Rover fitted with stretchers were on charge to the Medical Platoon. The Medical platoon had 2 N.C.Os in possession of A.F.154. This was a great advantage as it made the Medical platoon self-supporting in drivers.

h. Hygiene Standards:

The Health Officer at UNFICYP HQ visited Wolfe Tone Camp and expressed satisfaction with the standard maintained. Certain adjustments were authorised by him and this work was carried out by contractors.

The installations were very good and met full requirements for the safeguarding of health in the climate of Cyprus. Kitchens were fitted with extractor fans and this eased the physical strain on cooks and kitchen staff and was particularly necessary at Bn HQ where kitchen space was small for the number of meals supplied. Waste food containers were stored in fly-proof containers. For outposts, fly-proof shelters for cooking were on supply, where needed. Latrines were of the D.T.L. type and were satisfactory.

i. Water:

Coy Sgt Tisdall of the Medical Platoon completed a course in regimental water duties at No.1 Hygiene Wing, Dhekelia. He was available to carry out periodic water tests.

j. Sanitation:

One N.C.O from each Coy attended a Regimental Hygiene Course at No.1 Hygiene Wing, Dhekelia. One other N.C.O from each Coy completed a Rodent Control Course also at Dhekelia.

k. Rations:

The British Army ration scale was adequate and the presentation of food was good though the frequency of salad for lunch was found monotonous.

1. A medical questionnaire was compiled and distributed to unit officers to assist on more accurate reporting on cases in the villages. Prior to this a good number of urgent calls were found on arrival to be more of a routine nature. The services of the Base Medical Hospital, Dhekelia were given unstintingly in all cases of emergency. The specialists in this hospital expressed their willingness to assist and commented favourably on the type of necessitous cases brought there by the Irish Battalion.

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l. A medical questionnaire was compiled and distributed to unit officers to assist on more accurate reporting on cases in the villages. Prior to this a good number of urgent calls were found on arrival to be more of a routine nature. The services of the Base Medical Hospital, Dhekelia were given unstintingly in all cases of emergency. The specialists in this hospital expressed their willingness to assist and commented favourably on the type of necessitous cases brought there by the Irish Battalion.

m. Constant liaison was maintained between medical hospital personnel at all hospitals. An effort to persuade a Turk Cypriot Doctor to return to his position in the Government hospital was initially successful but after a while he refused to travel into Varosha. A Greek Cypriot M.O. was accompanied on his routine visits to Greek Villages while Larnaca Government Hospital was visited by a Medical Officer who accompanied the Government Hospital Radiologist on his routine visit there from Famagusta. This Radiologist was taken to Base Medical Hospital and introduced there to members of the staff. Hygiene problems in the Old City, Famagusta were examined with the assistance of the Health Officer, UNFICYP HQ and a solution worked out. Turk Cyp Doctors were accompanied by one of the battalion M.Os. on their tour of the Turk Cyp villages.

In general on meeting the medical staffs of the Gk and Turk Centres a keen sense of appreciation was noted for work done by the unit. On numerous occasions the M.Os. were asked to take verbal messages of greeting and goodwill from one side to the other. It appears that there was no bitterness between those medical staffs: they gave the impression of wanting to work in harmony together and made no distinction in patients.

Throughout the tour the medical officers paid frequent visits to the villages and rendered medical assistance where necessary, in the early days. They also held weekly clinics in the villages but after three months approx. the M.Os. work was confined to treating emergency cases and removing patients to hospital. In fact hardly a day passed that an M.O. was not called out on a sick call to one of the villages.

n. Medical Assistance to Civilians.

At the time of arrival of 40 Irish Bn the Medical Services of the District, outside the Town of Famagusta, had more or less broken down. In particular after the events of 11th May '64 Turkish Doctors and patients were afraid to travel. The Greek Cyp Villages were better off in that they enjoyed a good measure of freedom of movement and Government support.

One of the first actions of the SMO, Comdt. A. MacSullivan, and his assistant Comdt. B. Boylan was to assess the overall problem. This was difficult at the beginning as the Villagers were reluctant to give information, and what was forthcoming was generally unreliable. Early on some indifference was displayed by the authorities on both sides. However, gradually the barriers were broken down and a very big contribution to the mission of UNFICYP was made by the Medical Pl of the Bn. Valuable assistance was given by the Coys of the Bn and the Joint Patrol. All members of the bn took a deep interest in the problem.

Having assessed the situation Comdt MacSullivan set about persuading the local Medical Officers to visit the Villages and hold Clinics by arranging protection and giving assistance and advice as well as supplying drugs, medicines and medical equipment. There were still many Villages without the regular service of a Medical Staff and these cases usually fell to the Medical Pl.

The Base Hospital, Dhekelia gladly gave full facilities in this work and were always ready to admit patients on the recommendation of the bn's M.Os. in cases beyond the resources of the Turkish and Greek Hospitals in Famagusta. The two Ambulances and Landrover F.F.S. were in heavy demand for the evacuation of sick and wounded. (In all a total of 80 Turk Cyp and 6 Greek Cyps patients were evacuated to Hospitals in Famagusta, Nicosia and Dhekelia.)

Medical Officers of the bn also operated in the Turkish and Greek Hospitals in Famagusta and gave valuable assistance and advice to the Medical Staffs. Liaison was established between the Greek and Turk Medical Personnel and the Turk Doctors were persuaded to resume work in the Greek Hospitals.

o. Concern re Malnutrition

On 15th September, '64 the following more backward Turkish Villages were visited by Senior M.O. in conjunction with inspection by Bn OC and joint Patrol Officer.

Galiporni:

There was no obvious evidence of malnutrition or underfeeding among the population of this village. One house visited at random and adjacent store was well stocked. The children had returned to school after the summer holidays. A mass inspection of the children in the school yard showed them to be highly energetic and in good spirits. A number of the first year pupils were examined for skin appearance and bodily development and these were all normal healthy children. There was no one acutely sick in the village. The father of a two month baby said his baby was ill with diarrhoea and malnutrition. This baby was out in the field with its mother who was working in the fields while the father was back in the village. It is not possible for a mother so soon after pregnancy to be able to continue to feed an infant satisfactorily and work in the fields.

Korovia:

A spot check was carried out on the children running about the village. There were well nourished and had no skin rashes. There were no cases of acute illness in the village. The M.O. was asked to see a baby of six months complaining of diarrhoea. This trouble could not have been of long standing as the baby was well developed and there was no pyrexia. This baby was being fed on condensed milk to supplement breast feeding. The mother was examined and she was healthy.

Ayios Simeon:

The children running about were examined on a spot check basis and appeared in average good state of development and nutrition, again there was no evidence of skin infection. A baby of 4 months, a surviving twin, (Ozkan Osman) was brought for examination. It had unilateral eye infection which should respond to treatment. I have arranged to send on suitable treatment. The baby, for a twin, was otherwise healthy. I examined a man said to be ill in his house, he had apparently long standing piles and could be easily cured by operation (Lufti Adem). The people generally were in a good state of nutritional health.

The housing conditions in all villages were adequate and showed no obvious deterioration. A request for shoes was made for the winter, especially for the children.

p. Climate and Physical fitness.

The unit commenced its overseas trip on 9th April, 1964. As yet the true Summer in Cyprus had not come in and although the temperatures and humidity were greater than our men were accustomed to at home, it was possible to affect adequate acclimatisation. During the period following the killings in Famagusta on May, 11th duties became extremely heavy. This factor was not reflected in the sick parades and only a few instances were noted which reflected on morale. These were cleaned up by the M.O. by direct approach to the men concerned - once they were satisfied that the duties had been evenly distributed they had no further complaint and carried on manfully.

p. (contd)

It will be recalled that shelters from the sun were a necessity and also cooled drinking water. Swimming facilities were excellent and fully availed of. On average, the whole unit reacted very well and the standard of all round fitness was excellent. It was seen that age was a big factor in this climate, the older officers and also other ranks were a greater hazard than the younger age group. Psychologically also, the younger man thinks less of the effect of heat and humidity and is a better bet for such operations. The M.O. noted quite a few of the older group of Officers and men were constantly in doubt about their ability to withstand physical strain in these conditions. On the standard of all round fitness the long term view is satisfactory - The M.O. has no record of any deleterious effect on personnel after a period of time.

Incidence of Disease:

Monthly statistics for the unit have been recorded and were strikingly lower than other contingents. This was the subject of comment on more than one occasion from Chief Medical Officer, U.N.F.I.C.Y.P. HQ.

Throughout the tour there was one case of Bacillary Dysentery confirmed by Bacteriological examination. Not one other case developed which is a tribute to the hygiene standards prevailing and the measures taken to control the outbreak. Incidences such as this bring it home to one that disease conditions do exist and the fact that healthy states prevail is a sign of good management rather than good fortune. Some individual cases are worth recording. A member of B Coy accidentally crashed his face against a water pipe one night. He had a damp nasal haemorrhage which was controlled initially but recurred twice. After the third burst he was put under specialist observation and had a rough time necessitating up to 8 pints of blood to keep him alive. Cases such as this emphasise the need for supervision of men on such occasions.

A member of A Coy who carried too much weight went to sleep one night on a cot bed - because of his size and weight he went to sleep with his right arm lying on the bar of the cot. He awoke next morning with a paralysed arm which could not be repaired for the remainder of the tour he had to be repatriated. An example of gross obesity and one of its hazards.

A man playing football fractured his leg and was also repatriated. A M.P. Cpl broke down after arrival and threatened to commit suicide if he was not sent home. Finally one gastric ailment flared up - a leaking Duodenal ulcer - this man was also repatriated.

Nisserian or Venereal disease was well controlled and our efforts at control were adequate comparing favourably with other contingents. There was no proven case by bacteriological means; only such proven cases would have been officially reported.

Hospitalisation:

Both the Austrian Field Unit and British Military Hospital at Dhekelia offered to the battalion a magnificent service. At the latter a tribute was paid to the men who were patients, by the Commanding Officer and Matron. It was good to hear the tps described as genuine patients excellently behaved, always cheerful and willing to co-operate as well as being so well mannered and respectful.

p. (contd)

It was a source of great satisfaction to the Battalion Medical Officers that such excellent base medical support was available to the unit.

Medical supplies and equipment

These were very adequate and there is very little comment to be made on the standards of quality or quantity. Supplies and equipment were taken out from Ireland and had been organised at Base Medical Stores Dublin. Ambulance transport was supplied from the British base at Dhekelia.

The British Army School of Hygiene conducted a schedule of training courses at Dhekelia which were profitably attended by 40 Battalion personnel, who acquitted themselves very well. This training included water control, field hygiene, rat inspection control and the use of Field hygiene appliances: of particular value was training in water purifications and standardisation of tests. Personnel of the Med pln were regularly invited guests to the appropriate messes to attend functions at the British Base. Their conduct was excellent at all times.

On occasion, medical treatment was afforded to U.N. personnel of other contingents while they were on leave in Famagusta. One cannot speak too highly of the associations from a medical point with the British units. Having already referred to more direct Medical and hospital approaches it is necessary also to mention the assistance of dental units and their officers to our patients - it was of the highest standard as also was the help and advice always available from the Hygiene unit at Dhekelia. I think all ranks of the Medical platoon benefited from this association.

Finally, it must be stated that the Medical platoons satisfying and possibly rewarding work was done amongst the Cypriot population in the Famagusta district. The political situation was responsible for a break away by the Turkish Cypriots rendering these people dependent on their own inadequate resources in villages and Turkish Cypriot quarters. While Turkish Cypriot doctors, nurses and orderlies had previously worked in partnership with Greek Cypriot staff in established Government Hospitals with supplied facilities and organisation, they now became solely dependent on meagre supplies of medicines and with no organised hospitals readily available to them. In addition doctors could not freely travel to villages and no ambulance service existed for them. An estimated 18,000 Turkish Cypriots were thus isolated in the Famagusta districts. There was no case of anyone being lost due to lack of attention. Obstetrical emergencies were a constant source of attention and some first rate emergencies were encountered. The obstetrical unit at B.M.H Dhekelia under Colonel Andrews was always more than willing to take cases from us. It became an accepted principle at the hospital that if the Irish were sending an obstetrical emergency, the unit was prepared without further ado.

Turkish Cypriots wounded in hostilities were attended to and evacuated to hospitals. The Greek victims of the shooting in Famagusta Old town on May 11th were evacuated in conjunction with the British Red Cross St. John team. A medical survey of a number of Turkish Villages was also undertaken with reference in particular to nutrition and morbidity statistics.

p. (contd)

The problem of helping the victims of Cooleys Anaemia a disease particular to this island, was considered but on the advice of the British Consultant pathologist, no more than palliative steps could be offered against this fatal disease. The offer of fresh blood from battalion troops to be used in such cases was not considered wise, because the drain on personnel would be too great a strain on unit efficiency without comparable beneficial results to the recipients. Once palliative transfusions were started it would be difficult to withdraw. Commandant MacSullivan was able to maintain constant friendly liaison with the Greek Cypriot hospital and medical staffs. This helped by his associations with them through membership of Lions International Service organisation. Very cordial relations existed with Doctor Hadjikakou an Orthopaedic Specialist with a local clinic; he on more than one occasion attended Turkish Cypriot patients with Dr. MacSullivan. Dr. Meletion, Radiologist at the Government hospital was always on the most cordial terms and repeatedly asked the Battalion Medical Officers to take his good wishes to Dr. Ali Atun of the Turkish Cypriot community. On one occasion Dr. MacSullivan took Dr. Meletion to the Turkish old town to visit the Medical staff of that sector and took Dr. Hadjikakou and his wife to have a social evening in the old city at the invitation of Dr. and Mrs. Ozkau. It was obvious that no feelings of bitterness existed between these differing peoples and they wished to be back working together.

Dr. MacSullivan was approached by Dr. Michaelides, a Greek Cypriot practitioner in Famagusta who was President of the Famagusta clinical Society, to read a paper at one of their meetings. This he did taking as his subject "The History of Anaesthesia and up to date Freuds in its development" The paper was well received as was obvious from words of a speaker, the Senior Surgeon to the Cypriot Government, Dr. Monangas.

Doctor MacSullivan made contact through the British Medical personnel with a Greek Cypriot who was very helpful in appropriate cases and gave his time and services unstintingly. This man, Ulr Petrides, an artificial limb specialist came to Famagusta and fitted and supplied artificial limbs and a walking califer appliance to Turkish Cypriot children.

All the Medical-cum- intercommunal work was well worthwhile and gave the Medical Officers and all the members of the medical team a great feeling of satisfaction. It was also a most important factor in the peace-keeping work of the battalion.

The figures shown at columns 3 and 4 are calculated per 1,000.
The figure given at column 5 is factual.

CONTINGENT :	Strength :	Sick Cases :	Hospl Adms :	Sick Bay Adms.
		(per 1,000)	(per 1,000)	
Austrian.	55	-	5	-
British.	1,753	147	49	41
Canadian	1,117	209	80	36
Danish	922	256	73	34
Finnish	999	179	63	54
Irish	638	115	36	16
Swedish	947	266	56	36
